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

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CASSELL'S

# ILLUSTRATED HISTORY

OF THE

# RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

BY

EDMUND OLLIER,

AUTHOR OF "CASSELL'S ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES," ETC. ETC.

VOL. II.

FROM DECEMBER, 1878, TO THE RATIFICATION OF PEACE.

INCLUDING

A History of Cyprus, and of the Afghan War.

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BAKER PASHA.

# CASSELL'S HISTORY OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR.

## CHAPTER I.

**Preparations for a Winter Campaign—Plans of the Russians—The Turkish Defence—Terrible Snow-storms—Breaking of Pontoon Bridges over the Danube—The Stream encumbered with Ice—Dangers of Navigation—Deadlock in the Transport Service—Unprepared State of the Russians for meeting the Severe Weather—The Turkish Prisoners on their March to the North—Dreadful Sufferings from Cold and Deprivation—Destitution in Russia, consequent on the War—Immense Loss of Life—Peculation in the Commissariat Department—The *St. Petersburg Journal* on the War and its Objects—Independent Spirit exhibited by the Turkish Parliament—Ahmed Vefyk Pasha—Capture of the Turkish Steamer *Mercene* by Captain Baranoff, of the *Russia*—Inefficiency of the Ottoman Black Sea Fleet—Difficulties of the Blockade—Progress of the Servian Invasion—Capture of Ak Palanka, Pirot, and other Towns—Unpopularity of the War in Servia—Violent Agitation of Opinion in England—Meetings for and against a Warlike Policy—Deputation to the Turkish Minister, and Reply of Musurus Pasha—Demonstrations in Favour of Peace and Neutrality—Views of the High Church Party and the Non-conformists—The Clergy and the Eastern Question.**

ALTHOUGH the fall of Plevna had considerably daunted the spirits of the Turkish Ministers, and disposed them to seek an accommodation with the enemy, it had not entirely put an end to hope, nor induced a readiness to accept any terms the Russians might feel inclined to exact. They not unreasonably calculated on the difficulties thrown in the way of the invaders by the Balkan chain and the severity of the winter, to say nothing of the brave armies which still remained to the Sultan, and the yet untaken fortresses which menaced the conqueror's path. But the Russians did not suffer any of these obstacles to deter them from prosecuting the great success they had already obtained. It was determined to reinforce General Gourko, whose southward advance had been checked by Mehemet Ali; to conduct a large army over the Bulgarian mountains; and to threaten Adrianople, and the capital itself, from the more open lands of Roumelia. This movement, however, could not be begun at

once, owing to the necessity of making preparations for so laborious a march at so inclement a season; and the Turks took advantage of the pause to place themselves in the best posture for defence. On the 19th of December, they assumed a strong position in the defiles between Sophia and Ichtiman, and occupied the road from Slatitza in great force. Several additional regiments were sent to Kamarli, where Chakir Pasha, who succeeded to Mehemet, found himself in command of fifty-five battalions, with upwards of fifty guns. The highest redoubts in the Kamarli Pass were held by Bosnian troops, who were well inured to the cold; and a division of cavalry was placed under the command of General Baker, with two English aides-de-camp. The supervision of these officers soon produced a marked improvement in the mounted force, and Baker was excellently posted among the mountains. Suleiman Pasha's plan for the defence was to draw most of his forces from the east of Bulgaria to a line between Philippopolis and Adrianople. Ten thousand men belonging to the army of the Quadrilateral left by sea towards the end of December, and the remainder were rapidly concentrated at Varna, to follow on the return of the ships. Suleiman, who visited Constantinople about this time, was appointed to command the Army of Roumelia, and all looked well for the approaching struggle.

On both sides, military movements were much impeded by the weather. Terrible storms of snow swept over Bulgaria, and made the defiles of the Balkans nearly impassable. By this time, also, the Danube was covered with drifting ice, and the Russian communications with Roumania were seriously endangered. Early in December, the bridge of one hundred pontoon-boats, from Turna Magurelle to Nicopolis, was injured by wind and wave, and it was certain that the mischief would become worse with the advancing winter. Sixteen boats were sunk; sixteen more were damaged; and the necessary repairs could not be executed under a fortnight or three weeks. The cause of this disaster was the blowing of a strong east wind, which drove the waters of the Black Sea in great billows up the channel of the Danube, so that the boats were either dragged from their moorings, or swamped and sunk. By the 19th of December, the rest of the structure was entirely swept away; a few days later, the action of the drift-ice shattered the bridge near Ibraila; and at the same time a Russian steamer was closed in by the severity of the frost. The last of the bridges—that at Petroceni—yielded on the 28th, and intercourse with the northern shore of the river was then kept up only by small vessels rowed by sailors. The service was so dangerous, owing to the immense masses of ice, that seventeen persons were drowned in attempting the passage in a private boat; and it sometimes took nearly three hours to get across. Thick fogs added to the perils of the way; and, as the river was then only partially frozen, it was impossible to send men, provisions, or material over the ice from the base of operations in Roumania to the conquered districts in Bulgaria. The consequence of this was that the transport service came to a deadlock. Immense quantities of stores were accumulated at Bucharest and Simnitza; but how to get them across the Danube was an almost insoluble problem. Even on land, the difficulties of transit were great. The draft-cattle died in large numbers, from overwork and insufficient food; the roads were deeply involved in snow or mire; and in powers of organisation the Russians and Roumanians seemed equally at fault. The invasion of Turkey thus became additionally onerous; doubt and anxiety settled over the future; and, in the event of a serious reverse, the inability to recross the Danube would have been nothing short of tragical.

The very morning after the Czar's departure from the Imperial head-quarters, it began to snow heavily, and continued, with occasional intermissions, for several days. On the 18th and 19th of December, snow fell to the depth of three feet, and the strong east wind then blowing carried it into the underground huts which the soldiers had dug for themselves, and buried many of them. Two men who had gone to sleep in the open air were frozen to death before dawn. All operations were suspended, and a courier driving from the head-quarters of the Czarewitch to those of the Grand Duke Vladimir was obliged to leave his horses and cart on the road, and make the rest of his way on foot. This is just the kind of weather to which Russians are accustomed; yet, strange to say, they omitted to make any preparation for it in Bulgaria. The use of sledges would greatly have helped the transport service when carriages with wheels were no longer practicable; but sledges were not provided. In other respects the Russian soldier suffered more than he need have done, and every one longed to pass the intervening barrier of the Balkans, that he might bask in the comparative warmth and softness of the southern plains. One of the great demands of the invaders was for saccharine articles of diet, the warmth-producing qualities of which make them especially valuable. All such articles, however, were very difficult to procure; and whenever chance threw them in the soldiers' way, they were devoured with an eagerness proportioned to the length of the deprivation.

RUSSIAN COURIER CROSSING THE DANUBE.

In the midst of terrible climatic influences, the troops captured at Plevna were sent north. The Russians took 30,000; the Roumanians, 10,000. Owing, perhaps, more to defective arrangements than to intentional cruelty, the Turkish prisoners in Alexandria—a Roumanian town not far from the Danube—were much neglected, and at times reduced to the very verge of starving. Their bitter and dreary march (which began on the 16th of December) had been attended by the most extreme hardships; for the unhappy men were lightly and poorly clothed, and several were already wasted by

fever, fatigue, and deprivation. Every now and then, one of these miserable creatures dropped by the way, and perished in the snow from disease or exhaustion. Attracted by the ghastly procession, and the opportunities which it offered them, clouds of carrion-crows hovered darkly in the air above, and the breath was hardly out of a man's body ere these birds of prey, together with numberless dogs, were tearing the flesh from the bones. If any one of the captives lagged behind from sheer weariness, he was struck and roughly pushed on by the Roumanian guard; and the brutality of the soldiers was equalled, if not surpassed, by the Wallachian peasantry, who often, when the prisoners were quartered in their cottages, turned them out at night in the midst of the snow. At the village of Putenieu, some of the Turks thus treated took refuge in a dead-house, and, clearing a space among the corpses, lit a dull and smouldering fire with rags from the dead bodies and such straw as they could find, and so struggled throughout the night for a little feeble warmth. When the prisoners arrived at Bucharest, however, they were kindly treated, and comfortably housed in a large building, the management of which appears to have been excellent in all respects. Those of the Turkish soldiers who were sent to Russia had to encounter upon the road a still harder fate than that of their brethren, because the greater distance necessarily added to their fatigue and suffering. No doubt, the difficulty of providing for so large a body of men, at a time when the communications were interrupted, and the weather had become exceptionally severe, was very great; but there was also no little mismanagement, and it is to be feared that much indifference to the comfort of the prisoners existed among the Russian military authorities charged with the duty of conveying them to their several places of detention. Even while yet waiting for removal, their misery was heart-rending to witness. Herded together in the snow, without the smallest shelter, they were left for nearly a week destitute of the commonest necessaries. Four days after the battle which preceded the capitulation of Plevna, part of the prisoners had received no rations, and the poor starving creatures fought with their comrades for a crust. The frightful condition of the camp engendered fever, and hundreds died in their wretchedness before the march began.

Nevertheless, we must not suppose that Turks were the only sufferers at this terrible epoch. It was remarked by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times* that the brilliant victories gained by Russia had been bought at a price which was not to be computed merely by the number of killed and wounded, and the sum-total of the war-expenses. The report of a Benevolent Society, formed for the purpose of aiding the families of poor soldiers, showed the enormous losses which the country had sustained in other respects. The field of activity chosen by this association was a small district containing fifteen villages. The number of inhabitants in the villages amounted to 6,000, forming 830 peasant families, or homesteads; but of these 830 families 118 were compelled to furnish recruits, and, as a consequence, many persons were depressed to the level of destitution. An inspection of the homesteads shewed that nineteen possessed neither labourers nor horses, and were therefore utterly incapable of supporting themselves. Twenty-one of the families were found to be in a state of extreme poverty, and in five houses one labourer had to support from five to eight persons. In thirteen cases, families had been driven from their homes as soon as the recruit was taken. These expulsions, it is said, resulted from the simple inability of the remaining brother to feed the absent brother's family as well as his own. The custom in Russia, when two brothers with their families live together, and one is taken as a recruit, is for the other to assume the entire responsibility of the united household; but, in many instances during the war of 1877–8, the poverty induced by the disastrous struggle was so extreme that the rule was necessarily broken through.

By the latter end of the year, the loss of life was beginning to tell even upon the enormous population of Russia. There were few families who had not to mourn the loss of at least one among their relatives, and the effect of this was seen in a prevalent gloom and sadness, which even the recent successes of the Empire did but little to relieve. The general depression was increased by the discovery of great mismanagement, and even gross dishonesty, in the Commissariat Department. Many did not scruple to affirm that the Commissariat officers robbed both the Treasury and the soldiers. These complaints were certainly not without foundation, and a flagrant case came to light about the period of the fall of Plevna. "It was noticed," says the *Times* correspondent, "that the uniforms, not only of the Line, but also of the Guards, very soon became threadbare and semi-transparent. To discover the cause of this, an investigation was made in several manufactories which supplied the material, when it was found that the cloth contained forty per cent. of woollen refuse. As four per cent. is considered the legitimate *maximum*, honest Commissariat officers might easily have detected the deception when the cloth was delivered. With semi-transparent uniforms, the soldiers are, of course,

in great need of warm sheepskins, for the winter is not nearly so mild in Bulgaria and Asia Minor as in St. Petersburg; but only a small number of these articles had been received by December 15th. Why they were not provided sooner is one of the many Commissariat mysteries which have not yet been explained. For the Army of the Caucasus, according to the very lowest calculation, at least 8,000 are absolutely necessary, chiefly for the sick and wounded, and, according to the latest accounts, only 800 had been delivered. Some people belonging to the richer classes have endeavoured to correct, so far as their own relatives are concerned, this negligence of the authorities, by sending parcels of warm clothing at their own expense; but I have never heard of such a parcel reaching its destination, and I have heard of many, some of them addressed to officers of high rank, which have gone astray. Letters, too, many of them containing money, have very often a similar fate." All these facts tended to dishearten the mass of the Russian people; yet in political circles a vigorous prosecution of the war was still urgently demanded, as the only means by which results might be obtained of sufficient value to repay the cost.

It was at this period that the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, the organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, preached the carrying out of a species of crusade, which should not stop short of Constantinople. The advice was justified by the determination of the Turks to conduct their defence to the last extremity. This resolution, in the opinion of the St. Petersburg journalist, was not surprising, as the dominant class in Turkey was precisely the one which had the least to lose by continuing the struggle. Having so excited the popular passions during the previous eighteen months, and so profited by them, these men could not easily confess that the criminal game was coming to an end. But if there was thus little reason to be astonished by the language held at Constantinople, there was still less, according to the official writer, to regret it. If the Stamboul Turks wished that the Eastern Question should at that time receive a complete and final solution, there would be in Russia an unanimous feeling of satisfaction and relief. It would be all the better if Russia had the opportunity to finish her glorious mission. "Let fanaticism, then," continued the St. Petersburg journal, "have its way at Constantinople. Thank Heaven, the Russian army is quite able to face these last convulsions of a race which confesses that it can maintain itself in Europe only by carnage and devastation. Mr. Gathorne Hardy, who the other day expressed his conviction that the fall of Plevna would bring peace, should address his exhortations to Constantinople, if it be still time. As to what he said about the ardour which the English nation would show in defence of its flag and its fleet, 'the most important which exists in Asia, in Africa, and in America,' as also in preventing any diminution of the British Possessions—that is a purely academic thesis, for we are not aware that that flag, that fleet, or those possessions, are menaced by any one." Passages such as these expressed the feeling of the governing classes in Russia; and it is not surprising that the existence of such a feeling should have had its effect upon the policy of England, and the public opinion of this country.

In Turkey itself, the popular sentiment found expression through the national Parliament; and the members of that body were not disposed to endorse everything that the Government had done, but exercised their right of criticism as freely as if Constitutional forms had been of long standing in the dominions of the Sultan. Some days were occupied in discussing the answer to the Speech from the Throne. On one of those days, the House divided on the wording of a passage expressing disapprobation of the conduct of political and military affairs by the Cabinet, when forty-one members voted for, and forty against, the phrase implying censure on the Sultan's Ministers. The Government endeavoured to obtain an alteration of this phrase; but the Opposition then brought forward another, which, without specifically mentioning the Cabinet, condemned in general terms those who "held the Executive Power"—words which included not merely the Ministry, but the military authorities who had had the conduct of the army. This amendment was carried by fifty-six against thirty-two votes. Explanations were frequently required of Ministers, and the House even took upon itself judicial functions, to the extent of passing a severe sentence, including a fine and imprisonment, on six Jewish bankers charged with speculating in *kaimês*, or paper-money. The President of the Chamber of Deputies in the previous session had been Ahmed Vefyk Pasha; but since then he had been made Vali or Governor of Adrianople—a post from which he was speedily dismissed. Against this official the Government appears to have entertained a strong prejudice, and it is said that no efforts were spared to prevent his re-election to the Chamber. Certain it is that he was defeated in several places, and it was well-known that, in the event of his return to Parliament, he would criticise the policy of Ministers in the same independent spirit that he had previously exhibited.



TURKISH PRISONERS FROM PLEVNA EN ROUTE TO RUSSIA.

Ahmed Vefyk had been made the subject of many depreciatory remarks, which seem to have had little or no foundation in truth. Not only was he disliked by his own Government; he was very generally denounced in England as a blood-thirsty and inhuman official. So confirmed was this impression in certain quarters that the English Ambassador at Constantinople thought it right to address a special despatch to Lord Derby, pointing out the injustice that had been done. Mr. Layard here stated that his Excellency had given him most valuable assistance and advice in employing the fund for the relief of fugitive women and children (Mohammedans and Christians), and had himself distributed a considerable quantity of food, clothes, and other necessaries confided to the British representative for that purpose. A communication from Mr. Consul Dupuis to Mr. Layard contained several details confirmatory of this assertion; and Mr. Dupuis added that Ahmed Vefyk was indefatigable in looking after things himself, in visiting the different poor asylums, and in securing the comforts of the inmates. The Vali was in the habit of visiting by rotation the various military hospitals supported by the Stafford House Fund, and in distributing tobacco and small comforts to the wounded soldiers, cheering them with words of kindness, and expressing the hope that they would soon get better, and go home to their families. Ahmed Vefyk Pasha had been accused of



CAPTURE OF THE "MERCENE" BY THE "RUSSIA."

encouraging the execution of Bulgarian prisoners; but, according to Mr. Layard, the very reverse of this was the truth. He had done his best to check the executions; but full powers were not confided to him, and many things were done which he found himself unable to prevent.

One of the subjects which demanded and received the attention of the Turkish Parliament was the capture of the *Mercene*, a steamer employed in maintaining the blockade of the Black Sea. This vessel was encountered on the 23rd of December by the *Russia*, Captain Baranoff, which left Odessa on the previous day, and fell in with its adversary off Penderekli, close to the mouth of the Bosphorus. The *Mercene* was at that time carrying, in addition to the crew, seven hundred and ninety-three soldiers and Bashi-Bazouks, twenty officers (including a lieutenant of the Sultan's yacht, *Izzedin*), and a few women and children. Owing to some misapprehension on the part of the Turkish commander, the Muscovite vessel was allowed to get very near, and even to steer between the *Mercene* and the coast. It was probably thought that the *Russia* was a less formidable antagonist than proved to be the case; but when once the action had begun, the error was speedily discovered. After the third shot, the Turk hauled down his flag, and Captain Baranoff sailed off to Sebastopol with his prize. It was at first intended to take the prisoners without delay to Odessa; but on the 26th a great storm arose, which obliged Captain Baranoff to put back before he had got a dozen miles from shore. The colonel of the troops was accordingly despatched by rail to Simpheropol, and the other officers were entertained by the Russian captain. Prince Woronzow visited Sebastopol on the 28th, and looked over the prize, which was lying at the Custom House wharf. She was a strongly-built, well-fitted screw-steamer, of 1,400 tons burden, and had recently been employed by the Government as a transport. The capture of this vessel did not terminate the Russian operations at sea. On the night of December 27th, the torpedo-launches of the *Constantine* attacked a Turkish monitor lying at anchor in the Batoum roads. A self-propelling torpedo, fired by the launch *Tschesme*, struck the monitor amidships, and exploded, while another torpedo from the launch *Sinope* passed under the Turkish vessel without exploding. Some Turkish ships then started in pursuit of the Russian launches, and compelled them to make sail for Sebastopol; but the incident furnished another proof of the energy and boldness of the Czar's naval commanders.

Three of the Russian ironclads—the *Constantine*, the *Vesta*, and the *Vladimir*—had for two months been steaming about the Black Sea, looking for Turkish prizes; but, although the Ottoman fleet was exceedingly powerful, not one of the Russian vessels was captured. They appear to have been managed with remarkable skill and daring, whereas the Turkish vessels were never at hand when anything was to be done, or, if they were, acted with feebleness and inefficiency. The blockade was so loosely enforced that it is believed the Turkish authorities permitted, for a consideration, several vessels laden with grain from Odessa to pass the Bosphorus. Others escaped by good luck; and until the 17th of November it was ruled by the prize-court that if a vessel got beyond the line of the blockading squadron, she could not be captured. The point, however, is one with respect to which jurists are much divided, and after the period in question a change was made in the practice of the prize-court. It was then declared, in accordance with rules laid down by the great English and American authorities, Lushington and Wheaton, that the blockading squadron has the right to seize a blockade-runner until she has completed her voyage. After this decision, nearly thirty vessels were, during a period of a few weeks, arrested while at anchor in the Bosphorus. A good many of the blockade-runners sailed under the flags of Greece and Italy, and the Ministers of those countries protested against the arrests as illegal. The alleged illegality was at the best extremely doubtful; but the Turks had placed themselves in the wrong by first acting on the contrary rule, and then suddenly changing their practice, and still more by permitting certain favoured vessels to run the blockade, for advantages which were certainly underhand, and obviously opposed to the recognised principles of nations.

As the year drew towards its close, the Servians continued their advance up the valley of the Nissava, and on the 24th of December Ak Palanka was taken, after eight hours' fighting. Three Krupp guns, and a large quantity of ammunition and provisions fell into the hands of the conquerors, whose losses were insignificant, while those of the Turks were severe. The troops under Generals Leschjanin and Benitzki occupied Leskovatz and Kurshumlia on the 25th, and here also large stores of provisions were captured. At the same time, small detachments from Arnoldi's cavalry pushed forward from Berkovatz, and opened communications with their brethren on the Sophia road. The capture of Pirot followed on the 28th. This town, which is otherwise called Charkoi, is a place of some importance, situated

forty-seven miles from Sophia, and inhabited by about 17,000 people, of whom by far the greater number are Christians. Pirot was strongly fortified, and was not taken until after two days' hard fighting. The engagement was particularly severe around the Turkish redoubts at Budimbel, on the left bank of the Nissava; but the success, when finally achieved, was worth the expenditure of life at which it was purchased. The Servian prizes included twenty-three guns, one thousand rifles, a large quantity of ammunition, several tents, and other war-materials. The Turks, after blowing up the powder-magazine, and causing great destruction of property, retreated in the direction of Sophia, and only a very few of their number were taken by the Servians. By the Christian inhabitants of the town, the invaders were received with much enthusiasm, and the Islamite minority were obliged to accept the rule of their new masters with as much grace as they could command.

So far, the armies of the little Principality had acquitted themselves well, and obtained a fair measure of success; yet the war was far from popular among the masses of the Servian race. They had not recovered from the wounds inflicted by the war of 1876, and could not resist a fear that after all they might be equally unlucky in their new adventure, or that, if successful by the aid of their Russian patrons, they would have to pay for that assistance in some way that would be hurtful to the national interests. Many excited demonstrations in favour of peace were made by the subjects of Prince Milan, and the Government was compelled to employ harsh measures to restrain the agitation. As if anticipating some violent opposition to his warlike policy, the Prince had placed his dominions in a state of siege at the same time that he announced his determination to invade Turkey; so that the Servians found themselves deprived of their accustomed liberties, as the necessary concomitant of a campaign in which from the first they felt but little interest. Servia, in fact, entered into the war at the bidding of Russia, though, from motives of ambition, the Prince himself may have been willing to encounter the risk. The Servian people had little to gain by such a course. It was they who would have to pay the expenses, both in blood and gold; and they had no certain prospect of substantial gain as the reward of their sacrifices. Prince Milan doubtless hoped to exchange his title for the grander name of King; but the poor Servian peasantry saw nothing before them of sufficient brilliance to compensate for the sufferings they were now called on to endure. Consequently, while the army was achieving successes, of more or less importance, over weak and scattered divisions of the Ottomans, the people murmured, and Prince Milan was obliged to put in force the arbitrary decrees which he had lost no time in issuing.

There was certainly far less division of opinion in Servia than in England. As the Russians pursued their victorious career, the British people became every day more distracted by opposing counsels, and more parted into hostile camps. The announcement of the premature meeting of Parliament produced an agitation such as scarcely any other foreign question has excited in modern times. The pro-Turkish party believed that the Government had at length determined upon war, and expressed their congratulations accordingly. The anti-Turks, fearing what the others desired, took every means of denouncing such an intention as an act of atrocious wickedness. Both sides were very eager and enthusiastic, and their disagreements went far to endanger the public peace. On the 29th of December, the National Society for the Resistance of Russian Aggression and the Protection of British Interests in the East, of which Lord Stratheden was the President, attempted to hold an anti-Russian demonstration in Trafalgar Square, with the object of pressing the Government to take active measures in support of the Sultan. The meeting had been announced for several days, and a counter-demonstration was got up by some well-known leaders of working men's political and trade associations. When the members of the National Society arrived upon the ground, their chair, table, and banners were seized by the anti-Turks, and one of that body was called on to preside. The original organizers of the meeting, however, rallied their forces after a while, and made a desperate attempt to storm the position from which they had themselves been driven out. In this endeavour they were defeated, and their banners were torn into rags in the violence of the encounter. The peace-party then carried a resolution, setting forth that the working men of London protested against the country being plunged into war with either side, under any pretence whatever, especially the pretence of so-called British interests. But this did not terminate the proceedings. Detached fights were taking place all over the square; flags were snatched from the hands of those who bore them; and very little discussion was possible in the midst of so much tumult. Nevertheless, the leader of the Philo-Turks, Mr. Maltman Barry, contrived to form a small circle, in the midst of which he and his friends held something like a deliberative assembly. Ultimately it was proposed and carried

that the meeting recognised the Russian invasion of Asia Minor and Eastern Europe as a danger to British interests and a violation of treaty-law, and called upon the English Government to use every means in its power to put an end to the struggle without further delay; also, that a deputation, consisting of the chairman and speakers at the meeting, be charged to deliver a copy of the resolution to Lord Beaconsfield.

Mr. Barry and his friends then proceeded to the Turkish Embassy, where they had an interview with Musurus Pasha, who expressed his sense of the great sympathy shown to the Turkish nation, and assured the deputation that a reciprocal feeling animated the whole Turkish people. England, he remarked, had been the ally of Turkey in times past, and the memory of their old friendship forbade the supposition that the mutual sentiments of the two nations had undergone any change. His residence in this country had convinced him that the Christianity of England and the Christianity professed and acted upon by Russia were two very different things. Turkey had been assailed by a great military Power. The perfidy of that Power, former history had shown; the cruelty and inhumanity of that Power, recent history had demonstrated. The Turks were asked to make concessions, to sacrifice their honour, and to dismember their Empire. But why should they do so? They were engaged in a struggle for their national existence, and in such circumstances concession was impossible. With these and similar assurances and expressions of gratitude, the deputation departed; but the effect of the meeting did not end there. The Secretary of Lord Stratheden's Society received a telegram from four members of the Hungarian Parliament, saying:—"In the name of Turkish friends in Hungary, we send sympathetic greetings to the Trafalgar Square meeting. The sanctity of treaty rights must be secured. Where there is a will, there is a way." Lord Beaconsfield, however, in acknowledging the resolutions, declined to receive a deputation from the meeting, on the ground that the pressure of public affairs left him no time for such a purpose. The wary Premier was feeling the pulse of public opinion, and was not disposed to commit himself too far in any one direction.

On the opposite side, resolutions in favour of strict neutrality were adopted by numerous meetings, not only in London, but in all the principal towns of England and Scotland; for the party in favour of peace was much more energetic than that which inclined to war. The delegates of the Working Men's Peace Association met on the 29th of December at the Cannon Street Hotel, when Mr. Edmond Beales occupied the chair, and speeches were delivered antagonistic to the views of those who would have committed the country to a martial policy. Finally, an address to the Queen was almost unanimously adopted, and the memorialists expressed a hope that her Majesty's Government would be enabled to obtain such guarantees for the future happiness and development of the subject-races of the Porte, and such additional security for the independence of adjoining States, as might in some degree compensate for the enormous sacrifice of material wealth, the terrible slaughter of human life, and the consequent misery, which the war had entailed. "Your memorialists," said the address, "are of opinion that the complete autonomy of Bulgaria is the least of all things which the Turkish Government should concede; that no diplomatic pressure should be brought to bear upon Servia or Roumania for the purpose of limiting their just and reasonable claims for a larger independence than is now recognised; that the rights and necessities of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be adequately considered; that the natural frontier and outlets of Montenegro should be adjusted and secured; and that the fortifications in and about the Dardanelles should be removed, and the passage between the Mediterranean and Black Seas be free to the ships of all nations, at all times, without distinction." A preliminary conference, with a view to the formation of a committee of London citizens anxious to prevent the country from being dragged into war, was held on the first day of the new year in the Caxton Buildings, occupying the site of old Newgate Market. On this occasion, Mr. Hubbard, one of the members for the City, expressed in the form of a letter his opinion that Russia would not propose any conditions which could in the slightest degree conflict with the true interests and dignity of England. Canon Liddon, a distinguished member of the High Church party, who had from the first expressed very strong convictions in favour of Russia, wrote that if England was to be saved from engaging in a criminal war against that Power, under the pretext of defending some very hypothetical interests of her own, it was necessary that public opinion should make itself heard. This was the very thing that public opinion was doing; but, as usual, that rather vague abstraction spoke with two voices. It would be impossible to say which of the opposing parties was in a numerical majority; but in many respects the pro-Russians were more powerful than those who maintained the contrary view. The enemies of Turkey were strongly reinforced by a considerable section of the

Church of England, and by the main body of the Nonconformists. Yet an opinion seems to have been entertained in some quarters that the clergy of the Established Church were in favour of war on behalf of Turkey. A body called the National Reform Union issued a manifesto in which it was affirmed that war was promoted "by Government contractors, by landowners, and by a large portion of the clergy of the Church of England, who always support those who, like themselves, are privileged." The Bishop of Oxford wrote to the *Times*, protesting against this imputation, and observing that to charge the clergy with promoting a war on behalf of a tyranny which for more than four centuries had desolated some of the fairest lands in Europe and Asia was an insult which it was not easy to bear in silence. The accusation certainly appears to have been unjust, whether the view adopted by the Church was wise or unwise. The clergy, as a body, can hardly be said to have taken any definite position at all on the question; but numerous individuals belonging to that body were conspicuous in their opposition to pro-Turkish tendencies, while the opposite sentiment does not seem to have found any supporters among the clerical ranks.

## CHAPTER II.

Position of General Gourko in the Middle of December, 1877—Mehemet Ali and Suleiman Pasha—Evacuation of Berkovatz by the Turks—Reinforcement of Gourko—Plan of the Winter Campaign—Resolution of the Ottomans—Sufferings of Gourko's Troops from Exposure and Cold—Forward Movement on the Morning of December 25th—The Advance over the Balkans—Terrible Fatigues and accumulated Difficulties—The Bivouac in the Snow—Descent of the Mountains on the Southern Side—Perils and Hardships of the Way—The Turks surprised and discouraged—Incidents of the great Achievement—Retreat of the Turks from Arab Konak—Their new Position at Taskosen attacked by the Russians—Defeat of the Ottomans after a severe Engagement—Withdrawal towards Sophia on the 1st of January, 1878—The Abandoned Turkish Positions—Survey of the Country by the Invaders—Ferocious Treatment of the Turkish Wounded by the Bulgarians—Combat on the Isker—Further Retreat of the Turks—Evacuation of Sophia, and Entry of the Russians—Condition of the Hospitals—Apathetic Reception of the Russians by the Bulgarians—Restoration of Order in the City—Lady Strangford and the English Doctors—The Turkish Government disposed to make Overtures of Peace—Communications between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, and Refusal of the Latter to allow of Interposition—The Question of Mediation—Speech of the Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon) on England and Russia—Warm Approval of the Gladstonians—Mr. Forster on the Work of the Opposition.

General Gourko was brought to a standstill in the Etropol Balkans by the strength of the ground occupied by Mehemet Ali, and the determined front presented by the troops of that commander. But after the fall of Plevna the relative positions of the invaders and their antagonists were so seriously altered, to the detriment of the latter, that a resumption of the Russian advance became inevitable at no distant date. In the meanwhile, the lines in the vicinity of Orkhanieh were strengthened, and mounted with fresh guns; but no offensive movements of a serious character were made for several days, and the mountain fogs were so thick that it was found impossible to point the guns. By the middle of December, the command of the Turkish troops had passed from the hands of Mehemet Ali into those of Chakir Pasha, and the former officer had proceeded to Constantinople, that he might appear before a court-martial presided over by Raouf Pasha. In the course of this inquiry, Mehemet Ali accused Suleiman Pasha of being principally responsible for the Turkish disasters; and it was held that he had completely justified himself, and disproved the charges of mismanagement that had been brought against him. These two commanders were, with the exception of Osman Pasha, the most important military leaders of the European campaign; but it is yet too early to determine their relative merits and defects. If the fault of Suleiman was a culpable rashness, by which he was incited to fling himself against positions which he had no reasonable chance of taking, that of Mehemet Ali lay in the direction of excessive prudence, so that he sometimes missed opportunities that might have been turned to advantage. The late commander of the Balkans had much the same qualities as General McClellan, who directed the Federal armies of the United States in the early part of the Civil War. If a position was to be defended, his management was excellent; but if a forward movement was to be made, or an attack to be hazarded, he seemed to shrink from the possibility of failure.

After the removal of Mehemet Ali from the command of the Army of the Balkans, some

aggressive movements were made by the Turks, but without any success. On the 12th, 13th, and 14th of December, they failed in several attempts to advance from Berkovatz in the direction of Katlowitza, and were, in consequence, obliged to evacuate Berkovatz on the 16th, when they retreated towards Sophia, leaving one gun in the abandoned town, which was subsequently occupied by Russian Uhlans. By this time, reinforcements were on their way to General Gourko. His troops, originally, had not numbered more than 30,000, and these had been greatly reduced by cold, fatigue, and actual fighting. It was impossible for the General to resume his march, or to conduct any offensive operations against the enemy, until his forces were augmented; but now that the great stronghold of Osman Pasha had surrendered, together with the large army which defended it, additional battalions could readily be spared, and were soon despatched. The plan of what may be called the new campaign included two lines of advance across the Balkans—one by way of Sophia, the other by the Shipka and Trajan Passes. The Army of the Jantra and the corps of Zimmerman were simultaneously to operate against the Quadrilateral; and the siege of Rustchuk was to be firmly prosecuted. Everything evinced a determination to push the war vigorously, now that the nightmare of Plevna had been removed; and on the other hand the Turks showed no signs of a disposition to yield. It was alleged that the Seraskierate was able to collect 200,000 men at Adrianople; but this, doubtless, was in excess of the fact. Nevertheless, the fighting capacity of the Turks was far from exhausted, and the prospect of the coming months was fierce and bloody.

The advance of General Gourko did not commence until the morning of December 25th. It might at first appear that the day had been purposely selected for the inauguration of an enterprise by which it was hoped to carry the cross up to the very walls of Constantinople. But it must be borne in mind that, by the Russian computation, the 25th of December is reckoned the 13th, so that the Christmas Day of the invaders did not fall until twelve days later. The movement would in fact have taken place sooner, but for the delay in the arrival of fresh troops at Gourko's head-quarters. That delay had been caused by severe storms in the mountainous country, and by the bad state of the roads; and it was only on the 24th that the reinforcements reached Orkhanieh. Their presence was most enthusiastically welcomed, for the heights near the Baba Konak Pass were rapidly becoming untenable. The sufferings of the troops from cold were extreme. Clumsy at the making of extemporary shelter for himself—an art in which the Turk is singularly proficient—the Russian soldier was left to the full rigour of the season; and in those elevated regions the snow was deep and the frost cruel. Thirty men were frozen to death during four days of storm; many were the mortified hands and feet that the night-watches entailed; and the number of sick from exposure amounted to more than two thousand when the reinforcements entered Orkhanieh. Supplies and ammunition were running short; the shelter-tents were torn almost into shreds; and, in the absence of warm clothing, which had failed to reach that remote locality, the soldiers wrapped themselves in the skins of bullocks and sheep which had been slaughtered for food. Even bread was scarce, and wood for fuel could only with difficulty be obtained.* Matters, therefore, had come to such a pass that, unless the division under General Gourko had been speedily relieved, it must have abandoned its trenches, and executed a retrograde movement towards the main body of the army. But it was now in a position to advance, and Gourko's plan was already formed for pushing across the Balkans towards Sophia.

The details of that plan were for the most part elaborated by General Maglovsky, the Chief of Gourko's Staff; but the condition of the roads, owing to the formation of ice, necessitated several modifications. The army was divided into nine detachments, and these were to cross the mountains at different points, and to descend into the plains beyond. Before daylight on the morning of the 25th, the soldiers assembled in the streets of Orkhanieh, and preparations for the march were rapidly pushed forward. A dense fog filled the air, and the vapours froze as they settled on the houses of the little town, and on the garments and faces of the troops. At nine o'clock in the morning, General Gourko and his Staff left Orkhanieh on the road to Vracesi. The ways were slippery with ice, the trees laden with snow, and the rocks crystallised with the glittering investiture of frost. Cold and fatigue soon began to tell on the soldiers, some of whom dropped out of the line, and lay exhausted on the stony ground. A little beyond Vracesi, however, the advancing column passed out of the fog into bright sunshine, and a warm south wind blew in the faces of the almost frozen men. The old road to Sophia turns off from the vicinity of Vracesi, and by this road it was determined to proceed. Having been disused for several years, it

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

THE ADVANCE OVER THE BALKANS.

had become overgrown with trees and bushes, so as to be almost lost; but two battalions were sent forward a few days before, and the road was by this time widened, levelled in some parts, cleared of obstructions, and made generally practicable. In the more difficult places, steps had been cut in the ice; and all this had been done so close to the Turkish redoubts east of Arab Konak that the work could only be performed at night. The path was now sufficiently good to allow of cannon being hauled up; yet this was no easy task, and the heavy guns often came to a standstill. General Rauch was the commander of the advance-guard, and he showed the most untiring energy in directing the operations of his men. As night came on, the soldiers, worn out by the fatigues of the day, sank down in the snow, and slept with uncontrollable weariness. Their commander, however, permitted himself no rest, and, riding up and down the slippery paths, frequently roused his men to another spell of work at the guns. The poor fellows, obeying with the ready and cheerful willingness which is one of the virtues of the Russian soldier, would struggle on for a few paces, and then once more tumble down like dead men. Towards midnight, General Gourko and his Staff came up the path, and the officers gathered close to the bivouac-fires, which were kept low, that the Turks might not discover what was going forward. The snow was freezing hard, under the influence of a bitter wind, and, as little could be obtained either to eat or drink, the night was passed under circumstances of extreme discomfort.

"The sun," says Mr. Millet, one of the correspondents of the *Daily News*, "rose on a scene of wonderful picturesqueness, and a landscape of serene beauty. Generals and aides-de-camp, some wrapped in bourkas and furs, some in overcoats alone, without additional covering, lay in the snow, huddled together about the fires. Cossacks and dragoons were already busy with their cooking, and hundreds of horses, tied to the trees about the bivouac, stamped impatiently in the snow. Southward lay the great plain of Sophia, its pure white face broken only by little dark lines where the villages were; and beyond, half veiled in dense clouds, were the mountains further south, and the great peak Vitos that towers over Sophia. Through the trees eastward was clearly visible the great bare peak near the Bilia Konak Pass, and the lines of the Turkish works were drawn on the snow as plainly as pencil-marks on white paper. General Rauch, always on foot, clambered up to the bivouac for a few moments' rest, and to consult with General Gourko the motive power and General Maglovsky, the soul of the enterprise. Then both General Rauch and General Gourko were off again to hasten the movements." Not very much, however, was done on the 26th. News came from the column on the right that the road was almost impassable, while from Dondeville, on the left, nothing at all was heard; but it was known that the Guards had started up the mountains near Etropol, and were making good progress. The column accompanied by General Gourko at length reached the summit of the mountain it had been scaling, and the descent of the other side began after dark. The road for a long way was nothing more than a gully worn by the rain, and now converted into a sheet of ice. The men slid down as best they could (sometimes helping themselves by means of the undergrowth), and, having reached the valley, pushed on to the nearest village. The bringing down of the guns was a matter of great difficulty; but it was accomplished during the night, and the cannon were in the village by daybreak. They had been lowered by means of ropes wound about the trees; the tumbrils were sent down empty, and the ammunition was carried by the men. The labour had been enormous; but the success of the enterprise was ample compensation for the fatigue and suffering.

Thus were the Balkans passed a second time, and that in the dead of winter. Two divisions and a half had made the turning movement over the Sophia-Balkan ridge west of the Baba Konak Pass. One division of the Guards, and the Rifle Brigade of the same body, had been sent by the mountain-path from Orkhanieh, and had descended at the village of Curiak, or Tschurgan. The division under General Wilhelminof took the route which rises behind Vracesi in a south-westerly direction, and ultimately descends on Zilava; but circumstances caused an alteration in the route. General Dondeville had not yet been able to effect his passage; but, on the whole, the movement was a great success. The Turks had reckoned too confidently on the great chain of rugged mountains and the rigours of the winter season interposing an insuperable obstacle to the invaders. Courage and endurance had overcome another of the barriers between the Russians and Constantinople, and military skill was soon to do the rest. A brief but sharp engagement occurred in the early morning of the 27th, when a brigade of Kuban Cossacks attacked a transport-train which the Turks were convoying towards Baba Konak. More than two hundred waggons, laden with provisions and forage, and constituting about half the train, were captured, and the Turks fled, to return, however, after awhile, with fresh spirits for the battle. In the end, the

waggons remained in the hands of the Cossacks, who then cut the telegraph wires, and secured the position from sudden assault. On the evening of the 28th, the column of General Wilhelminof began to debouch into the valley of Curiak, having found

WITH GENERAL GOURKO IN THE BALKANS—BIVOUAC IN THE SNOW.

the descent to Zilava too difficult to be accomplished. The troops under this commander had endured even greater hardships than their comrades with Gourko. Their march had occupied nearly four days, during which time they had been exposed to terrific snow-storms, and had suffered much from want of food. The guns had been dismounted from their carriages, and sent down on sledges; but the men could not be so easily provided for. For the last thirty-six hours they had marched almost without a halt, and were at once frozen and famished when they reached the positions in the vicinity of Curiak. The crossing of the Balkans must be reckoned one of the most remarkable achievements of the war. The Turks seem to have been completely taken by surprise, and the Cossacks were frequently bringing in prisoners, who were often half-naked, and in a state of the most extreme misery. Several bands of Turkish Circassians were defeated, and part of another transport, escorted by two squadrons of cavalry and a battalion of infantry, was taken by the Russian irregular cavalry, who also captured six hundred head of cattle and a large flock of sheep. The

Ottomans were staggered by the suddenness and completeness of a blow which they had regarded as impossible. But the passage of the Balkans had cost the Russians about 1,200 men, and the sufferings of all concerned had been very great.

In recording the incidents of the crossing, Mr. Millet has observed that the panorama of that mountain climb would contain more scenes of personal devotion, and more dramas of human interest, than even the battles of the war. "Every step," he writes, "presented a new picture. Gathered round a small fire at the foot of a large tree, two or three Guardsmen would be relating the history of Gorny Dubnik, and with animated gestures illustrating how they dragged guns up the mountains near Etropol. Huddled up against the banked snow on the side of the pathway, at every few paces, were the soldiers who had carried up the muskets of those who hauled the guns; and we stumbled over many lying in the path, shapeless bundles who could only be recognised as soldiers from the rifles which were stuck in the snow, and lay scattered about on either side the track, the men having fallen fast asleep, after futile efforts to make a fire out of green wood. When the soldiers dragging the cannon halted for a moment, they lay down without letting go of the rope, and slept on the ice, one lying upon the other. Their feet were wrapped in rags and skins; pointed capuchins covered their heads, almost hiding the faces; and most of them wore their shelter-tent as a cloak. A file of them slowly stalking past in the darkness had a wondrously strange aspect. In the intense cold of the night their overcoats became inflexible, like sheets of iron. When the moon rose, it lighted a scene of weird picturesqueness, figures and trees coming out dark against the mysterious background of snow, and the winding path being lost far up in the frosty haze. At intervals along the track were motionless groups of men, cannon, horses, and caissons; and little fires twinkled with a ruddy light all over the mountain side."

The invaders remained four days at Curiak, waiting for reinforcements of infantry and artillery. Bodies of cavalry were sent across the plain in the direction of Sophia, and two regiments penetrated as far eastward as Dolny Kamarli, to the south of Arab Konak. The Russians were now between the Turkish positions and the capital of Bulgaria. The Ottomans were consequently in great danger of being cut off, and a movement towards the south began without a moment's delay. Taking up a new position on a hill near Taskosen, the Turks speedily built three redoubts commanding the road at that point; but the Russians were determined not to leave them in quiet possession of these works. The attack was ordered for the morning of December 31st; but the Russian plans were much disorganised by the non-arrival of Dondeville, whose column had been unable to cross the mountains, and had retired to Etropol. The General had been obliged to leave several cannon on the summit of the range, and had moreover lost a large number of men from exposure to the cold. In the contemplated attack, the lead was to have been given to Dondeville, and his absence from the scene was an embarrassing circumstance. Nevertheless, the movement was not delayed, for the capture of the positions was important. The Russian forces were divided into four columns, the object being to assail the enemy on both flanks, in front, and in rear; and this complicated movement was begun shortly after daylight. A large intervening space had to be crossed, and a hill to be climbed, before the enemy could be reached; but all the while a sharp artillery-fire was being exchanged between the opposing batteries. Towards noon, a furious combat broke out upon the Russian right, and General Mirkovitch was wounded. The Turks were posted in rifle-pits, which they defended with their accustomed resolution; but in the meanwhile the various turning movements were being effected. After the combat had proceeded a considerable time, a caisson exploded in the Turkish battery over the village, and the Russian commanders then gave the order to attack. This was about two o'clock in the afternoon, and, as the assailants were rushing down the slope towards the village, a dense fog came on, which to a great extent cloaked their movements. Under cover of the wide obscurity, they entered the narrow streets from various directions, only to find that the Turks had withdrawn, abandoning their horses, ammunition-cases, and wounded, and that they were rapidly scaling the hill-side beyond. The Ottoman batteries now ceased firing, and even the musketry soon dropped off into a few straggling shots. The fight was resumed at Karaula, half a mile further on, but by dusk the struggle had entirely ceased. The Russians had achieved a very important success; but they had not accomplished all that they desired, for the mountain covering the Turkish retreat from Baba Konak by the road towards Slatica still remained in possession of the Ottomans. This was held to be the key of the position, and the Turks had fought for it with extraordinary valour. They were outnumbered three to one, yet the Russians could boast only a partial triumph. It was indeed vital

to the Ottomans that they should retain the mountain which they still held; for it was only thus that they could secure their escape from a position of grave danger.

This was the last battle of 1877, and, so far as heroism was concerned on either side, it not unfitly closed a year of great and terrible events. On the following day—January 1st, 1878—General Gourko and his Staff conducted a reconnaissance in the direction of Baba Konak. The party halted on a little knoll, whence the whole of the adjacent valley could be scanned. On the further side, a large number of Turks were perceived running through the snow. Some Cossacks immediately gave chase; and although, in the heavy state of the ground, rapid movement was impossible, the fugitives, not being mounted, were in time run down. These, however, were only stragglers, and the main body of the army was seen in another direction, filing off in great black masses. The latter probably amounted to nearly 15,000 men, and, being a long way off, with about two hours' start of their opponents, they were able to make good their retreat. The Turks had in fact abandoned their imperilled positions while it was yet time; and shortly afterwards a detachment of the Russians took possession of the hill which on the previous day they had been unable to wrest from the enemy. General Gourko, observing from a distance that his men were in force on that eminence, remarked to his officers, in tones of great satisfaction, "Now we can say, in all conscience, that we have crossed the Balkans in every phase of the undertaking." But the labours and anxieties of the time were not yet over, for the small detachment of Wilhelminof, which had taken up a position at Gorny Bugaroff, was assailed on the 1st by eight battalions of infantry, supported by cavalry and eight guns, issuing from Sophia. According to the official report of General Gourko to the Imperial head-quarters, Wilhelminof's corps, which consisted of five battalions of infantry and one brigade of cavalry, with six guns and a brigade of Circassian Cossacks, was attacked and hemmed in on three sides. The Russians, however, were enabled to hold their ground without asking for reinforcements, although they stood in some danger of being overwhelmed by numbers. The Turks at one time made an attempt to outflank their adversaries, but were defeated with heavy loss, after a combat of several hours, in which they lost a standard and a large number of men, and were soon in full retreat towards Sophia. The Russians pursued; but the chase could not be very vigorously conducted, partly on account of the deep snow, and partly because the cavalry attached to General Gourko's army was insufficient for the purpose. A good many scattered bodies of Turks were nevertheless brought in by the Cossacks, and it was evident that the others would not make a stand until they had arrived at the Bulgarian capital.

The abandoned Turkish positions were found to be very strong and well-arranged. One source of weakness, however, was discovered in the absence of any depôt of stores in the neighbourhood. The troops were therefore fed by transport trains from Sophia, and retreat became imperative as soon as the road was cut by the advance of the Russians. The Turks seem to have been not at all well acquainted with the geographical features of the country they were defending, and to have been actually ignorant of the existence of two roads by which they might have facilitated their retreat. The invaders exhibited a more intelligent appreciation of their duties, and, having collected a large amount of information from the Bulgarian peasantry, straightway constructed a number of maps, which gave a fair, though necessarily rough, idea of the conformation of the ground, and of the relative distances of places from one another. Thus provided with something like an index to the maze of mountains and valleys, Prince Tzereteleff undertook the work of discovering paths across the range, and in a few days found half a dozen routes, all of them practicable for an army.

On the 2nd of January, General Gourko moved his head-quarters from Taskosen to Gorny Bugaroff. The roads were melancholy with long streams of wounded Turks, painfully toiling through the snow to the neighbouring villages, where they might find a night's shelter. Many of these poor wretches fell dead upon the way, and the pitiless Bulgarians came down upon them like a troop of jackals, and stripped the bodies naked for the sake of their clothes. The battle-field of Gorny Bugaroff was blackened by clouds of these scoundrels, pursuing their foul and abominable work unchecked; but the fact was not surprising, as the character of the Bulgarians had come out in black and revolting colours throughout the whole history of the war. It was their ferocity, in the first instance, which provoked the ferocity of the Turkish irregulars, when Russian conspiracies had excited a rising in the Balkans; and the same savage instincts broke out again and again, wherever the weakness of the Turks, or the presence of strong Russian forces, permitted their gratification. Even the most violent opponents of the Ottomans, with the exception perhaps of Mr. Gladstone and a few of his most devoted followers, were beginning to be



FIVE MINUTES' REST.

ashamed of the despicable race which only a few months before they had held up to the admiration of Christendom. From the earliest times, the Bulgarian has had a bad name in history. It was only a temporary agitation which converted him into a species of saint; and he must effect a total revolution in his nature, if he do not appear in later annals much as he has already figured in the petty circle of his provincial existence.

In retreating on Sophia, the Turks made a brief attempt to defend the bridge over the Isker at a place called Vrasdebna; but on the 2nd of January General Rauch, in command of the advance-guard, came up in force, and made a vigorous attack upon

BULGARIANS STRIPPING THE DEAD.

the enemy. One of his regiments crossed the river on the ice, and speedily dislodged the Ottomans from their positions. The latter tried to set the bridge on fire; but the flames were extinguished, and the Turks continued their southward retreat. On the same day, General Gourko discovered, by means of a reconnaissance executed by himself in person, that Sophia was fortified only on the eastern side, and was quite open on the north. With twelve battalions of Wilhelminof's division, Gourko proceeded to the village of Kumanitza, lower down the channel of the Isker, where he proposed to cross the bridge, and attack the Turks on their most vulnerable side; but the enemy evacuated his positions during the night, and retired by the southern road to Kostendil. It was believed that the fugitives would make a desperate stand at Sophia, and everybody supposed that the town would not be taken without hard fighting and considerable loss. But on the afternoon of the 3rd a Cossack came riding into General Gourko's head-quarters with the surprising intelligence that Sophia was evacuated, and that the column of General Rauch was entering the city. Gourko at once started for the spot, and, on overtaking the troops, emphatically warned them that plundering would not be permitted. The work of pillage had in truth begun as soon as the first detachment of the troops got within the walls; but it was stopped by General Rauch, even before the arrival of his principal. The streets soon resumed an aspect of orderliness; but the condition of the hospitals, as at other towns, was horrible in the last degree. Those of the Turkish wounded who had strength to move were marched off a day or two before the entry of the Russians, and numbers perished on the wintry roads. Those who were too far gone to be taken from their beds were left to the care of Bulgarian nurses, and not only neglected, even as respects the commonest necessities of nature, but in many instances robbed, and actually murdered.* The neglect was not immediately remedied after the Russians marched in. For some time the new comers took no notice of the patients—whether from dull indifference, from habitual apathy, or from want of organisation, it would be difficult to say; but in any case the unfortunate Turks suffered to an extent which

* The statement was made by the *Daily News* correspondent, on the authority of English and American, as well as Turkish, doctors.

it is appalling to contemplate. At Sophia, as elsewhere, numerous deaths occurred, not in the fiery crisis of battle, but in the slow and unutterable agony of neglected wounds, of poisonous air, and even of positive famine. The occupants of the hospital, however, were not entirely without help. Lady Strangford, with several English, American, and German doctors, did all that was possible under the circumstances, with a devotion to humanity so noble in its simple heroism that it seems almost indecent to praise it. Yet, with their utmost exertions, they could only in some degree mitigate the enormous misery of the time.

When General Gourko entered the town, he was met by a crowd of several hundred citizens, led by priests with banners, crucifixes, and lanterns. One of the priests carried a salver with bread and salt, the customary Eastern symbols of hospitality and welcome. The Russian commander was then escorted in procession through the streets; but, with a few exceptions, the populace did not seem greatly moved by the arrival of their so-called deliverers, although that was the first time since 1434 that a Christian army had entered the walls of Sophia. Throngs of citizens were assembled in the public roads; but the listless character of the Bulgarians, which seems incapable of excitement unless when murder or pillage is to be committed, was apparent everywhere. Not a cheer was heard, and the advancing column of Russians threaded its way through a crowd of voiceless, sullen men and boys, who may perhaps have been glad that the Turks had gone, but who were apparently not much gratified that the Muscovites had arrived. The houses, for the most part, were barred and closed, and it was only in a few instances that sprigs of evergreen were thrown out of the upper windows by the young women. At the principal church, a short religious ceremony was performed, and the Bulgarian capital then settled down into that state of enforced and rigid calm which is common to cities that have been occupied by a foreign army. The Turkish quarter had been sacked before the arrival of the troops; but any one found in possession of plundered effects was arrested by the Russians, and compelled to disgorge his spoil, which was then exposed in the streets, under a military guard, till claimed by its owners. General Gourko was certainly as good as his word when he told his men that all pillaging would be severely punished; for a Cossack who had stolen some watches and money was straightway bound and shot. On the whole, discipline was enforced with admirable strictness, and such of the Turks as remained had no cause for taxing their conquerors with undue rigour.

It would seem that a little before the evacuation of Sophia by the Ottomans, orders had been received from Constantinople to burn the city, and blow up the mosques. A rumour was at one time prevalent that this had actually been done; but, although the Bashi-Bazouks set fire to several houses in different parts, no great damage was effected. The town, however, owing to the outbreak of Bulgarian brigandage, was in a state of chaotic confusion when the Russians marched in, and with the stern hand of military power put a stop to such excesses. Lady Strangford was treated with great consideration by all the commanding officers, and the surgeons of the Stafford House and Red Crescent Associations were in no respect interrupted in their benevolent labours. General Gourko, indeed, made a personal inspection of the hospitals, and even entered the typhus wards at the risk of his life. This conduct was to his honour; but it is much to be regretted that he was not more prompt in seeing to the necessities of the sick and wounded Turks. Up to the evening of the third day of occupation, these wretched beings were left without bread. Life was only just sustained, where it was sustained at all, by food which the doctors were able to distribute out of their private stores. What made the neglect more shocking and inexcusable was the circumstance that immense quantities of provisions existed in the town; so that the failure resulted entirely from culpable inattention, aggravated, it is to be feared, by conscious indifference to the sufferings of a vanquished foe.

The deepening gloom of the situation, and the certainty that Russia would increase her terms with every new success, once more disposed the Turkish Government to seek an understanding with the enemy. The Sultan's attempt to obtain the mediation of the Powers had utterly failed; but it was still believed that negotiations for peace might be opened by the friendly interposition of the British Government. If any hope of armed assistance from England had ever been seriously entertained, it must have vanished soon after the fall of Plevna. On the 24th of December, 1877, a Ministerial paper at Constantinople, the *Vakit*, declared that the presence of the British fleet in the Dardanelles—of which there had been some rumours—would be welcome if the fleet came as an ally, though not otherwise; but it was evident that it would *not* come as an ally, unless Constantinople itself were occupied by the Russians, of which there was no great probability. On that same day, Mr. Layard was instructed by Lord Derby to ask the Porte whether the Sultan was willing that her Majesty's Government should inquire of the Russian Govern-

ment if the Emperor would entertain peace proposals. From the Grand Vizier's reply it appeared that a request to that effect had already been sent through Musurus Pasha. Accordingly, Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was directed, on December 27th, to inquire of the Russian Government if the Emperor was disposed to receive overtures of peace. His Lordship telegraphed that he had spoken on the subject to Prince Gortschakoff, who had said that Russia desired nothing better than to arrive at a pacific solution, but that for such a purpose the Porte must address itself to the Imperial Commanders-in-Chief in Europe and Asia, who would state the conditions on which an armistice would be granted. At the same time, the Porte seems to have been officially advised that the terms on which Russia would agree to a suspension of arms included a rectification of the Asiatic frontier, the opening of the Straits, the independence of Roumania, and the adoption of the Conference programme for Bulgaria; the settlement of Servia and Montenegro to be reserved for ulterior negotiations. Russia would not admit anything in the shape of intercession. She had got her enemy by the throat, and would strangle him on the spot, or force him on his knees to beg for mercy. Such was the general situation at the beginning of 1878.

In certain quarters, great indignation was expressed at what was described as the insolent way in which Russia had refused the proffered mediation of England. To this it was replied by the Anglo-Russian organs that no mediation had been refused, because none had been offered. In a narrow, technical sense, this may perhaps be true: the word mediation was not used by the Government, and the meaning might therefore be disavowed, if such a course were found convenient. But that something in the nature of mediation was intended, can hardly be denied. The greatest ingenuity cannot attach any other meaning to the step that had been taken; for if the Government meant simply to convey a message, the act was laboriously superfluous, since there is no conceivable reason why the message should not have been sent direct by the party interested. It is obvious that Turkey hoped in this way to secure the friendly offices of England; and it is equally clear that, by accepting the commission, England sanctioned that view. The *Daily News*, while vehemently denying that there had been any offer of mediation, spoke of the Government, in this very matter, as "an intermediary;"* though how there could be an intermediary where there was no mediation, it was not so good as to explain. In first announcing (on the 29th of December, 1877) the new turn of events, the same journal remarked that the Government had thus taken upon itself "the character of an intercessor for one unfortunate belligerent, while acting also officiously for Europe," the leading Continental Powers of which had but recently refused to take any part in the matter. Now, the act of an intercessor, who steps in to save a defeated belligerent from further punishment, is surely a species of mediation, however much the word may be avoided; and Russia, in declining to listen to the representations of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, was guilty of a studied discourtesy, though doubtless acting strictly within her right.

While the minds of men were thus agitated on the question of mediation or no mediation, Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary for the Colonies, made some very important observations, which may be taken as a turning point in the progress of the war, so far as the English Government was concerned. A deputation of South African merchants waited upon his Lordship on the 2nd of January, 1878, to obtain some information with reference to existing troubles at the Cape; and in the course of the interview some questions were asked with reference to the latest phases of the Eastern dispute, the complications of which, should they lead to war, would necessarily affect commercial interests. After disposing of the subjects with which the deputation was mainly concerned, Lord Carnarvon said that no material change had taken place in the European situation since the fall of Plevna. The attitude of the Government remained much the same as before. They were watchful of all real British interests, friendly as regarded other nations, neutral as regarded the belligerents. They were not prepared to bolster up Turkish interests as such; but, on the other hand, they were still resolved, as they had been from the commencement, to have a voice in the settlement of the question, whenever it came on for settlement. They had not offered to mediate, still less to intervene in the ordinary sense of intervention; they had simply conveyed overtures of peace from one belligerent to the other. His Lordship denied that the Russian answer to the English message implied any insult to this country.

So far, Lord Carnarvon's observations, though

* "It was evident that Ministers saw all the delicacy and difficulty of the situation in which they had been placed by the request of Turkey, and that it would have been not only a dereliction of duty, but a mark of extreme stupidity, if they had so presented the Turkish request as to compromise their own freedom of action in the very probable event of Russia preferring to treat directly with the Porte, *rather than through an intermediary*."—Leader in the *Daily News* of Jan. 3rd, 1878.



liable to criticism, were not characterized by any marked imprudence. But the speaker was not content to stop at this point. Having opened his lips on the subject, he launched forth into a series of remarks which can only be understood as an encouragement to Russia to pursue her course of ambition and aggrandisement, and a warning to Englishmen generally not to be so presumptuous as to interfere. "I think," said his Lordship, "there is at this moment a serious risk on each side. On the one hand, I hope that in this country we shall not lash ourselves up into a nervous apprehension of so-called British honour and British interests. I have never heard throughout these transactions, and nobody else has ever heard, a whisper against British honour; and, as regards British interests, we must be very careful always, as men of the world dealing with undoubtedly very large interests, to discriminate between those that are real and those that are secondary. On the other hand, also, I sincerely hope that the Russian Government and people will remember that many of the questions arising at this moment are questions which are not for the settlement of the two belligerents alone. They involve European interests—they are European questions; and we, as a member of the European family, have not only a right to be heard upon them, but it is very important we should have a distinct voice in the final decision of them. I do not myself feel any difficulty in reconciling these two views, provided only there is reasonable management and moderation on each side. Most of us in this room are old enough to remember the outbreak of the Crimean war. We can remember how Russia, on the one hand, through self-deception, and this country, on the other hand, in a great measure through an extreme excitement, drifted—to use an expression which became historical—into war. I apprehend there are very few people now who look back upon that war with satisfaction; and I am confident that there is nobody in this country insane enough to desire a repetition of it. One safeguard I think we have, and that is that the experience of that time has not been wholly thrown away, either in England or in Russia; and that there is—especially in the commercial world which you represent—a cooler and more sober feeling, disposed to look at things as they are, and not desirous to rush hastily to conclusions." Finally, Lord Carnarvon hoped that, while upholding the honour and self-respect of the country, we should do nothing to encourage alarm, nor allow that diplomacy had, even in those critical times, become so exhausted and barren as to be incapable of affording a pacific solution of the Oriental difficulties.

That, at such a moment, a Cabinet Minister should almost insult his countrymen because they exhibited some distrust of Russian designs, and should condemn the whole course of the Crimean War as a pernicious mistake, was certainly one of the grossest infractions of official reticence that the history of this country can afford. If the impropriety of the speech could be the subject of a moment's doubt, that doubt would be removed by observing the hysterical delight with which the pro-Russian party and the pro-Russian press hailed the observations of the Colonial Minister. Lord Carnarvon is a politician of very decided Tory views; yet, on the strength of this speech, the Gladstonites at once pronounced him "a statesman who is not in the habit of losing the balance of his mind when dealing with great interests."* Mr. Gladstone himself, in a letter to Mr. Chamberlain, M.P., said that Lord Carnarvon had "manhood, as well as integrity and ability." Other members of the same party expressed their high satisfaction at the late Ministerial utterance; and, on the assumption that Lord Carnarvon expressed the views of the entire Cabinet, the pro-Russian papers, though ordinarily speaking for the Opposition, became quite Ministerial in their tone. There was one very important person, however, to whom Lord Carnarvon's opinions gave marked displeasure; and that was Lord Beaconsfield. In Cabinet Councils subsequently held, the Prime Minister severely condemned the language which Lord Carnarvon had used. The incident passed off for the time; but the Colonial Secretary was out of harmony with the views of his chief, and we shall see a little further on that he found himself compelled to resign, in consequence of his dissenting from measures which were deemed necessary for the protection of the country.

The odd tangle into which political affairs had fallen was made the subject of some comments by Mr. Forster, M.P., at Bradford, on the 5th of January. "Curiously enough," he said, "it fell to the lot of the Opposition to support the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries against the attacks of their own friends; and it was possible that, when Parliament met, the Opposition might have to support them against their own colleagues." Nevertheless, Mr. Forster disbelieved the rumour that there were divisions in the Cabinet; but the Liberal party, he remarked, approved of the line taken by the Earl of Derby, and, if the Premier appealed to the country against him, he would see the result. This was one of those beggings of the question common with thinkers who reason through the medium of

* *Daily News*, Jan. 3rd, 1878.

their passions; but the support of Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon by the Opposition was a strange and yet a very significant fact, and it proved the existence of those divisions in the Cabinet which Mr. Forster had the unlucky temerity to deny.

## CHAPTER III.

**A Period of Disaster—Fall of Antivari—Surrender of Nisch to the Servians—Renewed Advance of General Gourko—Order of the March—Difficulties and Perils of the Enterprise—The Turkish Retreat from Sophia—Rumours of an Armistice—Progress of General Gourko—Evacuation of Trajan's Pass by the Turks—Anxious Position of Fuad Pasha—Retreat and Pursuit along the Maritza—Abandonment of Tartar Bazardjik—Hurried Flight of the Turks—The Maritza forded by the Russians—Abandonment of Philippopolis—Consternation among the Mohammedans—Desperate Battle in the Mountains—Heroic Valour of Fuad Pasha—Defeat and Dispersion of the Turkish Army under his Command—Capture of the Shipka Pass by the Russians—Victorious advance of Radetzky's Army—Taking of Kezanlik—Desolation of the Country in Rear of the Retreating Turks—Annihilation of Suleiman Pasha's Army—Affairs at Constantinople—Parliamentary Opposition and Ministerial Changes—Proposals for an Armistice—Despatch of Commissioners to the Turkish Head-quarters—Policy of England and Austria—Turkey's illusory Hopes—Meeting of the English Parliament—Debates on the Address in the Upper and Lower House—Contemplated Measures of Precaution—Awful Sufferings of the Turkish Fugitives in Roumelia—Risings in Thessaly—Agitation in the Kingdom of Greece.**

EVENTS followed one another with startling rapidity in those January days. Antivari, having suffered a prolonged siege and a terrible bombardment, surrendered on the 10th, when Prince Nikita, of Montenegro, returned their swords to the Beys, as an acknowledgement of their brave resistance. The population were allowed to emigrate where they pleased, and the Prince lent his own horses, and those of his Staff, to carry the sick and wounded who would not stay. The situation of this town within the limits of Albania, made its loss a matter of some importance; but the misfortune was succeeded by others no less serious. The Montenegrins attacked the fortified heights above Dulcigno on the 19th of January, carrying them after a long and bloody fight, notwithstanding the determined opposition of a Turkish ironclad in the roads. The town was stormed on the same evening, and the garrison of the citadel took refuge on board the fleet. A whole battalion of Turkish regulars had been taken prisoners when the fortified positions were captured; and the Montenegrins, emboldened by their success, pushed on towards Scutari, which, by planting batteries so as to command the river Boïana, they cut off from the sea. Several island fortresses on the lake were seized soon afterwards, and the Turkish power in the whole of that region was reduced almost to extremity before the conclusion of peace. Equal calamities were occurring in other directions. After a brilliant success over the Servians—who on the 7th of January were compelled, with great loss, to evacuate Kurshumlia, which they had taken on the 25th of December—the Turks were once more discomfited by their rebellious vassals. Five days' severe fighting occurred before Nisch; on the 9th and 10th of January, Goritza, Vinik, and all the other heights commanding the fortress, were stormed at a great expenditure of life; and on the following morning Nisch itself capitulated. A fortnight earlier, the commandant had offered to surrender the place if he and his troops might be allowed to march out with all their weapons; but the terms were refused, and the siege proceeded with renewed vigour. The Servian losses before this fortress amounted to seven officers and three hundred privates; but the great end had been attained. Nisch, which in the early days of the war was a place of importance to the Turks, though its value diminished with the inability to hold Bulgaria, was now in the grasp of Prince Milan; and, together with the stronghold itself, the Servians captured two hundred guns (of which twenty-five were Krupps), together with munitions and rations to a large amount.

These events, however, were trivial in comparison with what was simultaneously proceeding in the region of the Balkans. Animated by his brilliant success in crossing the great mountain-range between Orkhanieh and Sophia, General Gourko resolved to lose no time in pushing further south. He divided his army into four detachments, which were to advance by parallel roads upon as many distinct positions. The column on the right, which was commanded by General Wilhelminof, started from Sophia on the 7th of January, and was ordered to march rapidly on Samakova, so as to cut off the Turks who were retreating in the direction of Radomir. The main column was under Count Schouvaloff; and, starting on the morning



NISCH.

of the 9th by the Ichtiman road, it moved towards Tartar Bazardjik. General Schilder-Schuldner commanded a detachment on the left, which was to follow the river Topolnica; while, still further to the left, General Krüdener, at the head of a strong column, was to proceed by way of Otlukoi, to follow the line of retreat of Chakir Pasha from Kamarli, and to unite with the other columns before Tartar Bazardjik. Thus the Turks were to be crushed by a concerted operation, the success of which depended upon great exactness in the management of details, and which, at any rate, would involve a large amount of labour, suffering, and hazard. Another vast mountain-range lay before the war-worn soldiers of Gourko's army, who had not yet entirely recovered from the fatigue of their recent march; and the communications with the base of supplies at Sophia would necessarily become very difficult as soon as the advancing divisions had got far into the glens and passes. But it was believed that the enterprise was practicable, and the result proved the correctness of that view. The order to march was therefore given, and six days' rations of hard bread were distributed to each of the troops. Extra ammunition was taken with the artillery, and to every gun was a double supply of horses.

The Turks from Sophia had retreated in two directions, almost at right angles with one another. A detachment of 5,000 fell back towards the defile of Kapudchik, about ten miles in the rear of Ichtiman, while the bulk of the army, consisting of some 25,000 men, shaped their course towards Samakova and the country beyond. At the same time, the troops from Arab Konak, numbering 15,000, retired on Slatitza, their rear-guard commanded by Baker Pasha, whose excellent dispositions secured the safety of the force. The Russian pursuit of the flying Ottomans was pressed with unrelenting vigour, and rumours of approaching peace were not allowed to interfere with it. General Wilhelminof had not advanced far on the 7th of January ere he discovered the Turks drawn up in a strong position; but before he could attack, a *parlémentaire* entered his lines with a telegram from Constantinople, to the effect that an armistice had beer accepted by Russia. The news was passed on by Wilhelmin of to General Gourko, and the former suspended operations until the receipt of further orders; but on the morning of the 8th the Turks had vanished. On the 9th, the Second Division of the Guard, under Schouvaloff, marched against

Ichtiman, and the force under Krüdener, together with the Third Division of the Guard, commanded by Dondeville, advanced towards Slatitza. It was not until that day that Gourko and his Staff, at the head of the main column, left Sophia, and their progress was soon delayed by a severe snow-storm and intense frost, succeeding to a brief period of thaw. The hamlet of Vakarel, where they had hoped to obtain shelter for the night, was found to be burned, and the soldiers were obliged to bivouac in the snow. The weather was extremely trying, and the men had not the excitement of combat to sustain their spirits, for the Turks continued to retreat with rapidity, and hardly a trace of them could be discovered. Ichtiman was reached by General Gourko on the 10th, and here some confirmation of the news touching an armistice was received from Major Zéki, an aide-de-camp of Suleiman Pasha, who had come into the lines under cover of a flag of truce. During the day, however, a despatch from the Grand Duke Nicholas was received by General Gourko, who was ordered to continue his advance, notwithstanding any rumours of a pacific character, the authenticity of which was described as doubtful, though the Grand Duke must have known that an armistice had really been proposed.

The Turks had by this time evacuated their positions at Trajan's Gate—a narrow pass in the Balkans, which it was thought would be defended with resolution. Over this rugged path, now slippery with ice, General Gourko and his column advanced on the morning of the 11th, and, on arriving at Vejtrenova, beheld the Turks pursuing their way along the road to Tartar Bazardjik. It was now evident that the design of Suleiman Pasha was to concentrate his forces in that town, and afterwards to follow the army of Chakir Pasha to Adrianople. The Turkish Generalissimo had hoped to gain time for these movements by sending his adversary news of the proposed armistice; but the Russians, as we have seen, refused to slacken their march on that account. Fuad Pasha, who was stationed at Samakova, was thus placed in a very difficult position; for, to reach Tartar Bazardjik, he had to traverse a longer and more difficult road than Gourko, and there was no little probability of his being intercepted and cut off, with his detachment of 25,000 men. He manœuvred, however, with remarkable skill. Finding that his column and that of Gourko were proceeding in parallel lines, at no great distance from one another, he put the river Maritza between him and his enemy as quickly as he could, and so protected his left flank. Marching day and night, he covered the ground with so much rapidity that he was enabled to reach the plain beyond the mountains a little before his pursuer. Nevertheless, the Russians captured a train of nearly three hundred waggons, and dispersed three battalions of his rear-guard. The four columns of the Muscovite force, which up to this point had been following separate roads, re-united in front of Tartar Bazardjik on the 13th of January. The town was already on fire in several places, and nine great columns of smoke rose into the air as the Russians reached the crest of the hill overlooking the wide expanse of level ground which stretches towards Philippopolis. A strong body of Turks was perceived drawn up across the road in advance; but it was resolved to defer any attack until a more favourable opportunity, and the fugitives were allowed to continue their south-easterly march unmolested, after a little artillery firing, and a slight skirmish between the outposts.

The immediate object of the retreat was Philippopolis. Following the line of rail at the foot of the Rhodope Mountains, the Turks hurried forward without a pause, while the Russians made the best of their way along the opposite, or northern, bank of the river. The bridges by which the Ottomans had crossed and recrossed (for Tartar Bazardjik stands on that side of the Maritza which the Russians had been pursuing) were found, on the morning of the 14th, to be either wholly or partially destroyed. The city itself was in a state of ruin, glaring with many fires, darkened with clouds of smoke, and littered with broken furniture and the contents of ransacked shops. Before leaving the place, the Turks had driven away several of the Bulgarian inhabitants, and had compelled others to follow the army. The former returned as soon as the Russians entered the city, and besought protection and assistance. Some dead and wounded Turks lay about the streets, and a few prisoners were brought in from the environs; but the bulk of the army was safe for the present on the other side of the Maritza, and, as night drew on, the camp-fires of the retreating columns were seen blazing on the opposite hill-sides. As it was now imperative to press the pursuit very closely, and the bridges were no longer practicable, it was decided that the detachment of Count Schouvaloff should ford the river at once. The water was piercingly cold, full of drifting ice, and so strong in its impeded current that the men could hardly keep their feet. Though chilled to the very heart, and almost frozen, the soldiers, on reaching the southern shore, pushed on in their dripping garments, and bivouacked in the village of

Adakeui. At daybreak on the 15th, they began a demonstration in the hope of delaying the enemy's retreat until Schilder-Schuldner's brigade could ford the Maritza near Philippopolis, and turn the flank of the fugitive and disheartened Turks. An animated engagement, which lasted all day, ensued among the rice-fields; and at dark the opposing forces were still face to face. While the battle was proceeding, General Gourko arrived on the other side of the river, which several of his men presently crossed—some on the horses of the Staff officers and escort, others on foot. Schilder-Schuldner's division was delayed, and did not arrive until late in the afternoon. The turning movement was therefore a failure, and during the ensuing night the Turks got quietly away, and took up new positions between Stanimaka and Der-



RETREAT OF THE TURKS: A DANGEROUS ROAD.

bendere. In the course of the same day, Krüdener's detachment occupied a suburb of Philippopolis lying north of the Maritza, but was unable to cross, owing to the bridge having been burned. The men were therefore exposed for some hours to the fire of two guns which the Turks had mounted on a rocky height in the middle of the town, but which inflicted little damage.

On the night of the 15th, a squadron of eighty

Dragoons of the Guard, who had already crossed the river, made an adventurous dash into the city, and, meeting with no opposition, advanced towards the railway station, which they found in flames. Not far off, a number of Turkish soldiers were assembled in great disorder. They had been seized with panic, and were abandoning the town with so much precipitation that a supper which had been prepared for three Pashas was left untouched. Dismounting from their horses, and concealing themselves in a ditch, the dragoons opened a sudden fire on the Ottoman force, at the same time cheering and shouting loudly. The fire was returned with vigour, but after a while dropped off, and faded away in the distance. It was evident that the Turks were in full retreat, and the dragoons, mounting in haste, galloped after them, killing some, and capturing others. When the Russians settled down in the city, it appeared that large numbers of Turkish families had fled southward for some days, under orders from Suleiman Pasha, who had announced his intention of burning the town on the approach of the Russians. A writer from the spot has recorded that frequent trains were run, carrying thousands of passengers, who loaded the roofs, the steps, and even the buffers of the carriages; that provisions were thrown away, or sold for trifling sums; and that a yoke of oxen brought only a Turkish pound, a cow eight piastres, and a sheep four. The last passenger-train left on the 10th of January; and the city was then plundered, and fired in several places, by the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks, whom there was no authority to hold in check.

A temporary bridge was constructed on the 16th, and a ferry opened with as little delay as possible. The forces still on the northern shore of the Maritza were thus enabled to cross into the city, and some approach to order was soon established. In the hospital, and indeed in the town generally, those scenes of misery, suffering, and neglect, which had by this time become the veriest commonplaces of the war, were found in ample measure. General Gourko took up his quarters in the Russian Consulate, and the officers were housed in dwellings of the chief citizens. Throughout the night of the 16th, and the whole of the 17th, a furious battle proceeded on the mountains south of Philippopolis, where Fuad Pasha, who commanded a detachment of Suleiman's army, took up a position among some vineyards, and encountered the united attacks of Dondeville on the right, of Wilhelminof on the left, and of Schouvaloff and Schilder-Schuldner in front. The division of Fuad had by this time dwindled down to a shadow of its former strength. Many of the troops had been killed and wounded; others had escaped still further south; some, probably, had disbanded in sheer weariness and despair. The number now with Fuad Pasha is believed not to have exceeded 15,000 men; but they fought like giants. Charging at the point of the bayonet, they endeavoured to re-take eighteen cannon which Dondeville had seized on the previous day. The attempt failed, after a fierce and bloody conflict, and the Turks were compelled to abandon thirty-two more before they finally relinquished the hopeless and unequal strife. Fuad Pasha had always declared that he would die rather than surrender; and he kept his word. In a transport of valour, hatred, and fanaticism, he rushed, at the head of his men, on the brigade of General Krasnoff, and, becoming separated from his escort, fell under repeated wounds, after having killed or injured seventeen Russians with his own sword. At length, the exhausted and almost starving Turks broke up into small bands, and, as the darkness thickened on that fatal 17th of January, escaped into the gloomy and snow-white mountains in their rear.

Suleiman Pasha's plan of defence had completely broken down; but this result was due in part, not only to the events just related, but also to a great disaster at the Shipka Pass. Against the Turkish positions in that mountain tract, a large force had been set in motion, under the command of General Radetzky. This force was divided into three columns; the right commanded by Skobeleff, the left by Prince Mirsky, and the centre by Radetzky in person. The two wings were ordered to turn inwards on the village of Shipka as soon as they had arrived at their destinations, while Radetzky himself kept the heights of St. Nicholas. The depth of snow among the mountains delayed the execution of this project; but on the 8th of January the wings began their concentric movement on the rear of the Turkish troops. Fighting commenced on the following day, when, in the midst of a thick fog and blinding snow-storm, the two armies came into collision. The Turks did not yield without a desperate struggle; but at length, finding themselves surrounded and overwhelmed, they submitted unconditionally to the Russian commanders. The men who thus laid down their arms numbered 32,000, including four Pashas: 92 guns, together with ten colours, also fell into the conquerors' hands. But the Russians paid dearly for their success. They had to lament two generals, one colonel, and one lieutenant-colonel wounded; nineteen inferior officers killed,

and a hundred and sixteen wounded; 1,103 men killed, and 4,246 wounded: in all, a total of 5,464 men removed from the fighting ranks. The Turks do not seem to have kept any watch upon their flanks, but to have trusted to their strong position in front, and to the barrier against the enemy presented by the heavy snow-falls. The consequence was that the Russians established themselves so strongly on both sides and in the rear that the Ottomans were thoroughly crushed, and, though exhibiting their accustomed gallantry, as well as their usual want of generalship, were obliged to surrender to their more astute antagonists. Vesoul Pasha, the Turkish commander, seems to have shown great lack of intelligence in his conduct of affairs, and to have thrown away by remissness the excellent opportunities for defence which were offered by his position.

The village of Shipka, together with the pass so named, was now in the hands of the invaders, and Radetzky, encouraged by his success, took immediate measures for pushing further south in aid of Gourko's movement. In the first instance, he sent the cavalry forward, and by the 14th of January a detachment of the Moscow Dragoons had reached the railway between Philippopolis and Tartar Bazardjik. Here they removed a portion of the rails, so as to stop the traffic; and on the same day Skobeleff's advance-guard, commanded by General Strukoff reached Schirpan, situated north of Hermanli, which was captured on the 16th, after an obstinate struggle with the inhabitants. The central column of Radetzky's army occupied Eski-Zaghra and Yeni-Zaghra a few days later, and then pushed on to Yamboli by the direct Adrianople road; while a third column from Twarditza prepared to advance in the direction of Karnabad. During the battle in the Shipka Pass, Kezanlik had been taken by Prince Mirsky, and it now presented a most dismal aspect, having been partly burned some time before by Suleiman Pasha, and partly sacked by the returning Bulgarians. Until the outbreak of the war, Kezanlik was a pretty and prosperous town, full of gardens and orchards, and with sparkling rills of water coursing through the streets. It was the capital of what is called the rose-country—the district in which roses are grown for the manufacture of perfume; but it was now little better than a blackened ruin. The same might be said, according to a writer in the *Daily News*, of every town and village from Slivno to Karlovo, including the richest and most beautiful parts of Bulgaria (so called). The Turks had been leaving the country during the past two or three months. Most of them had gone to Adrianople, or to the capital; and when the Russians entered the abandoned cities, they were found to be almost depopulated. Many were burned, or otherwise destroyed; for the Turks, as they retired before their irresistible enemy, set fire to the places they could no longer save, and spread havoc and desolation over a large extent of territory. It was now obvious that neither the country northwest of Adrianople, nor Adrianople itself, could be defended against the Russians. The army of Suleiman Pasha was almost annihilated, and the shattered remnants were glad to take refuge in the Rhodope Mountains, where they might indeed be safe from further reverses, but where they would be powerless to assist the national cause by any active movements.

Before the occurrence of these events, Suleiman had been deprived of the principal European command, and placed under the orders of Raouf Pasha, the Minister of War, who, about the commencement of the year, was invested with the command-in-chief of the Ottoman forces in Europe. At the same time, Mehemet Ali was appointed a member of the Military Council, and everything seemed to indicate a determination to pursue the struggle, even to the last extremity. Such was certainly the feeling of the Chamber of Deputies, the members of which vehemently opposed all who were suspected of lukewarmness in the service of the country. Their attacks on the Grand Vizier and Mahmud Damat were especially violent, and it was believed that the Sultan had no alternative but to dismiss the House, or sacrifice the men in power. On the 7th of January, the Chamber unanimously adopted a motion of Emin Effendi, deputy for Smyrna, declaring it urgent that the Government and the House should come to an understanding on the question of the national defence. The Chamber also discussed, on its first reading, a Bill for the creation of an independent Court of Accounts, to be charged with the revision of the various Ministerial estimates, and to exercise a control over the public expenditure. The result of this opposition was that several Ministerial changes were made on the 11th of January. Said Pasha, Secretary to the Sultan, was appointed Minister of the Interior; Namyk Pasha became Minister of the Civil List; Kiani Pasha went to the Ministry of Finance, in place of Yousouf Pasha, who was appointed Governor of Trebizond; Safvyk Pasha received the office of Minister of Customs, and Ahmed Vefik Pasha that of Public Instruction; while Edhem Pasha was succeeded as Grand Vizier by Hamid Pasha, until then Minister of the



GATHERING ROSES AT KEZANLIK.

Interior. Mukhtar Pasha attended the Cabinet Council for the first time on the 12th of January, and it may be fairly assumed that his voice was not in favour of a weak submission. Yet at that very moment the Sultan was negotiating with the Czar for the conclusion of an armistice.

ARRIVAL OF A TRAIN OF FUGITIVES AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

When the English answer to the Turkish appeal arrived at Constantinople, the Porte put a very strained construction upon the intimation of the Emperor that he would not entertain any peace proposals until an armistice had been asked for by Turkey. It was assumed that this was virtually the proposal of an armistice by Russia, and telegrams to that effect were sent out to the Pashas in command, ordering them to suspend hostilities. The Russians, however, declared that they had never sought any suspension of arms, and required the Sultan to make a formal demand on his own behalf. Accordingly, an armistice was requested on the 7th of January. The reply of the Grand Duke Nicholas was to the effect that negotiations could be conducted only with himself, and that there could be no question of an armistice without the bases of peace being at the same time laid down. The Turks, on their side, asked to be informed of the conditions likely to be proposed for their acceptance, in order that the Porte might be in a position to give the necessary instructions to its representatives. Server Pasha and Namyk Pasha were appointed the chief Ottoman Plenipotentiaries; but their departure for the Russian head-quarters was delayed by a railway accident. Accompanied by Ferik, Vesseb, and Liva Pashas, however, they arrived on the 17th of January at Hermanli, where they were received by the officer delegated by the Grand Duke for that purpose, and escorted to Kezanlik, which they reached on the 19th.

In the meanwhile, speculation was rife as to the conditions which they were empowered to accept. England and Austria, in particular, were agitated by considerable apprehension as to the designs of Russia, who, it was feared, would, in the intoxication of her great success, insist on concluding with Turkey a peace which might be antagonistic to European interests. The Courts of London and Vienna lost no time in laying before the Porte their decided objection to any such arrangement. Server Pasha informed them in reply that Turkey preferred to accept whatever terms Russia chose to dictate, considering that she was unable to make any further resistance, and having, therefore, no alternative but to throw herself into the arms of her foe. The European Powers, he remarked, would have no just ground of complaint if Turkey consulted her own interests exclusively, since they had ostentatiously and repeatedly proclaimed that they would only intervene to further their own ends; and he added that the Porte was ready, if necessary, to sacrifice one half of the Turkish Empire, in order to save the other. The Ambassadors immediately telegraphed a full report of these observations to their respective Governments, and in a few hours received instructions to inform the Porte that England and Austria would not recognize any arrangement made in contravention of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, without the participation of the guaranteeing Powers. This notification was interpreted by the Sultan's Ministers as revealing a disposition on the part of the two Powers, but especially of England, to assist Turkey against the Russians, if the demands of the latter were too extreme. The representations of the English Government were regarded as *bonâ fide;* those of Austria were considered somewhat equivocal, and as put forth merely *pro formâ*, with a view to possible eventualities. The latter judgment was a very shrewd guess at the truth; for it must always be recollected that behind any superficial differences of opinion, or of aim, between the Russian and Austrian Cabinets, there was the hidden, though scarcely secret, understanding of the two Emperors —an understanding which had governed the conduct of Austria throughout the war, and which would in all probability determine her action at the period of peace.

The interests of England in the Eastern Question were greater than those of Austria, and, notwithstanding the vacillations of many months, the Porte was inclined to believe that the Government of Lord Beaconsfield still regarded Turkey as essential to the safety of the British Empire. For some time past, Mr. Layard (who at the beginning of the year had been made permanent Minister at Constantinople, instead of occupying, as heretofore, the position of Sir Henry Elliot's substitute) had been extremely unpopular in the official circles of Constantinople, because it was thought that he had buoyed up Turkey with hopes of assistance from England, when he ought to have known that no such assistance was intended. But he was now once more viewed with favour, and the English alliance again assumed a colour of probability. A few days before, it was even believed that the Ambassador ran some risk of being insulted in the streets of Constantinople. The authorities would not permit Dr. Engländer, Reuter's agent, to telegraph a contradiction of the report that Server Pasha had addressed bitter reproaches to the Minister of Great Britain; and caricatures, designed to cover England with ridicule, were hawked about the capital until seized by the police.* The recent despatch from London, however, entirely altered the feelings both of the Turkish officials and the Turkish people, and hopes were entertained, which in the end proved

* Pera Correspondent of the *Times*.

nearly as deceptive as those which had gone before. People even began to talk of an English occupation of Gallipoli, which they believed would be converted into a second Gibraltar, and held against Europe as long as the British fleet commanded the seas. Yet it was at the same time proclaimed that the Sultan would not permit any English force to land on Ottoman soil, unless such force came as an avowed ally. Turkey had persistently refused to allow the entrance of the British fleet into the Dardanelles, except upon a like condition; and it is impossible to blame her for assuming this ground. The presence of a British army or fleet within the Turkish dominions would clearly have been a menace, unless it were an act of decided friendship. There could hardly be any medium. England must have presented herself either as an ally in arms, or as a secret enemy, desirous of promoting her own ends at the expense of Turkish independence.

While the arrangements for the armistice were still in suspense, the English Parliament assembled, in accordance with the announcement that had been made about a month earlier. It was the 17th of January, and the Turks were in flight before the victorious Russian advance across the Balkans. On that very day, the Turkish delegates for the conclusion of a truce had arrived at Hermanli, and affairs had reached almost the last extremity for the Turkish cause. Parliament had never met under more anxious circumstances, and the words of the Royal Speech were looked for with more than usual curiosity. "I have thought fit," said her Majesty, "to assemble you before the usual period of your meeting in order that you might become acquainted with the efforts I have made to terminate the war now devastating Eastern Europe and Armenia, and that I might have the advice and assistance of my Parliament in the present state of public affairs." The recent course of events was then briefly sketched, and, after alluding to the opening of negotiations for peace, her Majesty continued:—"Hitherto, so far as the war has proceeded, neither of the belligerents has infringed the conditions on which my neutrality is founded, and I willingly believe that both parties are desirous to respect them, so far as it may be in their power. So long as these conditions are not infringed, my attitude will continue the same. But I cannot conceal from myself that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt measures of precaution. Such measures could not be effectually taken without adequate preparation, and I trust to the liberality of my Parliament to supply the means which may be required for that purpose."

Here, then, in accordance with what had been generally anticipated, was the actual cause of Parliament having been summoned before its usual time. The debates in the two Houses did not lessen the gravity of the Royal announcement. The tone adopted by Lord Beaconsfield, in replying to Lord Granville, was decidedly bellicose. Reverting to the war which England had waged against France in the early part of the century, the Premier observed:—"It was a great cause which your forefathers then maintained; and, however depressed trade may be, whatever may be the circumstances brought forward to enervate the national mind, whatever may be the considerations introduced to prevent you from acting as your forefathers then did, it may be your duty to follow in their footsteps. If that cause were again at stake,—if there were a Power that threatened the peace of the world with a predominance fatal to public liberty and national independence,—I feel confident that your Lordships would not be afraid of the charge of being isolated, if you stood alone in maintaining such a cause, and in fighting for such a British interest." These observations gave great dissatisfaction to the anti-Turkish party, and the Duke of Argyll argued that the Prime Minister's language would be interpreted by Turkey as giving a hope of assistance, and that Russia would consequently find the Pashas more difficult to deal with in the negotiations for peace. In the course of his address, the Duke ventured on the preposterous misstatement, very common with his party, that the European Powers had, at the peace of 1856, undertaken obligations to the subject races of Turkey which they could never repudiate; that they had, in fact, bound themselves to protect the interests of those races under the extreme circumstances which had then arisen. One of the most noteworthy facts brought out by the debate in the Upper House was the gradual conversion of Lord Salisbury from the decidedly Muscovite views which he had held a year before to opinions more consonant with the position of an English Minister. He was still overwhelmingly complaisant to the Russian Emperor and the Russian Government; but he was beginning to perceive that, however excellent might be the intentions of those who had made the war, the possibilities of ambition were not to be disregarded. "I do not wish," he said, "to examine what exactly are the circumstances under which the interests that have been defined will be threatened; but I know that the wave of war is approaching closely to localities with which those interests are connected. Before the Parliament of England, therefore, lies this alternative: if it does not trust the present Government, let it

provide itself with a Government which it can trust; but if it does trust the present Government, let it confide to it the proper means for efficiently performing those great duties which its confidence has imposed."

The debate on the Address in the House of Commons extended over two evenings, and the chief representative of the Government in that Chamber—the Chancellor of the Exchequer—adopted a less belligerent tone than his leader in the House of Lords. Sir Stafford Northcote said that the contemplated appeal to the liberality of Parliament would depend altogether upon the course of events, and would involve no immediate demand for further supplies. The Government was ready to believe that the Russian proposals would be in accordance with declarations made before the outbreak of the war; but it was impossible to say what might be the effect which a long struggle might have had on the position and views of the Russians. It was therefore necessary that Ministers should maintain an attitude of watchfulness and reserve until they knew what it was that the Emperor desired. For the present, they would make no proposals; but they thought it right to warn the House that it might become their duty to take measures of precaution, and to put themselves in a position to do this effectually. The statements of the Chancellor of the Exchequer amounted to nothing more than what everybody knew very well without them; viz., that England was not going to war for the support of Turkey, but that nevertheless British interests might be so prejudiced by Russian demands as to necessitate a hostile posture. Yet Mr. Gladstone affected to be very much relieved by Sir Stafford Northcote's suave assurances. He hardly knew how to express his thanks for the debate of that night. He had never known any speech of a Minister for which they owed so much thankfulness. They had had a very gracious Speech from the Throne, for which he was thankful. He was also thankful for the very gracious Speech from the front Ministerial bench. He thanked his right honourable friend for the relief he had given, not only to the minds of the Opposition, but he believed also to the mind of the country; and he sincerely hoped, for all their sakes, that the contingency pointed out might never arise. This was not altogether without meaning. There was no real or essential opposition between the phrases in the Queen's Speech and the statements of Sir Stafford Northcote; but there were a few superficial divergencies, of which Mr. Gladstone was delighted to avail himself, in the hope that he should pin the Chancellor of the Exchequer to some strained interpretation of his words, such as might commit the Government to a policy favourable to the aims of Russia under almost any circumstances that were likely to arise. The artifice failed; but it existed none the less, and the studied effusion and iteration of Mr. Gladstone's language must not be suffered to conceal the fact.

Peace was as yet very far from being assured; but even the distant prospect of a termination to the war must have come like a gleam of hope to the unhappy civilians, including a large proportion of women and children, who were now flying from the northern parts of Roumelia to the south. It may fairly be doubted whether universal history presents any scene of wretchedness greater than that which was beheld from day to day in those war-stricken and devastated lands. The whole Mussulman population seemed to be in frantic movement towards the capital, and the terrible severity of the winter added incalculably to their sufferings, which in any case would have been extreme, seeing that they had lost their all, and were often starving for sheer want of bread. A correspondent of the *Times* spoke of this exodus as "the panic of a whole country larger than Great Britain, of an entire population, of tens and hundreds of thousands, bereft of judgment, careless of everything but the safety of the moment, which flight seemed the only means of securing." The railway trains were so closely packed that many deaths took place from suffocation. Mothers, mad with fear, threw their infants out of the carriage windows, and it is related that one mother deliberately killed three of her children, to save them from a more prolonged agony. The roofs of the carriages were covered with refugees, and numbers fell off, and were crushed beneath the wheels. Planks were stretched across the buffers; mattresses were piled upon the planks; blankets were hung up to stave off the bitter wind; and many were glad to obtain a position in those frail and dangerous refuges. The iron crates for luggage, hanging behind the carriages, were crammed with fugitives, who became so stiff with cold that they could not be moved at the stations, and were fed through the bars. In one crate, Consul Blunt, who had been engaged at Tchorlou in relieving the refugees, saw fifteen persons, one of whom had died on the road, while the rest were so jammed in with the dead body that the latter could scarcely be separated. Midhat Pasha, who was at that time staying for a few weeks in London, stated in the English papers that more than sixty districts had been deserted by Mussulman families, terrified by the sad recollection of former massacres; that crowds

of fugitives were huddled together in the capital and in other towns; that the later arrivals, finding it impossible to obtain shelter, were dispersed about the open country in the midst of frost and snow; and that from 25,000 to 30,000 souls—women, children, and aged folk—were scattered along the line of railway between Adrianople and Constantinople, without resources and without shelter. Among the fugitives from Nisch and Pirot, who reached Tartar Bazardjik to take the train at the latter town, were eighty families of wealthy persons who could not obtain room in the carriages then about to leave. Overcome by despair, the old men, the women, and the children, lay down on the rails, preferring, said Midhat, to be crushed by the engine-wheels, rather than endure a continuance of such fearful suffering. It was only by force that they could be removed; and scenes such as this were of frequent occurrence at that tragic epoch. Refugees were pouring into the capital at the rate of three thousand a day, and about the middle of January it was reported that 20,000 more were on their road. The misery of these forlorn creatures was aggravated by the lawlessness of the Circassians, who attacked their co-religionists equally with the Christians. The country around Constantinople, for a radius of a hundred miles, was given up to plunder, and it seemed as if, in the military collapse of Turkey, the very principles of social order had disappeared.

The whole of European Turkey was in truth convulsed. An insurrection broke out in Thessaly, and many families, both Turkish and Christian, sought refuge in the fortress of Volo, or in Greece. The insurgent ranks were augmented by Thessalian volunteers resident in the adjacent kingdom, who fought under the Greek flag, and were received with enthusiasm in the districts which they invaded. Various parts of Macedonia also were agitated by revolutionary movements, and Epirus was watchful of any opportunity for throwing off the Turkish yoke. The infection spread across the borders: at Athens, popular demonstrations in favour of war occurred from day to day. A Ministerial change had recently taken place—in the Greek Kingdom, and the new Premier, M. Comoundouros, declared that his policy was active and real, aiming at the protection and defence of Hellenism, and of their oppressed brethren. Nevertheless, the new Minister did not sufficiently identify himself with the war party to satisfy the popular demands. On the 26th of January, 10,000 persons went in disorderly procession to the residences of the principal Ministers, fired pistol-shots at the hotel of M. Comoundouros, and then proceeded to the King's palace, where his Majesty found it necessary to harangue the people, and exhort them to preserve the peace. These disturbances were renewed on the following day; but the popular effervescence was in some degree quieted by an article in the Athens *Débats*, a semi-official organ, which stated that the Greek Government had vainly sought the alliance of Russia, and that by declaring war against Turkey at such a time Greece would be tempting her own ruin. The confession was one which it was deeply painful, and even humiliating, to make; but it expressed the bare truth, and the Greek people, after their mood of temporary excitement had passed away, saw that the safest policy was to await in peace the further development of events.

BULGARIAN TYPES.

ADRIANOPLE.

## CHAPTER IV.

**Abandonment of Adrianople by the Turks, and Entry of the Russians—Ancient Memories of the City—Inability of the Turkish Commander to defend the Position—Arrival of the Grand Duke Nicholas and the Ottoman Delegates—Bombardment of Russian Towns on the Black Sea—Belligerent Rights and Wrongs—Bad Condition of the Turkish Navy—The Sultan and Reform—Unpopularity of the War—Sufferings of the Bulgarians at Slivno—Alleged Persecutions by the Turkish Government—The Mohammedan Fugitives on the Road from Philippopolis to Hermanli—Horrible Scenes along the Route—Desperate Resistance of the Turkish Peasantry to the Advance of the Russians—Ferocity of the Bulgarians to the Turks—State of Affairs at Erzeroum—Severity of the Winter, and Scarcity of Fuel—The Russian Lines of Investment—Appeal to the Populace—The Turkish Forces within the Walls—Completion of the Investment by the Russians—Occupation of Illidge and Aschkalé—Crossing of the Kop Dagh—Armenia almost entirely in Possession of the Invaders—Movements of the Turks—Terrible Marches in the Snow—Patience and Loyalty of the Ottoman Soldier—Successful Movements of General Komaroff—Despondent Feeling at Erzeroum—Death of Mehmed or Mehemet Pasha—Destruction of a Turkish Ship off Batoum—Russian Defeat near that City—The English Fleet ordered to proceed to the Dardanelles—Countermanding of the Order—Important Announcement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—Resignation of Lord Carnarvon—Statement of the Retiring Minister in the House of Lords—Vacillation of the Government—Resignation of Lord Derby, and withdrawal of the Resignation—Speeches of Mr. Bright and of Sir William Vernon Harcourt.**

AFTER the capture of the Shipka Pass, the complete crossing of the Balkans, the occupation of Philippopolis, the surrender of large Turkish armies, and the flight of Suleiman Pasha, the possibilities of a successful defence were fairly exhausted, and nothing but submission lay before the vanquished Moslems. The peace negotiations at the Russian head-quarters proceeded slowly, being evidently delayed by the conquerors in the expectation that further triumphs would enable them to extort still more favourable terms; and even before any result could be settled, the Turks seem to have resigned themselves to despair. Great preparations had been made for the defence of Adrianople; but the second city of European Turkey was abandoned without a blow. Early on the 19th of January, some of the public buildings were set on fire, the store of ammunition was blown up, and the Mussulman inhabitants took to flight, following on the track of the garrison, who, with arms and baggage, retired upon Constantinople. Djemil Pasha, the Governor of the city, left together with the other authorities, and the Greek Patriarch and Chief Rabbi, aided by a guard of Christians, assumed the direction of affairs. A deputation of the leading inhabitants then went forth to meet the Russians, whose advance-guard entered Adrianople at a late hour that night. A Provisional Government, composed of members of different nationalities, was established on the following day, and a body of



RUSSIAN SOLDIERS TRYING ON TURKISH CAPS IN A BAZAAR AT ADRIANOPLE.

cavalry at once began throwing out patrols on the roads towards Lulé Burgas and Demotica.

Adrianople is to some extent the gate of Constantinople. It is a city of considerable size, lying about a hundred and thirty-five miles north-west of the capital, at the junction of the Maritza (anciently the Hebrus) with the Tundja and the Arda. The name is derived from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who restored the city, and gave it an importance and a beauty which it had not before possessed. Many relics of those ancient times are to be seen about the public ways, and the central portions of the town are surrounded by an old stone wall, erected in the epoch of the Byzantine Empire. Mosques, baths, fountains, and aqueducts give something of Imperial stateliness to the venerable city; yet the streets are narrow and irregular, after the manner of the East. The mosque of Sultan Amurath was once a Christian fane; but it yields in beauty to that of Selim II., which was chiefly constructed of materials brought from the ruins of Famagosta, in Cyprus. The town originally occupying the site of Adrianople was called Uscudama, and was one of the seats of the warlike but not very civilised Thracians. Its successor has been associated with several military events of importance. In the adjacent plain, Constantine the Great, in the year 323 of the Christian era, defeated Licinius, and thus gained the Empire; and in 378 the Goths overthrew the Emperor Valens, who was burned alive in a house where he had taken refuge. Adrianople was seized by the Turks under Amurath (or Murad) I. in 1361, and remained the capital of the Turkish Empire until the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Even up to the commencement of the last century, it was a frequent and favourite residence of the Sultans; but since then it has declined very much in importance. Still, its relative position towards Constantinople renders it a point of great value to an invader, and its capture by the Russians, on the 20th of August, 1829, brought the war of that period to a termination, and extorted from the Ottomans a treaty of peace full of disastrous conditions.

The Turks had from fifteen to twenty thousand men at Adrianople in January, 1878, and, as the town was strongly fortified, it may at first sight appear strange that some attempt was not made to defend it. The number of troops, however, was altogether inadequate for such a purpose. Had Suleiman Pasha been able to get into the place, as he hoped to do, it is most likely that the progress of the Russians would have been delayed, and that, if successful at all, they would have succeeded only at the expense of a severe and prolonged struggle. But the capture of the Shipka Pass, and the southern march of Gourko and his companions-in-arms, completely disconcerted the schemes of Suleiman, who was now a fugitive in the Rhodope Mountains. The military commander in the city, before the flight of the Turks, was Eyoub Pasha, and he seems to have considered the position hopeless. Accordingly, he did not even wait to be attacked, but secured his retreat while there was yet time. It has even been alleged that he was ordered by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, Server and Namyk Pashas, to give up the city to the Russians, as the Grand Duke Nicholas desired to conduct the peace negotiations there.* The Russian force by which Adrianople was occupied was at first commanded by the younger General Skobeleff, who speedily restored tranquillity, and extinguished the incendiary fires which the Turks had kindled. Seventy Ottoman soldiers remained in the town after the departure of their comrades, and patrolled the streets until the arrival of the Russians, to assist in the preservation of order. Skobeleff allowed these men to leave without molestation, and they had certainly performed a useful office. The Christians were not unnaturally in a state of elation; the Mohammedans were proportionately exasperated; and the danger of a fanatical outbreak was considerable. On the 26th of January, General Gourko arrived in advance of his column, and, being the senior officer of Skobeleff, replaced that commander in the direction of the troops. Next day, the Grand Duke Nicholas entered the city, accompanied by the Turkish delegates. There had been considerable discussion of the terms of peace during the stay of those officials at Kezanlik; but nothing had been settled, and the negotiations stood over for ulterior arrangement at Adrianople.

In the midst of all these doleful events, the Turks were enabled to wreak some mischief on their antagonists by means of the large and powerful fleet with which they scoured the Black Sea. That fleet had done but little to oppose the much smaller force of the Russians, and particular vessels had often suffered very rough usage; but the coast-towns of Russia were from time to time made to feel the weight of Ottoman guns. In the early part of January, four ironclads, commanded by Hobart Pasha, left Batoum, and bombarded the fortifications and military establishments at Chevketil, Grigorethi, and Poti, where they committed great havoc, and caused much loss to the Russians.

* Communication from Pera, dated Jan. 23rd. *Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 22nd, 1878.

Eupatoria, in the Crimea, was bombarded on the 12th by two ironclads, when several houses were damaged, and one man was mortally wounded. On the following day, Theodosia, also in the Crimea, was attacked in a similar manner, and some extensive conflagrations were caused by the shells. Neither of these towns was fortified, and the Turks were much blamed for conducting warlike operations against places that possessed no military character, especially at a time when they were requesting an armistice. The objection, however, seems to have come from the Russians themselves, and to have been a little one-sided. It is commonly admitted that a belligerent is entitled to do his antagonist as much injury as he can; and, although the greater humanity of modern times has imposed some limitations on this right, unfortified towns have not always been held exempt from the visitations of war. To talk of the armistice negotiations was absurd. They had not even commenced, although Turkey had certainly expressed a desire that they should be opened; and, when actually proceeding, Russia did not consider that they fettered the action of her commanders in the slightest degree.

The Turks were very little moved by these criticisms, which were in truth of no great value; and about the same time, Captain Manthorpe, an English officer in the Turkish service, bombarded Yalta, Anapa, and Quesleve, destroying the forts and towns, and forcing the inhabitants to fly into the interior. These actions, however, were poor compensation for the absence of those triumphs over the Russian fleet which were confidently anticipated at the beginning of the war, and the failure of which has never been explained. One cause of failure may have been that many of the ships, being constructed on new principles of naval architecture, turned out less manageable and seaworthy than was hoped. Vessels, it seems, were continually returning to Constantinople for repairs. The *Assari Tefvik*, one of the finest ironclads in the Ottoman navy, broke down in the middle of November, 1877, and was not again ready for sea until about the same period in January, 1878. The *Mukbir Surroor*, a wooden frigate sent to reinforce Hobart Pasha at Batoum, returned in three days with a leak. Another frigate was reported to be in a similar condition; and two ironclad corvettes needed large repairs of their machinery. The Turkish seaworthy ships at this date are said to have been not more numerous than could be counted on the fingers of one hand, and the inactivity of Hobart Pasha was explained by the alleged fact that all his best ships had been withdrawn from him. At the beginning of January, he had under his command only one vessel—a small despatch-steamer, named the *Izeddin*. With such meagre resources, it was of course impossible to do anything of importance; and the bombarding of a few coast-towns was the utmost that could be accomplished.

Thus, both at sea and on land, the ancient predominance of the Osmanlis waned before the mightier power from the North. The Turkish people were overwhelmed with grief, astonishment, and anger, and visited the national misfortunes on the Ministers of the Sultan. In the amendment to the address in reply to the speech from the throne, the Parliament observed that if the military and diplomatic operations had been conducted in a manner worthy of the sacrifices made by the people, the State would not have been reduced to the condition in which it then stood; and every day brought fresh confirmation of the truth of this remark, by showing more clearly how few were the capable and patriotic commanders or diplomatists whom Turkey possessed. The Sultan himself admitted, in the course of an audience which he gave to a deputation from Parliament on the 18th of January, that the criticisms of the national representatives were just, and that reforms were necessary. These, he said, were impossible during the continuance of the war; but he earnestly promised to put himself at the head of the reform movement as soon as peace was re-established. Parliament had been requested by the Grand Vizier to appoint a committee for the defence of Constantinople; and the President, with a few leading members, went by special invitation to the Seraskierate, where the deputation was received by the Sultan. But the people at large were getting sick of the war, which they perceived had reached a point beyond which nothing but accumulated misfortune lay before the country. They were willing to make the best terms possible with the victorious Russians, and to leave the other European Powers to settle the Eastern Question among themselves in any way they pleased. With the Balkans passed, with the enemy advancing on Constantinople, with nothing to oppose his progress but broken, disorganized, and disheartened armies, it is not surprising if some even in high places shared these views, and were disposed to abide the worst with the mingled apathy of despair and fatalism.

But the more fanatical had no such feeling. With them, the reverses and humiliations of the time begot a mood of vengefulness and ferocity, which led to fresh outrages. A terrible state of affairs existed, in particular, at Slivno, where it is said that more than five thousand Bulgarian women

and children from devastated villages in the neighbourhood were wandering about the streets in a condition of the most extreme penury. The prisons, moreover, were full of Christians, charged with offences against the Government; executions on a large scale occurred frequently; and some of the rich merchants of the city were seized and flung into gaol, from which they were occasionally permitted to release themselves by the payment of heavy bribes. In the latter part of 1877, several Bulgarian notables were sent in chains to Constantinople, where they were at once imprisoned, without any accusation being made against them. Subsequently they were exiled to Boli, in Asia Minor; and it is alleged that the reason for this treatment was the fear that the imprisoned notables might exercise their influence in favour of an insurrectionary movement. Such, at least, were the stories circulated in the early weeks of 1878; but, as they came from Bulgarian sources, and were admirably adapted to excuse any subsequent tyranny of the Russians over the Mohammedan population, they must be accepted with some reserve. Nevertheless, it cannot be questioned that the fanaticism of the Turks was highly excited at this period of the struggle; that they looked on the Bulgarians as the origin of all their sufferings and disgrace; and that they revenged themselves, where they could, with the frenzy which seems common to all Eastern populations.

There was certainly enough to try their forbearance to the utmost. Even in the summer, the misery of the Mohammedan fugitives had been great; with the advancing winter it became immeasurably worse; and in the month of January it reached the very acme of pitiable wretchedness. An impartial yet sympathetic observer has described the road from Philippopolis to Hermanli as "seventy miles of utter desolation, seventy long miles strewn with the household effects of many thousand families, seventy weary miles of a continuous, ghastly, sickening panorama of death in every form, and in its most terrible aspect." Writing on the 27th of January, this chronicler averred that the roads had for many weeks been the theatre of scenes so inexpressibly horrible in their character that no one who had not witnessed them could conceive in the most moderate degree the nature of the diabolical drama. Fugitives from the whole territory from Plevna to Philippopolis were for months endeavouring to make their way to Constantinople; and the public roads were strewn with dead bodies (some of which had blood-stains on their garments), with dead horses and cattle, with broken-down arabas, and with rags of cast-off clothing. The number of persons who had passed that way was so large that many had made distinct paths for themselves through the rice-fields on each side; and still the block had evidently been great at particular points. The severity of the weather had done more than human ferocity in thinning these crowded ranks. Women and children frozen to death, but otherwise not injured, lay about in the snow, or looked forth in white rigidity from the ditches, and from pools of muddy water. Several infants in arms had died at their mothers' breasts, and been cast away to lighten the burden of the survivors. Even worse than this happened. A woman was seen to thrust into the snow by the roadside a sick child of ten who was unable any longer to keep up with her. The twilight was closing in; the araba-train was almost out of sight in the distance; and a night on the open road meant death. The act was truly appalling; but those who sit in their warm homes, with scarcely the power to imagine such trials, have not the right to judge it.

The arabas, or ox-carts, were of the most miserable description, and the lean and ill-fed beasts who drew them became exhausted after a time, and perished in large numbers. Bedding and household utensils were piled high upon these crazy vehicles, and afforded some little shelter and warmth during the night. Most of the poor people were insufficiently clad in thin and ragged garments, though the wind blew keenly across snowy wastes. Of the men who had died from wounds, some were Turks, and others Bulgarians. There had manifestly been a series of deadly frays at different localities, and it appeared that, as the Russians advanced southward from Philippopolis, the armed Mohammedan population of several villages resisted them with desperate but unavailing courage. The Bulgarian peasantry got mixed up in these contests, of course in opposition to the Turks; and several of the combatants lost their lives in the fury and hatred of the struggle. At the village of Derbent, three peasants shut themselves up in a small stone house, from which they fired repeated volleys on the Muscovite cavalry. The place could not be taken until cannon were brought to bear on it; and even then the three Moslems sallied forth, firing on the body of soldiers by whom they were confronted. In another minute they were shot down; but the Russians had already lost several of their number. The same kind of thing occurred in other places; and near Tirali the peasantry travelling in 15,000 arabas, which were there drawn up in bivouac, made a masked attack on a squadron of cavalry, who were put to flight. Preparations were then begun

for assailing the caravan in force; and the fugitives, seized with sudden panic, took to the mountains, leaving their carts, cattle, and furniture behind them. The number of persons who thus rushed off into the barren deserts, where many must have perished of cold and hunger, is believed to have been no fewer than 75,000. When one of the newspaper correspondents rode that way, several days later, he found the fields and hill-sides bristling with the deserted arabas, and the ground, for hundreds of acres and for many miles, covered with rich carpets, with soft draperies, with blankets, bedding, clothes, and various kinds of goods.

It has been said that these unhappy people acted foolishly in quitting their native villages, and endeavouring to reach Constantinople. They should have remained quietly in their homes, and trusted to the generous forbearance and high-minded protection of the Russians and Bulgarians. Unfortunately, the Turks had formed a much truer estimate of the treatment they were likely to receive. Some returning refugees, who had been driven back by the advance-guard of the Russian cavalry, were attacked in the village of Kurucesme by a number of Bulgarians, who robbed them of their cattle and all their household effects, even to the extent of dragging the beds from under sleeping infants. A few Russian officers interposed, and soundly flogged the cowardly thieves, forcing them in some instances to relinquish their booty; but this conduct, much as it reflects honour on the persons concerned, must not blind our judgment to the deliberate cruelty of the Russian military authorities in turning the Mohammedan fugitives back on the vindictive and remorseless Bulgarian villagers. As the correspondent to whom we have referred was riding out of Kurucesme, he saw several bodies of Bulgarians, and further on a great many dead Turks. Upon his asking who killed the latter, the peasants answered, with a kind of fiendish pride, "We did it! We and our friends did it!"* Some of the victims had evidently been stoned to death, after being first wounded with swords or other weapons. Beyond Haskioi, the Bulgarians drove their carts across the heads of dead men and women, without evincing the slightest feeling of compassion, or even the most ordinary regard for decency. The spirit of a diabolical license had passed over the land.

From these appalling scenes we must turn to the distant fields of Asia, where the Turkish army of Mukhtar Pasha was still held fast in Erzeroum. As the wintry days grew colder, the forces of both belligerents suffered much from the frost and snow of those inclement regions. Among the Turks, about fifty men a day were sent from the hospitals to join their regiments, but in so weak a state that they speedily succumbed. Soldiers on outpost duty were not unfrequently frozen to death during the night. Firewood was extremely scarce, for there are but few trees in that part of Armenia. From time to time, old houses were demolished for the sake of the timber, and a little fuel occasionally reached the town from the neighbourhood of Ersingan; but for the most part the inhabitants were obliged to depend on a peculiar kind of composition, made from the droppings of cattle, mixed with earth, and dried in the sun. Many of the people were in a starving condition, and seven thousand sick persons were to be found in the infirmaries, to say nothing of four thousand more, who had been sent away to safer localities. The Russians also suffered, though in a less degree, because they had command of the surrounding country. This, however, was not so great an advantage as it might seem, for the vicinity yielded but little, and the Turks did all they could to burn the villages, and destroy the forage, as long as they were not actually blockaded in the beleaguered city. Movements of this character, though at times successful, were often defeated with heavy loss; and on the whole the Russians improved their position from day to day. At the close of December, 1877, they were close to Erzeroum, and had extended their lines so considerably that the investment was very nearly complete. Nevertheless, the military authorities were anxious to get possession of Erzeroum without having to fight for it; and early in December a very curious paper was picked up in the streets. It was a proclamation from General Heimann, the commander of the Russian advance-guard, and was addressed to the inhabitants of the city. Heimann warned the people not to oppose the Russian arms now that Kars had fallen. If they quietly submitted, and allowed the invaders to occupy the town, they would receive at their hands the same kind treatment which had been shown to the inhabitants of Kars and Ardahan; but for anything that happened after an assault they would have to blame themselves alone. The document was written in the Turkish and Armenian languages on Russian stamped paper, and was evidently an appeal to any lurking elements of treachery which might be found amongst the citizens. That these elements existed, was probably well known to the Russians. Most of the Armenian Christians were well disposed to open the gates to the enemy, and several of these mal-

* *Daily News* Correspondence.

contents had been enrolled in a kind of militia to aid in the defence of the city, so that they had some degree of power in their hands. The regular troops did not exceed 15,000; but they were sufficient to man the works, and to keep the traitors in check.

was still a large quantity of unground corn. The soldiers were dying at the rate of one hundred a day, and the bodies, after being exposed to the frost for a night, were buried a little distance beneath the surface. With each successive week,



STREET IN ERZEROUM.

After the departure of Mukhtar Pasha for Constantinople, and the assumption of the command by Ismail Hakki, the Russians strengthened their line still further, occupied a number of outlying villages, and pushed forward their closing movement round the city. In the early days of 1878, the amount of food within the walls was very seriously reduced. The stock of flour had nearly run out; but there

the isolation of the garrison became more thorough. After a while, all communication between Erzeroum and Trebizond was cut off, and the investment of the former town was completed on the 9th of January. In spite of these misfortunes, the fighting-men within the walls retained their cheerfulness, and determined to make an obstinate stand if an assault should be attempted. The investment was pre-



ENGLISH HOSPITAL AT ERZEROUM.

ceded by the occupation of Illidge. At about ten o'clock on the morning of January 4th, six battalions of Russian infantry, preceded by two regiments of cavalry, crossed the Kara Su, and took possession of the hamlet. They then cut the telegraph wires, and threw out videttes in the direction of Pernacaban. Edhem Pasha, who had the command in that locality, believed he saw before him the advance-guard of a whole army-corps, and accordingly fell back with some precipitation. In the course of the ensuing afternoon, Mehemet Pasha made a sortie from Erzeroum, in connection with a flank movement led by Ismail Hakki, and the Russians, after a brief cannonade, evacuated the village, and recrossed the river. But this success on the part of the Turks was very fleeting. Illidge was again occupied a few days later, and on the 9th of January the Russians took Aschkalé, when Edhem Pasha had a narrow escape of being made prisoner. The Cossacks had approached stealthily along the opposite bank of the Kara Su, under cover of a heavy snow-fog; then, crossing on the ice, they surprised the Turks, who numbered only six hundred men. These fled in disorder, without any attempt at fighting. Some got safely away on their fleet horses; others were slain or taken prisoners. The Russians next pushed a force towards Pernacaban, three hours' march further on, and were soon in a position to threaten Baiburt, the central position of Armenia. It was to this place that Edhem Pasha had fled after his escape from Aschkalé, and it was now doubtful whether he would be safe even there. The passage over the Kop mountains, in the midst of drifting snow and Arctic cold, was one of the most terrible episodes of the war. Many of the wretched soldiers sank by the way, to rise no more; and it was only a small remnant of the army commanded by Edhem Pasha which ultimately reached the place of refuge.

Following closely on the track of the Ottomans, the Russian cavalry and artillery made their way over the Kop Dagh, in spite of the snow with which it was covered to the depth of many feet. The pursuing force consisted of four battalions of infantry, three sotnias of Cossacks, and a battery of mountain guns. The mountains were soon in undisputed possession of the invaders; the plains at their base were dominated by the Russian cannon; and the whole of the surrounding country was in the power of General Melikoff and his colleagues. Erzeroum, Trebizond, and Batoum were separated from one another, so as to be quite incapable of giving mutual support; and these were the only places of importance in Armenia where the rule of the Sultan still existed. The Russian flying columns moved in every direction, without encountering any opposing force, and were thus enabled to collect stores of grain and forage from the numerous villages scattered about the country. A force of five hundred horsemen and three infantry battalions had for some time kept watch over the road leading from the Kop Dagh to Baiburt; but on the 16th of January a telegraphic order from Constantinople directed the removal of the cavalry to Ersingan. They were to take with them a large number of old Enfield and Minié rifles, which were to be used for arming the populace, who were to combine with a corps of Bashi-Bazouks in placing some check upon the Russian foraging parties.

The Turks in Armenia, however, were rapidly losing heart, and not without reason. They had no faith in Erzeroum being able to resist attack, and looked forward to the time when the whole province would fall into the hands of the Czar. In Erzeroum itself, the sanitary condition was so desperate that it was doubted whether in a little while the city would not be without defenders, owing to the effects of disease. Typhus fever was raging in the hospitals, and in many of the private houses. Of the English doctors who were attending the patients, several were struck down by the malady, and one or two lost their lives in the prosecution of their noble duties. Matters were scarcely better at Baiburt, from which six hundred soldiers, only partially recovered from dysentery and typhoid fever, were despatched to Trebizond. To reach the latter city, they had to make their way over the Vavouk mountains, where their sufferings from cold and fatigue were terrible to witness. Their clothing was quite inadequate to protect them from the freezing atmosphere, and their feet were bound in withered mountain sedge, tied on with rags and fragments of rope. The utter disorganization of the Ottoman armies was seen in nothing more than in this inability to supply the men with proper clothing. Both in Europe and Asia, the troops were in tatters, and there was an entire absence of those comforts which are necessary to support life during seasons of exceptional severity. The deaths from cold and hunger alone were sadly numerous, and nothing but the extraordinary fidelity of the Turks to their Padishah, combined with a strong sense of nationality and of the claims of their religion, prevented these unhappy men from breaking into open mutiny, or dispersing themselves to the four quarters. Desertions, indeed, were numerous, and the marvel is that the regiments could be held together at all. But the

habit of obedience is common in most armies, and in none more than that which marches under the symbol of the Crescent.

The active operations of the Russians during these winter months were necessarily restricted. It was not easy to move large bodies of troops through the snow-laden country, and it was almost as much as could be effected to maintain the investing lines round the Ottoman fortresses, and to hold the enemy in an ever-tightening grip. Yet from time to time a few enterprises of the invading force broke the prevailing lethargy. On the 13th of January, General Komaroff's detachment advanced from Ardanutsch against Artivin, and, after encountering a large body of Turkish troops holding strongly-entrenched positions, carried the heights of Gorchotan. A few days later, the same General achieved a further success, notwithstanding the snowy and tempestuous weather against which he had to struggle. During the night following the 21st, he occupied the Imirkoff Bridge, and attacked a Turkish position near the village of Dolibkhan. The Ottoman force, consisting of two battalions of regulars, and six of irregular troops, was completely defeated, when part fled in the direction of Artivin, and the rest withdrew into the neighbouring mountains. On this occasion, the Russians captured one mountain-gun, a number of tents, and a quantity of ammunition and arms. Their own losses appear to have been insignificant; but for this we have only the authority of their official reports, which in such matters are as little worthy of absolute credence as those of any other Power. These reverses increased the despondency of the Turks in a degree which was perhaps disproportioned to the actual calamities; but the enormous accumulation of defeat, in both divisions of the Empire, had produced a feeling of despair. Erzeroum still held out, but nobody supposed it would be able to do so much longer. Mukhtar Pasha, whose name had been associated with victory, was recalled to Constantinople. No great confidence was felt in the abilities of Ismail Hakki, his successor; and Mehmed or Mehemet Pasha, who was regarded as the best officer left to the beleaguered garrison, and who occupied the position of second in command, was carried off by typhus fever in the early part of January. This enterprising commander was only thirty-two years of age, and was born of Hungarian or Polish parents. It was he who had conducted the perilous expedition against the Kizil Tépé, on the 25th of August, 1877, when the Russians were surprised and dispossessed. On the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of October, he had superintended the defence of the Lesser Yahni; and he was the only commander who held his ground on the left flank of the Turkish line on that fatal 15th of October when the Ottoman army was driven back upon Kars. Later on, he had contributed in a most important degree to the defence of Erzeroum; and when he succumbed to the terrible epidemic, he left behind him no man who was entirely competent to fill the position he had occupied.

In addition to their misfortunes by land, the Turks experienced a heavy loss at sea in the neighbourhood of Batoum. The Russian steamer *Constantine* left Sebastopol on the 22nd of January, to cruise along the Caucasian coast, and arrived on the 24th at Sukhum-Kalé, after experiencing a severe storm. On the night of the 26th, she approached Batoum, where a Turkish squadron, consisting of seven large vessels, was at that time stationed. Captain Marakoff, the commander of the *Constantine*, despatched some boats, armed with Whitehead torpedoes, to attack the Turkish ships. Two of these torpedoes were directed against a screw-steamer which was keeping watch, and their explosion so completely shattered the vessel that she sank almost immediately. The surface of the water was covered with broken spars and other portions of the wreck, and the Russian cutters were unable to save any of the crew. The *Constantine* then proceeded along the coast towards Samsun, and ultimately returned to Sebastopol on the 28th of January. The Russian army before Batoum was not equally successful. Intelligence having been received, to the effect that a portion of the Turkish army in that city had been sent to Constantinople, the Russians determined on the resumption of active operations, which had for some time been suspended. Accordingly, at five o'clock on the morning of January 30th, the right flank and centre of the Turkish position near Zichisdiri were attacked with great vehemence, and one division of the assailants succeeded in carrying a portion of the Samaba heights, and of the Stolovaja hill. In the centre, however, the Russians were encountered by great difficulties, especially in crossing the river Kintrischi, where the fire from the enemy's trenches was particularly severe. It was soon discovered that the Turkish forces were more considerable than had been supposed; and at two o'clock in the afternoon the Russians retired to their former positions. A day or two later, the Turks captured a redoubt which had previously been taken by the invaders; and with this exploit the active operations of the war in Armenia came to a close. The Russians were by that time undisputed masters of the open country; but at

Erzeroum, at Batoum, and at Baiburt, the Turks yet stood at bay, defying their enemies to the last from behind their ramparts and their bristling tiers of guns.

The overwhelming successes of the Czar in all directions, and the rapid advance of his European armies towards Constantinople, created a feeling of anxiety in the minds of English Ministers; and on the 25th of January Lord Beaconsfield made a very important communication to the House of Lords. Her Majesty's Government, he said, had thought it their duty to order the fleet in the Bay of Smyrna to proceed to the Dardanelles, and, if the Admiral did not there receive directions to the contrary, to advance through the narrow seas to Constantinople. At the same time, the Cabinet prepared a telegraphic despatch to the European Powers, stating that this course implied not the slightest deviation from the neutral policy which England had maintained from the first. The alleged reasons for the step were that her Majesty's Government had not received any information respecting the negotiations between the belligerents; that the Russian forces were moving in a direction where British interests were deeply involved; and that the Sultan had himself declared there was no security for life in Constantinople, owing to the disorganization existing there. It was necessary to defend the lives and property of British subjects in the Turkish capital, and to take care of British interests in the Straits; and with these objects the fleet had been ordered to enter the Dardanelles. This determination was formed on the 23rd of January, and the order was at once sent out. The telegraphic message to Admiral Hornby, which was dated from the Admiralty at seven o'clock on the evening of that day, was thus expressed:—"Most Secret. Sail at once for the Dardanelles, and proceed with the fleet now with you to Constantinople. Abstain from taking any part in the contest between Russia and Turkey; but the waterway of the Straits is to be kept open, and, in the event of tumult at Constantinople, you are to protect life and property of British subjects. Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as you may think necessary to preserve the waterway of the Dardanelles, but do not go above Constantinople. Report your departure, and communicate



BLOWING UP A TURKISH STEAMER OFF BATOUM.

with Besika Bay for possible further orders; but do not wait if none are there. Keep your destination absolutely secret." The fleet accordingly set sail for the Dardanelles and Constantinople; but on the evening of the 24th another telegraphic order was sent out to Admiral Hornby, directing him to anchor at Besika Bay, and to await further orders. The Government had in the meanwhile become acquainted (though informally, and not in all respects correctly) with the proposed conditions of peace, and, having examined them, were of opinion that they furnished the basis of an armistice.

The action of the Government had been characterised by its usual vacillation. Either there had been no necessity for ordering so extreme a step as sending the fleet to Constantinople, or there was a necessity which equally existed after the proposed terms of peace had become known. It will be seen as we proceed that Lord Beaconsfield still considered the existing state of affairs as fraught with danger to the country; but the divisions in his Cabinet, which had already caused so much mischief, were now causing more, and the hesitation from day to day was encouraging Russia to pursue her private ends in a manner which might be dangerous to English interests, and was at the same time forcing the Turks into the arms of their hereditary enemies. That the Cabinet, on the whole, was dissatisfied with the turn events were taking, and looked forward to the possibility, if not probability, of an approaching war, was shewn by a notice which the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave in the House of Commons on the 24th of January, when he announced that on the following Monday (the 28th) he would, in Committee of Supply, move a supplemental vote for naval and military services. In the event of war really breaking out, the presence of the British fleet in the Dardanelles or at Constantinople, where at that time the English would have been received by the Sultan as friends, would have given an immense advantage to England over her antagonist. Even supposing war not to be certain, but granting it to be possible, this advantage should not have been sacrificed; yet it was recklessly thrown away, because the Government did not know its own mind from hour to hour, but was driven wildly about in different directions in the absence of any controlling will.

One good result, however, had ensued from the determination to send the fleet to the Dardanelles, speedily cancelled though it was. A main supporter of Russia in the Government of Lord Beaconsfield felt at length compelled to withdraw from association with those whom he had fettered rather than assisted. Lord Carnarvon sent in his resignation as Secretary of the Colonies, in consequence of the order given to the fleet, and of the vote which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had announced his intention of moving in the House of Commons; and it was certain that the Government gained in strength by his absence. This nobleman was the Minister who, on the 2nd of January, in reply to a deputation which then waited on him, made the singularly imprudent and reprehensible speech to which we have before referred. That escapade very nearly led to the retirement of Lord Carnarvon; but the matter ended with a rebuke from Lord Beaconsfield. On the 12th of January, the Cabinet discussed whether or not it would be desirable to send the fleet to the Dardanelles, and the Colonial Minister expressed a very decided opinion against that proposal. No decision was then taken; but on the 15th it was resolved to adopt the suggested course. On the following day, Lord Carnarvon wrote to the Prime Minister, requesting him to submit his resignation to the Queen as soon as the fleet had sailed. Then came another change in the policy of the Cabinet, and the order to the fleet was cancelled. Writing to Lord Beaconsfield on the 18th—the day after the meeting of Parliament—Lord Carnarvon observed:—"I have been led to consider carefully the events of the last few weeks, and the divergences of opinion which have, unfortunately, developed themselves among us; and I cannot conceal from myself that those differences have been very considerable on a question where it is of the utmost importance to the country that the Government should be one and undivided. Taking, therefore, all this into account, I avail myself of this opportunity to place clearly on paper the opinion—even though you and my colleagues are already familiar with it—that I am not prepared in present circumstances, or in circumstances similar to them, to agree to any armed intervention, or any course of a similar nature. I see no reason as yet why the questions at issue should pass out of the sphere of diplomacy. Further, the vote of credit or increase in the Army and Navy Estimates (whichever it may be) is a measure which I consider useful as a means of strengthening our diplomacy at this juncture; but I do not contemplate the application of any aid granted by Parliament to the purposes of a foreign expedition, unless circumstances should change in a manner and to a degree wholly beyond my present anticipations." The resignation of the Colonial Secretary was delayed by the change in Lord Beaconsfield's intentions, and by the declaration

of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the first night of the session, that the Government would make no proposals for an increase of armaments until it was clear that the Russian conditions were unsatisfactory.

Thus matters stood on the 18th of January; but on the 23rd the proposal for sending the fleet to Turkish waters was again brought forward in the Cabinet, and after a discussion it was decided that the step should be taken, and that the House of Commons should be asked to grant the Government a large sum for warlike purposes. This determined the action of Lord Carnarvon, who definitively sent in his resignation on the 24th. In explaining his conduct to the House of Lords, on the 25th, the Earl argued that the moment was ill-chosen by the Cabinet for adopting the course to which he had objected. Such a step, in his opinion, was calculated to produce a mischievous effect in encouraging Turkey, and bearing the appearance of a menace to Russia. He also thought it a dangerous policy to place the English fleet in a position where the contingencies of the war might involve it in numerous hazards, and even provoke collisions of the most serious nature. It seemed to him that in adopting such a course we were abandoning our former attitude of observation for an attitude of menace to one of the belligerents; that we were exchanging the position of a neutral for the position, it might be, of a combatant; that the step, in short, was a step in the direction of war.

After this statement, it required some boldness on the part of Lord Beaconsfield to repeat what he had said on the opening night of the session; viz., that there had never been the slightest division in the Cabinet. Yet that degree of boldness was not wanting in the Premier. The head of the Government endeavoured to show that he was simply carrying out in detail certain general principles which had been laid down from the first, and in which Lord Carnarvon had fully acquiesced; but, inasmuch as the application of those principles had led to considerable differences of opinion, and even to the resignation of a leading Minister, it is difficult to see how it could any longer be maintained that the unity of the Cabinet was unbroken. The division was in fact much greater than the statement of Lord Carnarvon gave the House to understand. At the same time that the Secretary for the Colonies sent in his definitive resignation, a still more important Minister determined, for the same reasons, to follow the same course. The despatch of the fleet to the Dardanelles was as distasteful to Lord Derby as to Lord Carnarvon. He at once tendered his resignation; but, on the order to the fleet being countermanded, he considered that he might still retain his place in the Cabinet. The loss of two Ministers at the same instant, and one of those the Minister for Foreign Affairs, would doubtless have been a serious embarrassment to the Government of Lord Beaconsfield; and it is perhaps not hazarding too much if we assume the probability of Lord Derby's proffered resignation being the actual cause of the withdrawal of the fleet from the waters whither it had been sent. From the autumn of 1876 down to the winter of 1878, the pro-Russian sympathies of Lord Derby had evidently moulded the policy of the Cabinet to a much greater extent than the anti-Russian tendencies of the Premier. The speeches of Lord Beaconsfield, both in and out of Parliament, leave us in no doubt as to his personal inclinations; but those inclinations were repeatedly—indeed, almost invariably—thwarted by a will which to that extent seems to have been stronger than his own. For a moment, the policy of the Prime Minister appeared to be in the ascendant; but Lord Derby had not played all his cards, and a threatened resignation again drew the balance towards his side. When, on the afternoon of January 25th, Admiral Hornby entered the Straits of the Dardanelles, and steamed up to Fort Sultanieh, where the fleet saluted the Turkish flag, the crestfallen Ottomans believed that the English Government had at length determined to come to their assistance. The Dardanelles could not be entered without the permission of the Porte; but that permission had been given. Bitter, therefore, was the feeling of disappointment when, after the despatch of a communication from the British consul to the flagship, the fleet was seen steaming back to its anchorage outside the Straits. Lord Beaconsfield had sent the ships to Turkish waters; Lord Derby, in effect, had recalled them. And yet there was no division of opinion in the Cabinet, though it was only with the utmost difficulty that its component parts could be withheld from flying asunder with the turmoil of conflicting views!

At such a time, it would have been strange if the voice of Mr. Bright had not been heard. The right honourable member for Birmingham had always been one of the most energetic, and certainly one of the most eloquent, expounders of the foreign policy which has for its chief object the destruction of Turkish power. In the days of the Crimean War, he and Mr. Cobden had raised their voices with dauntless resolution, and with a spirit which it is impossible not to admire, against the determination of this country to embark in hostilities, rather than see Turkey trampled under the feet of Russia.

Mr. Cobden had not lived to behold the reaction against the opinions of those days which has since so powerfully set in, or had beheld only its faint beginnings and uncertain approaches. But Mr. Bright has seen the fulness of that movement which he was one of the principal agents in producing. It was therefore not without some warrant that he adopted a tone of self-congratulation in a speech which he delivered at Birmingham on the 12th of January, and which he doubtless hoped would have its effect on the Parliament then about to assemble. "At the time of the Crimean War," he said, "the public mind was filled with falsehoods; it was in a state which one might describe by saying that it had become almost drunk with passion. Many of you will recollect what was said of the power of Russia, her designs, her despotism, and the danger which hung over the freedom of all the countries of Europe. Nor was error confined to a particular class. It spread from the cottage to all classes above, and did not spare even those who were within the precincts of the throne. It affected not only the clergy of the Church of England, but the ministers of the Nonconformist bodies. The poison had spread everywhere; the delusion was all-prevading; the mischief seemed universal; and, as I know to my cost, it was scarcely worth while to offer any arguments, or to bring forward any facts, against it." The result, according to Mr. Bright, was the occurrence of a war which was an enormous error on the part of our statesmen, and which we are now bound utterly to condemn. The war had certain objects in view; but every one of those objects had failed. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea was no longer confined within specified limits. Turkey was in much greater danger than she had ever been before; and, in comparison with that Empire, Russia was seen to be as powerful as if the Crimean War had never occurred. All this was true enough; but to argue that a policy is wrong because it has been abandoned, is to confound a matter of fact with a matter of opinion. By the same rule, the policy was right as long as it continued; but of course the member for Birmingham would make no such admission. He considered that the heart of the country was gradually changing; indeed, he almost asserted that it had actually changed. "Lord Derby," he remarked, "said the wisest thing that has been uttered by any member of the Administration during the discussions on this war, when he observed that the greatest of British interests is peace. A hundred—aye, far more than a hundred—public meetings have lately said the same; and in millions of households men and women have thought the same. To-night we shall say amen to this wise declaration." Mr. Bright carried the meeting with him; but there was a large part of the English population who widely dissented from his views, while admitting the thorough honesty of intention by which this illustrious statesman has always been distinguished.

To similar effect, but with even stronger emphasis, Sir William Vernon Harcourt had addressed the Oxford Liberal Association three days before, viz., on the 9th of January. Sir William said he did not wish to speak disrespectfully of the Crimean War, but, after the experiences of a quarter of a century, he would ask if the country was prepared to make the same sacrifices again. Certainly her Majesty's Ministers were not; for not only in their words, but by their deeds, they had treated the policy of that earlier period as a thing condemned, exploded, and abandoned. There were but two courses for the Government to pursue. They might have said to Turkey, "As you cannot reform yourself, we will compel you to be reformed, and then we will protect you." On the other hand, they could say, "As you will not be reformed, we will abandon you." The Government had deliberately adopted the second course, and Turkey was abandoned. Sir William proceeded to scout the belief expressed by some thinkers that Russia was an ambitious, overgrown, aggressive Power, always extending her dominions—a Power with which it was necessary to deal before she became too strong and too dangerous. It was a law of political nature, he said, that young and vigorous empires would grow; and Russia had grown, and would grow still more. To Sir William Harcourt there appeared nothing objectionable in Russia conquering Central Asia; and if the Czar threatened to occupy Constantinople, England might avert that danger by forcing Turkey to make peace. It was language such as this, repeated at numberless public meetings and echoed by a large portion of the press, that encouraged Russia to believe she might do precisely as she liked, without any dread of English interference; and the approaching peace shewed to what purposes she turned her reliance on the influence exercised in the councils of the nation by statesmen such as Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bright, and Sir William Harcourt.

## CHAPTER V.

Delay in the Peace Negotiations—Continued Advance of the Russians towards Constantinople—Line of Retreat of Mehemet Ali and Suleiman Pasha—Concentration of Turkish Troops at Gallipoli—Views of the Russian and English Governments with respect to the Occupation of that Position—Progress of Affairs North of the Balkans—Severe Fighting in the Valley of the Morava—Repeated Defeats of the Turks by the Servians—Continued Successes of the Montenegrins—Entire Collapse of the Turkish Powers of Resistance—Russian Preparations for a Possible War with England—Sufferings of the Russian Troops from Cold and Disease—Server and Namyk Pashas at Kezanlik—Discussion of the Terms of Peace—Procrastination of the Grand Duke Nicholas—Removal from Kezanlik to Adrianople—Charges and Counter-charges as to the Cause of the Delay—Objections of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries to the Russian Demands—Acceptance of the Russian Terms by the Porte on the 23rd of January—Signature of the Preliminary Agreement on the 31st—Conditions of Peace—The English Government and the Vote of Credit—Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—Relations of England and Russia on the Eastern Question—Conclusion of Sir Stafford Northcote's Speech—Opposition to the Vote—Mr. W. E. Forster's Proposed Amendment—Heated Debates in Parliament—Withdrawal of the Amendment, and Sanction of the Vote of Credit for Six Millions by an Immense Majority.

RUSSIA was willing enough to make peace with her vanquished antagonist, but was not disinclined to postpone the final arrangements for a little while, so as to enable her armies, by getting still nearer Constantinople, to strike a more abject terror into the minds of the Turkish Ministers. The progress of the negotiations was therefore delayed by all possible means, and the resistless hosts poured on. Lulé Burgas, to the south-east of Adrianople, was occupied on the 25th of January. On the 30th, General Strukoff sent a force towards Rodosto, situated on the Sea of Marmora, and, on the evening of the same day, advanced with his vanguard from Lulé Burgas towards Tchorlu, lying to the north-west of the capital. Rodosto was entered by the Russians on the 2nd of February, and the valley of the Eskene was then occupied from Demotica to Tchorlu, with Rodosto for an advanced post. The railway to Constantinople runs along the valley, and the possession of this line placed the invaders in a most favourable position for menacing the Sultan in the very seat of his government. At the same time, Kirk-Kilissa, situated between Adrianople and the Black Sea, was seized by another force. It was to this town that Mehemet Ali and Ahmed Eyoub Pasha retired after the evacuation of Adrianople; and thence, turning southward, they reached the metropolis by way of Viza and Sarai. Suleiman Pasha had a more difficult task in effecting his escape. After the crushing defeat of January 17th, the scattered remnants of his army made their way by various paths over the Rhodope Mountains (called by the Turks the Despoto Dagh), and reappeared in a few days on the southern side of that range. The several divisions were then reunited in the Bay of Kara Agatch, situated on the Ægean—a wide expanse of low, dismal, sandy ground, thinly peopled, and backed by snowy mountains. The weather was tumultuous with wind, rain, and lightning, and the men were found by Captain Manthorpe, who had been sent to bring them off, lying stretched along the beach, without shelter, and almost without food. "Suleiman's head-quarters," says a correspondent of the *Times*, "were established in a ruined fort a considerable distance from the shore; and here he was found by the Commodore, intent, it would seem, only upon his own escape, without one thought of the devoted army which had been reduced to such miserable straits through his incapacity and obstinacy—to call it by no worse a name. If ever a man was hated and detested, Suleiman Pasha is by all those who have lately served under his command. He is roundly accused of being the cause of all their disasters; not a single voice in the army is heard in his favour; and charges of cruelty, neglect, and a criminal waste of opportunities, are laid to his door, which, if substantiated in the case of a general in another country, would lead to his death by order of court-martial. Having accompanied Manthorpe Bey, I was at no pains to discover the muttered discontent; and no doubt the anxiety of Suleiman Pasha to be off was due in a great measure to his fear of falling a victim to the vengeance of his men." The embarkation was a work of no little trouble, owing to stress of weather, and to the insufficiency of the Commodore's resources; but it was at length effected, and the men were conveyed, about the end of the month, partly to Gallipoli and partly to Constantinople.

While the struggle with the Russians was yet proceeding, Baker Pasha had fortified his position on the heights of Stanimaka; but after the final defeat, Suleiman Pasha decided on abandoning this post, and putting the Rhodope Mountains as fast as possible between himself and the enemy. He seems, indeed, to have taken the most gloomy view of the situation, for, in a telegram to the Porte, received



ENTRANCE TO THE DARDANELLES.

on the 24th of January, he counselled peace on any reasonable terms, in consequence of the immense losses that had been suffered by the Turkish armies. During the retreat, his rear-guard, under Baker Pasha, had been much harassed by the Muscovite cavalry, and the troops, on reaching their southern places of refuge, were found to be considerably disorganized. The artillery horses were brought away; but ninety-seven guns in all, together with a large amount of baggage, had been left in General Gourko's hands. It was now feared that the Russians were advancing on Gallipoli—a position of great importance on the northern shore of the Dardanelles, the possession of which would enable a hostile army to close the Sea of Marmora against any fleet going to the assistance of the Turks at Constantinople. To secure this position was therefore a matter of the most extreme urgency; and the Turks lost no time in concentrating troops there. Suleiman Pasha was entrusted with the command, and the place was soon considered safe from attack, the lines being so strong, in the opinion of the late Sir John Burgoyne, that 12,000 men could easily hold them against a much superior force. But these very precautions only increased the danger. On the 24th of January, the semi-official *Agence Russe* published an announcement, to the effect that the Imperial Government was not unaware of the importance attached by the English Cabinet to Gallipoli, but that Russia had no interest in touching that point, which did not come within the sphere of her operations. The place would therefore be neither occupied nor attacked, unless the Turkish regular army should be concentrated there; in which case, it was added, Russia would find it impossible to tolerate such a force on the flank of her invading armies. In other words, Gallipoli was to be left at the mercy of the Russians, or it would be seized, whether England objected or not. This, however, did not at that moment suit the views of the English Government; and when, on the 23rd of January, Admiral Hornby was ordered to sail to the Dardanelles, it was also resolved that a force of marines and sailors should land in the vicinity of Boulair, in order that they might act as temporary defenders of Gallipoli, in case it should be menaced. The force was afterwards to be augmented, should the necessity arise, by the mass of the garrison from Malta. Gallipoli is situated about the middle of a long, narrow peninsula; and the lines of Boulair extend across this peninsula from the Gulf of Saros to the Dardanelles, so as to protect the town on the north-eastern or landward side. The forces of Suleiman Pasha were re-united at Boulair in the beginning of February; but the rescinding of the orders to the British fleet was a lamentable confession of weakness.

North of the Balkans, Osman Bazar was occupied on the 27th of January, and Rasgrad on the 28th, after a brief skirmish: operations were also conducted against Rustchuk and Widdin. The Roumanians, wishing to engross to themselves the honour of taking the latter fortress, came to an arrangement with the Servians, who accordingly desisted from a further advance in that direction, and employed their forces in expeditions to the south-west. Kurshumlia was again taken by them, after a hotly-contested engagement, in the third week of January. The whole valley of the Morava was the scene of very severe fighting, and the Servians, exhibiting a degree of energy and resolution which had been almost wholly wanting in the war of 1876, drove the Turks back on Pristina, though not without a desperate resistance on the part of their antagonists. A sanguinary battle, fought in the Vrania Pass, lasted four days, and ended, on the 1st of February, in the capture of Vrania itself, and of a large number of prisoners, together with ammunition-stores and two thousand rifles. Other successes in the same valley and the surrounding country placed the conquerors in possession of the whole of Old Servia; and the Montenegrins, simultaneously pursuing their career of victory, compelled the Moslem garrison to evacuate Trebinje, in the Herzegovina, wrested the fortified island of Vranjina (in the Lake of Scutari) from the Turks, crossed the Boïana on the 29th of January, and laid siege to Podgoritza and Zabliak, in the north-western parts of Albania. Thus, in every direction the Ottoman collapse was signal. The Russians, indeed, were not entirely delivered from apprehension as to the future; for it was still doubtful whether England would not intervene. But the resistance of the Turks was virtually at an end. Baffled at every turn, overwhelmed by superior numbers and larger resources, gashed, bleeding, and exhausted, Turkey conceived she had no choice but to throw herself on the mercy of a relentless foe.

That foe was determined to push his advantage to the utmost, and, in the very hour of his intoxicating success, was taking precautions against any possible interference by England. The managers of some of the Russian lines of railway were commanded to prepare a special organisation of the goods traffic, capable of meeting such emergencies as might arise should the Baltic ports be blocked by a hostile fleet. With this view, a large increase of the rolling stock was purchased in Germany, and

the directors of the Vistula and Terespol Railway received orders and means to lay down a second line of rails, which was to be reserved solely for military purposes. The formation of a new army, 300,000 strong, was commenced in Russian Poland, and all able-bodied men under the age of forty were summoned to the Imperial standards. Yet, while thus facing the possibilities of another war, Russia had good reason to desire the conclusion of peace. In the campaign altogether, she had lost at least a hundred thousand of her best soldiers, and the crossing of the Balkans in the depth of winter had been accomplished at a terrible price. A member of the Red Cross Society has stated that when at Tirnova and in its vicinity, during the first part of February, he found more than half the patients in the Russian hospitals suffering from the severity of the weather. In one large military hospital, holding eight hundred patients, he saw more than one hundred without toes, which they had lost by being exposed to the excessive cold of the Balkans; he also found three hundred cases of typhus and typhoid fever. At that time, the Russians had 20,000 sick and wounded north of the Balkans (including the inmates of the hospitals in Roumania); and to these were to be added nearly 100,000, which, according to the official returns of the Russian Red Cross Society, had been sent home.* The troops still remaining were in many instances raw and immature lads, of feeble physique and insufficient drill, poor in health, and depressed by their surroundings; so that, if the Turks had not been utterly cowed, they might even yet have rallied behind the lines of Constantinople.

The Czar, however, calculated on the growing despondency of his antagonist, and did not fear to send his legions still farther into the heart of the country while the negotiations for peace dragged on their slow and tedious course. The more the Turks were intimidated, the more likely they would be to grant whatever was required; and the danger of a reverse, or even of English interference, was not sufficient to counterbalance the advantages of delay. We have seen that the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries arrived at Hermanli on the 17th of January, and at Kezanlik on the 19th. At the latter place they were received by the Grand Duke Nicholas; but at the preliminary interviews nothing took place beyond very general discussions. On the 21st, Server and Namyk Pashas had a long conversation with the Grand Duke and M. Nelidoff, when they were asked what conditions they expected. Namyk is reported to have made a reply which sounds more romantic than probable. He said, according to the anecdote, that they came to treat as a conquered people, and would throw themselves on the generosity of the conqueror; and he reminded the Grand Duke of the story of the Indian prince, to whom, when vanquished by Alexander the Great, the Macedonian hero restored the whole of his possessions. It is scarcely credible that Namyk Pasha could have supposed that the negotiations were to be conducted after this ideal fashion. He was a statesman of long and varied experience, having been Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Ambassador at Paris during the reign of Louis Philippe, and from time to time the occupant of several offices in the Home Government. At any rate, it is certain that the Czar was in no such mood of poetic heroism.

The precise course of affairs it is not possible to follow, as the negotiations were kept secret from the world; but there is no reason to doubt that the Grand Duke procrastinated by a variety of subtle devices, in order that Turkey might be more completely reduced to a condition of despair. It is asserted in a letter from Varna, published by the *Hamburgischer Correspondent*, a German paper of repute, that the Plenipotentiaries were not allowed to produce their credentials, or to enter into a formal discussion, until the seventh day after their arrival—viz., the 25th of January. In the intermediate period, the Grand Duke, according to this statement, had been away at Yeni-Zaghra; and even after his return, further excuses were found for delaying the prosecution of business. On the 25th, Server and Namyk Pashas represented that, although they had understood that the negotiations for peace were to be carried on simultaneously with those for an armistice, there were reasons which seemed to render justifiable an immediate cessation of hostilities. The six days' delay which had already occurred was much against their wish, and should not, they thought, be suffered to stand in the way of a temporary arrangement. The Grand Duke replied that he was without instructions on that head, but promised to send an inquiry by telegraph at once, and believed he should receive an answer in the course of that night. The night, however, passed away without any reply arriving, nor was there the least intimation from St. Petersburg on the following day, the 26th. The Grand Duke then told the Turkish representatives that Adrianople was the historic place of negotiation between Turkey and Russia, and therefore requested them to accompany him to that city At Adrianople they arrived on the 27th, and the actual deliberations can hardly be said to have commenced before that date. In the meanwhile,

* Letter in the *Daily News*, Oct. 1st, 1878.

the Turkish Plenipotentiaries had been informed of the Russian conditions, and had communicated them to the Porte. As early as the 23rd of January, the Turkish Government telegraphed its acceptance of the peace preliminaries submitted by the Grand Duke. Yet the conclusion of an armistice was still delayed; and as, in the absence of any formal truce, the war necessarily went on, Turkey was placed every day in a more unfavourable position for resisting even the most extreme demands.

In a despatch from Mr. Layard to the Earl of Derby, telegraphed from Constantinople on the 29th of January, the English Ambassador said he had been categorically and distinctly informed by the Grand Vizier that the Sultan had, on the afternoon of the 23rd, instructed his representatives at Kezanlik to accept the bases of peace, as submitted to them in writing by the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Porte had telegraphed to the Plenipotentiaries three times since the despatch of those orders, requiring them to report the result; but no answer whatever had been received. The Grand Vizier added that he could not admit any delay or procrastination in the matter on the part of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries. Telegraphic communication with Kezanlik, according to Mr. Layard's despatch, was still open, for a member of the mission had telegraphed to his family at Constantinople, and messages from Kezanlik had been received in twelve hours from the time of their being sent. The Russians of course threw the blame of this delay on their adversaries; professed their own readiness to hasten the conclusion of peace; and charged the Turks with postponing that result, in the hope of English assistance, which the despatch of the British fleet to the Dardanelles had once more stimulated. The *Agence Russe* of January 30th stated that the instructions sent by the Porte to its agents, when they accompanied the Grand Duke from Kezanlik to Adrianople, were forwarded by way of Trieste, Vienna, and Bucharest—a fact which, in the opinion of the Russian journalist, explained the delay that had occurred. But, even allowing the fact to be as here alleged, it does not in the slightest degree account for the procrastination at Kezanlik, between which town and Constantinople the telegraphic communication was direct and unimpeded; nor could the hope of English assistance have exercised any influence over the Turkish authorities after the return of the British fleet on the 25th of January. From that moment, the Turks had no desire but to terminate the war with the utmost speed possible; the Russians, on the contrary, gained by every day. It seems, therefore, but reasonable to suppose that, even if there was a little temporary fencing on the part of Server and Namyk Pashas, the delay was mainly attributable to the Czar, who had the most obvious reasons for following such a course.



LINES OF BOULAIR.

When first the conditions of peace were propounded to the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries, they decided, after two days' deliberation, to refuse compliance. The Grand Duke and M. Nelidoff represented to them that this refusal might involve the destruction of the Turkish Empire, which

Russia did not desire to effect. They were told that Philippopolis and Adrianople were taken, that the army of Suleiman Pasha was destroyed, and that the Russians would continue to march on the capital, unless their terms were accepted. To this, Namyk Pasha—a venerable old man—replied, "Well then, if the Ottoman Empire *must* perish, let it perish by force; we will never sign our own death-warrant." After two hours' reflection, both he and Server Pasha still maintained the same tone, and the operations of the war proceeded, with continued success to the Russians. One of the points to which the two Pashas especially objected was that having reference to Bulgarian autonomy. The Russians demanded the creation of a Bulgarian Principality, similar to those of Servia and Roumania, with limits extending nearly to Constantinople on the one side, and to Salonica on the other. The Plenipotentiaries very reasonably observed that this was almost equivalent to the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe. It would, in truth, have left the Ottomans with little else than Constantinople on the western side of the Bosphorus, and would have reduced the Sultan's dominion to the same state of miserable dependency and isolation as that of the last Emperor Constantine a little before the fall of his Imperial seat. Server and Namyk Pashas were willing to cede Kars and Erzeroum, to grant the complete independence of Roumania and Servia, to open the Straits of Constantinople to the Russian fleet, and to pay a war-indemnity. But the autonomy of Bulgaria they would not admit; and this was the very point on which Russia most insisted. Other matters she was willing to leave to the revisal of the European Powers; but the creation of an independent Bulgaria, having only a nominal connection with the Porte, was a matter she desired to settle at



FORTRESS OF WIDDIN.

once by direct negotiation with the Sultan.* For this determination the reasons are sufficiently clear. A large Bulgarian Principality, reaching nearly to the gates of Constantinople, would mean nothing less than the actual presence of Russia in the immediate neighbourhood of that city. No one could suppose that a Principality thus created by Russian blood and gold would be anything else in fact than a portion of the Russian Empire. With the establishment of such a State, the whole purpose, not only of the war, but of Russian policy for more than a century, would have been accomplished; and it is therefore not at all surprising that Russia insisted on the one hand, and Turkey demurred on the other. These discussions, however, must have taken place previous to the 23rd of January; for, as we have seen, the Porte on that day telegraphed to its agents that the Russian proposals were to be accepted.

At length the negotiations came to a close, and on the 31st of January the Grand Duke Nicholas and the Plenipotentiaries of the Sultan signed the bases of peace and the terms of the armistice. The conditions of peace, as at first briefly set forth, were as follows :—"1. Establishment of a Principality of Bulgaria. 2. The payment of a war-indemnity, or a territorial compensation. 3. Independence of Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, with an increase of territory for each of those Principalities. 4. Introduction of reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5. Ulterior understanding between the Sultan and the Czar on the question of the Straits. 6. Evacuation of certain fortresses by the Turks." The armistice, as will be seen further on, placed the Turkish Empire almost completely in the grasp of Russia. A little before the signing of these preliminaries, the Emperor of Russia, in reply to a telegram from the Sultan, begging him to hasten the conclusion of peace, said :—"I desire peace as much as yourself; but it is necessary for me, and it is necessary for *us*, that it should be a solid and durable peace." This was the first intimation of a readiness on the part of Russia to establish something like an alliance with Turkey. After the signatures had been attached, the Sultan and the Czar exchanged telegrams expressing their mutual satisfaction at the cessation of hostilities. A feeling of relief was experienced at Constantinople, and at St. Petersburg prayers were offered up in the churches, salvoes of artillery were fired, and the city was illuminated. The agony of war had at last come to an end; but, although the general conditions of peace had been settled, the arrangement of details would evidently be a subject of the utmost difficulty, and it was far from certain that the susceptibilities of other Powers would not lead to a renewal of the contest on a still larger scale. Nor could there be any absolute reliance on the two combatants themselves, when the various points involved came to be more fully discussed with a view to their practical application. A breathing time had been secured, and that interval of repose and moderated passions might lead to a final settlement. But the issue was still involved in clouds, and from those clouds the lightning and the thunder might once more glare and reverberate.

It was owing to the delay in the conclusion of the preliminaries, and to the extreme uncertainty as to the intentions of Russia, that the English Government considered it necessary to ask for a vote of credit, to enable them to prepare for warlike operations in certain eventualities. The notice of an intention to move that vote had been given in the House of Commons, as already related, on the 24th of January, and on the 28th of the same month the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to make his statement, and to ask for the required sum. He said that, although it had been mentioned to her Majesty's Government, several days before, that the Porte had accepted, or was prepared to accept, the bases submitted to it, no news of any armistice having been signed had at that time been received. He did not know the reason of the delay; but, whatever the explanation might be, day after day passed by without the expected intimation being made. While this state of things existed, it was within the right of the Russian forces to advance. The Government was in possession of no statement, at once complete and authentic, as to the proposed terms of peace; but some heads had been communicated, on the morning of the 25th, by the Russian Ambassador, Count Schouvaloff. These heads were to the same general effect as the conditions finally agreed upon; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer submitted that they were of a sweeping character. The Bulgaria which it was proposed to establish would include the whole centre of European Turkey, and a report, which bore some appearance of authority, stated that the ruling Prince was to be selected by the Emperor of Russia. With regard to an indemnity, the condition of Turkey was such as to render it difficult for her to pay a large pecuniary sum; and even if it were in her power to do so, the way in which the condition was framed was such that Russia might elect to receive a territorial compensation instead—a circumstance which might affect, not only Turkey, but other European

* Correspondence of the *Daily News*.

Powers as well. The arrangements for the navigation of the Straits were matters with regard to which no separate understanding, engagement, or treaty between Russia and Turkey could be admitted. Her Majesty's Government had openly expressed this opinion, and Austria had shown by repeated declarations that she entirely shared their views. When the treaty of peace was concluded, we might find ourselves in a position of some disadvantage; for, assuming Russia and Turkey to come to an agreement with regard to the question of the Straits, territorial and strategic arrangements might be made, which would give Russia such a voice in the Council that no other voice would have a chance of being heard. As a matter of fact, the delay in the negotiations had given the Russians an advantage, and had very materially altered the military situation of Turkey.

With regard to Constantinople and the Dardanelles, her Majesty's Government, said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, could not be altogether free from anxiety when they saw the Russian forces advancing so rapidly towards vital points. On December the 13th, 1877, Lord Derby had sent to Count Schouvaloff a despatch, in which he expressed an earnest hope that no attempt would be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles. On the 16th, Russia returned the following reply: —"The acquisition of Constantinople does not enter into the intentions of his Majesty the Emperor, any more than it did before the war. His Imperial Majesty continues to consider the destination of this capital as a matter of common interest, which can only be determined by a general agreement. His Imperial Majesty also continues to hold the opinion that, if the possession of Constantinople should come into question, it should not belong to any of the great Powers of Europe. His Majesty the Emperor believes it to be his right and his duty to compel Turkey to conclude a solid peace, giving effective guarantees against the return of the permanent crises which have troubled the repose of Russia and of Europe." But the despatch went on to say that for this purpose it was necessary that the Russian forces should continue to advance, and it added that "if the obstinacy or illusions of the Porte should oblige his Majesty to continue military operations," his Majesty would reserve to himself that full liberty of action which was the right of every belligerent. It further stated that after the formal assurances which Russia had several times given, and which she now repeated, his Majesty could not understand how the interests of England, as defined in the communications of the British Government, could be affected by the course which his Majesty was pursuing; and finally it asked her Majesty's Government to state what were the interests of England which they deemed likely to be so affected, in order that his Majesty might endeavour to reconcile them with those of Russia. Notwithstanding this friendly statement, the matter remained exactly where it was. On the 30th of January, 1878, the Russian forces had not only obtained possession of Adrianople, but were marching on Gallipoli. In answer to the inquiry contained in the last paragraph of Prince Gortschakoff's memorandum of the 16th of December, the Foreign Minister said, in a despatch dated January 12th :—"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to the proper consideration of the terms of the final settlement between Russia and Turkey." Lord Augustus Loftus was therefore instructed to ask Prince Gortschakoff whether he was willing to give an assurance that no Russian force should be sent to the peninsula of Gallipoli. The reply of the Russian Chancellor (dated the 15th of January) was that the Emperor had no intention of directing his military operations on Gallipoli, unless the Turkish regular forces should concentrate there; and at the same time the Prince expressed a hope that the British Government did not contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which would be a departure from their neutrality, and would encourage the Porte to resistance. Her Majesty's Government replied on the 21st of January by stating that England did not, under existing circumstances, contemplate any occupation of the peninsula in question. The Russian advance, however, continued, and great anxiety was occasioned when it appeared that Suleiman Pasha was retreating in a direction which might very possibly bring him to Gallipoli, in which case the Russians might, within the terms of their engagement, consider themselves free to direct their attack upon that place. It was under these circumstances that the Government thought it right to despatch Admiral Hornby to the Dardanelles. But on the evening of the 24th, after the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice of his intention to move the vote of credit, the Government received a telegram from Mr. Layard, which afterwards proved to be unauthentic and inexact. It contained the terms of peace, as far as the Ambassador had been able to collect them, and they were to this effect :—A pecuniary indemnity; a guarantee from Turkey for payment; fortifications to be destroyed; Roumania to be declared independent; and the question of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to be settled

between "the Congress" and the Emperor of Russia. On the following day, however, it appeared that the question was to be settled, not between the Congress and the Emperor, but between the Sultan and the Emperor. Thus, the interests of Russia with regard to the Straits were to be arranged by a separate understanding between that Power and the Porte; not, indeed, excluding the other Powers from subsequently discussing the settlement, but, as between Russia and Turkey, providing a separate arrangement, so that, whenever England and the other States came to the discussion of the matter in a Conference or Congress, the Porte would be precluded from taking an independent part in the deliberations, and would be bound to give its voice in the way already agreed upon with Russia. As, however, the Government were led to believe on the 24th of January that the arrangement was to be made between a Congress and the Emperor, and as, moreover, they understood from the form of the telegram that the Porte was ready to accept those terms of peace, they considered the presence of the fleet in the Dardanelles no longer necessary, and therefore recalled it.



THE BRITISH FLEET AT VOLO.

Having made these statements, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proceeded to observe that the attitude which England was to take in the council of nations that would shortly assemble was not a question of the moment. It was a question whether we were or were not to go into that Conference armed with the strength of a united nation, and whether we were or were not to speak the voice of England as that voice ought to be heard. Referring to the language of some who declared that England was humiliated and degraded, Sir Stafford Northcote said that such words were as mischievous as they were false. England was not a weak country; it was second to none. Put to the test, and roused as it might be, the strength of England would be found even greater than in former times; but there were certain sources of weakness which they should not conceal. It was a great source of weakness that there should be those among them who were perpetually making light of the power and spirit of their country. It was not the cause of peace that was promoted by such language; nor was that cause advanced by constantly telling every one that England was afraid to go to war—that she was too

weak or too divided to strike a blow. "We are asked," said the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "why we are seeking for this vote—to what object it is to be applied. We ask for this money, not necessarily that it should be expended at all, or even the greater part of it. We ask you to give us authority to spend it if we think such a course necessary. You must bear in mind that the strength of England can be measured only by the power you possess of making use of it." They were shortly to be parties to the great settlement which must ere long be made; and it was desirable that on entering into those counsels they should be able to speak with the firmness which belonged to those who represented not only a great and wealthy nation, but a nation that had confidence in them, and would support them in whatever steps they might deem it necessary to take. They desired, on entering into negotiations, to be armed by Parliament with a vote which should be not merely a vote of credit, but a vote of confidence. "Before I conclude," said Sir Stafford Northcote, "I may repeat in this House a few words that I heard this morning from a foreigner of distinction—one who was not likely to take an anti-Russian view of the matter. He said, 'I think you are about to do a wise action, and one which will be advantageous to the interests of Europe. We all want to be taught a lesson of prudence, and no one will be listened to unless he is strong.'" The right honourable gentleman concluded by moving a vote of credit for six millions.

It was not to be expected that so decided a step as this would be allowed to pass without vehement opposition. Speaking at Oxford on the 30th of January, Mr. Gladstone observed that the vote which had just been submitted to Parliament was what they technically called a vote of credit, but that he was disposed to modify that expression, and to call it a vote of *dis*credit; and he promised that the minority in Parliament would do all they possibly could to oppose the measure. He also called upon the country to agitate on the subject, and to determine whether, at that great European crisis, it would give an effective voice on the side of peace, or would take upon itself the tremendous burden of encouraging Turkey to persevere in the cruel and bloody struggle that had already brought her well nigh to destruction. It was Mr. W. E. Forster, however, who in the House of Commons moved a resolution by way of amendment. The motion, which was brought forward on the 31st of January, set forth "That this House, having been informed in her Majesty's gracious Speech that the conditions on which her Majesty's neutrality is founded had not been infringed by either belligerent engaged in the war in the East of Europe, and having since received no information sufficient to justify a departure from the policy of neutrality and peace, sees no reason for adding to the burdens of the people by voting unnecessary supplies." The argument of Mr. Forster was to the general effect that there was nothing in the demands of Russia to affect the interests of England, and that the conduct of the Ministry throughout the war had not been such as to create a feeling of confidence in their wisdom. Mr. Forster wished the Government to go to the Conference as the representative of a united nation; and they could do so if they desired. They ought to protect such English interests as those of the Suez Canal and Egypt, and the maintenance of our equality with any Power in the Black Sea. They ought also to prevent the permanent possession of Constantinople by the Russians, if that were threatened; but he did not believe in any such danger, and seemed, indeed, to have a perfect reliance on the good faith of Russia in every matter that might arise.

The spokesman for the Government on this occasion was the Home Secretary, Mr. (now Sir Richard) Cross—he who, on the 7th of May, 1877, had laid down the particular conditions on which England would continue to observe neutrality. In the course of his observations on the present occasion, he very pertinently remarked that the Emperor's forces had unrestingly advanced towards Constantinople, even after it was known that the bases of peace had been accepted by Turkey Mr. Bright was one of the speakers in opposition to the proposed vote, and a good deal of heated feeling was apparent on both sides of the House. Mr. Cross had said that there was "a lying spirit" abroad with reference to the intentions of the Government; Mr. Bright imputed raving lunacy and *delirium tremens* to some of the advocates of a war policy. But the time was one of great popular excitement, and even gentlemen of political distinction could not altogether free themselves from the disturbing influences of the hour. When the debate was resumed on the 1st of February, the Chancellor of the Exchequer mentioned that the general bases of an armistice and of peace were to have been signed on the previous day at Adrianople, but that the Foreign Office had not, up to that moment, received any intelligence to the effect that the signatures had been actually appended. Even on the 4th of the same month, when the debate was again pursued, the Government had no other information on the subject than what had been communicated by the Turkish Ambassador. On that evening, the chief speech



PRAYING AND WASHING. TURKISH PRISONERS AT BUCHAREST.

on behalf of the Opposition was from Mr. Gladstone. That gentleman began his address by disclaiming any intention of entering upon controversial matters, and expressed a desire to arrive, if possible, at a solution of all difficulties and differences. In some respects Mr. Gladstone declared his agreement with the probable intentions of the Government. He remarked that one subject of the greatest importance which must come before the Conference was the perfect freedom of the navigation of the Danube. Russia had no natural interest in the Danube, and Mr. Gladstone hoped she would not be permitted to obtain a power over that river. With respect to the Straits, also, the Opposition had some common ground with the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had spoken with alarm of the extension to be given to Bulgaria. Mr. Gladstone agreed with him in that feeling, but thought that the danger was to be counteracted by favouring the development of

Greece, between which country and the Russian Empire there was now very little sympathy. He would rejoice if the vote could be postponed until Ministers had obtained clearer evidence of its necessity. They could in that case present an address to the Crown, setting forth that they were desirous of supporting the action of her Majesty's Government in the councils of Europe; and this would do something to bury past controversies. Both Houses might then proceed to say that they were determined to aid her Majesty on all occasions in defending the interests of the Empire; that they desired to pursue European objects and purposes by means of a concert among the Powers of Europe; and that they recognised and adopted the engagements which had been given by the Government to endeavour by friendly means to obtain for Turkey the most favourable arrangements that circumstances would permit in all matters that might arise between the late belligerents, or among the Powers of Europe. Mr. Gladstone's speech was remarkably conciliatory. The great Parliamentary leader seems to have recoiled from the first exhibition of resolute intention on the part of the Government; probably, also, his faith in Russia was shaken by the unmistakable symptoms of ambitious designs which every day brought forth. He therefore held out a species of olive-branch, which, however, he could scarcely have anticipated that the Government would accept.

The reply to this speech was made by Mr. Gathorne Hardy (Lord Cranbrook), to whom the acceptance of olive-branches does not come very naturally, and who, as Minister of War, may have considered a vehement tone more befitting his office than one of greater suavity. Certain it is that he rejected Mr. Gladstone's proffers with a warmth of feeling and of language which was sometimes scarcely within the limits of Parliamentary debate. He contrasted the very moderate expressions used by his opponent that evening with the bitter imputations which for some years past he had been in the habit of casting forth against the head of the Government. Quoting from the speech recently delivered by Mr. Gladstone at Oxford, he said that the right honourable gentleman had used these remarkable words:—"To my own great pain, and with infinite reluctance, but under the full and strong conviction of my political old age, I may be said to have played the part of an agitator for the last eighteen months. My purpose, I may tell you fairly, has been, with extremely inadequate means, and in a very mean and poor degree, but still to the best of my power, for the last eighteen months, day and night, week by week, and month by month, to counter-work, as well as I could, what I believe to be the purpose of Lord Beaconsfield." It seemed to Mr. Gathorne Hardy that those who had taken upon themselves to address the strongest language to excited audiences had no right to go into that House, and, "with 'bated breath and whispering humbleness," speak in a totally different tone, and with a totally different intention. "We have hitherto preserved peace," concluded Mr. Hardy; "we mean to keep peace, and we believe we are going the right way to keep it when we ask you to assist amid the confusion which we see around us. The nations of Europe are armed to the teeth; a single spark may kindle Europe into a flame which may involve every interest we hold dear, to an extent of which we have no conception at this moment. It is because we feel all this, and are deeply anxious, in the face of Parliament and of the country, not only to protect British interests, but to do our part in the European concert for the benefit of subject nations, that we ask you for this vote."

The amendment proposed by Mr. Forster was withdrawn by that gentleman on the 7th of February, owing to the existence of rumours to the effect that the Russian troops, in spite of the armistice, were still advancing on Constantinople. Mr. Forster reserved to himself full freedom in Committee; but he was confessedly uneasy as to the course of affairs in the East, and even Mr. Gladstone concurred in the course which he had taken. When the House divided on the motion that it should go into Committee, the numbers were 295 against 96. On the following day, the vote passed through Committee by 328 votes against 124, and the Marquis of Hartington, while making some objections to the manner in which the vote of credit had been brought forward, declined to take any part in opposing it. All the more moderate members of the Opposition, whether in the Upper or the Lower House, acknowledged the immense gravity of the situation, which had become more alarming during the last few hours by the receipt of further information with reference to the articles of the armistice, to the effect that the lines protecting Constantinople were included in the neutral zone within which the Turks were bound not to retain any fortifications. Tchataldja, which lies close to the outer line of the Constantinopolitan defences, was by that time in Russian hands; and, although orders had been given from St. Petersburg to stop hostilities along the whole line in Europe and Asia, it was obvious that the capital of Turkey was completely in the

grasp of Russia, and that the armies of the Czar might enter at any moment that they pleased. The majority for going into Committee included nine Liberals and four Home Rule members; and that of the 8th was made up of eleven Liberals, four Home Rulers, and three hundred and thirteen Conservatives. On the latter occasion, a considerable number of Opposition members, including the majority of the front bench, left the House without voting, although Mr. Gladstone, while repeating some of his conciliatory language of a former evening, intimated his intention of going into the lobby against the Government. In Committee of Ways and Means, on the 11th of February, the resolutions necessary for raising £6,000,000 upon Exchequer bonds and bills, and for voting a sum out of the Consolidated Fund, were agreed to. The Chancellor of the Exchequer said it was not intended that this sum should be added to the permanent debt; but all detailed explanations were deferred until the introduction of the Budget. The efforts of the Opposition to deprive the Government of the necessary power to enter Congress with effect had entirely broken down; and from that period a reaction set in against the Russianizing tendencies which had existed in such force since the autumn agitation of 1876, and which were so largely accountable for the frightful and atrocious war now terminated by the exhaustion of the weaker combatant.

## CHAPTER VI.

Gravity of the Situation at the End of January, 1878—Lord Derby's Despatch to St. Petersburg—Assurances given by the Russian Government with Respect to European Interests—Russian Designs on Gallipoli—Mr. Layard's Despatches from Constantinople—Advance of the Russian Troops towards the Turkish Capital after the Conclusion of the Armistice—The Lines of Tchataldja and Tchekmedje abandoned to the Invaders—Statements and Counter-Statements in the English House of Commons—Dishonest Denials of Prince Gortschakoff—Proceedings of General Skobeleff before Constantinople—The Capital left without Defence—Violent Conduct of the Russians, and Perplexity of the Turkish Commanders—Terms of the Armistice and of the Peace Preliminaries—Accusations of Server Pasha against England—The Alleged Deceptions of Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Layard—Dismissal of Server Pasha from the Office of Foreign Affairs—Temporary Misunderstanding between Austria and Russia—Austrian Proposal for holding a Conference—Imperial Speech at the Opening of the German Reichstag—Proposal of Russia to take back the Portion of Bessarabia ceded to Moldavia in 1856—Indignant Remonstrances of the Roumanians—Disquieting Rumours as to Russian Demands—Popular Opinion in Russia on the Question of the Straits—History of that Question as affected by Successive Treaties—The Settlement of 1871—Further Changes in the Turkish Government—Abolition of the Grand Vizierate—Ahmed Vefyk Effendi appointed Prime Minister—Stormy Scenes in the Chamber of Deputies—Denunciation of the Pashas and of the Government—Sudden Prorogation of Parliament—Free Institutions the Hope of Turkey.

WHEN it became known in London that the Turkish powers of defence were considered exhausted, that negotiations for peace were in progress, that the Sultan was ready to accept almost any terms that might be imposed by the victors, and that nevertheless the Russians, while artfully delaying the conclusion of an armistice, and veiling in secrecy the conditions they intended to demand, were pushing on with eager haste towards Constantinople, the Government of Lord Beaconsfield began to perceive the grave position into which its blundering policy had brought the country, and to take some measures against a danger which could much more effectually have been excluded at an earlier date. Even Lord Derby thought it would not be advisable to allow the Russians and Turks to conclude entirely by themselves an agreement which might vitally affect the interests of England and the condition of Europe generally. Lord Carnarvon had quitted the Ministry because it was at length resolved to make some slight assertion of the national dignity and spirit; and, although there were still divisions in the Cabinet, it was determined to speak plainly to Russia on some matters of importance. On the 29th of January, the Earl of Derby wrote to Lord Augustus Loftus, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, declaring that her Majesty's Government, while recognizing any arrangements made by the Russian and Turkish delegates at Kezanlik, for the conclusion of an armistice and the settlement of bases of peace, as binding between the two belligerents, was unable to admit in them any validity, in so far as they were calculated to modify European treaties, and to affect general and British interests, unless they were made the subject of a formal arrangement among the parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856. A notification to the same effect was on the same day despatched to the British Ambassadors at Paris, Vienna, Berlin, and Rome.

The reply of Prince Gortschakoff was satisfactory as far as it went. On the morning of January 30th, Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with the Russian Chancellor, when his Highness observed

that to effect an armistice certain bases of peace were necessary, but that they were only to be considered as preliminaries, and were not definitive as regarded Europe. Questions bearing on European interests would be concerted with the European Powers; and Prince Gortschakoff added that he had given her Majesty's Government clear and positive assurances to that effect. He had in fact, a few days before, instructed Count Schouvaloff, the Ambassador at London, to affirm distinctly that Russia did not intend to act by herself in matters of general interest, and that the passage of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles was a question reserved for agreement among the Powers. In his interview with Lord Augustus Loftus on the 30th, the Prince stated that the fifth article of the peace-conditions, referring to an ulterior understanding as to Russian interests in the Straits, was vague and unnecessary. He professed a willingness to suppress it altogether; denied that it referred to an understanding between Russia and Turkey alone; and authorised the English Ambassador to state categorically to Lord Derby that Russia considered the settlement of the Straits a European question, with which the other Powers were concerned. With these assurances, Lord Derby expressed the satisfaction of her Majesty's Government; and so the matter rested for a time. Yet the future was involved in much uncertainty; and even while Prince Gortschakoff was making his fair-seeming promises, the Russian armies were advancing towards Constantinople, although the Porte had signified its acceptance of the conditions of peace as early as the 23rd of January. Gallipoli was still believed to be threatened, and the occupation of that position was undoubtedly at one time within the Russian designs. Without waiting for any Turkish concentration of troops in the peninsula, General Skobeleff ordered the cavalry of the Guard to march from Adrianople towards Gallipoli, soon after the first of those cities had been entered. The fact was mentioned in an official telegram of the Grand Duke Nicholas, dated from Kezanlik, January 23rd, and sent to the Emperor at St. Petersburg.* That the movement was afterwards checked, seems to have been due to the English Government, which began at length to show some signs of energy, though its action was still unfortunately characterised by the hesitation that had been apparent throughout. But the intention was only held in abeyance, and no one could tell how soon it might be carried into effect.

Mr. (now Sir A. H.) Layard was in constant communication with his Government during those anxious days; and his despatches were calculated to increase the feeling of apprehension. If the invaders were not advancing on Gallipoli, they were certainly drawing nearer and nearer to Constantinople. Mr. Layard reported that the movement was in progress even after the conclusion of the armistice and the signing of the peace-preliminaries on the 31st of January. At five o'clock on the evening of February 5th, the English Ambassador at the Porte telegraphed to Lord Derby:—"Although the armistice has been concluded, the Russians are pushing on towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the protest of the Turkish commander, the Turkish troops were compelled by General Strukoff to evacuate Silivri last night, and the protest of the Turkish commander was refused. The Russian General declared that, according to his orders, it was absolutely necessary that he should occupy Tchataldja to-day. Although five days have elapsed since the signature of the bases of peace and of the Armistice Convention, the Porte has not yet received the Protocol, and is still in ignorance of its real terms. Great alarm is felt, and the proceedings of Russia are not understood by the Turkish Government. Representations have again been made by the Porte to the Grand Duke Nicholas, and his attention has, at the same time, been called to the fact that the Servians, having destroyed Vrania, are marching on Uscub. Telegraph with Europe cut off, except through Bombay." On the following day (the 6th), Mr. Layard announced that the Russians had occupied Tchataldja in considerable force; that the General in command insisted on the abandonment by the Turks of the Tchekmedje lines, as one of the conditions of the armistice; and that the Turks had accordingly been compelled to withdraw from those lines, leaving Constantinople entirely undefended. It was evident (observed Mr. Layard) that, with a view to improving their military position during the armistice, the Russians were consolidating their advance. These were the statements read to the House of Commons on the evening of February 7th, previous to the House going into committee on the vote of credit. The agitation they produced has scarcely ever been surpassed in a Legislative Assembly, and they had the effect of persuading Mr. Forster to withdraw his amendment. But the excitement did not end there. In the course of the discussion which ensued, a letter arrived at the Treasury bench, and was passed on to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, at the first opportunity, read aloud a communication from Lord Derby, stating that the Ambassador of Russia had addressed his Government, in order to

* Telegraphic-Despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus to Lord Derby, Jan. 25th, 1878.

ascertain whether it was true that the Russian army was acting as affirmed by Mr. Layard, and that Prince Gortschakoff, telegraphing from St. Petersburg on that day, had replied that the order had been given to stop hostilities in both seats of war, and that there was not a word of truth in the rumours that had been circulated. The incident was startling, but did not suffice to delay the policy of Government. It was very properly felt by the majority of the House that the word of an English Ambassador was not to be lightly discredited, because of the denial of a Russian Minister, who had an interest in saying what he did.

A brief while showed that the information supplied by Mr. Layard was correct. The late Mr. MacGahan, one of the Special Correspondents of the *Daily News*, and a witness very far from unfavourably disposed to the Russians, has related that the rapidity of Skobeleff's march from Adrianople was not in the least relaxed after the signature of the armistice, and that the result was the occupation of the lines mentioned by Mr. Layard. This, as it afterwards appeared, was in accordance with the terms of the armistice; but the fact was carefully concealed as long as possible, and the arrangement was none the less a danger to Europe because the Turks agreed to it. The troops under Skobeleff had marched along the railway without baggage or artillery, which were sent on by train. Living partly on supplies found in the country, and partly on provisions despatched after them from Adrianople, they pushed on with remarkable quickness, and reached Tchataldja in the early part of February. The advanced guard arrived there on the 5th, the cavalry on the 6th, and Skobeleff himself, with the head of his infantry column, on the 7th. General Strukoff, of Skobeleff's calvalry, reached Silivri, situated on the Sea of Marmora, on the 5th, and required the Turkish forces there to abandon the position. They refused, saying they had no orders to that effect; whereupon, the Russians brought up a battery of cannon, and threatened to fire on them. The Ottomans then withdrew; but the action of the Russians was quite unjustifiable, as, according to an agreement which had been come to between the belligerents, the Turks were not bound to evacuate their positions until the following day (the 6th). The same course was pursued in other localities. "The Russians," says Mr. MacGahan, writing from Tchataldja (the head-quarters of General Skobeleff) on the 9th of February, "pushed forward, and drove the Turks out, by threats and force, everywhere up to the line of demarcation." The Turks protested, but of course in vain. These acts of violence undoubtedly began on the 5th, when they were clearly in defiance of the understanding; and even on the 6th there was considerable excuse for the Turkish hesitation. Owing, apparently, to interruption in the telegraphic service between Adrianople and the capital, it was not until February 4th that the Porte was informed of an arrangement having been effected on the 31st ultimo between Server and Namyk Pashas, and the Grand Duke Nicholas. Nothing beyond the bare fact of the signatures having been appended was even then communicated. Up to the evening of the 5th, details were wholly wanting; and it was only at a late hour on the 6th that Mukhtar Pasha, who had been appointed to the command of the defences about Constantinople, could be furnished with the terms of the armistice. Until then, he was under the impression that the two armies were simply to remain where they stood; and he not unnaturally felt great surprise and indignation at the continued advance of the Russians.

The armistice, when it came to be precisely known, proved very severe. The truce was concluded between Russia, Servia, and Roumania, on the one part, and Turkey on the other; and the terms were to be communicated by Russia to Montenegro. It was provided that a notice of three days should be given before any resumption of hostilities could take place, and that any guns or territory acquired after the signature should be restored. Certain lines of demarcation between the armies of the belligerents, and for the creation of a neutral zone, were set forth in the third article, and their general effect was to place in Russian hands almost the whole of Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Thrace, up to the lines of Constantinople and Gallipoli. As regarded the vicinity of the capital, it was stipulated that the Russian lines should be from Bujuk Tchekmedje, on the Sea of Marmora, to the Lake of Derkos, on the Black Sea; and that the Turkish lines, also reckoning from sea to sea, should extend from Kujuk Tchekmedje to the village of Ak Bunar, leaving a space of about seven miles between the lines as neutral ground. Mr. MacGahan very justly remarked that by this arrangement the Turks really abandoned their last line of defence, and left Constantinople at the mercy of the Russians, as the lines of Kujuk Tchekmedje were but slightly fortified, and, by the terms of the armistice, the Turks were not permitted to erect any other defensive works there. The lines handed over to the Russians were extremely formidable, and might have held the invaders at bay for many weeks. It seems, therefore, extraordinary that Server and Namyk Pashas should have relinquished

them, as their continued possession would have enabled the Turks to obtain more favourable terms of peace than were afterwards possible. But the policy of the moment was the policy of despair.

As regarded Servia and Montenegro, it was agreed that a joint commission should determine the lines of demarcation. It was also stipulated that the Russians should occupy Burgas and Midia, on the Black Sea, in order to obtain supplies, but not war-material. The armies beyond the lines of demarcation were to be withdrawn within three days of the signature of the armistice.* The Turks were to be at liberty to remove arms, &c., to places and by routes defined, on evacuating the fortifications mentioned in the third article; the evacuation to be complete within seven days after the receipt of orders by the commanders. Sulina, at one of the mouths of the Danube, was to be abandoned within three days by the Turkish troops and ships of war, unless removal should be prevented by the ice. The obstacles in the river were to be cleared away by the Russians, who would superintend the navigation. The Turks, on their part, were to raise the blockade of the Black Sea, and freedom of trade was to commence immediately. Rustchuk, Silistria, and Widdin, were to be given up to the Czar's troops, who were to occupy the coast of the Black Sea, from the Russian frontier to Baltjik, in the Bay of Kavarna; then, passing over an interval which left Varna and its vicinity in the occupation of the Turks, they were again to follow the coast to Derkos and the line of demarcation. In the Sea of Marmora, the Russians were to occupy the coast from Bujuk Tchekmedje to Sharkoi (twenty miles from the Boulair earthworks guarding Gallipoli), and in the Ægean from Ourcha to Makri, the starting-point of the railway to Adrianople. Railway traffic on the Turkish lines was to be open for trade, and the landing of merchandise at the ports was to be permitted, with the exception of ammunition. Such were the leading provisions of the armistice, and they showed in striking colours the state of complete helplessness to which Turkey had been reduced. They placed in the grip of the Russians and their allies the entire line of the Danube from Servia to the outfall; the greater part of the Black Sea coast; the whole of the Sea of Marmora (excepting the immediate vicinity of Constantinople); and important positions on the Ægean. The communications of the Russian army in the south with its base of operations in the north were rendered completely independent of the mountain routes; concentration at any point was facilitated; and the best positions were occupied for resisting attack by England, should that be menaced. The head-quarters of General Skobeleff were at Tchataldja, while Mukhtar Pasha was stationed east of the neutral ground, with a Turkish force equal to that of the Russian advanced guard. The main body of the Russian army was at Adrianople, but detachments were also encamped at Silivri and Rodosto, on the Sea of Marmora. The distance from Tchataldja to Constantinople is about thirty miles, and it was computed in the Russian camp that the Turkish capital could be occupied in from thirty-six to forty-eight hours.

The preliminary conditions of peace were officially published at St. Petersburg on the 8th of February. Up to that date, only the general heads had been known; but the details were now set forth with some degree of fulness, though still incompletely. It was here stated :—

"1. Bulgaria, within limits determined by the majority of the Bulgarian population (which limits shall in no case be less than those indicated by the Constantinople Conference), shall be formed into an autonomous tributary Principality, with a national Christian Government, and a native militia. The Ottoman army shall no longer remain there, except at certain points to be decided upon by common agreement.—2. The independence of Montenegro shall be recognised. An increase of territory, equivalent to that which the fortune of arms has placed in her hands, shall be secured to her. The definitive frontier shall be fixed subsequently.—3. The independence of Roumania and Servia shall be recognised. An adequate territorial compensation shall be secured to the former, and a rectification of frontier to the latter.—4. An autonomous administration, with adequate guarantees, shall be granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similar reforms shall be introduced into the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe.—5. The Porte shall agree to compensate Russia for the expenses of the war, and for the losses which she has been compelled to incur. The nature of this indemnity, whether pecuniary, territorial, or otherwise, shall be settled hereafter. His Majesty the Sultan shall come to an understanding with the Emperor of Russia for the protection of the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.—As a proof of the acceptance of these essential bases, Turkish Plenipotentiaries shall proceed immediately to Odessa or Sebastopol, in order there to negotiate the preliminaries of peace with the Russian Plenipotentiaries.

* The agreement with respect to the 6th of February seems to have been posterior to the written stipulation as to "three days," and was of course no less binding in honour. It is mentioned by Mr. MacGahan in a communication to the *Daily News*, dated "Kadikoi, February 7th."

As soon as the acceptance of the foregoing conditions has been notified to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Imperial armies, armistice conventions shall be negotiated at the two seats of war, and hostilities may be suspended provisionally. Both Commanders-in-Chief shall have power to complete the above conditions by indicating certain strategical points and fortresses, to be evacuated as material guarantees for the Sublime Porte accepting the armistice conditions, and commencing negotiations for peace."

some preliminary observations, the Turkish Plenipotentiary said he had a message to send to England, which he would be obliged to the correspondent if he would transmit. He then proceeded:—"Say this as coming from Server Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, word for word as nearly as you can translate it. I have hitherto been a partisan of England, of English policy, of the English alliance. I believed there were ties of sympathy, friendship, and interest between the two




THE LINES OF DEMARCATION.

Taken together, the peace-preliminaries and the armistice reduced Turkey from the position of an independent Empire to one existing solely by the will and pleasure of a superior power. No wonder that old Namyk Pasha shed tears when compelled by the force of circumstances to accept such hard conditions. No wonder that his colleague was in a state of painful agitation, which found vent in passionate reproaches against the British Government. Much interest was excited in England at this period by the report of an interview between Server Pasha and one of the Special Correspondents of the *Daily News*. After

peoples that necessitated an alliance. I believed in England to the extent of compromising myself and my Government. I see that I have been mistaken; that I was deceived, or (correcting himself) that I deceived myself. I now abandon the English alliance. I no longer believe in English policy, the English Government, or the English people. I accept the Russian policy and alliance. I am a partisan of them. I believe in the Russian policy. I am more Russian than the Russians themselves. Say this, please." In the course of further conversation, Server repeated these statements in even stronger language, especially as regarded the alleged decep-

TURKISH OFFICERS DISCUSSING THE TERMS OF PEACE, IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

tion. He said, "We have been encouraged, misled, *trompé* (deceived); and I have documents by which I can and will prove it."

This interview took place at Adrianople on the 28th of January, and the correspondent afterwards had a conversation with two other members of the Turkish Embassy to the Grand Duke, one of whom laid the whole blame of the war on Lord Salisbury, while the other confirmed what Server Pasha had said. "We were encouraged to go to war by England," observed the second of these officials, "and even to continue the struggle when our judgment told us we had better make peace on any terms. We could have made a peace before the fall of Plevna, that would have satisfied Russia, but for the counsels of the English Government. I do not refer to the official notes of Lord Derby. They were explicit and clear. If we believed them, we had nothing to hope from England; but it is not official notes diplomatists believe in most. It is 'officious' notes. It is words whispered in the ear. It was the private conversation of Lord Beaconsfield with Musurus Pasha, and of Mr. Layard with Server Pasha and the Sultan, that led us on and deceived us. It was to this that his Excellency Server Pasha referred when he spoke to you just now about his being deceived. Why, I assure you that no longer than three weeks ago Mr. Layard still assured us England would come to our aid; that we had only to fight on; that all would come right in the end. I allow you to repeat what I am now saying. Mr. Layard said to me:—'Do you think I, as a friend of Turkey, was sent here for nothing? Do you not see that it was to encourage you, and offend Russia? Believe me. Have courage. Make no peace. Fight to the end.' Mr. Layard spoke in the most open manner. The language held by him is well known to all the other Ambassadors at Constantinople. It was no secret. He was even indiscreet, he encouraged us so openly. I can only urge in his behalf that he himself was honestly deceived; that he deceived us the more readily because he himself was so completely deceived. Musurus Pasha represents Lord Beaconsfield's language to him in private as almost as strong, though far more cautiously expressed than that of Mr. Layard. Server Pasha has documents which will prove beyond doubt all I say, and which will be published after the war. It has been our destruction. It has been the ruin of Turkey. *C'est triste! C'est triste!*" Of Server Pasha the correspondent related that he spoke in an excited, indignant manner, and grew more and more angry the more he talked, like a man who feels he has been deeply wronged. Namyk Pasha was quiet and gentle in his manner, and his calm, uncomplaining dignity made a great impression on the representative of the English newspaper. "Allah is great!" he exclaimed. "If He wills that we are to come through this trouble, He will find the means: I know not what they may be. We have done our best. We can fight no more. We have no help, no hope, but in Him. If He wills that we are to perish, still we are content."

It would have been well if both the Plenipotentiaries had adopted this tone of pious fortitude and resignation. Server Pasha, however, was influenced by a very different spirit, and gave fiery expression to the grief by which his whole nature was tormented. There is much to be urged in his excuse; but his allegations seem to have been incorrect and unjustifiable. The report appeared in the *Daily News* of February 7th, and was made the subject of questions in the House of Commons that evening. The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that he had communicated on the subject with Lord Beaconsfield, who had said in a brief letter that the statement was "an infamous fabrication;" and it subsequently appeared that the Turkish Ambassador had authorised Lord Derby to give the most direct contradiction to the allegation that private or non-official encouragement had been held forth to the Sultan's Ministers by any member of her Majesty's Government, or that language had been spoken to him (Musurus Pasha), privately, which differed from what had been used publicly and officially. At Constantinople, Mr. Layard took up the matter very warmly. Server Pasha, on his return to the capital, openly declared that when he left for Kezanlik he was still under the impression that English assistance was about to be rendered to the Turks. It was impossible that the English Ambassador could remain quiet under such imputations, and he demanded the removal of Server Pasha from the Government. Server denied the accuracy of the statements contained in the *Daily News*; but Mr. Layard disbelieved the denial, and the Sultan, feeling that in any case the communication of such remarks to the representative of a newspaper was a grave impropriety, removed Server Pasha from his office of Foreign Minister, and, on the 19th of February, conferred the vacant portfolio on Safvet Pasha. It is noticeable, however, that Server Pasha, according to the report of his words in the *Daily News*, made no precise allusion either to Mr. Layard or to Lord Beaconsfield. The general statements of Server had received their particular application to the English Premier and the English Ambassador from the unnamed member of the Embassy with whom the correspondent

afterwards conversed. It is also remarkable that the *Daily News* soon allowed these specific accusations to drop out of view, and confined its iterations to the more vague and general statement of the Foreign Minister and first Plenipotentiary.* Nevertheless, it is probable that Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Layard were the persons whom Server Pasha had in his mind. Both statesmen were friendly to the Turkish Empire, and disinclined to see the Russians too victorious; and the probability is that Server Pasha built a number of purely imaginary hopes on the basis of these personal inclinations and disinclinations, and then burst forth into angry reproaches because his own interpretation of Ministerial purposes had turned out to be entirely false. That there was anything in the nature of a promise, direct or indirect, expressed or implied, that England would draw the sword on Russia, except under certain conditions, distinctly laid down, and not as yet infringed, is in the highest degree unlikely. Mr. Layard, it is true, had frequently urged his Government not to allow Turkey to be entirely destroyed, and had hinted to the Porte that, when peace was arranged, we should not suffer the Russian Emperor to carry his pretensions to extremities. But this is a very different thing from the promise of military assistance during the war.

The position and probable intentions of Austria at the period of the peace negotiations was a subject of no little anxiety in the diplomatic world. Some degree of misunderstanding appears to have existed momentarily between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, owing to the reserve of the Russian Government in respect to the full terms of peace which had been proposed to the Porte. The personal alliance of the two Emperors does not seem at any time to have been broken; but the Austrian Government had to consider the influence on Hungary which might possibly result from the terms of peace. Hungary, as we have had occasion to mention several times before, was intensely jealous of any large accession to Russian power in the south-east of Europe. Count Andrassy, himself a Hungarian, although the Austrian Prime Minister, was obliged to consider the feelings of his countrymen, and to consult the interests of the united Empire in the final settlement. Russia, on the other hand, was apprehensive that at the last moment Austria would raise unexpected demands, which it would not be convenient to satisfy. The Government at St. Petersburg was informed of the points on which Austria would express a decided opinion, even although those points might be settled between Russia and Turkey; and some degree of divergence seemed for a time apparent. It was even thought by well-wishers to the Ottoman Porte that an alliance against Russia might be concluded between Austria and England; but of this there was never any probability. Austria was in fact rather acting a part to save appearances than placing herself in any position of direct hostility towards Russia. The establishment of a great Sclave nationality in her immediate neighbourhood was obviously against the interests of Austria, unless she could obtain a sufficient compensation; but this was known to be forthcoming. The price of Austria's complicity with Russian ambition had been settled long before the war broke out, and there was little reason to suppose that Russia would violate her engagement. Even while the hesitation of the Austrian Government was being discussed, and causing much idle speculation as to the future, it was affirmed by a Paris newspaper, on the authority of what it described as precise and authentic information from Berlin, that the understanding of the three Emperors was completely re-established, with a view to the definitive settlement of the Eastern question.† The object which Austria now sought to effect was to bring about the assembly of a Conference for settling the various European questions resulting from the war. Formal invitations to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris were issued by the Vienna Cabinet on the 3rd of February, and were immediately accepted by the several Governments to which they were addressed, including that of Russia after a little hesitation. Even in Germany some uneasiness as to the designs of Russia was beginning to be felt. In the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the German Reichstag on the 6th of February, the approaching peace formed the subject of the concluding paragraph; and although the words employed were sufficiently vague, they seemed to imply a desire on the part of Germany that the demands of Russia should not be pushed too far. "When the Reichstag opened last year," said the Imperial address, "our expectation was not as yet without foundation that the Turkish Government would proceed by its own motion to carry out the reforms on which the European Powers had come to an agreement in the Conference at Constantinople. This expectation has not been realized. The Emperor hopes, nevertheless, that a speedy peace may bring into operation, and may lastingly secure, the principles of that Conference. The comparatively small amount of interest which Germany possesses in

* The communication was not reproduced in the *Daily News* volume of War Correspondence.

† The statement appeared in the *Gaulois* of January 30th.

the East permits to the policy of the Empire an impartial influence in bringing about an understanding of the Powers concerned, with respect to future guarantees against the recurrence of disturbance in the East, and in favour of the Christian populations." These remarks seem to suggest that the Emperor expected the terms of peace not to exceed the known; but additional details continued to ooze forth, and these were of a character to make the European Powers generally still more discontented with the proposed re-arrangement of the East. It was not long before Roumania discovered that her devotion to the Russian cause—a devotion marked by flagrant treachery and breach of faith towards



SIR A. H. LAYARD.

arrangements agreed to in the Constantinople Conference. Every one, however, knew perfectly well that, after so desperate a struggle, Russia would not be content with what she had somewhat unwillingly accepted even at the earlier period. The words of the German Emperor, therefore, must be received as one of those easy generalities which are capable of many interpretations, and as containing no more definite sense than the mild expression of a wish that the Czar would not proceed to insane extremities.

The designs of Russia were even yet imperfectly

Turkey—was to be requited after an evil fashion. It appeared that Russia intended to take back to herself that portion of Bessarabia which was separated from the Empire at the peace of 1856, and bestowed on Moldavia, now forming part of the Roumanian Principality. In exchange for this territory, Roumania was to receive the barren gift of the Dobrudscha—a marshy waste, fatal to life, and incapable of culture. The object of the forced exchange was obvious. England and France desired in 1856 to throw back the Russian frontier from the Danube, and especially from the mouths of that

river, which the Czar could at any moment close by his ships, or cross by his armies. The measure was one of protection to the Turkish Empire, and the present object of Russia was to do away with that protection, and restore her powers of aggression in all their former plenitude. Some months before, it had been whispered that to effect this purpose was one of the chief ends which Russia had in view in waging war with Turkey; and the Roumanians were not slow to perceive—when it was too late—that their co-operation had been obtained on false pretences, and that their brave soldiery had been cynically used as an instrument for the furtherance of Russian schemes. At the period of the peace, the truth was only too well known, although Russia hesitated to proclaim it. The whole Roumanian population burst into a flame of anger, and declared that it was not for such objects that they had thrown away ten thousand lives, and sacrificed several millions of money. In the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, questions were addressed to the Government on the 7th of February, and a resolution was unanimously and jointly adopted by both Houses, setting forth that the integrity of Roumania had been guaranteed by the Great European Powers, and that this integrity had in a special manner been recognised by Russia in Clause II. of the Convention of April 5th, 1877, which stipulated that, in order that no disadvantage or danger should accrue to Roumania in connection with the passage of the Russians over Roumanian territory, Russia laid herself under an obligation to maintain and uphold the political rights of Roumania, as defined by her internal laws and by existing treaties, and also to maintain and defend the existing integrity of that State. The resolution then went on to assert that Roumania had faithfully fulfilled the obligations incurred by this Convention, and had shed her blood and made heavy sacrifices for the consolidation of her independence. Considering, therefore, that an independent and homogeneous Roumania accorded with the interests of neighbouring States, and with those of Europe, the Chamber and Senate declared that they were resolved to maintain the integrity of Roumania, and would not agree to the alienation of any part of the country, in return for territorial or other compensation. Of course, even those who made this protest knew very well that it would be inoperative, and would only serve to place on record the national indignation at an act of bad faith wholly opposed to the interests of Roumania. If the Danubian Principality had alone been concerned in the contemplated change, few persons in Europe would have felt much regret. The conduct of the Roumanian Government and people had been so treacherous to Turkey that every one in whom partizanship had not extinguished shame would have regarded her treatment as a just retribution. But the question was evidently one of European importance, since the retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia would place the entrance to the Danube in the power of Russia, and in some measure subject the whole of that important water-way to her influence.

Disquieting rumours as to other features in the approaching peace were current in London. It was said that the Russians had required the principal Turkish ironclads, and had withdrawn their demand only in consideration of the Sultan having undertaken not to cede the vessels to England. It was also asserted that Russia wished to expel the whole Mohammedan population from the Bulgarian Principality that was about to be created. The accuracy of these statements was denied; but a matter of equal importance, having reference to the Straits, continued to occupy the serious attention of English politicians. The free passage of Russian war-vessels through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was earnestly desired by the patriotic party in Russia, and it was feared that the clamours of this party would overcome the prudence of Ministers. "A merchant marine," said the assertors of Muscovite predominance, "cannot prosper unless it is properly protected. In order, therefore, to develop the commerce of our southern ports, we must have a Black Sea fleet which can pass out freely into the Mediterranean. Our former fleet in those waters was destroyed during the Crimean War, but the heroic spirit which animated it has survived. All that we require, in order to create a large naval force in the Black Sea, is free passage for our war-vessels." The St. Petersburg Correspondent of the *Times*, who kept his journal well informed as to the development of opinion in Russia, observed that for a time this argument seemed very satisfactory, as it was universally believed that the freedom of the Straits meant something which would be strenuously opposed by England, and which consequently must be advantageous to Russia. When, however, the same scheme was advocated in England, suspicions were aroused, and it was perceived that the required freedom, if taken in the widest sense, would admit the British fleet into the Black Sea, as well as the Russian fleet into the Mediterranean. As the English navy is much larger than the Russian, this would be an arrangement not at all favourable to the subjects of the Czar. The aspirations

of the latter, consequently, underwent a great modification, and it was explained that what Russia needed was the exclusive right of passage for herself. This right, argued the patriotic journalists, was quite in accordance with the recognized principles of international equity. "The coast of the Black Sea," they said, "belongs exclusively to Russia and Turkey, and therefore those two Powers alone should have the right of entrance for ships of war. The navies of the Powers which own no possessions on the Black Sea coast can have no reason to pass through the Straits, except for purposes of attack and invasion." In a little while, even this demand was not thought sufficient, and it was then proposed that Russia should be predominant in the Straits, and, for the due assertion of her power, should obtain a fortress on the Bosphorus. Thus, the so-called freedom of the Straits would have led to something very like the exclusive possession of the waters by the Russian navy. These ideas went considerably beyond anything that the responsible statesmen of Russia were at that time prepared to demand; but they indicated what was stirring in the hearts of the Russian people, and the vague aspiration of to-day is apt to be the definite policy of to-morrow. It has been seen that Prince Gortschakoff introduced a stipulation as to the Straits into the peace-propositions which he forced the Turkish Sultan into accepting; and although he afterwards allowed that all such matters must be submitted to the approval of the Powers, it was manifest that here was a very ominous question, brought forward by Russia at the conclusion of a war which had established her undisputed supremacy in the East.

This question of the Straits has been the subject of several diplomatic arrangements during the present century, and it may be as well to consider it with some fulness. As far back as January, 1809, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Turkey, by which it was agreed that the Porte should close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to armed ships of all nations, both in time of peace and in time of war. For some time previous to that date, the practice had been confined to times of war; it was then equally extended to periods of peace. We must bear in mind that the Bosphorus,



FORT KILID BAHR: EUROPEAN SIDE OF THE MOUTH OF THE DARDANELLES.

the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles, are waters wholly within Turkish territory, and that they possess a peculiar importance, as giving access to the Turkish capital. The right to close them is therefore a right naturally inherent in the very principle of sovereignty; but when the power of Turkey declined, and that of Russia became alarmingly aggressive, it was considered prudent to establish this right on the more definite ground of treaty law. The agreement with England in the year 1809 arose out of the war with Russia then proceeding, and was dictated by a desire on the part of Turkey to put an end absolutely, and with the sanction of Great Britain, to the admission of Russian ships of war through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. This arrangement underwent a modification in the famous Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, signed on the 8th of July, 1833. In

the treaty itself, as published to the world, nothing whatever was said about the Straits; but a separate and secret article, annexed to the main body of the treaty, ran as follows:—"In virtue of one of the clauses of Art. I. of the patent [published] Treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Ottoman Porte the expense and inconvenience which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not ask for that aid. If circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent Treaty, shall confine its action in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles—that is to say, not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter them, under any pretext whatsoever."



FORT CHANAK KALESSI: ASIATIC SIDE OF THE MOUTH OF THE DARDANELLES.

The object of this understanding was to exclude the enemies of Russia from passing through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, so as to attack her in the Black Sea. There was nothing in the treaty, nor in the secret article, to prevent Russia from entering the Sea of Marmora from the Bosphorus; so that, supposing the Western Powers to be at war with Russia, and Turkey to be favourably inclined to their side, she would be compelled to exclude their vessels from passing eastward through the prohibited waters; while at the same time Russia might have a large fleet in the Sea of Marmora, within sight of Constantinople itself, which it could intimidate without fear of opposition. Although the words, "foreign vessels of war," must, as a matter of plain grammatical construction, be taken to include Russian as well as other vessels, and to forbid the passage of Russia westward into the Ægean and the Mediterranean, no less than the passage of other Powers eastward into the Sea of Marmora, it was thought advisable, in the treaty of 1841, to extend the prohibition specifically to Russian ships. At the Conference of Vienna, in 1855, Russia proposed the opening of the Straits to the war-ships of all nations. On this proposal Lord Clarendon remarked, in his circular despatch of June 19th in that year:—"The effect of this scheme would have been, that Constantinople would at all times have been exposed to all the dangers which must have arisen from the sudden appearance before that city of an overwhelming Russian armament; while the tranquillity of the Mediterranean, and all the great interests in that sea, would have been liable to disturbance by the action of a powerful Russian fleet sallying forth at any moment from the Euxine. To guard against this danger, the Governments of England and France would have been compelled to maintain in the Mediterranean war-establishments

in time of peace, and permanently to station their armaments at a great distance from their arsenals and resources; so that peace concluded on such conditions would have been nothing more than an armed truce, divested of the security which is the essence of peace."

The inviolability of the Straits was again affirmed by the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, and by the supplementary Treaty of London, in 1871; but the latter of those instruments restored to the Sultan a power of which he had previously divested himself. Whereas the treaties of 1841 and 1856 bound the Sultan, as long as he was at peace, to admit no ships of war into the Straits, the treaty of March 13th, 1871, conceded to the Sultan the right to open the Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, whenever his Imperial Majesty should consider such a step necessary to secure the execution of the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Paris. The alleged restrictions on Russia, imposed by various treaties dealing with the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, are in truth restrictions on her powers of aggression only. Absolute liberty of passage for trading vessels was established at the peace of 1829, and re-affirmed in the most precise terms by the third article of the treaty of 1871. Nor is the Mediterranean prohibited even to the war-ships of Russia, any more than to other Powers, if she approaches it, in common with those Powers, by the Straits of Gibraltar. The Sea of Marmora and its two outlets are essentially private waters, surrounded by Turkish territory, and lying, by a natural right, within Turkish jurisdiction. There is no conceivable reason why Russia should desire to set aside that right, except from covert motives, aiming at the destruction of the Turkish Empire, and the establishment of a preponderating power that would be dangerous to the whole of Europe.

The mortal throes of Turkey at this distracted epoch were seen in the frequent changes of Government to which the Sultan had recourse. One of them took place in January; another followed at the beginning of February, when the office of Grand Vizier was abolished, and Ahmed Vefyk Effendi was made President of the Council and Minister of the Interior. His appointment to this post, which was equivalent to that of Premier, excited considerable astonishment in the country, as he had but recently been deprived of the Governorship of Adrianople, and was thought to have lost his election to the Chamber in consequence of official opposition. Still more recently, however, he had been made Minister of Public Instruction, and, being a man of great intelligence and varied accomplishments, had evidently acquired an influence at court, which now carried him to the summit of power. He was generally said to be of Greek origin, and he possessed qualities of mind which seemed to confirm the report. In former years, Ahmed had been Turkish Ambassador to Napoleon III.; but he was accused of an inability to work harmoniously with his colleagues, and this had hitherto acted against his prospects as a public man. His promotion to the post of First Minister was by many attributed to the friendship of Mr. Layard, who had certainly, a short time before, interested himself very warmly in defending Ahmed from certain accusations of cruelty which had been brought against him. The position to which he succeeded was one of the utmost difficulty, the anxieties of which were increased by the spirit of opposition that had recently been developed by the Parliament. Ahmed Vefyk was unpopular with the Chamber, and the irritability of the deputies increased with his accession to power. They vehemently demanded that the terms of the armistice should be submitted to them, though the Ministry were bound to silence. They called for the punishment of several officials of high position, and they pressed the Government with questions which, under the circumstances of the time, it would have been imprudent to answer. The Chamber of Deputies was in fact exercising its right of criticism to the utmost; but it was not exceeding its powers under the Constitution, though a more temperate exercise of such functions might have been advisable in that era of ruin and disruption. In several respects it was doing good service by calling attention to the misconduct of officials, and to the fanaticism of certain portions of the Turkish population. Some horrible massacres of Greek Christians had occurred at Viza, in the vicinity of Burgas, and at other places, and these crimes were brought before the notice of the House by members of the Greek race. The Chamber decided that urgent measures should be adopted, and the debates made a remarkable impression. Many Turks joined the Christians in denouncing the cruelties that had been committed, and Ministers were accused of shielding the perpetrators. It was demanded that the offenders should be brought to trial, and one member declared that those who defended the wrong-doers became their accomplices. In a secret sitting of the Chamber, a deputy fiercely attacked certain Pashas who had been buying Christian girls from the Circassians, and alleged that one of them was a member of the Government. "This traffic in human flesh," cried the deputy in tones of excitement, "is infamous. The

Circassians are great miscreants; but how much worse are the purchasers, who, notwithstanding their high position, do not scruple to take part in the odious traffic! What an unhappy country is ours! How quickly it has been ruined by the rapacity of these infamous men, who continue to perpetrate such vile acts even while our city, which has for four hundred years been honoured, is in the hands of the Russians! Woe to the wretches, woe!" The speech was loudly applauded in all parts of the Chamber, and was followed up by a general attack on the Government for its numerous sins.

The Ministry and the Chamber were at open war, and it was clear that this condition would not be suffered to last much longer. The rupture came very soon after the appointment of Ahmed Vefyk to the Premiership. A stormy sitting took place on the 11th of February. Fifteen members presented memorials, declaring that the Sultan had acted illegally in abolishing the Grand Vizierate without a vote of the Chamber. Ahmed Vefyk tried to procure the withdrawal of these memorials, but failed. The Chamber then insisted upon knowing the terms of peace, to which the Prime Minister replied that details could not be given until the protocol had been received from the delegates. A deputy cried out, "Why do you not tell us at once that you have given away the whole Empire, and that all is finished?" The choleric nature of Ahmed flamed up at this question, and he exclaimed, "The Chamber is ruining the country." Several of the deputies retorted, "It is not we who have ruined the country; it is the late Ministers. We demand that they be tried."* Shortly afterwards, Ahmed left the Chamber, saying that with such deputies he could do nothing; and on the 14th of February Parliament was prorogued by an Imperial message. It was generally believed that the adjournment was equivalent to a dissolution, and it was feared by many that the experiment of a Turkish Constitution had irretrievably broken down. That experiment had been tried under the most difficult circumstances conceivable—in the midst of foreign war and domestic revolution; and it is not surprising that it had met with a harsh and sudden interruption. But it must be recollected to the credit of the Turkish character that the Ottoman Parliament had not been in all respects a failure. It would not have been surprising if a people so entirely unaccustomed to legislative forms had shown a complete incapacity to adopt them, and had simply registered the decrees of the executive Power. But the Chamber of Deputies at Constantinople had acted in no such manner. It had shown spirit, energy, independence, and debating faculty; it had made itself felt in the councils of the nation; it had proved how true a germ of hope for Turkey dwells in those forms of liberty which have been the salvation of the West. If the jarring elements of Turkish society are ever to be organized to harmonious ends, it must be in the arena of free debate; and although the prorogation of the Chamber may have been a necessary evil in that moment of supreme agony, it is only by the resumption of Constitutional law and the rights of popular election that Turkey can ever inherit a new life, or acquire an interest in the future age.

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## CHAPTER VII.

General Posture of Affairs at the Beginning of February—Turkey completely in the Grasp of Russia—Apprehensions of the English Government—Renewed Determination to send the Fleet to Constantinople—Statements of Lord Derby and Sir Stafford Northcote to Parliament—Communication from Prince Gortschakoff to the Russian Ambassador—Refusal of the Porte to grant a Firman for Passing the Straits—Popular Feeling in Turkey—Position of the Ottoman Porte towards the English Government—Negotiations between the Two Powers—Entrance of the English Fleet into the Dardanelles, against the Protest of the Sultan—Subsequent Agreement with Russia—Communications from Lord Derby to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg—Agitation in England—The Peace Party and the War Party—An Appeal to the Mob—Excited and Turbulent Meetings—The Peace Party silenced—Objectionable Character of the whole Movement—Publication of Official Papers on the Eastern Question—Exposition of Russian Views with Respect to the Peace—Interview of the Czar with Colonel Wellesley—Reply of Lord Derby—Disingenuous Remarks by Lord Beaconsfield—Warlike Proceedings of Greece—Intervention of the Powers, and withdrawal of the Greek Troops from Turkish Territory—Insurrectionary Movements in Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete.

WITH the advent of February, diplomacy took the place of generalship in the conduct of the Eastern Question; but behind the diplomatists were the armies and the fleets, and it was clear that the latter would exercise no small influence on the ultimate result. The truth of this proposition was felt nowhere more strongly than in England, not-

* Constantinople Correspondent of the *Standard*.

withstanding the efforts of the Gladstonian party to persuade the Government and the people that they should enter the approaching Conference with all the material strength on the side of Russia. The aspect of affairs in the East was so threatening that the necessity of taking precautions against possible eventualities could no longer be successfully gainsaid. The concessions which Russia had extorted from Turkey became progressively more alarming the more they were known. Not only were the Czar's commanders put in possession of the defensive lines before Constantinople, but, on giving three days' notice, they were free to advance into the city itself. Thus, the Turkish capital, though not actually occupied, was entirely in the grasp of the invaders, and Russia, while appearing to keep her promise not to enter, had virtually broken it. Russian officers, indeed, were to be seen walking about Pera and Galata, and their men were not far off, ready to pour down on the Ottoman metropolis, and camp within the shadow of St. Sophia. Even the lines about Gallipoli were to some extent in the power of the Russians, owing to the commanding positions which had been acquired on the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Ægean. The defencelessness of the Turks could therefore hardly be exceeded; and, as England had interests of the weightiest character in that part of the world, it behoved her to see that Turkey's misfortune did not also become her own.

Lord Beaconsfield must by this time have recognized the serious error he had committed in withdrawing the fleet from the Dardanelles immediately after sending it there. On the 25th of January, when Admiral Hornby sailed into the Straits, and directly afterwards sailed out again, the war was not yet over: Turkey had not definitively resigned herself to the will of Russia, and was willing to receive England as a friend and possible ally. All that had now been altered. The preliminaries of peace were signed; the Turks were disgusted with what they held to be the treachery of England; most of the strong positions had been handed over to the Russians, and there was talk of a Russo-Turkish alliance. All favourable opportunities for resisting the threatened danger had been wantonly sacrificed to the demands of party, or to the inclinations of particular Ministers; and the peril grew with every hour. The Sultan had been alienated, the Czar angered, and every other European potentate rendered distrustful or contemptuous, by the policy of tergiversation which the British Government had pursued for a year and a half. Yet it was necessary to do something, and the Ministry reverted to the step which a few weeks before they had taken only to abandon. On the 8th of February it was officially announced in both Houses of Parliament that a detachment of the Mediterranean fleet would proceed to Constantinople, to afford protection, in case of need, first to English subjects residing in that city, and next to others who might be in danger from an excited population. Orders to that effect had just been despatched to Admiral Hornby and to Mr. Layard. It was explained that, in taking this step, Ministers were anxious to avoid all appearance of hostile demonstration, and had therefore communicated their intention to the neutral Powers, at the same time inviting them to act in a similar manner. Moreover, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been instructed to make clear to Prince Gortschakoff the objects with which the squadron had been ordered to pass the Dardanelles; and Lord Derby seems to have thought that these representations would quiet the irritability of Russia, and remove all difficulties.

The alleged reason for the step was the fear of disturbances in Constantinople, resulting from the terms of peace, and the aroused fanaticism of the people. Sir Stafford Northcote, in making the announcement to the House of Commons, said that Russia had been fully prepared for such a course by a memorandum communicated to the Russian Ambassador in London on the 28th of July, 1877. In that memorandum, her Majesty's Government had stated that "they look with much anxiety at the state of things in Constantinople, and the prospect of the disorder and bloodshed, and even anarchy, which may occur there as the Russian forces draw nearer to the capital. The crisis which may at any moment arrive in Constantinople may be such as her Majesty's Government could not overlook while they had the means of mitigating its horrors. Her Majesty's Government are fully determined (unless it should be necessary for the preservation of interests which they have already stated they are bound to maintain) not to depart from the line of neutrality which they have declared their intention to observe; but they do not consider that they would be departing from this neutrality, and they think that Russia will not consider that they are so doing, if they should find themselves compelled to direct their fleet to proceed to Constantinople, and thus afford protection to the European population against internal disturbance." Notwithstanding these smooth diplomatic phrases, the Russian Government must have been perfectly well aware that the protection of life in Constanti-

nople was only one of the objects which the English Government had in view in again sending the fleet into Turkish waters. The movement was mainly intended as a demonstration against Russia; and it was so understood. But it had come too late to possess much value as a counter-stroke of policy. The game was obviously in the hands of Russia, and, although she might be exasperated, she could hardly be turned back. Turkey's feelings towards England may be judged by some expressions used by Lord Derby in making his statement to the Upper House. "There can be no doubt," said the Foreign Secretary, "that the public excitement at Constantinople is very great, and that it is not likely to diminish. I am afraid I must add that, in consequence of the policy of neutrality which has been pursued by us during the war, it cannot be expected that the same friendly feeling exists towards us as was formerly entertained, or that our influence in Turkey is what it formerly was." This was unquestionably true; and it was equally the fact that, while Turkey had been offended, Russia was not pleased.

The latest action of the English Cabinet was met by the Czar in no amiable spirit. On the 10th of February, Prince Gortschakoff telegraphed as follows to the Russian Ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome:—"The British Government, upon reports furnished at Constantinople, has determined to take advantage of a previously-obtained firman in order to direct a portion of its fleet to Constantinople, with the object of protecting the lives and property of British subjects in the Turkish capital. Other Powers have adopted a similar course with a view to the protection of their subjects. This intelligence, taken as a whole, obliges us on our side to take into consideration the proper means of protecting those Christians whose lives and property might be threatened, and, in order to attain this result, to contemplate the entry of a portion of our troops into Constantinople." Such was the reception given by Russia to the new policy. The attitude of Turkey was scarcely less emphatic. The Ottoman Government instructed its Ambassador at London to represent that the lives and property of English subjects were not in danger, and to urge on the Cabinet of St. James's "to give up a step which from its nature and character might provoke grave complications." For any foreign Power to enter the Dardanelles, it is necessary first to obtain a firman of authorisation from the Porte. Prince Gortschakoff was mistaken in supposing that the British Government intended to proceed in virtue of the firman obtained towards the end of January, without making any renewed application. A fresh authorisation was requested by Mr. Layard on the 9th of February; but this was refused, and it was intimated that the earlier one could not be recognised. Admiral Hornby reached the entrance to the Dardanelles, for the second time, on the same day; but, finding that the officers at the forts had no instructions to let him pass, and receiving shortly afterwards a communication from Mr. Layard, intimating the decision of the Porte, he returned to Besika Bay, where he awaited further orders. Communications were then opened between her Majesty's Government and the Porte, with a view to the removal of difficulties; but the issues involved were evidently serious, and they did not grow less with time. Three other Powers—France, Austria, and Italy—instructed their Ambassadors to apply for firmans to pass the Straits, and Russia prepared for an immediate occupation of Constantinople, in case her conquests should be seriously disputed by any of the European Governments. The check given to England was regarded with great satisfaction by a portion of the Turkish people. Pera was placarded on the 14th of February with a satirical notice, which ran:—"Lost, between Besika Bay and Constantinople, an ironclad fleet. Any one giving information will be handsomely rewarded." This feeling, however, was not universal. The Turkish Parliament, a few days before its prorogation, took up the matter in a different mood, and expressed a hope that the Ministry would not wound the susceptibilities of so old an ally as England. Ahmed Vefyk promised to consider the subject; but the spirit to which Server Pasha had given rash expression continued to rule the Cabinet, and Turkey maintained her refusal to admit the British fleet. It was believed that more might now be made out of the Russian than the English alliance, and desire of revenge against England for her desertion of Turkey was the prevailing sentiment in the hearts of Ottoman statesmen.

The Government of Lord Beaconsfield was placed in a very difficult position. To order the ships to pass the Straits in defiance of the Sultan, was almost equivalent to an act of warfare; while to accept the rebuff would have placed us at a grave disadvantage with Russia. A few days' negotiation left matters pretty much where it had found them, but at the same time showed that the alleged excuse for the presence of the British fleet at Constantinople had little or no justification in fact. The excitement in the Turkish capital had greatly calmed down since the final days of the war, and it was considered by the representatives of France and Italy that all danger of an outbreak was at an

end. The orders given to the fleets of those Powers were therefore countermanded very shortly after they were sent; but Austria still held to her intention. As regarded England, every one knew that the ostensible reason for demanding a passage was not the real one; and Lord Derby, in making his explanations to Parliament on the 8th of February, revealed the actual motive very clearly. At the

THE PORT OF HALKI, PRINCE'S ISLANDS, SEA OF MARMORA.

end of January, the Foreign Secretary had momentarily resigned because the fleet had been ordered into Turkish waters; he now maintained that the Russians had Constantinople completely in their power, and that therefore the circumstances had entirely altered. It might have been argued with much force that if the fleet had not been withdrawn on the 25th of January, the Imperial city would in all probability have been still in a position of independence, as the Turks, encouraged by the appearance of support, would doubtless have held their formidable lines of defence. It could further have been shown that nothing was so likely to bring about a Russian occupation of Constantinople as the passage of the Dardanelles by English ships of war. But, whatever the wisdom of the later policy, the intention was plain enough. The Government had postponed their move until it was too late; but the design with which it was made could hardly be concealed by any artifice of words. The ideas of Lord Beaconsfield had again got the ascendency for a little while, and it was resolved to oppose English force to Russian in the arena of the East.

Turkey not unnaturally feared that in the collision of these forces her own ruin would be complete. The entrance of the Russians into Constantinople was dreaded as the greatest humiliation and misfortune that could occur; and the apprehension of this catastrophe, as the consequence of England's proposed action, was undoubtedly one of the reasons for refusing the solicited firman. In the event of the Russians entering, it seems to have been the intention of the Sultan and his Ministers to retire to Broussa, the ancient Asiatic capital of the Empire; and it was considered doubtful



Rupert. Research. Temeraire. Swiftsure. Hotspur. Ruby. Agincourt. Sultan. Salamis (yacht).

THE BRITISH FLEET AT THE ENTRANCE OF THE DARDANELLES.



Ruby. Research. Rupert. Swiftsure. Hotspur. Temeraire. Agincourt. Sultan (flagship).

THE BRITISH FLEET PASSING THE ISLE OF TENEDOS.



Research. Swiftsure. Hotspur. Agincourt. Sultan. Ruby. Temeraire. Rupert.

THE BRITISH FLEET OFF THE TOWN AND FORT OF CHANAK.

whether in that case the rule of the Turks in Europe could ever be restored, even in the most modified degree. Under the influence of this fear, the Sultan went the length of writing to the Queen, begging her, in the name of humanity, not to send her ships into the Dardanelles; and to the Emperor, requesting him to postpone any contemplated measures with reference to Constantinople. The Czar replied by merely confirming what had been said by Prince Gortschakoff in his circular of February 10th. The Queen of course left the question in the hands of her responsible advisers; and from the 9th to the 12th the discussion on the point of right went on between the English and Turkish Governments. The former endeavoured to make it appear that the previous firman was still valid; the latter as strenuously denied such an interpretation, and even hinted that it would resist any attempt on the part of England to enter the Straits. At length, the Government of Lord Beaconsfield determined to cut the matter short, and on the 12th of February sent final orders to Admiral Hornby, through Mr. Layard, to steam at once into the Dardanelles, and to use force if necessary. This was done on the morning of the 13th, in the midst of a heavy snow-storm, which made steering so difficult, owing to the obscurity, that one of the vessels was aground for some few hours. The ships were all prepared for action; but happily there was no occasion for violence, as the Turkish authorities, while protesting against the act as a breach of Ottoman sovereignty, refrained from offering any resistance.

The naval force thus employed consisted of ten ironclads, two of which remained at Gallipoli, while the remaining eight passed on into the Sea of Marmora, and anchored at an hour's distance from Constantinople, off the small group called Prince's Islands. Russia viewed this movement with great displeasure, and the troops of General Skobeleff, previously scattered about through the villages in the neighbourhood of the capital, at once began to concentrate, with a view to possible operations. Neither England nor Russia, however, was really anxious to come to blows, and a compromise was speedily arranged. The Russian commanders began to see that it would not be necessary for them to occupy Constantinople unless English troops were landed there—a measure which was not then contemplated by the British Government. Admiral Hornby discovered that there was not such good anchorage at Prince's Islands as might be found in the Bay of Mundania, situated on the Asiatic coast of the Sea of Marmora, nearly forty miles south of Constantinople, and in telegraphic communication with that city, which Prince's Islands, though several miles nearer, are not. As the Admiral had been left perfectly free to choose his place of anchorage, and as the Council of Ministers at Constantinople earnestly requested that the fleet would move farther off, fresh quarters were taken up on the 16th of February. But no sooner did Admiral Hornby arrive at Mundania Bay than he found the anchorage very bad indeed, and accordingly, on the 18th, left for Touzla, near the entrance to the Gulf of Ismid, where the ships were within seventeen miles of the Turkish metropolis. Here they remained, and the danger of a rupture gradually diminished; though it may be a question whether the forcible entrance of the Dardanelles, against the Sultan's protest, might not have been regarded as a *casus belli* both by Turkey and Russia.

The incident was of course attended by a certain amount of diplomatic correspondence. On the 13th of February, the Russian Ambassador communicated to Lord Derby a telegraphic despatch from Prince Gortschakoff, which was thus expressed:—"The British Government having announced that they were about to send a detachment of their fleet to Constantinople for the protection of the life and property of their subjects, whose safety might be endangered, according to the reports which reached them, the Russian Government, with precisely the same object, have in view the temporary entry into Constantinople of a part of their troops—with this distinction, that they will extend their protection, should the occasion arise, to all the Christian population. The two Governments would accordingly fulfil a common duty of humanity. This undertaking, pacific in its nature, could not therefore take any character of mutual hostility." The despatch was at once transmitted by the Foreign Secretary to Lord Augustus Loftus. While expressing the satisfaction of the British Government at the courteous language of Prince Gortschakoff, Lord Derby intimated that they could not acknowledge any similarity in the circumstances as affecting England and Russia, or that the despatch of British vessels to the Sea of Marmora justified the entrance of the Russian troops into Constantinople. In the one case, the ships of war of a friendly Power were sent into the proximity of the city in order that they might afford the protection which British subjects were entitled to require of their Government in case of need; in the other, the troops of a hostile army were to be marched into the town, in violation of the existing armistice, and at the risk of provoking disorders, and of causing the very danger to the Christian population which the Russian Government

deprecated. Her Majesty's Government, accordingly, could not admit that the despatch of English ships had any bearing on the entry of Russian troops —a measure which, in their opinion, was uncalled for by any circumstances of military or other necessity, and the consequences of which might be most disastrous to the population of the city. On the afternoon of the same day (February 13th), Lord Derby had some conversation with the Russian Ambassador, the results of which were telegraphed to Lord Augustus Loftus. "I took occasion," said the Foreign Secretary, "to express an earnest hope on the part of the Government that the Russian Government will not make any movement of troops towards Gallipoli, or of such a nature as to threaten the communications of the English fleet. Any such movement, I said, would be regarded in England as compromising the safety of the fleet, and, in the actual state of public feeling, I could not answer for the consequences, which might be most serious." The subject was again brought before the grave attention of the Russian Government on the 15th of February, in a memorandum from Lord Derby, written in consequence of a report as to the accumulation of troops in the neighbourhood of the lines of Boulair. On the 18th, the Russian Government replied that it maintained its promise of not occupying Gallipoli, or entering the lines of Boulair, but that it expected in return that there should be no debarkation of English troops on the Asiatic or European shores of the Straits. On the 19th, Lord Derby rejoined that the English Government received this assurance with satisfaction, would engage not to land troops on the European side, and were prepared to extend the engagement to the Asiatic side, on receiving an assurance that no Russian troops would be landed there. The answer, received on the 22nd, was to the effect that the Russian Government did not intend to occupy the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles, if England equally abstained from doing so. Should this condition be fulfilled, as well as that of not disembarking English troops on the European shore of the Straits, Russia would not occupy Gallipoli, nor enter the lines of Boulair. With this intimation the correspondence ended; but Russia, as will be seen further on, was at that moment taking steps to render her hold on Turkey even stronger than before.

Popular feeling in England was indeed most violently agitated at that period of doubt and suspense. Both the war-party and the peace-party summoned all their forces to the field, and it was doubtful which would exercise the greater influence on the councils of the nation. In the early part of January, the followers of Mr. Gladstone had the chief part of the argument to themselves. Public meetings took place in more than a hundred and fifty distinct places in England and Scotland, to protest against any acts likely to result in war. Chambers of Commerce and Town Councils added their voices to those of the more irregular assemblies. The pulpit came to the aid of the platform, and some of the most influential writers and journals in the country zealously opposed the tendencies, real or imagined, of Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues. The contrary view was expressed with comparative feebleness; but after the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given notice of the vote of credit, a reaction in favour of a more national policy began to be visible. The peace-party were frightened, and called loudly for a renewal of the agitation which had already been so successful. Notwithstanding the great force that had been brought to bear on behalf of Russia, it was still doubtful whether the majority of the English people were prepared to sanction a policy of entire submission to that Power. The only hope, therefore, was in what might be regarded as an appeal to the unreasoning passions of the mob. This appeal was accordingly made in the *Daily News* of January 30th, in the form of a letter, printed in the largest type, from Mr. Auberon Herbert, brother of the Lord Carnarvon who had recently quitted the Government because it was not sufficiently pacific to suit his views. The words of Mr. Herbert are well worth reproducing, as evidence of the sort of agitation by which at that time it was hoped to shape the policy of England. "If the country allow this £6,000,000 to be voted," said the writer, "it will not only unsay all it has said at thousands of great public meetings; it will not only approve and confirm all the hateful foreign policy of the Government—the part taken against the insurgents, the support given to Turkey, the diplomatic verbiage that followed the Bulgarian massacres, the trifling at Constantinople, the insolent assertion of misconceived English interests, the reckless desire to gain some paltry advantage over Russia at the risk of war; it will not only trust the power of England to the same men to pursue the same lines of policy; but it will have weakened and unmanned itself for every political struggle in the future. Its intelligence, its belief in what is right, its steady resolves, its hopes and sympathies, will have been trodden under foot with the dust lying on the ground, never to be exactly the same again. I believe it to be in the power of this country to stop this vote. It cannot be done by a debate in the House of Commons, nor by one set of meetings in the country, however enthusiastic and crowded; but it can perhaps be done *by the employment of*

*every means of agitation, by an obstinate, unyielding, and fierce agitation, beginning at the present hour, and growing intenser from day to day,* until the Government find themselves in face of a people thoroughly aroused, and resolved at every cost that this step shall not be taken. I believe the people could force an appeal to themselves. Let them do it."

Here, in the opinion of the opposite side, was an appeal to the mob, and the mob took it up, though after a fashion which surprised Mr. Herbert and his friends. It is very undesirable that questions of such extreme nicety, depending on a degree of historical and diplomatic knowledge which the masses do not possess, should be determined, in one way or another, by a number of riotous public meetings in large open spaces, where there can be no true discussion, and where there is every temptation to substitute noise for coherent speech, and personal collisions for the interchange of ideas. But when such an appeal is made, it is at any rate satisfactory, in some small degree, that the result should be a discomfiture for those who make it. Such was the case in February, 1878. Numerous bodies earnestly endeavoured to do as Mr. Auberon Herbert suggested; the war-party met them on their own ground, and defeated them with their own weapons. One of the earliest meetings of the pro-Turkish party—that of the 29th of December, 1877, in Trafalgar Square—had been violently broken up by an organized attack on the part of the pro-Russians. The supporters of the Government now determined to act after the same fashion. The meetings of the opposite party were dispersed again and again by bands of opponents; resolutions, the very contrary of those which it was hoped to pass, were carried by acclamation; and the expression of opinion for which Mr. Herbert had called, and which he doubtless calculated on obtaining, dwindled down to the very smallest dimensions, and after a while ceased altogether.



THE BRITISH FLEET OFF PRINCE'S ISLANDS.

One of the most remarkable of these events took place on the 31st of January at the Cannon Street Hotel. The meeting was to have been in favour of peace, and the time of assembly was fixed for three

o'clock in the afternoon; but about two the street was filled with a crowd, the members of which made their way, not merely into the room appointed for the discussion, but into every other part of the hotel to which they could gain admission. Several speeches were delivered, in the midst of so much noise and tumult that they could not be distinctly heard; and eventually the crowd moved off to the Guildhall, which was found open. A resolution was then adopted setting forth that "this meeting is sincerely desirous of peace being maintained, if it can be done consistently with the honour and interests of the British Empire; and it considers that the cause of peace and the interests of the Empire will be best promoted by supporting the foreign policy of her Majesty's Government, in which this meeting respectfully expresses its entire confidence." A deputation at once took down this resolution to the House of Commons, and presented it to the Postmaster General, Lord John Manners, who replied by expressing the satisfaction of the Government at a manifestation of opinion which was in complete accordance with their own views. The Lord Mayor, who had presided at the Guildhall meeting, afterwards received an autograph letter from the Prime Minister, to the same general effect. This letter was posted up outside the Mansion House, but was soon torn down by one of the opposite faction, who, after a good deal of rough usage by the mob, was given into custody. At Sheffield, and some other places, the conduct of the Ministry was warmly approved, and these meetings continued throughout several weeks. An excited demonstration took place at Cremorne on the 9th of February, and in the afternoon of the same day three thousand medical students held a meeting in Trafalgar Square, whence they marched to Downing Street, with the object of assuring the Earl of Beaconsfield of their confidence in the Government. The Premier, however, had left, and the students then proceeded to the Houses of Parliament, where they found a large body of police drawn up. The outer gates, and also the doors of Westminster Hall, were closed, and the students were persuaded to be content with sending half-a-dozen of their number as a deputation to some member of the Government. The Home Secretary, Mr. Cross, addressed them in a few words, and hoped they would leave the precincts of the House in a quiet and orderly manner. Subsequently, in Palace Yard, one of the deputation, standing on the pedestal of a lamp-post, informed the crowd of the reception they had met with, and the entire body then dispersed, singing "Rule, Britannia," and various patriotic songs. Other meetings resulted in angry conflicts, and the public peace was not only endangered, but to some extent broken. By demonstrations such as these, the peace-party was almost extinguished, and at length considered it prudent to abstain from further meetings. Reasonable men of all shades of opinion can have no other feeling than one of regret that a momentous question should have been influenced in either direction by the physical violence of excited partizans, assembling in uproarious crowds, not for discussion, but for mutual exasperation, insult, and defiance. The war-party was certainly unfortunate in some of its allies. The frequenters of music-halls, and other places of questionable entertainment, were stimulated by so-called patriotic songs of the vulgarest and most offensive character. Phrases from these songs were caught up, and echoed from mouth to mouth with a loud and senseless iteration which disgusted all persons of intelligence; and the outbreaks of violence by which several of the meetings were characterized brought discredit on a view of public affairs which was capable of a much more reasonable advocacy. But it must not be forgotten that the example was set by the followers of Mr. Auberon Herbert's views, and, as the matter had been referred to the arbitration of noise and force, it is some satisfaction that the chief sufferers were the persons principally blamable. The ultimate result was not much affected by the clamours of the street; but in the meanwhile the Government derived a certain measure of strength from being enabled to say that at any rate a large proportion of opinion was ranged on their side—a fact which previous meetings had brought into question. Mr. Auberon Herbert had called for an agitation, and the agitation, when fairly awakened, cashiered him and his friends after the most sudden and peremptory fashion. Then ensued many angry protests; but the decision of the mob had been given, and the invokers of the storm presently sank out of sight, out of hearing, and out of most men's thoughts.

During the progress of this agitation, several official papers were presented to Parliament, which threw considerable light on the progress of negotiations before the outbreak of war, and which certainly did not increase the reputation of the Government for ingenuousness in their conduct of affairs. From the memorandum of a confidential conversation between Count Schouvaloff and Lord Derby on the 8th of June, 1877, which formed one of these papers, it appeared that the English Ministry were at that date clearly given to understand that, in the event of the Emperor's arms being victorious, Russia would require some territorial compensation for the sacrifices she had made. After repeating the assurances already given by Prince Gortschakoff,

that Russia would not interfere with the Suez Canal or Egypt, and would not permanently take Constantinople, though a temporary occupation might perhaps be found necessary, Count Schouvaloff, who had just returned to London from St. Petersburg, referred to the question of the Straits, and observed that the existing arrangement was conceived in a spirit of distrust and enmity towards Russia. A resettlement of that question might, he thought, be advisable; but he admitted that it could only be effected by a general agreement amongst the European Powers. If the Porte should sue for peace before the Russian armies had crossed the Balkans, the Emperor would agree not to pass that line; and in that case peace might be concluded on the following terms:—Bulgaria, up to the Balkans, should be made an autonomous vassal province, under the guarantee of Europe. The Turkish troops and officials should be removed, the fortresses be disarmed and razed, and self-government be established, with the support of a national militia, to be organized as soon as possible. With respect to what Count Schouvaloff called Bulgaria south of the Balkans (he ought rather to have said Roumelia, for that was what he really meant), it was suggested that the Powers should agree to assure to that territory, as well as to the other Christian provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for a regular administration. Furthermore, Montenegro and Servia should receive an increase of territory, determined by common agreement, and Bosnia and Herzegovina be provided with such institutions as might by common consent be judged compatible with their internal state. "These provinces being situated conterminously with Austria-Hungary," said Count Schouvaloff, "gives the latter a right to a preponderating voice in their future organization." Servia, like Bulgaria, should remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and the relations of the Suzerain and the vassals should be defined in such a manner as to prevent disputes. The ultimate condition of Roumania, which had just proclaimed its independence, appeared to the Emperor a question which could be settled only by a general understanding. Should the Porte accept these terms before the Russian armies had crossed the line of the Balkans, Russia would agree to make peace; but at the same time she reserved to herself the right of stipulating for certain special advantages, as compensation for the costs of the war. "These advantages," said the Russian Ambassador, "would not exceed the portion of Bessarabia ceded in 1856, as far as the northern branch of the Danube (that is to say, the delta formed by the mouths of that river remains excluded), and the cession of Batoum, with adjacent territory. In this case, Roumania could be compensated by a common agreement, either by the proclamation of its independence, or, if it remained a vassal State, by a portion of the Dobrudscha. If Austria-Hungary on her side demanded compensation, either for the extension acquired by Russia, or as a security against the new arrangements above mentioned for the benefit of the Christian Principalities in the Balkan Peninsula, Russia would not oppose her seeking such compensation in Bosnia, and partly in the Herzegovina. Such are the bases to which his Majesty the Emperor would give his consent, with a view of establishing an understanding with England and with Europe, and of arriving at a speedy peace." Count Schouvaloff was authorised to sound Lord Derby on the subject of these conditions of peace, without concealing from him the value which the Imperial Cabinet attached to a good understanding with the Cabinet of London. The whole case was thus summed up:—"If the Porte sues for peace, and accepts the above terms before the Russian armies have crossed the Balkans, the Emperor would consent not to press the operations of war any further. If the Turkish Government refuses, Russia would be obliged to pursue the war until the Porte was obliged to agree to peace. In this case, the terms of the Imperial Cabinet might be altered. In thus indicating, with perfect openness, the object which the Emperor has in view, and which he will not exceed so long as the war is confined to this side of the Balkans, his Majesty offers a means of localising the war, and preventing the dissolution of the Turkish Empire; but it is important for the Emperor to know if, within the limits indicated, he can count upon the neutrality of England—a neutrality which would exclude even a temporary occupation of Constantinople and the Straits by the latter Power."

The arrangement with respect to Bulgaria here proposed—viz., the division of the province into two portions, one of which should be nearly independent, and the other provided with a species of municipal administration—was ultimately enforced by the Treaty of Berlin; but Russia increased her terms almost as soon as they were made. In a despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, dated June 14th, 1877, Lord Derby mentioned a communication from Prince Gortschakoff to the Russian Ambassador in London, to the effect that, after a mature examination of the situation on the spot, his Highness had come to the conclusion that the separation of Bulgaria into two provinces would be impracticable. Lord Derby expressed an opinion that even the

minor terms would not be recognized by Turkey, unless she were reduced to extremities; and that the later modification was still less likely to be accepted.* On July 20th, Colonel Wellesley, the English Military Attaché at the seat of war, telegraphed that the Czar was ready to treat for peace, if the Sultan would make suitable propositions; and a memorandum was communicated to the Russian Ambassador on the 28th of July, stating the satisfaction of her Majesty's Government at the receipt of Colonel Wellesley's contradiction of the atrocities said to have been committed by Russian soldiers in Turkey, and also at the report that the Emperor was willing to treat for peace. It was in this memorandum that Lord Derby, as already mentioned, intimated the possibility of the fleet being sent to Constantinople under certain contingencies. The views of the Czar were further set forth in a conversation with Colonel Wellesley, which that officer reported in a memorandum to Lord Derby, dated August 7th. The conversation took place at Biela on July 30th, 1877, and was to the same general effect as the statement of Count Schouvaloff to the Foreign Secretary. The Russian conditions were dependent on the maintenance by England of her position of neutrality. If England should abandon that position, matters, it was added,

GREEK INSURGENTS.

* Blue Book on Turkey, No. 15 (1878).

would then enter on a new phase; but the characteristics of that phase were not indicated. His Majesty said he had no ideas of annexation beyond the possible reclamation of the territory lost by Russia in 1856, and perhaps a certain portion of Asia Minor.* The Emperor would not occupy Constantinople for the sake of military honour, but only if such a step were rendered necessary by the march of events. His Majesty was ready to enter into negotiations for peace, if suitable propositions were made by the Sultan; but mediation in favour of Turkey could not be entertained. Europe, however, would be invited to a Conference for the final settlement of the conditions of peace. The Emperor had not the slightest wish or intention in any way to menace the interests of England with regard to Constantinople, Egypt, the Suez Canal, or India. With respect to India, his Majesty considered it not only impossible to take any threatening steps, but an act of folly if practicable. A temporary occupation of Bulgaria would be necessary. His Majesty had never entertained hostile feelings towards England, nor had he desired to give her offence; but it was easy to take offence at anything, if there was the will to do so. One of the most remarkable sentences in this communication to Colonel Wellesley was that in which the Emperor referred undisguisedly to the Triple Alliance as an actually existent fact. It was formed, he said, for the preservation of peace, and without any idea of aggression, or of offence to England. The fact of that alliance had been often doubted, and sometimes equivocatingly denied: we have here the most distinct admission of its reality. Its precise terms have never yet been made known to the world; but the arrangements concluded at Berlin in the summer of 1878 may give us some approximate idea of what was intended from the first.

In replying to this communication on the 14th of August, Lord Derby took special note of a remark by the Emperor, to the effect that the policy of England tended to encourage the Turks, and to prolong the war. The Government, said the Foreign Secretary, feared that the influence which they were enabled to exercise on the counsels of the Porte was far less than his Imperial Majesty seemed disposed to believe. English advice was sought with eagerness, and received with deference, in the capital of the Turkish Empire, so long as the Porte expected assistance from England; but under existing circumstances those feelings no longer prevailed. The course of military events since the Emperor had addressed Colonel Wellesley appeared to her Majesty's Government such as to make the Turks indisposed to entertain any propositions of peace, save on conditions which it was unlikely that the Russian Government would accept. Here the correspondence with reference to this particular aspect of the question came to an end, and it was not until February, 1878, that the various documents were printed, and given to the world.† The Government had been bound to secrecy in the intermediate period, and were not at liberty to publish the facts until the war had come to an end. Lord Beaconsfield, however, has been justly blamed for having, in his Guildhall speech of November 9th, 1877, adopted a tone which led every one to suppose that the Czar's original declarations at Livadia had undergone no modification. The Premier observed at the civic banquet that the Emperor of Russia, with a magnanimity worthy of his elevated character, had announced, a little before the commencement of the war, that his only object was to secure the safety and happiness of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and had pledged his Imperial word of honour that he sought no increase of territory. This was true as far as it went; but Lord Beaconsfield must have known that the earlier declaration had been superseded by a later one, and consequently ought not to have been alluded to as if it were still in force. Moreover, the Emperor's Livadia statements, to which the English Minister was alluding, had been made, not on the eve of war, but nearly six months before its outbreak, while efforts to preserve the peace were still being pursued, whether sincerely or not. The passing triumph which the Premier obtained over his Imperial adversary recoiled upon his own head when the facts came to be known. The English advocates of Russia were furnished with an effective weapon for use against the Minister who, more than any other, was supposed to represent an anti-Russian policy. The weapon was plied with vigour, and it is impossible to deny that the Premier had laid himself open to its sharpest edge.

Immediately after the conclusion of the war with Russia and her allies, Turkey was threatened with a new danger, though one of no great magnitude. The agitation in the Greek provinces of the Ottoman Empire induced the neighbouring kingdom to adopt a step towards which popular opinion had for a long while been tending. Without any declaration of war, the Greek Cabinet ordered its troops to cross the frontier, with the professed object of preventing further massacres in Thessaly. On the morning of the 1st of February, a *Te Deum*

* By Asia Minor, the Emperor seems to have meant Armenia.

† Blue Book on Turkey, No. 9 (1878).

was celebrated outside the town of Lamia, after which a corps of 10,000 troops and numerous volunteers crossed the boundaries in three divisions. The Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens stated to Photiades Bey, the representative of Turkey, that Greece had no intention of declaring war against the Porte, but solely desired to protect Greek subjects. Acts of pillage, committed by Bashi-Bazouks in Thessaly, had frequently been reported to the Turkish Government, but no attention had been paid to these complaints. Photiades Bey promised to refer the Minister's declaration to his Government; but before any response could be received, the aspect of affairs had become decidedly warlike. On the 4th of February, five Turkish men-of-war, under Hobart Pasha, passed the Dardanelles on their way to the Greek coast. The ports of the Piræus and Phalery were obstructed with torpedoes, and other defensive measures were adopted by the Greek Ministry and people. Turkish ironclads and transports were ordered to convey to Volo eight or ten thousand troops, to oppose the progress of the rebellion in Thessaly, and to cut off the retreat of the Hellenic army. Another corps, under Mehemet Ali, was sent to Crete, where an insurrection had recently broken out. The Cabinet of Athens, encouraged by the general agitation prevailing throughout the Hellenic world, determined not to stop the progress of its troops, unless the Great Powers promised to maintain public order in the Greek provinces of Turkey, and to secure their rights in the Conference. The resolution, however, was nothing better than a piece of idle bombast. Greece probably hoped to frighten Turkey into acquiescence in her demands, and possibly thought that the European Powers would take up her cause with enthusiasm. Neither event ensued, and Greece was further dismayed, as well as exasperated, at finding that her former patron, Russia, was so little inclined to act in her favour that she was contemplating a new arrangement of Ottoman territory, such as would subject



MOUNT PELION AND THE GULF OF VOLO.

the Greek to the Bulgarian race. The time, therefore, was not at all favourable to heroic attitudinising; and, on the representatives of the six Powers undertaking to use their influence for the restoration of order in the Greek provinces, and to recommend the claims of the Hellenic nationality in the approaching Conference, directions were issued to the troops, on the 7th of February, to re-cross the frontier. Nevertheless, the insurrections in Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, continued with unabated energy, and a decree was issued by the Provisional Government in the first of those provinces, proclaiming its union with the Hellenic Kingdom. The chief influence brought to bear on the Greek Ministry was that of England. Mr. Layard was disinclined to see the Greek question violently agitated at that juncture, and appears to have swayed his Government in the sense that he desired. An actual collision between Greece and Turkey was thus avoided; but it is certain that the Cabinet of Athens gave secret support to the revolutionary movements across the borders. Fighting on a serious scale took place between the insurgents and the Ottoman troops, and the latter experienced many reverses; yet on the whole the cause of independence was not greatly advanced.

The details of these insurrectionary struggles it would be tedious to follow. They were characterized, according to reports published in the Greek papers, by great excesses on the part of the Turkish troops, and it is but too probable that reprisals of the same nature were committed by the rebels; but the conflict was attended by no events of striking importance, and has led to no results of permanent interest. The news of the British squadron having been refused admission to the Dardanelles created much excitement at Athens, and it was hoped that a new political and military situation might be created, in which Greece and England would be found side by side. A correspondent of the *Times* recorded that the mere anticipation of such a contingency reconciled even the most extreme patriots to the recall of the troops from Thessaly, and helped to keep within bounds the indignation of the people at the news constantly arriving from the frontier, where great numbers of Christians, belonging to villages in Thessaly evacuated by the Hellenic troops, were seeking refuge under the sceptre of King George, in consequence of outrages committed by the Bashi-Bazouks. An alliance between Greece and England, however, was not at all likely under the circumstances. Greece has before her a future which can hardly fail to be prosperous, and may perhaps be splendid; but in February, 1878, the complication of affairs in the south-east of Europe was so extreme that the Great Powers naturally shrank from adding to the difficulties by which all were perplexed, and some were brought into peril of immediate collision.

## CHAPTER VIII.

**Position of Mr. Layard at Constantinople—His Views on the Eastern Crisis—Despatches written by him in June, 1877—Turkish Objections to the Formation of a semi-independent Bulgarian Principality—Designs of Russia on European Turkey—Greece and her Aspirations—Unfair Treatment of the Porte—Danger to England of abandoning the Turks to Destruction—Mr. Layard and Server Pasha—Speech of Prince Bismarck on the Eastern Question—The Relations of Germany towards Russia—Opinions of Bismarck with respect to Austria and the approaching Conference—The St. Petersburg Press on the German Chancellor's Speech—Influence of the Triple Alliance on the Course of Affairs—Views of the Austrian and Hungarian Cabinets—Proceedings of the Turks in fulfilment of the Armistice—Scarcity of Food at Keshan and Gallipoli—Melancholy Condition of Rustchuk after its Surrender to the Russians—Turkish Capabilities of Defence at the Period of the Peace Negotiations—The Refugees in Constantinople—Organisations for their Relief—Friendly Intercourse between Russian and Turkish Troops—Discontent in Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro—Measures adopted for Russianizing Bulgaria—Unreality of the Austrian Opposition—Popular Demands in Russia for the further Prosecution of the War—Sclavonic Dreams and Aspirations—Aims of the St. Petersburg Sclavonic Benevolent Society—The Future of Bulgaria—Advantages of Turkish Ruie—Increased Stringency of the Russian Preliminaries of Peace.**

SERVER PASHA attributed the misfortunes of his country to the indirect promises of England, followed by treacherous abandonment; and one of his colleagues mentioned the name of Mr. Layard as that of a principal agent in creating totally false expectations. We have seen how the incident terminated; but the real position of the English Ambassador with reference to the war is well worthy of examination, as no one was believed to possess more influence with the Porte, or to be better inclined to the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. It is quite conceivable that when Mr. Layard was transferred from Madrid to Constantinople, as the substitute of Sir Henry Elliot, his appointment was

regarded by the Turks as an act of friendliness which might imply more than was expressed. His arrival in the Ottoman capital, after the temporary suspension of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and Turkey, occurred on the very eve of the Czar's declaration of war, and it was naturally taken as an indication of feeling, and even of possible action, on the part of the English Cabinet. Yet Turkey was not permitted to remain in the dark with reference to the intentions of the British Government. Mr. Layard at once intimated that the Porte had little to expect from England, and must amend her evil ways before she could enjoy even the sympathy of the English people. The same tone was maintained throughout; and even in the worst crises of the war, Turkey was distinctly informed that she must not reckon on the military support of her old ally.

That Mr. Layard doubted the wisdom of this policy, is beyond a question. He saw that its probable result would be the ruin of the Turkish Empire; he knew that the ruin of Turkey meant the aggrandizement of Russia; and both as a statesman and a Liberal he wished to see such a catastrophe averted. He truthfully conveyed the views of his principals to the Ottoman Porte; but in private despatches to Lord Derby he represented in the very strongest colours what would ensue from the complete abandonment of Turkey to the ire and rapacity of her Titanic foe. These despatches were written in the summer of 1877, and were presented to Parliament in February, 1878, when they furnished a curious and interesting comment on the turn which events had by that time taken. On the 12th of June, 1877, Lord Derby telegraphed to Mr. Layard the terms which Russia would accept if peace were made before crossing the Balkans (as stated in Count Schouvaloff's Memorandum), and inquired whether there was any probability of the Porte accepting those conditions. The English Ambassador replied that there was no such probability, and, in a despatch dated from Therapia, June 13th, 1877, gave his reasons for the conclusion he had reached. "The Turkish Government," said Mr. Layard, "would feel that to form Bulgaria as far as the Balkans into a vassal autonomous province under the guarantee of Europe, the Turkish troops and functionaries to be withdrawn, and the Turkish fortresses on the Danube to be disarmed and razed, would not only be to lay the foundation for the speedy and complete independence of the new province, but of its union with Servia and the other Sclave provinces, and the inevitable extension of Russian influence and rule over the whole Sclave Christian populations of Turkey in Europe; that to consent to the destruction of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the new province, would be to give up the main line of defence of Turkey in Europe, and to place the rest of that Empire, and Constantinople itself, at the mercy of Russia; and that to establish self-government in this province with the support of a national militia would infallibly bring about these results. The Turkish Government would be convinced that Greece, foreseeing that to create a semi-independent Bulgarian Principality (for such the new province would be) must, sooner or later, lead to the annexation to it of the provinces south of the Balkans in which there is a Bulgarian population, would take measures at once to invade Thessaly and Epirus, and to raise the Greek population in Macedonia, with a view to securing them from ultimate absorption with Bulgaria; that the Hellenes would be supported by Europe; and that a fresh dismemberment of the Empire would then take place. The Sultan and his Ministers would further fear the effect upon all the Mussulman populations of the Turkish Empire of handing over to Christian government and influence a large Mohammedan population. Such would inevitably be the result of forming Bulgaria, north of the Balkans, into an autonomous State." According to Mr. Layard, the Turks would look with particular detestation on the plan, suggested in Count Schouvaloff's Memorandum, of allowing Austria to take Bosnia and a portion of the Herzegovina. Nothing but the most dire necessity would induce the Porte even to listen to such conditions, for there was not a Turk, in the opinion of the English Ambassador, who would not see in them the dismemberment and destruction of the Ottoman Empire. No Sultan, no Minister, would dare even to entertain them, and Mr. Layard believed it would be highly dangerous for England, or any other Power, to suggest such conditions to the Turkish Government. They would be certain to excite the utmost rage of fanaticism, and would probably lead to a frightful massacre of the Christians. But, before dismissing the subject of the Russian terms, Mr. Layard made one important qualification. "I may add," he wrote, "that the observations I have ventured to make apply to the present state of affairs. Were Russia over the Danube and at the Balkan Passes, and were she in possession of Armenia, there might be grounds for forming a different opinion to that which I have now expressed; but it must be remembered that up to the present time the Russians have gained no very signal victories, and the Porte is still under the impression (however ill-founded) that it can

resist the Russian advance with fair prospects of success."

The several questions were again discussed by Mr. Layard in a despatch of June 19th, 1877. Prince Gortschakoff's proposal for the creation of a single Bulgarian Principality, co-extensive with the presence of a Bulgarian population in Europe, was here criticised in a very unfavourable sense. The limits to be assigned to the province, observed the Ambassador, could only be matter of conjecture; but they might be made to include the vilayet of Adrianople, and that of Salonica down to the Ægean. It will be seen further on that Mr. Layard made a near approach to the dimensions which the Czar desired to give this new autonomous province, and which he would have succeeded in giving it but for the opposition of England. The realisation of such a design was correctly described by Mr. Layard as the end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. "It would take but a little time," he remarked, "to convert this so-called 'vassal autonomous province' into a semi-independent Principality or State. Its complete severance from Turkey would then be but a question of a few years. Like Servia and Roumania, it would become a mere dependency of Russia, to be annexed when necessary or convenient. With the creation of this vassal autonomous province, the remainder of the territories of Turkey in Europe must be lost to her. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be completely cut off from Constantinople both by sea and land, unless, which is altogether improbable, a right of way would be left for Turkish troops through the new Bulgaria. These two provinces would either be formed into another vassal autonomous State, or would be divided between Austria, Servia, and Montenegro, as Prince Gortschakoff evidently foreshadows." Then Greece would be compelled to take those provinces of Turkey where the Hellenic race predominates, so as to prevent herself from being cut off from Constantinople, the goal of all her hopes. This would probably be resisted by Russia, who had been working for many years to bring the whole of Macedonia, and especially Mount Athos, within the boundaries of Sclavism. Of late, the feeling of Russia towards the Greeks had entirely changed, and the latter knew well that they had been abandoned for the Sclaves. After such changes, "what would remain to the Sultan," asked Mr. Layard, "but Constantinople and a part of ancient Thrace? How long could he hope to retain even this fragment of his European Empire, with the Danube, the Balkans, Varna, and every port in the Black and Ægean Seas, in the hands of his irresistible enemy? Could Turkey believe that any conditions or treaties, however solemn or stringent, imposed by Europe upon the new vassal autonomous province, would be observed? She has learnt by experience how far such engagements, whatever may be their character or their guarantees, are respected by such semi-independent States themselves, and by Russia, and by Europe, whenever it is to the interest of either to override them. Whilst she has been held to the strict observance of her treaty obligations to her vassal States, they have been allowed to violate theirs with impunity. Servia, treated by her with rare moderation and generosity after a disastrous defeat, takes the first opportunity to throw over a treaty entered into a few months before, and sends her Prince to the Emperor of Russia—at war with her Suzerain—to ask leave to join in it, and to visit Prince Charles, who is in open rebellion to the Sultan. Roumania, after having secretly entered into a convention with Russia against Turkey, with cynical audacity accuses her of aggressive designs on the Principality, and declares her independence in the teeth of European treaties, and of her conventions with the Porte. With the experience of the past, could Turkey agree, except when utterly prostrate at the feet of Russia, to such terms as are now proposed by Prince Gortschakoff?" Mr. Layard proceeded to observe that it was vital to the gravest interests of England—to interests the importance of which no words could adequately describe—that she should be ready to interpose to save the Turkish Empire from complete dissolution. He more especially pointed to the fact that the Sultan, even if reduced to the condition of a fifth-rate Asiatic prince, would still be the Caliph of Islam; and he argued that the Mussulman world, in a struggle for very existence, might turn upon England (which has millions of Mussulmans among her subjects) as the principal cause of the dangers which threatened it. Notwithstanding the doubts expressed by persons of authority, Mr. Layard was persuaded, by what he saw passing around him, and from what he had learned, that this danger was real and serious. "It is scarcely necessary," continued the Ambassador, "to dwell, in this place, upon the result of the breaking up and partition of the Ottoman Empire on the balance of power, or upon the great danger to liberty and civilization of the establishment of a vast military Sclave Empire in the East of Europe. If her Majesty's Government are of opinion that there is nothing to be done to oppose the designs of Russia, we should at least be prepared to mediate when the time comes. In order to be in a position to do so, we should make Turkey feel that, although, as we have warned her, she cannot expect any help



VIEW OF CONSTANTINOPLE, SHOWING PRINCE'S ISLANDS IN THE DISTANCE.

from us in her struggle with Russia, we shall be ready, at a favourable moment, to do our best to see that she be treated with justice and moderation, and her Mohammedan and Christian subjects alike with impartiality and equal humanity." It was admitted by Mr. Layard that he had striven to raise such hopes at Constantinople, as he had no other to give without committing her Majesty's Government, whose views and policy it was his duty to consider and carry out.* Here, in all probability, we have the origin of Server Pasha's mistake as to the encouragement given to Turkey to pursue the war, in reliance on England's fixed intention to assist her with an army and a fleet. The Turkish Minister mistook Mr. Layard's opinion (doubtless often and earnestly expressed), that his Government would never allow the conditions of peace to be pushed so far as to destroy the Turkish Empire in Europe, for a promise of military succour during the war itself.

When these letters were published, Europe knew the general conditions of peace which Russia desired to impose on Turkey, and a feeling of uneasiness was apparent all over the political world. Every one anticipated with considerable interest the answer which Prince Bismarck was to give to an interpellation by Herr von Bennigsen on the Eastern Question. The German Chancellor had long been suspected of a much less friendly feeling towards Russia than his Imperial master was known to entertain; and the tone of his speech on the 19th of February was somewhat reserved and cautious. He argued that Germany had no interest in the re-arrangement of Bulgaria, in the independence of Montenegro, Roumania, and Servia, or in the new position of Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and other Turkish provinces. The question of the war-indemnity, if it took a pecuniary form, was simply an affair of the two Powers immediately concerned; if, on the other hand, it assumed a territorial character, it would come within the jurisdiction of the Treaty Powers. With regard to the Dardanelles, Prince Bismarck believed that more apprehensions had been raised than were justified by actual probabilities; but he admitted that the question would be one of great importance if it were proposed to place the key of the Bosphorus in other than the existing hands, and if it were necessary to decide whether Russia should be able to close the Straits at her own good pleasure or not. The speaker, however, did not seem to regard this phase of the question as likely to arise. The regulations at the Dardanelles in regard to ships of war, he said, were scarcely so important as those in regard to commerce. Herein lay Germany's chief interest in the East—that the Straits and water-ways, like the Danube from the Black Sea upwards, should be as free as they had been before. It was certain that they would attain that end, according to an official communication received from St. Petersburg, which, in regard to this point, simply made reference to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. Supposing some of the other Powers to disagree with the Russian projects, and to go to war with the Czar rather than sanction them, upon those Powers, in the event of their succeeding, would devolve the duty and responsibility of determining what was to become of the Christian provinces of European Turkey. That they would be prepared simply to restore Turkish rule, the German Chancellor did not consider probable; but he believed it to be as little likely that the immediately neighbouring Power, Austria, would be willing to accept the entire legacy of the Russian conquests, and with it the responsibility for the future of those Sclavonic countries, whether by incorporating them with Hungary, or by setting up vassal States. The Prince had touched upon these matters only to show how slight was the probability of a European war. The idea of a Conference was originally proposed by Austria, and first accepted by Germany. Various places of meeting had been mentioned—Vienna, Brussels, Baden-Baden, Wiesbaden, Wildbad, and a town in Switzerland. Prince Bismarck was equally well-inclined to all; but if the assembly was to be in any German city, the Conference must have a German President.

Towards the latter end of his speech, the Chancellor observed that Germany had no wish to act as arbiter in the pending discussions. All her ambition was confined to the modest task of a broker who settled a bargain between different parties. His experience had taught him that two States, when left to settle a delicate affair alone, were easily led to quarrel (the speaker seemed to be here alluding to the demands of Austria, and to the possibility of a disagreement between that Power and Russia); while the co-operation of a third party not only exercised a wholesome influence, but also kept flagging negotiations up to the mark. "On the most friendly terms with Russia and Austria," said the Prince, "Germany enjoys the further advantage of having no one interest, excepting the pacific rivalry of trade, which could bring her in opposition to England. This lucky circumstance would enable Germany to mediate between England and Russia, were England and Russia to wish for her intervention. The three Emperors' alliance, if it may be so called, is based, not upon written engagements, but upon the per-

* Blue Book on Turkey, No. 15 (1878).

sonal sympathies existing among the three Emperors, and the long and intimate relations of the Ministers advising them. Whenever a difficulty arises between Russia and Austria, Germany avoids siding with either, for fear that the tie may snap. But, after all, however strong the three Emperors' alliance may be, it is not strong enough to induce any of the participants to sacrifice important national interests for the favourable regards of another Power. They have no wish to fight, and therefore can have no wish to point to their power as an argument in the discussion. They have no wish to imitate the Napoleonic example, and constitute themselves the arbiters of Europe. Suppose they were to take the advice of the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, and, assuming the part of European policemen, were to intimate their resolve to resist Russian usurpation. The result would be that certain Russian personages unfriendly to Germany, should they come into power, would stimulate their countrymen against us. You know how much Russian political parties are given to declamation, and you can easily imagine what they would say were Germany to prevent their reaching the goal they have been pursuing for centuries. At present, political parties friendly to Germany are in power in every part of Europe. Are we to imperil the continuation of this fortunate state of things? Are we to jeopardize the peace of Germany for the sake of securing the peace of one of our friends? An Empire situated in the midst of Europe had better be cautious at such a time as this. No doubt we are strong—we have a large army at our disposal; but only if our own independence, our own interests, are at stake, will I advise the Emperor to unsheathe the sword." A debate followed this speech, and Prince Bismarck made some further observations, which, taken in conjunction with the rest, showed that the three military Empires were substantially agreed, and that no serious breach was likely to ensue. Still, the general tenor of the Chancellor's remarks suggested a greater leaning towards Austria than towards Russia; so that, supposing any dissension to arise, and Germany to act the part of mediator, she would be more likely to support Vienna than St. Petersburg. Their relations with Austria, said the Prince, were excellent: the two Emperors, the two Ministers, had real confidence in each other. One thing was clear; and that was that Germany would join with Austria, and so far with England, in requiring that the settlement should be by a European concert. But, as regarded certain matters, this had already, in principle, been conceded by Prince Gortschakoff.

The address of the German Chancellor gave little satisfaction in Russia. The *Golos* endeavoured to think that the speaker's aim was to annihilate the hopes of those who relied on the indirect support of Germany; and drew the conclusion that, as Germany found in the conditions nothing contrary to her interests, Russia might quietly remain satisfied with accomplished facts, and shew complete indifference to protests. But this journal was not very confident, and the *Novaya Vremia* was even less so. The latter paper professed to consider it enough that Prince Bismarck should be impartial, and believed that his voice would sound unpleasantly in the ears of Europe, because it was friendly to Russia; yet the writer added that the speech was like a cold breeze, which would sober those St. Petersburg politicians who expected the German Chancellor to speak like a Russian Minister. A still more melancholy note was sounded by the *Vedomosti*, which remarked that ingratitude was the ordinary result of the self-sacrificing activity of Russia, and that no sooner had the war finished than they were met on all sides with intrigues and hostility, both from powerful neighbours who could support their words by force, and from feeble little States like Roumania and Greece. But the speech of Prince Bismarck gave as much offence in Austria as in Russia. It was in truth one of those vague utterances which reveal considerable embarrassment on the part of the speaker, and it might safely have been anticipated that neither at St. Petersburg nor Vienna would it be received with entire satisfaction. Prince Bismarck was evidently not disposed to see any large accession to the power of Russia, yet at the same time felt unable to offer positive opposition to the Czar's designs. The German Emperor was repaying the obligation to his Russian nephew which he had incurred in 1870–71, and even the leading Teutonic statesman was not sufficiently powerful to exercise any great influence, in this respect, on the policy of his Imperial master. A curious illustration of the reality of the Triple Alliance, even at a period of somewhat uneasy discussion, is to be found in the fact that not only the ideas, but even some of the expressions, of Prince Bismarck's speech were known beforehand, and repeated in conversation, in the official circles of Vienna and St. Petersburg.* There must, consequently, have been a very close and familiar interchange of views amongst the three Cabinets; and, although divergences had not entirely ceased, it was highly probable that an understanding would be arrived at within a very short period.

The views of Austria-Hungary were officially expounded in the Legislative Chambers of the two

* Correspondent of the *Times*.

States on the same day that Prince Bismarck addressed the German Parliament. In the Austrian Reichsrath, Prince Auersperg, the Minister-President, said that the Government had, with all possible frankness, stated its position with regard to the bases of peace, and had declared that it could not consider as binding for itself any arrangements between the belligerents, in so far as they might appear to affect the interests of the Monarchy, or the rights of the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris, so long as such arrangements had not been sanctioned by those Powers. The Government was bound to declare generally that it could not regard some of the stipulations as consonant with the interests of the Monarchy. These reservations referred especially to such provisions as might involve a shifting of the balance of power in the East to the detriment of Austria. In the Hungarian Diet, the President of the Council of Ministers, M. Tisza, spoke to the same general effect as Prince Auersperg, but with greater emphasis and warmth. The question, he remarked, was no longer one of ameliorating the condition of the Christians in Turkey, but involved a total transformation of influence and power in the East. These answers to questions put in the Reichsrath and the Diet had been previously concerted by Count Andrassy with the respective Minister-Presidents. The interests of Hungary were even more concerned in the approaching arrangement than those of Austria, and Hungary was making herself felt in the councils of the dual Empire.

Peace was still doubtful, and the Turks wisely prepared themselves for the worst. Ammunition-trains were being constantly despatched from Constantinople to the lines of Gallipoli, in the fortifications of which there were soon upwards of a hundred cannon, fifty of which were Krupp guns of heavy calibre. In the existing state of affairs, however, it was as likely that these guns would be used against the English as against the Russians. The prevalent feeling amongst Ottomans was a sentiment of anger against this country, and it was due to the advice of only a few cool-headed politicians that the British fleet was not fired upon in passing the Dardanelles. The disposition to co-operate with the Russians became stronger every day, and the Turks made no difficulty about fulfilling the terms of the armistice. Rustchuk was quietly given up to the Russians on the 20th of February, Erzeroum on the 22nd, and other fortified towns about the same time. Gallipoli, however, was still held, for there was nothing in the armistice to compel its surrender. It was very insufficiently victualled, considering that, in addition to the garrison, the town was burdened with five thousand families from the Balkans. Articles of consumption cost three times the price they had commanded a month before, and bread was so scarce as to be procurable only with difficulty. At Keshan, where a Russian force was stationed, the want of food was so extreme that animals of all kinds were killed and eaten. The Russian soldiers themselves suffered from defective commissariat, and the unfortunate Turks were much worse off. General Komaroff and Prince Tcherkasski, on taking possession of the town, deprived the Turks of their arms, and handed them over to the Christians, who at once began plundering and burning in every direction. At Gallipoli, the wants of the refugees were in some degree supplied by the Government, and by Mr. Odoni, the English Consul, who represented the Compassionate Fund. A considerable sum of money was distributed by this gentleman every day; but the difficulty was in obtaining food, even when the people had money in their hands. For fear of a bread-riot, the bakers' shops were closed, except for a short time during the day, and in that brief period the struggle for food amongst the crowds outside was lamentable to witness. The bread was handed out through a narrow aperture in the shop-front, and it was necessary to place a strong guard of soldiers on the spot, to prevent the famished applicants from trampling one another in the eager rush for food. The soldiers were not allowed to purchase bread from the bakers, because it was supposed that their own rations were sufficient; but this was often very far from being the case, and the men would occasionally break through the rule, though they were severely punished, if detected.

When General Todleben, accompanied by about two hundred of the Staff, and followed by a brigade of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and four sotnias of Cossacks, entered Rustchuk, they were met by a deputation of Bulgarians, who, with every expression of adulation, welcomed them to the place. The town was discovered to be greatly injured by the bombardment. A large number of houses were laid in ruins, and the Grand Place presented a scene of perfect desolation, most of the buildings being reduced to little better than heaps of rubbish. In some quarters, the private dwellings were blown inside out, and so many of the inhabitants had left, that, excepting in a few directions, nothing but a dreary solitude disclosed itself to the conquering troops. Doves were perched upon the shattered domes and minarets, and homeless dogs prowled about amongst the shattered masonry and brickwork, or quarrelled with one another over such scraps of food as they chanced to light upon. Soon after the

entry of the Russians, the last two regiments of Turkish soldiers marched out towards Schumla, accompanied by a few Russian Staff officers. As the town had never been taken by the enemy, it was a severe trial to these men to be compelled, under the stipulations of the armistice, to surrender a position which they doubtless felt competent to hold; but they behaved with admirable discipline, and exhibited that wonderful spirit of resignation to the inevitable which is so strongly characteristic of Mohammedans. Provisions of the rougher sort were plentiful, and it was believed that the garrison could easily have held out for another six weeks, or perhaps two months. On the 21st of February, General Todleben left Rustchuk for Russia, and Prince Dondakoff Korsakoff then took the command. The fortifications were found to be very strong. The outlying forts, numbering forty, were situated in the most advantageous positions, and constructed after the most admirable fashion. The suburban streets of the town had been prepared for barricades, and rows of trenches covered the surrounding fields. It was evidently the intention of the Turkish commandant to hold the place to the utmost, and to resist any assault that might be made; but the conclusion of the armistice had rendered all these preparations futile. "While the Turks held Rustchuk and Widdin," said a correspondent of the *Daily News*, who related the foregoing particulars, "they could feel that they had almost as strong a hold on Bulgaria as the invaders, and, in the event of complications arising, and any European Power interfering, they might, with the help of these strongholds, have regained every inch of the province they had lost." The rapid collapse of the Turkish defence, after the crossing of the Balkans by the invaders, seems to have resulted from an unreasoning despair, unless it was hoped in this way to force the English Government to take up the Ottoman cause, or unless the fact is to be explained by treachery. There cannot be a question that with a little energy and resolution the war might yet have been prolonged throughout the winter; and in that case it is by no means certain that the Russians would not have been compelled to recross the Danube, from sheer necessity of obtaining food and shelter. The exact reasons which influenced the Sultan and his Ministers were the subject of much conjecture, and the only thing absolutely clear was that the Turks threw away their remaining chance, and, while they might yet have continued a passive resistance, gave up their Empire into the hands of the Czar.

The condition of Constantinople was not much better than that of the provincial towns. The Turks were crest-fallen and out of heart. The Christians were naturally jubilant, and many of the refugees who poured into the city were desperate with want, mortification, and rage. The Circassians behaved after their usual manner, and robbed the Mohammedans equally with the Christians. The Zeibeks from Asia Minor were little better, and a fanatical outbreak was for some time dreaded, even by the Turks themselves. It was these facts which furnished the English Government with its excuse for sending the fleet into the Sea of Marmora; but by the time Admiral Hornby had passed the Dardanelles, the danger had been reduced to a minimum. The Turkish Government acted with great promptitude in ensuring the safety of the capital; but before efficient police regulations could be enforced, the peril was serious. To deal with such a sudden access of poverty-stricken and exasperated fugitives was no easy matter. It is stated that 110,000 refugees passed through Tchorlu, the midway station between Adrianople and Constantinople, in a period of ten days; and these were exclusive of the numerous men, women, and children, who arrived on foot, or in ox-waggons. All were provided for by special arrangements, as they were in the last stage of poverty. The Government made use of the Moslem Civic Guard, to draft these refugees into different quarters, and to supply them with food. The wealthy Greeks behaved with much generosity, and churches and mosques were alike used for the reception of the fugitives. Within the walls of St. Sophia were crowds of exhausted wayfarers, and the Greek Church of the Virgin was filled in the like manner. An international refugee-fund was set on foot, the committee of which was formed by the consuls of all nations; and in this way the distress was to some extent got under in a surprisingly short time. Several of the refugees were shipped off by the Government to the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and the ports of the Sea of Marmora; but the greater number still remained, and it says much for the self-restraint of the populace, and for the organizing powers of the Government, that a ferocious outbreak of misery and fanaticism did not take place in the metropolis itself.

Now that the war was over, the Russian and Turkish troops, wherever they happened to come in contact, evinced every disposition to be on friendly terms. The opposing lines before Constantinople were separated by the little river Kara Su, over which was a bridge about a hundred feet in length. Two Russian sentries stood at one end of this bridge, two Turkish sentries at the other; and no passes were demanded of civilians, who went to

and fro in large numbers, without a word of inquiry being addressed to them. Turkish soldiers were frequently to be seen marching along the roads towards Constantinople, in company with straggling Russians, with whom they appeared to be on the most cordial terms. The Russians were indeed much more amicably regarded by their late enemies than by their late allies. Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro, were all more or less disappointed and angry. In the first of those Principalities, there was a strong and general sentiment in favour of annexing that part of Albania which is sometimes called Old Servia, or at any rate a portion of the territory. It was feared by many that the nominal independence of Servia, unless the State were made sufficiently strong, would be nothing better than an actual incorporation with the Russian Empire; and the Government petitioned Austria to intercede for conditions of peace more favourable to the Principality. Great indignation was felt at the occupation of Vrania, Pirot, and Ak Palanka. Those places had been won by Servians, and it was considered hard measure that they should be compelled to give up their conquests to promote the designs of Russia, who wished to incorporate the disputed territory with the new Principality of Bulgaria. In Roumania, the feeling of exasperation at the proposed retrocession of Bessarabia grew so furious as to threaten the tranquillity of the State. Montenegro was seeking a wider extension of territory than she was likely to obtain; and it seemed as if all the populations which Russia had professed a desire to serve, and which had largely tasted of the miseries of war in consequence, would be ranged against her in the approaching Conference, excepting always the much-petted Bulgarians.



THE CASTLE OF EUROPE ON THE BOSPHORUS.

Even the Bulgarians, however, were being made to feel the stern hand of their master. The reconstruction of the province under Prince Tcherkasski (who, however, died rather suddenly in March)




REFUGEE DISPENSARY AT PANCALDI, NEAR CONSTANTINOPLE.

was carried out entirely on Russian principles. All the posts in the administrative system were filled by Russians, or by Russianized Bulgarians; the language of the Empire was introduced as the official language; and an order was issued in February for the organization of seventy battalions, twelve squadrons, and eight batteries of native militia, the nucleus of which was to be formed by the Bulgarian Legion, while the Russian army was to furnish officers and non-commissioned officers, and the language of command was to be Russian.* The Vienna Cabinet had always protested against such arrangements, and had from the first based the neutrality of Austria on the abstention of the conquerors from establishing their power, whether directly or indirectly, on the right bank of the Danube. Russia had now planted herself on that bank, under the specious pretence of creating an independent Bulgarian Principality, and was at the same time aiming at the re-incorporation of Roumanian Bessarabia, on the left bank. The two facts taken together would give the Czar complete command of the Lower Danube; yet Austria was doing nothing more than raising feeble and ineffective protests. Count Andrassy was doubtless sincere in his opposition to this policy; but it is now certain that the two Emperors had long before agreed that Russia should have her way, and that Austria's compensation should be Bosnia.

Public opinion in Russia was all this while demanding that the Government should do even more than it proposed to do. The patriotic Muscovites could not understand why there should be any diplomatic agreement at all. They argued that they had beaten the Turks without any foreign assistance, and that therefore they had a perfect right to dictate their own terms. Why, they asked, should they not deal with Turkey as Prussia had dealt with Austria in 1866, and Germany with France in 1871? The idea of a European Conference or Congress was so distasteful that it was often said to weigh like a nightmare on the national heart, and it seems to have greatly reduced the people's satisfaction at the termination of the war, successful as the Russian arms had been. The terms of peace were criticised in the most grudging spirit; and great complaints were made that the autonomy of Bulgaria was after all imperfect, that the emancipated Rayahs were still to pay tribute, and that Turkish troops were to remain at certain parts of the emancipated territory. "We are apparently," said these reasoners, "about to apply to Bulgaria the system of gradual emancipation which has proved so disastrous in the case of the other Christian provinces of Turkey. Within a few years, we shall have disturbances, insurrections, and diplomatic negotiations for the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons; and when that has been obtained, we shall again have disturbances, insurrections, and diplomatic negotiations for the abolition of the tribute. Why not avoid all this by giving complete independence at once?" The favourite idea with these thinkers was that the Russian army, having got so far south, should have marched boldly into Constantinople, without paying any attention to representations, protests, or threats. In that case, the Sultan would have crossed into Asia; a great part of his Mussulman subjects would have followed his example; and the thirteenth war with Turkey would have been the last. These views were especially prevalent in Moscow, where the Czar's Ministers were described as a set of imbeciles, or rather as children who imagine that by raising little piles of atoms they can stop the onward course of an avalanche. Prince Gortschakoff and his colleagues were said to be ignorant of the great historical movement in which they were concerned, and it was prophesied that they would be swept forward by the national will, and by the irresistible force of circumstances. There was undoubtedly much discontent at what were regarded as the incomplete results of the war. On the conclusion of the armistice and of the preliminary conditions of peace, the police of St. Petersburg and Moscow suggested an illumination. The proposal met with a cold response in the former city, and with none at all in the latter; but when it was believed that the Russian troops were about to enter Constantinople, in consequence of the movements of the British fleet, there were excited popular demonstrations in several of the Russian towns.† Some enthusiasts even went so far as to preach a revival of the Crusades, and to demand that Russia should free the whole of Western Asia from the curse of Mohammedanism, deliver the Holy Places, and establish a free, Christian, international province of Jerusalem, extending from the sea to the river Jordan. This, of course, was an extreme view, put forth by a comparatively small number of persons; but the expulsion of the Turks from the whole of Europe was a project dear to the hearts of the Russian people.

Although the invading armies were to be withdrawn from Bulgaria after a certain period of occupation, the influence of Russia over the new State was to be perpetuated in other forms. The Sclavonic Societies were to continue their activity, and to serve as mediators between Russia and the South Sclavonians. A speech was delivered in the

* Vienna Correspondent of the *Times*.

† St. Petersburg Correspondent of the *Times*.

course of February to the St. Petersburg Sclavonic Benevolent Society, in which this idea was plainly expressed. The speaker was the president, Prince Wassiltchikoff, and the text of his address was the necessity of establishing close moral and intellectual ties with the emancipated Sclaves. "There is, or was, among us," he said, "a wide-spread illusion that in all matters of civilization we stand higher than the other sections of the Sclavonic race. In reality, such is not the case. In many Sclavonic lands, the economic life of the people is higher than might be expected. Elementary education is also in a very satisfactory condition. In Bulgaria, Servia, and even Montenegro, there is a wide net-work of schools for the rural population. Our Government has taken upon itself the task of obtaining human rights for that population. In this matter, the Sclavonic Societies have nothing to do; but they have other work to perform. The founding of the higher schools, particularly those of a special kind, meets with insurmountable difficulties. Periodicals cannot exist for want of subscribers; and publishing books does not pay. We have there a wide field for our science and literature. The great advantage which we possess over the West European centres of civilization lies in our language, which is more easily learned by the Sclaves. The Russian language might be introduced into the Sclavonic schools; the programme of studies might be assimilated, so that pupils from Sclavonic schools might enter the Russian Universities; bursaries might be founded in the Universities for the benefit of Sclavonic students; and Russo-Sclavonic dictionaries might be published." In the annual financial statement of the Society, issued about the same time, it was said that 592 roubles had recently been spent in distributing newspapers, 725 in the circulation of books, and 5,528 in giving support to local literature and science in Sclavonic lands. The determination of the Russian people to assimilate Bulgaria with Muscovy is clearly apparent from these facts. When the process is complete, —when the Bulgarian tongue is merged in that of Russia,—when every manifestation of a separate national life has been seduced into extinction, or cowed into submission,—it will be proclaimed that the time has arrived for incorporating Bulgaria with the Russian Empire. The immediate object of the war will then have been accomplished, and Constantinople will speedily fall into the hands of the Northern colossus. But by that time the Bulgarians will probably have discovered that Turkish rule, whatever its faults, allowed them a much larger measure of freedom than the patronage of the Czar. Prince Wassiltchikoff, in speaking of the fair degree of civilization existing in the South Sclavonic lands, where he admitted that elementary education was in a satisfactory state, paid an unconscious tribute to the better side of Turkish rule. The Bulgarians had in many important respects been left very much to themselves for several years, and had at the same time been protected by the Porte from the tyranny of other communities. They were permitted the enjoyment of their own schools and their own churches, and it was always a grievance to the Hellenic population that the Bulgarians were suffered to throw off the yoke of the Greek Patriarch, and order their ecclesiastical affairs in accordance with their own views. When the Principality of Bulgaria has been completely Russianized, it may fairly be doubted whether this local independence will not have suffered very serious diminution.

The sternness of the Russian terms as regarded Turkey seemed progressively to augment. In the preliminary conditions of peace, as officially published at St. Petersburg on the 8th of February, it was set forth that the Ottoman army was to remain in the new Bulgarian Principality at certain points, to be afterwards decided upon. Prince Bismarck, when addressing the German Parliament on the 19th of the same month, believed that this arrangement was to be carried out, and observed that the proposed condition of Bulgaria would be analogous to that of Servia before the evacuation of Belgrade and the other fortified cities. He was not aware that two days earlier the Russian Government had published a new version of the peace-preliminaries, in which it was stated that the Turkish army was not to remain at all. The view to which the German Chancellor gave expression, and which evidently had his approval, was therefore incorrect: the dependence of Bulgaria upon the Porte was to be simply nominal, and to possess no actual quality whatever. A new State was to be created, stretching from the Danube to the Ægean; and that new State, with all its resources and all its possible influence on the south-east of Europe, was to be almost as completely in the hands of the Russian Czar as Moscow or St. Petersburg, as Poland or Circassia. Such was one of the principal facts which the European Powers had to consider at the approaching Conference, and to decide whether they would accept, reject, or modify.

## CHAPTER IX.

Unsatisfactory Results of the Neutral Policy—Reply of Lord Derby to Lord Stratheden's Motion on the Treaties of 1856 and 1871—Activity in the Dockyards—Return of a more Pacific Feeling—Determination of the Russians to remove their Headquarters to San Stefano—Reasons for taking that Step—General Character of the Place—Menace to Turkey and England—Indignation of the Turks at the Relinquishment of the Final Line before Constantinople—Hints of Treachery—Contrast between the Russian and the Turkish Soldiers—Negotiation of the Treaty of San Stefano—Alleged Procrastination of the Turks—Mukhtar Pasha and the Grand Duke Nicholas—Abandonment by the Turks of the Line of Kujuk Tchekmedje—Discussions between General Ignatieff and Safvet Pasha, as the Chief Russian and Turkish Commissioners for settling the Preliminaries of Peace—Signature of the Treaty of San Stefano on the 3rd of March, 1878—Summary of the Articles—Comments on the Leading Features of the Treaty—Establishment of the Russian Power from the Danube to the Vicinity of Constantinople—Effect of the Treaty on Europe and on the Russian People.

LORD DERBY remarked, with no little reason, during a debate in the House of Lords on the 25th of February, 1878, that a large number of those who, at the commencement of the Russo-Turkish War, supported a system of neutrality, did so without foreseeing exactly what that system involved. Two alternatives, he remarked, had been put before the English people: either to stand neutral, or to declare that they would maintain the treaties of 1856 and 1871, and would draw the sword rather than permit them to be set aside. From an early date, public opinion appears to have determined that there should be no war, unless in certain extreme contingencies; yet, when the inevitable results of such a policy unfolded themselves, many of its advocates seem to have been startled, surprised, and indignant. It was always probable, that unaided Turkey would be overwhelmed by the greater strength of Russia; it was certain that the conqueror would take the utmost advantage of his success, and that the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire would be seriously impaired. The particular interests which the Government had defined as marking the limits of English neutrality were over-confidently regarded as the whole measure of our national concern in the drama which was being played out in South-eastern Europe. When it was too late, a large number of Englishmen who had shouted for neutrality in the spring and summer of 1877, and who had almost hailed Russia as the great apostle of freedom, perceived that even if Constantinople and Egypt were untouched, and the condition of the Straits and of the Suez Canal were not affected, the Czar was acquiring an ascendency in important regions of the globe, which would be as injurious to the future of England as it was antagonistic to international right and justice. The sudden discovery of this truth, which reflecting men had seen from the first, led to the violent outcry for war which distinguished the winter and early spring of 1878. The Government yielded to that cry to the extent of making warlike preparations; but the Russianizing section of the Cabinet was still predominant, and the aberrations of the people themselves increased its power.

The observations of Lord Derby were made in reply to a resolution moved by Lord Stratheden, to the effect that the correspondence on the affairs of Turkey, recently issued, justified her Majesty's Government in taking every precaution to discourage the serious encroachments by which the treaties of 1856 and 1871 were threatened. This resolution was quietly set aside without a division; and the debate showed little else than the thoroughness with which, up to that point, the Foreign Secretary had succeeded in impressing his ideas on the Cabinet and on the country, and the readiness of the Opposition to support the Government whenever it believed that a policy fatal to the Turkish Empire was being carried out. Lord Stratheden brought forward his resolution at a moment when the disposition of Ministers was again pacific, and therefore in favour of allowing Russia to pursue her ends without interruption. Not many days earlier, it had apparently been warlike. At the same time that the fleet was sent into the Dardanelles, two powerful war-vessels were added to the British navy by the purchase of the *Payki Sherref* and a companion ship, which were being built for the Turkish Government on the Thames. The four ironclads forming the Channel squadron were directed to proceed immediately to Gibraltar, on its becoming known that the ships under Admiral Hornby had been refused permission to enter the Dardanelles; and orders were despatched to Chatham dockyard, on Sunday, February 10th, directing that every possible effort should be made to complete the fleet of vessels then being prepared for sea. The artisans, in consequence, worked extra hours, and in the mechanical department the machines were served by relays of men. An extra grant of money was allowed for the needs of Portsmouth dockyard; additional skilled workmen

and labourers were employed; and the dockyard authorities were authorised to take on as many men as might be required to expedite the completion and fitting out of the various ships of war in hand. It was stated that at Woolwich no such energy in the various departments had been witnessed since the Crimean War; and a very general impression was created that the Government had at length resolved on war. A fortnight later, all was changed. Considerable reductions were made in the wages expenditure of Portsmouth dockyard, and work was slackened in several directions. This was coincident with the reply of Lord Derby to Lord Stratheden—a reply which indicated that the policy of the Foreign Secretary was again the prevailing element in the councils of the Government.

Yet at that very time the Russians had taken a step of an unexpected character, and the occupation of Constantinople seemed once more probable. It was resolved to remove the head-quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas from Adrianople to San Stefano, a place situated on the Sea of Marmora, about twelve miles from Constantinople. This change was due partly to the fall of Server Pasha, which had been procured by the influence of Mr. Layard, and partly to the action of the English Government in sending the fleet through the Dardanelles. The fallen Minister had professed his willingness to further the ends of Russia to the utmost of his power, as a means of taking revenge on England; his successor was not likely to be so obsequious. The vicinity of Admiral Hornby's ships to the Turkish capital seemed to the adventurous spirits of Russia a species of challenge which it was necessary to take up. On the 21st of February, therefore, General Gourko left Adrianople with so much suddenness that his Staff received only two hours' notice of departure. Next day it was announced that the whole of the Head-quarters' Staff, together with General Ignatieff and the Diplomatic Chancery, were to start on the 23rd for San Stefano; and at the same moment there was a forward movement of the troops. The reappearance of General Ignatieff on the scene had been a fact of evil omen to the Turks. The former Russian Ambassador to the Porte had lured Sultan Abdul-Aziz into some of the worst acts of his reign, and with consummate mastery had prepared the way for the fatal war of 1877–8. He was now acting as the principal agent in a no less fatal peace.

San Stefano, originally a little fishing village, has of late years grown into a species of ornamental suburb, the summer resort of prosperous Constantinopolitans. It is situated on the seaward slope of a range of low hills running west from the capital, and is peopled for the most part by Greeks and Armenians, who find delight in its bathing, its beach, and its showy *cafés* overlooking the sea. A lighthouse is reared upon the shore, and holds forth an answering beacon to the distant pharos on the island of Marmora, forty miles away. The locality is beloved of sportsmen, who go there to shoot quails, which gather thickly on the uplands in the late summer months; but down to the period of which we are treating, the place was so utterly obscure that not many foreigners knew of its existence. "In summer," said a correspondent of the *Times*, "it looks cheerful enough lighted up by sunshine, especially on holidays, when it harbours troops of pleasure-seekers. But in winter it is a doleful spot, desert and damp in its seat among reedy tarns and dreary brickfields, plashy and pool-pitted." Another writer from the little town gave a more cheerful account of the place, even as it appeared in winter months, and spoke of the bright sunshine, the glimmering sea, the soft aerial distance on the Asiatic shores, the boats and caiques skimming over the waves, and the picturesque groups sauntering up and down the beach, where the bands play all day long. The advantage to the Russians of removing their head-quarters to San Stefano was that it brought them into almost immediate proximity with Constantinople, compelled the unfortunate Turks to give up half their only remaining line of defence (such as it was), and, by placing the capital still more thoroughly in the power of the enemy, operated as a menace at once to Turkey and to England. Thus, while the English fleet, to avert an actual occupation of Constantinople, was obliged to remove a considerable distance from the Bosphorus, the Russian commanders advanced nearly twenty miles closer to the point of contention, so as virtually to obtain what in terms they seemed to exclude. The breach of good faith was patent; but it was backed by resistless force, and therefore prevailed. With their head-quarters at San Stefano, the Russians were established on the flank and in the rear of the original Turkish line, and, as regarded the new positions, the neutral zone was entirely abolished, so that the troops of the Czar came close up to the Turkish camp. The change, moreover, brought under the power of the invaders the long line of Government works, including powder-mills, cartridge-factories, and iron-foundries, which extends from San Stefano to the Gate of the Seven Towers, leading into the Imperial city itself. The Czar's purposes could not have been better answered had his legions piled their arms before the very palace of the Sultan.

It is not surprising that this new move created the utmost indignation among all Turks who had not entirely abandoned themselves to despair and apathy. A general officer in the Ottoman army, who had acted with distinction during the war, bitterly complained of the fact to the representative of the *Times*. "Backwards, backwards!" he exclaimed in uncontrollable anger; "nothing but retreat for the last month—retreat without reason! We have not once, through all the campaign in Europe, been beaten in fair battle. Never was an army more able or more willing to fight. We have been tricked out of the victory that was ours, and the trick has been played in Stamboul" (Constantinople). This view the writer had heard expressed or suggested many times by officers of various grades, and on one occasion by soldiers in the ranks. The belief, whether or not justified by facts, gave an additional pang to defeat; and the dictatorial manner of the Russian officers was at times almost beyond endurance. The correspondent was very favourably impressed by the calm, quiet dignity of Mukhtar Pasha, as compared with the overbearing swagger which distinguished the Muscovite generals. Equally striking was the contrast between the Russian and Turkish soldiers gathered at San Stefano. The brigade commanded by Nedjib Pasha, who had fought with much gallantry at the Shipka Pass, reached its new position on the 22nd of February, and encamped on rising ground to the east of the village. The previous fortnight had effected a great change in the appearance of the men. Reduced in numbers as the battalions were, they yet presented a good front, and the privates were healthy and well clad. "When the Osmanli is fit," said the writer already quoted, "there is no comparison

HOUSE AT SAN STEFANO IN WHICH THE TREATY OF PEACE WAS SIGNED.

SIGNING THE TREATY OF PEACE AT SAN STEFANO.

physically between him and the Russian soldier. He is stouter in figure, immeasurably more sympathetic in face and manner, more noble in bearing, and far more cleanly. The Osmanli will be clean when he can; the Muscovite has no ambition in that direction." Yet the fortune of war had brought the Turk beneath the heel of his adversary, and there was no hope for him but in mere submission.

The real motive for the removal to San Stefano was, as we have said, a desire to coerce the Turks, and to counteract the English Government; the ostensible reason was discontent at the alleged procrastination of the Ottoman Commissioners for the settlement of the terms of peace. The early part of the negotiations preceding the Treaty of Peace had been conducted at Adrianople, where the several details were subjected to close examination. The Russian Plenipotentiaries were General Ignatieff and M. Nelidoff; those of Turkey were Safvet Pasha, ultimately the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Sadoullah Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador at the Court of Germany, who, however, was not present in the earlier stages of the proceedings. Though used as a pretext, the charge of procrastination seems not to have been entirely without foundation. The representatives of the Czar were naturally anxious to finish the discussions as soon as possible, so as to anticipate any hostile action on the part of England with the accomplished fact of a treaty actually arranged and signed. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Turks may have hoped to gain something by delay. Safvet Pasha (who arrived at Adrianople on the 12th of February) is accused of having refused to accept point after point without orders from Constantinople, and it is also said that telegraphic communication was on divers occasions mysteriously interrupted. Three or four days elapsed before the receipt of answers to messages, and the same thing happened with telegrams to General Ignatieff. After awhile, Safvet Pasha complained of illness, and desired to adjourn further proceedings until the arrival of Sadoullah Bey from Berlin. With respect to several matters of detail; he expressed entire ignorance, and at length provoked General Ignatieff into declaring that he should send in an ultimatum, if he could not get peace signed in any other way. Then came the fall of Server Pasha, and Safvet, who succeeded him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said the negotiations must be suspended.*

By this time, the English fleet had entered the Sea of Marmora, and the Russian Government considered it advisable to make a counter-demonstration. Taking advantage of Safvet's temporising policy, General Ignatieff announced, in obedience to his instructions, that the scene of the negotiations would be removed to San Stefano. The Turks, seeing the futility of arguing with the master of many legions, consented to abandon their last line of defence, that of Kujuk Tchekmedje; but the Grand Duke Nicholas, on arriving at Tchataldja on the evening of the 23rd, was informed by Tahir Bey, the Turkish officer appointed for regulating the lines of delimitation, that Mukhtar Pasha had no orders to withdraw his troops, and that therefore the Russians could not be suffered to proceed any further. The telegraph was set working, and it was determined, if the Turks did not give way, to assault the Ottoman positions on the following morning. As, after an interval of two hours, no answer had been received to the telegraphic messages, the Grand Duke, losing patience, said angrily to Tahir Bey, "Go and tell Mukhtar Pasha that when I give an order he must obey it, and at once, or it will be the worse for him. Go!"† The mandate was as coarse in tone as it was unjustifiable in spirit; for Mukhtar Pasha had no right to abandon a position which he was set to guard, without orders from his Government, and those orders he had not received. The Turkish commander, however, shortly afterwards withdrew, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 24th the Grand Duke entered San Stefano, where, on the 3rd of March, the Provisional Treaty of Peace was signed in a little villa on the seashore, within view of the minarets of St. Sophia. The ratifications were exchanged at St. Petersburg on the 17th; but the text was not officially published until the 21st.

The First Article of the Treaty of San Stefano had reference to the new boundaries to be assigned to Montenegro. The accession of territory, which was not very large, was taken from the provinces of Bosnia and Albania, and lay to the north, east, and south of the original State. The advantage to Montenegro of this new arrangement was that, by including the vicinity of Antivari and Scutari, it gave the mountaineers their much-coveted admission to the sea. It was next provided that a European Commission, on which the Sublime Porte and the Government of Montenegro were to be represented, should be charged with fixing the definite limits of the Principality, making on the spot such modifications in the general tracing as might be thought necessary and equitable from the point of view of the respective interests and the tranquillity of the two countries. The navigation of the Boïana, having, according to the Treaty,

* Correspondent of the *Daily News*.

† Ibid.

always given rise to disputes between the Sublime Porte and Montenegro, would be the subject of a special regulation, to be prepared by the same European Commission. By Article II., the Sublime Porte recognized definitively the independence of the Principality of Montenegro. An understanding between the Imperial Government of Russia, the Ottoman Government, and the Principality, was to determine subsequently the character and form of the relations to be established between the Sublime Porte and Montenegro, particularly as regarded the presence of Montenegrin Agents at Constantinople, and in certain localities of the Ottoman Empire where the necessity of such Agents might be recognized; the extradition of fugitive criminals on the one territory or the other; and the subjection of Montenegrins travelling or sojourning in the Ottoman Empire to the Ottoman laws and authorities, according to the principles of international law, and the established usages concerning the Montenegrins. A Convention would be concluded between the Sublime Porte and Montenegro, to regulate various international questions; and it was further provided that the points upon which an understanding could not be effected should be settled by Russia and Austria-Hungary, to the arbitration of which Powers, acting in common, the settlement of all future differences, excepting as to new territorial demands, should be assigned.

Article III. dealt with Servia, which was recognized as independent. The new frontier of this Principality was to follow the course of the Drina, the Dezevo, the Raska, the Ibar, the Morava, and some other streams, and was drawn so as to give Little Zwornik, Zakar, Leskovatz, Ak Palanka, and Nisch, to the Servians. Ada-Kalé was to be evacuated and razed. A Turco-Servian Commission, assisted by a Russian Commissioner, would within three months arrange upon the spot the definite frontier-line, and would also settle the questions relating to the islands of the Drina; and a Bulgarian delegate was to be admitted to participate in the work of the Commission, when it should be engaged on the frontier between Servia and Bulgaria. By Article IV. it was decided that Mussulmans holding lands in the territories annexed to Servia, and who might wish to reside out of the Principality, could preserve their real property by having it farmed out or administered by others; to which end, a Turco-Servian Commission, assisted by a Russian Commissioner, would be charged to decide absolutely, in the course of two years, all questions relating to the verification of real estate in which Mussulman interests were concerned. This Commission would likewise be called upon to settle within three years the method of alienation of State property and of religious endowments, as well as all questions relative to the interests of private persons. In Article V., the Sublime Porte undertook to recognize the independence of Roumania, which would thus acquire a right to an indemnity, to be hereafter discussed between the two countries.

The most important sections of the Treaty were of course those which had relation to Bulgaria. They commenced with Article VI., which set forth that Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous, tributary Principality, with a Christian Government and a national militia. The definitive frontiers of the new Principality were to be traced by a special Russo-Turkish Commission before the evacuation of Roumelia by the Russian army, and it was provided that this Commission would, in working out the modifications to be made on the spot in the general tracing, take into account the nationality of the majority of the inhabitants in the border districts, and also the topographical necessities and practical interests involved in the intercommunication of the local populace. The new Bulgaria was of very considerable dimensions. It extended from the Danube in the north to the Ægean in the south; and from the borders of Albania in the west to the Black Sea in the east. All that was left to Turkey in this part of her Empire was an irregular and somewhat narrow territory, running westward from Constantinople along the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Ægean until it touched the limits of the new Principality, and extending no farther north than was sufficient to include Adrianople and its immediate neighbourhood. By this arrangement, the territory so left to the Sultan was completely separated from Thessaly and Albania; and some of the most fertile and valuable lands belonging to the Porte—lands which had been Ottoman possessions for centuries—were entirely removed from that dominion. According to Article VII., the Prince of Bulgaria was to be freely elected by the people, and confirmed by the Sublime Porte with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the Great European Powers should be capable of being elected Prince of Bulgaria, and, in the event of the dignity being vacant, the election of the new Prince was to be subject to the same conditions and forms as previously. Before the election of the Prince, an Assembly of Bulgarian Notables, to be convoked at Philippopolis or Tirnova, should draw up, under the superintendence of an Imperial Russian Commissioner, and in the presence of an Ottoman Commissioner, the organization of the future administration, in conformity with the precedents

established in the Danubian Principalities in 1830, after the Peace of Adrianople. In localities where the Bulgarians were mixed with Turks, Greeks, Wallachians, or others, proper account was to be taken of the rights and interests of those populations in the elections, and in the preparation of the organic laws. The introduction of the new system into Bulgaria, and the superintendence of its working, would be entrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian Commissioner; and the same article further provided that, at the expiration of the first year after the introduction of the new system, Russia, the Sublime Porte, and the Cabinets of Europe, could, supposing an understanding on the subject to have been previously established, associate special delegates with the Russian Commissioner, if that should be considered necessary. By Article VIII., the Ottoman army would no longer remain in Bulgaria, and all the ancient fortresses would be razed at the expense of the local Government. The Sublime Porte would have the right to dispose of the war-material and other property belonging to the Danubian fortresses already evacuated, and to the strongholds of Schumla and Varna. Until the complete formation of a native militia, the country would be occupied by Russian troops, who would give armed assistance to the Commissioner in case of need. This occupation would be limited to a term approximating to two years, and the strength of the army of occupation was not to exceed 50,000 men. The force would be maintained at the expense of the country occupied, and the Russian troops were to keep open their communications with Russia, not only through Roumania, but also by the ports of the Black Sea, Varna and Burgas, where, for the term of their occupation, they might organize the necessary depôts.

Article IX. declared that the amount of the annual tribute which Bulgaria was to pay the Suzerain Court would be determined by an agreement between Russia, the Ottoman Government, and the other Cabinets, at the end of the first year during which the new organization should be in force. This tribute would be calculated on the average revenue of all the territory which was to form part of the Principality. Bulgaria was to take upon itself the obligations of the Imperial Ottoman Government towards the Rustchuk and Varna Railway Company; and the regulations as to all the railways crossing the Principality were reserved for an ulterior agreement between the Sublime Porte, the Government established in Bulgaria, and the directors of the companies concerned. By Article X. the Sublime Porte was to have the right to make use of Bulgaria for the transport, by fixed routes, of its troops, munitions, and provisions, to the provinces beyond the Principality, and *vice versâ*. The conditions of this right were to be laid down by a special regulation within three months after the ratification of the Treaty; and in the meanwhile it was fully understood that the right was limited to the regular Ottoman troops, and that the Bashi-Bazouks, Circassians, and other irregulars, were to be absolutely excluded from it. The Sublime Porte moreover reserved to itself the right of sending its postal service through the Principality, and of maintaining telegraphic communication. These points also were to be determined within the same period of three months.

The Mussulman proprietors, and others who should fix their personal residence outside the Principality, were permitted by Article XI. to retain their estates, by having them farmed or administered by others. Turco-Bulgarian Commissions were to sit in the principal centres of population, under the superintendence of Russian Commissioners, and to decide absolutely, in the course of two years, all questions relative to the verification of real property in which either Mussulmans or others might be interested. Similar Commissions would be charged with the duty of regulating, within the same period, all questions relative to the mode of alienation, working, or use for the benefit of the Sublime Porte, of the property of the State, and of the religious endowments. At the expiration of the two years, all property which should not have been claimed was to be sold by public auction, and the proceeds devoted to the support of the widows and orphans, whether Christian or Mussulman, of those who had perished in the recent events. Article XII. provided that all the Danubian fortresses should be razed, and that in future there should be no strongholds on the banks of the Danube, nor any men-of-war in the waters of Roumania, Servia, or Bulgaria, except the small vessels usually employed in the service of the river police, and for custom-house purposes. The rights, obligations, and prerogatives of the International Commission of the Lower Danube were maintained intact; and by Article XIII. the Sublime Porte undertook to render the passage of the Sulina channel again navigable, and to indemnify the private individuals who had suffered loss by the war, and by the interruption of the river navigation. Article XIV. imposed on Turkey the obligation to introduce reforms into Bosnia and the Herzegovina; these reforms to be based on the European proposals submitted to the Constantinople Conference, subject to any modifications which might be agreed upon in common between the Sublime Porte, the Government of Russia, and

that of Austria-Hungary. The payment of arrears of taxes in those provinces was not to be required, and, until the 1st of March, 1880, the current revenues were to be exclusively applied to indemnifying the families of refugees and inhabitants, the victims of recent events (without distinction of race or creed), as well as to the local needs of the country. After that date, the sum to be received annually by the Central Government was to be fixed by a special understanding between Turkey, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. In Article XV., the Sublime Porte engaged, as regarded the island of Crete, scrupulously to apply the Organic Law of 1868, and to introduce an analogous law, adapted to local requirements, into Epirus, Thessaly, and other parts of Turkey in Europe. Special Commissions, in which the native population should be largely represented, were in each province to be entrusted with the task of elaborating the details of the new organisation, and the result of their labours was to be submitted to the Sublime Porte, which would consult the Imperial Government of Russia before carrying it into effect.

As regarded Armenia, it was stipulated by Article XVI. that, in order to avoid conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two Empires, the Sublime Porte would carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and would guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians. In Article XVII. a full and complete amnesty was granted by the Sultan to all Ottoman subjects compromised by recent events; and all persons imprisoned on that account, or sent into exile, were to be immediately set at liberty. The Sublime Porte promised in Article XVIII. to take into serious consideration the opinion expressed by the Commissioners of the Mediating Powers, as regarded the possession of the town of Khotour, and engaged to have the works of the definitive delimitation of the Turco-Persian boundary carried into effect. The question of the war-indemnities was arranged in Article XIX., which set forth that the Emperor of Russia claimed, in all, 1,410,000,000 roubles for losses imposed on Russia during the contest. This grand total was divided into several items, having reference to the charges of the army, the replacing of war-material, the expenses of war-contracts, the damage done to the south coast of Russia, as well as to commerce, industries, and railways, the injuries inflicted on the Caucasus by the Turkish invasion, and the damages received by Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey. The Emperor, however, did not desire to receive the whole of this indemnity in the form of money-payments, but, taking into consideration the financial embarrassments of Turkey, and acting in accordance with the wishes of the Sultan, was willing to substitute for the greater part of the sums enumerated certain territorial cessions, consisting of the Sandjak of Tultcha, on the Danube (including the Delta Islands and the Isle of Serpents), and, in Asia, Ardahan, Kars, Batoum, Bayazid, and the territory extending as far as the Soghanli Dagh. With respect to the Sandjak of Tultcha and the Delta Islands, Russia, not wishing to annex that territory, reserved to herself the right of exchanging it for the part of Bessarabia detached from her by the Treaty of 1856; the question of the appointment of waters and fisheries to be determined by a Russo-Roumanian Commission, within a year after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. The ceded territories in Europe and Asia were to be taken as an equivalent for the sum of 1,100,000,000 roubles. The mode of payment and guarantee of the rest of the indemnity was to be settled by an understanding between the Governments of Russia and Turkey, excepting as regarded the 10,000,000 roubles claimed as indemnity for Russian subjects and establishments in Turkey, which should be paid as soon as the claims of those interested were examined by the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, and handed to the Sublime Porte.

Article XX. engaged the Sublime Porte to take effective steps for putting an end to several long-standing law-suits of Russian subjects, and to indemnify them if need were. In Article XXI. various arrangements were made with reference to the inhabitants of the districts ceded to Russia who might wish to take up their residence out of those territories, and who would be free to do so during an interval of three years, after which time they would be considered Russian subjects, if they continued to remain. Sundry details having reference to property, religious establishments, war-material, &c., were by the same article handed over to a special Russo-Turkish Commission. Article XXII. stipulated that Russian ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks, travelling or sojourning in Turkey, whether European or Asiatic, should enjoy the same rights, advantages, and privileges as the foreign ecclesiastics of any other nationality; that the right of official protection by the Imperial Embassy and Russian Consulates in Turkey should be recognized, both as regarded the persons above-mentioned, and their possessions, religious houses, charitable institutions, &c., in the Holy Places and elsewhere; and that the monks of Mount Athos, of

Russian origin, should be maintained in all their possessions and former privileges, and should continue to enjoy, in the three convents belonging to them, and in the adjoining buildings, the same rights and privileges as were assured to the other religious establishments and convents of Mount Athos. Article XXIII. re-established all the treaties, conventions, and agreements, previously concluded between the two Governments, with the exception of the clauses affected by the existing Treaty. By Article XXIV. it was agreed that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should remain open, in time of war as in time of peace, to the merchant-vessels of neutral States arriving from, or bound to, Russian ports; and the Sublime Porte engaged never thenceforward to establish, at the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azof, a fictitious blockade, at variance with the spirit of the Declaration signed at Paris on the 16th of April, 1856.

Article XXV. provided for the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Russian armies. This was to take place, in Europe, with the exception of Bulgaria, within three months after the conclusion of the definitive peace, and in Asia within the space of six months; the operations of the evacuation to begin immediately after the exchange of ratifications. It was further provided by Article XXVI. that as long as the Russian troops remained in the localities to be restored to the Sublime Porte, the administration and order of affairs should continue in the same state as had existed since the occupation, and the Sublime Porte would not participate in that administration until the entire departure of the Russian troops. The Ottoman forces were not to enter the places to be restored, nor was the Sublime Porte to exercise its authority there, until notice of each fortress and province having been evacuated by the Russian troops had been given by the commander of those troops to the Turkish officer appointed for that purpose. The Sublime Porte undertook by Article XXVII. not to punish in any manner, or allow to be punished, those Ottoman subjects who might have been compromised by their relations with the Russian army during the war; and Article XXVIII. arranged for the return of prisoners of war by both Powers, as well as by Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, immediately upon the ratification of the peace-preliminaries. Finally, it was agreed by Article XXIX. that the ratifications should be exchanged in fifteen days, or sooner if possible, at St. Petersburg, where likewise an agreement should be come to as to the place and time at which the stipulations of the existing Act should be invested with all the solemn forms usually observed in treaties of peace; it being in the meanwhile well understood that the High Contracting Parties considered themselves formally bound by the existing Act from the moment of its ratification. This was the last article in the Treaty of San Stefano; but an additional paragraph to Article XI. provided that the inhabitants of the Principality of Bulgaria, when travelling or sojourning in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, should be subject to the Ottoman laws and authorities.

Such were the new arrangements of South-eastern Europe which Russia hoped to effect, as the guerdon of her extraordinary success. They accomplished a complete revolution in the state of European Turkey, and indeed went very far towards the entire destruction of the Ottoman Power in that part of the world. The Treaty of San Stefano was nothing else than an elaborate contrivance for substituting, though indirectly, the rule of Russia for the rule of Turkey over a large extent of territory lying between the Danube and the Ægean. It established and sanctioned the independence of Montenegro, which Turkey had for many years disputed. It gave to Servia a distinct existence and a wider area. It created a Bulgarian Principality, the administration of which was for a considerable period to be in Russian hands. It took from Turkey all her Danubian fortresses, and re-established the Russian sovereignty over Roumanian Bessarabia. It weighed down the Ottoman Empire with the payment of an enormous indemnity, and appropriated for the benefit of Russia a large part of the Turkish possessions, both in Asia and in Europe. It provided for the continued occupation of Turkish lands by Russian troops until its several conditions should be fulfilled; and it handed over the final settlement of a large number of delicate and important interests to bodies of Russian and Turkish Commissioners, in which it was certain that the will of the former would be supreme. A victorious Power will naturally exact its own terms from the Power that is defeated; and in this instance there was no balance of successes, which could enable the Turks to moderate the demands of insolent and predominating strength. As between herself and Turkey, Russia had the game entirely in her own hands, and it is not surprising that she made the most of it. She was perhaps not more exacting than any other great military Empire would have been under similar circumstances; but she was certainly not less so. The object of the war was to make the nearest approach permissible to the entire expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the new Principality of Bulgaria stopped but little short of Constantinople, while it left to the successors of Othman only a narrow fragment

of territory on the Sea of Marmora and the Ægean, and certain other fragments, entirely detached, on the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea. Russia had, indeed, fulfilled her engagements with respect to Constantinople, the Straits, the Suez Canal, and Egypt; but it was unnecessary to her success, or to her ultimate designs, that she should touch any of those burning questions. She made war with other objects, and with the hope of obtaining benefits as valuable and less dangerous. She had regained possession of the entry to the Danube from which the Great Powers had excluded her by the settlement of 1856, and she had established a nominally independent Government of Bulgaria, which would in truth be simply a vassal State, existing at the pleasure of the Czars, and enabling them at any moment to march by an almost uninterrupted line of territory from St. Petersburg to the neighbourhood of Constantinople. What more could be required as the result of one campaign, however successful? What more could even the Autocrat of Russia demand from the complicity or the fears of Europe?

Had the Treaty of San Stefano been allowed to stand, the next step in the southward march of Russia—namely, the acquisition of Constantinople—would have been even more facile than it is now; so easy and certain, indeed, that Russia could have well afforded to wait until, in a generation or two, the step could be taken with less fear of alarming the European Powers, or exciting their jealousy. No wonder that so sweeping a revolution as that effected by the Treaty of San Stefano fell like a thunderbolt on the nations, and aroused a feeling of general distrust. No wonder, either, that the merely provisional conclusion of such a peace excited powerful emotions in the Russian people. Some had with reluctance seen the Empire embark upon the perilous sea of war. From month to month there had been fluctuations of opinion; and in the ill-omened days of August and September the malcontents were able to argue with considerable force that their view had been justified by events, and that Russia was destined to a fatal defeat in her latest conflict with the Ottomans. But all these doubts were now disproved, and the believers in Holy Russia, who had always been the vast majority, could point to one of the most brilliant successes of modern times, though still a success less than they desired, as evidence that their unswerving faith had had its root in truth. With blood-dropping sword and battered harness, the gigantic figure of Muscovy strode over the prostrate and gasping Turk; but in the distance, behind the dispersing mists of war, stood the Powers of Europe which had an interest in the final settlement, and chief amongst them the enormous force of England.

PLOUGHING IN BULGARIA.

## CHAPTER X.

San Stefano on the 3rd of March, 1878—Waiting for News—Announcement of the Conclusion of Peace to the Russian Army—A *Te Deum* on the Shores of the Sea of Marmora—Interchange of Congratulations—Rumours as to Russian Designs—Alleged Conspiracy to deceive—Indications of a Warlike Intention on the Part of England—The Army Estimates of 1878—Debate in the House of Lords on the Treaties of 1856—Speech of the Duke of Argyll on behalf of Russia—Lord Hammond on the Dangers of the Treaty of San Stefano—Position of Lord Derby with reference to the Independence and Integrity of Turkey—Proposal of Austria that a Congress should meet at Berlin—Discussion as to whether all the Articles of the Treaty should be submitted to the Congress—Requirements of England, and Objections of Russia—Feeling of Irritation at St. Petersburg—Semi-official Views in Germany—Demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government for a Credit of Sixty Million Florins—Russian Proposal to embark Troops in the Bosphorus—The British Fleet in the Sea of Marmora—Mr. Gladstone's Trust in the Magnanimity of Russia—Dissatisfaction of the Conservatives with Lord Derby—His Resignation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Determination of the Government to call out the Reserves—Opinions of the Gladstonian Party, at different Periods, on the Political Character of Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury—Mr. Gladstone on the Possibilities of War—Lord Derby and the Congress—Necessity of asserting the National Strength.

On Sunday, the 3rd of March, 1878—the day on which the signatures were attached to the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey—a large number of excursionists from Constantinople arrived at San Stefano by steamboat, attracted by the announcement that a review was to take place in honour of the Czar's accession to the throne, and also by the rumour that peace would be concluded that day. Before the quarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas were gathered the horses of the Imperial Staff; and here a large crowd assembled, waiting for the appearance of the Commander-in-Chief. Two o'clock in the afternoon, however, came and went without any movement from the house, and people began to think that at the last hour some difficulty had arisen, and that perhaps peace would not be made after all. A storm had set in over night, and the waves of the Sea of Marmora were still wild and turbulent. In this change from the warm and tranquil weather that had prevailed for some days, the superstitious saw an omen of rupture and renewed war. But the portent was deceptive. The review was delayed because the Grand Duke was waiting for the signatures to be attached to the treaty, and this could not be done until the Russian and Turkish copies of that document were complete. Owing to the length of the treaty, the work took several hours, and, although the secretaries of both diplomatic bodies sat up the greater part of the preceding night, in the midst of a violent gale of wind, which lashed the waters into foam, and shook the walls of the house, the task was not finished in time to enable the review to be held at the hour originally fixed. At last, however, the signatures were appended, and the state of war was brought to an actual and formal close.

About four o'clock in the afternoon, the Grand Duke rode up to the Diplomatic Chancery, and asked at the door if the treaty was ready. Being satisfied with the answer, he galloped off to the hill on which the army was drawn up; and presently afterwards a carriage came rapidly driving towards the spot. The occupant of the carriage, General Ignatieff, rose as he approached, and, addressing the Commander-in-Chief, said, "I have the honour to congratulate your Highness on the signature of peace." A loud shout of satisfaction followed; the news rapidly spread, and the soldiers in the ranks echoed the cheers with the reverberating cries of many thousands. The Grand Duke then rode between the lines, and reviewed the troops; after which, halting on a little eminence, he exclaimed, "I have the honour to inform the army that, with the help of God, we have concluded a Treaty of Peace." Again the cheering rose and swelled, and all felt that a load of suspense and anxiety had been removed. From the crest of a neighbouring hill, several Turkish soldiers looked on, and to them the moment must have been one of bitterness unspeakable. On the conclusion of the review, the Grand Duke observed to the officers by whom he was surrounded, "To an army which has accomplished what you have, my friends, nothing is impossible." All the officers next dismounted, the soldiers knelt, and a *Te Deum* was celebrated. The day was now passing into twilight, and, in the decaying radiance of an evening from which the storm-clouds were heavily drifting off, the solemn tones of the religious service mingled with the voices of winds and waves, and gave an additional grandeur to the majesty of sea, and earth, and sky.

The march-past of the army—which was about 20,000 strong—was not concluded until long after dark; but before this the Grand Duke had telegraphed to the Emperor at St. Petersburg a few words of congratulation on the great event of the day. "God has vouchsafed to us," he said, "the happiness of accomplishing the holy work begun by your Majesty; and, on the anniversary of the enfranchisement of the serfs, your Majesty has

delivered the Christians from the Mussulman yoke." On the same day, the Sultan sent a message to his late enemy, in which, alluding to the circumstance of that being the anniversary of the Czar's accession to the throne, he offered his congratulations, "with the desire of renewing friendly relations." The Emperor replied:—"I thank your Majesty for your congratulations, which I received simultaneously with the news of the signature of peace.



THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL GUARD ENTERING SAN STEFANO.

I perceive in this coincidence a presage of good and lasting relations between us." These were the formal civilities usual at such times; but they were of little avail to hide the dissatisfaction which was felt throughout Europe at the general posture of affairs. Russia showed no disposition to allay this feeling, and allowed some days to pass without communicating to foreign Powers the exact terms of the treaty that had been concluded at San Stefano. Many persons, therefore, still continued to give credence to the rumours concerning Russian designs which had circulated during the progress of the negotiations. The source of these rumours is said to have been Constantinople. An English correspondent in that city, who was animated by a very antagonistic spirit to the Turkish Government, reported to his journal that the Sultan, beginning once more to hope for armed assistance, after the appearance of the fleet in the Sea of Marmora, and the outbreak of warlike sentiment in England, had delayed the negotiations as much as possible, and in the meanwhile had worked on the fears and jealousies of the English people by exaggerated and untruthful statements. The representatives of pro-Turkish newspapers published in London were, according to this authority, crammed with misleading information as to what Russia intended to do and to exact. The conditions, it was alleged, were terribly hard, and were aimed especially at England. The Moslem population of Bulgaria and Roumelia were to be exiled. Russian sailors were said to be in Adrianople, and the enemy insisted on the surrender of the Turkish fleet. Afterwards it was admitted that the Russians had not required the whole fleet, but rumour still averred that they demanded six ironclads. Another piece of news was to the effect that the Czar's Plenipotentiaries

spoke of taking the Egyptian tribute, by which the interest on the English and French debt is secured, as a guarantee for the war-indemnity. It was also asserted that Salonica was to be included in the new Principality of Bulgaria, and that Russia was determined to have a port on the Sea of Marmora, and a dockyard in the Bosphorus. These reports were afterwards contradicted by the Russians, who said that no such measures were ever contemplated. It is certain that they were not introduced into the Treaty of San Stefano; but it would be rash to conclude with absolute certainty that not one of them was ever mooted. In the diplomatic world, denials are sometimes less true than the things denied; and it is quite within the bounds of possibility that Russia was led to moderate her demands by the more resolute action of the English Government.

The hesitation which had marked the official conduct of England during earlier weeks had now considerably diminished, though it had not entirely disappeared. An announcement that Lord Napier of Magdala would have the chief command of any military force which might be sent out, and that Sir Garnet Wolseley would be Chief of the Staff, created a general impression that war was really imminent. Being questioned on the subject by the Marquis of Hartington, on the 28th of February, the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained that no actual appointment had been made, but that the two distinguished officers in question had been selected, some ten or twelve days before, in case an expeditionary force should be required. Lord Napier of Magdala had been summoned home from Gibraltar, in order that he might consult with the military authorities in England, and be in readiness if his services were needed. This looked decidedly belligerent; but when the Army Estimates were introduced on the 4th of March, Mr. Gathorne Hardy observed that they were peace estimates—that was to say, they were estimates which in no sense whatever would enable the country to conduct a war. It was announced that an increase in the regimental army was to be made, to the extent of 1,732 men; but this small addition was needed principally in consequence of troubles in South Africa. An army-corps ready for foreign service was to be stationed in the autumn in the neighbourhood of Salisbury; yet here again there seemed nothing very hostile. "The country," said Mr. Hardy, "has a strong military spirit—not a warlike spirit, but a spirit which is patriotic. In 1878, as at the time of the Crimean war, men will be ready to come forward for the service of their country, if any necessity arises. I trust that our forces may not be called upon for active service; but I feel confident that, if called upon, the army and the navy of England will continue to do honour to this country, as they have done in former years." The Secretary for War took care to assert the spirit of the nation, in case the worst should ensue; yet it cannot be said that the tone of his remarks was menacing towards Russia, or any other Power.

The obligation of England to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was much discussed at this intermediate period between the conclusion of the war and the opening of those final negotiations in which the Great Powers were to take part. Not a little ignorance on this subject prevailed in the popular mind, and the facts were hardly made any clearer by a debate in the House of Lords on the 7th of March, when the Duke of Argyll rose to call attention to the treaties of 1856, and to move an address for copies of any correspondence between her Majesty's Government and the Government of Greece. The Duke—an enthusiastic follower of Mr. Gladstone in this matter—denied that there had been an absolute and unconditional guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Sultan's dominions; although nothing can be more emphatic than the language of the Tripartite Treaty signed by England, France, and Austria on the 15th of April, 1856.* He further maintained that the principle of the Treaty of March 30th, of the same year, was that the affairs of Turkey should be settled by Europe; although the Ninth Article of that treaty most distinctly laid down that the communication by the Porte of its firman of reforms gave the Powers no sort of right to interfere in the internal administration of the Ottoman Empire. In spite of this express provision, the Duke of Argyll had the courage to argue that the only violation of the treaty had been by Turkey herself, in not carrying out the promised reforms. He also affirmed that the arrangement of 1856 contemplated individual action on the failure of mediation, and that Russia had in no way violated her engagement in taking up a quarrel against Turkey when all the other Powers refused. The Duke relied a good deal on the Eighth Article of the Treaty of March 30th, which affirmed that "If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the signing Powers any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation." From this

* See Note to page 105, Vol. I., of this History.

the Duke of Argyll inferred that, on the failure of negotiations, Russia was free to attack Turkey, and partition her dominions. It is of course obvious that no treaty can bind a Power never, under any conceivable circumstances, to make war on another; yet it is none the less true that England, France, and Austria distinctly guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and that they failed to maintain it.

A very different view was expressed by Lord Hammond, who, having for many years been connected with the Foreign Office, was necessarily a great authority on all questions of international policy. This nobleman, while admitting that Turkey had in several ways failed to carry out her obligations, contended that the object of the Crimean War, and of the peace which followed it, was to prevent the dangers that might result from the substitution of Russian for Turkish rule in the south-east of Europe, and from so grave a disturbance of the balance of power. The maintenance of the navigable channel of the Danube, as it existed before the war of 1877–8, was essential to the interests of Central Europe. But, in the opinion of Lord Hammond, the transfer to Roumania of all the navigable channels of the delta, from Isaktcha to the sea, would in time neutralize the efforts which had for some years been made for the improvement of that region. The independence of Roumania would be a fiction. To all intents and purposes, Roumania would be the vassal of Russia, and it was well known how Russia had dealt with the Danube in the period between the Treaty of Adrianople, when she acquired the delta, and the Crimean War, when she was deprived of it. Acting in the interests of her own corn-growing provinces, Russia, said Lord Hammond, had evaded her engagements to improve the navigable channel of the Danube; and thus the corn-growing countries along its banks, not held by Russia, were seriously damaged. But the chief question was that of Bulgaria, where it would be necessary to see that the predominance of the Christians belonging to the Eastern Church did not lead to the persecution of other Christians, and of Mohammedans and Jews. Much of the misery suffered by Christians in the East had resulted from the oppression of one sect by another, and of the laity by the clergy; and Lord Hammond was of opinion that these evils would be perpetuated under the protection of Russia, if means were not taken to prevent it.

The most important address of the evening was of course that of Lord Derby. Speaking with all the weight attaching to his office, the Foreign Secretary maintained that, although we had given some sort of pledge, in the Treaty of Paris, to prevent the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire from being violated, the guarantee did not involve an obligation on the part of the guaranteeing Powers to make war. It simply said that any act tending to the violation of the guarantee was to be considered a question of general interest; and this form of words, in the judgment of Lord Derby, would never have been adopted if it had been intended to bind each of the guaranteeing parties to draw the sword. He looked on the policy of 1856 as an attempt to see whether, by obtaining for the Turkish Empire a generation of peace, and of security from outward attack, it might not be possible to make that State really independent, self-supporting, and strong enough to protect itself against other Powers. But he did not explain how, if the treaty was actually devoid of the character usually supposed, it could have had the effect of giving to Turkey a period of security from outward attack. In the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris (March 30th, 1856), the Sovereigns of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia, guaranteed in common the strict observance of their engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; but the interpretation which Lord Derby put on this guarantee reduced it to something like a meaningless form, or rather to a piece of subtle treachery, like the promises of Shakespeare's witches. Lord Derby spoke of England having taken up the attitude of a protector to Turkey, yet in the same breath denied that we were under any obligation to protect. Of the Tripartite Treaty, Lord Derby said nothing; and the debate, which was for the most part of a very unsatisfactory character, terminated without any result.

It was certainly desirable that the English Cabinet should know its own mind on the Eastern Question, and should hold distinct, intelligible, and coherent opinions on the position of Russia towards Turkey, and of Turkey towards the guaranteeing Powers. The proposal of Austria with respect to a diplomatic meeting was beginning to assume a more definite shape, and the invitation to a Conference at Vienna (afterwards Baden) which had been issued on the 3rd of February, and accepted by the English Government on the 4th, was withdrawn by Austria on the 7th of March, in order that a Congress at Berlin might be suggested instead.* The

* The letter from Count Beust to Lord Derby, giving the reasons of the Austrian Cabinet for suggesting a Conference at Vienna, was written on the 5th of February; but the first proposal was sent by telegraph on the 3rd, communicated to her Majesty's Government on the 4th, and accepted the same day.



THE GRAND DUKE ANNOUNCING THE TREATY OF PEACE TO THE TROOPS AT SAN STEFANO.

difference between a Conference and a Congress has never been clearly defined; but it is generally understood that the latter body is endowed with greater powers than the former. On March 8th, Lord Derby informed Count Beust, the Austrian Ambassador at London, that the English Cabinet because, if any topics were to be withdrawn from official cognizance and criticism, the entire object of the Congress, so far as England was concerned, might be defeated before the proceedings began. The same stipulation was again laid down in subsequent notes of the English Government,

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were willing to agree to Berlin as the place of meeting, but considered that "it would be desirable to have it understood, in the first place, that all questions dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey should be considered as subjects to be discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it had received the assent of the Powers." This was a point of great importance; and especially in a letter of March 13th from Lord Derby to Sir Henry Elliot, our Ambassador at Vienna, wherein the Foreign Minister said it must be distinctly understood, before England consented to join in the negotiations, that every article in the treaty between Russia and Turkey should be submitted to the Congress—not necessarily for acceptance, but in order that it might be considered what articles would affect the interests of the several Powers, and what would not. The Austrian

Government took a somewhat equivocating position with respect to this matter. Count Beust communicated to Lord Derby, on the 14th of March, a telegram in which Austria maintained that all the stipulations which might affect European interests ought to be discussed at the Congress, so that Europe might decide upon them. "But," added the message, "as Prince Gortschakoff has declared to Austria that it was the Congress which would decide what are the articles of the preliminaries of peace which affect the interests of Europe, and that all the points which were found to be of European interest would be submitted to its deliberations, and could not be considered as valid until they obtain the assent of all the Powers, it appears to Austria that the object of the English declaration—that is to say, the reservation of her full liberty of action, a point of view which Austria entirely shares—is thereby attained; and Count Andrassy thinks that under these circumstances it is neither for the interest of England nor of Austria to raise difficulties in regard to this question." No doubt, it was far from the interest of Austria to raise difficulties; but England was not a member of the Triple Alliance, and had no good reason for unquestioning trust.

On the same day, Count Schouvaloff communicated to Lord Derby a copy of a telegraphic despatch from the Russian Chancellor (likewise dated the 14th), which said:—"All the Great Powers know already that the complete text of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace with the Porte will be communicated to them as soon as the ratifications shall have been exchanged—a matter which cannot be delayed. It will be simultaneously published here. We have nothing to conceal." As a mode of meeting the English objection, Prince Bismarck, on the 15th of March, suggested the holding of a Preliminary Conference, to settle the conditions by which the greater meeting should be guided. He thought this plan preferable to writing despatches which crossed other despatches; but on the following day the English Cabinet replied that they saw no advantage in the proposed arrangement, and added that no amount of discussion was likely to alter their decision with respect to the whole of the treaty being laid before the Congress. No Government with the slightest respect for itself could have taken any other course under the circumstances; for it was evident that Russia was acting in bad faith. According to a despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, written from St. Petersburg on March 12th, and received on the 18th, Prince Gortschakoff, in the course of conversation on the former day, had said that the treaty, when ratified, was binding as between Russia and Turkey; that if any modifications were introduced by the European Congress, they would be the subject of further arrangement between the two lately belligerent Powers; and that, although of course he could not impose silence on any member of the Congress, he could only accept a discussion on those portions of the treaty which affected European interests. This did not look hopeful; but the Russian Government endeavoured to smooth away the difficulty that had arisen by instructing Count Schouvaloff to say (which he did on the 19th of March) that the Treaty of Peace concluded between Russia and Turkey would be communicated to the Government of the Queen in its entirety, and long before the assembling of the Congress. It was also stated that the treaty in question was the only one that existed, as Russia had contracted no secret engagement. Russia did not dispute the right of the other Great Powers to reserve to themselves, at the Congress, full liberty of appreciation and action; but the same liberty she claimed for herself, and Prince Gortschakoff maintained that it would be to restrict that liberty if, alone among the Powers, she contracted a preliminary engagement. To this Lord Derby replied in a communication to Count Schouvaloff (dated March 21st), maintaining the position already defined by him, and denying that Russia's freedom of opinion and of action in Congress, more than that of any other Power, would be restricted by the preliminary understanding required by England. Her Majesty's Government therefore desired to ask whether the Government of Russia was willing that the communication of the entire treaty to the various Powers should be regarded as a placing of the treaty before the Congress, in order that the whole instrument, in its relation to existing treaties, might be examined and considered.

The reply of Russia to this question was communicated by Count Schouvaloff on the 26th of March, and was to the effect that Prince Gortschakoff felt it his duty to adhere to the declaration which the Russian Ambassador had been ordered to make on the 19th. As different interpretations had been given to the phrase "liberty of appreciation and action," the Imperial Cabinet defined the meaning of that term by saying that it left to the other Powers the privilege of raising such questions at the Congress as they might think fit to discuss, and reserved to Russia the right of accepting or not accepting the discussion of those questions. Still, it was by no means clear that all the stipulations of the treaty would be placed before the Congress for discussion. There was a decided

vagueness about the Russian engagements, which rendered it extremely doubtful whether, when the Congress assembled, its members might not be precluded from examining certain portions of the Treaty of San Stefano; in which case, the omitted sections might be the very parts most important in the estimation of England. Unless some such design were contemplated, it is impossible to understand why Russia objected to the required stipulation in the form suggested by England. On the 23rd of March, Sir Henry Elliot was informed by a trustworthy person that Prince Gortschakoff had declared in distinct terms to the Roumanian agent at St. Petersburg that he would not allow the article of the treaty relating to the cession of Bessarabian Moldavia to be discussed by the Congress.* The Cabinet of St. Petersburg refused even to make a formal declaration that the communication of the Treaty to the Powers was equivalent to submitting it to the Congress. The word "submit" appears to have given special offence, as it was supposed to imply that the Congress was a species of tribunal, and that Russia was expected to subject herself to its jurisdiction, whereas the Imperial Cabinet regarded it as an amicable assembly of the Powers, for the purpose of developing the principles of the treaty, and of conciliating, as far as possible, all conflicting interests. It was believed in Russia that her Majesty's Ministers, in making the demand to which Lord Derby gave expression, had in view one of two aims—either to inflict a formal humiliation on Russia, or to avoid the necessity of attending the Congress. Supposing the latter, the Congress would not be held at all, and Russia, it was currently reported, would simply endeavour to effect an arrangement with Germany and Austria.†

In these extreme views, Russia found but little general support. Towards the end of March, the *Berlin Post*, a journal sometimes containing official intelligence, adopted a warning tone towards Russia, advising that Power to yield, and pointing out that, notwithstanding what was said to the contrary, England was unlikely to fight alone, should a conflict really ensue; whereas an alliance of other States with Russia against England was obviously out of the question. The failure of the Congress would probably result in Russia and England remaining at peace, while arming for war; and these prolonged armaments, it was added, could be much better afforded by England than by Russia.

* Telegraphic Communication from Sir Henry Elliot to the Earl of Derby (Vienna, March 23rd, 1878). The statement was afterwards denied by the Russian Chancellor.

† St. Petersburg Correspondent of the *Times*.

In the event of the Czar endeavouring to extend his conquests, Austria and Greece would join England, to protect their own interests; and Germany would never fight for Russian or any other foreign objects. "Russia, therefore," said the semi-official journal, "had better restrain her ambition." In Austria, the feeling was one of so much uneasiness that on the 9th of March the Government presented to the Austrian and Hungarian Delegations a Bill authorising an extra credit of 60,000,000 florins—a measure equivalent to that which had already been introduced in England, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked for the vote of credit. In explaining to the Delegations his reasons for wishing to raise an additional sum, Count Andrassy observed that, looking towards the East, he could see only the glowing metal, and not the mould into which it was to be cast. The metaphor implied some doubt as to the shape which Russia ultimately intended to impress upon the molten mass; and the Austrian Minister considered it necessary that the Dual Government should be placed in a position to take extraordinary measures, if such should appear necessary for protecting the interests of the Monarchy. Yet it is strongly to be suspected that both in Austria and Germany the Emperors had resolved to counterwork the intentions of their own Cabinets, if those intentions should prove inimical to the general designs of policy which formed the basis of the Triple Alliance. Nor did Count Andrassy find anything like enthusiastic support in the Austrian Delegation. The credit for which he asked was indeed sanctioned by thirty-nine votes; but twenty members voted against it. In the Hungarian Delegation the decision was unanimous; but it was only in Hungary that the feeling against Russia was generally diffused.

The prospects of a pacific arrangement grew less hopeful as the March days wore on. Popular distrust in England was increased by the determination of Russia to embark her troops in the Bosphorus—a proceeding not contemplated by the twenty-fifth article of the Treaty of San Stefano. The alleged reason for this step was that all the railway carriages on the Fratesti-Jassy line were infected, in consequence of the number of typhus cases among the wounded soldiers who were brought to Jassy in the course of January and February; and that therefore it was absolutely necessary that the Russian troops, returning home from Bulgaria and Roumelia, should be conveyed by another route. The proposal to embark these troops in the Bospborus looked like a further attempt on the part of Russia to obtain a power over Constantinople; and Mr.

Layard emphatically called the attention of the Porte to the contemplated design, against the execution of which he protested. The only result of his protest, however, was that troops which would otherwise have been sent away were retained in their positions, and that, in particular, the departure of the Imperial Guard was countermanded. The danger of a collision between the forces of England and of Russia was serious in the excited state of feeling then existing in both countries. The number of British ships in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora at that date was formidable, and a very trifling incident might have brought them into action. Four ironclads were cruising in the Gulf of Ismid, and two were at Gallipoli; besides which, there were seven smaller vessels in different parts of the Sea of Marmora, and at the Sulina mouth of the Danube, where it discharges into the Black Sea. The position of these vessels was in many respects perilous. Supposing them to have desired to return, they would have had to pass a range of heights bordering the Dardanelles, from which the heavy artillery of the Russians could have done fearful damage, or perhaps even have sunk them. The circumstance would not have been without precedent. In the year 1807, Admiral Duckworth, at a time when we were at war with Turkey and in alliance with Russia, made a rash threat of bombarding Constantinople, but, on endeavouring to return to the Mediterranean, lost two ships and six hundred men from the heavy Turkish ordnance with which the Straits were swept.

Had the worst ensued in 1878, there can be no doubt that the Russians would have done as the Turks did in the early days of the century. Moreover, they had in the Bosphorus two large torpedo-ships, carrying six torpedo-boats, the fearfully destructive powers of which instruments had already been unmistakably proved upon the vessels of the Turkish navy. Under all the circumstances, however, it would have been the height of folly to withdraw the English ships; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, replying to a question in the House of Commons on the 21st of March, said that the Government did not see any reason why the ships of war should not be kept where they were. Such was not the opinion of Mr. Gladstone, who, in addressing a deputation of his constituents on the 23rd of March, observed that he had heard no argument which could justify the presence, after the conclusion of peace, of the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora, in defiance of the stipulations of treaties which, as the Government frequently asserted, it was our special business to uphold. On this occasion, Mr. Gladstone expressed a general concurrence in the treaty which had just been signed by Russia and Turkey, although he could not approve of the large extension of Bulgaria westward, nor could for one moment excuse the taking away from the Roumanians of the strip of territory excised from Bessarabia. The right honourable gentleman hoped that Russia would show "too much magnanimity to make such demands," and asked what there was to necessitate war. It was clearly begging the question to assume that there was any fixed intention to go to war; but the military preparations which Mr. Gladstone so strongly denounced were doubtless requisite towards inducing Russia to abandon any portion of those extreme demands which the speaker himself condemned, but which he hoped to redress through an appeal to Russian magnanimity.

A few days after the delivery of this speech, the great representative of similar views in Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet gave notice that he had resigned office. For several weeks, if not for some months, it had been very generally known that Lord Derby was at issue with the Premier as to the proper conduct of the Eastern Question. It was only with great reluctance that he acquiesced in the early summoning of Parliament. He momentarily resigned, towards the end of January, on the question of the Dardanelles, and on the proposed vote of credit, though he almost immediately resumed office on the recall of the fleet after its first entry into the Straits. The breach between the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, however, was too great to be healed by an occasional concession. Lord Beaconsfield wished to defeat the aims of Russia; Lord Derby was wholly indifferent to them, if he did not rather desire their success. The hesitation of the Cabinet was due in a great measure to him, though he had a very cordial supporter in Lord Carnarvon until the resignation of that nobleman, and probably in other Ministers as well. The Foreign Secretary had for some time lost the confidence of his own party, and it was no secret that a strong movement against him had set in amongst the Conservatives themselves. As early as the 13th of February, the *Morning Post* announced that the feeling of the country gentlemen of England had at last been thoroughly aroused by the vacillations of the Cabinet, capped as they had been by the ridiculous spectacle of the ironclads of Great Britain moving to and fro with uncertain aims and varied orders. It was determined that the Government should be required to represent the true opinions of the party and of the country; and on the evening of

February 12th a meeting of Conservative members of Parliament was held with a view to the expression of this resolve. These gentlemen, while convinced that they might thoroughly trust the Premier, were agreed, according to the *Morning Post*, to refuse any further confidence to the Foreign Secretary, unless he took his tone implicitly from Lord Beaconsfield. It thus appeared that a large body of Conservatives, who were so far organized that they had appointed Sir Laurence Palk as their chairman, were bent on bringing the strong opinion of the country to bear upon the intentions of Government. Their action, however, does not seem to have been very conspicuous; yet they may have had some influence on the Prime Minister, in strengthening him for a more decided expression of his policy. Their influence on Lord Derby, if any such were exercised or felt, had probably no other result than to confirm him in his Gladstonian views. It is certain that he was much more a Minister of the Opposition than of the party with which he was associated; and when, on the 7th of March, the Duke of Argyll observed that his noble friend at the head of the Foreign Office had been exposed to attacks out of doors which were as violent as they were unjust, the cheers of the Opposition were loud and long. In spite of all these facts, however, it was still denied that there were any dissensions in the Cabinet. Lord Derby himself spoke to this effect on the 21st of March. "Differences of opinion, if they are found," he said, "are legitimate matters for criticism and inference; but to say that one Minister recommends this and another that policy, on the strength of stories vaguely floating about, is neither dignified nor desirable."

Exactly a week later—viz., on the 28th of March—the Earl of Derby rose in his place in the House of Lords, and said, "It is my duty to take the earliest opportunity of stating to your Lordships that I have ceased to hold the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs." He went on to explain that the Cabinet had arrived at certain conclusions which were of a grave and important character, but in which he had not been able to concur. He did not consider that those measures necessarily or inevitably tended to bring about a state of war. He gave those with whom he had acted entire credit for desiring, as much as he desired, to maintain the peace of Europe. But he differed with them as to the means necessary for securing that end; and he could not, in the exercise of his deliberate judgment, regard the measures upon which his colleagues had decided as prudent in the interests of European peace, required for the safety of the country, or warranted by the state of matters abroad. No personal motive had influenced him in the step which he had felt compelled to take: every personal motive and every private feeling influenced him in the opposite direction. But the matters in discussion were matters involving the issue of peace or war, and, that being so, his sense of public duty did not permit him to be influenced by considerations of personal regard. His lordship, however, sat down without intimating (as indeed he was not at liberty to do) the character of that measure which had finally determined him to withdraw from Ministerial duties.

This revelation was reserved for the Premier himself, who, after a feeling expression of his regret at losing the services of an old colleague, remarked that public mischief might result from the observance of unnecessary mystery in such affairs. He therefore felt it his duty to say that, in consequence of the Cabinet's belief that the Congress would not meet, it became matter for consideration, at a period when the balance of power in the Mediterranean was so disturbed, and when the hope of rectifying that balance by the assembly of the Congress seemed altogether to have ceased, to decide what steps should be taken in order to countervail or resist the mischiefs which were impending. It was in the interests of peace, and for the due protection of the rights of the Empire, that the Ministry had thought it their duty to advise her Majesty to avail herself of those powers which she possessed of calling out the Reserve Forces. This, then, was the measure which appeared to Lord Derby so unnecessary, and so likely to involve the country in war, that, rather than sanction it, he retired from office, even at the risk of breaking up the Government by the secession of one of its most important members.

It is curious to observe how completely the opinion of Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury, entertained by the Gladstonian party, had altered within a year; how thoroughly the former had taken the position of the latter, according as that position was defined in days when the Indian Secretary was regarded as the friend of Russia, and the Foreign Secretary as the friend of Turkey. On the 23rd of June, 1877, the *Daily News*, referring to a rumour that the Government was about to ask for a vote of some millions on credit—a course which it was supposed would lead to the resignation of Lord Salisbury—used these noticeable words:—"Lord Beaconsfield's Government without Lord Salisbury would be without the element which has secured to them such confidence as the country is able to place in them.

The withdrawal of the Secretary of State for India would be the withdrawal of the strong sense and the knowledge of facts which up to this time have controlled the fantastic imagination and the adventurous projects of Lord Beaconsfield." On the 29th of March, 1878, the same paper wrote:—"The retirement of Lord Derby removes the last check upon Lord Beaconsfield from within his Cabinet. Lord Salisbury, who is said to have designated himself as Lord Derby's successor in the Foreign Office, has proved to the public that the show of strength and the reality of it may very easily be separated. Pliant to General Ignatieff in Constantinople, he is manageable without difficulty by Lord Beaconsfield in London. The phrase by which Napoleon III. was described—a reed painted to look like iron—correctly describes the Indian Secretary. Sharpness of tongue and force of style disguise in his case an impulsive temper and an unsteady purpose. If Lord Beaconsfield is to be restrained at all, he must be restrained by the country. His colleagues are his subjects." In the autumn agitation of 1876, Lord Derby had been roughly handled by the Gladstonians for weakness, irresolution, and evil proclivities. He was now complimented on "his sincerity, the calmness of his judgment, his curiously un-Tory-like propensity for ascertaining facts before forming opinions, and his superiority to the vulgar influences of mere partizan interest." From these and similar utterances, it would almost seem as if the measure of a statesman's ability and character, in the estimation of some thinkers, was to be found in his greater or lesser approval of the policy of Russia.

On the same afternoon that Lord Derby announced his resignation to the House of Lords, Mr. Gladstone addressed some remarks to a deputation from Leeds, who called upon him at his residence in Harley Street, to give expression, amongst other objects, to their confidence in the principles which had guided his administration. In the course of his observations, Mr. Gladstone spoke with great severity of the wrong that had been done to Europe by the interception of the meeting of Congress. There was a party in this country, he said, which did not want it to meet. He did not charge this upon the Government, because he did not know that such was the fact; but there was a party in the House of Commons which had not been able to keep down the manifestation of its desire that England should make a complete settlement of the Eastern affair. "I am perplexed, troubled, and afflicted," said the right honourable gentleman, "that, after the bloodshed and horrors of this war—after a complete pacification has been effected between the parties—after the conclusion of a preliminary treaty, prepared for individual further discussion by Europe—some foolish or some guilty scheme stands between us and the assembling of the Powers for the purpose of settling this great question. I do hope, and I think you must hope with me, that these suspicions may not be greatly prolonged. I hope that if ever there come again into view the danger, in whatever form, of a guilty war, every one of you, and of the masses of your countrymen, will pursue the same course that you pursued in December, and will say, 'It shall not be done. Peace shall not be broken, except in obedience to some great call of national duty; and the call of national duty now is not to break but to maintain peace.'" It may not unreasonably be inferred from these somewhat cautious sentences that Mr. Gladstone disapproved of the determination of the Government to insist upon a distinct intimation from Russia that every clause of the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to the judgment of the Congress. If such was his meaning, however, he had not even Lord Derby to support him. In his statement to the House of Lords, that nobleman took especial care to make it known that his resignation did not result from any disagreement as to the conditions upon which England ought to go into the Congress. He deeply lamented the obstacle which had arisen; but the fault, he observed, did not rest with the Government of England, and he very clearly stated his opinion that the dispute in which they had been engaged was not one of form or of words, but one of very substantial realities. In his belief, it would have been useless for England to go into the Congress unless she could be sure that the discussion would be of a real, and not of an illusory, character; and, if England was to choose between two unsatisfactory issues, he considered that, in the interests of a European peace, it would be the lesser misfortune that the Congress should not meet at all than that, having met, and differences having arisen at the outset, it should be broken up without any result. On this point the judgment of Lord Derby was sound and rational. It is only surprising that he did not see how necessary it had become to support the will of the country by a still greater manifestation of physical strength than had already been made. Had the fleet not been recalled from the Dardanelles on the 25th of January, it is highly probable that the Russians would never have acquired that ascendency over the very heart and life of the Turkish Empire which immediately afterwards they obtained. The subsequent movements of the fleet, though to a great extent they came too late, seem to have had a moderating



ILLUMINATIONS IN THE NEVSKY PROSPECT, ST. PETERSBURG, ON THE SIGNING OF PEACE.

influence on the terms of peace embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano. As long as England did nothing, the ambition and rapacity of the Russians were constrained within no bounds; but in exact proportion to the development of a resolute purpose was the manifestation of a desire on the part of Russia, notwithstanding blustering words and hectoring acts, to come to some species of agreement with the European Powers. Again a difficulty had arisen; and Lord Beaconsfield was right, by every principle of policy, and every law of protection, in making it known that, in the last resort, the reasonable demands of England would be maintained by England's strength.

## CHAPTER XI.

**Continued Occupation of Turkish Villages by the Russians—Visit of the Grand Duke Nicholas to Constantinople—Interviews with the Sultan, and Exchange of Civilities—Turkey again inclining to the English Alliance—Circular Despatch of Lord Salisbury on the Treaty of San Stefano (April 1st)—Reply of Prince Gortschakoff (April 9th)—The Leading Arguments on both Sides—Position of Russia towards the Treaties of 1856 and 1871—Prince Gortschakoff's Threats against Roumania—Determination of the Roumanians to resist the Russian Demands—Discussions in the Chambers—Mission of M. Bratiano to Vienna—Servian Opinion on the Treaty of San Stefano—Greece and the Congress—The Insurrection in the Greek Provinces of Turkey—Death of Mr. Ogle—General Ignatieff at Vienna—Opinion in St. Petersburg on the Resignation of Lord Derby—Isolation of Russia—Animosity of the Russian Official Circles towards England—The Czar amenable to the Stress of Public Opinion—Interruption in the Negotiations for a Congress of the European Powers—Dangerous Position of Russia in the Spring of 1878.**

FLUSHED with their success, the Russians seemed as if they desired to heap mortification on the heads of their vanquished opponents, and at the same time to irritate opinion in England to the utmost. Even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, they continued to advance, and occupied villages still nearer to Constantinople than San Stefano. The Turkish Government did not know what to expect, and the state of affairs was rendered doubly alarming by the desire of the Grand Duke Nicholas to visit Constantinople with a mounted escort of eighty persons, consisting of his Staff in full uniform. The Sultan was perfectly willing to receive his late enemy, and had in fact sent him an invitation; but he very naturally wished him to come without any military state, such as might wound the feelings of the Turkish people. Owing to this initial difficulty, the visit was postponed; but in the end the Grand Duke carried his point, though with some modifications. Accompanied by twelve general officers, he proceeded in the Imperial steam yacht *Livadia*, on the 26th of March, to the Dolmabaghtché Palace, where he found the Sultan surrounded by his Ministers, as well as by several generals, including Osman Pasha. The *Livadia* was followed by the *Constantine*, containing sixty officers, all of whom were present at the first part of the audience. After conversing with the Ottoman sovereign for about three quarters of an hour—during which time the only other persons present were Safvet and Raouf Pashas, M. Nelidoff, and the dragoman of the Russian Embassy acting as interpreter—the Grand Duke went to the Beylerbey Palace, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. As a compromise of the original plan, the Grand Duke had proposed that he and his followers should go by water to the Dolmabaghtché Palace, and that the Sultan should return the visit on board the *Livadia*, or in any other way that might be considered advisable. The Turkish Ministers, however, put the Beylerbey Palace at the disposal of their Imperial visitor, and there the return visit was paid. Another conversation followed, and the Sultan, on getting into his launch to return to the opposite shore, requested the Grand Duke to go back with him. The invitation was accepted, and his Imperial Highness, accompanied only by the dragoman, paid a second and shorter visit to the Dolmabaghtché Palace. On these occasions, various matters were discussed, of which very little was allowed to reach the public ear.

The French, German, and Austrian Military Attachés had been invited to be present at the earlier reception; but all stayed away. Nevertheless, the Grand Duke was not entirely deprived of complimentary recognition. Although, by his express orders, the Russian flag was not hoisted on board the *Livadia*, the yacht was recognised by the Austrian despatch-boat, the crew of which gave a hearty cheer as it passed up the Bosphorus; and immediately afterwards three English gunboats dressed ship, and hoisted the Russian flag. After his second visit to the Sultan, the Grand Duke, accompanied by part of his suite, called on Prince Reuss, and then proceeded to the Russian Embassy, in front of which the Muscovite eagles and coat of arms, which had been muffled since the breaking off of diplomatic relations, were uncovered and once

more displayed. During the day, a short religious service was held in the chapel of the Embassy, and on the evening of the 27th the Grand Duke dined with the Sultan, on which occasion several Russian princes and generals, together with the chief Turkish Ministers, were present. On the 30th, the Imperial guest had an interview of two hours' duration with the Sultan; and on Sunday, the 31st, he received the members of the diplomatic body, when the British and French Ambassadors simply left their cards. Three days later, the Grand Duke left the Turkish capital. Two parties were at that time contending for influence over the mind of the Padishah—the party which inclined to a Russian alliance, and that which looked towards British support. Doubtless, the Sultan listened to both, and may at different times have leaned each way; but the English alliance was now increasing in favour. The Government may to some extent have been influenced in this respect by a threat said to have been uttered by the Khedive, that he would declare the independence of Egypt, if the Porte



SALOON OF THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS AT SAN STEFANO.

quitted Constantinople, and returned to his residence at San Stefano.

The dreaded visit was thus brought to a termination; but it is very doubtful whether the Russian Commander-in-Chief, in forcing it on the Sultan with concomitants which must have been highly distasteful, did not do an injury to his own cause, which more than counterbalanced the petty triumph he obtained. On his first visit to the Sultan, that Potentate said he hoped his guest would not believe the stories that were told about his wishes and intentions, and added that he only desired to be at peace with his neighbour, the Emperor of Russia. But that these were little more than words of courtesy became very obvious before the Grand Duke entered into any combination with Russia against England. But the ostentatious conduct of the Grand Duke had its effect also. At the last interview between his Imperial Highness and the Sultan, the former expressed much regret at his Majesty's refusal to allow the embarkation of Russian troops at Bujukdere; to which the Sultan replied that the proposal was inadmissible, and that any attempt to carry it out would be considered as contrary to the existing good relations between Russia and Turkey. Notwithstanding this very emphatic intimation, the Russian authorities renewed their demand a few days later, representing that embarkation at San Stefano was impossible, and that all idea of despatching the troops from that

place had been abandoned. The Government of the Sultan still persisted in its refusal, and the Russians then declared that the army would remain at San Stefano as long as the British fleet stayed in the Sea of Marmora. Russia, therefore, had made but little advance towards obtaining Turkey as an ally; and for this failure she had in a great degree to thank her own arrogance and presumption.

It was indeed doubtful whether the reaction against Russia would not lead to a complete abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano. The dissatisfaction with that arrangement was very general, and the chief objections to it were set forth with great clearness and cogency in the first despatch written by the Marquis of Salisbury after his removal to the Foreign Office. The communication bore date April 1st, and took the form of a circular addressed to her Majesty's Embassies abroad.* After recapitulating the recent interchange of views between England and Russia with reference to the conclusion of peace and the proposal for holding a Conference or Congress, Lord Salisbury remarked on the unsatisfactory nature of Prince Gortschakoff's declaration that Russia, while leaving to the other Powers the liberty of raising at the council-board such questions as they desired to discuss, reserved to herself the right of accepting or not accepting the discussion of those questions. On this point, the new Foreign Secretary observed:—"How far the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano would commend themselves as expedient to the judgment of the European Powers, it is not at present possible to decide. But even if a considerable portion of them were such as were likely to be approved, the reservation of a right, at discretion, to refuse to accept a discussion of them in a Congress of the Powers, would not on that account be the less open to the most serious objection. An inspection of the treaty will sufficiently show that her Majesty's Government could not, in a European Congress, accept any partial or fragmentary examination of its provisions. Every material stipulation which it contains involves a departure from the Treaty of 1856." Lord Salisbury then went on to record that it was impossible for the Government, without violating the stipulation of the Treaty of 1871 which restrained any Power from liberating itself, of its own will and pleasure, from the engagements of a treaty, or even modifying them without the consent of the other Powers, to acquiesce in the withdrawal from the cognisance of those Powers of articles in the new treaty which were modifications of existing treaty engagements, and inconsistent with them. The general nature of the treaty, and the combined effect of its several stipulations upon the interests of the signatory Powers, furnished, in the judgment of Lord Salisbury, other and conclusive reasons against the separate discussion of any one portion of those stipulations apart from the rest.

The most important consequences likely to result from the treaty were described as those which would ensue from its action as a whole upon the nations of South-eastern Europe. "By the articles erecting the new Bulgaria," said Lord Salisbury, "a strong Sclave State will be created under the auspices and control of Russia, possessing important harbours upon the shores of the Black Sea and the Archipelago, and conferring upon that Power a preponderating influence over both political and commercial relations in those seas. It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominant Sclave majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it, not only in nationality, but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The provisions by which this new State is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian commissary, and the first working of its institutions commenced under the control of a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in future it is to form a part. Stipulations are added which will extend this influence even beyond the boundaries of the new Bulgaria. The provision, in itself highly commendable, of improved institutions for the populations of Thessaly and Epirus, is accompanied by a condition that the law by which they are to be secured shall be framed under the supervision of the Russian Government. It is followed by engagements for the protection of members of the Russian Church, which are certainly not more limited in their scope than those articles of the Treaty of Kainardji upon which the claims were founded which were abrogated in 1856. Such stipulations cannot be viewed with satisfaction, either by the Government of Greece, or by the Powers to whom all parts of the Ottoman Empire are a matter of common interest. The general effect of this portion of the treaty will be to increase the power of the Russian Empire in the countries and on the shores where a Greek population predominates, not only to the prejudice of that nation, but also of every country having interests in the East of the Mediterranean Sea. The territorial severance from Constantinople of the Greek, Albanian, and

* Lord Salisbury did not receive the seals of the Foreign Office from her Majesty until the 2nd of April; but he was acting Foreign Secretary on the 1st.

Sclavonic provinces which are still left under the Government of the Porte, will cause their administration to be attended with constant difficulty, and even embarrassment; and will not only deprive the Porte of the political strength which might have arisen from their possession, but will expose the inhabitants to a serious risk of anarchy. By the other portions of the treaty, analogous results are arrived at upon other frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea, which are principally inhabited by Mussulmans and Greeks, and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum, will make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia will place the population of that province under the immediate influence of the Power which holds them; while the extensive European trade which now passes from Trebizond to Persia will, in consequence of the cessions in Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure of the Russian Government by the prohibitory barriers of their commercial system. Provision is made for an indemnity, of which the amount is obviously beyond the means of Turkey to discharge, even if the fact be left out of account that any surplus of its revenues is already hypothecated to other creditors. The mode of payment of this indemnity is left, in vague language, to ulterior negotiations between Russia and the Porte. Payment may be demanded immediately, or it may be left as an unredeemed and unredeemable obligation, to weigh down the independence of the Porte for many years. Its discharge may be commuted into a yet larger cession of territory, or it may take the form of special engagements subordinating in all things the policy of Turkey to that of Russia. It is impossible not to recognise in this provision an instrument of formidable efficacy for the coercion of the Ottoman Government, if the necessity for employing it should arise."

In further considering the component parts of the treaty, Lord Salisbury observed that their separate and individual operation, whether defensible or not, was not that which should engage the most earnest attention of the signatory Powers. Their combined effect was "to depress, almost to the point of entire subjection, the political independence of the Government of Constantinople." Great Britain had the deepest interest in the regions over which the sway of Turkey extended; and it was therefore a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the Government to which that jurisdiction belonged should not be so closely pressed by the outposts of a greatly superior Power that its independent action, and even existence, was almost impossible. The object of her Majesty's Ministers at the Constantinople Conference was to give effect to the policy of reforming Turkey under the Ottoman rule, rendering the different populations contented, and thus creating a feeling of patriotism and loyalty. That policy was frustrated by the unfortunate resistance of the Ottoman Government itself, and the same results could not be attained to the same extent by the same means. Large changes would no doubt be required in the treaties by which South-eastern Europe had been ruled. But good government, assured peace, and freedom, were still the ends which England desired to effect; and, in requiring a full consideration of the general interests which the new arrangements seemed to threaten, her Majesty's Government believed that they were taking the surest means of securing those objects.

Prince Gortschakoff replied to this circular on the 9th of April. He begun by remarking that it was not accurate to speak of a new Bulgaria, or a very strong Sclave State under the control of Russia, having been created by the Treaty of San Stefano. Bulgaria had a previous existence, though an existence made miserable by oppression. The Constantinople Conference could not have intended to render inefficacious those measures of reform which had been considered necessary. The members of that Conference desired the endowment of Bulgaria with a national existence and a real administrative autonomy. It was true that the proposed Bulgarian State would have been divided into two provinces; but it would nevertheless have been constituted in germ, and the germ would in time have been developed until that had been attained which the Treaty of San Stefano brought to maturity at once. "The Treaty of San Stefano," said Prince Gortschakoff, "only makes it obligatory on the Porte to consent to a programme of reforms more complete, more precise, and more practical; but even the fact that the Treaty of San Stefano is a preliminary one indicates that in the mind of the Imperial Cabinet it is only a matter of principle, without definitively prejudging the application, which requires technical studies, an exact appreciation of geographical necessities, and the conciliation of numerous interests. It is because of this that many articles are expressed in vague terms, so as to leave room for ulterior understandings as to the modifications deemed indispensable." The Russian Chancellor denied that the Treaty of San Stefano had placed the new State under the control of Russia. The Imperial Cabinet, he said, had done only what it had accomplished in 1830 for



RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTERING A TURKISH VILLAGE.

Moldo-Wallachia. This reference to Moldo-Wallachia told badly for Prince Gortschakoff's own case; for, in the war just concluded, the Roumanian

"if Moldo-Wallachia, which owed its existence to, and bordered upon, Russia, had been able to make itself independent of her, with yet stronger reason



COSSACKS REQUISITIONING TRANSPORTS IN ROUMELIA.

Principality, definitively created in 1861 out of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia, had acted as the tool of Russia, and had been forced, even against her own interests, to aid Muscovite designs on Turkey. With a cynical disregard of facts known to all the world, the Chancellor added that should we count on the same result for Bulgaria, the territory of which would be separated from Russia in the foreseen event of a cession of the Dobrudscha to Roumania." The Imperial Cabinet was quite ready to shorten the maximum term of the Russian occupation, which had been approximately

fixed at two years, but which might be abbreviated without endangering the success of what had been undertaken. In indicating the proposed delimitation of Bulgaria, the sole principle by which Russia had been guided was that of the majority of the population. As regarded the ports on the Ægean Sea which the treaty conferred on Bulgaria, Prince Gortschakoff declared that the commercial development of that State had alone been in view. "Certainly," he observed, "Russia will not profit by this development so much as England, and the Powers whose Mediterranean commerce—much more active than that of Russia—has always been a powerful lever for the maintenance of their political influence." The preliminary treaty in no way placed Bulgaria under the domination of a chief chosen by Russia, as it was formally stipulated that the Governor should be elected by native administrative councils, with the confirmation of the Porte and the consent of Europe, and that members of the reigning dynasties should not be eligible for the office. In other respects, according to the Russian Chancellor, the organization of the Principality was left to the natives themselves, with but little interference from Russia. Prince Gortschakoff then proceeded to dispute the accuracy of Lord Salisbury's criticisms on the Treaty of San Stefano in reference to the alleged extension of Russian influence beyond the limits of Bulgaria, the stipulations for the introduction of better institutions into Epirus and Thessaly, and the clause requiring protection for the members of the Russian Church in Turkey. Russia, it was explained, had made provisions in favour of the Greeks, because the Greeks were fellow-Christians; but she had not done as much for them as for the Bulgarians, because she had not acquired positive belligerent rights. As regarded Christian ecclesiastics, monks, and pilgrims, in the Ottoman Empire, the treaty only contemplated those who were of Russian origin, and did not extend the power of the Russian Empire over countries where the Greek population predominates.

Passing to another portion of Lord Salisbury's Circular, Prince Gortschakoff observed:—"One may equally find exaggeration in the statement that the stipulations of San Stefano as to the retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia, the extension of Bulgaria up to the Black Sea, and the acquisition of the port of Batoum, render the will of Russia predominant in the whole neighbourhood of the Black Sea. Russia has powerfully contributed in the past to emancipate Greece and Roumania, but has not reaped so much benefit from it as have the other Powers. The retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia would be only the return of an order of things modified twenty-two years ago for reasons which have no longer a *raison d'etre*, nor legal title, nor even pretext, since the liberty of the navigation of the Danube has been placed under the control and guarantee of an International Commission, and especially since Roumania has proclaimed her independence, which Europe seems disposed to recognise. It must be added that this retrocession does not include all that part of Bessarabia ceded in 1856. The delta of the Danube is excluded from it, and the project of the Russian Government is to give that delta to Roumania, from which it was taken in 1857. This circumstance reduces considerably the importance of the desired retrocession, from the point of view of influence over the navigation of the mouths of the Danube." The acquisitions in Armenia were described as possessing only a defensive value. Prince Gortschakoff remarked that possibly England would rather see those strong positions in the hands of the Turks, but frankly admitted that, from the same motives, Russia set a value on their possession for her own security. England was reminded that, if she had wished to spare them to Turkey, she had only to ally herself with Russia, as had been twice proposed to her, so as to put a united maritime pressure on the Porte, which would probably have sufficed to obtain the desired ends without bloodshed. This was the favourite idea of Mr. Gladstone, as he was continually reminding his audiences when he addressed them at public meetings; and we may thus see how thoroughly the member for Greenwich was in accord with the Russian Government, how completely their minds ran in the same tracks, and what a perfect identity of views was shared between them. Prince Gortschakoff was at a loss to understand how the freedom of European commerce with Trebizond, *vid* Persia, could be prejudiced by the proposed rectifications of frontier in Asia. He piteously complained that it was carrying distrust to an extreme to affirm that these rectifications placed Russia in the position of impeding the European commercial system by prohibitive duties. The objections made by Lord Salisbury with reference to the indemnity appeared to the Russian Chancellor no better established than his other criticisms. The amount of the indemnity, he argued, was out of all proportion with the overwhelming charges which the war had entailed upon Russia. It might exceed the actual resources of Turkey, and increase her difficulty in satisfying the claims of those to whom she was indebted; but, on the other hand, there was ground for believing that, if peace were re-established

upon the bases of the Treaty of San Stefano, this would result in a diminution of the expenses of Turkey, and an augmentation of her resources, which might enable her to respond to the demands of her foreign creditors. If the precise manner of payment had been stipulated, it would have been necessary to encroach upon a region already mortgaged to the foreign creditors of the Porte. By avoiding this, Russia, said Prince Gortschakoff, had exposed herself to the suspicion of seeking to paralyse or dominate over Turkey for several years, or of meditating new territorial acquisitions as a substitute for the indemnity. "But against mistrust," remarked the Chancellor, aphoristically, "there is no remedy."

Prince Gortschakoff did not fail to make the most of the imprudent admissions with which Lord Salisbury concluded his despatch. It was of course very satisfactory to him to find the Foreign Secretary of the English Government affirming that it was the desire of himself and his colleagues to ensure liberty and good rule to the subject populations of Turkey; because the expression of this wish necessarily implied that right of interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire which was the very thing Russia most desired to see established, as an indispensable means to the furtherance of her own ends. Equally gratifying to the Russian Chancellor was the admission of Lord Salisbury that great changes would undoubtedly be necessary in the treaties by which the South-east of Europe had up to that time been governed. The situation, according to Prince Gortschakoff, had resolved itself into this:—The existing treaties had been successively infringed for twenty-two years: first by the Turkish Government, which had not fulfilled its obligations towards the Christians; then by the union of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (begun in 1859, though not concluded until 1861); next by the French occupation of Syria; and, finally, by the Conference of Constantinople itself, which constituted an interference in the interior affairs of the Ottoman Empire. With respect to the first of these alleged infringements, it may be remarked that, as we have already shown more than once, the Turkish Government had not contracted any treaty obligations with reference to its Christian subjects, and therefore could not be accused of having violated treaty-law. The union of the Danubian Principalities was only a very slight infringement of existing treaties, and, being sanctioned by the European Powers, and by Turkey herself, ceased to be of any importance. The French occupation of Syria in 1860-61 seems more in point, but is in reality very far from being a parallel case to the Russian interference in Bulgaria and Roumelia. The French, it is true, sent an army to Syria; but it was with the consent of the Porte, and with the object of helping the Turkish Government towards the restoration of order in a country where anarchy had resulted from the fanaticism of opposing sects. Moreover, it did not result in any diminution of Turkish territory. The Conference of Constantinople was undoubtedly a breach in the Treaty of 1856, which excluded the Powers from interfering between the Sultan and his subjects; but the Conference was a project in the interests of Russia, which the English Government unfortunately originated, and which was accepted by the Turkish Government under a total misconception of its character — a misconception inevitably resulting from Lord Derby's statement as to what was intended. In quoting the Constantinople Conference as a justification for further interference, Russia was simply taking advantage of one wrongful act to inflict a wrong still greater.

If we would judge correctly the real position of Russia towards the liberties of South-eastern Europe, we must have regard, not to the cautious diplomatic phrases of Prince Gortschakoff, but to the testimony of facts as revealed through other mediums. It appeared from correspondence published by the British Government in April, 1878, that on the 16th of March General Ghika, the Roumanian Agent at St. Petersburg, had an explanation with Prince Gortschakoff on the question of Bessarabia, and the intentions of Russia with regard to it. "Prince Gortschakoff," said the Roumanian Foreign Minister in a communication to the representative of his country at Vienna, "declared to our Agent that, notwithstanding our clamouring both at home and abroad, the Russian decision was irrevocable; that Russia would not bring this question before the Congress, because it would be an offence to the Emperor; that if another Power wished to do so, she would not be a party to it; that it was with us she wished to treat; that if she could not succeed in making us give in, she would take Bessarabia from us by force; that if we made an armed resistance, it would be fatal for Roumania." The statement that Russia would not permit the Bessarabian question to be discussed at the Congress was afterwards officially denied; yet it is certain that Prince Gortschakoff's tone towards the Roumanian Agent was exceedingly arrogant and offensive. That this was not a temporary outburst of vexation and irritability, is proved by the fact that more than a fortnight later the Prince still spoke in the same

tone and to the same effect. One morning at the beginning of April, the Russian Chancellor requested General Ghika to call upon him, and then asked whether it was true that the Roumanian Government intended to protest against the Eighth Article of the Treaty of San Stefano, which provided for a communication through Roumania of the army of Bulgaria with Russia. "The Emperor," said Prince Gortschakoff, "already ill-disposed towards you by your attitude about Bessarabia, would lose all patience if such a declaration were made; and his Majesty commands me to tell you, for the information of your Government, that, if you have the intention of protesting against or opposing the article in question, he will order the occupation of Roumania, and the disarmament of the Roumanian army." Upon General Ghika observing that it was with Roumania, and not with Turkey, that Russia should concert for the passage of her army through the Principality, Prince Gortschakoff replied, "We did not choose to have anything more to do with you, on account of your conduct. It is important you should know that we insist upon free passage through your country, and that you should inform your Government of the declaration of the Emperor. Your Government must explain themselves categorically. Do they, or do they not, intend to protest against, and oppose themselves to, the right we have reserved to ourselves under this article?"

Russia, of course, was in a position to overawe all resistance on the part of Roumania; but the spirit of the Prince and of the people was thoroughly aroused, and there was at any rate no disposition to cringe before the Czar, or to deprecate his menaces. Prince Charles wrote to the diplomatic Agent in St. Petersburg:—"Tell Prince Gortschakoff that the Roumanian army may be utterly crushed, but, so long as I am alive, it shall not be disarmed." Popular feeling was decidedly in favour of resistance to the uttermost, and some were sanguine enough to believe that they could successfully encounter the legions of Russia. They recollected the many blunders committed by the Czar's generals and troops in the summer and early autumn of 1877; they were not forgetful that their own army had done very much towards saving the Russians from utter defeat by the Turks, and that some of the most gallant achievements of that time, north of the Balkans, were due to the soldiers of the Principality. No doubt they exaggerated their powers; it would have been an easy task for Russia, unless Roumania had been helped by England or Austria, to sweep her opponent into annihilation; but it is equally certain that, had a collision occurred, the Roumanians would have fought with resolution, and have made their oppressors pay dearly for the triumph they obtained. The Ministry and the Chambers gave hearty support to the Prince in his assertion of Roumanian independence. In a sitting of the Lower House on March 27th, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that the Treaty of San Stefano, so far as Roumania was concerned, was null and void, having been concluded without her participation. The Government, he said, had protested against it, and would send their protest to all the Powers; and he denounced the treaty as a scourge for the country, since it virtually imposed a foreign occupation for two years. The Roumanian Senate and Chamber warmly and unanimously rejected the exchange of Bessarabia for the Dobrudscha; and at the same time a disposition was observed to open more friendly relations with Turkey. The Government relied a good deal upon Austrian support, and M. Bratiano, the Minister of War and of the Interior, was sent to Vienna, in the hope of inducing the Emperor to take up the cause of the Principality. In this he failed; but opinion in Austria and Hungary, especially the latter, was very much in favour of the Roumanian quarrel. M. Bratiano afterwards went to Berlin, with no better success; but the demands of Russia were subsequently moderated.

Servia was almost as discontented as Roumania. The Servian troops continued to occupy the territory they had conquered, long after the period had elapsed beyond which, according to the treaty, they were not entitled to remain. The Servian newspapers abounded in unfriendly criticisms on the conduct of Russia, and the semi-official journal, *Istoc*, declared that Servia could not consider the war ended until the national flag waved over Pristina. "Europe," said the writer, "repudiates the Treaty of San Stefano, and Servia, acting in conjunction with other nations, takes up an armed position to protect her own interests." Greece was equally exasperated by the proposed extension of Bulgaria to the Ægean, which, if carried into effect, would have put an end to Greek aspirations in connection with Thrace and Constantinople. Russia was now regarded as the most dangerous of the enemies of Greece, and the Hellenes looked with confidence to the interposition of England as a Power favourably disposed to their ultimate aggrandizement. A little before he left office, Lord Derby officially informed the Government of Athens that he had instructed the English Ambassadors at the chief European capitals to propose that Greece should be represented at the Congress. This announcement produced a

very favourable impression, and it cannot be denied that, if the Congress was to sit in judgment on the constitution of the heterogeneous Turkish Empire, the little kingdom of Greece had as good a right to be represented as the great military Powers, whose interests were less directly affected than her own.

Considerable attention was at this time attracted towards Greece, on account of the struggle then being maintained by the Greek provinces of Turkey, with the scarcely-concealed approval and indirect assistance of the Athenian Government. The insurgents fought with the same desperate valour that had been exhibited by the Greeks in the War of Independence fifty years before; but little progress was made, although the Turks were often defeated in scattered actions. Horrible massacres and cruelties were committed on both sides, and on the 29th of March a correspondent of the *Times*, who had been very zealous in exposing the malpractices of the Turks, was found dead at Makrinitza, in Thessaly. The condition of the body (which was headless) showed clearly that the unfortunate gentleman, Mr. Ogle, had come to his death by violence, and it was asserted at the time that he had been assassinated by the Turks. An inquiry was afterwards conducted by Mr. Consul-General Fawcett, and the evidence raised a presumption that Mr. Ogle had imprudently identified himself with the cause of the insurgents, and had been killed in actual battle. This presumption was subsequently disputed, and it is perhaps impossible to arrive with any certainty at the truth; but there is sometimes a disposition, on the part of civilians brought into contact with scenes of war, to take sides more eagerly than the nature of their position justifies; and if this was the case with Mr. Ogle, his death, though deeply to be deplored, can hardly be charged as a crime upon those by whom it was effected. The case, however, is one with respect to which it would clearly be improper to pronounce any positive verdict; and even should the worst be supposed with regard to the manner of his death, the fact would still have very little bearing on those larger and more general issues which form the subject-matter of history.

At the same time that M. Bratiano was visiting Vienna, General Ignatieff was also on a mission to that capital, charged with the task of reconciling Austria to the Treaty of San Stefano. Count Andrassy, however, informed him that Austria rejected the terms of peace as clashing both with her own and European interests; and General Ignatieff, being devoid of powers to conclude an arrangement, left for St. Petersburg without having advanced the cause of his Government in any appreciable degree. The *Agence Russe* afterwards declared that his mission could not be regarded as a failure, because he was simply instructed to afford, and to receive in return, friendly explanations in reference to the Treaty. But there can be no doubt that his object was to establish, if possible, something like an identity of views between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, and that his efforts in this respect produced no result. The isolation of Russia was becoming serious, and the resignation of Lord Derby was an element in the general situation which the Russians fully appreciated. It was plainly confessed in many quarters that Lord Derby was looked upon as an ally, who, as long as he held office, would use all his influence towards restraining any warlike tendency on the part of his chief. The *Golos* described the retirement of the recent Foreign Minister as a political event of the greatest importance. By his withdrawal from office, and by the declaration, made in some of the English newspapers, that the Queen approved the conduct of the Cabinet, the Conservative Ministry, in the opinion of the *Golos*, had practically declared war upon Russia. The same paper broadly affirmed that Russia could not permit any criticism of a treaty to which the vanquished party had consented; and the Russian authorities were urged to maintain their troops in Turkey, even after the period appointed for withdrawing them, and to acquire such a command over Constantinople as would make their position impregnable. The *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* observed that Lord Derby had reluctantly shared in those acts of the English Government which had prevented a European understanding, and regretted that he did not retire together with Lord Carnarvon, since his retention of office misled the Russian people into the belief that a pacific policy had prevailed. The *Novaya Vremia* remarked that the calling out of the reserves was tantamount to a declaration of war, the only means to avoid which would be to occupy Gallipoli and the Bosphorus; and, in the opinion of the *Ruski Mir*, a direct war with England, although in many respects highly regrettable, would be far better than the intolerable situation in which Russia had been placed since the conclusion of peace. All this was the language of desperation, and was meant as a sort of defiant reply to the strictures upon the Treaty which by this time were being made in every direction. Even Germany, whose Government had been the heartiest supporter of Russia, adopted a tone of warning and rebuke. The Ministerial *Berlin Post*, of April 3rd, contained an article intimating that the Czar had violated the pledges with which he began the war, and, instead of being satisfied with the

knightly task of rescuing the Bulgarians, had cunningly sought to lay new bases of Russian aggrandizement. Unless Russia made a speedy and essential modification of the Treaty of San Stefano, she would be confronted, according to the *Berlin Post*, by a European coalition. She had in truth a coalition of opinion already against her: the only question



VISIT OF THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS TO THE SULTAN.

was as to the willingness of the Continental Governments to translate that opinion into acts. In this respect, Russia probably felt sufficient confidence to pursue her course with steady determination. The alliance of the three Emperors was still unbroken, and Russia calculated on the power of that alliance over-riding the wishes of peoples, and even the tendencies of Governments. Yet Prince Bismarck was getting restive. As early as the 13th of March, he requested Lord Odo Russell to tell the English Government that Germany would not take part in the Conference without England, and that he could not understand how a Congress for the revision of European rights could be held when one of the chief contractors was not present.

The opposition of England herself was surrounded by many doubts, and clogged with many obstructions; but it was against this country that the animosity of the Russian Government and nation was chiefly directed, and it was the Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield which was mainly charged with preventing the definitive conclusion of peace. The Russians affected not to know what England really required; and, in the confusion of antagonistic views, as well as in the hesitation of the British

Government on the great question submitted to its decision, there was plausible ground for saying that England did not understand her own wishes. "Is it not time," asked the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg* on the 22nd of March, "to demand of the Cabinet of London what it really wants? We state it with profound regret, but there is only one explanation of this strange attitude of the English Government. Compromised by its undecided and malevolent policy since the beginning of the Eastern crisis, and during the whole course of the war, it sees in the peace, such as it is made by the preliminaries at San Stefano, only a success for Russia, and a danger for its own *prestige* in the East. Is it fitting for Europe to allow a single Power to compromise the interests of peace, to cause new hecatombs, and perhaps a general conflagration, for the simple satisfaction of her self-love? The time for diplomatic circumlocutions and equivocal declarations is at an end. Every one desires peace: England alone puts obstacles in the way. Will that be tolerated by Europe? If not, let Europe cite England before her judgment-seat, and summon the Government to re-enter the sphere of international law by withdrawing the fleet from the Straits, and making a formal engagement not to send it back again." This sounded very martial and heroic; but there was a great deal of downright fear at the back of it. An influential diplomatist told the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Times* that the Government dared not resist the popular demands for dread of revolutionary disturbances. He observed that it was a great mistake to suppose, because the Empire was autocratical, that it could show entire indifference to public opinion. He explained that in matters which did not interest the people at large they could afford to act secretly, and even in matters like the present they had greater liberty of action than a Constitutional Ministry; but, on the other hand, if an autocratic Government committed a great blunder in a question which concerned the national honour, the consequences were much more serious than in a country like England, as public indignation was visited, not on the Ministers, but on the Sovereign himself. The growth of public opinion in Russia within the last few years has indeed been remarkable. The papers give their opinions with a good deal of freedom; and although, undoubtedly, the Emperor could silence them at any moment if he pleased, he would hardly venture on so extreme a step when they were asserting the national power, and the claims of Holy Russia. Some recent trials have shown how dangerous an element of insubordination exists

THE LATE MR. OGLE, "TIMES" CORRESPONDENT.

among the poorer classes of the people. Success on the field of battle and in the paths of diplomacy is the most easy and obvious means of diverting popular discontent; and a despot cannot afford to receive a check from foreign Powers at a time when the good will of his own subjects is becoming more and more precarious. For these reasons, it was essential to the Czar that he should maintain the Treaty of San Stefano without any material diminution, and that England should be foiled as completely as Turkey had been vanquished.

The difficulty with respect to laying the Treaty before Congress put a temporary stop to the project of an international revisal of what had been accomplished at San Stefano. Russia had communicated the whole treaty to the Powers individually; but she refused to give a distinct undertaking that every Article in that treaty should be submitted to the Congress. A pause in the negotiations ensued about the end of March; but it was not long ere Russia evinced an inclination to re-open the discussion. The obstacles to an agreement, however, were still felt to be great, and Russian diplomatists argued that, if the English demand were conceded, Russia would by that very concession recognize the Congress as a tribunal. In some quarters it was considered that the most likely basis for renewed negotiations would be Prince Bismarck's proposal that the Powers should be invited to assemble for the revision of the treaties of 1856 and 1871; but this did not meet the views of the English Government, and the proposal came to nothing. It was increasingly evident that Russia had placed herself in an exceedingly difficult and even perilous position by the objections she had raised to a complete submittal of the treaty to European judgment. Unless she actually wished to withdraw that act from the cognizance of the very Powers whose co-operation she was professedly seeking, the difference was simply about a matter of form, which might have been readily and gracefully yielded. The probability, however, is that the form really concealed an intention fatal to the objects which the Powers had in view. Rather than relinquish that intention, Russia faced not only the possibility, but the probability, of a general war; and yet, even while she took this desperate resolve, her army was thinned by conflict and disease, her credit was almost bankrupt, and her population was vaguely stirred by revolutionary elements which might at any moment burst into consuming flame.

## CHAPTER XII.

**Origin and Character of the Acts creating a Reserve Force—Division of Opinion as to the calling out of that Force—Speech of Lord Beaconsfield in the House of Lords (April 8th)—The Contemplated Measure necessitated by the Failure of the Congress Negotiations—Speech of Lord Derby against the Government—England without Allies—General Character of the Debate—Speech of Lord Salisbury on the Treaty of San Stefano and the Aims of Government—His Attack on Lord Derby—The Debate in the Commons—Exposition of the Government Policy by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—The Real Intention in calling out the Reserves—The Case for the Opposition, as stated by Mr. Gladstone—Criticisms of the Right Hon. Gentleman on the Despatch of Lord Salisbury, the Intentions of Russia, and the Prospects of the Eastern Question—Reply of Mr. Gathorne Hardy—The Position of England towards Europe—Lord Hartington and the Government—Final Remarks of Sir Stafford Northcote, and Results of the Division—Deficit in the Revenue, caused by War Expenditure—Warlike Feeling in the Country—Preparations for a coming Struggle—England in Possession of an Army of a Hundred Thousand Men—Restoration of the Balance of Power as affecting the South-east of Europe.**

LORD BEACONSFIELD, in resolving to call out the Reserves, availed himself of a power which the Legislature had created some years previously. By the Reserve Force Act of 1867, as amended by the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, it was enacted that, in case of imminent national danger, or of great emergency,—the occasion being first communicated to Parliament, if Parliament were then sitting, or declared by proclamation,—it should be lawful for her Majesty to direct that the forces held in reserve, or such part of them as her Majesty might think fit, might be called out on permanent service, and that, upon the issuing of any such proclamation, the men in Class I., or those of them to whom the proclamation applied, should become subject to general service with her Majesty's army. The men who are liable to be thus called out, and who are experienced soldiers, completing their term of enlistment under these modified conditions, are to serve until it shall be signified to them by her Majesty's command that their services are no longer required, but so, nevertheless, that the men shall not be kept under arms beyond six months after the proclamation of peace. Acts for the creation of a Reserve Force had been passed in the summer of 1859, when the number for the army was fixed at 20,000, and that for the navy at 30,000. These Acts were consolidated and amended in 1867, under the Administration of the elder Lord Derby; and the law was further modified in 1870, when Mr. Gladstone was

Prime Minister, and Mr. Cardwell, as Secretary for War, introduced several reforms, which were embodied in the Army Enlistment Act. Up to the spring of 1878, there had been no occasion for using the exceptional powers conferred by the law, though the men forming the Reserves had of course to assemble occasionally for training; but it then appeared to her Majesty's Ministers that the threatening aspect of affairs in the East required a degree of warlike preparation such as the several Acts creating the Reserve Force enabled them to make.

The step now taken by the Government was the most serious of any which had up to that time marked the progress of events. It was an admission that war was probable, and, like all such admissions, it seemed to render still more likely the very catastrophe against which it was intended to guard. The party opposed to the Government condemned the measure with the utmost vehemence and determination, and several meetings were at once held in various parts of the country, to denounce the calling out of the Reserves as a menace to Russia, and an attempt by the Prime Minister to create a false alarm, or to stimulate a factitious patriotism. With a considerable part of the nation, however, the proposed act was popular, and Lord Beaconsfield felt that he was not without tangible support when, on the 8th of April, he rose in the House of Lords to move an address to her Majesty, in reply to a Royal Message of April 1st, intimating the intention that had been formed. The reasons for the contemplated step were mainly based on the fact that the proposal for a Congress had broken down, owing to the refusal of Russia to give a distinct undertaking that every article of the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to that body. Of this treaty, the Premier remarked that every one of the articles, with a single exception having reference to a purely technical detail, was a deviation from the treaties of 1856 and 1871. It was not difficult to see that the effect of all the stipulations combined would be to make the Black Sea as much a Russian lake as the Caspian. The stipulation with reference to Bessarabia undid what Lord Palmerston, at the peace of 1856, deemed an article of European interest and importance; and, as concerned the opening of the navigation of the Black Sea, the Sultan was reduced to a state of absolute subjugation to Russia. The Treaty of San Stefano had been signed on the 3rd of March; but it was not delivered to her Majesty's Government until the 23rd. At that time, Ministers still hoped and believed that a Congress might be obtained, and that, by a discussion of the several clauses of the treaty, a definitive regulation of the conditions of peace would be effected. But Russia had disappointed the expectations of her Majesty's Government, and, as there was no assurance that the Treaty of March 3rd would be placed before the representatives of the Powers, the plan for holding a Congress had come to an end. In the meanwhile, a most important part of Eastern Europe, and a considerable portion of Western Asia, were either occupied by an invading army, or in a state of actual rebellion. It was possible that, with the British fleet in the Dardanelles, the chief highway between Europe and Asia might be seized, and that the commercial road from Trebizond to Persia might be stopped. Egypt itself would be held in trepidation, and the Suez Canal be imperilled. Thus everything was unsettled, and all Europe was arming. Under these circumstances, asked Lord Beaconsfield, was England alone to be unarmed? In his opinion, it was necessary for the country to show its strength, not only by its naval but also by its military force; and for this reason the Government had considered it their duty to advise her Majesty to do that which he was then explaining to the House. By the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, the system of short service was introduced, and it was laid down that in time of war a battalion should consist of a thousand men, and in time of peace of only five hundred. In the latter case, the other five hundred formed the reserve after a few years' service with the colours, and were then only liable to be called out on emergencies. But by summoning these reserves her Majesty would be able, in a very brief space of time, to possess an army of 70,000 men, fairly and even completely disciplined. That army would be double the force of Englishmen whom Marlborough or Wellington ever commanded; and, although such an army would not be sufficient to carry on a great war, it was a considerable body, and one which seemed adequate to the existing circumstances of the country.

After the Prime Minister had concluded his address, Lord Granville, as the leader of the Opposition in the Upper House, declared that no adverse motion would be brought forward, but at the same time criticised the policy of the Government in an unfavourable spirit. One of the most noticeable speeches of the evening was that of Lord Derby, who favoured the House with some further details as to the dissensions which had for some time existed between himself and his late colleagues, from whom it now appeared that he had differed as to the summoning of Parliament (which would have met at a still earlier date but for his opposition),

and with respect to the vote of credit, as well as on the original proposal for sending the fleet to the Dardanelles, and the policy of calling out the Reserves. He denied that there was any great and pressing emergency, such as would justify the last of those measures. It was not the fact that all diplomatic means of settling the existing differences had been exhausted. The negotiations for a Congress, it was true, had come to a deadlock; but, with the exception of Austria, no Power had ever been anxious that the Congress should be held. Russia objected to it in the first instance; Germany gave her assent with some reluctance; and France did not disguise her aversion from the design. The Government, as it seemed to the late Foreign Secretary, had entered on a very difficult course. They had communicated to all Europe a series of objections to the Treaty of San Stefano, and they were proceeding to arm in such a manner as to indicate an expectation of war. In foreign countries an impression would necessarily be produced that her Majesty's Government demanded the tearing up of the treaty, and were preparing to support that demand by force. It was of course possible, though it was most unlikely, that Russia would accede to the requirements of England. That would indeed be a great diplomatic triumph. But, on the other hand, it might be that England would withdraw or greatly modify the objections she had made; and that would be a great diplomatic failure. Russia seemed inclined, in deference to European opinion, to admit a liberal modification of what she had proposed; but the appearance of a threat on our part would be very likely to encourage a mood of resistance on hers. Lord Derby observed that, if the conduct of affairs were still in his hands, he would wait, so as to let matters cool down; feeling confident that delay would be much more prejudicial to Russia than to England. Supposing a war to ensue, it appeared to the speaker tolerably certain that England would find no allies, excepting, perhaps, Austria, who might at any moment effect a compromise with Russia, and retire from the contest. Moreover, the objects of such a war could not be clearly defined. No power could restore the Turkish Empire, such as it was before the late war; and to fight simply for influence, and for the restoration of our credit, would be unworthy of us. We had chosen to be neutral during the contest, and it would be ridiculous to say that we must fight, after all, because Russia had been more successful than we anticipated. "The truth is," said Lord Derby—and here his words were beyond dispute—"that the public have not, from the beginning of this business to the end, known their own minds for six months together. Two years ago, it would have been almost dangerous for any man to get up at a public meeting, and express in plain terms his doubt as to the disinterested philanthropy of Russia. Now the cry is all the other way." Lord Derby was of opinion that the foolishness and virulence of the two conditions of the public mind—that in which Turkey was denounced, and that which had Russia for its object of attack—were very nearly equal; and he asked the English people how they could expect to have a foreign policy that should be even consistent and intelligent, to say nothing of far-sightedness, if within eighteen months the great majority of them were found shouting for things directly contrary. The noble Lord believed that, even if we fought, and succeeded in our object, we should have to do the work all over again in twenty or five-and-twenty years; and he instanced the settlement of 1856 as an example of failure in the attempt to arrest the fall of Turkey. "I shall certainly rejoice," he said in conclusion, "if my noble friends obtain by peaceable and diplomatic action those results for which they hope. I shall not be inclined to reproach them, if, still confining themselves to the use of peaceable means, they obtain results considerably inferior to those put forward. I must say I require something more than any of the reasons and arguments I have heard, either in this House or out of it, to show me that, in the circumstances which now seem likely to arise, there is a *casus belli*. Unless such a war be absolutely forced upon us, I object to it, because it will be a war undertaken without necessity, without a clear and defined object, with a divided country, and, in all probability, without an ally."

The general tone of the debate was in favour of the conclusion that Turkey was not worth fighting for; but the Government policy was expounded in an effective speech by Lord Salisbury, who denied that he had in the slightest degree departed from the sentiments he had expressed at Constantinople. Though he intensely desired the welfare of the subject Christian populations of the Porte, he had never adopted what appeared to have passed into an axiom on the other side, that there could be no happiness and no good government with any of those populations unless they were subject to the government of Russia. It had been stated that the huge Bulgaria, which was the great blot of the Treaty of San Stefano, derived some authority from the Conference at Constantinople. But that Conference agreed in the first place to impose nothing upon the Porte, and, unlike the Treaty of San Stefano, it accepted the control of the Powers. Further, it

constructed not one but two provinces of Bulgaria, in one of which the Sclave element did not predominate—that one, namely, which embraced the great mass of the Greek population on the shores of the Euxine and the Ægean. Again, the Conference took abundant security for the local self-government of the different populations; but it did not destroy the political authority of the Porte, so that those provinces would still have remained a barrier to invasion from without. When the Government agreed upon the conditions of neutrality, they did not contemplate such an instrument as the Treaty of San Stefano; yet it was erroneous to say that they demanded of Russia a complete abandonment of the results accomplished by the war. What they had said was that the conditions of the peace formed a connected and united whole, which they would not consider unless they were free to discuss all the details, and that the withdrawal of any one article would vitiate the discussion of the others. With respect to Lord Derby's speech, the Marquis observed that it was the most remarkable address he had ever heard in either House of Parliament; for he never before heard an ex-Cabinet Minister speak so freely of what had occurred in the councils of the Government while he was in office. It was the constitutional practice that such matters were not to be mentioned in public, and no record of them was kept; it was also well understood that for what passes in a Cabinet each member who does not resign is absolutely and irredeemably responsible. The Marquis of Salisbury denied that his recent circular was an entire abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano, or that there was anything necessarily warlike in the calling out of the Reserves. They were simply taking measures of precaution. What was it but the existence of international law, and respect for treaty right, which saved all the nations of Europe from the duty of maintaining their military preparations at the highest point of efficiency? "When international law and treaty right are disregarded," continued the Foreign Secretary, "you revert to an older and simpler condition of society, when each man depends for his safety upon his own right arm. It would be an exaggeration to state that even in respect of South-eastern Europe we have arrived at that condition; but, in proportion as the guarantees of treaties have been withdrawn, it has been our duty, and will continue to be the duty of the Government, to take all necessary precautions. These precautions do not involve any settled designs of war, still less any menace to any Power in the world. My noble friend used language implying a doubt whether any of the objects called in question by the treaty would be worth the risk of a war. But I remember to have heard him say in this House that we had declared the occupation of Constantinople to be a *casus belli*; and I will ask any sensible man whether the possession of Constantinople is more threatening to English interests than the possession of the Ægean Sea." Lord Salisbury admitted that they were bound to foster the aspirations of the rising races of the south-east of Europe, to consolidate their nationalities, and to find a security for future stability and peace in the patriotism of the Christian communities. But they were also the trustees of the British Empire, and it was their duty to hand on the strength, the glory, and the traditions of that Empire untarnished to their successors.

A similar address was moved on the same evening in the House of Commons, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer expounded the policy of the Government in a speech of considerable length. The emergency, he said, was such as to render it desirable that the army should be put upon a footing which would permit of its being used without delay; in fact, the step was very similar to that of asking for the vote of credit. They had not at the earlier date asked for an additional number of men, because it was known that they had the Reserves to fall back upon, if occasion should arise. In the opinion of her Majesty's Government, that occasion had actually arisen, and it was necessary that the Reserves should be called out, not in any sense as a measure of war, but simply as a measure of precaution. The Treaty of Paris had been virtually set aside, and it was proposed to substitute for it the Treaty of San Stefano. In the final settlement, England had interests which were separate and peculiar to herself; but she had also interests in which others shared equally. Nothing was more untrue than that England was throwing obstacles in the way of a Conference; but the Government objected to the opening of an unreal Conference, and they would regard it as a serious evil if they found themselves in a Conference or Congress from which they were afterwards compelled to withdraw, and still more so if they found themselves in an assembly of the Powers which left untouched any questions that might lead to future wars or disturbances. They must insist that the Treaty of San Stefano should undergo a complete examination. It was idle to conceal from themselves that Russia had not agreed to the full discussion of that Treaty. It was their duty to consider what were the peculiar interests of England, and, if they could not effect a general European settlement, they were bound to see that the interests of England took no damage. Her Majesty's Ministers attached great importance

to the maintenance of our communications with India and with the East; they desired to establish themselves on such a footing that there should be no danger, either of the interruption of those communications, or of such a threatening of our position as might cause embarrassment or difficulty. "We have not been able," said Sir Stafford Northcote, "to conceal from ourselves the moral effect which would be produced on our position in India from changes that might occur. We have not been able to conceal from ourselves the effects that possible changes might have on the routes and communications with our Eastern dominions that are now kept open; and it is our duty to be prepared, if any unfortunate occasion should require it, to defend, by our own right hand and our own means, the communications which we think essential." It will thus be seen that Sir Stafford Northcote justified the summoning of the Reserves mainly on the ground that, should war ensue, our road to India might be endangered, and that it was necessary to be in a position to defend it. In the event of war, however, a much larger force would have been required than that which was then being called into existence. The real intention of the measure was to give a warning to Russia that, if she pushed matters to extremities, she would have to reckon with England in arms. It was another step in that policy of preparation for the worst which had been inaugurated by the vote of six millions. But to have said so in direct language would have been too plain a defiance to Russia; and the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, as any other Government would have done under the like circumstances, was obliged to



GRAND SALON IN THE BEYLERBEY PALACE, TEMPORARY RESIDENCE OF THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.



CALLING OUT THE RESERVES: SCENE IN SCOTLAND.

evade the precise point in question, and to hint in a distant manner at that which could not be more bluntly expressed.

The case for the Opposition was undertaken by Mr. Gladstone, who stated at the outset, however, that he had no intention of proposing an amendment, as the occasion was not appropriate for raising an issue to be decided by a division. Commenting on the phrase, "a great emergency," which had been used in the Queen's Message as describing the occasion for which the Reserves were to be called out, Mr. Gladstone denied that there were any circumstances which justified the employment of those words. He presumed that we were to have a lax interpretation of the phrase, and that the military machinery of the country was to be put in motion for the defence of British interests which no one had attacked, and which it was obviously no one's interest to endanger. The measure distinctly contemplated an expedition beyond our own shores; but the speaker drew some degree of comfort from the assurance of Sir Stafford Northcote that it was still his warm and earnest desire to find England honourably placed in a European Conference, and that he had not entirely abandoned the hope that such a body might in time assemble. To Mr. Gladstone there seemed no reason why it should not assemble at once. When Prince Gortschakoff said that Russia would reserve to herself the right to accept or not accept the discussion of any point, he meant, in the opinion of the orator, simply to limit the share of Russia in the proposed discussion, and not the right of the other Powers to join it, if they pleased. It was one thing for Russia to limit the discussions of the Congress; it was another to do that which any other Power might do—namely, to make herself the judge of her own share in those discussions. He had asked in vain whether the Russian Minister intended to claim the right of withdrawal which every Power possesses, or the right of veto which no Power possesses; but it was evident that Mr. Gladstone believed the former of those alternatives, and that he considered the position of the Russian Government a fair and reasonable position, to which the English Government had objected out of a captious and arrogant spirit. After remarking upon the conduct of the Ministry since the assembling of Parliament, and especially since the resignations of Lord Carnarvon and Lord Derby, Mr. Gladstone proceeded to consider Lord Salisbury's Circular of April 1st. He accused the new Foreign Secretary of a great misrepresentation in saying that Bulgaria was to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia would practically choose. The stipulations in the Treaty of San Stefano with reference to this matter stated that the Prince of Bulgaria was to be freely elected by the people; that his election was to be confirmed by the Porte, and that it was afterwards to receive the assent of the other Powers. Mr. Gladstone wished to know how, in the face of these stipulations, it could be said with honour and decency that the choice of the Prince of Bulgaria was to be left practically to Russia. These arguments were received with laughter; and, although such an expression of sentiment is scarcely courteous, it can hardly, in the present instance, be considered surprising. When it is remembered that the election of the Prince was to take place during the presence in Bulgaria of a large Russian army, the free choice of the people becomes a farce, and the assent of the Porte and of foreign Powers an idle form, from which it would be more dignified to abstain altogether. The Marquis of Salisbury was therefore perfectly justified in saying that Russia would practically choose the Prince, although she would not nominally do so. Mr. Gladstone proceeded to indicate what he regarded as another misstatement. The despatch of Lord Salisbury affirmed that the Christian provinces, other than Bulgaria, were to be governed by laws framed under the supervision of the Russian Government; but Mr. Gladstone argued that by the treaty these Provinces were to be organised by special commissions appointed by the Sultan, and in which the native element was to be largely represented. The plan, said Mr. Gladstone, was to be submitted to the Porte, and the Porte was to consult Russia before it was carried into effect. Here there were Ministerial cheers and laughter; upon which Mr. Gladstone observed that to say the plan would be framed under the supervision of Russia was a contentious mode of arguing, which he would not call "attorneyism," because none but the meanest of attorneys would adopt it.

Mr. Gladstone passed on to consider that portion of the despatch which referred to the protection of members of the Russian Church. He took particular exception to Lord Salisbury's remark that the engagements for the protection of members of that Church were "certainly not more limited in their scope than those articles of the Treaty of Kainardji upon which the claims were founded which were abrogated in 1856." This description seemed to Mr. Gladstone to be greatly in excess of the truth; though, as the meaning of the Treaty of Kainardji has always been a moot point, so far as the position of the Christians in Turkey is concerned, it was quite open to Lord Salisbury to entertain the view which he expressed. In one respect, Mr.

Gladstone was in harmony with the Ministerialists. He conceived that the taking of Bessarabia from Roumania was at once impolitic and culpable; but he tried to moderate the force of his objection, in some degree, by declaring that "it was quite unworthy of Russia," and by hinting at the same time that it was rather in the English manner, being "a step suggested, apparently, by considerations of national vanity, and by what is called *prestige*, to which, unfortunately, other people are apt to be subject." Moreover, he believed that Russia would not adhere to that proposition: a remark which, as events have since proved, shows that Mr. Gladstone's faith is sometimes greater than his penetration. The right honourable gentleman, however, had a strong case when he asked why the Government had kept their resentment secret from the month of June, 1877, when Count Schouvaloff had informed them that it was the intention of Russia to take back that portion of Bessarabia which had been alienated in 1856. With regard to this resolve, and other stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano to which the Government now objected, Mr. Gladstone very pertinently remarked that all these matters had been communicated to the Cabinet in the summer of 1877, and that not a word had been said against them. About the 12th of August, her Majesty's Government had written that they received with satisfaction the statement made by the Emperor of Russia as to the objects of the war, his disclaimer of any idea of an extended annexation, and his readiness to enter into negotiations for peace; and yet at that very time they had in their possession the official declaration of the Emperor that he meant to reclaim Roumanian Bessarabia. It cannot be questioned that in this part of his argument Mr. Gladstone had the Government at a terrible disadvantage; but he once more quitted the region of good sense when he proceeded to argue that a large Bulgaria would be less under the influence of Russia than a small one, and to instance Roumania as an example of independent national life—Roumania, which had been made the tool of Russia from the commencement of the war, and was now about to be her victim. Mr. Gladstone concluded by observing that the isolated action of the Government had been their bane throughout. "We are told," he said, "of the great difficulties through which the Government is to guide the country. God grant that they may do so, and discover a policy better than their past—a policy based on a sufficient union of interests and feelings to make a solution of the difficulties practicable! Unfortunately, they have chosen to take us, not along a plain, open path, but by the brink of a precipice, and we are nearer to the brink than we were. But if they would seek only the ends of justice and freedom, and would humble themselves, and be content to work with Europe, it is my belief that they would receive the support of a united people; they would earn the gratitude of a nation which is never slow to yield it; and they would escape the immeasurable guilt of a causeless war."

Mr. Gathorne Hardy (who had now become the Indian Secretary) replied to Mr. Gladstone, and in the course of his remarks denied that the Government had misled Russia, the fact being that the terms mentioned by Count Schouvaloff were never regarded as possible terms by her Majesty's Ministers. They were sent to Mr. Layard, who was asked whether there was a probability of the Porte acceding to them. At that time, Turkey would not listen to any terms at all; and the whole thing fell to the ground. It was distinctly understood between Russia and England that the communication was to be of a personal and private character; and Mr. Hardy seemed to think that this exonerated the Government from the charge of acting with bad faith towards the Northern Power. The statement, however, was no answer to the strictures of Mr. Gladstone, who was clearly right in maintaining that if the Government, by their silence, led Russia to believe, in the summer of 1877, that they had no objection to the suggested terms of peace, they were not at liberty to oppose the same terms when they were brought forward at the conclusion of the war. "Nobody can doubt," said Mr. Gathorne Hardy, "that there is at this moment, assuming the Treaty of San Stefano to stand, a great darkening and overshadowing of the south-east of Europe. No one can doubt that one Power of Europe is supreme there at this moment, and that Turkey is absolutely crushed. I feel deeply the gravity of the situation, and I trust I have not said a word to bring about a collision of feeling, or to hinder the establishment of a secure peace. My strong desire has been otherwise. Is it possible that an English Minister, having the interests of England at heart, could wish for war? The accusation is so ridiculous that I am ashamed to repel it; but there are worse evils than war. Worse evils arise from the degradation of a country that is asserting its position and claiming its rights—degradation resulting from the refusal to that country of the right to exercise its influence in the settlement of a State in which it has held great interests. By submitting to such a degradation, a country would only weaken itself for future effort, when war would come down upon it heavily and earnestly, and against

its will. It is better to take time by the forelock, and, if the country is unjustly excluded from its rights, to place itself in such a position as to show that it means to maintain them, and not to allow

ARRIVAL OF RESERVES IN BARRACKS AT WESTMINSTER.

the Empire of England to be trodden down and dishonoured, even by the greatest despotic Power in the world."

The debate was then adjourned until the following evening, when the principal speaker was the Marquis of Hartington. As leader of the Opposition, Lord Hartington had, throughout the whole discussion of the Eastern Question, adopted a much more moderate tone than Mr. Gladstone. Indeed, his views were often unquestionably vague, and he was open to the reproach of not exactly knowing his own mind on a topic with respect to which the virtual leader of the party was at any rate very positive and very emphatic. It certainly could not be said that the Marquis had ever obstructed the Government by factious antagonism, though he had often checked his own followers by lukewarm advocacy. But this dubious position had its advantages. Lord Hartington felt the difficulties of the Government; and although, in many respects, he did not

approve their policy, he refrained from hampering the public service by exaggerated criticisms or any of the arts of an agitator. On the first evening of the present debate, Sir Wilfrid Lawson had moved the following addition to the address:—"But that this House regrets that her Majesty's Ministers have thought it right to advise the calling out of her Majesty's Reserve Forces, considering that no great emergency has been shown to exist, and that such calling out of the Reserves is neither prudent in the interests of European peace, necessary for the safety of the country, nor warranted by the state of matters abroad." These expressions where reproduced from the speech of Lord Derby on intimating his resignation. On the second evening of the debate now engaging our attention, the Marquis of Hartington said that he should not vote for the amendment, being of opinion that, under the circumstances then existing, it was not desirable to multiply occasions of difference between one side of the House and the other. He even protested against the course which Sir Wilfrid Lawson had taken, and observed that it placed his side of the House in a difficult position, since Liberal members were for the most part disinclined to support either the original motion or the amendment. In the view of the Marquis, the Treaty of San Stefano was in many points open to the criticism to which it had been subjected by Lord Salisbury; but he considered that it might have been made the basis of a permanent settlement. It was not the business of this country to defend the interests of other nations, or to preserve the peace of Europe. Taking this principle in conjunction with the admitted fact that none of the landmarks laid down by the Home Secretary had been touched by Russia, Lord Hartington said that the country had a right to know, before the debate closed, what was the object for which they were going to war. He then made a very earnest appeal to Sir Wilfrid Lawson not to force his amendment to a division. There was a danger, he thought, of war arising from two causes: first, from her Majesty's Government holding language of such a nature as to render it impossible for Russia to accept any modifications of the treaty; and, secondly, from words being uttered by any political party, calculated to encourage the Russian Government in the belief that they would be supported in refusing to entertain any demands, however just. Sir Wilfrid Lawson must know that the Government would have an immense majority, and that that majority would be represented as being in favour of a warlike course. He also knew that every vote which he himself received might be construed by the Russian Government as a proof that they could count upon the existence in this country of a party supposed to be ranged against its own Government, in order to resist every modification of the Treaty of San Stefano, however reasonable. Such were the wise and patriotic adjurations which the Marquis of Hartington addressed to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, but addressed in vain. The debate was wound up by a reply from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who thanked the Marquis for much that had fallen from him, and again asserted the determination of the Government not to go into Congress unless the whole treaty were considered. When the amend ment was put, it was negatived by 319 to 64 votes, and the address was then agreed to without a division. The Marquis of Hartington, and a large number of Opposition members left the House before the division was taken on the amendment; but amongst the minority is to be found the name of Mr. Gladstone, although on the previous evening the right honourable gentleman had given it as his opinion that it was neither necessary nor desirable that an amendment should be moved.

The policy of calling out the Reserves was thus sanctioned by both Houses of Parliament, as indeed it was obvious from the first that it would be. The Government, however, had embarked upon a course which was certain to be unpopular in many quarters—partly because it contradicted the preconceived ideas of certain political sections, and partly because it necessarily involved very heavy charges, which the nation would have to defray. In moving the vote of credit, several weeks earlier, Sir Stafford Northcote had observed that probably very little of it would be spent; but by the beginning of April three millions and a half out of the six millions had already vanished. The expenditure on the army and navy had been exceptionally large; the civil expenditure also had undergone a grave increase; and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward his Budget, on the 14th of April, he had to admit a deficit of very serious proportions. From the figures which Sir Stafford Northcote laid before the House, it appeared that there would be a total deficiency of £5,310,000. The gap would be partly filled up by new taxation, including an addition to the income-tax; but this still left an adverse balance of £1,550,000, to be met in the ensuing year. The deficit was in some degree attributable to the commercial depression which had for some time prevailed, but in a still greater degree was owing to the additional expenditure resulting from the fear of war, and the perplexing combinations in the East. Nothing is more likely to destroy the popularity

of a Government than heavy demands on the pockets of the taxpayers; and the onerous Budget of Sir Stafford Northcote furnished the Opposition — and especially the platform opposition out of doors—with an effective weapon against the entire policy of the Cabinet, whether in foreign or in home affairs. The objections taken were not altogether unjust; for, if the Government had followed a more consistent course, it is probable that not a single additional shilling would have been spent upon the armaments of the country. But this was an argument which the pro-Russian party were hardly free to urge, as the hesitations of the Ministry had proceeded mainly from the pressure of adverse criticism. Partizanship and love of office had brought the nation to the brink of war, and beyond the brink of heavy expenditure; and now that the mischief was done, few persons had any clear conception as to who were principally guilty.




TROOP-BOATS READY FOR SERVICE IN CHATHAM DOCKYARD.

As usual, there was a good deal of warlike feeling in the country. At a special parade of the 30th Stafford Rifle Volunteers on the 29th of March, the commanding officer requested that every man who was willing to volunteer for active service in the United Kingdom should shoulder arms. The response was nearly unanimous, for only three men withheld from the required sign. The Government received tenders of assistance from Canada and other colonies; but there was no occasion for accepting these patriotic offers, which were inspired by the best and truest spirit of Imperialism. The War Office, however—the Secretaryship of which had been transferred to Colonel Stanley—was indefatigable in making preparations for the struggle which seemed not unlikely to ensue. Army and navy were being got ready for active service, and large orders for ambulance-waggons, which orders were marked "very urgent," were issued by the Government. Horses for the transport service were purchased in large numbers, and two hundred tons of Palliser projectiles for heavy guns were issued from the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich about the close of March. The transport department of the Admiralty, in consultation with the War Office, entered into arrangements by which an entire army-corps, with horses and all necessary equipment, could be embarked at a few days' notice for any destination. Steps were taken for the immediate mobilization of a large number of militia regiments throughout the kingdom, and commanding officers were instructed to communicate with their subordinates in view of an approaching call to arms. The activity which was being exhibited in all military and naval departments may be judged from a statement in the *Times*, to the effect that whereas, a few weeks before, our resources were in so undeveloped a state, and our army in so fragmentary a condition, that we

were hardly ready for a war, even with the Kaffirs, a complete transformation had been effected by the early part of April. The regiments, with but few exceptions, had been brought up to the increased peace-strength laid down by the latest regulations. Moreover, there were scarcely any men who in the course of another fortnight would not be fully clothed and equipped, and sufficiently drilled to take their place in the ranks. A small proportion of the recruits were too young and feeble to go at once into active service; but it was believed that a few months' regular living, with drill and gymnastics, would make such an improvement in their physical condition that they might be relied on as the first reserve of an army in the field. The first army-corps was thus nearly completed, and the second corps had received its orders for mobilization. Had it been necessary, we could by midsummer have had three army-corps, amounting to rather more than 100,000 men, ready to start from England for any seat of war, and these corps would have been complete in every requisite for action. The Army Service Corps was about to be augmented by five additional companies, and volunteers for that branch of the service were invited from the Militia. The chief want of the War Office was in horses; but purchases were being energetically carried on, both at home and in America. Recruits were coming forward in abundance, and these, although necessarily new to their duties, would soon be fitted for garrison work, and would thus set free the older soldiers, who had previously been employed in matters of routine. Many of the Volunteers, besides those already mentioned, were anxious to be employed; several corps of Militia expressed their willingness to undertake duties outside the kingdom; the Indian transports were held in readiness for work near home; a fine steamer was added to our fleet of troop-ships; and provisional contracts were made with shipowners. "Considering that we have the command of the sea," said the military writer in the *Times*, "the fact that we could, within three months, or even a shorter time if necessary, despatch from our shores a mobile army of upwards of 100,000 men in the highest state of efficiency, is a fact the significance of which cannot fail to be appreciated in Europe. The faculty of shifting our base, and moving at pleasure by sea, at least doubles the military power of England." The necessity of taking such precautions had much to do with Sir Stafford Northcote's deficit, both present and prospective; but the development of events in the south-east of Europe, the unyielding mood of Russia, and the enormous strength of the three great Military Monarchies, which might at any moment coalesce for their common ends, made it necessary that the champion of European law, and the main assertor of liberal principles in the Old World, should not stand naked and defenceless before the bristling armies of the Continent.

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## CHAPTER XIII.

Organisation of the New Bulgarian State—Provisions of a Russian Imperial Ukase—Movements of the Russian Army in Bulgaria and Roumania—Apprehensions of a War with England and Austria—Difficult Position of Turkey—Circular to the Ottoman Representatives abroad—Prospects of the Mohammedans in the New Bulgaria—Petition to the Queen, and Interview with Mr. Layard—Adjournment of the English Parliament for the Easter Recess—Quieting Assurances of Sir Stafford Northcote—Determination of the English Government to despatch Native Indian Troops to Malta—Policy of that Measure—Imperial Responsibilities and Imperial Resources—Mr. Bright on the Prospects of War—Mr. Gladstone on the Treaty of Peace—Austria and Montenegro—Russian Ambition and its Friends—Strengthening of the Turkish Lines about Constantinople—Concentration of Turkish Forces—Objections urged by the Russians—The English Fleet in the Sea of Marmora—Interview between the Sultan and Mr. Layard—The Lines of Boulair, before Gallipoli—Retirement of the Grand Duke Nicholas from the Command, and Succession of General Todleben—Dangerous Position of the Russians in View of a Fresh War—Probabilities of a Collision with England—Feeling of the Russians in Favour of an immediate Rupture.

WHILE the diplomatists were disputing over forms and precedents, the Russian authorities in Bulgaria were quietly proceeding with the organisation of the new State, according to their ideas of what was suited to the needs of the people. An Imperial Russian Ukase, issued in the first part of April, decreed that Bulgaria should be divided into two Governments. Each Governor was to act together with an Administrative Council, chosen from among the most trustworthy persons in the jurisdiction. The territory was distributed into circuits presided over by sub-governors, each having a council of seven Bulgarians. Over each circuit was to be placed a superintendent, supported by a Bulgarian magistracy; and these superintendents were to have command of bodies of police, composed both of

Christians and Mohammedans, and discharging functions similar to those of the Turkish Zaptiehs. A certain amount of judicial power was conferred on the superintendents, who were to give decisions in small causes. In each circuit town, an autonomous court of law was to exercise jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases, partly in accordance with former Turkish laws, and partly in harmony with traditional usage; and the verdicts of the circuit-courts were to be final. When all these institutions were fully organised, a National Assembly was to be constituted at Philippopolis; but the mode of electing this representative body was left for ulterior settlement. The proceedings of the Assembly were to be formally opened by the Civil Commissioner, and its duties were to organize on a permanent basis the offices which until then would be only provisionally held, and to fix the salaries to be attached to the various State appointments. It was proposed that in the first sitting of Parliament a scheme of laws, already drawn up, should be submitted for approval or amendment; a system of taxes was also to be discussed; and various measures of internal reform were to be brought forward for the consideration of the Bulgarian representatives.

Such were the arrangements made in view of assured peace; but the contingency of renewed war was also present, and for this likewise preparation was assiduously made. The Czar's troops in Bulgaria, Roumania, and the south-western districts of Russia, took up positions at various points of strategic importance, and contracts were made for the delivery of supplies in those localities. Some of the regiments engaged in the late war were sent back to Russia; but the greater number remained, and the feeling against England entertained by the officers, who were thus prevented from rejoining their families, was bitter in the extreme. Russian officials of rank at Bucharest declared that they fully expected the English ships to succeed in forcing their way into the Black Sea, in the event of war; and on this account the Russian Government took measures to ensure increased facilities for the land-transport of troops over lines not accessible to interruption from the fleet, and as far distant as possible from the Austrian frontier.* By the second week in April, large bodies of Russian troops were concentrated in Roumania. One division crossed the Danube at Giurgevo, and another passed from the Dobrudscha into Galatz. Many of the villages around Bucharest were occupied by the strangers, who took possession of the town-halls, schools, and dwellings of the inhabitants; and complaints were made that the country was being treated like a conquered territory. The Roumanian Government repeatedly asked the Russian Cabinet for explanations as to its motives, but could obtain none, and the movements of troops continued unabated. The object of these movements was twofold: it was desired to overawe the Principality, in case any serious resistance should be made to Muscovite projects; and, in view of a possible rupture with Austria, it was considered advisable to take up positions near the southern ends of the chief passes through the Carpathians. From the northern parts of Wallachia, and so on through the most vulnerable regions of the new Bulgaria, the Russians had a chain of military posts, which they were continually strengthening, and which would have enabled them to operate effectually on the flank of an invading army coming from beyond the Carpathians, and seeking to approach the south. But the Czar had little to fear in this direction, and, though he did not contemn the prudence of being prepared for the worst, he doubtless relied on his Imperial brother much more than was generally supposed.

If there was to be war at all, it would be war with England. In that case, the position of Turkey must have become extremely difficult, for neutrality would have been almost impossible, and coalition with either belligerent would have drawn on the Osmanli the vengeance of the other. Fear of what might ensue dictated certain precautionary measures on the part of the Turkish Government. All religious and artistic objects of value were removed from the Palace of Top Capou to Scutari, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus; and arms and munitions of war, stored in the arsenals of Constantinople, were conveyed to safer places. Meanwhile, the Porte sought to influence the Powers in its favour, and, in a circular to its representatives abroad, issued in the early part of April, recognized the Treaty of San Stefano as the result of the reverses sustained by Turkey in the war recently concluded. While expressing a full determination to carry out the terms of the treaty in a loyal manner, the Ottoman Ministers declared that they would nevertheless regard as opportune such modifications as might result from the benevolent intervention of the Powers, and the moderation of Russia. But in any case the Porte pledged itself to carry out the projected reforms; and this was all it could do under the circumstances, with a foreign army in occupation of the country, and the probability of a fresh war shadowing the near horizon. The most important question now, however, had reference, not to the Christians, but to

* Bucharest Correspondent of the *Times*.

the Mohammedans. The former were in the position of command, and might be trusted to take care of themselves; the latter were vanquished, friendless, and open to persecution. What Power was at once able and willing to vindicate the cause of oppressed Moslems? The support even of England was far from certain, and in no other direction was there a gleam of reasonable hope.

consideration. The petition having been read and interpreted, Mr. Layard, through the medium of Mr. Baring, entered into a long conversation with the Turkish representatives, in which they were desired to give some more specific details than had been contained in the document just delivered. In answer to questions, they stated that they could live in harmony with the Bulgarians, if they were

INDIAN TROOPS: A HALT FOR PANI.

Under these depressing circumstances, the refugees in Constantinople held numerous meetings, and chose from among themselves the leading men of several districts, to whom they entrusted the task of settling their future condition. After much debate, it was determined to appoint a deputation of six members to present their petition to Mr. Layard as the Ambassador of England. The deputies thus chosen were men of property and good position in some of the principal towns of Bulgaria and Roumelia; and they were received by the British Minister with great courtesy and not placed under the direct rule of Russia. They believed it would be possible, if they returned to their own lands, to settle down on what had been left from the ravages of war. In the meanwhile, they had learned that the Mussulmans were put to great hardships, and that the property of the refugees generally had been seized; but for this they could not undertake to vouch. To a correspondent of the *Times*, two of these petitioners afterwards stated that some of the Russian commanders exercised a very strict control over their men, and permitted no ill-treatment of the

inhabitants, or theft of their property; but that others sanctioned or tolerated misconduct. The refugees, it appeared, had held numerous meetings to discuss the future position of the 2,900,000 Mussulmans (such, at least, were the figures as given by them) occupying the territory invaded by Russia. One great difficulty was as to their serving in the army of the Christian Prince of Bulgaria. To this they earnestly objected, since they might at some time be required to fight against their co-religionists —a thing abhorrent to their consciences; and they accordingly decided to pay the tax for exemption from military service, as the Christians had done during the Ottoman supremacy. "Let us assume," said these people, "that we—two millions and a half of Mussulmans in Bulgaria—are all bad: still, would this be a reason for punishing our grandchildren after us? If no one will take an interest in *us*, at least let the innocent be considered, who will come after us. A great misfortune has fallen upon our race; our voices can no more be heard; we implore justice in vain. If our situation previous to our recent misfortunes be carefully examined, it will be found that the Mussulmans as well as the Christians were victims of the misrule of their Government; yet, notwithstanding the badness of the administration, we had established in our districts schools which were better managed than those of the capital. We only demand equal justice for Mussulmans and Christians—an equality to be watched over by the Consuls of the English nation, on behalf of the Mussulmans. Christians and Mussulmans have suffered alike, and a bad Government has encouraged every disorder. Yet we nourish the hope that we may yet enjoy a prosperous future." The petition which Mr. Layard was requested to forward to the British Government referred to the Queen as Empress of one hundred millions of Mussulmans (a most prodigious exaggeration, by the way), and reminded Lord Derby of a promise he had made in the House of Lords on the 31st of January, 1878, when he had said that one of the principal duties of the Ministry, on the conditions of the peace becoming known, would be to ensure equal justice for Mussulman and Christian. "We do not believe," said the authors of the petition, "that the representatives of the Empress of so many millions of Mussulmans will appear at the Congress with the sole object of ratifying the decisions of San Stefano. Not only do we not desire to quit our country and our property, and meet with the fate of the Mussulmans of Wallachia, of Servia, of the Morea, and of the Caucasus; but we wish that our lives, property, goods, and honour, in a country where a race which has hitherto lived in community with us is about to be enfranchised by autonomy, shall be guaranteed." This petition was drawn up a little before the resignation of Lord Derby; but the withdrawal of that nobleman did not lessen the chances of a favourable hearing.

On the 16th of April, the English Parliament adjourned for the customary Easter recess—the House of Commons to the 6th of May, the House of Lords to the 13th of the same month. In the final sitting of the former, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was rather profuse in his assertions that nothing whatever had occurred which should give occasion for increased anxiety, or in any way diminish the hope of a satisfactory arrangement. There was no reason for despair, he said, and the Government saw no ground for apprehending any inconvenience or danger from the adjournment. The session, accordingly, came to a temporary stop, and Ministers were free to pursue their own ideas of expediency without check from the Legislature. The very next day—April 17th—it was announced at Calcutta that the Indian Government had received orders to despatch eight native regiments, together with some artillery, and a body of sappers and miners, to Malta. This unexpected step was little in harmony with the suave assurances of Sir Stafford Northcote previous to the breaking up; and the opponents of the Government loudly complained of secrecy and surprise, and contended that so unusual a measure should have been announced while Parliament was still sitting, and could express an opinion on what it was proposed to accomplish. In other respects, the summoning of Indian troops was a stroke of policy for which much might be said. The question at issue was to a great extent an Oriental question. It was one in which a nation of Mohammedans—the fellow-believers of a large proportion of our Asiatic soldiery—was vitally concerned; and it touched our interests as the sovereigns of India, in an appreciable, if a remote, degree. Moreover, it was a manifestation of Imperial strength which circumstances had rendered necessary, or at least advisable. Opposed to England was one of the greatest, if not actually the very greatest, of the world's military Powers. In any war that might ensue, England was not likely to find allies, and might very possibly be confronted by other enemies than the principal—enemies possessed also of great resources and innumerable soldiers. Only by calling out the full strength of our dominion could we hope to encounter with success the enormous force that we should be certain to find arrayed against us in the event of an armed collision. Russia, it is true, had lost a hundred thousand soldiers in

the struggle with Turkey; but, however great the effort, their places could have been supplied. Subject nationalities, mongrel tribes, savage hordes,—the Finn and the Tartar, the Pole and the Georgian, the Cossack and the Central Asiatic,—the denizens of the city and the wanderers of the steppe,—would have obeyed the summons of the Czar for a new campaign: some, perhaps, unwillingly; others with passionate enthusiasm; but all under the compulsion of irresistible power. In the face of this immense combination, was England to abandon half her strength, and to say that she would fight with one hand bound? Was she alone, among all the great Empires of the world, ancient or modern, to renounce an important part of her resources, and to go into action denuded of the very troops who in such a cause would be the most likely to fight with ardour? The proposal met with vehement disapproval in certain quarters; but the objectors seem to have forgotten the circumstances which gave peculiarity to the case. The regiments to be despatched from India amounted to but a small army; but that army, which could at any time have been increased, embodied the principle that the war, if it was to be waged at all, was to be waged for the protection of our Indian realm from the menace of an approaching peril, and for the rescue of a Mohammedan sovereignty from a misfortune which might become our own. It has been too much the custom to forget that the British Empire is an Empire not only in name, but in fact. It has far-reaching responsibilities and complicated interests; but together with these it has multitudinous resources. The acceptance of the one involves the use of the other; and the day must come when, if the Empire is to be maintained at all, and not to dwindle down into the petty Kingdom which formed its nucleus, it must be maintained as one great whole, whose heart, indeed, is at London, but whose life spreads through all the vast circumference, sustaining every part with the unity of an organic existence, and utilising every force for the defence of common benefits and common aims.

The announcement with respect to the Indian troops set every one again thinking about war; and the probability of a rupture seemed all the more likely when an announcement appeared in a supplement to the *London Gazette*, published on the 18th of April, forbidding the exportation of torpedoes, torpedo-boats, all apparatus capable of being used in conjunction with such engines, and all articles which might be converted into military or naval stores. People naturally inferred from such facts that the prospects of peace were very slight indeed; but a large part of the population was strongly opposed to war. This feeling was expressed by Mr. Bright at the annual Conference of the Lancashire, Cheshire, and Derbyshire Sunday School Unions, which was held on Good Friday (April 19th) at Rochdale. He remarked that the school might check the barbarism of the nation—might save it from the regret and sorrow which, as a people, we could not escape if another bloody chapter were to be added to the annals of our time. If it could be put to all the Nonconformist congregations throughout Great Britain, whether or not it was the duty or the interest of England to be involved in war, Mr. Bright had no doubt that from Cornwall to Caithness there would be a universal voice in favour of the preservation of peace. "Can it be possible," asked the speaker, "that the Christian men and women engaged in your holy work should not coincide with Lord Derby when he said that peace was the greatest of British interests? You are yourselves the ministers, humble, but earnest, of the Prince of Peace. It is therefore within your calling, within your solemn duty even, to express some feeling on this question; and if there ascend from your hearts a prayer to the throne of the Most High on behalf of your children and your nation, let it be a prayer that He may turn the hearts of your rulers from thoughts of war, and bring them to sentiments of mercy and peace." The name of Lord Derby, when thus introduced, was received with loud cheers; for Lord Derby was now the idol of those who would have given up to Russia whatever she required. Mr. Bright is always eloquent and conscientious; but he does not invariably apply his principles with rigid impartiality. If he, and those who thought with him, had been as earnest in their opposition to Russian attacks on Turkey as they were in their criticisms on any disposition of the English Government to check that career of avarice and cruelty, the terrible war just finished would never have been waged, and the condition and prospects of the East would not have been darkened by the shadow of enormous wrongs.

Mr. Gladstone took advantage of the Parliamentary recess to deliver one of his popular orations at a meeting of Nonconformist ministers which, on the 18th of April, was held in the library of the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, for the purpose of presenting to the right honourable gentleman a declaration against the warlike policy of the Government. He here remarked that it seemed to be the pleasure of the Cabinet to keep the country dangling over an abyss; but those whom he was addressing were doing their utmost to convey to the heart of every Englishman

a full knowledge of what was probably being contemplated. It was impossible to say with any certainty whether there would be war or not; but, if war came, it would be in the highest degree guilty, and, apart from its guilt, in the highest degree absurd. He could not help cherishing the hope that after all we might be saved from such a war; but he was compelled painfully to confess that, if we were, we should be saved not so much in respect of its guilt as in respect of its absurdity. a struggle with such a Power as Russia. It was much more probable that Russia would meet the terms of Austria, and thus bring her over to the Russian side. Therefore, considering all the dangers of war, Mr. Gladstone wished that we should go into Congress; and he even desired that we should be on the watch against Russia, and against Austria too. Russia, he said, appeared to have avowed one purpose which would excite general indignation; that was to say, the purpose of



THE BOULAIR LINES.

It was obvious that in the main this great war between two of the greatest Powers in the world would, among more horrible characteristics, present, as conspicuously as any other feature, that which he had described by the term "absurdity." The precise nature of the absurdity, however, Mr. Gladstone did not set forth; but he appeared to think that, if Russia were compelled to retire from her advanced positions, and the Turkish Government were thus restored in the countries from which it had been displaced, the result would be vastly amusing, as well as decidedly criminal. Mr. Gladstone scoffed at the idea of an Austrian alliance, and not without reason. Austria, he considered, was very unlikely to run the risk of imposing her own yoke on a portion of Roumania —of carrying back that country from free institutions to a state of things in which, as regarded the highest political liberty of man, it would undoubtedly recoil from a superior to an inferior condition.

He was also strongly suspicious of the course which had been taken by Austria with regard to Montenegro. When the mountaineers were, by their own strong arms and indomitable spirit, liberating those lands to the north of the Black Mountain which were the lands of their fathers, the Austrian Emperor despatched a message to them, signifying that they must stop their victorious career. Since then, they had been told



SOLDIERS OF THE 31ST BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

by Austria that they must be excluded from the sea. "They have found their way to the sea again," said Mr. Gladstone. "Their great object is to live as other men live. They have been warriors for four hundred years; every man is a warrior—aye, and, in case of need, every woman too. But they are warriors by necessity, and not by choice; they wish to cultivate the arts of life; they wish to have lands that they can plough; they wish to be in intercourse with other nations, and not to be buried between Austria and Turkey. They have achieved their work by their own blood, their own tears, and their own gallant labours; they have made their own way; and is England to stand by, and see the fruits of those most heroic triumphs wrested out of their hands by the overweening domination of a Power that has never yet registered one single title to the gratitude of mankind?" Mr. Gladstone probably exaggerated the virtues, while he concealed the defects, of the Montenegrins, whose savagery is not to be excused or explained by the fact that they were without a seaboard. But he was quite right in saying that, as the mountaineers had achieved their independence by their own valour and determination, it would be a shameful thing if Austria, or any other Power, were to step in to deprive them of the results of their sacrifices. Very admirable, also, was his description of Austria as a Power that had not established a single title to the gratitude of the world; and the censure of the Russian Czar for his designs on Roumanian Bessarabia was thoroughly deserved, though unnecessarily guarded in tone. On the latter subject, however, Mr. Gladstone's criticisms were distinctly challenged. The very evil he condemned, he had been thought by many largely instrumental in bringing about; for he had persistently doubted the covert designs with which Russia began the war, and had materially helped to encourage her in that dishonest policy which found its natural fruit in territorial acquisition. The real intention of the war—the subserviency of all other considerations to the aggrandizement of a military despotism — was obvious from the first; and it was not for those who had fostered and stimulated the cause to complain of the effect. The argument of those who thought with Mr. Gladstone that England, had she joined the Russians in their attack on Turkey, would have restrained their ambition and selfishness, will not bear a moment's examination. Either Russia would have overcome the scruples of England, and made her an accomplice, or, after Turkey had been destroyed by the pressure of military threats, or by actual war, we should have had to encounter the great Northern Power at the sword's point. It is very certain that, having once commenced active operations, Russia would not have relinquished her objects without a struggle. It was the opinion of many that Mr. Gladstone helped to make the war, and was not in a position to sit in judgment on its crimes.

The Turks themselves were strongly disinclined to give up everything to the invader. They were by this time recovering from the depression which, in the days immediately following the peace, not unnaturally sank them to the very earth; and, seeing that the Russians were disposed to advance still nearer to Constantinople, and were not unlikely, under certain contingencies, to enter the city itself, they set about strengthening such defensive lines as they possessed, which were indeed but slight. These operations gave great offence to the Russians; but they were nothing more than what any Power would, under the circumstances, have considered advisable, and indeed imperative. In the first instance, Mehemet Ali, who now had command in that direction, threw up a number of ordinary camp-entrenchments, consisting of shelter-trenches, and of five detached works, in the nature of light field-redoubts. The lines extended along a front of some forty miles, and ought not in reason to have annoyed the Grand Duke Nicholas. The Russian Commander-in-Chief, however, raised grave objections, and warned the Porte that he would be constrained to occupy them, if their construction was persisted in. Before this warning could reach the Turkish military authorities, Mehemet Ali, who probably anticipated a protest hurried forward his precautions against a rupture, and in a little while found himself in a position which would have given the invaders considerable trouble, had they determined to attack it. Behind their hastily-improvised shelter, the Moslems had now an army of nearly 80,000 men, and several of these were amongst the most tried and steady veterans of the war. The Turks appear to have borne the hardships and miseries of the time much better than the Russians, many of whose regiments were so decimated by disease, and so cast down by fatigue and long suffering, as to have lost all appearance of military spirit, cohesion, or self-respect. To the objections made by the Russians with regard to Mehemet Ali's defensive lines, the Porte replied that the very nature of the works showed that they were not designed with any aggressive purpose; but that the continued presence of a large Russian army at the gates of Constantinople, and the absence of any apparent intention to withdraw it, had created

a feeling of uneasiness among the Turkish population, and it was absolutely necessary to give the public some assurance that, in the event of complications arising out of the Treaty of San Stefano, the preparations were adequate to enable the Porte to maintain its attitude of neutrality, and prevent any attempt to occupy Constantinople and the Upper Bosphorus. This reply was far from giving satisfaction to the Russians, who observed in their rejoinder that no kindred measures had been adopted to prevent the British fleet from taking possession of the Upper Bosphorus, and that it amounted to a prospective breach of neutrality to make defences against one possible belligerent, and none against the other. Nothing could be more futile than this attempt to draw a parallel between the presence of the Russian army and that of the English fleet. In returning to the subject, the Turkish Ministers pointed out that the fleet was very far distant from Constantinople, and that its presence in the Bay of Ismid did not cause those apprehensions among the people of the capital to which the pressure of a great army on its outskirts gave rise. It had, moreover, been settled by the Treaty of Peace that the invading army should begin evacuating Turkish territory at a date which had already passed; yet the strangers, so far from withdrawing, had begun to entrench many of their positions near Constantinople. The Russians answered that the presence of the British fleet in the Sea of Marmora was the real obstacle to their immediate withdrawal. The Turks not unreasonably met this argument by remarking that England was the Power to which remonstrances should be addressed. The fact of the British fleet being where it was, did not constitute any breach by Turkey of the Treaty of San Stefano, and therefore afforded the Russians no pretext for breaking it. This correspondence continued for some time; but the Russians still considered themselves aggrieved, and insisted that it was the duty of the Porte to urge upon the British Government the withdrawal of the fleet.*

The Sultan felt compelled, under the difficult circumstances of the time, to take some further notice of the Russian complaints, unreasonable though they were; and he accordingly requested Mr. Layard to meet him in the small kiosque of Flamour, which glitters with its white marble walls in the midst of a grove of evergreens, situated in a deep hollow a little outside Constantinople. The interview took place on the 7th of April, and during its progress a numerous military guard protected the kiosque. The Sultan desired to know whether there was any immediate prospect of the fleet being withdrawn; but to this Mr. Layard could only reply that its withdrawal depended wholly upon the retirement of the Russian forces before Constantinople. Thus, the fleet waited for the initiative of the army, and the army waited for the initiative of the fleet. The matter accordingly ended in nothing, and the Russians and English continued, so to speak, facing one another across the interposing mass of Constantinople, which, had war broken out afresh, would doubtless have suffered in the struggle of the rivals. But in such an event the mounds and ditches created by Mehemet Ali would have done good service to the Ottomans; and a further source of strength would have been found in the works about Gallipoli. The lines of Boulair stretch across the narrowest part of the attenuated isthmus connecting the Thracian Chersonesus with the mainland. The fortifications drawn across this isthmus near the village of Boulair were made by the Anglo-French army of occupation in 1854. They have been strengthened since those days, and additional works were still in progress in the direction from which a Russian advance was to be feared, supposing war to be again precipitated. It was calculated that a garrison of 10,000 soldiers could defend the lines against a much superior force. The English, having command of the sea, could very speedily have thrown any number of men into the fortifications, if the Turks, departing from their neutrality, had chosen to permit such a proceeding; and it was the apprehension of these not improbable perils that made the Russian authorities so earnest in their remonstrances with the Turkish Government.

The relations between the Russians and the Turks were at this time very delicate, and it appears to have been considered by the Czar that his brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas, had not asserted the national power with sufficient resolution. He was accordingly removed from the command about the close of April. The usual excuse of ill-health was put forward as the reason of this change; but by many it was believed that the Russian Government desired the prosecution of a sterner policy, and that the Grand Duke, having long before pledged his honour to the Turks that his troops should not enter the capital, held to his word, notwithstanding instructions to the contrary. Such, at any rate, was the impression in quarters which were likely to be well-informed; but there were not wanting statements of a very different character, to the effect that the Grand Duke had compromised his Sovereign's cause by encroaching too much upon the independence of the Turks. The former of these opinions bears the greater stamp of probability;

* Correspondent of the *Times*: Pera, April 12th, 1878.

for the Russian Government at that time was hardly in the mood for abating its pretensions. General Todleben succeeded the Grand Duke Nicholas in the chief command of the army before Constantinople, and the general impression was, that his appointment portended strife. A farewell review by the Imperial commander took place on April 29th, when General Todleben was presented to the troops at San Stefano. The Grand Duke then left for Constantinople, where, on the following morning, he introduced General Todleben to the Sultan, of whom he himself took leave, and shortly afterwards started for Odessa with the Chief of his Staff. It seemed likely that events were about to enter on a fresh stage, and in the prosecution of renewed operations General Todleben would doubtless have been one of the most efficient officers that the Imperial army could furnish.

GENERAL TODLEBEN.

The situation of the Russians was in many respects calculated to excite uneasiness. Their line of communication from the Pruth to San Stefano was more than four hundred miles in length, and between the two ends of the chain were the broad waters of the Danube and the rugged heights of the Balkans, with the Rhodope Mountains on the flank. The positions in front of Constantinople were much scattered, and the forces, though considerable, were hardly sufficient to maintain their ground against the pressure of actual warfare. The Turks were still in possession of Schumla and Varna; so that the Russian line of communication was flanked in two of its most vulnerable parts by fortresses which, in the event of another war, could have operated very powerfully against the foe. The Turkish army, now concentrated in and about Constantinople, was numerous, well trained, and in excellent condition; and the Mohammedan population in rear of the invaders was in a state of revolt which threatened the most alarming consequences. Russia, therefore, had every motive for seeking an arrangement; but in such matters pride is often stronger than reason or prudence. The Imperial Government had assumed a position from which it was difficult to retreat. While professing a readiness to submit certain portions of the Treaty of San Stefano to the judgment of Europe, Russia had managed to create a cloud of mystery as to how far that judgment would be permitted to apply. The refusal of Prince Gortschakoff to accept the terms of the English Government had complicated the whole question to a degree which seemed beyond the power of diplomacy to unravel. Russia, there can be no question, trusted in the first instance to the great influence exercised by the Gladstonian party in shaping the policy of the English Government. It was believed that under

no circumstances would England go to war to upset any portion of the Treaty of San Stefano. When it was seen that Lord Beaconsfield was preparing for hostilities, and that a large part of the people supported the determination thus expressed, it was too late to retreat without loss of character. The almost universal sentiment among the Russians was that their Government should maintain its policy in face of what were regarded as the provocations and menaces of England. It was consequently assumed that war could not possibly be avoided. For this issue the national spirit was prepared, although it must have been evident to all well-informed Russians that the resources of England were much greater than their own. Public opinion was powerfully excited, and the Government was accused of being timorous and backward. "Diplomatic arguments," said the persons who thought after this fashion, "are utterly powerless to solve great historical questions, and in the present instance a military occupation would be much more to the purpose than any amount of calm logical discussion. As an indefinite prolongation of the present state of affairs is advantageous for England, and ruinous for Russia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg ought to bring it to an end as soon as possible. Already the British fleet has taken possession of the Dardanelles, and its next move will be to seize the Bosphorus. In a few weeks, English ironclads will be able to enter the Baltic, and the communications between Roumania and Bulgaria will be interrupted for a time by the breaking up of the ice on the Danube. That is the moment which the Cabinets of London and Vienna will choose for the declaration of their real intentions; and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg will perceive that it has lost valuable time in useless diplomatic negotiations."* Those who felt thus contended that it was idle to argue with England about the matter. The English, they said, did not care to have justice on their side, but merely thought about their interests. It might be shown that their interests would not suffer from the new order of things created by the late war: they would simply reply that they considered themselves the best judges in such a matter. The issue, therefore, was one to be decided by blows, rather than by words, and the time for diplomacy had passed. Such was the tone expressed in many of the most influential organs of Russian opinion in those moments of doubt, distrust, and anger; such was the view of national dignity which was urging the Empire to a fatal struggle, when every interest of Russia demanded concession, and pleaded for the maintenance of peace.

* St. Petersburg Correspondent of the *Times*, writing on April 13th.

CAMF BHISLI (WATER CARRIER).

## CHAPTER XIV.

Turkey in April, 1878—Mohammedan Enthusiasm, and Desire for the Renewal of the War—Another Change in the Government of the Sultan—Vefyk and Said Pashas—Palace Intrigues and their Consequences—Disturbed Condition of the Vilayet of Janina—Proclamation to the People—Rising of the Lazis against the Russians at Batoum—Mohammedan Insurrection in the Rhodope Mountains—Origin of the Movement—Severe Fighting with the Russian Troops—Agitation in Bosnia—Popular Dissatisfaction with the Sultan—Seditious Attempt of Ali Suavi—Distress of the Refugees in Constantinople—Appeal in Moscow for the Formation of a Volunteer Fleet—Russian Intrigues for Purchasing Ships in America—Speech of Mr. Gathorne Hardy at Bradford—An Imperial Policy and its Obligations—Speech of Mr. Bright at Manchester—Intemperate Vituperation—Lord Beaconsfield and the Ten Commandments—Alexander II. and the Sermon on the Mount—Disingenuous Application of Great Arguments—Appeal to the Ministers of Religion—Declarations against War, and their Signatures—The Emotions and the Reason—Fatal Reliance on the Government—The Coming Surrender.

TURKEY was convulsed with internal agitation while the question of peace or war between Russia and England hung trembling in the balance. The excitement of the public mind was extreme, and most Mohammedans cherished the hope that the two European Powers would draw their swords on each other, and that the Porte would ultimately side with the one which might be expected to act on behalf of Islam. This feeling was really an embarrassment to the Ministry, which was obliged to maintain a show of friendliness towards the Russians, however bitter against them at heart; for the national sentiment was expressed openly, fervently, in many quarters, and in many ways. Some of the more prominent among the Mussulman enthusiasts sent a communication to the Shereef of Mecca and the Muftis of Tunis and Morocco, inquiring whether, as the faith was threatened, an attitude of neutrality would be permissible in the event of war between the Russians and the English, or whether their religious duty, as followers of the Prophet, ought to lead them to an alliance with the latter. The reply of the Shereef was cautious, and amounted simply to a promise that, if the contemplated war occurred, he would submit the question to the Council; that of the Muftis was more decided, and was to the effect that the Turks should abandon their neutrality. This was undoubtedly the answer that was desired and anticipated; and the abandonment of neutrality would have meant alliance with England, unless Russia had bidden much higher than was probable for the support of Turkey. It can hardly be doubted that the mass of the Turkish people were longing for the recommencement of the war under more favourable conditions, and that, in the lengthening days of April, it was hoped that a few weeks would see the hosts of England fighting once more with soldiers of the Crescent against the dwindling legions from the North.

The perturbations of the time led to another change of Ministry, and, on the 17th of April, Ahmed Vefyk Pasha, the President of the Council appointed at the beginning of February, was dismissed in favour of Sadyk Pasha, who became President of the Council and Minister of Public Works. The other members of the Cabinet were Izzet Bey, Minister of War; Ibrahim Pasha, Minister of Marine; Safvet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Kiani Pasha, Minister of Finance; and Ali Fuad Pasha, Secretary to the Sultan. Mollah Bey was the new Sheikh-ul-Islam—a post of great importance, as being that of chief expounder of the Sacred Law. The Cabinet of Ahmed Vefyk had been considered rather English in its leanings; that of his successor was credited with somewhat Russian proclivities. Without supposing any personal inclination on the part of the Sultan towards his late opponent, it is easy to believe that it may have been prudent, with a Russian army of occupation at the very gates of Constantinople, to make some little concession to Muscovite feelings. Another reason, however, has been given, which doubtless had considerable weight in determining the change. Ahmed Vefyk had taken a strong aversion to Said Pasha, who in the late Ministry had charge of the Civil List, and who had acquired so great a hold upon the Sultan's confidence that (as some have alleged) he was employed as a spy on the other members of the Government, whose policy he is believed to have thwarted. Vefyk at length remonstrated with his Sovereign, and plainly told him that he must choose between Said and himself. Abdul-Hamid then made overtures to some of his former Chief Ministers, to see if another Cabinet, more subservient to Said, could be constructed; but, not being immediately successful, he pretended to be reconciled to Vefyk Pasha. The British Embassy was informed that no change was impending, and everything seemed quiet for the time. In an interview with the Sultan on the 17th, when the reconciliation appeared to be effected, Vefyk obtained a promise that thenceforward Said Pasha should not attend Cabinet Councils.

He represented that the whole Ministry was opposed to the favourite of the Palace, that he was the object of popular dislike and distrust, and that his continued influence would be attended with danger. So earnest was Vefyk in pressing his views that he even tendered his resignation, which the Sultan refused. But the Minister had not departed very long ere the monarch, unable to give up his supporter, and obeying the impulse of a sudden caprice, sent for Sadyk Pasha, and insisted on his forming a Cabinet.* The Sultan afterwards issued an Imperial Hatt, recommending Sadyk to observe the Constitution, and to carry out reforms; but the Constitution was in abeyance, and reform was not likely to be promoted by a Government arising out of a personal whim, and consisting for the most part of members in whom the public had little confidence. Nor did the new arrangement last very long. At the end of May, Sadyk Pasha was relieved of his functions as President of the Ministry, in which post he was replaced by Ruchdi Pasha. The office of Grand Vizier, abolished at the beginning of February, was now re-established, and a few days later Safvet Pasha succeeded Ruchdi in the dignity thus named.

The authority of the Sultan was almost at an end in several parts of his Empire. The insurrection in Thessaly was, indeed, beginning to contract before the steady pressure of the Turkish troops; but in Crete the people were still in full revolt, and the vilayet of Janina, in the south of Albania, was causing much anxiety to the Porte. A proclamation to the inhabitants was issued in April, and it was here stated that "certain froward men," at the head of undisciplined bands, had been for some time attempting to invade the homes of the people, and incite to civil war. These criminals supposed that the Empire, being engaged in a great struggle, would be unable to assert its power, and that they would thus be free to realise their designs. But the people generally were reminded that the return of peace placed all the military resources of the Empire at the disposal of the Government for the maintenance of public order, and it was added that all good subjects should endeavour to dispel

SAFVET PASHA.

* *Times* Correspondent: Pera, April 22nd.

the doubts which had been created as to the paternal intentions of the Sultan and his Government. No one, according to the proclamation, was more alive than the Imperial Government to the administrative errors of which the inhabitants had to complain, or felt more keenly the necessity of carrying into effect such reforms as were calculated to promote the happiness of the country, and its moral and material development. "Events should have already shown you," said this document, "that in all departments of the administrative system his Majesty was disposed to introduce the most radical and the most liberal reforms. The war in which the country became involved prevented, it is true, the immediate introduction of these reforms; and the sacrifices, moreover, imposed on all subjects of the Empire by this luckless state of things, have weighed very heavily on them. But these bitter experiences have come to an end, and the reforms solemnly promulgated by his Majesty constitute the cardinal laws, to the carrying out of which the State now looks for safety. Certain international engagements have quite recently tended to give additional force to these obligations. The administration of your province is about to be remodelled in a manner calculated to leave nothing for you to envy in other districts of the Empire. This re-organisation is to be based on the most complete civil and political equality; on the participation of the people in the government of their homes, without distinction of tongue, creed, or nationality; on such a degree of decentralization of Government departments as is compatible with the unity of the State; on the reform of the judicial system, and of the civil and criminal law, in such a way as to guarantee justice, impartiality, and toleration for the religion, language, and customs of every one of you; and, finally, on the regulation of taxes and the manner of their collection. All these reforms the Imperial Government has determined to introduce without delay, and the only possible obstacle in the way of this benevolent design would be the state of disorder into which it is sought to plunge you." The city of Janina was the capital of the famous chieftain, Ali Pasha, who, in the early part of the present century, made himself almost independent of the Sultan. The people of the surrounding country are for the most part Albanian Greeks, and, although the larger number are Mohammedans, they are not at all disposed to sacrifice their freedom to the centralized authority of Constantinople. The Porte, therefore, had good reason for regarding with uneasiness the spirit of disaffection then rife at Janina.

In many directions, the people were rising, not against Turkey, but against Russia. The Lazis, a Mohammedan race inhabiting the province of Lazistan, on the Black Sea, protested against the annexation of Batoum and the surrounding country to the dominions of the Czar. Several thousands of them offered to ransom the place by raising a large sum of money, if that would be accepted; and, when informed that no such arrangement would be considered, their chief replied that they would prevent the cession by force of arms. Immediately afterwards, they formed a camp near the town, and, being armed with Winchester rifles, gave the Russians considerable trouble on several occasions. The greatest difficulty with which Russia was confronted, however, lay in the region of the Rhodope Mountains. Those savage heights, which attain an altitude even greater than that of the Balkans, extend in a sort of semi-circle along the western and southern parts of Thrace, and in one direction approach within a short distance of the Ægean Sea. They are the Despoto Dagh of the Turks, but are commonly known in England by their old classical designation, derived from the wife of the Thracian king, Hæmus, who, according to the ancient legend, was changed into a vast range of rocks for preferring herself in beauty to Juno. It was through this entanglement of rugged hills, precipitous valleys, and sterile passes, that Suleiman Pasha and his beaten army effected their retreat to the south in the second half of January. Although the greater number of the soldiers on that disastrous occasion found their way to the margin of the Ægean, some thousands appear to have remained among the stony labyrinths of the mountains, and to have formed a league with the Mohammedan peasantry. Much of Suleiman's artillery, and large quantities of arms and stores, were also left behind, owing to the impossibility of conveying them over such difficult roads; and these, having been safely concealed in the recesses of the mountains, were available for use when the time appeared favourable for displaying the standard of revolt against the Sultan's enemies. The immediate cause of the rising, according to a writer from Constantinople, was the intolerable oppression of the Russo-Bulgarian rule. The Christian peasantry had sacked some Turkish villages, carrying off two married women, and one girl. A Bulgarian offered to sell back the girl to her father for four thousand piastres; but the man suddenly drew a pistol, shot the ravisher dead, and gave the signal for a general rising. This was immediately obeyed, and the greater part of that mountainous district burst into a flame of revolt. The rising began about the middle of March, but it was not until a month later that it




RUSSIAN OFFICERS AT THE HOTEL BYZANCE, CONSTANTINOPLE.

became serious. The fighting at first was in the Arda Valley, where Hadji Ismail Agha, after an appeal to Constantinople for protection which the Porte was unable to grant, collected a band of his countrymen, and assailed the Russians with success. Kara Yousouf, another popular leader, took the command to the north of the Arda Valley, and was equally fortunate in his sudden and unexpected attacks. The focus of the insurrection was in the mountainous region of Sultanyeri, west of Demotica, whence the movement extended northward to the valley of Krishna, between Philippopolis and Tatar-Bazardjik, southward to Ghiumursina, and eastward to Tchirmen. In a little while, the insurgents were joined by large numbers of Greeks; and the Pomaks—a tribe of Bulgarians professing the Mohammedan faith—also threw in their lot with the patriots. If the Russians were under any impression that the movement was one of no gravity or importance, they were speedily undeceived. The insurgents proved to be good soldiers, well armed, not devoid of military cohesion, and inspired by desperate valour and unswerving resolution. So serious was the opposition to Muscovite rule that the invaders found it necessary to concentrate 12,000 troops at Tchirmen, and to provide them with mountain-guns. A prolonged engagement took place in the Sultanyeri district on the 18th of April, when the Russians are stated to have lost five hundred men in killed and wounded, including eight officers who fell to rise no more. At that time, the insurrection extended over an area of nearly 10,000 square miles, and engaged 30,000 Russian soldiers. The patriots appear to have numbered 15,000; and when the leaders at Sultanyeri were summoned by the Russians to lay down their arms, on the ground that Turkey and Russia had signed a peace, they replied, "We are fighting for no sovereign, but for our own lives and honour." Arms and ammunition, destined for the insurgents, were discovered leaving Adrianople concealed in coffins; and the Turkish Government so far recognised the legitimacy of the rising as to communicate to the several embassies various petitions from the malcontents, stating that it was Bulgarian cruelties which caused the revolt. It is worthy of note that the operations of these guerilla bands were not confined to the southern side of the Rhodope Mountains, but extended, after a while, to the northern slopes, and thus affected that part of the country which was considered peculiarly Bulgarian. At the same time, Bosnia was in a state of extreme agitation; large bodies of Mohammedans were in arms, and, if the Christians refused to join them, their villages were burned, and themselves maltreated. Wide tracts of land were lying uncultivated; commerce was stagnant, and coined money had almost disappeared from circulation. In every quarter of the Turkish Empire, the war had proved a misery and a curse.

By many it was thought that the Sultan ought to have given active support to these scattered insurrections, and to have resumed the war with Russia after the short breathing time that had been enjoyed since the end of January. The feeling was very unreasonable, for, without the support of England, which was highly doubtful, the Turkish Government would simply have risked complete annihilation in once more provoking the anger of her powerful foe. But the cautious reserve of the Sultan created a general sense of dissatisfaction, and plots aiming at the restoration of Murad were suspected by the authorities, and with difficulty kept in check. A wild movement of this nature was indeed attempted on the 20th of May, when a number of Mussulman refugees, or persons having that appearance, made an attack on the palace of the ex-Sultan. The leader of the plot was Ali Suavi Effendi, an eager partisan of the "Young Turkey" faction, and, for some months in 1877, Director of the Imperial Lyceum of Galata Serai, in which capacity he published a fierce attack on the character of England, and lost his post in consequence.* He was married to an Englishwoman who had recently deserted him, and he had employed his time in the composition of numerous pamphlets, bearing on the fortunes of his country. More recently, he had raised and armed a strong band of refugees for service in the Rhodope Mountains, where, under the command of a Circassian chief, they were to aid the cause of the insurgents. On the morning of the 20th of May, the members of this band were mustered, and told that they must first do homage to the Sultan. By "the Sultan," Ali Suavi appears to have meant the prisoner, Murad; and to the Palace of Tcheragan the refugees were accordingly led. The sentinel challenged them, but was immediately stabbed, and, as the assailants were forcing their way into the edifice, they were encountered by a small body of troops, who fired on them. A brief conflict ensued, ending in the repulse of the enthusiasts, and the death of Ali Suavi himself, of the Circassian chief, and of nineteen others. Fifteen more were wounded, and these were sent for by Sultan Abdul-Hamid, and interrogated by him. They declared that they had no notion of doing wrong, and in fact believed that they were about to pay homage to their lawful

* See Vol I., p. 435.

sovereign. The Sultan thereupon pardoned them, and placed the wounded under care of the Palace surgeons. The real objects of the movement were wrapped in considerable mystery; but it was probably hoped to create a revolution, and to establish on the throne some one who would take a more directly patriotic part in opposition to the Russians. From day to day, Constantinople seemed on the brink of a sanguinary convulsion; and a fire which broke out on the night of May 22nd within the precincts of the Sublime Porte, and which destroyed several of the Government offices, may perhaps have been intentionally brought about. The distress amongst the refugees would in itself have caused some desperate movement with any people less patient than the Turks. Five thousand of these miserable beings sent a deputation to the Porte, asking for relief, and stating that provisions had failed, and sickness was increasing among them. The Government promised that rations should thenceforth be regularly distributed; but it was doubtful how far the means existed for meeting the wants of so considerable a body of paupers.

The misfortunes of Turkey were in many respects the misfortunes of Russia also. The uncertain posture of affairs did incalculable mischief to commerce, and even the most self-reliant of Russians looked forward with uneasiness to a collision with the enormous naval force of England. To meet the apprehended danger, a patriotic body was formed in the ancient capital of Russia, called the Moscow Cruiser Committee. A proclamation by its members, headed "Appeal for Subscriptions in Aid of the Acquisition of Ships for the Volunteer Fleet," was dispersed all over the Empire, and it is said that the production was revised by the Czar's eldest son previously to its being sent forth in May. "The Lord has sent Russia another trial," said this appeal to the nation. "Our implacable foe threatens us with war. Are we to bear patiently the wresting from us of the fruits of our victory? Our foe is strong on the sea. The number and might of his marine resources greatly exceed our own. But there is a way of striking him a blow on his sea-path, which he may sensibly feel. Who does not know that the interests of our enemy lie in his profits and gains? He owns a mighty marine force. Thirty thousand vessels plough the sea for him. Here, then, is the way to strike him a blow. At the moment when the enemy closes our seas, and, as in the time of the Crimean War, burns and robs our undefended villages along the coast,—at that moment, let us carry the misery of war into the midst of his marine. For this purpose, we must have swift and powerful vessels, which may present themselves suddenly and with terror upon the sea-paths of our foe. Cruise among the enemy's merchant-fleet, and our antagonist will be rolled up in his self-presumption." The proclamation had less effect than might have been expected. The sums raised were very small; yet, trifling as they were they are said to have been double the amount paid to the Czarevna's committee for the relief of the sick and wounded in the field. Nevertheless, the necessity of creating a stronger naval force was acutely felt by the Government, and attempts were made to meet the want in America. At the close of April, a large German steamer, the *Cimbria*, which was known to have been chartered by the Russian Government, arrived in one of the harbours on the coast of Maine, and stayed there for some time, undergoing repairs. The vessel had no armament, but contained six hundred Russians, consisting of naval officers and men-of-war's men. It appears to have been the object of the Russian Government to purchase a large number of steamers in America; and two Russian officers or agents, one of whom was a brother of the naval officer in command of the *Cimbria*, arrived at New York on the 4th of May, and, after consulting with a well-known shipbuilder, proceeded to Washington. Captain Semetschkin, of the *Cimbria*, admitted to various newspaper reporters that his object was to purchase ships, and that his officers and men were designed to man any cruisers which he might obtain. He was aware that to enlist men in America would be an infringement of the law; but this he had no intention of doing. All he proposed was to purchase vessels, arms, or anything else he might want, and man the ships thus acquired with a Russian crew. To keep within the terms of the law, he had engaged the services of half a dozen able lawyers, and he promised to be guided by their advice in whatever he did. Captain Trippenburg, the other Russian agent, stated that, in case of war, the officers and men of the *Cimbria* would be despatched to a Russian naval station in the Pacific, from which point vessels could be manned and sent to their destination more speedily than at any part of the American coast. The captain, however, was considerably embarrassed by the close watch kept on his movements by persons whom he regarded as agents of the English Government, but who may possibly have been employed by the Washington Cabinet, as proceedings of the nature of those in which the Russian officers were engaged are not unlikely to involve a country in very awkward complications with the Power whose interests are assailed.

Parliament had not yet reassembled after the Easter recess; but the views of Ministers and their opponents found expression in speeches delivered on several public occasions. Mr. Gathorne Hardy, one of the most energetic supporters of an anti-Russian policy within the circle of the Cabinet, made an elaborate address at Bradford on the 29th of April, in which he observed that her Majesty's Government would abide by the conditions to which however horrible or however disastrous it may be." The speaker asked any candid man, whatever his party or his politics, if he could see in the Treaty of San Stefano a single element of permanent peace. He did not say that it could not be modified so as to effect a permanent peace; but, as it stood, it contained in itself every element which would cause dissatisfaction, the disruption of unity, and the spread of ambitious passions, and which would



A YOUNG LAZE OF BATOUM.

England assented at the peace of 1856, and which were ratified at the settlement of 1871. In the latter year it had been declared that, supposing there were several parties to a treaty, one of those parties could not withdraw from any portion of that treaty without the assent of all the signatories; and upon this broad principle of public faith and public honesty the Government took their stand. The sufferings of the Christian population of Turkey had undoubtedly been extreme, and the Bulgarian massacres were of the most terrific character. "But," said Mr. Hardy, "the policy of a great contract is not to be destroyed by an incident, eventually bring about a war that must either destroy Turkey, or ruin the new province which it was proposed to set up. The Christians of Turkey belonged not merely to one sect or nationality. The Sclaves inclined towards the Russians, because the populations were analogous; but the Greeks were a distinct race, and had distinct interests and feelings. Was everything to be done for the one population, and was the other to be sacrificed? Moreover, they had to consider the Mussulmans, to whom any sense of wrong was as bitter as the ill-usage of Christians was to us. Mr. Hardy earnestly repudiated the accusation that Ministers desired

BURNING GOVERNMENT OFFICES AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

war; cast ridicule on the principles of the peace party; and warmly condemned that section of the Liberal body which proclaimed that England ought to have joined Russia in coercing Turkey. To have done so, he maintained, would have been an iniquity so abominable that the burden of it would have remained on the national conscience for ever. The war had been productive of most frightful evils. The sufferings of the Christians themselves had been enormous, and the calamities of the Mussulmans were even greater. It had been estimated that not less than half a million persons—a great number of whom were women and children—had died either by famine or the sword, or had endured outrages worse than death; and it was by this accumulation of woe upon woe that the wrongs of the Bulgarians had been redressed. The Indian Secretary spoke very highly of the way in which the Reserves were responding to the call of Government; and he added that the summoning of the Indian forces to Europe showed that England was no longer a small and isolated country, but a vast Empire, which had a right to draw its defenders from every part. As regarded the principle of non-intervention, Mr. Hardy agreed with it so far as it related to the internal affairs of other countries; but for England to assert that she would not share in the general policy of Europe, would be equivalent to saying that she has no Empire at all. "It is with the object," said Mr. Hardy, "of securing a durable peace that we seek to enter a Congress where our voices may be fully heard upon every question that affects the treaties of 1856 and 1871; and we look to the people of England to enable us to speak with that force and that decision which will give effect to our efforts."

Mr. Bright, who (as the reader is aware) had but recently addressed the public on this subject at Rochdale, made another speech at Manchester on the 30th of April, when he severely criticized the remarks of Mr. Hardy on the previous day. The burden of Mr. Bright's argument was, that the Government intended to go to war, and were contriving in every way to provoke a collision. He denounced with great bitterness the vote of credit, the sending of the fleet to the Sea of Marmora, the calling out of the Reserves, and the bringing of Indian troops to Europe. The last of these acts struck him as particularly iniquitous, since it might end in sending Mohammedan soldiers to fight against the Christian nation of Russia. That the project of a Congress had been suspended, was due, according to Mr. Bright, entirely to the Government of England. Russia had made no difficulty; Germany had started no obstacle; Austria had alleged no complaint; Italy was satisfied; France went with the rest. Such was Mr. Bright's contention; but in some respects it was singularly inexact. The statement that Russia had made no difficulty is one of those misrepresentations into which even a man of the highest worth may be betrayed by a too eager partizanship. But the whole of Mr. Bright's speech on this occasion was distinguished by his inferior qualities of verbal excess, while failing in his better qualities of reasoning power and eloquent expression. The right honourable gentleman rebuked Mr. Hardy for having said that the policy of a great contract, like that entered into in 1856, and confirmed in 1871, was not to be destroyed by such "an incident" as that of the Bulgarian massacres. "Surely," said Mr. Bright, "it has something to do with the minds of Christian men, who are asked to go to war to set on its legs again a Power and a Government with whom massacre is not an incident once in fifty or a hundred years, but an incident of constant operation within the bounds of that Empire. And I say, that if any man will go to the men and women of England, and ask them whether they are willing to sacrifice their blood and treasure to sustain that terrible oppression, that multitudinous crime, which is called the Ottoman Government, the people of England will very soon dispose of any Minister, or of any Government, who will put the question to them in that naked form." All this was the license of an impulsive oratory, which the flatterers of Mr. Bright may call eloquence, but which more judicious admirers of his great political career must needs regard with sorrow. The statement that massacre is an incident of "constant operation" within the bounds of the Turkish Empire is so extraordinary an exaggeration that it is only to be palliated by the excuses which may be urged for a man who speaks in a passion, and does not measure his words too nicely; while the imaginary appeal to the people of England is one of those beggings of the question which, on the slightest analysis, wither into the dust and ashes that are their only substance. Mr. Hardy was perfectly right in saying that a particular crime, however great, must not be suffered to set aside the faith of treaties, and the most obvious considerations of rational policy. Mr. Bright described Mr. Hardy's speech as "boisterous, reckless, and illogical;" yet he proceeded to make an attack on Lord Beaconsfield, which for bitterness and violence has rarely been equalled in the annals of political warfare. "We are asking the Christian men and women of England," said Mr. Bright, "that they shall not accept from that Minister, and carry into

effect without such solemn consideration as the question demands, a suspension for an indefinite period, not only of the Ten Commandments, but of the Sermon on the Mount." If, by this, Mr. Bright had meant nothing more than that every war carries with it an enormous mass of crime, his remark would have been just, if a little trite; but he gave it a special application which was eminently *un*just. When the Emperor of Russia, after first preparing a state of things in Roumelia which gave him the desired pretext for intervention, carried fire and sword across the borders of the Turkish Empire, and caused a degree of misery, and a foul undergrowth of wickedness, in comparison with which the Bulgarian massacres were trifling indeed, nothing was heard from Mr. Bright as to the suspension of the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount. From the tone uniformly adopted by the right honourable gentleman in treating of this question, it might have been supposed that the highest laws of morality and religion were being established by the Russian sword; but when preparations were made by England, not necessarily for war, but for the enforcement of a policy which had for its object to restrain the excessive ambition of the Northern Power, Mr. Bright discovered that the Commandments were about to be suspended for the special gratification of Lord Beaconsfield, and that the Sermon on the Mount was to be set aside until it was the pleasure of that Minister to re-enact its provisions. Too many of our public speakers have of late adopted a tone of personal rancour which, if it be not discouraged, will soon degrade their utterances to the lowest levels of the worst oratory of New York or California. Statesmen to whom the world is indebted for much noble and abiding work are false to themselves if they adopt a tone which a peevish child should recollect with shame in the moments of its restored sanity.

Unfortunately, however, it is language such as this which has the greatest influence on large numbers of the people, for it is common to many minds to judge rather through the medium of their emotions than through that of their reason. Mr. Bright made a direct appeal to the forty or fifty thousand ministers of religion whom he supposed to exist in Great Britain and Ireland; and in so doing he addressed a class peculiarly liable to be led away by sudden gusts of feeling. He remarked that, somewhat more than a year before, he had asked, when speaking at a Welsh watering-place, why it was that those ministers were absolutely dumb in reference to the great question of peace or war; and he had wished them to consider how it was that, while there had been Christianity of some sort for eighteen centuries, the Christian sentiment of the people, and the Christian teachings of the priests, had not been able to overcome the temptations to war which arise from the ignorance of peoples, and the ambition of potentates and statesmen. He had been gratified to observe that during the previous year, and especially during the previous few months, there had been more manifestation of feeling on that question among the teachers of religion than at any former time. Mr. Bright was not wrong as to the matter of fact; but he should have added that this manifestation of feeling was directed not against the aggressor, but against the victim, and against all those in our own country who would have restrained the former in his designs upon the latter. At that very time, the Dissenting bodies of England, and a large proportion of the Established Church, were fiercely agitating against any interference with the Russian victor who had marched through torrents of blood up to the very gates of Constantinople. A declaration, to be signed by clergymen of the Church of England, was promoted by the Rev. Mr. Denton, a minister in the East of London, who some time before had published a work on the sufferings of the Christians in Turkey. Immediately on the announcement being made, the names of 1,600 clergymen were sent in to be appended to the document. This number was afterwards considerably augmented; and the Nonconformists had their own declarations of a similar character. A protest against war was published in the newspapers, with a request that signatures might be transmitted from all parts of the country. The names first came in at the rate of one thousand a day; then two thousand a day; then three and four thousand a day; and ultimately 14,750 signatures were received by the secretary through one morning's post.* In the course of May, this declaration was signed by more than 200,000 persons; and, previously to that, an address to the Queen, deprecating warlike measures, and praying for the assembly of a Congress, was signed by the Dukes of Bedford and Westminster, and by 12,000 persons of all ranks and callings in life. At the same time, a petition to the Queen and to the Legislature, urging a due assertion of the national dignity in the affairs of the East, received only a few thousand adhesions, and none whatever of any mark or prominence. The issue had been successfully removed by Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bright, aided by the inarticulate fervours of the pulpit, from the ground of reason to the ground of emotion; and the highest

* Speech of Mr. Jacob Bright at Manchester, April 30th, 1878.

questions of policy and justice were forgotten in the cries of hysteria and the shouts of faction. It is still doubtful whether the adherents of Russia counted a numerical majority in the country; but their organisation was perfect, and they made their appeal to the very feelings which are always the most likely to obtain a striking, if a temporary success. Those who still believed that Turkey had rights, and that England had duties, were a numerous body; but they trusted to the Government, and indulged in a fatal security. How little the Government responded to the confidence thus placed in them, a few weeks sufficed to show; and the 200,000 signatures to the declaration against war facilitated the surrender which was even then suspected by acute observers.

## CHAPTER XV.

**Reassembling of Parliament on the 6th of May—The Question of the Indian Troops—Speech of Mr. Gladstone at Hawarden—Extension of the Royal Prerogative—Debate in the Two Houses of Parliament—The Constitutional Argument as stated by Lord Selborne—Reply of Lord Cairns on behalf of the Government—Position of the Indian Army, as determined by the Indian Government Act of 1858—Speech of Lord Beaconsfield—Debate in the House of Commons on the Motion of the Marquis of Hartington—The Principles of 1689, and their Application—Amendment by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach—Speeches of Mr. Fawcett, the Attorney-General, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Cross, Sir Henry James, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—Reply of Lord Hartington—Defeat of the Opposition—Further Discussion in the Committee of Supply—Inconsistent Arguments—An Historical Precedent—The Discussion of 1775 on the sending of Foreign Troops to Gibraltar and Minorca Divers Interpretations as to the Distinction between the Kingdom and the Dependencies of the Crown—The Constitutional Maxims of one Age to be modified by the altered Circumstances of another—Popular Power the Modern Safeguard against Despotic Government.**

After an Easter recess of about three weeks, the House of Commons met once more on the 6th of May, when it became immediately apparent that the great battle between the Opposition and the Government would be fought out on the important question whether the bringing of Indian troops to Europe was justifiable on Constitutional grounds, or expedient in the existing posture of affairs. On the very first evening that the members re-assembled, Lord Hartington asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer for information on the subject, and Sir Stafford Northcote replied that it would be the duty of the Government to lay before the Legislature an estimate of the cost of removing the troops to Malta, and that then would be the most fitting time for raising a discussion on the whole matter. Mr. Fawcett afterwards made some remarks which struck the key-note of the Opposition with regard to this momentous issue. He observed that, if the principle were sanctioned, Indian soldiers might be brought over to an almost unlimited extent. They might have 200,000 men from that army one year, and 500,000 the next. No Indian soldier, he said, had ever been brought into Europe before, and there was consequently no precedent to justify what had been ordered. The House did not know what was going to be done with the troops, and, according to the opinion of some whose opinions were entitled to respect, there was nothing to prevent the Government from landing 70,000 or 80,000 of these Eastern warriors in London itself. The question was not fully discussed on that occasion; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave it emphatically as his opinion that the order to her Majesty's Indian troops was strictly within the Constitutional prerogative of the Crown, and one which the Queen had as much right to give as to direct any regiment of British troops then in England to proceed to Gibraltar, or Malta, or anywhere else. Thus the issue was fairly joined, and a grand debate on abstract principles of Constitutional law—always a subject fertile in adverse arguments, and incapable of being brought to any decisive test—appeared imminent in the near future.

The day for this discussion could not be immediately fixed, and in the meanwhile Mr. Gladstone found or made an opportunity for the extra-Parliamentary expression of his views. On the 8th of May, he received at Hawarden, in Wales, a deputation representing a large number of towns and political organisations in various parts of England, to whom he delivered a long address on the latest developments of the Eastern Question. Was India, he asked, to be responsible for keeping up an army for Imperial purposes? If that was to be done, the injustice to India was not to be described. He alluded with much emphasis to an article which had recently appeared in the *Quarterly Review*, and which he designated as "a feeler." Its objects, he said, were disloyal to the Crown, and dangerous to

public liberty. As the intention of the article was to show that the Sovereign had a right personally to direct the policy of this country in peace or war, it is difficult to see how it could be described as "disloyal," however mistaken, or even mischievous, it might be. But Mr. Gladstone was so irate with the luckless essay that he compared it with those which in former times it was customary to burn by the hands of the common hangman; though he acknowledged that Englishmen have now a much better way of deciding such matters. Mr. Gladstone appears to have given more attention to the article than it required. The bringing of the Indian troops to Europe was doubtless an important Constitutional question; but it was one affecting the responsibility of Ministers, rather than any abstract consideration as to whether or not the prerogatives of the Crown ought to be enlarged.*

The debate in the two Houses of Parliament began on the 20th of May, when, in the Upper House, Lord Selborne—an able and distinguished lawyer, who had been Lord Chancellor in Mr. Gladstone's Government—called attention to the question "whether the Indian troops, excepted from the vote recited in the preamble of the Mutiny Act, can consistently with Constitutional law, be employed during time of peace elsewhere than in her Majesty's Indian possessions, without the previous consent of Parliament." Lord Selborne directly challenged the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that her Majesty had a perfect right to move the Indian troops to Malta by the simple exercise of her prerogative, and that such an act was subject to the control of Parliament only, like all movements of British forces, by means of the power of withholding the supplies asked for to enable the movement to be effected. To Lord Selborne it appeared that such an act was opposed not merely to those abstract maxims of Constitutional right which had been laid down by great authorities, but also to the strict letter of the law. He affirmed, and undertook to maintain, two propositions: first, that the previous consent of Parliament was necessary ere any forces in addition to those voted for the year, and mentioned in the Mutiny Act, could be employed in time of peace, except in India, whether they were Indian troops or not; secondly, that under the India Government Act of 1858 the Indian revenue could not be used, without the previous consent of Parliament, for the payment of Indian or native troops out of India, and that such payment was not made legal even when there was an intention on the part of Government to ask Parliament for an indemnity. One of the main points in Lord Selborne's argument was that the forces mentioned in the annual Mutiny Act, by which the numbers of the army were determined for the ensuing twelve months, constituted the Imperial standing army, and were not intended simply for service in the United Kingdom. The forces for outlying plantations and garrisons were kept separate, and had separate votes and separate appropriations; but they were not regarded as part of the Imperial army. From this, it appeared to be inferred by Lord Selborne that only the forces mentioned in the Mutiny Act, exclusive of the forces voted separately, could be moved from one part of the Empire to another; the remainder of the forces being simply designed for local purposes. In addition to the Constitutional question, however, was the strictly legal question; and the charge against the Government, that it had broken actual statute law, was based on the following section or clause (the 55th) of the India Government Act of 1858:—"Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of her Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontier of such possessions by her Majesty's forces charged upon such revenues." That clause was not originally in the Bill: it was introduced by Mr. Gladstone, but received the approval of the late Lord Derby, then Prime Minister, and of Mr. Disraeli, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader of the House of Commons. In 1867, after the employment of Indian troops in the Abyssinian expedition, Mr. Gladstone objected to the payment of the men by advance out of the Indian revenues, although it was always intended to repay the money out of British taxation; and Sir Stafford Northcote, the Indian Minister of that day, somewhat rashly admitted that the clause quoted above would, strictly speaking, prohibit what had been done. A good deal, however, depended on whether "the consent of both Houses of Parliament" necessarily meant *previous* consent, and on the interpretation of the phrase "sudden and urgent necessity." Lord Selborne was clearly of opinion that the consent of Parliament must be first had and obtained; and he was equally convinced that there had been nothing in the nature of sudden urgency, such as could justify the Government in departing from the usual custom with reference to the Indian troops.

The Constitutional and legal question was argued, from the point of view of the Government, by the

* The article to which Mr. Gladstone alluded appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for April, 1878, under the title of "The Crown and the Constitution."

Lord Chancellor, the late Earl Cairns. In opposition to Lord Selborne, he contended that the Bill of Rights (clause 6) simply forbade the maintaining "within the kingdom" of an army in time of peace without the consent of Parliament. When that Act was passed, in 1689, "the kingdom" was understood to mean England only, and indeed could not have meant anything else, as Scotland and Ireland were distinct kingdoms, though under the same Crown; but, after the union with Scotland, the term included the whole of Great Britain. Ireland was not included until 1801, and Lord Cairns affirmed that throughout the whole of the eighteenth century an army was kept up in Ireland without the consent of the English Parliament. That, he argued, was not a violation of the Bill of Rights. The Mutiny Act said nothing of Ireland; but since the union of that country with Great Britain, the understanding with the Crown had been declared to be that no army was to be kept up within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament. This was the interpretation which Parliament annually put upon the well-known clause of the Bill of Rights. It could not be contended that Malta was part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and in the Mutiny Act a clear distinction was drawn between troops in a colony or dependency of the Crown, which could not serve in the United Kingdom, and those which could so serve. In Canada, New South Wales, Victoria, New Zealand, British Guiana, Jamaica, Honduras, St. Vincent, Grenada, Antigua, Dominica, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and St. Helena, there were forces of the Crown not included in the Mutiny Act; and in the first of those possessions they numbered in one year nearly 45,000, who were bound to serve either within or without the



Dominion. The native Indian Army, since the Act of 1858, had been part of the forces of the Crown, which, according to Lord Cairns, it was the prerogative of the monarch (except where the power was specially restrained) to move to whatever place might be thought fit. This prerogative, like every other, may be made the subject of dispute; but it is at any rate worthy of note that so extreme a Whig as Charles James Fox gave it as his opinion that the power vested in the Sovereign, of sending troops to whatever part of his dominions might require their assistance, was one of the most valuable

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of the Royal privileges. That great Liberal statesman objected to a measure then before Parliament, because it was dangerous to this prerogative, and might prevent the Crown from sending troops to Ireland from any other place, or from Ireland to other parts of the Empire. The terms of enlistment of the native Indian Army contained the words,—"I will be faithful to her Majesty the Queen, her heirs and successors, and will go wherever I am ordered, by land or sea, and will obey all commands of the officers set over me, even at the peril of my life." These troops have on several occasions been employed in various parts of the Empire besides India; and the late Lord Derby, in accepting the principle of Mr. Gladstone's clause, expressly said that it was not intended to limit the prerogative of the Crown, but to protect the revenues of India from bearing the cost of the maintenance of Indian troops when serving out of their own country. Doubts on the subject had been expressed by Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and some other leading statesmen of the time, who thought the clause would impose too great a restriction on the power of the Crown, and under special circumstances, interfere with the military operations of the State. Lord Derby himself appears to have seen some applicability in these objections; for, setting aside the clause which had been sanctioned by the Lower House, he introduced another, which, though substantially the same, was so expressed as to remove any ambiguity that might otherwise have existed. The case of the Government, therefore, amounted to this: that the right of moving the Indian troops belonged exclusively to the Sovereign, acting on the advice of responsible Ministers; that those troops could be moved to any part of the British Empire, except within the bounds of the United Kingdom, that being (in time of peace) precluded by the Bill of Rights, unless with the express sanction of Parliament; that the expense should be borne by the English people, and not by the Indian revenue; that, although the consent of Parliament would be required for throwing the charge permanently upon

the Indian revenues, the law did not stipulate that the consent must be given before the movement of the troops was ordered, and the charge incurred; that, consequently, the temporary outlay from the Indian Exchequer was not illegal, since it was proposed to repay the amount from the Imperial Exchequer; that it was for Ministers to decide whether or not the occasion was one of "sudden and urgent necessity;" and that if, in this or any other respect, they had acted illegally or improperly, the remedy was in the hands of the Legislature, which could at any time turn them out of office, or refuse the supplies necessary to the proposed policy.

Lord Beaconsfield, in winding up the debate, said it would not be for the advantage of the public service to answer the question that had been asked, why Parliament had been called together three weeks before the usual time, if it was to be kept in the dark about such an operation as the bringing of Indian troops to Malta. Her Majesty's Government, he stated, were unable at that time to defend their conduct without entering into details which it would not then be proper to lay before the House. The Premier professed to feel much regret that his lips were closed, and averred that he and his colleagues would like to explain their whole policy, and give their reasons for it. They were striving to secure the blessings of peace, and to maintain the freedom of Europe and the just position of England. But it was impossible at that moment to defend their conduct without making statements, and entering into arguments and details, which might be prejudicial to the great objects which all had in view. "Until," said Lord Beaconsfield, "the time arrives when we can enter into a complete exposition of our policy, all I shall answer is, that what we have done we have done with the belief that it was for the public service; and, though you may condemn us, we shall remain silent under the accusation, sooner than vindicate our conduct by injuring the public we are bound to serve." In these remarks, Lord Beaconsfield seems to have foreshadowed the compromise with Russia which was being then negotiated, and which, when at length revealed to the world, gave little satisfaction to either friend or foe.

The attack of the Opposition was not confined to the House of Lords; for on the same evening (May 20th) Lord Hartington introduced into the Commons a formal resolution, which set forth "That, by the Constitution of this realm, no forces may be raised or kept by the Crown, in time of peace, without the consent of Parliament, within any part of the dominions of the Crown, excepting only such forces as may be actually serving within her Majesty's Indian possessions." The leader of the Opposition argued that if it were possible for a large number of Indian forces to be brought over to fill outlying garrisons and posts, without the consent of Parliament, it was obvious that a much larger number of troops might be withdrawn from the colonies, and concentrated in the United Kingdom, than was contemplated by Parliament when it voted the Estimates, and passed the Mutiny Act. It must always, however, be recollected that, as the number of troops is specifically mentioned in the Mutiny Act, the total force thus determined could not, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, be increased by a single man without the most obvious and glaring infraction of the law. Lord Hartington, indeed, did not seem to be at all at ease with his own contention; for he admitted that Parliament had wisely, and even of necessity, decided that a system having some of the characteristics of a despotism should be applied to India, and that the Constitutional guarantees which we maintain at home, and in all our colonies, are not suited to the rule of that country. Parliament, in 1858, had not insisted on the same Constitutional checks in the case of our Indian army as it had always maintained with respect to the standing army at home, and in our several possessions other than India. But this very fact, which Lord Hartington appeared to consider a strong point against the Government, was really one of the arguments by which the Government justified its action. The Indian Army is in truth, as Lord Hartington admitted, part of a despotic system which is administered by the Crown through its chosen agents; and, unless anything in statute law prevents it, there is no reason why the Sovereign should not move a portion of that army into a possession such as Malta, whenever the public necessity should seem to require the removal. The well-understood terms of the British Constitution preclude, and very properly preclude, the introduction of such an army into England, Scotland, or Ireland; but India and Malta are beyond the bounds of the British Constitution, and are administered upon different principles of government. The mistake of the Opposition in this matter seems to have proceeded from an altogether futile attempt to apply the Constitutional maxims of 1689 to a condition of things which the legislators of that date could never have anticipated, and which, if they could have anticipated it, they would certainly have met by principles totally distinct from those which they applied to the conduct of home affairs. The best proof of this is to be found in their method of dealing with Ireland. Ireland stood towards the

England of those times in much the same position as that in which India stands towards the England of to-day. It was a dependency of the Crown, and was to be ruled despotically.* Whether this was right or wrong is not the question: the fact was so, and it shows that the law-makers of 1689 would no more have applied the Bill of Rights to India or to Malta than they in fact applied it to Ireland.



THE 9TH BENGAL CAVALRY (HODSON'S HORSE).

The King might raise troops in that country, and might at pleasure send them to other dependencies of the Crown; but he was not to bring them into England in time of peace, unless with the consent of Parliament. At the present day, dependencies like India and Malta stand in the same relation towards the British Constitution that Ireland occupied at the period of the Bill of Rights; that is to say, they stand outside of it, and are not immediately affected by its provisions. It was idle, therefore, to argue the question then before Parliament on simply Constitutional grounds. The point really to be determined was, whether there had been a violation of statute law in the removal of the Indian troops without sufficient reason, or without the previous consent of Parliament; and this point the Marquis of Hartington seemed rather to evade, both in his resolution, and in the speech by which it was accompanied.

A counter-resolution, by way of amendment, was moved by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Colonial Secretary. The amendment declared "That this House, being of opinion that the Constitutional control of Parliament over the raising and employment of the military forces of the Crown is fully secured by the provisions of the law, and by the undoubted power of this House to grant or refuse supplies, considers it to be unnecessary and inexpedient to affirm any resolution tending to weaken the hands of her Majesty's Government in the present state of foreign affairs." The Colonial Secretary exposed a fallacy which had to some extent influenced the argument of the Opposition. He alleged, and with indisputable truth, that the 55th section of the India Government Act contains nothing which forbids the use of the Indian troops beyond the limits of our East India possessions, even without the consent of

* "The colony in Ireland," says Lord Macaulay (History of England, Chap. 23), "was emphatically a dependency; a dependency, not merely by the common law of the realm, but by the nature of things. It was absurd to claim independence for a community which could not cease to be dependent without ceasing to exist." The historian is speaking of the year 1698. A species of Parliament sat in Ireland at that time; but it represented only the English part of the population, and it was subordinate to the Parliament at Westminster. Nevertheless, it was not the Parliament at Westminster, but the King, who on certain occasions determined the Irish military establishment.

Parliament. The prohibition is directed simply against so employing them (except in certain cases) at the expense of the Indian revenue, unless with the consent of the Legislature. But it was not proposed to charge the expenditure on India; so that any objection on this ground was beside the mark. At the conclusion of his address, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach asked the House, by rejecting the motion of Lord Hartington, and by adopting in lieu of it that which he had proposed, to make it clear to the world that, when danger threatened us, the thongs of our Empire would be drawn closer and closer still, and that, in the defence of right, freedom, and civilization, we should, if necessary, marshal not only the inhabitants of our own islands, but the natives of distant shores and varied climes, linked together in the wide dominions of the Queen.

The debate continued without anything material being added to the argument on either side, and was ultimately adjourned until the following evening, when the discussion was re-opened by Mr. Fawcett, who gave notice that, if the Ministerial amendment passed, he would, on the first Supply night, move a resolution declaring that, as the army of India was so large as to admit of troops being despatched to the aid of England in a European contest, the military expenditure of India was excessive, and ought to be reduced. He described the claim set up by Government as amounting to this—that the Indian army might be drawn on indefinitely to assist this country in a European conflict; and he believed that this was so serious an innovation that the people of England ought to have been consulted before it was sanctioned. Moreover, it was a mean and ungenerous thing to call upon India to shed her blood in defence of British interests; and, having regard to all the facts and principles of the case, Mr. Fawcett announced his intention to put before the English people, whenever the opportunity arrived, this broad and intelligible question:—"Is it your wish that the control which Parliament has exercised in the past over the strength of the English army shall be continued, or do you desire that the control which your forefathers struggled for should, by the exercise of a dominant prerogative, be virtually taken away from the House of Commons?" Mr. Fawcett was followed by the Attorney-General (Sir John Holker), who maintained that Parliament had a complete check and control over the raising and disposition of the forces, not only in the United Kingdom, but elsewhere, when the expense had to be paid out of British revenues, because it might refuse the requisite supplies. It could not, however, be said that, irrespective of the question of expense, it was impossible to raise forces in any part of the British Empire without the consent of the Imperial Parliament; for in several of the colonies distinct bodies of troops had been formed, without the Parliament at Westminster having anything to do with it. It might be urged that these soldiers were raised by Acts of the local Legislatures, which were themselves created by the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland. But, asked the Attorney-General, under what authority were the native troops of India raised? Were they raised simply by the will of the Governor-General? No: they were raised under a law of the Governor-General in Council, which law was enacted under the authority of the Imperial Legislature. There was, he contended, nothing in the Act for the Government of India which precluded her Majesty from exercising her prerogative, and bringing these troops from India to Malta; but the revenues of India were not to be charged with the expense of moving them. The Bill of Rights and the Mutiny Act referred simply to the United Kingdom; and if her Majesty could move her Indian troops where she pleased in time of war, as was not denied, no Constitutional principle prevented her from moving them in time of peace, if the expense were borne by this country.

The Constitutional question was once more raised by Mr. Gladstone, who delivered a long and interesting speech, characterised, however, by the same spirit which has appeared in all the right honourable gentleman's utterances in connection with Eastern affairs. He said that the doctrine of the Attorney-General, taken as a whole, was that it is the prerogative of the Crown to make peace and war, to raise and maintain armies, and to discipline, command, and direct troops; and that this prerogative, which was universal in the seventeenth century until it was supposed to receive its death-blow in 1689, still continues in force everywhere outside the United Kingdom. Parliament, according to Mr. Gladstone's version of Sir John Holker's argument, had nothing whatever to do, except to vote the money, and to vote it after it had been spent. Such were the views which Mr. Gladstone imputed to the Attorney-General. The honourable and learned gentleman does not appear to have denied that, in the colonies which have received a Constitution and an independent Legislature, the raising of the local forces is subject to the same kind of Parliamentary control (namely, the control of the local Parliaments) as that by which it is restricted in England; but he maintained, by an appeal to unquestionable facts, that the

Indian army stands upon a totally different footing, although, for removing it out of India, the consent of Parliament is necessary on financial grounds, either before or after the act of removal. Mr. Gladstone raised a great contention as to whether the Bill of Rights made the law which it laid down, as the Attorney-General affirmed, or, as he himself alleged, only declared it as a thing already existing. It is true that the Bill of Rights states that the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons, in Parliament assembled, "declare" such and such things; but it may still be a question whether the mere act of their making this declaration is in itself proof conclusive that the law was really as they asserted. The practice of the Crown, for some generations previous to 1689, had certainly been in a contrary sense, and, objectionable as that practice undoubtedly was, it might be difficult to show that it was distinctly illegal. But even if Mr. Gladstone's contention, that the Bill of Rights was simply declaratory, be admitted, it still does not follow that when the two Houses spoke of "the kingdom" they meant to include, not merely England, but every possession of the English Crown. It seems, indeed, hopeless to maintain that such was their meaning, when, as a matter of historical fact, it is clear that Ireland was not embraced within the provisions of the Bill of Rights.* Mr. Gladstone proceeded to ridicule the idea that there was any sudden and urgent necessity for what had been done. The necessity, such as it was, had arisen in the sequence and regular order of proceedings, each one of which was an indication of the one that came after it. In the estimation of Mr. Gladstone, the Constitution had been violated, and the liberties of the country had been impaired; and he considered that it was the duty of the minority to protest against such acts, even although they knew beforehand that they should be outvoted by the adherents of the Government.

When the discussion was again renewed, on the evening of May 23rd, Mr. Cross gave some explanations as to why the Government had not announced their intention before the separation of Parliament for the Easter recess. They did not wish to take such a step unless they were absolutely driven to it; and when they came to their decision, they were encountered by local difficulties with regard to winds and waves, which made it essential that the troops should be embarked by a certain time. "As there was still a doubt," continued the Home Secretary, "whether some practical difficulties could be got over or not, it would have been the height of folly if we had told the world of our intentions, and had then found it impossible to carry them out. There were reasons which even at the present moment cannot be told; and I may say on behalf of the Government that the most absolute secrecy was essential, for negotiations of the highest importance were going on, and we had received certain information from high authority, which has since happily turned out untrue. No one was more glad of that than myself; but there were rumours, coming from such an authority that we were bound to pay respect to them, and it would have been extremely rash if we had induced Parliament to enter into excited debates on the subject." One of the most able speeches in the latter part of the discussion was that of Sir Henry James, who had been Attorney-General in the Government of Mr. Gladstone. Amongst other matters, the honourable and learned gentleman addressed himself to a consideration of the Lord Chancellor's contention in the other House, to the effect that the Crown had, without the consent of Parliament, and without dispute, maintained a standing army in Ireland, at a time when that country formed no portion of the United Kingdom. Sir Henry denied that this statement had any foundation in fact. From 1691 to 1698, the English Parliament, he said, voted the Irish troops. In the latter year, Parliament came to the resolution that the troops should be disbanded, with the exception of 12,000, and the Legislature then conferred on the Crown the power of maintaining those troops in Ireland. In 1767, the English Government, growing uneasy about the American colonies, thought it advisable to add 3,000 troops to the Irish establishment; but they asked the assent of Parliament, which they obtained by an Act reciting the previous Act of William III. (1698), declaring the necessity for 3,000 more men, and enacting that it should be lawful for his Majesty to raise and keep in Ireland a number of troops of his Majesty's subjects, not exceeding 15,000. This general authorisation, however, is a very different thing from an annual vote, renewed from session to session with the option of refusing it, and proportioned to what Parliament regards as the varying necessities of the time. Moreover, it is beyond contradiction that additional

* It has always been understood that the common law of England, since the twelfth year of the reign of King John (1210), applied to Ireland as well as to this country; but, of English statutes passed since the date of Poynings's Laws (tenth of Henry VII., 1494), only those were binding upon Ireland in which that country was specifically named, or included under general words. Now, Ireland is not specifically named in the Bill of Rights, except with reference to the settlement of the succession, where the country is mentioned as a kingdom distinct from England; and the general expression, "the kingdom," in the earlier part, cannot possibly be understood as meaning two kingdoms.




INDIAN TROOPS LEAVING FOR MALTA.

troops, in considerable numbers, were maintained on the Irish establishment without any English vote. Several instances, occurring in the latter end of the century (1793–1800), were afterwards adduced by Lord Cairns; and the raising of these troops does not seem to have been challenged in any quarter. Additional troops had also been raised in Ireland in 1702, 1704, 1727, 1729, 1757, and 1760; and it was customary for the monarch to move the Irish regiments at will, and to increase their numbers whenever it appeared desirable. The debate on the Marquis of Hartington's motion was wound up, so far as the Cabinet was concerned, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who scoffed at the idea that the Government were advancing a claim on the part of the Crown to keep up a standing army of unlimited amount in any of the dominions of her Majesty without the consent of Parliament. He justly observed that all acts on the part of the Government are subject to the Constitutional control which Parliament exercises over the Ministers. If a merely literal construction were placed (for example) on the prerogative of declaring war, the Queen could any day make an attack on any foreign Power, for no reason whatever but the fancy of the moment; but every one knew it was practically impossible that such a thing should be done.



ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST TRANSPORT SHIP AT PORT SAID WITH INDIAN TROOPS.

The Marquis of Hartington, in his reply, questioned very much whether it was impossible in these days for a standing army to come into collision with Parliament. "No doubt," said the leader of the Opposition, "the Crown has, and always had, the power of making war; but it has that power far more completely and absolutely now than it had at any earlier period. Formerly, wars were conducted on a very small scale, and with comparatively great expenditure of time. Governments did not command large forces, or large pecuniary means. Preparations had to be made long beforehand; and

after they had been made, and expeditions had been sent out, both armies went into winter quarters, and there was plenty of time to consider, and perhaps to give up the war. But now, with the great armies and the great resources at the disposal of Governments, and with telegraphic communication all over the world, the Government may give an order which within a week may make a great war absolutely inevitable, and over which Parliament can have no control whatever." The Marquis regarded the voting of supplies as a privilege of no worth in such cases. He held it to be impossible for Parliament, whatever might be its wishes, to refuse the expenses of the Indian troops which had been sent to Malta. In other words, he believed, according to his own contention, that the British Constitution should be vitally injured, rather than that the money should not be voted when once the expenses had been incurred. He maintained that the powers of the Government in declaring war were far greater than they had ever been before; he conceived that the precautions and restrictions which it had always been thought necessary to take against the existence of a standing army, should not be relaxed, but rather strengthened; and, being convinced that the action of Ministers tended to weaken those restrictions, he preferred the resolution he had moved to the amendment of the Government. At half-past two o'clock on the morning of the 24th, the House divided on Lord Hartington's motion, which was rejected by 347 votes to 226; and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach's amendment was then adopted without further division. On the 27th of May, the House went into Committee of Supply on the Supplementary Estimates necessitated by the removal of the Indian troops; when, previous to the Speaker leaving the Chair, some further opposition to the Government policy was offered by Mr. Fawcett and others. On this occasion, the Marquis of Hartington exhibited that moderation, and also, it must be added, that shrinking from the strict application of his declared principles, by which his political conduct has been generally characterized. He said he would take no part in a division, because, amongst other reasons, he was bound to consider what would be the consequence of the rejection of those estimates. The consequence, he argued, would either be that the expense of the movement would be thrown wholly upon India, or, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer had told them on a previous night, the funds would be found at the cost of a total disorganization of the arrangements for the naval and military services of the year. In the existing state of Europe, he was not disposed to give a vote which would have such an effect. Furthermore, the rejection of the Supplementary Estimates would mean that, although Parliament would doubtless in some way recoup the expenditure which had been incurred, the troops would be sent back from Malta to India with the least possible delay. He was disinclined to support such a course by his vote, or to present to Europe the spectacle of such irresolution. It was one question, he thought, whether in the first instance the expedition should have been ordered, and another and very different one whether, having been ordered, it should be countermanded. This, there can be no doubt, was the wisest and most patriotic course for the Marquis to pursue; but it was a course not easily to be harmonized with the views which he had emphatically declared beforehand. If the Constitution was really in danger—if the liberties of the English people were actually menaced with a deadly peril—it was surely better that the naval and military arrangements for the year should be disorganized than that such calamities should be admitted. If, moreover, it was in truth an evil precedent to bring Indian troops into Europe, and if that evil was rendered tenfold worse by being employed in the promotion of a cause which Lord Hartington and his party professed to consider bad in all respects, it was the duty of the Opposition to endeavour by every means to procure the sending back of the troops as speedily as might be; and the presenting to Europe of a spectacle of irresolution was no sufficient reason why such a duty should not have been performed. But the whole argument was unreal and theatric, and broke down the moment it was brought to any test of action.

During the discussion of the Constitutional question in the two Houses, much was said as to a precedent occurring in the year 1775. Large bodies of troops having been despatched to the American colonies during the War of Independence, certain regiments of Hanoverian soldiers were sent to garrison Gibraltar, and also Port Mahon, in Minorca. The Elector of Hanover was George III. of England; but the Hanoverian soldiers were none the less foreign troops on that account. The act, therefore, was grossly unconstitutional; but the Opposition in Parliament proceeded not merely on this question of nationality, but also on the more general question whether the King had the right to make any such movement of troops without the sanction of Parliament. What was then laid down, according to the statement of Lord Hartington, was that no troops of any kind, whether native or foreign, could be raised or maintained in any of the dominions of the Crown without the consent of Parliament having been previously obtained. Lord

North, the Prime Minister of those days, was inclined at first to maintain that the Constitution had not been violated, and he got rid of the vote of censure that had been proposed by moving the previous question; but he subsequently considered it advisable to introduce a Bill of Indemnity. This was carried through the Commons, but thrown out by the Lords, either because the preamble recited that there were doubts about the matter, whereas the Upper House refused to admit that there were any doubts at all, or because they considered it was inconsistent with the course they had already taken in voting the previous question. That the bringing of foreign troops into any portion of the Empire is unconstitutional, is now universally admitted; but the removal of Indian troops, which are in fact subjects of the Crown, is a totally different matter. Much stress, however, was laid by Lord Selborne, the Marquis of Hartington, and various Opposition speakers, on the fact that in 1775 Lord Camden and other eminent authorities had denied the right of the King to maintain, in any part of the British dominions, any troops other than those consented to by Parliament, both as to number and to nation. According to the view of those great authorities, "the kingdom" meant the entire possessions of the Crown; but this opinion, however much entitled to respect, as coming from such distinguished lawgivers, cannot be regarded as conclusive when it is recollected that the Crown has actually, without any demur or protest, maintained troops in Ireland without the sanction of the English Parliament. The argument of Lord Cairns on this subject was disputed, as we have seen, by Sir Henry James in his address to the House of Commons; but the Lord Chancellor afterwards showed that he had grounds for what he said. It is remarkable that the Earl of Shelburne, who supported the vote of censure on the Government of Lord North, admitted by implication that the kingdom was one thing, and that the dependencies of the kingdom were another. Speaking of the danger to be apprehended from the maintenance of a standing force without the consent of Parliament, he said that "To do this within the limits of *the kingdom*, and in time of peace, is more dangerous, and carries with it less colour of necessity. To do the same in *Ireland, Gibraltar, or any of the dependencies of the kingdom*, may be less dangerous; but will any man say there is no danger?" * Furthermore, it was acutely pointed out by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach that from the year 1801 the preamble to the Mutiny Act has spoken of "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," which can hardly be taken to include the distant possessions of the Crown. That it was not so understood at the period of the Crimean War, is evident from an Act of that date, authorizing the establishment of a German Legion, which, it was distinctly laid down, should not serve within the United Kingdom, but which nevertheless did serve in Malta and at the Cape. Against facts such as these, the opinion of even so great an authority as Lord Camden is of little avail. The truth is, that these abstract Constitutional questions cannot well be interpreted in any absolute sense. The Earl of Shelburne, in the speech to which allusion has been made, observed that the Bill of Rights was declaratory, and supposed a law which could be found in no written book or statute whatever. In point of fact, it declared nothing more than what its framers desired to see established as the ruling maxims of English polity. Those maxims were so excellent, and so well calculated to guard the natural liberty of Englishmen, that in the main they have been adopted ever since as fixed and indisputable principles. But in some respects, and especially in this matter of the army, the precise intention of the legislators of 1689 is open to different constructions, and has in fact been differently construed as the necessities of a widening Empire have appeared to render desirable. A pedantic adhesion to what was settled nearly two hundred years ago, even if it could always be determined to a nicety what the statesmen of that epoch desired, might at times be fatal to the very ends which our ancestors had in view, when the altered circumstances of the Empire are taken into account. The small Kingdom of 1689, with its scattered dependencies, smaller and feebler than itself, has spread into a mighty Empire, greater than that which was ruled by the Cæsars from the City of the Seven Hills. The powers of the Executive have necessarily increased in proportion to the realm that has to be administered; but the power of the people has increased also. It has increased in the wider basis of Parliamentary institutions; in the strength and efficacy of popular discussion; in the power of the press; in the rapid intercommunication of mind with mind, not only within the extent of the Empire, but throughout the circumference of the globe itself. The maxims of 1689 can never become obsolete; but they may in some respects demand re-adaptation to an altered world. The petty checks against petty tyranny, which were imperative at the era of the Revolution, have been superseded by the larger checks of a condition of society in which, as an ultimate and irresistible fact, the people are supreme.

* Parliamentary History, vol. xviii., p. 816, as quoted by Lord Hartington in the House of Commons, May 20th, 1878.

## CHAPTER XVI.

Warlike Preparations of England and Russia—Readiness of both Powers to accept a Compromise—Conciliatory Proposals of Germany—Visit of Count Schouvaloff to St. Petersburg in May—Exhausted Condition of Russia—Return of Count Schouvaloff to London—Renewed Prospects of a Congress—Invitation from the German Government to assemble at Berlin—Reply of Lord Salisbury—Secret Understanding with Russia—Unexpected Revelation in the *Globe* Newspaper—Disingenuous Denial of the Foreign Secretary—Terms of the Agreement of May 30th between the English and Russian Governments—Magnitude of the Surrender—The Congress to be attended by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury—Objections of the Opposition—Questions in Parliament as to the Agreement with Russia—Prosecution of a Foreign Office Clerk—Mr. Gladstone and the Indian Troops—Mr. Hanbury's Proposed Vote of Censure—Convention between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4th, 1878—Statement of the Marquis of Salisbury as to the Objects of the Cabinet—Duty of checking Russian Power in Armenia—Guarantee by England of Turkish Possessions in Asia—Proposed Occupation of Cyprus—Terms of the Convention and its Annex—The Consequences of a double-faced Policy—Necessity of a Compromise.

If preparation for war always ensured war, there ought to have been a tremendous convulsion in the spring or summer of 1878. England was arming as she had rarely armed before, and Russia, closing up her shattered ranks after the great contest with Turkey, set all things in order for a much more serious struggle, if the progress of events should render it imperative. In the foundries and dockyards of Great Britain, the din of martial work was ceaseless; while from the flat marshlands of the Danube, and the rugged valleys of the Balkans, came the tramp of countless legions, waiting the command of their autocrat to recommence the bloody business of their lives. Two Russian vessels laden with torpedoes were at Odessa, ready to close the mouths of the Danube in case of war with England, and elaborate precautions were taken, that the land communications with Bulgaria might be protected from attack, should the British fleet force an entrance into the Black Sea. The Russian Intendance Department at Bucharest prepared 16,000 transport-carts, for supplying the army in Bulgaria and Roumelia, which derived its stores from Roumania, on the northern side of the Danube; and from Widdin to the outfalls of the great stream, all important posts were occupied by the soldiers of the Czar. The Foreign Minister of Roumania complained, in a circular to the Agents of the Principality abroad, that Russia was throwing the greatest obstacles in the way of a free navigation of the Danube; that all exports through the Dobrudscha were forbidden; and that the river Pruth was for six days in the week closed to navigation by the pontoon-bridge. The equipment of the Baltic fleet was pushed forward with urgency, and a squadron consisting of seven powerful ships was ordered to be ready for sea as soon as the ice should break. Thus, everything looked very belligerent, and to outside observers it seemed as if a collision could hardly be avoided.

Yet there was a good deal of disinclination to fight, after all, especially on the side of the Russian Government. It was known that the war, if it came, would be long, sanguinary, and exhausting; and the neutral Powers were little disposed to see a large part of Europe devastated by the combats of two military giants, whose differences might possibly be composed, if only they could be brought together at the council-table for a fair and unrestrained discussion of the details which had set them in opposition. The German Government was particularly desirous of discovering some middle path by which disastrous extremes might be shunned. A war would not have served any German interest, and peace is generally very much in favour with Powers which have nothing to gain by the hostilities of others. It was proposed in the latter part of April that the British fleet and the Russian army should simultaneously withdraw from the neighbourhood of Constantinople; but the negotiations with this view proceeded very slowly. By an unlucky coincidence, Prince Gortschakoff and Prince Bismarck were both attacked with illness at this time, and it was even doubtful whether the former (who was about eighty years of age) would not be compelled to retire from office. But while affairs on the Continent were thus brought to a standstill, a fresh movement in the direction of peace began in London, though not on the initiative of the English Government. Early in May, Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, left England for St. Petersburg, after an interview with Lord Beaconsfield. The visit is said to have resulted from the Count's own wish, and to have been prompted by the hope that, by personal explanations, he would be able to give his Government a more correct idea than they seem then to have possessed respecting the views of the English Cabinet. Owing to the illness of Prince Gortschakoff, the Czar was exercising a direct control over the foreign administration of

his Empire; and Alexander, individually, was inclined to peace, as none knew better than he the costs and risks of war. A Cabinet Council was held at St. Petersburg on the Greek Easter Sunday, at which the Emperor presided, and a desire for conciliation was the prevalent feeling. This sentiment was due in great part to the reports of the respective Ministers on the financial, military, and internal condition of the Empire—reports showing that the country had suffered much from the late war, and was not in a position to bear, without alarming sacrifices, the strain of a fresh encounter. Count Schouvaloff was considered to be favourable to a good understanding with England, and, on arriving at the Imperial seat of Government, he found a willingness to entertain any suggestions which did not touch the national pride too nearly.

It was on the evening of May 12th that the Russian Ambassador reached St. Petersburg, after a short visit to Berlin, and on the following morning he was received by the Emperor. He did not carry with him any definite proposals from the British Cabinet; but he was of course in a position to state the general terms on which Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues would be disposed to enter into an arrangement, supposing the obstacle to the assembling of a Conference were removed. Public curiosity was excited to the utmost, but the outer world was not permitted to know much of what was passing within the charmed circle of the Court and the Ministry. Count Schouvaloff left St. Petersburg on his return journey on the 18th, and again stayed a brief time at Berlin, where he had interviews with Herr von Bülow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with the Emperor William, and with Lord Odo Russell, the English Ambassador. On the 22nd of the month, the Minister of Russia was back again in London, and on the 27th the Marquis of Salisbury stated in the House of Lords, in answer to Viscount Cardwell, that within the previous few days the prospects of a Congress had materially improved. The issue, however, was still involved in doubt and obscurity, and it was not until a week later—that is, the 3rd of June—that a definite announcement was made to the two Houses by Lord Salisbury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The announcement was to the effect that the German Government had invited the signatories of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 to a Congress, and that all the Powers, including Russia, had accepted the invitation, which was conveyed in a letter from Count Münster, the German Ambassador in London, dated that day. This communication was expressed in the following terms:—"In conformity with the initiative taken by the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet, the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of Germany has the honour to propose to the Powers, signatories of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, to meet in Congress at Berlin, to discuss there the stipulations of the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, concluded between Russia and Turkey. The Government of his Majesty, in giving this invitation to the Government of her Britannic Majesty, understands that, in accepting it, the Government of her Britannic Majesty consents to admit the free discussion of the whole of the contents of the Treaty of San Stefano, and that it is ready to participate therein. In the event of the acceptance of all the Powers invited, the Government of his Majesty propose to fix the meeting of the Congress for the 13th of this month [June]. The undersigned, in bringing the above to the knowledge of his Excellency the Marquis of Salisbury, has the honour to beg his Excellency to be good enough to acquaint him as soon as possible with the reply of the British Government." The answer of Lord Salisbury, also dated the 3rd of June, revealed the willingness—the too great willingness, as many persons thought—of the English Cabinet to adopt a compromise. "The undersigned," wrote the Foreign Secretary, "taking account of his Excellency's verbal intimation that the invitation has been sent in the same terms to the other Powers, signatories of the Treaty of Paris, and understanding that those Powers, in accepting this invitation, assent to the terms intimated in his Excellency's Note, has the honour to inform his Excellency that her Majesty's Government will be ready to take part in the Congress at the date mentioned."

The terms set forth by Count Münster undoubtedly conceded the point for which the English Government had been mainly contending—viz., that the whole of the Treaty of San Stefano should be submitted to discussion; though, as an odd result of the form necessarily adopted in a circular designed for the other Powers as well, it seemed more like a stipulation exacted than a concession made. But the public did not yet know with certainty—although it had grounds for suspecting—the immense capitulations to Russia by which this triumph had been obtained. Count Schouvaloff had in fact brought back with him from St. Petersburg certain proposals, to which, in consideration of Russia distinctly undertaking that the whole treaty should be laid before Congress, England unfortunately acceded. This agreement was to be kept secret until the time most convenient to the Ministry for divulging it. But

secrecy in these days is almost an impossibility, and the compact was revealed to the world in a manner which took the Government completely by surprise. On the evening of May 30th, the *Globe*—a newspaper supposed to be devoted to the interests of the Beaconsfield Cabinet—contained, in a late and special edition, the heads of an understanding arrived at that day between the Governments of England and Russia, subject to the decisions of a Congress. Startling as the revelation was, no questions were asked in Parliament until the 3rd of June, when previously given in a summary form. The compact was comprised in two documents, the first of which, signed May 30th, was headed "Project of a Memorandum determining the points upon which an understanding has been established between the Governments of Russia and Great Britain, and which will serve as a mutual engagement for the Russian and English Plenipotentiaries at the Congress." After a preamble, expressing the desire of the two Governments to establish an understanding such as might obviate the settlement of the Eastern Question



NEW RUSSIAN BATTERY ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE.

the Marquis of Salisbury, in answer to Earl Grey, said that the statement in question, together with a great many other statements, was "wholly unauthentic," and "not deserving any confidence" on the part of their Lordships. Earl Grey rejoined that the assertion with respect to England deploring, but not opposing, the retrocession of Bessarabia, appeared to him so preposterous that he could not for a moment believe it. Lord Salisbury's heart must have failed him a little as he heard those words; for a provision to that very effect was contained in the agreement of May 30th.

Notwithstanding the denial of the Government, the *Globe* continued to affirm the substantial accuracy of its statements, and on the 14th of June published the full text of the agreement which it had by the sword, the memorandum went on to say that England discarded the longitudinal division of Bulgaria, but that the representative of Russia reserved to himself the right to point out the advantages of that division to the Congress, promising nevertheless not to insist upon it against the definitive opinion of England. It was agreed that the arrangement of the boundaries of Southern Bulgaria should be modified in such a manner as to remove them from the Ægean Sea, according to the southern delimitation of the Bulgarian provinces proposed by the Conference of Constantinople. This, it was explained, did not concern the question of the frontiers so much as it referred to the exclusion of the littoral of the Ægean to the west of Lagos, from which point to the coast of the Black Sea the

discussion of the frontier would remain open. The western frontiers of Bulgaria were to be rectified upon the basis of nationalities, so as to exclude from that province the non-Bulgarian populations. Both Powers agreed that the western frontiers of the province ought not, in principle, to pass a line traced from the vicinity of Novi-Bazar to the Kursha Balkan. The Bulgaria thus limited was to be divided into two provinces, of which one, to the north of the Balkans, was to be endowed with political autonomy under the government of a Prince, while the other, to the south of the Balkans, nevertheless, reserves to herself to insist at the Congress on the right of the Sultan to be able to canton troops on the frontier of Southern Bulgaria. The representative of Russia reserves to himself at the Congress complete liberty in the discussion of this last proposition of Lord Salisbury." On the other hand, the British Government demanded that the superior officers of the militia in Southern Bulgaria should be named by the Porte, with the consent of Europe; and it was agreed that the Turkish promises concerning Armenia, stipulated by the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano, should not be



NEW RUSSIAN BATTERY ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE.

should receive a large measure of administrative self-government, such as that which exists in the English colonies, and should be placed under a Christian Governor, named, with the acquiescence of Europe, for a period ranging from five to ten years. "The Emperor of Russia," said the fifth paragraph of this agreement, "attaches a peculiar importance to the retreat of the Turkish army from Southern Bulgaria. His Majesty does not see any security or guarantee for the Bulgarian population in the future if the Ottoman troops are maintained there. Lord Salisbury accepts the retreat of the Turkish troops from Southern Bulgaria; but Russia will not object to what is enacted by the Congress respecting the mode and the cases where the Turkish troops would be allowed to enter the southern province to resist an insurrection or invasion, whether in a state of execution, or in a state of menace. England, made exclusively to Russia, but to England also. Article XV. of the Preliminary Treaty was to be modified in such a manner that the other Powers, and notably England, might have, like Russia, a consulting voice in the future organisation of Epirus, Thessaly, and the other Christian provinces remaining under the dominion of the Porte. With respect to the war-indemnity, the Emperor declared that he had never had the intention of converting it into territorial annexations, and he was ready to give assurances in that sense. It was understood that the war-indemnity would not deprive the English Government of their rights as creditor, and, without contesting the final decision which Russia might take with respect to the amount of the indemnity, England reserved to herself the right to point out to the Congress the serious objections which she saw to the proposed arrangement. As regarded the

Valley of Alashgerd and the town of Bayazid, it was observed that that valley was the great transit-route for Persia, and had an immense value in the eyes of the Turks, to whom, therefore, the Russian Emperor consented to restore it. At the same time he demanded, and had by that time obtained in exchange, the cession to Persia of the little territory of Khotour, which the commissioners of the two mediatory Courts had found it just to restore to the Shah.

"The Government of her Britannic Majesty," said the eleventh paragraph of the Memorandum, "would have to express its profound regret in the event of Russia insisting definitively upon the retrocession of Bessarabia. As, however, it is sufficiently established that the other signatories to the Treaty of Paris are not ready to sustain by arms the delimitation of Roumania stipulated in that treaty, England does not find herself sufficiently interested in this question to be authorised to incur alone the responsibility of opposing herself to the change proposed; and thus she binds herself not to dispute the decision in this sense. In consenting not to contest the desire of the Emperor of Russia to occupy the port of Batoum, and to guard his conquests in Armenia, the Government of her Majesty do not hide from themselves that grave dangers, menacing the tranquillity of the populations of Turkey in Asia, may result in the future by this extension of the Russian frontier. But her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the duty of protecting the Ottoman Empire from this danger, which henceforth will rest largely upon England, can be effected without exposing Europe to the calamities of a fresh war. At the same time, the Government of the Queen take cognisance of the assurance given by his Imperial Majesty that in the future the Russian frontier will be no more extended on the side of Turkey in Asia. Her Majesty's Government, being consequently of opinion that the modifications of the Treaty of San Stefano, approved of in this Memorandum, suffice to mitigate the objections that they find in the treaty in its actual form, engage themselves not to dispute the articles of the Preliminary Treaty of San Stefano which are not modified by the ten preceding points, if, after the articles have been duly discussed in Congress, Russia persists in maintaining them. It may be that during the discussions in Congress the two Governments may find it preferable to introduce by a common accord fresh modifications which it would be impossible to foresee; but, if the understanding respecting these new modifications be not established between the Russian and English Plenipotentiaries, the present Memorandum is destined to serve as a mutual engagement in Congress for the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Great Britain."

The second Memorandum formed an annex to the first, and was signed by both Plenipotentiaries on the same day (May 30th). By this document the British Government reserved to themselves freedom to discuss before the Congress certain other matters, such as the participation of Europe in the administrative organization of the two Bulgarian provinces; the duration and nature of the Russian occupation of Bulgaria, and of the passage through Roumania; the name to be given to the Southern province; the several questions, involved in the navigation of the Danube, with respect to which England had treaty rights; and all questions relative to the Straits. On the last of these heads, Count Schouvaloff, in the second Memorandum, undertook that the Russian Plenipotentiary at the Congress should insist on the *status quo*. Finally, the English Government promised to address to the Sultan a request that he would engage before Europe to protect the monks of other nationalities than Russia, whose monasteries were situated on Mount Athos.

That this agreement was in some respects an improvement on the stipulations of San Stefano will not be denied. It reduced the limits of the proposed Bulgaria, paid greater regard to the claims of races other than the Sclavonian, restored to the Sultan a portion of his dominions, protected the shores of the Ægean from an influence which would necessarily have been that of Russia, and secured to England a right of interposition in various matters which the Czar seemed at one time disposed to exclude from consideration. But the concessions were most serious. Not only Northern Bulgaria, but Southern Bulgaria (speaking generally), was to be denuded of Turkish troops, except under special circumstances; and from this would result the almost unrestrained influence of Russia over a large tract of country still nominally subject to the Porte. The transfer of Khotour to Persia was in truth a gain to Russia, for Persia is now little better than the slave of St. Petersburg. The retrocession of Roumanian Bessarabia was sanctioned, and one of the main provisions of the Treaty of 1856—one of the principal objects for which so much blood was shed in the Crimean War—was abrogated by a stroke of the pen. In the same spirit of weak surrender, Batoum was yielded to the Muscovites: Batoum, on which the Turks placed the highest value, as being an important harbour, giving access from the Black Sea into Armenia and Asia Minor; Batoum, the cession of which formed one of the

subjects of Lord Salisbury's criticisms in the famous despatch of April 1st; Batoum, which the Russians had been unable to subdue, and which yet stood erect and defiant before the enemy. The Russian demands in Armenia were generally adopted, though avowedly with reluctance; and the arrangements with respect to Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro—all of which tended to weaken Turkey—were by implication allowed. As regarded the Asiatic possessions of the Porte, the Government admitted that the future was menaced with serious dangers by the extension of Russian power in that quarter of the globe. To guard against these dangers, a vague undertaking to protect the Ottoman Empire, if again attacked, was placed on record, but in terms so general and ambiguous that Russia was not likely to feel much apprehension, nor Turkey to derive much comfort, from the assurance. England was already under an engagement to defend Turkey against aggression—an engagement not the less imperative because it was assumed coincidently with a similar pledge on the part of France and Austria; yet England had looked on while Turkey was sacrificed. Those, consequently, who had objected throughout to the Gladstonian policy of abandoning the Sultan to the wrath or the rapacity of Russia, and who believed that we were bound, by honour, justice, and self-interest, to save from extinction a rule which had been wantonly assailed, felt little satisfaction with Lord Salisbury's expression of the Government's opinion that the duty of protecting Turkey from renewed attack would to a great extent rest on us. The Convention of May 30th was only another chapter in the long record of what these thinkers regarded as the subserviency of English to Russian views. Their criticisms had undoubtedly considerable truth; but they did not sufficiently recognize the better parts of the agreement, nor sufficiently admit the force of circumstances by which a more appropriate arrangement was shut out.

When Lord Salisbury made his announcement to the House of Lords, that Count Münster had invited the Powers to a Congress at Berlin, and that England had accepted the invitation, Earl Granville asked whether it was true that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were the Plenipotentiaries appointed to attend the Congress. The Marquis of Salisbury admitted that such was the fact; whereupon, Lord Granville expressed dissatisfaction with the arrangement. The absence of two such important members of a Cabinet as the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary appeared to him highly undesirable. Some difficulty might arise, with respect to which it was possible the two Plenipotentiaries might disagree; and in that case the Cabinet would have to decide without any opportunity of consulting the absent members, and without the advantage of hearing their explanations. On the other hand, if the Plenipotentiaries agreed, they need not refer home to the Cabinet at all, and the other members of the Government would be put in the position of ciphers. Furthermore, Lord Granville appeared to be dismayed by that alarming fact which is so frequently brought forth whenever any one has the courage to do something unusual which his opponents do not like. There was "no precedent" for the proposed course; at any rate, Lord Granville desired to hear from the Premier whether any such precedent was to be found, and, in asking the question, clearly insinuated his own belief that the search would be vain. Lord Beaconsfield admitted that, to the best of his knowledge, a precedent exactly similar to what was intended could not be adduced; but he failed to understand the reasoning by which Earl Granville had come to the opinion that the absence of two chief members of the Cabinet would reduce the others to ciphers, when it rather appeared that their importance and responsibility would be increased by that circumstance. The Premier added that he and the Foreign Secretary had undertaken their important and laborious task at the instance, and with the full concurrence, of their colleagues; and in such a matter they must not be guided by mere precedent. The chief Ministers of Austria and Germany were to be present at the Congress, and, it was believed, the chief Minister of Russia also. It seemed to the Government, therefore, that the presence of two of the English Ministers was desirable under the circumstances of the case. Earl Grey, however, reinforced the objections of Lord Granville, and desired to know how far it was consistent with the responsibility of the entire Cabinet for every step, that the two most important members of the Government in relation to foreign affairs should be separated from the rest, and should settle questions without verbal consultation with the whole body. The same objections were advanced in the House of Commons by Lord Hartington; but the Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that the question had been the subject of long and anxious deliberation on the part of her Majesty's Ministers, and that they had found the balance of reasoning to be in favour of the course adopted. The criticisms of the Opposition seem, indeed, to have been of a somewhat frivolous character. If, as was urged, there could be no satisfactory communication between the two absent

Ministers and their colleagues by means of despatches and telegraphic messages, the same objection would equally have applied to any Plenipotentiaries who might have been sent; and in either case the determinations arrived at would be revised by the Cabinet acting in its corporate capacity.

The first intimation in the *Globe*, with respect to the secret understanding between England and Russia, caused much astonishment and many forebodings among the friends of Turkey; but the publication of the documents themselves fell like a thunderbolt on the Ministry, and led to several questions in Parliament. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was required to give explanations on the very evening of the publication, and could only reply that the Memorandums had not been communicated by the Cabinet, and that, without examining them, he could not profess to say whether they were authentic or not. These interpellations were resumed in both Houses on the 17th of June, and the cross-questioning in the Lords was particularly close and severe. The Duke of Richmond and Gordon, President of the Council, said, in replying to Earl Granville, that the papers had evidently been furnished by some person confidentially employed, and that the publication, so far as her Majesty's Government was concerned, was not only unauthorized, but surreptitious. As an explanation of the Ministerial policy, the statement was incomplete, and therefore inaccurate; and he could not be induced even to admit that the documents were authentic as far as they went. Lord Houghton, probably interpreting the general sense of the House, pressed for a more satisfactory answer, and observed that the effect of the documents on the whole of Europe had been portentous, especially in France, where a change had come over public opinion with respect to the position of this country. "It now stands before the world," said Lord Houghton, "that England would not go into Congress with free hands, but that before entering it she had made a contract, and abandoned some most important points, which several members of that House considered it was the duty of this country to insist upon." Earl Grey asked for more information; but the Duke of Richmond replied that he must be allowed to be the best judge of how far he ought to go in the matter. Her Majesty's Government did not think it expedient for the public interest to enter any further into the affair at that time; and so the subject was allowed to drop. But the statement that the documents published in the *Globe* were incomplete as an exposition of the Ministerial policy, and for that very reason inaccurate, created a feeling of general uneasiness, since no man could say what further was to be expected, nor whether the supplementary information would make matters better or worse. The incident was a striking comment on the difficulties of secret government in days like our own. The agency of the press has become so omnipresent, its powers are so large, and its sources of information so numerous, that a Ministry desiring to proceed by stealth finds itself confounded in the very act. In the present instance, the Memorandums had been copied by an inferior clerk, who had also some connection with the newspapers, and who seems to have been well paid for his irregular services. This person was afterwards charged at the Bow Street police-court with having stolen either the original documents, or the paper on which the copy was made; but the case could not be proved against him in this form, and there is no law under which clerks in Government offices can be punished, otherwise than by dismissal, for divulging information which in the course of their duties they happen to have acquired. The decision of the magistrate (Mr. Vaughan) was given on the 16th of July, and the circumstances attracted much attention for a time. It was insinuated in some quarters that the publication of the Agreement was brought about by the Russian Embassy, as a means of damaging the English Government; but of this, it is almost needless to say, there was no proof.

An episode of a personal character, affecting a very distinguished statesman, must not be omitted. On the 3rd of June, Mr. Hanbury, the member for North Staffordshire, gave notice that he would bring before the attention of the House, on the earliest opportunity, some passages in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century* for that month, "purporting to have been written by a member of her Majesty's Privy Council, lately First Lord of the Treasury." The article had reference to the movement of Indian troops to Malta, and the right honourable gentleman told our Asiatic subjects that in the partnership just effected the effusion of blood would fall largely to the Indian share, but that the policy would be ours, the command ours, the reward and promotion ours. We should use India as we use a steam-engine, and should consult her just as much. She would have as much control over the expenditure of her own blood as the locomotive has over the consumption of fuel; "at least," said Mr. Gladstone, using a very significant metaphor, "this alone will be her share, unless, and until, she explodes." The writer, continuing his taunts and incentives, remarked that it was very much to say

to India, as we had said, "We will measure, raise, and direct, and you shall pay, the army which is to defend you from the foreigner;" but it was now to be said, "We will raise, manage, and direct, and you shall pay, an army which is to be kept on such a scale that, besides defending you, it shall be sufficient to add largely to our European force, and make up for the disadvantage at which we stand in the struggle with any Continental Power." Then came four questions and a comment:—"Is it possible that this can work? Will India be content? Can India be content? Ought India to be content? In distant and, to her children, ungenial climes,—in lands, of usage, tongue, religion, wholly alien,—the flower of her youth are to die and bleed for us, and she will have no part but to suffer and to obey. This is injustice—gross and monstrous injustice; and those who are parties to its perpetration must prepare for the results to which injustice leads." Mr. Gladstone wanted to know if it were possible that such things could work. Mr. Hanbury wished to know if it were possible that Privy Councillors could use such language without rebuke. Certainly, he said, the offence was grave; doubly and trebly grave as coming from such a quarter. Had similar comments been published forty years ago by one of the fire-brands of the Chartist party, it is not improbable that he would have been prosecuted for inciting her Majesty's Indian forces to rebel. Yet the shouts of an ignorant demagogue were trifling matters in comparison with the deliberate language of a responsible statesman, who had held the most important position under the Crown, and was still practically at the head of a great party. The imprudence would have been more excusable if the removal of the Indian troops had been simply a suggestion of something which in the opinion of the Government it might be advisable to carry out in the future. But, at the time the article was published, it had been determined, whether wisely or unwisely, that a certain portion of the Indian army should be employed in Europe for a particular purpose; and, while the troops were actually engaged in these duties, Mr. Gladstone told them and their comrades that such a demand upon their services would justify a revolt—for it is impossible to explain in any other way the metaphor as to the locomotive exploding, and the hints that are uttered as to the retribution following on injustice. Mr. Hanbury accordingly gave notice that he should move "that, in the opinion of this House, such language on the part of a member of her Majesty's Privy Council is much to be condemned, as unwarranted, inopportune, and calculated to create sedition in her Majesty's Indian Empire." Finding, however, that he was not likely to get any support from the Government, or from the House generally, Mr. Hanbury withdrew his motion on the 17th of June. Mr. Gladstone considered that no such notice ought to have been given, unless it was determined to go on with it; and to this extent it is probable that most persons will be found to agree with him.

The meaning of the Duke of Richmond's statement, that the revelation contained in the *Globe* was "incomplete," and did not reflect the entire policy of the Cabinet, was explained on the 8th of July, when a most important series of papers was communicated to Parliament. From these papers it appeared that a Convention between Great Britain and Turkey had been concluded on the 4th of June, and that the expression in the agreement with Russia, respecting the duty which devolved on England of protecting the Ottoman Empire from further danger, had received a practical application. The first document in the series was a despatch from the Marquis of Salisbury to Mr. Layard, dated May 30th, 1878—the very day on which the Foreign Secretary and Count Schouvaloff concluded the arrangement already described in detail. It was here stated that the Government considered it probable that those articles of the Treaty of San Stefano which affected European Turkey would be sufficiently modified to bring them into harmony with the interests of the other European Powers, and of England in particular; but that there was no such prospect with reference to that portion of the treaty which concerned Turkey in Asia. The possession by Russia of Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, and the neighbouring regions, was naturally regarded by the English Cabinet as having a very serious bearing on the interests of this country in that quarter of the globe. The populations of Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia, seeing the inability of the Porte to resist the strength of Russia, would begin to calculate upon the speedy fall of the Ottoman domination, and to turn their eyes towards its successor. Her Majesty's Ministers felt it necessary to guard against the possibility of this future state of things; but they did not propose to accomplish their objects by a resort to war. They considered that the only substantial security for the stability of the Ottoman rule in Asiatic Turkey would be an engagement on the part of England to prevent any further encroachments by Russia, even at the cost of military operations. This, it was believed, would prevent the occurrence of the very contingency it was sought to guard against, and would give to the populations of Asiatic Turkey the requisite confidence in the existing rule. Two conditions, h

ever, were necessary to be fulfilled before England could take such a course. One was that the Porte should give a formal assurance of its intention to introduce reforms into the government of the Christian and other subjects of Turkey in those regions. The other was that her Majesty's Ministers should be allowed to occupy a position near the coast of Asia Minor and Syria; and the island of Cyprus appeared to them the most available locality for the fulfilment of the contemplated purpose. What was required was not the alienation of that territory, nor even of its revenue, but simply the occupation and administration of the island, limited by the condition that, if Russia should at any time surrender to the Porte the territory she had recently acquired in Asia, the stipulations in the proposed agreement would cease to operate, and the island would be immediately evacuated.



TOWN AND HARBOUR OF BATOUM.

This proposal was at once submitted to the Sultan, and on the 4th of June a Convention of Defensive Alliance between England and Turkey was signed by Safvet Pasha, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by the English Ambassador. docuicle I. of this Convention was thus expressed:— as anBatoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and it any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and, in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by England." The second Article simply provided for the exchange of ratifications within the space of a month, or sooner if possible. This was the whole of the Convention as it originally stood; but on the 1st of July an Annex, consisting of six Articles, was signed by the representatives of England and Turkey. These provided that a Mussulman religious tribunal should continue to exist in the island, for taking cognizance of religious matters as affecting the



CYPRUS: A BAZAAR AT LARNACA.

Mohammedan population; that a Mussulman resident in the island should be appointed to superintend, in conjunction with a delegate of the British authorities, the administration of the property, funds, and lands belonging to the religious establishments of the Turks in Cyprus; that England would pay to the Porte whatever was the existing excess of revenue over expenditure, the excess to be determined by the average of the preceding five years, to the exclusion of the produce of State and Crown lands let or sold during that period; that the Sublime Porte might freely sell and lease lands and other property in Cyprus belonging to the Ottoman Crown and State, the produce of which did not form part of the revenue previously referred to; that the English Government might purchase compulsorily, at a fair price, land required for public improvements, and land which was not cultivated; and that, if Russia restored to Turkey Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the island of Cyprus would be evacuated by England, and the Convention of the 4th of June, 1878, would be at an end.

These were the arrangements by which the Government of Lord Beaconsfield hoped to counterbalance the immense successes gained by Russia during the war. The Agreement of May 30th and the Convention of June 4th were the results of that double-faced policy which the Cabinet had pursued throughout the whole business—a policy dictated by distrust of Russia, strangely combined with subserviency to her military power. If the Ministers had gone heartily with Mr. Gladstone's view of Oriental politics, and had seen in Russia nothing but a heaven-appointed agent for the carrying out of noble designs, they would have left the Treaty of San Stefano just as they found it, and would not have required any guarantee against future aggression. If, on the other hand, they had been guided solely by that hatred of Russia, and that friendliness towards Turkey, to which every now and then they gave spasmodic expression, they would not have accepted the Treaty of San Stefano at all, but would have drawn the sword, and compelled Russia to relinquish her booty. They took neither of these courses, because the policy of the Cabinet was made up of antagonistic views and sympathies, which were to be fitted together, and in a manner harmonized, as well as the difficulties of such a task would permit. Jealousy of Russia was to be indulged, because it pleased Lord Beaconsfield. Turkey was to be partitioned and humiliated, because it pleased some other members of the Cabinet. The Gladstonites were to be flattered by the creation of an independent Bulgaria; while those who distrusted the designs of Russia were to be satisfied with an undertaking that at some future period we would fight the battle that we declined to fight in the war of 1877–8, and with the occupation of an island which would give us a military position on the coast of Asia Minor. The usual result of an attempt to gratify two antagonistic parties was not wanting in the present instance. Both were disappointed, and each considered itself betrayed. From a purely abstract point of view, the arrangement was unsatisfactory enough. It allowed Russia to remain the principal gainer by her attack on Turkey, and it offered only a precarious guarantee against a repetition of the wrong. But political affairs are not to be judged from the sublime altitudes of abstract speculation. The Convention with Turkey was probably the best thing that could be done under the circumstances. It was some mitigation of an evil which was still sufficiently great, but which otherwise would have been intolerable. Partly by external pressure, and partly by their own dissensions, the Government had been reduced to the alternative of compromise or war; and a very emphatic expression of public opinion had rendered war almost impossible.

## CHAPTER XVII.

**Continental Opinion on the Anglo-Turkish Convention—Views of the French Republicans—Anti-Russian Feeling in Germany and in Austro-Hungary—Russian Despotism in Bulgaria—Protest of Roumania against the Treaty of San Stefano—Appeal to the English Government for Representation at the Congress—Position of Roumanian Affairs in June, 1878—Speech of M. Bratiano in the Chamber of Deputies—Claims of the Greeks and Albanians—Journey of Lord Beaconsfield from London to Berlin—Honours paid to the English Premier—His Popularity in the Prussian Capital—Rumours of Danger from the International Society—Arrangements for the Congress in the Radziwill Palace—The Representatives of the Powers, and their Order of Precedence—Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortschakoff, and Lord Beaconsfield—Mehemet Ali, and his Reception by the German Representatives—First Meeting of the Congress (June 13th)—The Present and the Absent—Speech of Count Andrassy—Banquet at the Royal Palace—Instructions to the British Plenipotentiaries at the Congress—The Policy to be supported, and the Concessions to be made—The Bulgarian Question—Statistics as to the Proportion of the Several Races in the Proposed Principality—The Pomak Rebellion—Russian and Bulgarian Cruelties—Statement of a Guerilla Chief—Position of the Lazis—Appeal to the English Government—Arrangement with the Porte—Russian Designs with respect to Batoum—Decline of the Sclavophile Feeling in Russia, and its Causes—A Divided Nation—The Old Russia and the New.**

EUROPE was astounded at the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but the feeling was not unmixed, in many quarters, with satisfaction at what was considered a master-stroke of adroitness, tending to neutralize the gains of Russia. Opinion in Paris was for the most part inclined to tolerate Lord Beaconsfield's achievement, though France was certain to exhibit some jealousy in respect of her traditional policy regarding Syria and Egypt. The Republican party, while not indifferent to that policy, nor animated by any very romantic attachment to England, looked with a natural and reasonable distrust at the progress of Russian power, and thought that almost anything would be better than leaving the Czar to share with his uncle, the Emperor of Germany, the dictatorship of the Continent. French Liberals have not yet learned the perverse and self-stultifying lesson which English Liberals have acquired at the bidding of a disappointed ambition, a mortified vanity, and a factious intolerance. They have not yet discovered in Russia the apostle of freedom—the one guiltless and guileless Power in the whole circuit of the world; and in the summer of 1878 they saw reasons why the pretensions of this Power should be challenged, even if England were the only country to do it, and even if, in so acting, she added to her influence in the East. In addition to general considerations, affecting the very life of democratic institutions all over Europe, France had a special motive for bearing a grudge against Russia. During the war with Germany, the young French Republic requested assistance of the Czar, but met with a very decided rebuff from one who was anxious to support none but his fellow-monarch and co-assertor of the divine right of sovereigns to oppress peoples. From that time forth, the Republican party in France—never very well inclined to an alliance with Russia, except as a temporary expedient—conceived a strong dislike of that dark and gloomy Power in the North, which plots against the life of nations in the security of its arctic mists and shadows. Diplomatic France, it is true, gave a species of support to Russia in the late quarrel with Turkey; but that was because any other course would probably have led to war, and France could not afford to fight on such an issue. The popular sympathy was with the Turks; and consequently there was little disposition to make serious demur when it appeared that England had succeeded in putting some check upon the future aggressiveness of the Czar.

In Germany also, political observers could perceive a plain line of demarcation between the official and the popular feeling. The Emperor William was heartily in favour of his Imperial nephew, both from motives of gratitude, and from community of ideas and objects. But the German people—allowing, of course, for exceptions, such as will always occur—had no love for the Russian cause, and were disinclined to see the Northern autocrat carry all before him, whether on the field of battle, or in the council-chambers of diplomacy. The principles of government which are enforced at St. Petersburg meet with no approval in the better part of the German mind. German culture is disgusted with the absence of any intellectual warrant in the Russian people for domineering over a large portion of the globe. The military pride of Germany is offended at the spectacle of another army greater in material power than its own—an army which is already its rival, and may some time be its opponent. For all these reasons, the people of Central Europe looked with uneasiness and dissatisfaction at the brilliant successes of the Gourkos and Skobeleffs, and at the diplomatic gains of

Ignatieff, as represented in the Treaty of San Stefano. Among the Austrians, and still more among the Hungarians, the feeling of the majority had always been in favour of Turkey. It cannot be too often repeated that the alliance of the three Emperors did not carry with it any popular alliance. In Austria, the very Government was as much at issue with the personal inclinations of the monarch as it dared be. No Ministry of the Dual Empire can altogether disregard Hungary, especially when a Hungarian is at the head of affairs. The complete triumph of Russia over Turkey, without any mitigating circumstance, would have been a danger both to Hungary and to Austria, which no one in his senses could have overlooked; and the English Convention of June 4th seemed to offer some degree of protection from this overshadowing danger, by raising up against the future advance of the Muscovites a barrier less likely to be abandoned than that which had been reared by the Tripartite guarantee of 1856.

The conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was first made known to the world during the sitting of the Congress at Berlin, though it was signed more than a month earlier; and the comments of the French, German, and Austrian press were of course affected in some degree by the diplomatic drama then being played out in the Prussian capital. But before the Plenipotentiaries started for the scene of their labours, the world enjoyed several opportunities of judging how much Russia had lost in the favourable opinion of those populations with whose goodwill, and ostensibly for whose benefit, she commenced the war. Even the Bulgarians did not relish the military strictness with which they were ruled; and, although they dared not say anything themselves, Roumanian writers on the other side of the Danube were not wanting to give expression to the feeling of discontent which unquestionably existed on the southern shore. Towards the end of April, a Bucharest journal published an article on "Poor Bulgaria," in which the writer remarked that the unfortunate natives of that province, after having been the slaves of the Turk, were threatened with suffocation in the embraces of the Russian, and furnished an illustration of the species of liberty which the Muscovite Government was pleased to introduce into

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the East. "The system of administration put in practice in Bulgaria," said the Roumanian newspaper, "is precisely like the bureaucracy which oppresses Poland. The country is divided into ten Governments, instead of five, as before, and subdivided into eighty arrondissements, in place of forty. The number of civil *employés* brought from Russia is enormous. The greater part of these officials are in military uniform, and they are paid so highly that the Budget is four times as great as it was under the Turks. Russia has a marked predilection for an army of *employés*. She believes that she can insure the happiness of Bulgarians by transforming half the population into well-paid officials, and putting a gendarme at the back of every citizen, thus placing all his movements under the eyes of a spy disguised in military uniform, and paid out of the State Budget. The liberty which Holy Russia brings to Bulgaria is worthy of the liberator who holds in chains unhappy Poland, and who strangles in her subjects every pretension to freedom. Saddled with this system of Russian administration, with this liberty, and with the protection of their generous liberator, the poverty which already reigns in Bulgaria will certainly increase in frightful proportions. What does it matter to the Russians to pay out of the Bulgarian pockets to a Governor 28,000 roubles, and to a Chief of Arrondissement 9,000 roubles per annum, as long as their mission is to give to Bulgaria the liberty of a second Russia?"

But Roumania did not complain simply on account of her neighbour. She desired to lay her own case before Europe, and on April 11th M. Cogalniceano addressed a circular to the Roumanian Agents at foreign courts, in which the Treaty of San Stefano, as it affected the Principality, was subjected to severe condemnation. This circular was accompanied by a copy of the protest which the Government had sent to St. Petersburg on the 5th of the same month, and which gave specific reasons for the popular dislike of that preliminary understanding by which Russia and Turkey had brought the war to a close. The two papers were published by the English Government in May, together with a despatch (dated April 24th) from the Marquis of Salisbury to Colonel Mansfield, the English representative at Bucharest. The Foreign Secretary had recently had an interview with the Roumanian Agent in London, who had informed him that the state of things was becoming more and more threatening; that Russia had fully occupied Bessarabia; that an army-corps was surrounding Bucharest; and that at any moment the Government might be compelled to move into Little Wallachia, whither the troops had already been sent. The more particular object of the Agent's visit was to express a hope that Roumania might be represented in the Congress (the holding of which seemed at that time very doubtful), in order to state her own case. Lord Salisbury gave assurances that her Majesty's Government were most desirous that the integrity of the Roumanian territory should not be violated, and added that they would do whatever was in their power to secure due attention at the Congress to the representations of the Principality. Early in June, the Roumanian army, consisting of 60,000 men, took up a good strategical position with its back to the Carpathians, and waited to be attacked. The Russians, however, were in inferior force, and probably in any case would have hesitated about proceeding to extremities on the eve of a Congress from which they hoped, not without reason, to obtain the greater part of what they wanted. Nothing could well be more dispiriting than the prospects of the Roumanians; yet they determined to make every effort to obtain a hearing at the approaching conclave. M. Bratiano and M. Cogalniceano, two of the principal Ministers, left Bucharest for Berlin; and the former delivered a patriotic speech in the Chamber of Deputies a little before his departure on the 7th of June. He promised that he and his colleague would endeavour, with all their powers of appeal, to obtain admission to the great European Areopagus, that they might be heard there in defence of their cause. "We preserved our territorial integrity," said M. Bratiano, "through generations of foreign assault, and finally lost Bessarabia by a treaty in which we had no share or handiwork, losing in this way by political chicanery what the yataghan had striven in vain to force from us. A war was waged for the emancipation of the Christians of the East—at least, we were told so; and we could not be expected to oppose such a war while all Europe favoured the emancipation in one form or other. Notwithstanding our sympathy, we took some precautions, by means of a Convention, to preserve our nationality, although it could not be reasonably supposed that we were imperilling our own rights while taking part in a work of liberation. In spite of all this, however, Russia has proposed to take Bessarabia away from us, and to give us in exchange a tract of land on the other side of the Danube. I cannot believe that the common sense of Europe, or Divine justice, can permit such a monstrous deed to be accomplished." If M. Bratiano really entertained this confidence in what he called "the common sense of Europe," his simplicity was equal to the bad faith against which

he protested. Russia had conducted the war for certain principal objects, and Europe had evidently made up her mind to connive at those ends, provided she could obtain a few concessions which Russia was not likely to refuse. The re-annexation of Bessarabia was eagerly desired by the Czar and his people, and England had already signified her readiness to admit the arrangement. Who was likely to gainsay it? Roumania should

with which both Greeks and Albanians regarded the constitution of the new Bulgaria. An Albanian gentleman, well acquainted with the provinces of Turkey in Europe, where he had been employed by the Porte in important public offices, declared to Mr. Layard that his countrymen would never cease to agitate and make war until they had freed their country from the Bulgarians, whom they looked upon as a much inferior race. Mohammedan



ALBANIANS.

have had a little more reliance on common sense and common justice before quarrelling with a Suzerain who left her the most complete liberty, and seeking the alliance of a Power whose real motives are invisible only to the eyes of stupidity, of faction, or of selfish greed.

The Greeks looked on the approaching settlement with feelings of dismay; for the Treaty of San Stefano, unless modified to a greater extent than was probable, would consign a large part of their race to the dominion of dull, ignorant, and half-savage Bulgarians. Some despatches addressed by Mr. Layard to the Foreign Secretary in April gave clear expression to the feeling of discontent

and Christian Albanians would gladly unite for this purpose, and would ally themselves with the Greeks in resisting the encroachments of the Sclaves. The fall of the Turkish power, according to this gentleman, would be, not the end, but the beginning of the Eastern Question. On the 10th of April, Mr. Layard enclosed to the Marquis of Salisbury a memorandum given to him by M. Aristocles, President of the Hellenic Syllogus of Constantinople, and M. Vassiades, President of the Syllogus of Epirus, with reference to the Greek populations inhabiting the territory proposed to be included in the new Bulgarian Principality. A syllogus is a kind of club or association, formed for

instruction in the Greek language and literature, and for the diffusion of a correct knowledge of the tongue; but these societies also interest themselves in the spread of Hellenic ideas, and in the discussion of political opinions bearing on the future of the race. Messieurs Aristocles and Vassiades requested Mr. Layard, in the name of their countrymen, to forward the memorandum to Lord Salisbury, with a request that her Majesty's Government would give their support to that part of the Hellenic population which Russia wished to place under Sclave dominion. The authors of the document, according to the summary given by Mr. Layard, pointed out that to subject the population



THE KAISERHOF, BERLIN.

of the towns to the rule of the rural populations, as proposed by Russia, would be in opposition to the principles of modern civilization, and would place those who had wealth and intelligence, and who were making rapid progress in civilization, under men who were backward and ignorant, and had given proofs of their implacable hatred of all who were not of the same class and religious opinions as themselves. They also called attention to the danger of handing the country over to the Bulgarians, who were simple labourers, whilst the land, which they expected to divide amongst them, belonged almost entirely to Turkish and Greek proprietors. This, it was maintained, would be to sanction the worst doctrines of communism and socialism, by placing at the mercy of a poor, ignorant, and envious labouring class the property of those who were honest, intelligent, and civilized. Such a state of things, the authors of the memorandum thought, would constitute a permanent danger to Europe at large; and they accordingly brought their case before the attention of the English Foreign Secretary.

The assembling of the Congress was fixed for the 13th of June, and, as all the Powers which were concerned in the treaties of 1856 and 1871 had agreed to join in the discussion, it was generally hoped and believed that a pacific solution would be reached. Lord Beaconsfield left London on the 8th, and in the first instance visited Brussels, where on the following day he was received by Baron Prisse, Commandant of the Palace, by Mr. J. Saville Lumley, the British Minister to the Belgian Court, and by Karatheodori Pasha, the Turkish Minister there, who had been appointed to represent the Ottoman Empire at the Congress, together with Mehemet Ali. In the evening, the English Prime Minister attended a grand banquet at the Palace, which had been given in his honour. On the 10th he reached Cologne, and the Marquis of Salisbury left England the same day to join his chief at the scene of his future labours. It was on the evening of June 11th that the Premier arrived at Berlin, where he was met at the railway station by the members of the British Embassy, with several high officials of the German Foreign Office. He at once drove to the Kaiserhof, where he found his rooms adorned with flowers and fruit, sent by the Crown Princess (formerly the Princess Royal of England) from her garden at Potsdam. His whole journey from the German frontier to the Prussian capital had been characterised by the features of a triumphal progress. At every station, throngs were

waiting to see the chief representative of England, and to do him honour. At Cologne, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg was among the spectators who greeted Lord Beaconsfield with unmistakeable enthusiasm. The saloon carriage in which he travelled was decorated with flowers during his temporary absence, and at Berlin he could not go abroad from his hotel without being followed by crowds of people. According to a story which was very generally believed at the time, and which is not unlikely to be true, the Crown Princess sent the English Minister, on his arrival, a beautiful bouquet of flowers, in the centre of which was a strawberry-plant, bearing a single strawberry. The strawberry-leaf is one of the insignia of a dukedom, and the compliment was understood to mean, that if his Lordship prevailed in the great diplomatic duel then about to commence, he would deserve the highest honour in the English peerage.

Immediately on arriving at Berlin, Lord Beaconsfield expressed a desire to see the German Chancellor as soon as possible. Prince Bismarck at once placed himself at the English Minister's disposal, and the interview lasted from a quarter to ten at night to eleven. The other Plenipotentiaries reached Berlin about the same time, but none received the flattering attentions bestowed on Lord Beaconsfield. Prince Gortschakoff, in particular, was decidedly unpopular. His arrival created no excitement, and he had the mortification of perceiving that his great rival engrossed all the favours of the Berlin citizens. Yet the German authorities were not a little alarmed for the safety of the English Premier. Before leaving London, his Lordship had received a menacing letter, which he sent to the chief of the Berlin Police, and that functionary seems to have taken a rather grave view of the case. The German Emperor was then lying wounded by an assassin, who is supposed to have been connected with the mysterious body called the International, and all the capitals of Europe abounded in sinister rumours. Lord Beaconsfield was warned not to expose himself in the streets, and, in consequence, used for some time to drive about in a close carriage, until, disbelieving in the probability of danger, he abandoned precautions which were doubtless unnecessary.

The building appointed for the meeting of the Congress was the Radziwill Palace, which was then occupied by Prince Bismarck. Turning out of the vestibule of this palace was a room set apart for the secretaries of the Congress, and beyond that was the great hall where the Plenipotentiaries met. This saloon was of very large dimensions, and magnificently decorated with a profusion of gold. In the centre was a horseshoe-shaped table, in the middle of which, on the outer side, was the seat of Prince Bismarck, who presided over the deliberations of the Congress. On the side of the great hall near the secretaries' room were two conference-rooms, to which the Plenipotentiaries could retire, whenever a more particular and private consultation appeared desirable. The other side of the saloon gave admission to a colonnade, and to the gardens beyond. At the outset of the discussions, there was a difficulty about precedence; but this was finally settled by giving to Germany the first place, as being the country in which the Congress was held, and ranging the other Powers according to their alphabetical order. In all official lists and reports, therefore, the names of the respective countries stood thus:—Germany, Austro-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, Turkey. The chief representatives of these Powers were—For Germany, Prince Bismarck, Herr von Bülow, and Prince Hohenlohe; for Austro-Hungary, Count Andrassy, Count Karolyi, and Baron Haymerle; for France, M. Waddington, Count St. Vallier, and M. Desprez; for Great Britain, the Earl of Beaconsfield, the Marquis of Salisbury, and Lord Odo Russell; for Italy, Count Corti and Count Launay; for Russia, Prince Gortschakoff, Count Schouvaloff, and Baron Oubril; and for Turkey, Karatheodori Pasha, Mehemet Ali, and Sadoullah Bey. These principal representatives were assisted by a considerable number of councillors and secretaries; while representatives of Greece, Roumania, and Servia were also in Berlin, in the hope that they might be permitted to lay their respective claims before the diplomatic parliament. A deputation from the Israelite Alliance was likewise on the spot; for the Jews had interests of a very important nature in Servia and Roumania, where they suffered a good deal of oppression at the hands of those who had made all Europe ring with their own complaints against the Turks.

Among the Plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers, the most conspicuous were undoubtedly Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortschakoff, and Lord Beaconsfield. It is a remarkable circumstance that not one of these eminent men was in vigorous health when the three encountered each other in diplomatic debate. Prince Bismarck was only just recovering from one of those attacks of illness to which he is occasionally liable, owing to the exhaustion of excessive work. Prince Gortschakoff, besides being far advanced in years, had suffered much from gout and other maladies during the preceding six months. Indeed, it was at one time believed that his attendance at the Congress would be impossible; and when he entered the hall on the first day of

meeting, he leaned heavily on the arm of the German Chancellor, and excited sympathy by his appearance of feebleness and depression. Lord Beaconsfield, being some years the junior of the Russian Plenipotentiary, exhibited much greater activity and alertness; but even he had been considerably tried by his long journey, and there was always a fear that the fatigues of attendance in the council-chamber would be greater than his strength could endure. Of the other Plenipotentiaries, some were remarkable for what may be called accidental circumstances. The chief representative of France, M. Waddington, is an Englishman, who, having been brought up at Paris, and thoroughly identifying himself with French politics, had attained the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Karatheodori Pasha, the chief representative of Turkey, is a Christian of Greek origin; while Mehemet Ali was a German, and a Mohammedan convert. The last-named was received with great coldness in Berlin. The Turks, according to a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, thought to conciliate Germany by sending a delegate of German birth and race; but the fact of his being an apostate from the Christian religion told, in the first instance, very seriously against him. People seemed to forget that his conversion took place when he was a mere boy, and only to recollect that he had abandoned his country and forsworn his faith. Before the close of the Congress, however, Mehemet Ali contrived to make himself generally liked. His frank and jovial manners, his inexhaustible good-humour, his power of telling amusing stories when serious business was not being done, and a certain vein of German sentiment and poetry which still ran through his nature, won gradually upon the hearts of those with whom he was associated, so that in time he came to be regarded with a feeling akin to friendship.

The first meeting of the Congress took place, according to appointment, on Thursday, June 13th. At about two on the afternoon of that day, the hoisting of the German flag over the Radziwill Palace gave notice that the Congress of Berlin had commenced its deliberations; but little beyond formal business was then transacted. The gathering of the Plenipotentiaries was of a very imposing character, and certainly the occasion was one which, as affecting a large part of Europe, and as dealing with questions of the utmost delicacy and importance, seemed to require some outward sign of its momentous gravity. The diplomatists drove to the palace in Embassy carriages, and the Ambassadors were in State uniform. In the splendid saloon which had been set apart for their debates, these representatives of the six Great Powers, and of Turkey, the subject of their discussions, met on that summer day, to inaugurate a series of proceedings which might have an abiding influence on Europe, whether for good or evil. Statesmen who had become grey with years of public work, and others of less advanced age, whose names, nevertheless, were known wherever men read or think, were gathered in that gorgeous chamber, to reconstruct the south-east of Europe, and to open a new future to races which had long



KEEPING THE ROAD FOR THE GUESTS TO THE BANQUET AT THE ROYAL PALACE, BERLIN.

been complaining of their past, but whose capacity for any higher political life had yet to be proved. The representatives of those very races were not there; for the question had been made a battle-ground for the great Military Powers, which were chiefly interested in the settlement of their respective claims. Greece, Servia, Roumania,—the Bulgarians, the Bosnians, the Herzegovinians, and the people of the Black Mountain,—these were, so to speak, outside the door, but were not permitted to enter. Turkey might almost be said to have been on trial for her life; and in all that assemblage of distinguished politicians and experienced rulers (setting aside her own representatives) there was probably not one beyond Lord Beaconsfield who wished her well.

After the deposition of credentials, Count Andrassy addressed the Assembly in these words:—"Gentlemen! I have the honour to propose to you to confer upon his Serene Highness, Prince Bismarck, the presidency of the Congress. This is not only a step consecrated by precedent; it is at the same time a homage due to the Sovereign whose hospitality the representatives of Europe enjoy at the present moment. I have no doubt that this proposal will meet with unanimous assent. The personal qualities of the Prince, and his great wisdom, are guarantees that the work of the Congress will be well directed. I feel sure of your concurrence in giving expression, at the beginning of our first meeting, to the warmest wishes for the speedy re-establishment of the Emperor William's health." The Plenipotentiaries at once adopted Count Andrassy's proposition by rising from their seats, and Prince Bismarck then returned thanks for the honour he had just received. The next business was the nomination of the Congress secretaries, who were chosen as follows:—Von Radowitz, Bucher, Busch, Baron Holstein, Count Herbert Bismarck, and Count Moüy. The only point raised on this occasion was with reference to the position occupied by the Russian forces in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, where they had advanced beyond the line fixed by the armistice. Lord Beaconsfield called attention to the fact, which he regarded as a source of very great danger; but, after some observations by the Russian Plenipotentiaries, it was suggested by Prince Bismarck that, in the first instance, the representatives of England and Russia should discuss the matter in private, when a satisfactory result would probably be attained. This view was accepted by all the Plenipotentiaries, and the incident was suffered to pass. The session, which was somewhat brief, ended at a quarter after three o'clock, and the next meeting was fixed for Monday, the 17th. The proceedings were conducted for the most part in French; but the Marquis of Salisbury is said to have expressed himself with some difficulty in that language, and Lord Beaconsfield to have declined the task altogether, preferring to keep within the limits of his own tongue. On the evening of the 13th, a grand dinner was given in the Royal Palace to the members of the Congress, when seventeen of the Plenipotentiaries were present. The Crown Prince and Princess were the host and hostess; for the Emperor, as we have said, was disabled by wounds, and the Empress did not consider it fitting, under the circumstances, to be present. The Grand Duke and Duchess of Baden, Princes Karl and Friedrich Karl, with other members of the Royal House, were at the high table, and the Crown Prince proposed the following toast:—"The Congress now assembled at Berlin has been pleased to inaugurate its sittings by expressing its good wishes for the re-establishment of the health of his Majesty, the Emperor. I thank the representatives of the Powers for this mark of sympathy. In the name of my august father, I express the desire to see their efforts crowned by such an understanding as will be a sure guarantee of universal peace. In the name of his Majesty, I drink to the Sovereigns and to the Governments whose representatives are now assembled at Berlin." Several interchanges of courtesy took place from time to time; but the serious work of the Congress was not neglected.

The instructions to the British Plenipotentiaries, previous to their leaving England, were contained in two communications from the Home Secretary, dated from the Foreign Office on the 6th and 8th of June, and in one from the Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell, written from the same department on the latter of those days. The Foreign Secretary, of course, could not address himself; so the general views of the Cabinet were conveyed to the two chief Plenipotentiaries under the formal signature of Mr. Cross. The first letter, which was exceedingly brief, signified to the Premier and the Foreign Secretary that they were to guide themselves in the Congress by those ideas of policy which had already been settled by the Government, and that they were to keep the Home Secretary constantly informed of the proceedings of the Congress, and especially of any new questions, not previously considered by the Cabinet, which might arise in the course of its proceedings. In the second communication from Mr. Cross, some remarks were made on the anomalous position occupied by the Russian army before Constantinople,

and on the claims of the secondary Governments in the East of Europe—particularly of Greece—to be represented at those sittings of the Congress in which their interests would be directly touched. The letter from the Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Odo Russell was longer and more elaborate, as in that case instruction was an actual necessity, and not simply a matter of form. The English Ambassador at Berlin was told that his counsels were to be directed in the first place, so far as Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina were concerned, to the obtaining of good government for the several populations. He was not, however, to forget the ancient alliance between Austria and England, nor the general coincidence of their interests. "It is important," said the Foreign Secretary, "that, in the discussions of the Congress on these matters, you should support any legitimate proposals tending to benefit and strengthen the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But in doing so you will bear in mind that if Russia should ultimately adhere to the proposals of the Preliminary Treaty"—with respect to Servia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina—"these do not touch the interests of England so closely as to justify the Plenipotentiaries in pushing their opposition so far as to break up the Congress on that account." The instructions as to Austria in this passage are worthy of note, as foreshadowing an arrangement which was afterwards submitted to Congress by the representatives of England. Regarding the proposed annexations in Asia, a more emphatic tone was adopted; but it was anticipated that Russia would refuse any concession in respect of Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, and that the arguments of Great Britain would receive little support from other Powers. The proposed retrocession of Bessarabia was to be met by a distinct protest "against a violation of international law for which there seems to be little excuse, and which cannot be justified by reference to the purposes with which the war was undertaken." The rights of the Powers with respect to the navigation of the Danube were to be fully respected, and no countenance was to be given to an interpretation of Article XIX. of the Treaty of San Stefano which would give to Russia in any case the power of keeping the Dobrudscha as a portion of her own territory. Nothing beyond "a protest," however, was to be made against the taking back of Bessarabia; for here, as elsewhere, the Government was tied by the fatal Convention of May 30th. Lord Salisbury, moreover, was of opinion that none of the Continental Powers appeared to attach much importance to the union of Bessarabia with Moldavia, as settled by the Treaty of Paris, and that even those to whose trade the Danube was an important outlet did not seem willing to prevent by force the re-annexation of the former country to the Russian Empire. The direct interests of England, in the view of the Foreign Secretary, were but little affected by the change, and her means of action were comparatively restricted: consequently, she could not by herself assume the responsibility of resisting the Russian project. The demand of Russia to be exclusively consulted as to the administrative institutions of Bulgaria, Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, and other provinces of European Turkey, would probably not be pressed.

"The constitution of the Province of Bulgaria," continued the despatch, "will especially merit the attention of the English Plenipotentiaries. The tributary Principality, which, under the treaty, extends to the Ægean on the south, and beyond the Lake of Ochrida on the west, and trenches closely on the important towns of Adrianople and Salonica, requires very material reduction. In the judgment of her Majesty's Government, it should not be allowed to extend south of the Balkan range. Those parts of the territory south of that chain, which are principally inhabited by Bulgarians, ought to have the protection of institutions generally similar to those which were proposed at the Conference of Constantinople. Great care, however, should be taken that, while every necessary safeguard is provided for the good government of the population, the political and military authority of the Sultan's Government is sufficiently secured to provide against the risk of this province being made the field of treasonable intrigues, or the gate of an invading army. While it may be proper that the Turkish forces should not be cantoned among the body of the Bulgarian population, and especially in the neighbourhood of the towns which have been the scenes of lamentable calamities, it is very important for the security of Constantinople that they should continue to occupy the passes of the Balkans. England could not acquiesce in the institution of any local militia in that province, unless its principal officers are nominated by the Sultan." The Foreign Secretary dwelt furthermore on the necessity of preserving the Greek populations included in the new Bulgaria from the danger of absorption by a dominant Sclave element, and affirmed that Salonica and Kavala should be kept at a distance from the jurisdiction of any State likely to fall under the influence of Russia. He was strongly convinced that the Ægean littoral generally should remain in the hands of the Porte;

and he considered it scarcely less important that the position of the Sultan in the territory south of the Balkans should be made strategically so secure as to guard the independence of that sovereign from foreign interference. Another object of the English Plenipotentiaries was to diminish, as far as practicable, the number of troops (50,000) with of the Preliminary Treaty, insist on the maintenance of the regulations existing before the war.

Lord Salisbury was right in saying that the constitution of the new Bulgaria was one of the most important subjects for the consideration of the Congress. Every day made it more certain that the excuses by which Russia justified the late war




THE RADZIWILL PALACE, BERLIN.

which Russia was to be permitted to occupy Bulgaria, and to reduce the period of the occupation, which had been fixed at two years. Close attention was also to be given to the financial questions arising out of the indebtedness of Turkey, the indemnity imposed on her, and the distribution of all the liabilities she had incurred among the provinces which had acquired a complete or partial independence. With respect to the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it was intimated that her Majesty's Government would, in preference to the provisions contained in Article XXIV. were based on a system of misrepresentations; that the condition of the Bulgarians had been far better than Russian agents had given the world to understand; that the race was quite unworthy of independent existence, which would mean nothing more than the ability to tyrannise over others; and that the favoured population had not even that numerical majority which had been asserted on their behalf. The Turks alleged that the limits of Bulgaria, as settled by the Treaty of San Stefano, were determined by false statistics concerning the ethnographical divisions of the inhabitants, but that,

MEETING OF PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF AND THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD IN THE ANTE-ROOM, RADZIWILL PALACE.

owing to the haste and peremptory dictation of General Ignatieff, they were unable to obtain any correction of errors which were doubtless wilful. After the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace, however, copious statistics were supplied from German, Austrian, Greek, Bulgarian, and Russian sources, and they confirmed the view that had been taken by the Porte. The work of Teplow, a Russian, was particularly valuable, as coming from an authority not likely to underrate the number or importance of the Bulgarians. According to Teplow, the new province was to include eighteen sandjaks, or districts—five north of the Balkans, and thirteen to the south. The total population of these districts was stated at 3,900,000 non-Bulgarians, and 2,580,000 Bulgarians, giving to the former a majority of more than 1,300,000. In but two districts north of the Balkans (Widdin and Tirnova), and in two south of the same range (of which Sophia was one), were the Bulgarians in a majority. Even in the district of Philippopolis, only 300,000 out of 900,000 inhabitants were of Bulgarian descent, and in that of Adrianople only 120,000 out of 450,000. In other districts, the disproportion was still larger, and in Goritza there were said to be no Bulgarians at all. These statements appear to have been to a great extent confirmed by a map issuing from the Geographical Institution of Vienna, and constructed under the superintendence of Carl Sax, the Austrian consul at Adrianople—a gentleman widely acquainted with the districts in question, and who drew not merely from his own observations, but also from a great variety of consular reports.* It is therefore unquestionable that the large tract of country which Russia proposed to enfranchise under the designation of Bulgaria contained a preponderating population which was not in any sense Bulgarian.

The subjection of these several nationalities to Bulgarian domination could not be justified on the ground that the Bulgarians, although in the minority, are a superior race. The very contrary is the fact. In humanity and intelligence, the Bulgarian occupies the lowest level; and even while the representatives of the Great Powers were making arrangements for the grand conclave at Berlin which was to decide the condition of the East of Europe, the Bulgarians were outraging the civilization of the world by their treatment of the unfortunate Mohammedans who had fallen under their power. A mixed Commission of Mohammedans and Christians was sent by the Porte into the disturbed districts of the Rhodope Mountains, to see if it were possible to effect some arrangement with the insurgents. The attempt was an entire failure, for the grievances of the malcontents were too serious to be settled by empty words or facile promises. The Pomak delegates who met the Commissioners declared that they had been hunted down by the Bulgarians like wild beasts. That they spoke the truth was made evident by the condition of the country all about the chief centres of the insurrection. From Adrianople to Philippopolis, the blackened ruins of deserted villages told their melancholy tale of unsparing and ruthless oppression. These were the villages of Mohammedans, and they had been destroyed as the invading armies advanced from the North in the climax of the war. The Russian soldiers themselves may have borne but a secondary part in the actual outrages; but they certainly allowed the Bulgarians to do as they pleased. The Moslem populations were at once disarmed, and all the powers of the police and magistracy were vested in the Christians. Bulgarian delinquents were never convicted on the accusation of either a Mohammedan or a Greek. Round about Philippopolis, according to a correspondent of the *Times*, the Commissioners saw camped in the marshes several thousand Mohammedan refugees, who were literally rotting away with pestilential maladies, as they were not permitted to join their brethren in the mountains. The suffering from want of food alone was extreme, for the relief offered by the municipality was little more than nominal. The Commissioners expostulated with General Stolepine, commanding at Philippopolis, on the carelessness, indifference, and incapacity displayed by the Russian officers in the execution of their civil functions; but his Excellency replied that the officers so employed were merely soldiers, and were for the most part quite ignorant of all other matters. The Greeks and Catholics fared little better than the Moslems; but it was only the latter who had the spirit to stand up for their rights as human beings. They called themselves the Pomak nation, and their armed levies were still holding the Russians at bay in the beginning of June. When the Commission visited the disturbed districts a short time before that date, they invited the chiefs to confer with them; but the leaders of the revolt refused to come. A deputation, composed of Turkish and Russian officers, was then despatched to hold a parley with the other side. The members of this deputation were received at the Pomak outposts, and conducted to the tent of the chief; but they gained nothing by their interposition. "We are in arms," said the chief, "solely to protect ourselves from the Bulgars. All through the war we were hunted and massacred. After the

* Vienna Correspondent of the *Times*, writing on the 20th of June.

war, misled by false promises of the Russians, we went back to our homes, where we were again hunted and massacred. You yourselves have seen our ruined villages. We saw that our extermination was at hand, and we prefer fighting for our lives to being butchered like sheep. We will molest no one, but we will defend ourselves against attack. We shall not descend into the plain, for we are not insurgents; we are not here to attack, but only to defend. We will listen to no advice, nor believe any promises. We will not lay down our arms; in our greatest agony we appealed for help and protection in vain. We have only ourselves to trust to." The officers of the deputation reported to the Commissioners that the Pomaks occupied good strategical points, and were organized and encamped as an army would be in time of war. The insurgents appeared to be in possession of large herds of cattle, and of agricultural implements; but as, shortly afterwards, nearly thirty additional villages were destroyed or pillaged, and 20,000 more fugitives were driven into the mountains, the resources of the unfortunate people began to fail. An appeal on their account was made in England; but it met with only slight response. The enthusiasm which had been excited on behalf of the Bulgarians in the autumn of 1876 was not repeated on behalf of the Pomaks in the summer of 1878.

The Lazis in the neighbourhood of Batoum, whose encounters with the Russians since the peace had been comparatively slight, were equally resolute and equally ill-fated. Through the British Embassy at Constantinople, they sent a petition to the Government of England, asking to be taken under its protection; but such a request did not harmonise with the policy of the time, and the Lazis were left to the mercy of their Russian opponents, though in their desperation they hoisted the British flag over their encampments. These men were of a different race from the Turks, and, though nominally subject to the Porte, possessed a large amount of independence. Very earnest in their religious convictions, they considered that their character as Mohammedans would be destroyed by the supremacy of Russia; and for this opinion they found ample warrant in what had been suffered by their fellow-believers in Circassia, Daghestan, Mingrelia, and Abhasia. In the recent campaign they had fought with heroic courage, and with so much success that the Russians had never been able to take Batoum. "I myself," said Hobart Pasha in a letter to the *Times*, "saw during the late war from 10,000 to 12,000 of these brave men, actuated by the love of their country, and terrified at the notion of being placed under Russian rule, hurl themselves against the Russian army, with rifles in their hands and knives in their mouths, carrying in their wild passion all before them. I saw them, after having fired their rifles, throw the discharged weapons away, rush on armed only with knives, and drive the enemy far back past the frontier." The Lazis are indeed born warriors, and so skilled in the use of firearms that their achievements as marksmen are widely known in that part of Asia. Without the singular beauty of the Georgians, they are robust and active; their industry is much superior to that of the analogous races on the coast of the Black Sea, and as mariners they are not easily surpassed. From its physical conformation, which consists of a succession of rocky precipices, winding ravines, dense forests, and impenetrable jungle, their country is well adapted to guerilla warfare; and the men who people it are worthy of the opportunities which Nature has conferred on them.

The petition from the Lazis to the English Government stated that, if the Russians took possession of Batoum, the Mohammedans would be obliged either to submit to them and their laws, or to emigrate, and that they would consent to neither alternative. "We cannot submit to them," said the petitioners, "for the Russians are our enemies; they will destroy our religion, and the Cossacks will violate the sanctity of our homes. We cannot emigrate, because the greater portion of the inhabitants of the Batoum district are too poor, and are therefore unable to bear the expense. They would thus be compelled to remain within the iron clutches of the Russians, and we know from the past that sooner or later they would have to deny their faith." It appeared to these devoted men that the Sublime Porte was indifferent to their destiny; but in truth the Government of the Sultan was unable to do anything on their behalf. To the petition, which was dated May 17th, a note was attached, stating that the number of persons who had signed it, and sworn faithfully to observe its provisions, was 33,247. Fresh accessions were continually coming in, and there could be no doubt as to the reality of the agitation, or the intensity of the feeling by which it was prompted. The position assumed by these patriotic warriors was somewhat embarrassing to the Sultan, who, having concluded a peace with Russia, was naturally desirous that nothing should occur which might, in an irregular way, renew the struggle. Two Commissioners were accordingly sent from Constantinople, with instructions to effect some arrangement which, without prejudicing the independence of the Lazis, should render any serious collision with the Russians less probable. The people, however, were

much perplexed as to the object of this mission, which they regarded as involving too great a concession to the enemy; but after awhile the agents of the Government made themselves better understood, and succeeded in diminishing the peril that they feared. The Russians under General Komaroff were strongly posted in the neighbourhood of Batoum; and if the Lazis had acted with precipitation, the results might have been embarrassing.

OLD LAZE OF BATOUM.

The Commissioners ultimately persuaded the armed tribes not to provoke a conflict, if the Russians made no attempt to advance; but every care was taken that any strategical point from which the insurgents might retire could be seized again without delay, should the occasion seem to demand it. Batoum could be approached only from three directions, of which the easiest was along the shore from Poti. The other two paths led over the Ajarah hills, and by the Tchoruk valley. But every one of these routes was capable of being blocked at particular points by a small body of men; so that the Russians were not at all in a favourable position for attack. For the present, they were disinclined to make any further armed attempts upon Batoum. They trusted in the results of the Congress, and hoped in this way to acquire what they had vainly endeavoured to purchase with their blood. The Czar wanted Batoum as a port for the Caucasus, and based his claim on the ground that it formerly belonged to the old Georgian kingdom, the greater part of which had been subdued by Russia. Poti was the only port of shipment for their manufactures which the Russians possessed in the whole region of the Caucasus, and this they had themselves constructed with great labour, and at a serious expense. Batoum was a far more desirable place for such purposes, and the design was to construct a railway from that town to a point beyond the Poti swamps, where it would be connected with the system of inland navigation which conducts to the Caspian Sea. This, it was anticipated, would place the whole trade of Persia and Central Asia in the hands of the Russians; and such a result would undoubtedly involve an immense increase of the Czar's power in those important regions.

While the oppressed Mohammedans, both in

Europe and Asia, were thus presenting a bold front to their hereditary enemies, the Sclavophile feeling in Russia, out of which the war arose, was undergoing a remarkable collapse. The St. Petersburg Sclavonic Benevolent Society, which had been very active during the Servian war of 1876, held an extraordinary meeting about the commencement of June, 1878, to celebrate the memory of Cyrillus and Methodius, two missionaries of ancient times, who were the chief instruments in converting the Sclaves to Christianity. The attendance was extremely small, and the *Golos* described the gathering as a melancholy assembly, in which many saw a fitting epilogue to the Sclavonic epos. The champions of the regeneration and unification of the Sclaves had almost entirely melted away, and many persons, according to the *Golos*, inferred that the whole thing had been a lie, an invention, an artificial product. Before the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, the St. Petersburg section of the Sclavonic Committee had counted its members by hundreds; during the Servian war, the number had risen to thousands; but in 1877 it was only six hundred, and at the time the *Golos* recorded these facts it had dropped to less than three hundred. Among those who had retired were the most influential members of former times, and the whole movement appeared to have gradually fallen into discredit. This decline in what had once been a popular agitation was attributed by the *Golos* to artificial causes, of which the principal was the disorderly way in which the affairs of the society were conducted. The committees appointed to collect subscriptions had acted as they pleased, and resented any attempt to obtain from them a proper account of their stewardship. It was broadly asserted that much of the money collected for the starving Sclaves had been spent in congratulatory telegrams to the heroes of the war, or to their wives; and this is not at all improbable, seeing that peculation is universal throughout Russia. The accounts were so loosely kept that when an investigation was ordered it broke down through sheer inability to get at the facts. A kind of internecine war ensued between the partisans of corruption and those who demanded a more honest administration of the funds. The official body endeavoured to carry matters with a high hand; their opponents were equally resolute; and the result was that the society was reduced to a mere skeleton of its former strength. But these were not the only causes of the breakdown. The Pan-Sclavist feeling had for some time been unnaturally overwrought, and a reaction set in, as it is certain to do in such cases. The Russians and the Servians did not get on at all well together; arrogance on the one part being met by upstart insolence on the other. The Bulgarians excited nothing but disappointment in the minds of their deliverers; the cost of the war proved to be immensely greater than the Russians had ever anticipated; and now, when all was done, it appeared not improbable that England would step in, and deprive Russia of the full rewards of her victory. Hence the feeling of depression and irritability which had come over the popular mind. "We Russians," said the president of the St. Petersburg Sclavonic Society, in a speech which he delivered about this period, "gave way to delusions in imagining that in civilization and culture we stand as high above the other Sclaves as the Russian Empire, by its administrative and military forces, towers above the petty Sclavonic Principalities." Moreover, there were more divisions among the Russian people themselves than the outside world imagined. The founders of the Sclavophile school were citizens of Moscow; men deeply imbued with old Russian feelings and ideas,—religious, patriotic, and loyal. Many of these agitators were saintly enthusiasts, who thought that the great mission of Russia was to spread all over the East of Europe the distinctive principles of the Russo-Greek Church. The Sclavophiles who drew their inspiration from St. Petersburg were persons of a wholly different stamp. Their principles were not mediæval, but pre-eminently modern; not distinctively Russian, but rather cosmopolitan; not theological, but, on the contrary, disposed to abrogate all religions in favour of a sort of philosophical humanitarianism. The sources from which these men derived their chief ideas were the revolutionary writings of French politicians, and the materialistic speculations of German professors. They wished, indeed, to establish a strongly centralized authority over the vast mass of the Sclavonic race; but it was in order that they might propagate their faith in a soil which they regarded, whether correctly or not, as peculiarly favourable to its development. In no country of the world have extreme opinions in politics, metaphysics, and social reform been carried to more startling lengths than in Russia; and these speculations were not long in obtaining a foot-hold in the Sclavonic societies, and in causing the original agitators—men of a simple, old-world piety—to draw back in horror. It was seen that the two sections of the body had totally different ends in view; and a rupture necessarily ensued upon the discovery. Unquestionably, the Moscow sentiment is that which prevails throughout Russia, if we consider the mere fact of numbers; but St. Petersburg is the intellectual as

well as the political capital of that vast empire, and the radical politicians who propagate their opinions from the banks of the Neva are every day acquiring a greater influence over public affairs. Russia is probably on the eve of a revolution which may give to the forces of the national life a new direction, and a character which few anticipate; but at present we behold only the blind struggles of a divided social state, and of political forms which incline now towards tradition, and now towards the wildest experiments of an ideal future. If the Governments of Europe had been better informed as to the elements of Russian society, a resolute opposition to Muscovite designs would probably have made the Czar think twice before he provoked the war of 1877. But it was believed in the West that Russia was strong in the unity which has no flaw; and, relying on the aid derivable from that false impression, the Emperor placed himself at the head of a really divided people, and in one short campaign carried his armies up to the very lines of Constantinople.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

Second Sitting of the Congress—Proposal by Lord Salisbury for the Admission of Greece—Observations of Prince Gortschakoff on the Position of the Christian Races in Turkey—Antagonism of the Greeks and Sclaves—The Proposed Constitution of the Bulgarian Principality—Secrecy of the Proceedings in Congress—Third Sitting—Debate on the Proposal to admit a Representative of the Greeks—The Proposal affirmed—Fourth Sitting—Discussion on the Limits of Bulgaria and the Government of Eastern Roumelia—Amendments suggested by Count Schouvaloff—Opposition of Lord Beaconsfield—Danger of the Conference breaking up without Results—Concessions by Russia, with compensating Demands—Fifth Sitting of the Congress—Proposals by Austria as to the Occupation of the Bulgarian Principality—Objections of the Second Russian Plenipotentiary—Russian Intentions in Bulgaria—The Period of the Occupation fixed—Sixth Sitting of the Congress—Further Questions with Respect to the Organization of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia—Seventh Sitting—Conciliatory Remarks by Prince Gortschakoff and Lord Beaconsfield—Close of the Bulgarian Question—Gains of England and of Russia—Austrian Designs on Bosnia and the Herzegovina—Eighth Sitting—Proposal of Lord Salisbury—Concession to Austria—Ineffectual Protest by Turkey—The Independence of Servia confirmed.

MINDFUL of a promise which had been given several weeks before, Lord Salisbury brought forward the claims of Greece at the second sitting of the Congress, which was held on the 17th of June. His views on this subject were contained in a paper which he read to the assembled Plenipotentiaries, and which asserted the indisputable fact that the Christians in the territories under discussion were divided into two parties, whose interests were not identical, and whose sympathies were not in harmony. The bonds of friendship which formerly united the Greek and Sclave subjects of the Porte had recently been broken, and bitter disputes, leading sometimes to collisions, had occurred between the populations of the two races. These disputes had reference, originally, to matters of ecclesiastical government; but since the war of 1877, and the peace of March, 1878, the Greeks had feared the entire subjection of their race to the interests of their rivals. Their fate depended on the form which the Powers might give to the arrangements for protecting the Christians, and securing order to the provinces of European Turkey. But the two races, argued Lord Salisbury, were not on an equal footing before the Congress. The Sclaves had as their defender a powerful military nation, related to them by blood and by faith; while the Greeks had as their representative no nation of the same race. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the decisions taken under such circumstances would not content the Hellenes, and consequently would not promote either the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire, or the peace of Europe. England, therefore, proposed that the Hellenic Kingdom should be admitted to the Congress as the representative of the Greeks, or should at least be allowed to assist at all sittings in which questions concerning the interests of the race were discussed.

At the suggestion of Prince Bismarck, the consideration of this proposal (which was supported, with modifications, by the Plenipotentiaries of France) was deferred until the next meeting; but, before the subject passed, Prince Gortschakoff made a few remarks on the relative position of the Greeks and Sclaves in Turkey. His Highness was anxious that the Congress should look upon the representatives of Russia, not as exclusively concerned with the interests of the Sclaves, but as taking an interest in all the Christian populations of Turkey. The Russian Chancellor accordingly declared beforehand that he would identify himself with the measures adopted in favour of the Greeks: he would even demand for the Greeks of the Ottoman

Empire an autonomy similar to that which was claimed for the Sclaves. The object of his Government, he said, was to draw these two races closer together; and, with regard to the religious question, he observed that on essential points there was no discordance between the Greek Patriarchate and a people whom they regarded with contempt and aversion. The truth is that neither race was qualified to exercise control over the other; for both were ignorant of the first principles of political justice and freedom. In ecclesiastical affairs, the Greek Patriarch had long tyrannised over the

THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD ON HIS WAY TO THE CONGRESS.

the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was solely a question of liturgy which had brought about the separation of the two Churches. These explanations were allowed to pass without any comment; but the Greeks may well be excused for declining to accept the advocacy of Russia as at all answerable to their demands. The Bulgarian supremacy in Roumelia, which was what Russia was bound to uphold, was the very thing against which the Greeks protested, because it would subject them to the rule of Bulgarians; and the Hellenes now feared, not without reasonable grounds, that they would in turn be oppressed. The Porte had really, for some years past, secured the rights of both, by permitting neither to encroach upon the other.* But that supremacy had been destroyed, and the Congress had to consider what could best be put in its place.

The Constitution of the Bulgarian Principality then came up for consideration, and Lord Salisbury

* See Vol. I., pp. 15, 16, of this History.

after making some remarks to the same effect as those which were contained in his circular of April 1st, submitted to the judgment of the Congress the two following proposals:—(1.) That the tributary, autonomous Principality of Bulgaria should be restricted to that part of European Turkey which is situated to the north of the Balkans. (2.) That the Province of Roumelia, and all other territory south of the Balkans, should be under the direct political and military authority of the Sultan, necessary precautions being taken that the welfare of the populations should be protected by sufficient guarantees of administrative autonomy, or in some other manner. These proposals led to a little desultory conversation, and it was finally agreed, on the initiative of Prince Bismarck, that the Russian, Austrian, and British Plenipotentiaries should meet privately, and endeavour to arrive at an agreement on certain points which should be communicated to the Assembly with a view to facilitating its labours. In the outer world, little was known as to the proceedings of the Congress. The deliberations of that body were jealously guarded, and, on the first day of meeting, even pedestrian circulation was entirely stopped in the thoroughfare adjoining the Radziwill Palace. Within the walls of the council-chamber, Prince Bismarck exacted a pledge of secrecy from all over whom he had control. The German officials were compelled to take an oath on the Bible that they would divulge nothing, and the same oath was administered even to the printers and lithographers employed by the High Assembly. Nevertheless, some rumours as to the deliberations of the Plenipotentiaries managed to get abroad, and it was known, immediately after the meeting of the 17th, that the claims of the Greeks had been brought forward by the English Foreign Minister, that the constitution of Bulgaria had been discussed, and that the decision of both matters had been adjourned.

The Congress met for the third time on the 19th of June, when the admission of the representatives of Greece was debated at great length. The subject was one on which the Turkish Plenipotentiaries could not fail to entertain very decided views, since it touched the principle of Ottoman sovereignty. It seemed, therefore, to the representatives of Turkey that they were bound to guard the rights of the Sultan by declaring that they sat there for the entire Empire, which embraced the totality of the several elements contained in its population. Karatheodori Pasha, speaking on behalf of himself and his colleagues, abstained from opposing the suggestion that the Greeks should be represented, but trusted that the wisdom of Congress would prevent that privilege, if granted, from entailing the serious disadvantages which might possibly result from a protectorate of an exclusive nature. Prince Gortschakoff afterwards read a document, affirming the interest taken by Russia in all the Christian populations of Turkey, and signifying his adhesion to a proposal made at the previous sitting by the representatives of France, to the effect that the Government of his Hellenic Majesty should be invited to appoint a delegate, who should be allowed to develop the opinions of Greece when the condition of the border provinces was under discussion, and who might be summoned to the Congress whenever the Plenipotentiaries should deem it advisable. These provisions, Russia desired to extend equally to Crete, while Lord Salisbury wished to substitute the words "Greek provinces" for "border provinces," in order that not only Thessaly and Epirus, but Macedonia, Thrace, and Crete, might be included in the discussions at which the representative of Greece might be present. The amendment in the French text, thus formulated by the Second Plenipotentiary of England, was put to the vote after the original proposal had been affirmed; but, as the suffrages were equally divided, the desired alteration was held to be negatived. In this second vote, the amendment was supported by the English, Austrian, and Italian Plenipotentiaries, and opposed by those of Russia, Germany, and France, while the representatives of Turkey abstained from voting either way. The course pursued by Russia is well worthy of remark. When the Greeks were to be used as an instrument for still further reducing the power of Turkey, their claims were to be upheld; but when the admission of those claims might counteract the designs of the Czar in Bulgaria and Roumelia, they were to be denied and thwarted. If Greece was to be admitted to the council-board as the representative of the Hellenes of Thessaly and Epirus—and even of Crete, as Prince Gortschakoff himself proposed—there was no reason, in justice and sense, why she should not also have spoken on behalf of the Hellenes whom it was proposed to include in the new Bulgaria, and who considered that they would be greatly injured by that arrangement. But justice and sense are not the qualities which most frequently prevail at Congresses. Russia desired to subject the Macedonian and Thracian Greeks to the Bulgarians, and on this occasion Germany and France were her accomplices.

Prince Gortschakoff was unable to attend the fourth meeting of the Assembly, on June 22nd, owing to illness; but the other Plenipotentiaries

proceeded to discuss the proposed limits of Bulgaria, as defined by Article VI. of the Treaty of San Stefano, and modified by the suggestions submitted by Lord Salisbury at the second meeting of the Congress. Proceeding to develop his ideas, the Second Plenipotentiary of England proposed that the province to the south of the Balkans should be called Eastern Roumelia; that the incorporation of the Sandjak of Sophia, with strategical rectification of the frontiers of the Principality, should be agreed to, in consideration either of the retention of Varna by the Turks, or of the exclusion of the basins of the Mesta Karasu and Struma Karasu from Eastern Roumelia; and that the province so named should be placed under the direct authority of the Sultan, who would exercise it under certain specified conditions. His Majesty was to have the right to provide for the defence of the sea and land frontiers of the province, the faculty of maintaining troops on those frontiers, and the privilege of fortifying them there. Internal order was to be maintained by the militia, the officers of which should be appointed by the Sultan, who should take into consideration the religion of the population; and the Governor-General should have the right to summon the Ottoman troops, whenever the internal or external security might be threatened. Some general suggestions were made (subject to further deliberation) as to the boundaries of Eastern Roumelia, and it was proposed that a European Commission should take the matter in hand. Such were the views which Lord Salisbury set forth in a brief document, and submitted to the judgment of the High Assembly.

In answer to a question from the President, Count Schouvaloff stated that the Plenipotentiaries of Russia had brought forward two amendments, which in their opinion did not alter in principle the modifications proposed by Great Britain, but which nevertheless had not been accepted by their English colleagues. The representatives of Russia had sanctioned the division of Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans, in spite of the serious objections which that division presented. They had admitted, though with reluctance, the substitution of the name of Eastern Roumelia for that of South Bulgaria, reserving to themselves, however, with respect to this point, full liberty of subsequent discussion at the Congress. They had also agreed to remove the boundaries of the new province from the Ægean Sea. Still further, they had allowed a rectification on the western frontiers of Bulgaria, though they regarded this rectification with disfavour, as dividing a compact Bulgarian population. They had consented to alter the southern frontiers towards the Black Sea, thus abandoning the boundaries traced by the Treaty of San Stefano, and even throwing back those of the Conference of Constantinople. Lastly, they had given to the Sultan the guardianship of the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia. On the other hand, they thought they had a right to ask that the weak should be protected against the strong; and with that view they proposed two amendments, having for their object the safety of the population of Eastern Roumelia from the undue interference of the Porte. The principle, upon which all appeared to be at one, that the interior of that province should be occupied only by native militia, ought, in their opinion, to be guaranteed. This, they submitted, should be done by a European Commission, charged to determine the points which the Ottoman Government might be allowed to occupy on its frontiers, and the approximate strength of the forces of occupation. The Plenipotentiaries of Russia were authorized to accept the point relative to the right of the Governor-General to call in Ottoman troops under circumstances of danger; but they thought it necessary to adhere to the principle that the Congress should determine the occasion for, and the manner of, the entry of the Ottoman troops into Eastern Roumelia. Count Schouvaloff argued that these reservations in no wise altered the principles submitted by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain; and he considered them necessary to the safety of the Bulgarian population from the excesses of an alien soldiery.

The concessions granted by Russia, and the modifying provisos now put forward by that Power, had resulted from the private deliberations which had recently taken place between the representatives of the Czar and the Plenipotentiaries of England and Austria. After Count Schouvaloff had expounded his ideas to the Congress, Lord Beaconsfield expressed his opinion that that body had reason to be satisfied with the existing aspect of the question. It had been established by unanimous assent that the Sultan, as a member of the political body of Europe, was to enjoy a position which should secure to him the respect due to his sovereign rights. The two resolutions submitted to the Congress by Lord Salisbury gave to that monarch a real frontier, and a military and political power sufficient to enable him to maintain his authority, and to protect the life and possessions of his subjects. But his Lordship feared that the amendments brought forward by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia would weaken the force of those two resolutions. The institution of a European Commission was evidently derogatory from the

right of the Sovereign. The power of the Sultan could not possibly be respected if the Ottoman Government were hampered in the future defence of its frontier. Any arrangements which might be made by the European Commission would necessarily be unsatisfactory; and Lord Beaconsfield therefore hoped that the Congress would not sanction this proposition of the Russian Plenipotentiaries. The second amendment he considered even more inadmissible than the first, and he could not understand how a Governor-General could discharge his duties, if, before he could obtain the assistance of the Imperial troops, he should be obliged to conform himself to certain general rules drawn up beforehand by that Assembly. After considerable discussion, the Congress unanimously adopted the principle laid down in the first and second paragraphs of the English proposition, but with the understanding that the Russian amendments were to be subsequently considered, and that, before the next meeting, M. Waddington should prepare a draft, which should make the latter part of Lord Salisbury's text harmonize with the Russian proposals.

The triumph of England, as far as it went, had not been obtained without considerable difficulty. In the discussions between Lord Beaconsfield and the Russian Plenipotentiaries, the former had made it distinctly understood that the continuation of the Congress depended on the acceptance of the English demands by Prince Gortschakoff. The question was referred to St. Petersburg, and the Emperor signified his compliance with the proposed terms, but only on condition that the Sandjak of Sophia should be added to independent Bulgaria, and that the interior of Eastern Roumelia should not be occupied by Turkish troops. Pending the receipt of this intimation from the Russian capital, there was considerable doubt whether the Congress would not suddenly break up; in which case, war would almost inevitably have followed. Lord Beaconsfield at one time stated that if the sitting of June 22nd were allowed to pass without producing the results which he desired, he should probably feel it incumbent on him to leave Berlin at once. The Russian Plenipotentiaries vainly endeavoured to obtain a postponement of the points in question. Lord Beaconsfield resisted every attempt of this nature, and plainly, though courteously, hinted that his terms must be accepted, on pain of a rupture. The Czar's reply did not arrive until the afternoon of the 21st; but it was so far satisfactory that it accepted the English conditions in principle, though with the modifications already described. The disagreement between England and Russia had ended in a compromise. The Turkish occupation of the South Balkan passes was conceded by Russia, together with the other points on which England had insisted; but the addition of the Sandjak of Sophia to the proposed Principality was a decided gain to Russia, as Sophia is situated on the southern side of the great Balkan range. The possession of Varna by the new Bulgaria (to which Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury consented, on the understanding that the basins of the Karasus, to the west of Eastern Roumelia, should be left to Turkey) was also a point scored by Russia against England. But when it was argued, not merely by the Russians themselves, but by their friends in this country, that the strategical position of Sophia was equal to the possession of all the southern passes, it is evident that a great exaggeration was made to do duty for a more moderate truth.

It was by many suspected that the illness of Prince Gortschakoff was either feigned or overstated, in order to save him the mortification of being present when Russia formally conceded several points which she would much rather have maintained. However this may have been, he was again absent from the fifth sitting of the Congress, which took place on June 24th. On that day, some propositions were brought forward, and postponed for further discussion; and Count Andrassy then read an amendment to the second paragraph of Article VIII. of the Treaty of San Stefano. That Article stipulated the entire withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the Principality of Bulgaria; it also contained a clause to the effect that, after the evacuation of Turkey by the Russian troops, a Russian army-corps, not exceeding 50,000 men, should, until the complete organization of a native militia, occupy Bulgaria, and that the duration of this occupation should be about two years. Examining the effects of these terms, the chief Plenipotentiary of Austria remarked upon the inconvenience that would result from allowing the projected occupation to depend upon a period so difficult to fix beforehand as that which might be requisite for the complete organization of the militia, or upon a date so remote as two years. He feared it would be difficult to reconcile such a stipulation with the joint efforts of the High Signatory Powers for the prompt re-establishment of a definitive peace. As long as a foreign occupation lasted, something like a state of war would still appear to exist. Public credit would suffer, and even other countries would be exposed to the fluctuations of an ill-defined order of things. Moreover, the troops of Turkey, which

had been permitted to occupy the Balkan passes, would be left face to face with those who had recently been their enemies. The situation of Roumania was likewise an object of serious anxiety to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries. The Article in question gave to Russia the right of sending her troops across that Principality, with the object of securing their communications; and Roumania would consider herself deprived of independence, and subjected to a suspension or limitation of her rights. The Austrian Government conceived that it would be to the interest of all parties that a distinct period should be fixed for the occupation of Bulgaria, but was at the same time desirous that the Congress should make provision for the contingency that at the expiration of that period the condition of the provinces in question might still require the presence of a foreign army. The chief representative of Austria accordingly proposed that the Congress should decide as follows:—"(1.) The duration of the occupation of the Principality of Bulgaria by the Russian Imperial troops is fixed at six months, to date from the conclusion of the definitive peace. (2.) The Imperial Russian Government undertakes to terminate, within a further period of two or three months, or sooner if it can be managed, the passage of its troops across Roumania, and the complete evacuation of that Principality. (3.) If, contrary to all prevision, at the expiration of the term of six months the presence of the foreign auxiliary troops in Bulgaria should be considered by common agreement necessary, the Great Powers would supply contingents, of which the total would amount to about 10,000 or 15,000 men, which contingents would be placed under the orders of the European Commission, and their maintenance would be at the expense of the country occupied." Lord Beaconsfield expressed an opinion that it would be advisable to deliberate forthwith upon the proposals of Count Andrassy. He accepted the Austro-Hungarian ideas, which he regarded as wise and prudent; and he was authorized by his Government to add that England was ready to furnish its quota of the contingent which it was suggested should occupy Bulgaria under certain circumstances. But Russia was not disposed to agree with what had been advanced by Austria.

Count Schouvaloff confined himself to making three objections: 1st, in respect of the wording, which appeared to him not to take into account the separation of Bulgaria by the frontier of the Balkans; 2ndly, with regard to the period of six months demanded as the limit of the occupation, which he considered far too short; 3rdly, as to the mixed occupation, which offered many practical difficulties. The first of these objections he admitted to be purely formal; but with respect to the second he drew a distinction between the position of Eastern Roumelia and that of Bulgaria. In Roumelia, he said, the occupation might, strictly speaking, be abridged to six months, for, in the event of disorders, the militia would have to act, and if they proved inadequate the Governor-General would call for the intervention of the Ottoman troops. In Bulgaria, on the contrary, where no Turkish force could enter, the occupation ought to be prolonged. Count Schouvaloff desired, while on this subject, to give the Congress a general idea of what had been done in Bulgaria since the Russian army entered it, and what remained to be done there. Russia, he affirmed, had endeavoured to make as little change as possible in the institutions of the country, and he mentioned that the late Prince Tcherkasski had been struck with the fact that the Turkish legislation was well suited to the wants of the country, only that the laws and regulations were not known to the public functionaries, who accordingly did not put them in force. Since the province had been in the possession of Russia, the Provisional Government had caused the election of an Administrative Council, a Municipal Council, and a Judicial Council, in each caza. The Presidents of these three Councils would form the nucleus of the future Assemblies of the Notables, and the Administration intended to send with them to Tirnova the cadis of the Mussulman districts, in order to draw up the electoral law. When this law was formulated, the elections would be proceeded with; then the drafting of the Organic Statute; and lastly the nomination of the Prince. But this organization would require time, and Russia repudiated all responsibility for a premature evacuation. As regarded a mixed occupation of the territory, it appeared to Count Schouvaloff that such a force could not perform its duties equally well with a Russian army, accustomed as that was to the country and the people, and knowing the language. An army placed under the orders of a Commission seemed to him very inferior to one led by a military chief, and he apprehended the occurrence of collisions which might in time become serious. It likewise remained to be seen whether all the Powers would agree to this proposition of a mixed contingent, which would in fact be very costly and complicated.

In these respects, as in so many others, Prince Bismarck supported the wishes of Russia. Count Andrassy, replying to Count Schouvaloff, maintained the views he had already expressed, while admitting that he would rather not have recourse to a mixed

occupation, if any other plan were available. Finally, he called attention to the numerous petitions addressed to the Congress relative to the excesses of the Bulgarians, and expressed his opinion that it would be much to the interest of the Russian Government to be freed from so heavy a responsibility by authorising the proposal he had made. In order not to prolong the debate, Count Schouvaloff consented to a period of nine months for the evacuation of Bulgaria, and of three months more for the evacuation of Roumania; so that at the end of a year the Russian army would have completely abandoned the two countries. These proposals did not meet with the approval of Count Andrassy, and a rapid interchange of ideas took place, from which it appeared that the majority were disposed to view with favour a gradual evacuation of six months for Roumelia, of nine months for Bulgaria, and of a year for Roumania. Count Schouvaloff then declared that he was not in a position to accept this arrangement, which exceeded his full powers. As, however, he had already accepted the period of nine months for Bulgaria, and of twelve months for Roumania, it was simply the shorter date assigned for the evacuation of Roumelia which occasioned his scruple. Nevertheless, he successfully maintained his objection in this respect, and the matter was settled by assigning the same term for Roumelia as for Bulgaria. The objections to this course proceeded from Austria, France, and England; but ultimately all three gave way before the steady refusal of Count Schouvaloff, and the agreement of Italy and Germany with the ideas of Russia.



LUNCHEON ROOM, RADZIWILL PALACE.

At the sitting of June 25th (the sixth meeting of the Congress), M. Waddington announced that he had come to an understanding with his Russian and English colleagues, and accordingly presented a



formula which he hoped would be accepted by the High Assembly. After the passage in Lord Salisbury's proposal, stating that the Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia was to have the right of summoning Ottoman troops on special occasions, the First French Plenipotentiary desired to add a paragraph, providing that in such a contingency the Sublime Porte would communicate its decision, together with the necessity which justified it, to the representatives of the Great Powers at Constantinople. The Congress unanimously accepted this addition, and M. Waddington then read the amendment which he proposed to substitute for the following passage in Lord Salisbury's motion:—"Internal order is maintained by the militia, the officers of which are named by the Sultan, who will take into consideration the religion of the population." Instead of these words, M. Waddington submitted a clause which provided for the maintenance of internal order by a native gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia, and which added that in the formation of those two corps (the officers of which were to be named by the Sultan) the religion of the inhabitants, according to the different localities, should be taken into consideration. This amendment also was sanctioned by the Congress. Other matters of detail were subjected to elaborate discussion, and, in pursuance of an arrangement then made, a private committee of the Austrian, Russian, and British Plenipotentiaries, with Count Corti as the representative of the neutral members, met on the morning of June 26th, when the questions relating to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were settled in principle. As regarded the military occupation by Turkey of the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia, it was agreed that the Turks should occupy the chief positions with their regular military force; that they should not remain in the interior, unless formally summoned by the Governor; and that billeting should be forbidden. The proposed Russian Commissary in Eastern Roumelia was to be superseded by an International Commission; while in Bulgaria the Commissary was to be controlled by a Commission of Consuls, who, in the event of any difference of opinion, would have power to appeal to the Ambassadors at Constantinople. Resolutions were passed, securing religious liberty, the maintenance of commercial treaties, and a due consideration of the Turkish debt in connection with the amount of tribute to be paid by Bulgaria. The fortresses in that province (including Varna) were to be razed, and not to be re-erected; and, finally, transit-dues were prohibited in Bulgaria—a provision which would have the effect of making Varna a free port with respect to all goods destined for Roumania.

On the 26th of June, the health of Prince Gortschakoff was sufficiently re-established to enable him to take his place at the seventh meeting of the Congress. In addressing the Assembly, he referred to some remarks by Lord Beaconsfield at a previous sitting, when that nobleman expressed his desire that the Sultan should be master in his own dominions. This desire, said the Prince, was equally felt by himself; but he thought the existence of the Sultan's authority depended on conditions without which genius itself would be ineffectual. Those conditions were administrative and political, and it was of the utmost importance that the inhabitants of the provinces not declared independent by the Congress might be assured of their possessions and lives by a European agreement, such as would inspire general confidence. He therefore wished to see established, not the preponderance of any one Power, but the collective action of all the Great Powers; and, employing a happy figure of speech, he observed that Russia had brought to the council-board laurels which he hoped the Congress would convert into olive-branches. His more immediate colleagues had in the last two sittings made very large concessions to the earnest desire for peace which inspired Russia equally with all Europe. They had presented not phrases, but facts, to the High Assembly. Prince Gortschakoff therefore discarded the thought that any Power whatever wished to oppose the splendid result of peace, by raising its demands to limits which it would be impossible for the great Sovereign and the great nation he represented to overstep. He could not admit the possibility of a deed which would be severely judged both by contemporaries and by history. This was clearly a hint to the English representatives, and it called up Lord Beaconsfield, who, after a cordial expression of his satisfaction at the Russian Chancellor's improved health, said he was fully authorised to observe that he himself and his English colleagues had, in like manner with Russia, made important concessions for the maintenance of peace. Peace, in fact, was the wish of Europe; but, to accomplish it, the spirit of conciliation was still necessary. The rest of the sitting was occupied by the discussion of various details, including those which had been settled in the private committee of that morning. The unanimous adhesion of Congress being thus obtained to the proposed alterations, the Bulgarian question was brought to a close, and Prince Bismarck expressed a hope that, as regarded the subjects which remained for discussion, the Plenipotentiaries would

proceed in a more general and rapid manner than at the previous sittings. He pointed out that the Congress, as then constituted, could not sit long enough to enter into numerous details: it could only lay down the bases, and leave the particulars to be elaborated by an assembly to be convoked later on. Lord Beaconsfield also expressed a desire for the more summary treatment of questions still left open for debate; and, after listening to some proposals of the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries with reference to the new frontier lines, the Congress adjourned until the 28th of June.

Up to this point, the two chief actors on the scene had been Russia and England. In accordance with the general terms of the private agreement signed on May 30th, each Power had conceded somewhat to the demands of its rival. England had obtained—what was certainly of no inconsiderable value—the division of the proposed Bulgaria into two States, the retention of one of those States under the government of the Sultan, the restoration of the Ægean littoral to the dominion of the Porte, and other provisions lessening the power which Russia desired to exercise over those regions of European Turkey. But Russia, nevertheless, had succeeded in creating a Bulgaria which would be free from all but the nominal sovereignty of the Porte, and had fixed the capital of that State on the southern side of the Balkans, which in effect was equivalent to planting the outposts of Russia herself in that important strategical position. Thus, as far as European Turkey was concerned, the matters at issue between England and Russia had ended in a drawn battle, and this was all that could fairly be expected, save at the cost of war—a cost which neither country seemed disposed to incur. At the eighth sitting of the Congress, Austria appeared as the principal opponent of Russia. It has been explained several times in the course of this narrative that Austria's neutrality was of an interested description. A large proportion of the Emperor's subjects would gladly have gone to war with Russia, and Count Andrassy himself seems to have had some tendency in that direction; but behind the wishes of the people, and the inclinations of the Prime Minister, was the personal will of the Sovereign. That the three Imperial brethren, the great military rulers of Russia, Germany, and Austria, had come to an understanding long before the war, is now a well-known fact; and the basis of the understanding, as far as Austria was concerned, is not difficult to discover. In the confidential conversation between Count Schouvaloff and Lord Derby on the 8th of June, 1877, the Russian Ambassador remarked that if Austria should require compensation for any extension of power acquired by Russia as a result of the war then just beginning, his Imperial master would not oppose her seeking such compensation in Bosnia, and partly in the Herzegovina. This, in all probability, is what had been agreed upon between the two monarchs; and the degree of opposition which Austria evinced after the conclusion of the war seems to have resulted from a fear that Russia, in the intoxication of her success, would not hold to her bargain. From time to time, there were rumours of a forcible occupation of Bosnia by the Austrian troops. Towards the close of April, when the holding of a Congress appeared extremely doubtful, these rumours acquired a greater consistency, and it is not unlikely that Austrian regiments would have been sent across the frontier, if Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff had not so far composed their differences as to settle the terms on which a Congress was to assemble. That matter being accomplished, and Russia beginning to show a more conciliatory disposition, the path of Austria was clear enough. The Bosnian question was accordingly brought forward by Count Andrassy in the sitting of June 28th, when he read a long communication, setting forth the evils and dangers which had resulted from the disturbed condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and observing that the Turkish forces concentrated there had not been able to put an end to continual insurrection and emigration. More than 200,000 people, it was here stated, had abandoned their homes, and for upwards of three years the Government of Austria had been compelled to bear the expense of their maintenance. Ten millions of florins had already been expended in this manner, and the emigrants, distrusting the lot which awaited them on their return, still refused to go back. The Austrian Government did not regard with any satisfaction that article of the Treaty of San Stefano which proposed to introduce an autonomous Government into Bosnia and the Herzegovina. A durable settlement could not result from the proposed arrangement; the attempt to establish an autonomous organisation in so disturbed a land would probably fail; and Austria would be exposed afresh to the intolerable burdens under which she was then suffering. Count Andrassy therefore felt obliged to declare, frankly and openly, that the most vital interests of the Empire he represented demanded a solution of the Bosno-Herzegovinian question, such as would be likely to bring about a durable pacification, and to prevent the recurrence of events which had created for Austria-Hungary an intolerable

situation, of which she could not permit the continuance.

Lord Salisbury then read a proposition which had evidently been concerted beforehand with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria. Echoing the views of Count Andrassy, he enlarged on the state of anarchy prevailing in the provinces under discussion, and on the impossibility of the Turkish Government restoring order among a population so divided. "The geographical position of these provinces," said the Second Plenipotentiary of England, "is of high political importance. In case a considerable part of them should fall into the hands of one of the neighbouring principalities, a chain of Sclave States would be formed which would stretch across the peninsula of the Balkans, and the military force of which would menace the populations of other races occupying the territory to the south." It therefore appeared to Lord Salisbury that the Porte would give evidence of the highest wisdom if it refused to burden itself any longer with a task which surpassed its strength, and would avert serious dangers from the Turkish Empire by entrusting that task to a Power capable of discharging it. For these motives, the Government of the Queen proposed to the assembled Powers that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The proposal was ultimately supported by Prince Bismarck, and by the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, France, and Italy, although the Italian representatives seem to have done so with reluctance. Karatheodori Pasha read a long communication, setting forth the very decided objection of the Ottoman Government to any foreign occupation of the two provinces. He attributed the failure of Turkey to pacify those countries to the attacks which had been made upon the Empire during the last few years, and at the same time undertook to give speedy satisfaction in this respect, as well as in the matter of reforms, as soon as peace was definitively concluded. Lord Beaconsfield strongly reinforced the arguments by which the proposed occupation was recommended to the Congress. The Powers, he thought, ought to seek more efficacious means of pacification in Bosnia and the Herzegovina than Turkey was able to afford; and he believed they would find those means in the action of a great neighbouring Government, which had never sought to disturb the interests of other lands. If the Congress were to leave the provinces under discussion in their existing state, the predominance of the Sclavonic race—a race little disposed to do justice to others—would shortly be seen to reappear. After some further debate, Count Andrassy announced that his Government was ready to undertake the occupation and administration of Bosnia and the Herzegovina; but he added that, as the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar did not actually border on the Austro-Hungarian frontiers, Austria would refrain from undertaking the administration of that particular territory, and that consequently the Ottoman rule might continue there, though with power to Austria to form a garrison, together with military and commercial roads, along the whole of the district. It is not surprising that so monstrous a proposal—a proposal in no way short of downright robbery—should have been strenuously resisted by the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries. They were out-voted, however, although, with respect to what Count Andrassy had said concerning the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, Count Schouvaloff reserved the consent of his Government until he had received further explanations from the First Plenipotentiary of Austria. These were subsequently given, to the satisfaction of the Russian representatives.

The question of Servia was then taken into consideration, and it was agreed to recognize her independence on the following conditions:—(1.) Full religious liberty to be secured to all the inhabitants of the Principality. (2.) The existing commercial treaties with Turkey to be maintained. (3.) Prohibition of transit-dues on merchandize passing through the Principality. The questions of the frontier to be assigned to Servia, and of her liability, in respect of the tribute previously due to the Sultan, to any portion of the Turkish debt, were referred to a sub-committee of the Congress. On the new position of Servia, Karatheodori Pasha made some not undignified remarks touching the good faith with which Turkey had always exercised her right of suzerainty; but he did not, of course, enter any protest against a stipulation which circumstances had rendered absolute and unavoidable. The independence of Servia was thus confirmed, and an act of signal treachery on the part of that State received the reward which, for a time, treachery not unfrequently obtains when it is upheld by strength.

## CHAPTER XIX.

Progress of the Negotiations—Prince Gortschakoff and Lord Beaconsfield—Ninth Sitting of the Congress—Admission of the Greek Representatives—Their Statement of the Case of Greece—Question as to Roumania—Proposal that the Representatives of that Principality should be admitted to the Congress—Opposition of the Russian Plenipotentiaries—Discussion on the Proposed Retrocession of Bessarabia—Tenth Sitting of the Congress—Admission of the Roumanian Delegates, and Statement of their Views and Claims—The Independence of Roumania affirmed—Concessions by Russia with regard to Territory—Eleventh Sitting—The Question of the Danube—Proposals by Austria—The Indemnity required by Russia—Appeal by Turkey for more lenient Treatment—Count Schouvaloff on the Causes of the War—Reassuring Statements of the Russian Plenipotentiaries—Turkey and the Foreign Loans—Twelfth Sitting of the Congress—The New Boundaries of Montenegro—Increase to the Power of Austria—Freedom of Navigation on the Danube—Provision for Religious Liberty in Turkey—Thirteenth Sitting—The Boundaries of Greece—Fourteenth Sitting—The Russian Acquisitions in Asia—Concessions with respect to Erzeroum, Bayazid, Alashgerd, and Batoum—Speech of Lord Beaconsfield.

CONCILIATION was the prevailing sentiment in the deliberations of the Congress, and it produced the effect which the majority of its members, if not all, desired. Peace appeared more probable with each succeeding day. The Bulgarian question was the one most likely to cause a rupture, and that, as we have seen, was settled on the 26th of June. Up to this point, Turkey had certainly been a gainer by the councils of the Powers, and Russia had yielded to a greater extent than was anticipated. The Czar had in fact conceded more than was required by the agreement of May 30th, though he had at the same time insisted on a few compensatory stipulations, which to some extent, though not entirely, neutralised the concessions. Lord Beaconsfield had assuredly given up less than his opponent, and his firm and confident tone contrasted curiously with the nervous hesitation of Prince Gortschakoff. In a conversation between the First English Plenipotentiary and Prince Bismarck, which took place on the 21st of June, the latter very earnestly exhorted the former to make concessions; upon which Lord Beaconsfield is stated to have replied, "I did not come here to yield." The Berlin correspondent of the *Times* mentioned a remark of Prince Gortschakoff at the sitting of the 26th, which, if it was really made, showed that the First Plenipotentiary of the Czar did not entirely approve of all that had been done in his absence. "During your late deliberations," the Prince is reported to have said, "my colleagues have granted you, in the name of Russia, concessions far surpassing those she thought of making." On hearing this, it is added, all the members of the Congress evinced signs of apprehension, fearing lest the words of the Prince should be the prelude to a declaration withdrawing the concessions. But the Russian Chancellor, according to this account, proceeded to say that he was too well aware of the feelings which influenced his colleagues to raise any objection to the concessions they had deemed it their duty to make.* The speaker—who was borne from his carriage to the door of the council-room, and who rose with difficulty, holding on to the table for support—expressed himself in faltering tones, and was evidently much affected. His age and illness had a good deal to do with this; but it is not improbable that he perceived the partial failure of that for which he had laboured, and which at one time seemed almost within his grasp.

The ninth sitting of the Congress was on the 29th of June. As the order of the day had relation in the first place to Article XV. of the Treaty of San Stefano, which referred to the island of Crete and the provinces bordering on the Kingdom of Greece, the representatives of the Government of his Hellenic Majesty were invited to make to the High Assembly any communications with which they might be charged. M. Delyannis, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Rangabé, Minister of Greece at Berlin, were then introduced, and the former of those gentlemen expressed to the Congress the gratitude of the Hellenic Government for the admission of himself and his colleague to the High Assembly. As an exposition of the views of his Government, he read a long communication, declaring that nothing more was sought than the annexation of Crete, and of the provinces bordering on the Kingdom of Greece. "Would it not," asked the representatives of that State, "be a work of justice and humanity to satisfy the national aspirations of those countries, to fulfil their wishes, so often expressed, and for the future to spare them the destruction and catastrophes to which they expose themselves in order to gain a national existence? . . . . The natives of the Greek provinces of the Ottoman Empire are counted by

* The official Protocols of the Congress (Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 39, 1878) simply make the Prince state that his two colleagues had conceded much to the desire of peace by which Russia was inspired. (Protocol No. 7.) But official reports are often largely reticent.

EARL BEACONSFIELD'S INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE BISMARCK.

thousands; a great number occupy high positions in all branches of the Administration, in the navy, and in the army; others, not less numerous, are distinguished by their commercial and industrial activity. The echo which the news of an Hellenic insurrection in Turkey produces in their hearts is too powerful not to move them. Some it drives to cross the frontiers to join the combatants; others to empty their purses for the common cause. This excitement is rapidly communicated to all the inhabitants of the country, although not natives of the fighting provinces; and the whole population of the Kingdom, which cannot forget what it owes to the former struggles of these disinherited brethren, nor remain impassive in view of their efforts for deliverance, rushes to join their ranks, in order to assist them in re-conquering their liberty. . . . Even if the Government had the power of opposing a barrier to the national current, all these efforts would be without effect, by reason of the extent and conformation of the frontier line of the Kingdom, which an army of 100,000 men would not be sufficient to guard, so as to be able to prevent the clandestine departure of volunteers. The situation created for the Hellenic Government by these insurrectional movements is not less difficult and



VILLAGE FÊTE IN GREECE.

untenable from a financial point of view. The Budget of the Kingdom has often experienced, and is even now experiencing, the influence of like events. However great and striking may be the difference between the Budget of Public Revenues, drawn up in 1829 by the President of Greece, and that of last year (1877), it is none the less true that the pecuniary assistance granted each time to refugees from the insurgent provinces and to the repatriated combatants, and the armaments caused by this abnormal situation, and by the somewhat strained relations with the neighbouring State which have always resulted therefrom, have often swallowed up several millions, increased the public debt, and appropriated in fruitless outlay the greater part of the public revenues, which, if employed in the material development of the country, would have greatly increased its resources and well-being."

The President having promised that the Greek memorandum should be printed and distributed, and that the Congress would examine it with attention, M. Rangabé presented some supplementary considerations, and dwelt especially on the progress which had taken place in Greece since the proclamation of independence, as well as on the difficulties which the smallness of the territory, the absence of natural frontiers, and the permanent agitations of neighbouring populations of the same race, had perpetually opposed to the prosperity and development of the Hellenic Kingdom. After a few words from Prince Bismarck, Messieurs Delyannis and Rangabé retired, and the Congress proceeded to the examination of Articles V. and XIX. of the Treaty of San Stefano. These had reference to Roumania, and Lord Salisbury suggested that the representatives of that Principality should be heard by the assembled Plenipotentiaries. He urged that the High Assembly, after having received the delegates of a nation which demanded foreign provinces, would act fairly in listening to the representatives of a country which sought to retain territories belonging to it. Count Corti, on behalf of Italy, supported this view; but Prince Bismarck thought that the presence of the Roumanian delegates would be likely to increase the difficulties of the Congress, as their claims were not of a nature to facilitate a good understanding. Here again, the chief representative of Germany showed a strong disposition to take the part of Russia, who naturally did not desire to be accused at the council-board by the State she had betrayed. Both Prince Gortschakoff and Count Schouvaloff declared that the representation of Roumania in that chamber would provoke animated discussions, as Russia would certainly defend herself against any charges that might be brought. At the same time, however, they intimated that, if the majority voted for their admission, they would not oppose it, as they could not stand alone in wishing to exclude antagonists. Ultimately it was decided to invite the Roumanian delegates to the next sitting; but in the meanwhile the discussion of the two articles affecting Roumania was opened by the Plenipotentiaries then sitting. One of the principal speakers was Lord Beaconsfield, who viewed with the deepest regret the stipulations of the treaty referring to the retrocession of Bessarabia. The plan proposed was an infringement of the arrangements made in 1856, and no necessity had been alleged for the violation of so solemn an act. In the second place, it would, in the opinion of the First English Plenipotentiary, be a grave error to consider the stipulation with respect to Bessarabia as constituting a simple exchange of territory. The Fourth and Tenth Articles of the Treaty of Paris constituted an engagement entered into between the European Powers and Russia, with a view to ensure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, and Lord Beaconsfield could not find any guarantee for that freedom in the Treaty of San Stefano. The Russian Government proposed to retain the restored territory, without fulfilling the requisite conditions with regard to the Danube. The other signatories of the Treaty of Paris having declined all intervention in the matter, the First Plenipotentiary of England could not recommend the Government of the Queen to employ force to maintain the stipulations of 1856; but he protested against the change, and awaited the explanations of his Russian colleagues concerning the engagements into which their Sovereign would be willing to enter for preserving the freedom of the Danube. Prince Gortschakoff declared that his Government could not give way in the matter of Bessarabia, and hoped that Lord Beaconsfield would not persist in his objections when he perceived that the liberty of the Danube would in no wise suffer by the proposed retrocession. Count Schouvaloff observed that the reclamation of Bessarabia was for Russia a question of honour, and for that reason she did not demand back those portions of the territory the possession of which might have constituted a menace, or at any rate an interference with the free navigation of the river. Roumania would not lose, but rather gain, by the exchange; and Count Schouvaloff believed that she could not really preserve her independence and her integrity so long as she persisted in living on the spoils of a great Empire, which considered that it had the right to reclaim

a share of its former territory. In other words, he preferred that Roumania should live on the spoils of another Empire—to wit, Turkey. Prince Bismarck (as usual) supported the views of Russia, and the question was ultimately adjourned for the attendance of the Roumanian delegates.

M. Bratiano and M. Cogalniceano were present at the tenth sitting, on July 1st, as the representatives of Roumania, and, like the Greek delegates on the former occasion, read a memorandum expressive of their views. The hour of negotiation, they observed, had been less favourable to them than the fortune of arms; but they would confine themselves to declaring briefly the claims and wishes of their country. In strict justice, they contended, no portion of its existing territory should be taken away from Roumania. The restitution, by the treaty of 1856, of a portion of Bessarabia to the Principality of Moldavia, was an act of fairness on the part of Europe, as the partition of 1812 could not be justified by the right of conquest. The Treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji acknowledged that Bessarabia formed part of Moldavia; but it was afterwards assumed that Bessarabia was a Turkish or Tartar region, because the Ottomans occupied three fortresses there. The Roumanian representatives denied that this fact supported any such conclusion. Turkish fortresses had long existed in Wallachia, yet Wallachia had never been a Turkish country. During the whole of the recent war, Russia had considered and treated Roumania as an independent, allied State. Moreover, before beginning the campaign, Russia signed a convention with Roumania, whereby she expressly guaranteed the existing integrity of the Roumanian territory; and, since then, Roumanian troops had fought side by side with the Russian armies. "If that be no ground upon which to add to our possessions," said the memorandum, "it surely is none upon which to take away from them." Roumania did not forget her Russian benefactors; she revered the memory of Catharine the Great and of Nicholas I.; but she also retained the memory of the sacrifices she had imposed on herself for the aggrandisement, the fortune, and the glory of Russia. She bore in mind how, from the time of Peter the Great to the present day, she had been, alternately or simultaneously, a basis for the military operations of Russia, the granary which nourished her armies, and the theatre of terrible collisions. She could not but recall the fact that in 1812 she had lost, for the benefit of Russia, that part of Moldavia which consisted of Bessarabia from the Pruth to the Dniester. The Government of Roumania particularly urged that their soil might not be subjected to a right of passage during the occupation of Bulgaria by the Russian armies, and not unreasonably argued that the Danube and the sea offered those armies the easiest and least expensive means of transport and communication. It appeared to them that Roumania, by virtue of her ancient claims, should re-enter into possession of the islands and of the mouths of the Danube, including the Isle of Serpents. They had a firm hope that their country would receive from the Russian Government a war-indemnity proportionate to the auxiliary force that had been sent into the field. Roumania had had under her standard, whether as regular or reserve forces, more than 70,000 men; and, in addition to this expense, her towns on the banks of the Danube had been ruined by bombardment, her means of communication had been thrown out of gear, and her war-material was damaged. Ten thousand Roumanians had fallen around Plevna, to win liberty and independence for their country; but all these sacrifices would not assure to Roumania the pacific disposition of her destinies. She therefore brought her wishes before the representatives of the Great Powers, to whose justice and goodwill she thus appealed.

Such was the main substance of the memorandum recited by M. Cogalniceano to the assembled Plenipotentiaries; and the reading of the document was followed by some observations from M. Bratiano, who remarked that the withdrawal of a part of their inheritance would destroy in them all confidence in the efficacy of treaties, and in the force of natural equity and written law. After the retirement of the two delegates, Prince Bismarck observed that the question before the Congress was whether or no the Powers were agreed to recognise the independence of Roumania. M. Waddington said the French Plenipotentiaries demanded that independence on the same conditions as in the case of Servia—viz., equality of rights and freedom of worship. Certain local difficulties no doubt existed; but they would be more easily surmounted when the great principles he had mentioned should be recognised in Roumania, and when the Jewish race should learn that it had everything to hope from the union of its own interests with those of the indigenous populations. This view was supported by Prince Bismarck, Count Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, and the Italian and Russian Plenipotentiaries; but Count Schouvaloff added that the consent of Russia to the independence of Roumania was subject to the acceptance by that State of the retrocession claimed by the Imperial Government. The Ottoman Plenipotentiaries raised no objection, and the President thereupon announced that the

Congress was unanimously agreed to grant independence to Roumania, but only upon the same terms as those which had been applied to Servia. With respect to the proposed retrocession of Bessarabia, M. Waddington made an appeal to the justice and goodwill of the Russian Government. Would it not be possible, he asked, to give some compensation to Roumania? It appeared to the French Plenipotentiaries that the Principality had been treated somewhat harshly, and, although France had always counselled Roumania to accept the sacrifice of Bessarabia, M. Waddington thought it his duty to appeal in the name of his Government to the equity of Russia, and to express a hope that there might be granted to Roumania an extension of territory south of the Dobrudscha, so as to include Silistria and Mangalia. Prince Gortschakoff and Count Schouvaloff showed considerable unwillingness to meet these suggestions, and contended that Russia had already acted with generosity in offering to Roumania a province greatly exceeding Bessarabia in extent, and which moreover included a large portion of the bank of the Danube, and an important part of the Black Sea coast. Nevertheless, their instructions left them some degree of latitude, and Count Schouvaloff ultimately read the following proposal:—"In consideration of the presence of Roumanian elements, the Russian Plenipotentiaries consent to prolong the frontier of Roumania along the Danube from Rassova in the direction of Silistria. The point of frontier on the Black Sea should not be beyond Mangalia." Lord Salisbury demanded that the Isle of Serpents should be added to the increase of territory granted to Roumania, and the Plenipotentiaries of Russia declared their assent. The independence of Montenegro was afterwards affirmed, and some reductions in the line of frontier under the Treaty of San Stefano were adopted, according to terms which had been previously agreed upon between the Powers interested.

The questions of the Danube and of the indemnity formed the subjects of discussion at the eleventh meeting of the Congress, which took place on the 2nd of July. The President having, in the first instance, read Article XII. of the Treaty of San Stefano, Baron Haymerle, the Third Plenipotentiary of Austria, presented to the High Assembly a new draft of that Article, setting forth that, in order to insure by a fresh guarantee liberty of navigation upon the Danube, the whole of the river from the Iron Gates to the mouths in the Black Sea should be declared neutral, and that the islands situated in that portion, and at the mouths, should, as well as the banks of the river, be comprised in the neutrality. As a consequence, the fortifications which existed there should be razed, and the erection of new ones be prohibited. All ships of war were to be excluded from the above-mentioned portion of the stream, with the exception of such vessels of light draught as were intended to be employed in the service of the river police and of the Customs. Other paragraphs in the proposed Article provided for the retention of the European Commission of the Lower Danube, for the entire independence of the Commission, and for the representation of Roumania in that body. The regulations touching navigation and the river police below the Iron Gates were to be determined by the European Commission, and a commissary was to watch over their execution. Commerce and navigation were to be protected against injurious taxation, and to Austro-Hungary was to be confided the execution of the works destined to remove the obstacles presented by the Iron Gates and the Cataracts to the course of navigation. Finally, the stipulations of Article VI. of the Treaty of London (1871), relating to the right of levying a provisional tax for the expenses of the works in question, were maintained with respect to Austro-Hungary. These proposals, however, were considered to deal too much in detail for immediate treatment by the Congress; and the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiaries consented to extract from the draft just read the chief principles which it was desired to enforce.

Much debate ensued on Article XIX. of the Treaty of San Stefano, relative to the indemnity to be paid by Turkey to Russia. At the outset of the discussion, Lord Salisbury drew attention to the words, "the guarantee to be applied thereunto," and observed that, if this guarantee were to be a territorial indemnity, Great Britain would oppose herself to such a course. Prince Gortschakoff gave assurances that no territorial acquisition was contemplated, and Karatheodori Pasha read a document on the subject, enlarging on the difficulty which would be experienced by Turkey in paying the sums demanded of her. "In fact," said this memorandum, "the war which has just ended has caused Turkey incalculable losses. Not to mention the finances of the State, the condition of which is known, the misery of the towns and of the country districts, both of Turkey in Europe and Asia, is perhaps without example in history. We do not speak of improvements to be introduced—improvements, the extreme urgency of which is recognised by the Imperial Ottoman Government quite as much as by Europe, and all of which would require further outlay. But, independently

of these improvements, the inexorable expenses of the present hour must be provided for. All the Powers recognise the fact that Turkey cannot meet them, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices: how, then, could she undertake the payment of a war-indemnity?" Karatheodori Pasha further observed that in Asia, as well as in Europe, Russia would acquire territories which, according to the estimate of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself, would represent enormous sums. If still further payments were to be exacted, the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries felt it their duty to declare that they did not see whence Turkey could draw the amounts necessary to meet them, without affecting seriously the most essential conditions of her Government. They begged the Congress to consider that if, to satisfy the payment of the war-indemnity, an intolerable financial situation were created for Turkey, such a decision would not only ruin populations for which Europe showed an interest, but would at the same time act in opposition to the policy of conserving the Ottoman Government, to which Prince Gortschakoff himself had, at a previous sitting, given his explicit adherence.

An allusion by Karatheodori Pasha to the causes of the late war, which he said had not resulted from any breach by Turkey of engagements contracted towards Russia, drew forth a rather warm protest from Count Schouvaloff, who maintained that the war had been provoked by the constant and daily violation of undertakings given by the Turkish Government, and notably of the obligations contracted by the Porte in 1856 at the Congress of Paris. The fact that Count Schouvaloff should have made this statement, without finding any one to contradict it, is a remarkable instance of the force possessed by the most glaring misrepresentations of facts, when they have been often repeated with sufficient confidence. The readers of these pages do not need to be told that, with respect to the Christians in Turkey, the Porte contracted no obligations towards the Great Powers by the Treaty of Paris. But it is commonly alleged that she did, and at last the statement has come to be accepted, even by those who should know better. After this personal collision between Karatheodori Pasha and Count Schouvaloff, the discussion reverted to the more particular aspects of the question. Count Schouvaloff recognised that there were several European interests to preserve in the matter of the indemnity, and that Europe had a right to be consulted as to the form of the settlement. He repeated that in no case would the indemnity be converted into a territorial acquisition; and he then declared that the position of the French and English Governments, as regarded the loans which they had guaranteed, would remain the same as before the war. Respecting the capacity of Turkey to meet the demands which would be made on her, Count Schouvaloff remarked that the mode of collecting taxes in the Ottoman Empire was most objectionable. It would seem that only one-third of the sum furnished by the taxpayers enters the Ottoman Treasury. It is this third which constitutes the financial resources of Turkey; and if, in the future, a better administration succeeded in recovering for the Treasury merely the second third of the taxes that alone (argued Count Schouvaloff) would double the resources of Turkey, and offer to Russia a means of refunding herself, which it would be impossible for her to renounce. The same speaker gave an assurance that, as regarded the Turkish debt to foreign countries, Russia would respect every anterior hypothecation. Karatheodori Pasha, reverting to the observations he had already laid before the Congress, again affirmed that his country was not in a position to pay an indemnity to Russia; and he protested against the Porte being compelled to enter into an engagement which it could not keep. Prince Bismarck, however, reminded him that the engagement had been entered into at San Stefano, and was therefore no new demand. M. Waddington pressed the First Ottoman Plenipotentiary to say distinctly whether his Government proposed to respect in the future all her financial engagements, especially the hypothecations which had been set apart as guarantees of the various loans. Karatheodori Pasha replied that his Government had always desired to fulfil its engagements, and that it was only in the presence of absolute necessity that it had had recourse to a private understanding; but he feared lest the very idea of a pecuniary indemnity should so weigh upon Turkey as to paralyse her efforts and her credit. There was so much appearance of reservation in these remarks that M. Waddington not unnaturally required a more specific reply; and Karatheodori Pasha then said that the Porte would do all in its power to discharge its responsibilities, but added that for more exact information he must refer back to his Government.

At the twelfth sitting of the Congress, on July 4th, the first order of the day had reference to the labours of the Boundary Committee in respect of Montenegro. A plan for the settlement of those boundaries, which had been agreed upon between Austria and Russia, was submitted to the Congress, and adopted. According to this plan, Antivari was to be incorporated with Montenegro; Austria was



PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF ON HIS WAY TO THE CONGRESS.

to take possession of Spizza; and Dulcigno was to be restored to Turkey. The extension of frontier granted to Montenegro by the Treaty of San Stefano was to be much reduced on the east and south, but left nearly untouched on the north. It was agreed, moreover, that Montenegro should have no naval flag, and should not maintain any ships of war. When this settlement came to be generally known, it created great indignation among the mountaineers; and certainly the frontiers as thus arranged fell far short of the aspirations by which the Montenegrins had been animated in their long and deadly conflict with the Turks. The chief author of the limitations was Austria, who felt jealous of Montenegro acquiring a power which might be injurious to the Empire. In pursuance of these views, the port of Antivari, and the Montenegrin waters, were to be closed to the vessels of war of all nations; the fortifications between the lake and the coast, on Montenegrin territory, were to be razed; no new ones were to be erected; and a maritime and sanitary police was to be maintained by Austria, both at Antivari and all along the coast of Montenegro, by means of small coast-guard vessels. Montenegro was to adopt the maritime legislation existing in Dalmatia, which is a portion of the Austrian Empire. Consular protection to the mercantile flag of the little State was guaranteed by Austria, and the mountaineers were to come to an understanding with that Power respecting the right to construct and maintain a road and a line of railway across the new Montenegrin territory. The acquisition of Spizza enabled Austria to command Antivari, and thus placed that locality completely at the mercy of its powerful neighbour. The professed object of Austria was to take care that the port of Antivari and its coast should preserve a purely commercial character; her real object, there can hardly be a doubt, was to gain an increase of power on the shores of the Adriatic. The Montenegrins had unquestionably great reason to complain of Austrian avarice; and, after all their sacrifices, were not in



PRINCIPAL STREET IN CETTIGNE, THE CAPITAL OF MONTENEGRO.

a much better position than when subjected to the nominal sovereignty of the Porte.

The detailed plan proposed by Austria at the sitting of July 2nd, for securing freedom of navigation on the Danube, was then discussed; but the only change in established arrangements which was adopted, consisted in the extension of the jurisdiction of the European Commission to Galatz. No prolongation of the existence of that body was decreed; but it was determined that the question should be dealt with some time before the expiration of its powers in the year 1883. The Congress next passed on to Article XXII. of the Treaty of San Stefano, relative to the Russian ecclesiastics and the monks of Mount Athos; and the Marquis of Salisbury observed that before the sitting he had caused to be distributed among his colleagues a proposal tending to substitute for that Article a number of stipulations securing religious liberty to all inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire whatever might be their race or creed, and affirming that they should be free to compete for all public employments, functions, and honours, and should be equally admitted as witnesses before the tribunals. It was likewise provided that the ecclesiastics, the pilgrims, and the monks of all nationalities, travelling or dwelling in European or Asiatic Turkey, should enjoy an entire equality of rights, advantages, and privileges; the right of official protection was accorded to the diplomatic representatives and consular agents of the Powers in Turkey; and the monks of Mount Athos were to be maintained in their possessions and former advantages, and to be placed, without any exception, on a perfect equality of rights and prerogatives. The object of the amendments was the substitution of all Christians for the single nationality whose rights were alone secured by the Treaty of San Stefano. To these principles Karatheodori Pasha gave his adhesion, but at the same time desired that they should not be looked upon as an innovation. He then read a memorandum from his Government, which said:—"In presence of the declarations made in Congress in favour of religious toleration, you are authorized to state that the sentiments of the Sublime Porte on this point are entirely in harmony with the objects sought by Europe. Its most steadfast traditions, its secular policy, the instinct of its populations, all tend to this result. Throughout the whole Empire, religions widely differing are professed by millions of the Sultan's subjects, and no one has been annoyed in his faith, or in the exercise of his creed. The Imperial Government is determined to maintain this principle in all its force, and to give it all the extension of which it admits." The Turkish Plenipotentiary therefore required the addition of some explanatory phrase, such as—"in conformity with the declarations of the Porte, and with the previous stipulations which it declares itself willing to maintain." Lord Salisbury made no objection, and it was determined that the clause should be referred to the Drafting Committee, with a recommendation that it should consider the suggestion of the Sublime Porte. The second and third clauses were adopted without any change; but in the fourth clause some modifications were introduced, and, at the instance of M. Waddington, the vested rights of France were expressly reserved, and it was distinctly understood that the *status quo* in the Holy Places was in no way prejudiced. No further business of importance was transacted that day, and the next sitting was fixed for the following afternoon.

The boundaries of Greece formed the chief subject of consideration at the thirteenth meeting of the Congress, on the 5th of July, when Article XV. of the Treaty of San Stefano was passed under review. After delivering an address, calling attention to the serious evils which resulted from the incomplete formation of the Hellenic Kingdom, M. Waddington, in common with the First Plenipotentiary of Italy, submitted a resolution, by which the Congress invited the Sublime Porte to arrange with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and expressed an opinion that this rectification should follow the valley of the Salamyrias (the ancient Peneus) on the side of the Ægean Sea, and that of the Kalamas on the side of the Ionian Sea. It was also proposed that, to facilitate the success of the negotiations, the Powers should offer to mediate between the two parties. To these suggestions Turkey not unnaturally objected; for she was about to lose much territory, and could hardly be expected to contemplate with satisfaction the loss of more. The opinion of Congress, however, was strongly in favour of the French proposal, and Lord Beaconsfield supported it in a speech of considerable length, in which he characterised the frontier traced in 1831 as insufficient and imperfect, and observed that in the eyes of every competent statesman this frontier was a danger and a disaster, as well for Turkey as for Greece. He looked upon the boundary proposed by the First Plenipotentiary of France as open to discussion; but, harmony being above all things desirable, he would withdraw his objections in presence of an unanimous vote of the other Powers. The proposal of the Italian and French Plenipotentiaries having been submitted to the suffrages of the High Assembly, Karatheodori

Pasha declared that he had no instructions from his Government as to any rectification of the Greek frontier. He accordingly reserved the opinion of the Sublime Porte upon this point; but all the other Powers agreed in accepting the proposition.

The Articles of the Treaty of San Stefano relating to Asia were examined on the 6th of July, at the fourteenth meeting of the Congress. Referring to the proposed annexation of Ardahan and Kars, Lord Salisbury expressed his opinion that acquisitions of so serious a nature would shake the power and reputation of the Sublime Porte in Asia, and would render the maintenance of tranquillity in those districts very uncertain. He asked the Russian Plenipotentiaries whether their views had undergone any modification with respect to those fortresses, and observed that, in the event of Russia thinking herself bound to persevere in her design, he would reserve for England the right to secure her interests and her influence by whatever means she might consider fitting. Prince Gortschakoff replied that Russia was willing to give up Erzeroum, Bayazid, and the valley of Alashgerd, forming the passage for the caravans, and the principal commercial route to Persia. Furthermore, the Emperor would declare Batoum a free port—that is to say, a port exempt from Customs; which, in the opinion of Prince Gortschakoff, would meet the material interests of all commercial nations, and more particularly, perhaps, those of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield acknowledged that these concessions were of high value, and of a nature to remove one of the greatest obstacles to the solution desired by all Europe. The transformation of a disputed fortress into a free port, and a commercial depôt for all nations, he regarded as a happy idea; at the same time, he would have been better pleased to see Batoum remain under the sovereignty of the Sultan. The province of Batoum was not satisfied at becoming a Russian possession; it was in the hands of populations who thought themselves able to defend it, and the employment of force might under those circumstances result in serious dangers. Lord Beaconsfield was particularly desirous that, while giving its sanction to the proposal of the Emperor of Russia, the Congress should express a hope that all necessary measures would be taken to avoid disorders of which the consequences might be deplorable. Proper consideration should be shown to a valiant population which had declared itself strongly disinclined to the new rule sought to be imposed on it; and, while he accepted the creation of a free port at Batoum, the First Plenipotentiary of England hoped that the Congress would examine the details of this decision, with a view to the prevention of disastrous conflicts.

The concessions proposed by Russia met with the support of Congress, and Prince Bismarck thought that the dangers apprehended by Lord Beaconsfield might be obviated by a discussion of details. It was subsequently agreed that these points should be reserved for a meeting to be held between the representatives of England and Russia. Count Schouvaloff then declared that Batoum would be a commercial as well as a free port, and Lord Salisbury thereupon expressed his readiness to sanction a continuance of the *status quo* in regard to the Straits. Great difficulty had been experienced by the English Plenipotentiaries in obtaining what Russia at length granted with respect to Batoum; and it is said to have been only after the distinct declaration of Lord Beaconsfield that England would consider herself entitled to send her ironclads into the Straits whenever she pleased, unless the commercial character of the town in question were specifically stated in the treaty, that the necessary concessions were made.* Yet Russia remained, upon the whole, in the position of command as regarded Asia. She had, indeed, made certain concessions; but the main point — the possession of Batoum — had been secured. The stipulation that that town was to be a free and commercial port was a concession of more apparent than real value. The fate of the Lazis was particularly mournful. They knew what their fellow-believers in the neighbouring provinces had suffered under Russian rule; they had evinced the most decided disinclination to encounter the same risks themselves; but, by the decree of a Congress in which they had no voice, they were handed over to the domination of hereditary foes, with no other guarantee for their liberties than what might be settled by a few Plenipotentiaries, talking together in a private ante-chamber.

* Berlin Correspondent of the *Times*.

## CHAPTER XX.

**Prospects of Peace—Prince Bismarck on the approaching Settlement—Fifteenth Sitting of the Congress—Debate on the Rectification of the Turco-Persian Frontier—Reforms in Armenia—The Proposed Boundaries of Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Servia—Disagreements between England and Russia—Communication from Prince Gortschakoff on the Execution of the Reforms decreed by Congress—Sixteenth Sitting—Discussion on the Russian Proposals—Suggestions by Prince Bismarck—Remarks by Prince Gortschakoff, Count Schouvaloff, and Karatheodori Pasha—The real Design of Russia—Seventeenth Sitting—Proposal by Russia to establish a Military Cemetery in the Neighbourhood of Shipka—Modification of Prince Bismarck—Eighteenth Sitting—Renewed Discussion on Prince Gortschakoff's Declaration concerning the Execution of the Treaty of Berlin—Objections of Turkey, Great Britain, Austria, and Italy—The Declaration rejected—Proposed Capitalization of the Servian and Roumanian Tribute—Opposition of the Russian Plenipotentiaries—The Capitalization disallowed—Financial Condition of Turkey—Settlement of various Matters of Detail—Nineteenth Sitting—Completion of the drafting of the Treaty—Declaration by Russia concerning the Closing of the Straits—Twentieth and Last Sitting—Speeches of Count Andrassy and Prince Bismarck—Signature of the Treaty of Berlin—Close of the Congress—Banquet to the Plenipotentiaries at the Royal Palace—Indignation of the Philo-Sclaves at the Concessions of Russia—General Results of the Congress.**

FROM the moment that Russia made concessions with respect to Bulgaria, a friendly arrangement seemed probable. This was apparently the conviction of Prince Bismarck, and he omitted no opportunity of composing such differences as still remained. His views on the general posture of affairs at the beginning of July were expressed, on the evening of the 3rd, to the Berlin correspondent of the *Times*, with whom he had an interview. He had first seen his way to a pacific solution when Count Schouvaloff visited him on his road to St. Petersburg, early in May. "I sincerely respect this man," he observed, "for having left London courageously to tell his master the truth, and for having, at St. Petersburg, incurred the risk of disgrace and exile, if not successful in fulfilling his patriotic and humanitarian mission." England, in his opinion, had achieved a magnificent success at Berlin. She had limited Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans; she had restored the Ægean Sea to Turkey; she had protected Constantinople by giving to the Sultan possession of the mountains; and the question of the Straits would be settled to her satisfaction. Still, he urged, it must be remembered that Russia had been victorious in the war with Turkey, and that serious account must be taken of the concessions she had already made. A war between two great Powers like England and Russia would grievously affect the whole of Europe. In spite of all efforts to the contrary, the conflict might become general; universal commerce would be harassed, and the paths of the ocean would become uncertain. The great peril had been in connection with the Bulgarian question; for the German Chancellor saw plainly that England would go to war, rather than allow Russia to obtain such power in the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean as the Treaty of San Stefano indirectly conferred on her. When, therefore, in the private negotiations of June 21st, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and England seemed unable to come to an agreement with respect to Bulgaria, Prince Bismarck was apprehensive, and used his utmost endeavours to conciliate the opponents. The compromise ultimately effected removed the chief danger of a disruption; but at the time the great German statesman had his interview with the correspondent, some degree of anxiety was still felt on the subject of Batoum, which had not then come before the Congress. Nevertheless, it was hoped that an understanding on this head, as on all the others, would be brought about; and a general feeling prevailed that the Treaty of San Stefano would eventuate in a Treaty of Berlin.

The Congress reassembled for its fifteenth sitting on the 8th of July, when Article XVIII. of the Preliminary Treaty, relating to Khotour and the rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier, was brought forward for examination. In the opinion of Prince Bismarck, it was desirable, in conformity with a decision taken at the last meeting of the Congress, to grant a hearing to the representative of the Shah of Persia. Mirza Malcom Khan, the Plenipotentiary of that Sovereign, was accordingly introduced, and, in answer to the President, said he had no communication to make, and that he was only desirous to learn the decision of the Congress. Prince Bismarck remarked that the High Assembly had not then taken a resolution, but wished to assure itself that the restitution of Khotour to Persia would be accepted by the Shah. Malcom Khan thereupon declared himself authorised by his Government to accept with gratitude the restitution of the district in question. As to the extent of the territory, he left it to the demarcation drawn up by the Anglo-Russian Commission; but he added some remarks as to the situation of the Persian frontier from Bayazid to Monha Merra,

and called the attention of the High Assembly to the desire of his Government to see the Congress set a term to the constantly-recurring difficulties incidental to that part of the frontier line. Having intimated the willingness of Persia to submit beforehand to such decision as might be taken, Malcom Khan retired, and Count Schouvaloff proceeded to develop his views upon the subject. In the course of the negotiations which had taken place between Russia and Turkey after the conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano, the Government of the Emperor consented to give back to the Sultan Bayazid and the valley of Alashgerd, but with the stipulation that, in exchange, the territory of Khotour should be returned to the Shah. This stipulation had now to be carried into effect, and it was agreed that the Plenipotentiaries of England and Russia should concert as to the production of a new Article, to stand in place of the former.

The Congress then passed to the consideration of other matters, and an Article was adopted modifying Article XVI. of the Preliminary Treaty, so as to disconnect the engagements to be taken by the Sultan with regard to reforms in Armenia from any promises given specially to Russia. The Powers bound themselves to supervise the execution of these engagements, and a long discussion afterwards took place on the delimitation of the boundaries of Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Servia. With respect to the two first countries, Count Schouvaloff raised some difficulties. Since the agreement with respect to the Sandjak of Sophia, and the territory to be yielded to Turkey in the valleys of the Struma Karasu and Mesta Karasu, the English Staff officers who accompanied the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, and with whom lay the examination of details, had asked leave to put back the frontier behind the chain of mountains, and had thus converted a strategic rectification into a territorial cession. For this reason, the Second Russian Plenipotentiary asked of the Congress to decree, in principle, an augmentation of territory on the eastern frontier of the Sandjak of Sophia. Lord Salisbury explained that a close examination into the ground had revealed the fact that a portion of the valley of the Struma was comprised in the Sandjak of Sophia: it had therefore been considered necessary to demand a rectification of the frontiers to the south. Count Schouvaloff, however, still persisted; but ultimately the affair was settled by a compromise, and it was agreed that the Boundary Commission should be allowed to settle details by a majority, without referring to the High Assembly. Considerable discussion ensued on the proposal to add Vrania to Servia, which was ultimately sanctioned by the votes of Germany, Austro-Hungary, France, and Russia, against those of Great Britain, Italy, and Turkey. Hereupon, Lord Salisbury, protesting afresh against the cession of Vrania, which he regarded as dangerous to the Porte, refused to consent on those conditions to the line of the Servian frontiers; but that line was finally adopted, with the understanding that some compensation should be granted to Turkey.

At the conclusion of the sitting, Prince Gortschakoff read a communication, expressing certain general views to which Russia desired to give emphasis. The Plenipotentiaries of that Empire believed they were rightly interpreting the wishes of their colleagues in expressing a hope that the work of pacification in which all had been engaged might secure to Europe a solid and durable peace. "Russia," said Prince Gortschakoff, "is especially interested in this. She has made great sacrifices during the war, and also with a view to the re-establishment of peace, and to the maintenance of a good understanding in Europe. She has the right to expect that, at any rate, these sacrifices shall not be made gratuitously, and that the work of which they have laid the foundations shall not be fruitless through want of execution, like previous attempts at pacification in the East. She could not accept the prospect of a renewal of painful crises, similar to that which the Congress of Berlin has been summoned to terminate. The Plenipotentiaries of Russia are persuaded that this thought is shared equally by the High Assembly, and that it would not raise an ephemeral structure, which would expose the peace of the East and of Europe to fresh dangers. With this conviction, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia have orders to ask the Congress, before it concludes its labours, by what principles, and in what manner, it proposes to ensure the execution of its high decisions." The communication was put on the order of the day for the next sitting, and the Congress then adjourned.

When the Plenipotentiaries assembled for their sixteenth sitting, on the 9th of July, the communication of the First Russian Plenipotentiary was taken into consideration, after some further discussion on the cession of Khotour, the position of Batoum as a free port "essentially commercial" (to which the Emperor Alexander pledged himself in a special message), and the new boundaries in Asia. As regarded the Russian manifesto, Karatheodori Pasha observed that he could not grasp the bearing of the document. The principles and means intended to insure the execution of the

resolutions of the Congress had been already indicated in the course of their deliberations. Part of the decisions of the Congress came into immediate operation; while, as for the rest, special Commissions, with definite powers, had been instituted. Consequently, all necessary guarantees had been provided, to which, moreover, the signing of a Treaty of Peace would add the most solemn




THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS IN ASIA.

and binding form. The First Plenipotentiary of Turkey could not perceive what new conditions were requisite, and believed that anything further would lead to complications hostile to the object which the Russian declaration desired to attain. Prince Gortschakoff was equally at a loss to comprehend the objections of Karatheodori Pasha. It was necessary, he observed, that the execution of the treaty about to be signed at Berlin should be subject to an active supervision. All that Russia desired was that the stipulations of the treaty should be assured; and the Prince conceived that the question was one which touched the dignity of the High Assembly. Being requested by the President to submit a formal proposition, he replied that he should be ready to ask that the Powers who were parties to the Congress should guarantee collectively the execution of the resolutions at which they had arrived. Prince Bismarck remarked that he had not in this respect any warrant, as President of that body, to give expression to the general sentiment; he could speak only as the representative of Germany. In that capacity it appeared to him that the Powers of Europe could not intend to produce an inefficacious work, and ought therefore to watch over and direct the execution of stipulations which formed a whole, and of which it was impossible to accept a part, and reject the remainder. But the German Chancellor was not of opinion that each State separately should be obliged to use force for the execution of those arrangements, nor yet that a collective guarantee should exist. If the Powers engaged themselves jointly to use force at need,


ALTERATIONS IN EUROPEAN TURKEY
EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF BERLIN.
Budo
Pesth
R. Danube
R. Theiss
R. Drave
R. Save
HUNGARY
RUSSIA
R. Pruth
R. Sereth
R. Dneister
BESSARABIA
Jassy
Kischener
Galatz
Kilia
Sulina
S. George
ROUMANIA
Tchernavoda
Silistria
Kustendje
Bucharest
Belgrade
BOSNIA
R. Drina
SERVIA
Morava R.
Widin
Ruschuk
Sistova
Mangalia
R. Danube
Schumla
Varna
BULGARIA
Nish
Pirot
Tirnova
BLACK SEA
Novibazar
Sofia
Slivno
Burgas
MONTENEGRO
Mitrovitza
Vranja
Tundja R.
Pristina
Yehtiman
EAST ROUMELIA
Ince River
Scutari
Antivari
Uskub
Philippopolis
Midia
Dulcigno
R. Bojana
R. Drin
Adrianople
CONSTANTINOPLE
ALBANIA
ROUMELIA
Mekri
Enos
SEA of MARMORA
Kastoria
Salonica
Gallipoli
Kalamas R.
Salambria R.
EPIRUS
THESSALY
Corfu
ADRIATIC
AEGEAN SEA
ASIA MINOR
Boundaries of Countries .....
Proposed alterations by Treaty of San Stefano, shaded lightly. Those alterations agreed to by Treaty of Berlin, cross-shaded. Addition to Russia, marked R; to Roumania, R O; to Servia, S; to Montenegro, M; proposed addition to Greece, G.
Boundaries of East Roumelia, marked !!!!!!!!!!!!.
Railways, ———.
Scale of Miles
50 0 50 100

they would incur the risk of grave disunion among themselves. The Congress could perform only a human work, subject, like every other, to the fluctuations of events. The First Plenipotentiary of Germany was convinced that Prince Gortschakoff would be satisfied with a draft, indicating that the sum-total of the obligations signed in the future treaty should form a whole, the execution of which would be watched over by the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople, the European Governments reserving to themselves the right of taking counsel in case the execution should be defective or slow. But Prince Bismarck did not think that they could assume beforehand the non-execution of resolutions adopted solemnly by all Europe united. It would be necessary to wait for an infraction in order to take notice of it, and in that case the Powers, warned by their representatives at Constantinople, could arrange to appeal to new diplomatic assemblies.

A somewhat cautious tone had pervaded the remarks of Prince Bismarck; but the chief Plenipotentiary of Russia observed in reply that his meaning had been very correctly interpreted. He wished, in fact, that the treaty should contain an article declaring that the execution of the decisions formed by Congress was placed under the guardianship of all Europe. Count Schouvaloff said that the Plenipotentiaries of Russia had especially had in view the avoidance of misunderstandings similar to those which had followed the Treaty of Paris. Several of the articles of that treaty, stipulating for the amelioration of the condition of the Christians, had been disregarded, and this had resulted in frequent commotions, in war, and at length in the meeting of that Congress. However, he very willingly took note of a remark by Karatheodori Pasha, to the effect that the signature of the Treaty of Berlin would give the most solemn and obligatory sanction to its provisions. The leading representative of Turkey thanked Count Schouvaloff for his kind appreciation, and added that he would develop his ideas on the subject when the proposed article was submitted for consideration. In the meanwhile, however, he desired to observe at once that all the Powers who take part in a treaty ought to be on a footing of equality as to its obligations—that the treaty, in fact, should be obligatory on all the States who sign it. New stipulations of control, he again alleged, would be useless, and even likely to bring about serious difficulties; and with these comments the subject was set aside until the draft was ready for discussion. The protest of Karatheodori Pasha, if such it can be called, was not unnatural. He suspected that the object of Russia was to commit the European Powers to a guarantee of all the articles binding on Turkey, while evading those which were binding on herself. Prince Bismarck, in the course of his remarks, said he presumed that Prince Gortschakoff had not in view the stipulations intended to regulate the execution of reciprocal engagements, such, for example, as the evacuation of fortresses and territories, since the non-execution of those clauses by one of the two Powers interested would cause, on the part of the other, the non-execution of corresponding clauses. The First Plenipotentiary of Russia, he believed, had rather in view the stipulations of the High Assembly relative to the protection of the Christians. Neither Prince Gortschakoff nor Count Schouvaloff took the slightest exception to these remarks, and the former even declared that the German Chancellor had exactly expressed his ideas. The one-sided character of the contemplated arrangement was apparent to the representative of Turkey, who did no more than his duty in pointing out the covert design. To establish and confirm the principle that the European Powers have a right of interference in Turkish affairs, and to create, prospectively, an excuse for so interfering, seems to have been the intention with which Prince Gortschakoff brought forward his proposal.

The business transacted at the seventeenth meeting of the Congress, which took place on the 10th of July, was chiefly of a formal character. The Plenipotentiaries were principally engaged in revising the Articles of the definitive Treaty of Peace drawn up by the Committee appointed for that purpose; but the line of delimitation of the Asiatic frontier voted in the Boundaries Committee was also reported. The line, which was an intermediate one between what had been demanded by England and what was offered by Russia, was adopted by the unanimous vote of the neutral Powers. Various other matters of detail were passed under review, and Count Schouvaloff asked to submit for the approbation of the Congress a proposal which had been suggested to him by a sentiment that all would understand and appreciate. The text of this proposal was thus expressed:—"There is in the chain of the Balkans a spot which has been the theatre of heroic struggles, which may have been equalled, but have never been surpassed, in history. Never has there been a more energetic exhibition of all the military and patriotic virtues of which the flag is the symbol. What I am saying applies equally to both sides. Such struggles leave behind them reciprocal esteem, and the respect which clings

to the memory of thousands of Russians and Turks, whose bones are whitening the ravines of Shipka. We ask the High Assembly to give a proof of this respect to the brave men who sleep at Shipka, in making of this spot a glorious cemetery, where batteries will never be raised again, and the cannon will boom no more." Karatheodori Pasha, in the name of the Ottoman Government, thanked Count Schouvaloff for the expressions contained in this proposal. Nowhere, he said, was respect for the dead greater than in the East. The Turkish Government had never raised any objection to the construction of cemeteries and funeral chapels. If, therefore, it was solely a question of making a cemetery for the soldiers who had died at Shipka, the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries would give their entire consent to the project; but he had remarked, in the document read by Count Schouvaloff, an expression which might give rise to some difficulties. The Russian Plenipotentiary had demanded that Shipka should be transformed into "a glorious cemetery." The Ottoman Government would make no objection to the construction of a cemetery in the vicinity of Shipka; but Karatheodori Pasha felt it his duty to reserve the opinion of the Sublime Porte as to the precise locality to be designated for the purpose. Count Schouvaloff appeared disappointed that his idea had not been more fully appreciated by the representatives of Turkey. What he desired was that Shipka should be surrounded by a zone, the limits of which should be fixed by the European Commission, in order that the remains of the soldiers who had perished in those grand struggles should rest in peace on neutral ground. Mehemet Ali asked that the words, "reserving the strategical necessities of Shipka," should be added. Prince Bismarck believed that the idea of the Russian Plenipotentiaries would have the sympathy of all who loved to hold sacred the memory of fellow-countrymen who had fallen on the field of battle. It was certainly expedient that the tombs of so many brave soldiers should be protected by a special stipulation; but he suggested as a compromise that, if the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries were not authorized to consent without reservation to the project which had just been mooted, the High Assembly should declare on the Protocol that it adopted the idea expressed, and recommended it to the European Commission, which would be charged to examine on the spot the means of carrying it out. The Congress accepted this proposal, and the President afterwards declared that the Congress relied upon the good-will of the Sublime Porte, and trusted with confidence in the arrangements which would be taken by the European Commission, in concert with the Ottoman Government. The rest of the sitting was occupied by a discussion on several articles of the proposed treaty, which were read and considered at some length.

When the Congress re-assembled for the eighteenth time, on the 11th of July, Prince Gortschakoff brought forward his declaration binding the Powers to watch over the execution of all the articles of the treaty. The draft, which had been submitted at the previous meeting, but which remained over for discussion, set forth that—"Europe having given her most solemn and binding sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, the High Contracting Parties regard the totality of the articles of the present act as forming a combination of stipulations, the execution of which they engage to control and superintend, while insisting on their being carried out entirely in conformity with their intentions. They reserve to themselves the right to come to an understanding, in case of need, as to the requisite means to ensure a result which neither the general interests of Europe nor the dignity of the Great Powers permit them to leave invalid." A debate of great length ensued. Count Andrassy proposed that the document should be abbreviated and otherwise altered, so that the declaration might not be interpreted as a want of confidence on the part of the Congress in the result of its own labours. Lord Salisbury could not comprehend the object of the Russian proposal. He knew of no sanction more "solemn" or more "binding" than the signature of his Government; and he preferred not to accept an engagement which appeared to him either to be useless, or to have a signification of too undefined a bearing. Prince Gortschakoff, however, still maintained that the intentions of the Assembly ought to be expressed in a very categorical manner, and Count Schouvaloff proposed to substitute the following for the original version:—"The High Contracting Powers, having given their solemn and binding sanction to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, look upon the totality of the articles of the present act as forming a collection of stipulations, of which they undertake to control and superintend the execution." Notwithstanding this amendment, the objections of Karatheodori Pasha were as strong as ever, and he expressed the reasons of his dissent with great force and acumen. The Porte, he said, unquestionably considered its signature as binding, and looked upon itself as positively and strictly bound to carry out the engagements to which it had subscribed; but the wording of the Russian document, he continued, imposed on all the contracting parties the mutual duty of

controlling the execution of the treaty. The Porte would thus find itself obliged to admit within its own limits the control of other States, and in its turn to exercise a control over those other States, which had likewise contracted engagements. The Porte equally declined exercising a control, or submitting to the same; considering that such an obligation, besides its novelty, was too weighty for a Government which sought neither the burden it entailed, nor the benefit it bestowed. On the new draft of Count Schouvaloff being submitted to the Assembly, the Plenipotentiaries of Austro-Hungary stated that they had no objection to it; those of France, of Great Britain, and of Italy, reserved their vote; the representatives of Turkey observed that they had nothing to add to the declarations they had already made; while Prince Bismarck and his colleagues accepted the Russian proposal. The President, remarking that the document presented by the Russian Plenipotentiaries had not obtained the assent of the Congress, proceeded to take a vote upon the proposal of Count Andrassy, with respect to which, however, there seemed as little prospect of an agreement as in the previous case. M. Waddington then suggested that the Congress should confine itself to taking note of the declaration of Karatheodori Pasha, to the effect that Turkey fully recognised the obligations imposed by the treaty. The wording suggested to the High Assembly in the drafts that had been considered, appeared to him to establish a species of permanent tutelage as regarded the Ottoman Government. The treaty which the Powers were about to sign contained a very large number of clauses, which might become, under the action of a control decreed by that Assembly, a series of pretexts for incessant interference in all the acts of the Sublime Porte. The evident interest of the Turkish Government, in the opinion of M. Waddington, was to execute completely, and without reserve, all the decisions of the Congress. They had no right to suppose that the Porte was unwilling to execute, or incapable of executing, the stipulations to which it had consented. The proposed guarantee was either unnecessary or dangerous; for to inaugurate a right of general control over so large a number of clauses, possessing a character of unequal importance, would be very likely to introduce elements of discord where the object was to establish a work of peace and harmony. In replying to these observations, the force of which it was indeed impossible to destroy, Prince Gortschakoff for the first time declared that the proposed engagement was as applicable to the other contracting parties as to Turkey. Russia, he said, would be as fully subject to it as the Porte; and he quite admitted, with regard to his own country, the superintendence and control of the Powers. This, no doubt, was perfectly true, as a matter of dry, legal construction; but every one knows quite well that no such interference would have been attempted in the case of a strong Power like Russia, whereas, in respect of Turkey, pretexts for interposition would have been perpetually sought, and perhaps found with a certain appearance of plausibility. Count Schouvaloff observed that, as a matter of fact, interference in the concerns of Turkey already existed, and was about to be carried out by a network of European Commissions in Roumelia, in the Greek provinces, and in Armenia. But this very fact rendered it all the less desirable that the principle of interference should be carried any farther, or be established as a settled rule. M. Waddington, in reply to the Second Plenipotentiary of Russia, observed that the European Commissions had a precise and definite object, which was not the case with the Russian proposal; and assuredly these qualities of vagueness and permanence gave to the suggestion of Prince Gortschakoff its most objectionable characteristics. The President then recorded that neither the Russian proposal nor the Austrian amendment had been accepted by the Congress, and that the results of the discussion were, consequently, that the proposal would be entered on the Protocol, together with the answer of the Porte, and the decision of the Congress to take note of the declarations made by the First Ottoman Plenipotentiary.

The next subject discussed was the proposed capitalization of the tribute which Servia and Roumania had paid to Turkey as long as they were vassal States. In the opinion of Lord Salisbury, the two Principalities ought in fairness to hand over to the Porte a given sum of money, on account of the cessation of this impost. The tribute, he observed, formed part of the guarantee of Turkey's creditors, and so important a guarantee ought not to be taken away from them. It could not, he contended, be said that the tribute had been redeemed by great victories on the part of the Principalities, and should therefore be annulled altogether. It was Russia who had vanquished the Porte, and sustained the outlay; and Lord Salisbury could not see on what grounds the loss of the tribute should be imposed on Turkey. Prince Gortschakoff, on the other hand, considered that the Principalities were freed from all obligation, except for such portions of territory as they received in addition to their former limits, and which would support a share of the debt. This view was further expounded

by Count Schouvaloff, and obtained the sanction of the French and Austrian Plenipotentiaries. It was therefore decided that the Drafting Committee should suppress the Article which provided for the capitalization of the Roumanian and Servian tributes. The loss to Turkey was serious, and the prospects of Turkish creditors were rendered all the more gloomy by the decision of the Assembly; but it is difficult to question the fairness of the view advanced on this occasion by Russia, France, and Austria. As Servia and Roumania had obtained a distinct existence, whether by their own efforts or by those of Russia, it appeared unreasonable to expect that they should any longer be subjected to the burden of a tribute, whatever form it might assume. The yearly payment to Turkey was the result of their condition of vassalage, and, as that condition had ceased, its concomitants determined also. Turkey had no more right to expect a money payment from Servia and Roumania than England had to demand a similar contribution from the American Colonies after the recognition of their independence.

Count Corti then proposed, in the names of Great Britain, France, and Italy, that a European Commission should be appointed at Constantinople to examine the financial state of the Ottoman Empire, with a view to finding means of giving some satisfaction to the creditors of Turkey. This proposal was accepted by the Six Powers, who agreed to recommend it to the Porte. The remaining Articles of the Treaty were brought up by the Committee of Supervision, and agreed to, with some amendments. The resolution as to the rectification of the Greek frontier, not having been accepted by the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, was inserted in the treaty as the act of the Six Powers alone. The Commission of Delimitation reported the new line of frontier between the Russian and Turkish possessions in Asia towards Bayazid, including the concession of the Alashgerd Valley; Lord Salisbury reserved to England, with reference to the closing of the Straits to vessels of war, a general liberty of interpreting, according to the spirit of existing treaties, the engagements created by the Sixty-third Article of the Treaty of Berlin; and it was finally determined that the Ambassadors at Constantinople should be instructed to concert with the Porte the appointment of an International Commission, which should proceed at once to the Rhodope districts, in order to examine into the horrors which were reported to be taking place in that part of European Turkey, and, as far as possible, to apply a remedy.

The Congress had now very nearly covered the whole ground which it was their object to traverse. Only a few more topics remained for discussion, and the nineteenth sitting—that of July 12th—was not very important in its character. Objection was made by M. Desprez, on behalf of the Drafting Committee, to a paragraph in Article II. of the proposed treaty, which sanctioned a military road across the Bulgarian territory. The Committee very reasonably observed that it was not for the Congress to provide for the contingency of Bulgaria making war upon Turkey, for, after all, Bulgaria was not to be an independent State, but only a tributary Principality. It was finally determined that the paragraph should be suppressed; and Karatheodori Pasha then made some remarks relative to the rectification of the Greek frontiers and the eventual mediation of the Powers. The Porte, which had not given its consent to these proposals, reserved to itself the faculty of consulting with the signatory Cabinets on the real state of the Hellenic question. Further progress was made in the matter of boundaries; and, after a suspension of the sitting in order that the Plenipotentiaries of England, Russia, and Turkey might arrange certain details in private, the President recorded that the drafting of the treaty was complete. It was subsequently determined that Prince Bismarck was to communicate the document officially to the States concerned which had not taken part in the Congress, as soon as the ratifications had been exchanged, which was to be within three weeks of the date of signature, or sooner if possible. Before the meeting broke up, Count Schouvaloff, referring to the declaration made in the previous sitting by Lord Salisbury on the subject of the Straits, demanded the insertion in the Protocol of a declaration affirming that, in the opinion of the Russian Plenipotentiaries, the principle of the closing of the Straits was a European principle, and that the stipulations concluded in this respect in 1841, 1856, and 1871, and confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin, were binding on the part of all the Powers, in accordance with the spirit and letter of existing treaties.

The twentieth and last sitting of the Congress was held on the 13th of July, when all the Plenipotentiaries and members were present in full dress, as at the opening. From the three previous sittings Lord Beaconsfield had been absent, owing to a severe asthmatic attack, which at one time appeared so serious that his Lordship's medical attendant was fetched from London; but the malady vanished almost as suddenly as it had appeared. The Plenipotentiaries having assembled for their final meeting, Prince Bismarck invited them to proceed to the signature of the treaty, and Count

Andrassy then addressed the Assembly in a few remarks having reference to the services of their President, and to the hospitality which they had experienced at the hands of the German Emperor and the Imperial family. "At the moment when our efforts have resulted in a general understanding," he said, "it would be impossible for us not to render homage to the eminent statesman who has directed our labours. He has invariably aimed at securing and consolidating peace; he has devoted all his efforts to conciliating differences, and to putting an end, as quickly as possible, to the uncertainty which weighed so heavily upon Europe. Thanks to the wisdom, and to the indefatigable energy, with which our President has directed our labours, he has contributed in a high degree to the prompt success of the work of pacification which we have undertaken in common. I feel, therefore, sure of meeting with the unanimous assent of this High Assembly when I propose to you to express to his Most Serene Highness, Prince Bismarck, our warmest gratitude." The President, in gratefully acknowledging these complimentary expressions, said that the spirit of conciliation and the friendly feelings with which all the Plenipotentiaries had been animated had facilitated a task which in the existing state of his health he had hardly hoped to complete. He begged his colleagues to bear him in friendly recollection, and added that the memorable period just elapsed would never be effaced from his mind.



VIEW OF BAYAZID.

The Congress then proceeded to the signature of seven copies of the treaty, corresponding to the number of Powers represented in the High Assembly. The document was very handsomely printed on parchment, of folio size, bound in crimson velvet. This was the first time that a treaty had been printed for signature; but, old usage having at length been broken through, it is probable that the more convenient form will henceforth be generally adopted. The conclusion of this remarkable Congress was signalised by some final



CROWD OUTSIDE THE RADZIWILL PALACE, WAITING TO SEE THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES.

observations on the part of Prince Bismarck, who formally announced that the labours of the Assembly were at an end, and expressed his thanks to the various officers employed by the Congress for facilitating and recording the proceedings. "At the moment of separating," he added, "I do not hesitate to affirm that the Congress has deserved well of Europe. If it has been found impossible to realise all the aspirations of public opinion, history will nevertheless do justice to our intentions and to our work, and the Plenipotentiaries will enjoy the consciousness of having, as far as it is possible, given and secured to Europe the great benefit of peace, which was so gravely menaced. This result cannot be diminished by any criticism which the spirit of party may be able to publish. I have the firm hope that the European understanding will, with the help of God, be lasting, and that the personal and cordial relations, which during our labours have been established amongst us, will strengthen and consolidate good relations amongst our Governments. I once more thank my colleagues for their kindness towards myself, and it is with this feeling of great gratitude that I close the last sitting of the Congress."

The conclusion of the great deliberative council was celebrated the same evening by a Court dinner, given by the Crown Prince of Germany to the Plenipotentiaries. In proposing the toast of the occasion, the Prince observed that the hopes with which, a month before, he had, in the name of the Emperor, greeted the illustrious statesmen who then assembled for the Congress, had been happily realised, and that the blessings of peace, so much desired by Europe, had crowned their efforts. "As the interpreter of the sentiments of my august father," he proceeded, "I am happy to be able to render homage to the wisdom and the spirit of conciliation which have brought about this great result. The understanding which has been established will prove a fresh guarantee for the peace and welfare of the world. The co-operation of Germany is secured beforehand for all that can tend to ensure and preserve these great benefits. In the name of his Majesty, I drink to the health of the Sovereigns and Governments who have just signed, on this memorable day, the Treaty of Berlin." The banquet, which was given in the White Hall of the palace, was attended by all the Plenipotentiaries and members of the Congress, with the exception of Lord Beaconsfield and Prince Gortschakoff. It was of a very formal character, and terminated at half-past seven. A few days later, all the Plenipotentiaries had quitted Berlin, and the work of the Congress was left to the criticism of Europe and the appreciation of the world. It had already been loudly condemned by a certain party in Russia, which regarded the concessions made by the Czar as nothing less than treason to the people. The persons who held this opinion were the more extreme members of the Pan-Sclavist body, who of course would have been satisfied with nothing less than the entire ruin of Turkey, and the complete subjection of all the European Powers to the interests or the ambition of one. M. Aksakoff, the Sclave enthusiast, delivered a speech at a sitting of the Moscow Committee of Relief, in which he said that the Congress was an audacious mockery of what Russia desired; that the Plenipotentiaries had placed a fool's cap on Russia's head; and that their decisions were a monstrous absurdity, a public insult, a short-lived falsehood, and a conspiracy got up against the Russians by their own representatives. Russian diplomacy, he averred, had proved itself far more dangerous than Nihilism. The stupidity and immeasurable servility of the Russian Plenipotentiaries filled M. Aksakoff with amazement; and he declared that his country had been humiliated by the Congress, and that all national feeling had been thrown to the ground, and trampled under foot. These were the responses with which, in certain quarters, the complacent self-congratulations of officialism were encountered.

Yet to many, even beyond the circles of the great, the work of the Congress gave some degree of satisfaction, as being at least a temporary settlement of that vexatious Eastern Question which had so frequently brought war in its train, and which only a few months before had threatened to involve all Europe in armed collisions. Those who would have chosen war, rather than have yielded anything to victorious Russia, were proportionately disappointed and angry. More temperate and cool-headed observers saw in the results of the Congress somewhat to approve, and not a little to condemn. To these thinkers it was an outrage on natural right, and on the first principles of political science, that the fate of several communities should be determined in an assembly where they had no voice except as humble suppliants at the bar, to which, on special occasions, they were admitted as a matter of grace and favour. No less was it monstrous that—as in the case of Bosnia—Turkey should be compelled to give up territory which even the Treaty of San Stefano had spared, and to yield possession of Batoum, which the utmost military efforts of her enemy had been unable to subdue. But it must not be forgotten that these evils were counterbalanced by some benefits. It was much

that Russia had been constrained to submit her demands on Turkey to a tribunal in which the chief European Powers were the final arbiters, and which curbed the predominance of force by considerations of general interest. If alien Cabinets are to dispose of the political destinies of feeble lands, such as Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, it is some advantage that, as a corollary to this assumption, the pretensions of great and ambitious States should be obliged to acknowledge the claims of European policy, and to surrender a portion of their spoils in the very hour and supreme ecstasy of triumph. Napoleon III. at one time proposed that representatives of the European Powers should, at intervals of a few years, meet in periodical conclave, for discussing matters pertaining to the common good, and for the amicable adjustment of difficulties which might otherwise lead to war: a magnificent idea, for which, it is to be feared, the world is not yet ripe, but which the future will assuredly realise, if it be worthy of the hopes of men. The Congress of Berlin made some distant approach to this conception, though embodying and perpetuating many characteristics of a vicious past, against which every liberal politician is bound to raise his voice. It proved that in these days battalions alone are not to decide the issues of right and wrong; and it made the most aggressive of Empires understand that its will must be subordinate to what more enlightened Powers have judged fit and necessary to the European Republic. The Treaty of San Stefano brought Turkey almost to the brink of extinction. The Treaty of Berlin opened a new prospect to races which hitherto have suffered even more from injudicious meddling than from faulty rule.

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## CHAPTER XXI.

**The Treaty of Berlin—Points wherein it differed from the Treaty of San Stefano—Good, Bad, and Indifferent Features—Lord Salisbury on the General Characteristics of the New Arrangements—Remarks on the Ministerial Statements—Mr. Gladstone on the Treaty—A discreditable Outburst of Personality—Return of the Earl of Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury to England—Reception at Dover and in London—Popular Enthusiasm and its Explanations—Effect of the Anglo-Turkish Convention on the Views and Feelings of Russia—Vexation of Prince Gortschakoff—Despatch of Lord Salisbury to M. Waddington on English Designs in Asia—Reply of M. Waddington—French Mistrust regarding Syria and Egypt—Reassuring Statements of Lord Salisbury—Exposition of his Views in a Despatch to Lord Lyons—Debate on the Treaty of Berlin in the House of Lords—Speech of Lord Beaconsfield—The Premier's Opinion on Partition, the Claims of Greece, and the Value of Batoum—Russian Progress in Central Asia—"Thus far, and no farther"—Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury—Doubtful Revelations of Cabinet Projects—Debate in the House of Commons on Resolutions by the Marquis of Hartington—Immense Majority for the Government—Defection of some of the Liberals.**

THE Treaty of Berlin, signed by the Plenipotentiaries on the 13th of July, 1878, and of which the ratifications were exchanged on the 3rd of August, was the Treaty of San Stefano, with additions, subtractions, and amendments. The features of the earlier instrument have been amply detailed in Chapter IX. of this volume; and, as the variations in the later understanding have been made apparent in the proceedings of the Congress, it would be superfluous to go minutely through the several Articles. Speaking generally, it may be said that the objects of the Treaty of Berlin, as distinguished from its predecessor, were to place the Turkish Empire in a position of independence, and to protect the jeopardised rights of Europe. These ends it accomplished, or partially accomplished, by several important provisions. It divided the so-called Bulgaria into two provinces, of which the one to the north of the Balkans was formed into a tributary Principality, while the one to the south, which was to be designated Eastern Roumelia, was to remain under the direct authority of the Sultan, with administrative autonomy and a Christian Governor-General. It left to the Sultan the passes of the mountains, and the right of sending troops into the interior of Eastern Roumelia whenever there might be occasion. It reduced the stay of the Russian army in European Turkey from about two years to a period of nine months from the exchange of ratifications. It secured to Roumania, as compensation for the loss of that portion of Bessarabia which had been annexed to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris (1856), a larger amount of territory, south of the Danube, than had been granted at San Stefano. It restored to Turkey the whole of the northern shores of the Ægean, a wide extent of country in Europe, and, in Asia, the valley of Alashgerd and the town of Bayazid. It provided that Batoum should be a free port, essentially commercial. It transferred the settlement of various matters from Russia to

European Commissions; and it gave far ampler guarantees for religious liberty than had entered into the projects of the Czar. The specially bad features of the Berlin agreement (partly inherited from that of San Stefano, and partly originating at a subsequent date) were the cession of Bessarabia to Russia, the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, the arrangements giving to the same Empire a command over Montenegro, and the annexation to Russia of Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, and the adjacent territory. A stipulation having no very marked character, either good or bad, was contained in Article XXIV., which set forth that—"In the event of the Sublime Porte and Greece being unable to agree upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the Thirteenth Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, reserve to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties, to facilitate the negotiations." The Treaty of Berlin was much longer than its forerunner, having no fewer than Sixty-four Articles, as against Twenty-nine in the Treaty of San Stefano. But it was in all respects a more important document, and, in some, though not in every one, an improvement on what the Sultan had agreed to accept in the crisis of his agony and despair.

The general character of the new treaty was reviewed by Lord Salisbury in a despatch to Mr. (now Sir R.) Cross, dated from Berlin the same day on which the signature was affixed. The Foreign Minister observed that the effect of the alterations which had been made in the Preliminary Treaty was "to restore, with due security for good government, a very large territory to the government of the Sultan," and that the alterations themselves tended "powerfully to secure from external assault the stability and independence of his Empire." Alluding to a remark which had been frequently repeated, especially on the Continent, and which insinuated that the views set forth in the circular of the 1st of April had been abandoned in the subsequent action of her Majesty's Government, the Marquis proceeded to point out in detail how far the decisions which had been sanctioned by the Berlin Congress corresponded with the language of the document to which he had referred. The essential contention of the circular, that the Articles of the Preliminary Treaty, as being a departure from the Treaty of Paris, must be discussed by Congress as a whole, had, he affirmed, been admitted to the largest possible extent, both in theory and practice. The Treaty of Berlin had radically changed the disposition of the vast region to which the name of Bulgaria had been given in the earlier agreement. "Nearly two-thirds of it," said Lord Salisbury, "have been replaced under the direct political and military rule of the Sultan; and in this re-transfer are included Thrace and Macedonia, in which the Greek populations affected are almost exclusively to be found. Bulgaria, speaking generally, is now confined to the river-barrier of the Danube, and consequently has not only ceased to possess any harbour on the Archipelago, but is removed by more than a hundred miles from the neighbourhood of that sea. On the Euxine, the important port of Burgas has been restored to the Government of Turkey; and Bulgaria retains less than half the sea-board originally assigned to it, and possesses no other port except the roadstead of Varna, which can hardly be used for any but commercial purposes. The new Sclave State, therefore, is no longer strong—no longer merges in a Sclave majority any considerable mass of Greek population, and will certainly not confer upon Russia any preponderating influence over either the political or commercial relations of those seas. The events of the late war must for many years secure to Russia a great authority in this State, which will be assisted by affinity of language and similarity of religion. But the influences under which its institutions were to have been formed, and to have commenced their working, will no longer be specially Russian. The Russian and Ottoman Commissaries, who will supervise the election of the Prince and the selection of a Constitution by the 'Notables,' will be placed under the authority of the Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, acting through a Consular Commission upon the spot; and the retirement of the Russian army from the province must take place before the period at which the working of the new institutions is to begin. Its Administration, therefore, will be framed by others besides a Russian Commissary, and the first working of its institutions will not be commenced under the control of a Russian army."

Lord Salisbury took credit to his Government for the preservation to the Sultan of the continuity of his European dominions, which had been severed, in the Treaty of San Stefano, by the extension of Bulgaria to the Ægean. The application of the principle of religious liberty to other bodies besides the Russo-Greek Church, and the substitution of European for Russian control in the supervision of the new political and social state, were likewise mentioned; and it was added that the pecuniary indemnity, to which many objections had been taken by the English Government, was excluded altogether from the Treaty of Berlin, though it was still understood that Turkey was to make a

money payment to Russia after all claims on the Porte, in respect of loans anterior to the war, had been paid in full. Russia had distinctly declared that she would not seek to annex territory in satisfaction of the indemnity; and the payment of that indemnity in any form was, owing to the stipulations with respect to the foreign creditors, "postponed to a period infinitely remote." After referring to the checks on Russian preponderance which had been created on the Bulgarian shores of the Black Sea, and at Batoum and Bayazid, the Foreign Secretary admitted that, in some respects as regarded Asia, the Government had felt compelled to let the Czar have his way; but he believed that these objections had been fully met by the Convention with Turkey signed on the 4th of June. "The Sultan's dominions," he said in conclusion, "have been provided with a defensible frontier, far removed from his capital. The interposition of the Austrian Power between the two independent Sclave States, while it withdraws from him no territory of strategical or financial value, offers him a security against renewed aggression on their part which no other possible arrangement could have furnished. Rich and extensive provinces have been restored to his rule; at the same time that careful provision against future misgovernment has been made, which will, it may be hoped, assure their loyalty and prevent a recurrence of the calamities which have brought the Ottoman Power to the verge of ruin. Arrangements of a different kind, but having the same end in view, have provided for the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan security for the present, and the hope of prosperity and stability in the future. Whether use will be made of this—probably the last—opportunity which has been thus obtained for Turkey by the interposition of the Powers of Europe, and of England in particular, or whether it is to be thrown away, will depend upon the sincerity with which Turkish statesmen now address themselves to the duties of good government and the task of reform."

There was much in Lord Salisbury's despatch which correctly described the results of the Congress and the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. The interposition of England had in truth moderated some of the worst features of the Preliminary Treaty, had checked the advance of Russian power in the vicinity of the Balkans and of the Black Sea, and had placed the Turkish Empire once more on a footing of independence, and even of some dignity. But it was certainly an exaggeration to say that the famous circular of April 1st had been anything like completely carried out in the arrangements which had just received the sanction of the Powers. To some extent, no doubt, the demands of that circular had been satisfied; but in several respects the Government had been compelled to yield to the force of circumstances, and to renounce its views in favour of Russian requirements. The division of the proposed Bulgaria into two States, though a great improvement on the original plan, did not entirely meet the objections of the circular. A Sclave State, independent of the Porte in everything but the name, was still established in the heart of European Turkey, with its capital on the southern side of the Balkans; and another Sclave State, semi-independent, stretched towards the vicinity of Adrianople. The treaty contained no provision stipulating that purely Turkish territory should be evacuated within a given time, that being considered a question with which the Congress could not deal; and Turkey was thus left under the power of her enemy for an indefinite period. As regarded Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro, the boundaries of the Sultan's dominion were curtailed; Bosnia was in effect added to the Austrian Empire; Bessarabia was alienated from Roumania; and Batoum was suffered to pass under the sceptre of the Czar. All these facts constituted a state of things very different from what the circular of April 1st contemplated as desirable. Still, there had been a clear gain upon the whole, and it is difficult to see how more could have been obtained, except by a war, which public opinion in England did not appear inclined to support.

That the Treaty of Berlin was in many respects favourable to the views of the Anti-Turkish party was made clear by the admissions of Mr. Gladstone at a meeting of the Southwark Liberal Association on the 20th of July. Proceeding to expound a general remark, to the effect that "some great results for humanity" had been obtained by the assembled Plenipotentiaries, he said that "over eleven millions of men the authority of the Sultan had been either entirely abrogated, or so reduced as to leave him nothing except a limited amount of tribute and a limited amount of pecuniary benefit; while all power of government over the province of Bulgaria between the Balkans and the Danube had been entirely taken away from him, in full pursuance of what had been known as the 'bag and baggage' policy." Everything calculated to control the power of Russia was denounced by Mr. Gladstone with the utmost vehemence; and, on the evening of the same day, Mr. Forster, at the annual dinner of the Cobden Club, which was held at the Ship Hotel, Greenwich, took up the same line of argument, though perhaps with a little greater moderation of tone.

ARRIVAL OF THE EARL OF BEACONSFIELD AND THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY AT CHARING CROSS STATION.

The Conservative view found expression at a banquet given to Lord Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury in the Duke of Wellington's Riding House, at Knightsbridge, on the evening of July 27th. The most noticeable point in the speech of Lord Beaconsfield was a regrettable outbreak of irascibility against Mr. Gladstone. That gentleman had, at the Southwark meeting, described the Anglo-Turkish Convention as having an "insane" character; and he had emphasised the expression by saying that he pronounced it, not in a moment of excitement, but very calmly. Replying to this, Lord Beaconsfield said:—"I do not myself pretend to be as competent a judge of insanity as my right hon. opponent. I will not say to the right hon. gentleman, *Naviget Anticyram;* but I would put this question to an English jury—Which do you believe most likely to enter into an insane convention: a body of English gentlemen, honoured by the favour of their sovereign and the confidence of their fellow-subjects, managing your affairs for five years, I hope with prudence, and not altogether without success; or a sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity, and gifted with an egotistical imagination, that can at all times command an interminable and inconsistent series of arguments, to malign an opponent and to glorify himself?" The sally was in bad taste, and somewhat poor, both in the spirit and the form; but it was not wholly wanting in truth, and it had been provoked. Every great man, however, has a number of faithful followers, who are prepared to do anything for him. Among others, Mr. Gladstone has Earl Granville, and on the 29th of July Earl Granville drew attention to the matter in the Upper House. Lord Beaconsfield replied by saying that during the previous two years Mr. Gladstone had used towards him the most offensive epithets, reflecting on his personal character. In a letter dated the following day, Mr. Gladstone requested a list of these offensive epithets; and Lord Beaconsfield, while intimating that his subordinates had

RECEPTION OF EARL BEACONSFIELD AND THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY ON THEIR RETURN FROM THE CONGRESS.

been directed to make particular researches on the subject, at once furnished the right hon. gentleman with a few specimens of his rhetoric, which were certainly not creditable to the public manners of an English statesman.* The incident was painful and humiliating; but it has its place among the minor events of history.

In the midst of much popular excitement, and many conflicting opinions as to the worth of what had been accomplished, the British Plenipotentiaries returned to England on the 16th of July. At Dover, the shipping in the harbour was decorated in their honour, and the town put on a festive appearance. Addresses were presented to Lord Beaconsfield by the local Constitutional Association and by the Corporation; and, in returning thanks for the former, the Premier said, "We have brought a peace, and we trust we have brought a peace with honour, which I hope will be followed by the prosperity of the country." To the municipal body Lord Beaconsfield observed:—"I am very much touched by the address you have made to me; but I beg to state that it should have been addressed equally to my colleague, Lord Salisbury. You probably were not aware that we were travelling together. The country is equally indebted to him as to myself for any satisfactory results that may have been attained; and I hope that those results will do honour to the Sovereign, and insure the prosperity of the country and the peace of Europe. These paramount considerations have never been absent from our thoughts." Little girls, dressed in the Conservative colours, strewed his Lordship's path with flowers on his way to the train, which left in the midst of enthusiastic acclamations. Charing Cross was reached at a quarter to five in the evening, and it was there found that the western platform was boarded off, and adorned with a profusion of flowers and evergreens. The two Plenipotentiaries received a hearty welcome from the assembled crowd, and Lord Beaconsfield, as he descended from his carriage, was warmly greeted by Lord Henry Lennox, who had organized the reception. Among the first to congratulate his Lordship were Lady Burdett-Coutts and Sir Moses Montefiore. The latter, though he had attained the extraordinary age of ninety-five, had expressed a strong desire to be presented to the remarkable statesman, descended like himself from the Hebrew race, who had just accomplished one of the most conspicuous acts in modern history. The Premier and the Foreign Secretary left the station in the carriage of Lady Abergavenny, accompanied by her Ladyship and by Lady Salisbury; and a kind of triumphal progress to Downing Street then commenced. The day was brilliant and hot, and the pavements on both sides of the way were thronged by an excited crowd, who gave the distinguished statesmen a welcome of the most unmistakeable fervour and sincerity. That the reception had been to some extent organised by Conservative bodies is unquestionable; but it is impossible to account in this way for the thousands and tens of thousands who filled the streets, and made the shining summer air vibrate with their cheering. The carriage passed on at a walking pace, and hundreds of bouquets were showered on to it by ladies occupying the windows along the route. Opposite the Admiralty, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury received a particularly cordial ovation from those drawn up on the space in front of it; and, a little way further on, the Foreign Office was seen to be crowded with visitors, and brightly decorated with crimson hangings. At the official residence of the First Lord of the Treasury in Downing Street, the Premier alighted in the midst of renewed demonstrations of popular applause, and was received at the threshold by General Ponsonby, bearing a bouquet of rare flowers sent to his Lordship by the Queen. Lord Salisbury entered the official residence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, next to that of the Premier; and, in response to a summons frequently repeated, Lord Beaconsfield appeared at a window of the latter building looking towards Whitehall. It was long before he could obtain sufficient silence to make himself heard, but was at last enabled to utter a brief address. "I assure you," he said, "that no recognition of our labours could be more grateful to my feelings than this expression of the sentiments of those among whom I see many of my oldest and most cherished friends. Lord Salisbury and I have brought you back peace, I hope peace with honour, and such a peace as will satisfy our Sovereign, and add to the fame of our country. I can do no more than express my gratitude and pride for the sympathy which you have shown us at this trying moment." This short speech took a long time to deliver, owing to the

* Mr. Gladstone, it was here stated, had said in his Oxford speech that "the great name of England" had been "degraded and debased" by the Premier, who was alone responsible for all the acts of the Government. At Southwark, Mr. Gladstone observed that the Government had committed an almost unparalleled "act of duplicity" in concluding the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and he also alleged that the Government had "sold the Greeks." Other Russophiles at various periods characterised Lord Beaconsfield as "Machiavelli," "Mephistopheles," "Judas," "the lineal descendant of the Impenitent Thief," "a malignant spirit," "the evil genius of the Cabinet," &c. (See *Blackwood's Magazine* for January, 1879.) But Mr. Gladstone must not be held responsible for the excesses of his followers.

frequent interruptions of cheering; and, on the retirement of Lord Beaconsfield, a loud cry was raised for Lord Salisbury, who likewise found great difficulty in obtaining a hearing, though every one wished to hear him. Silence being restored, he said:—"I thank you heartily, and gather from this great assembly that you will always support a Government which supports the honour of England." Here the cheering burst forth again with such a volume and continuity of sound that the Foreign Secretary was unable to continue, and, having waited a considerable time, finished by observing that the encouragement which had been given to the Eastern policy of himself and his colleagues would strengthen them in maintaining that policy as the best for England. He then retired, and the crowd gradually dispersed, after singing "Rule Britannia," and other patriotic songs.

The enthusiastic reception thus brought to a close is to be explained by a variety of considerations, bearing but little on the most essential elements of the Russo-Turkish question. In the first place, there was the purely party feeling. Conservatives, whether at the bidding of any organisation or not, very naturally welcomed back their chief and his subordinate from a difficult expedition, in which they had undoubtedly achieved some triumphs. In the second place, the national feeling was deeply stirred. It had for a long time past been distinctly understood that England and Russia were brought into a position of direct antagonism with respect to various matters arising out of the war. One or the other must give way, or a compromise must be effected, which should leave to each some successes whereon it might justly plume itself. The controversy had in fact resulted in the latter alternative; but Russia had receded quite sufficiently to impress the popular imagination with a sense of England's predominance. The points which the Czar had scored to his own advantage were not recollected: it was only considered that the great Military Power of the North had consented to a number of distasteful things at the dictation of the great Naval Power of the West. Turkey might still be left in a dangerous position as regarded the future, and might have suffered wrong and injustice enough to make a thoughtful man despair. All that mattered little. The majority of human beings are not thoughtful, and few Englishmen know much of foreign politics. It is probable that, amongst those who shouted for Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury, only a small proportion understood the exact truth as to the origin of the war, the results of the peace, the concessions that had been made, and the perils that lay in ambush for a coming day. There had been a diplomatic battle, in which England appeared to have had the greater fortune. War had been avoided, yet a success had been achieved. Russia was to some extent baffled; Turkey was to some extent saved; and behind all was the Convention of June 4th, by which the Island of Cyprus was practically added to the territories of the British Crown. All looked brilliant and joyous, and there was in truth some solid gain, though a gain not equal to what the supporters of Lord Beaconsfield imagined it to be in that summer hour of triumph. This is, perhaps, the most that can be said for the reception of July 16th; but to deny that that reception had any value, is to speak the language of envy and of faction.

The most immediate and substantial gain to England was embodied in the Anglo-Turkish Convention; but it was precisely this which gave the most annoyance to Russia and her friends. The secret of the Convention was well kept by the Government, and little or nothing was known about it, either in England or at Berlin, until the 8th of July. Two days earlier, Prince Gortschakoff, by express command of the Emperor, had made the important concession that Batoum was to be a free port. The concession was accepted by Lord Beaconsfield, and the last serious difficulty in the way of an understanding was removed. When Prince Gortschakoff, early on the morning of the 8th, heard of the secret agreement which had been concluded between England and Turkey, he was much agitated, and is said to have exclaimed, "If I had known this forty-eight hours sooner!" He had not been unaware that negotiations were proceeding between England and Turkey; but he was ignorant of the exact nature of what was intended, and was therefore completely taken by surprise. It is not improbable that, had Russia known what had been effected a month before, she would have made no concessions to the English demands. Certain it is that the conciliatory mood was far less apparent as soon as the Convention was divulged. On the afternoon of the same day (Monday, July 8th), Prince Gortschakoff observed in private to another member of the Congress, "It would be a little too much if we were cheated out of the Batoum territory when Cyprus has just been taken." Russia accordingly was inflexible on the Laz question, and Lord Beaconsfield saw on the following day that it was absolutely necessary, unless war after all was to ensue, to abandon the unfortunate Mohammedans who had made so gallant a stand against Russia in the neighbourhood of Batoum. The Russians were

in fact greatly irritated, and in a preliminary conference it became evident that they would rather fight than yield anything further. Such, at least, is said to have been the private history of this part of the negotiations.*

But in the matter of Cyprus it was not merely Russian susceptibilities that had to be considered. France, as a Mediterranean State, with very strong opinions as to Syria and Egypt, was likely to feel some apprehension with respect to so considerable an increase of English power in the vicinity of those countries. Lord Salisbury, therefore, lost no time in communicating the Anglo-Turkish Convention to M. Waddington. On July 7th—the day before that on which the agreement was made generally known—the Foreign Secretary of England addressed to the Foreign Secretary of France a despatch enclosing a copy of the Convention, and setting forth the reasons by which her Majesty's Government had been influenced. Lord Salisbury observed that when it became probable that Russia would not give way as regarded her Armenian conquests, it seemed necessary to the Cabinet that they should carefully consider their position. The most menacing aspect of that position was the entire isolation of Great Britain with respect to this part of the Russian annexations. The Tripartite Treaty was practically no longer in existence. Austria would give her assistance only towards restoring the Porte to a certain independence in Europe, while France had clearly intimated her intention not to engage in war for maintaining the stipulations of 1856. Consequently, as far as the Asiatic conquests of Russia were concerned, England could count upon herself alone. To attempt the re-conquest of Kars and Ardahan would have been too formidable an undertaking; yet her Majesty's Government could not leave Western Asia lying unprotected at the feet of Russia. Had she done so, the countries between the Black Sea and the Persian frontier would soon have been absorbed by that Power. England had therefore thought it necessary to undertake the onerous obligation of a defensive alliance with Turkey; but this engagement could not be performed from such a distance as Malta, and, in consideration of that fact, the Sultan had assigned to Great Britain the Island of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by the British Government during such time as the defensive alliance should last. Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly, and from various quarters, been pressed to occupy Egypt, or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal. "Such an operation," said Lord Salisbury, "might not have been at variance with English interests, and would have presented no material difficulties. But this policy has never been entertained by her Majesty's Government. We have received an intimation from the French Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of their objection under existing circumstances. Her Majesty's Government have constantly turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that kind." They had equally refused the temptation to occupy some port on the coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, as they felt that such a proceeding might be construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia. They had therefore preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional occupation of a position which Lord Salisbury admitted to be less advantageous, but which he still thought sufficient for the purpose, and not exposed to the inconveniences he had mentioned. "How long the occupation will continue," he added, "it is impossible to foresee; but her Majesty's Government are not without hope that Russian statesmen will in due time satisfy themselves that the territory they have acquired is costly and unproductive, will recognise the futility of any plans which in any quarters may have been formed for making it a stepping stone to further conquests, and will abandon it as a useless acquisition. In that case, our *raison d'être* at Cyprus will be at an end, and we shall retire."

Responding to this communication in a despatch to the French Ambassador at London, written on the 21st of July, M. Waddington remarked that, although the public mind in France was not predisposed to receive with distrust the acts of the British Government, France had been "touched to the heart" by the fear that the special interests which she protected in the Levant, and the preservation of which she could not relinquish without the most serious material and moral detriment, might be endangered in consequence of the new position assumed by the English Government. Before accepting the invitation to the Congress at Berlin, M. Waddington had expressly excluded from all discussion the state of things existing in the Lebanon, in the Holy Places, and in Egypt. The several Cabinets agreed to this reservation, and the French public was therefore astonished when it became known that England was about to occupy an island in the Mediterranean, situated in the most favourable strategic and maritime position for commanding at the same time the coasts of Syria and of Egypt, and that, in addition to this direct advantage, England was also to acquire

* Paris Correspondent of the *Times*.

a right to intervene in the administration of all the territories of Asia subject to Ottoman jurisdiction. The matter, indeed, appeared so serious to the French Government that, after the receipt of Lord Salisbury's despatch written at Berlin on the 7th of July, and handed to M. Waddington on the same day, the French Minister considered it necessary to require personal explanations of the English Foreign Secretary. Those explanations added to the reassuring effect of Lord Salisbury's written communication. M. Waddington admitted in his despatch to the Marquis d'Harcourt that, as France and Austria had refused to intervene under the conditions provided for by the Tripartite Treaty of the 16th of April, 1856, England was naturally led to act alone, and to seek means to restore her credit in Asia, which had been weakened by the establishment of the Russians in a fortress so important as Kars. M. Waddington had signified to the English Government that, if all objection to the Anglo-Turkish Convention were to be removed as far as France was concerned, it would be necessary for the French Cabinet to obtain from that of England some positive declaration of a nature to satisfy France as to the future of all those interests which she considered to be connected with the maintenance of the existing state in Syria and Egypt. The traditional privileges of France concerning the Holy Places, M. Waddington believed to be sufficiently guaranteed by the special clause inserted at his request in the text of the Treaty of Berlin. The French Government had no intention of raising any obstacles to the natural development of English interests in the East. It was indispensable for England to maintain as an absolute principle the freedom of her communications with India through the Suez Canal; but M. Waddington maintained that France had a right to claim similar respect for her own privileges as a great Mediterranean Power. On these subjects he sought specific explanations from Lord Salisbury in the course of private interviews with him at Berlin. The replies of the English Foreign Secretary were such as to give entire satisfaction to the French Minister. "He has admitted to me," said M. Waddington, "the duties and rights which we derive from the position acquired by us in the Lebanon, and has declared to me that they should not be prejudiced by any act of the English Government. Nor have his words been less explicit in what relates to Egypt. He has declared his entire adhesion to the ideas which I had unfolded to him as to the part which would for the future fall to our two nations in that country, as to the equality and mutual respect which should preside over their reciprocal relations in that quarter, and as to the unity of action which should afford for the future an increased security for the private interests of both. Lastly, I may add that Lord Beaconsfield, in the several conversations I had with him, adopted the same views, and held to me the same language."

The object of M. Waddington's communication to the Marquis d'Harcourt was to ascertain, by direct communication from Lord Salisbury, whether he had correctly understood these intimations of English policy with regard to Western Asia. The Marquis of Salisbury accordingly addressed Lord Lyons on the 7th of August, and stated that the tenour of the language he had employed at Berlin was accurately reproduced by M. Waddington in his despatch to the French Ambassador. The interests of France, as a great Catholic Power, in the Lebanon and in the Holy Places of Palestine, had always, he observed, been scrupulously respected by this country. Her Majesty's Government did not contemplate any departure from the policy which in that respect had been pursued in times past. The efforts of Great Britain would be directed to securing the equal rights of men of all religions; but they did not consider themselves under an obligation to undertake the special defence of any of the religious bodies to be found in Asiatic Turkey, still less to contest the guardianship of Catholic interests which France had made her peculiar province. With regard to Egypt, France and England were interested in an equal degree, and there appeared to Lord Salisbury to be no danger of a misunderstanding between the two Powers with respect to that country. The common object of both was that the Khedive's dynasty should last, and that his people should prosper; and the English Foreign Secretary was of opinion that the only hope of enduring prosperity and progress for Egypt lay in the sincere co-operation, free on both sides from any ulterior designs, of France and England. Whatever uneasiness may for a time have been felt by the French people, in respect of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, was removed by these frank explanations. It was seen that the occupation of Cyprus was in no way directed against France, and that French interests in the Lebanon and in Egypt were not threatened by an arrangement which had for its object nothing more than the creation of a check upon the further progress of Russian aggrandizement in Asiatic Turkey.

The Treaty of Berlin was of course made the subject of animated debates in both Houses of Parliament. The discussion in the House of Lords took place on July 18th, when a very numerous assemblage crowded to hear the Premier's explanations, and the strangers' gallery was thronged by an unusually brilliant company. In laying on the

table of the House the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, Lord Beaconsfield delivered an elaborate address, in which he minutely reviewed all the features of the Treaty. His arguments were based on principles and considerations which have already been fully set forth in these pages; but one part of his speech, in which he defended the Government in favour of partition; but her Majesty's Ministers had declined to further such ends. Repeating and amplifying an argument he had advanced at the thirteenth sitting of the Berlin Congress, Lord Beaconsfield observed that a country might lose provinces without being partitioned. France, Austria, even England, had lost provinces. This



VIEW OF LARNACA, ISLAND OF CYPRUS.

against the charge of having partitioned Turkey, demands special notice. The object of himself and his colleagues, he said, had been to prevent partition, and it appeared to him that very erroneous ideas on that subject were in circulation. Her Majesty's Government had at all times resisted the principle of partitioning Turkey. They had done so partly out of high moral considerations, and partly because they believed that any attempt on a great scale to accomplish such a result would inevitably lead to a long, a sanguinary, and an often-recurring struggle. The opposite side had been country had indeed been compelled to relinquish possessions of the most precious character, the loss of which every one must deplore. But a Sovereign who had not yet forfeited his capital—and here, of course, the speaker alluded to the Sultan of Turkey—whose metropolis was one of the strongest in the world, who had armies and fleets at his disposal, and who still ruled over 20,000,000 of inhabitants, could not, in the opinion of the Premier, be described as a Sovereign whose dominions had been partitioned. With respect to Greece, Lord Beaconsfield said that the Porte had exhibited every dis-

DRINKING EARL BEACONSFIELD'S HEALTH AT THE CARLTON CLUB BANQUET.

position to treat the Hellenes in a liberal manner; but the views entertained at Athens were such as Turkey could not be expected to favour. The Greeks evidently desired Constantinople for their capital, and, although the Congress recommended Turkey to grant a considerable accession of territory to the little kingdom, the Plenipotentiaries did not find on the part of its representatives the response which they desired. The minds of those representatives were in another quarter, and it was impossible to meet the extravagant demands made by Greece—demands which were not in any way within the scope of the Congress, or the area of its duty. The acquisition of Batoum by Russia was treated by Lord Beaconsfield as a matter of very small importance. He laughed at the idea that the harbour was one of great capacity. It would hold, he said, only three considerable ships under ordinary conditions, though, if it were packed like the London docks, it might perhaps hold six; but in that case the danger, if the wind blew from the north, would be immense. The interior of the port, he admitted, might be increased; but, judging by precedents in that part of the world, the alterations could not be completed under half a century. These statements of the Prime Minister were afterwards strongly questioned, and seem in truth to be of doubtful accuracy; but on subsequent occasions Lord Beaconsfield again asserted the authenticity of his allegations. On the subject of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the Premier observed that the progress of Russia in the East, whatever might be her intentions, was such that, if we did not interfere in vindication of our own interests, the Turkish part of Asia must be either the victim of anarchy, or the possession of Russia. Yielding to Russia what she had obtained, England said to her, "Thus far, and no farther." Asia, in the opinion of Lord Beaconsfield, is large enough both for Russia and for England; but the room required by this country it was imperative to secure at once.

The views of the Opposition were expounded by Lord Granville; after whom, the Earl of Derby gave expression to those views of mingled agreement and dissent which had influenced his conduct towards the Government ever since his resignation of office. In the course of his speech, he made a very extraordinary statement; viz., that before he left the Cabinet a resolution had been formed to take the Island of Cyprus, and a post on the shores of Syria, by a secret expedition, with or without the consent of the Sultan, although compensation was to be made to that Sovereign for any loss he might incur. This, Lord Derby affirmed, was one of his main reasons for leaving the Cabinet. The statement took every one by surprise, because, at the time of his resignation, he had attributed that step to the calling out of the Reserves. Lord Salisbury, in replying on behalf of the Government, spoke sarcastically of this "revelation from the dark interior of the Cabinet." He twitted his former colleague with having addressed the House three times since he had left the Ministry, and with having on each occasion produced a fresh instalment of the fatal tale. He supposed the reason was similar to that which induced the famous Titus Oates to act in the same manner: he "did not know how much the public would endure." The statement they had just heard he described as being "not true," and, on being called to order, substituted the words, "not correct," at the same time intimating that he did not mean to impugn the veracity of the noble Earl. Lord Derby maintained the accuracy of his recollection; but, as the proceedings at Cabinet Councils are never placed on record, there is no possibility of bringing either the statement or the denial to any test more positive than the remembrance of individuals.

The discussion in the House of Commons commenced on July 29th, and was based on a series of resolutions moved by the Marquis of Hartington—resolutions which, while expressing satisfaction at the avoidance of war, regretted that it had not been found practicable to deal in a satisfactory manner with the claims of Greece; that, by the assumption of a sole guarantee of the integrity of the remaining territories of Turkey in Asia, the military liabilities of this country had been unnecessarily extended; and that such engagements had been entered into, and responsibilities incurred, without the previous knowledge of Parliament. Some of the most eminent speakers on both sides of the House joined in the debate thus inaugurated, and a very effective address was delivered by Mr. Gladstone, who, however, simply covered once more the ground he had explored on many other occasions. The debate spread over several nights, and did not conclude until the 2nd of August, or rather the early morning of the 3rd, when the Marquis of Hartington's resolutions were rejected by 338 votes to 195. An amendment, moved by Mr. Plunket, and expressing entire satisfaction with the policy of the Cabinet, was afterwards adopted without a division. The Ministerial majority of 143 was a very important triumph. That the Government would have a majority, and a large majority, was of course a foregone conclusion; but that the numbers would be such as they were, came with something of surprise even on the most attentive observers of public affairs. The truth is, that the

vote was much more than a party vote. There were those who felt that national interests had a greater claim upon them than considerations of party. Twenty-four members of the Opposition supported the Government against the censures of Lord Hartington, and fifty-one Liberals and Home Rule members were absent from the division, as against only nine on the part of the Conservatives. The discussion was characterised by considerable ability on both sides of the House, but also by an amount of personal rancour, and a degree of Parliamentary bad manners, which can only be excused by the late period of the session, when the patience of members is apt to be worn out by the heat of summer, and the length of their attendance at Westminster. Every aspect of the question had in fact been fully debated before Lord Hartington's resolutions were brought forward. The public were beginning to get tired of the subject; and the debate, consequently, received less attention from the outside world than was due to its gravity and its intrinsic merits.

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## CHAPTER XXII.

**The Anglo-Turkish Convention with reference to Cyprus and Asiatic Turkey—Mr. Gladstone on the Policy of the Measure—The Royal Prerogative and the Treaty-making Power—Reasons for Secrecy in concluding the Convention—Russia and Asia Minor—Mr. Forster on the Agreement—Lord Beaconsfield's Defence of his Policy in the House of Lords—Criticisms of Lord Derby—The Marquis of Salisbury on the Responsibilities of the Future—Statement by Lord Beaconsfield as to the Impression under which Russia entered on the War—Speech of Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons—The Principle of Intervention in the Affairs of Turkey—A one-sided Argument—Difficulties suggested by Mr. Lowe—Lord Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury in the City of London—Testimony of American Missionaries to the Progress of Turkey—Justice the main Requirement—Real Character of the Anglo-Turkish Convention—Beginning of English Rule in Cyprus—Arrival of Troops—Proclamation by the Queen—Installation of Sir Garnet Wolseley as Governor—Emigration to the Island—Exorbitant Prices and enhanced Rents—Measures of the new Government—Sickness among the Troops—The Climate of Cyprus—Want of good Harbours—Capabilities of the Island in the Future.**

Now that the Congress of Berlin was over, and that the reconstruction of European Turkey had been sanctioned by the Plenipotentiaries and accepted by the Porte, the attention of Englishmen was chiefly directed to the new territory which, by an unanticipated development of Lord Beaconsfield's policy, was placed under the guardianship of this country. The arrangement is said to have been well received even at Constantinople, and to have aroused the utmost enthusiasm in Cyprus itself. But the impression which the news produced at home was of the most contradictory description. Supporters of the Government characterised the Anglo-Turkish Convention as a master-stroke, at once check-mating the designs of Russia, and ensuring a prosperous future to Turkey. Opponents of the Government denounced it as an act of bad faith and political chicanery, as committing England to responsibilities which she ought never to have incurred, as a robbery of the Sultan, and a deception practised on the Czar. Mr. Gladstone of course took the latter view, and, in his Southwark address on the 20th of July, poured out on the Convention the hottest fires of his wrath. It has already been seen that he described it as "an insane covenant," and he went on to give his reason for this opinion. We had undertaken, he said, to be responsible for the good government of what was perhaps the worst-governed country in the whole world—the Turkish territory in Asia, from the Dardanelles to the Persian Gulf, from the Mediterranean to the limits of the Shah's dominions. The act had been defended on the ground that British interests were involved in the question; but Mr. Gladstone denied that England had any interest at all in the matter. He did not think that Russia wished to go to Asia Minor; but even if she went there, she had no ships to carry her beyond it—meaning (as he proceeded to explain) that the Dardanelles, by which alone she could approach the western shores of Asia, were closed to ships of war. If Russia were to attack India—which Mr. Gladstone regarded as a perfectly chimerical idea—she must do so through the heart of Asia; not through Asia Minor, but on the other side of the Caspian, beyond Persia. The secret conclusion of the agreement with Turkey presented itself to the mind of Mr. Gladstone as an act of duplicity, as well as an absurdity; because, although we insisted that the Treaty of San Stefano should not be allowed without the consent of Europe, we were all the while framing a secret engagement with the Porte. Such a simple piece of double-dealing,

Mr. Gladstone felt sure had never been surpassed, and he believed had rarely been equalled, in the history of nations. He also charged the policy of the Government with great imprudence; for we had given to Russia, he said, the power of attacking us when we were engaged elsewhere. By this statement, Mr. Gladstone meant that if, while we were fighting some other nation, Russia chose to attack Turkey in Asia, we should be compelled to go to the assistance of the latter. As, however, it has before now happened to this country to be at war simultaneously in different quarters of the world, and to issue forth victorious, the objection was felt is, the treaty-making power resides with the Crown, and may be exercised by the responsible advisers of the Crown, without the opinion of Parliament being previously asked. Certainly, it is usual to make treaties known before they are ratified, and thus rendered finally binding. But there may be circumstances when to do so would defeat the very end in view; and the Royal prerogative may then be exercised by the Ministers for the time being, on peril of impeachment, if, from criminal motives, they have advised or concluded a treaty which shall be judged to derogate from the honour and interest of the nation.* This, indeed, is not the only safe-



NICOSIA.

to be of little value, provided the policy of the measure were good in other respects. Such an objection, it was considered, would equally have applied to the guarantee of Belgian independence which was given by the Government of Mr. Gladstone himself during the war between France and Germany in 1870.

It was part of Mr. Gladstone's case against the Government that the Anglo-Turkish Convention had been concluded, and even ratified, before the English people knew anything about it, and that, consequently, they were bound by an act over which they were precluded from exercising the slightest control. Whether such a power as this should remain practically in the hands of the Government, or whether, as in the United States, no treaty should be ratified until it has been submitted to the Legislature, may be a very fair topic for discussion; but there can be no doubt that, as the Constitution now guard; for, without proceeding to the extremity of impeachment, a Government may be turned out of office by a vote of censure, in the event of its having concluded an objectionable treaty. Mr. Gladstone, indeed, could not assert that the action of the Government in this matter had been unconstitutional. He could merely argue that the prerogative of the Crown should always be used with a due regard to the known feelings of the country, and with every possible opportunity for the country to make known those feelings. There was nothing to show that the feeling of the country, in the main, was not in accordance with the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and if the Royal prerogative is never, under any circumstances, to be exercised without the popular sanction first had and obtained, it is clearly no prerogative at all, and had better be

* Blackstone's Commentaries, Book I., Chap. 7.

abrogated. To say that it exists, and yet does not exist—that it may be affirmed, but never used—that it is a part of the Constitution, and yet a violation of the Constitution—is to play with words, and to set the practical business of politics on the footing of a sophist's theme. The fact is, Mr. Gladstone was always invoking the Constitution when it furthered his ends, and repudiating it when it thwarted them. Unhappily, he did not stand alone. In addressing the House of Commons on the 1st of August, Mr. Lowe admitted that the law was against himself and his friends in this matter; but he thought that, to oblige himself and his friends, the law ought not to be enforced. Then he proceeded to a somewhat singular argument. "Look at what it means," he said, "if you are to take these old laws, and interpret them literally. The Queen has the undoubted prerogative to let loose every felon now confined in her gaols, without anybody having the right to say anything against it. The Queen has a right to make treaties, and could make a treaty ceding the Isle of Wight to France, without any one having the right to object. The Queen is the fountain of honour, and could make an earl of every cobbler in London if she thought fit, equally without any person having the right to object." By parity of reasoning, it might be said that the House of Commons might go on, year after year, refusing to vote the supplies, and might thus reduce the whole service of the country to a state of impotence. But these are propositions which hardly come within the sphere of reasonable discussion. They simply show that every prerogative (unless it be so essentially bad that it would be better to annul it altogether) should be exercised with moderation and good sense; not that it should never be exercised. The Anglo-Turkish Convention was part of a policy, with respect to which the most directly opposite opinions may be held with perfect fairness. But if that policy was to be carried out at all—and it certainly had the support of a very considerable body of the nation—it was absolutely necessary that the Convention of June 4th should be kept secret until the more important provisions of the Berlin arrangement had been settled. The whole dispute resolves itself into a question of policy, to which the method is merely incidental.

Equally beside the mark was Mr. Gladstone's argument that Russia could only approach the western shores of Asia by the Dardanelles, which are still closed to ships of war. It has long been the desire of Russia, with regard to the Straits, that this prohibition should be removed; it is the opinion of several of Mr. Gladstone's followers, if not of Mr. Gladstone himself, that the demand is just, and ought to be conceded. How can we tell that under some future Administration the closing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles may not follow the neutralization of the Black Sea? Besides, having once gained the shores of Asia Minor, Russia could build as many ships there as she pleased, and the neutrality of the Suez Canal would be menaced by a danger which does not now exist. Russia, speaking literally, would not approach India through Asia Minor; but the possession of the countries so designated would be a very important help in such an undertaking. It would give the Czar his coveted access to the Mediterranean; and, by finally crushing Turkey, it would remove a possible enemy from his flank. However much it may be asserted that Russia does not want Asia Minor, her acts declare the contrary, as she is continually advancing in that direction; and if it be a part of England's policy to prevent such a result, Cyprus is probably the best available position for the purpose. Adverse critics have said that an army might as well be planted in the Isle of Wight for resisting an attack from Scotland on the northern counties of England. But, if no nearer point could be secured, the Isle of Wight would certainly be better than Jersey or Guernsey. And, by the same rule, Cyprus is better than Malta, because it is so much the nearer to the possible scene of conflict.

Mr. Forster, in speaking at Greenwich, made a very candid admission, which upset a favourite contention of his clique. He said that the punishment for misrule in Turkey was rebellion, "assisted by Russia." It had been again and again denied by the Gladstonites that Russia had anything to do with the risings in various parts of Turkey. They were purely patriotic movements, which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had neither created nor encouraged. Of course, every one knew better; but the truth was now confessed. Russia does not assist rebellions, except to promote her own ends; and one of Mr. Forster's reasons for objecting to the Anglo-Turkish Convention was that she would no longer be able to do this. How, in the opinion of any Liberal, the intrigues of Russia can promote the interests of freedom and the cause of humanity, it is not easy to imagine. Yet Mr. Forster was vexed and angry that the Czar would no longer be in a position to foment rebellion in the dominions—at least, in the Asiatic dominions—of the Sultan. The influence of England in those parts, though perhaps questionable in some respects, may fairly be expected to promote good government much more than a number of desultory insurrections,

"assisted by Russia;" but Mr. Forster preferred the Russian propaganda. It would seem, therefore, that freedom and good government were not the objects actually sought by Mr. Forster and his friends. The destruction of Turkish power, by all methods and at all risks, was the real design; and if the predominance of Russia should be thus secured, even to the shores of the Mediterranean and the vicinity of the Suez Canal, the prospect had much to recommend it in the eyes of statesmen. who could find nothing in the policy of England but matter for denunciation or cavil, and little in the policy of the great Northern Despotism but occasion for praise, and gratitude, and devout thanksgiving.



LANDING TROOPS AT LARNACA, ISLAND OF CYPRUS.

In defending the Anglo-Turkish Convention before the House of Lords, on the 18th of July, Lord Beaconsfield observed that in the opinion of the Government the time had arrived when we ought to consider whether we could not do something to improve the general state of Asiatic Turkey, so that, instead of those favoured portions of the globe becoming every year more forlorn and wretched, they might be brought into a condition which would at least ensure tranquillity and order, with the further prospect of developing, by European skill and knowledge, the resources of a country which Nature had made so rich and teeming. Whenever the Turkish Empire was disturbed, our Indian Empire was a source of grave anxiety; and it had seemed to the Government that the anxiety might be brought to a termination. The Continental Powers had, of course, no interest in that particular aspect of the Eastern Question; and if any effectual arrangement was to be made, it must be made by ourselves alone. Such was the origin of the Convention concluded at Constantinople on the 4th of June. Its object was to associate the advice and policy of this country with an exhibition of its military power; and it was hoped that when



PRESENTING LORDS BEACONSFIELD AND SALISBURY WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE CITY OF LONDON.

tranquillity and order were restored in Asia Minor, the energy and enterprise of Europe might be attracted to those regions, the development of which would add greatly to the wealth and prosperity, not merely of the inhabitants, but of Europe generally. "I am told, indeed," said Lord Beaconsfield, "that we have incurred an awful responsibility by the Convention into which we have entered. A prudent Minister would not recklessly enter into any responsibility; but a Minister who is afraid to enter into responsibility is, to my mind, not a prudent Minister. There is one responsibility from which we certainly shrink: we shrink from the responsibility of handing to our successors a diminished or a weakened Empire. . . . In taking Cyprus, the movement is not Mediterranean; it is English. We have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of our Empire, and for its preservation in peace; but, if that be our first consideration, our next is the development of the country."

The acquisition of the island was condemned by Earl Granville, on the ground that we did not add to our strength by increasing our territory, and so augmenting the number of our vulnerable points. As far as his information went, Cyprus appeared to be an unhealthy island, without harbours. Lord Derby doubted whether a new naval station was really required, and believed that, if we kept up two great naval stations in the Mediterranean, we should do so at an enormous expense, or, which was more probable, should starve them both. But the question of Cyprus he considered a small one, compared with the price we were to pay for it in the nature of a guarantee. The performance of the pledge that had been given might be claimed at a moment when it would be most difficult and inconvenient to redeem it. If the defensive alliance went no further than a guarantee against invasion by a foreign Power, there would be nothing, in the opinion of Lord Derby, to prevent the disorganization of the land being effected by the old well-known means. Arms would be sent into the country from abroad; foreign officers would be supplied with money; a rising would occur; orders would be given from Constantinople to put it down; fresh atrocities would be committed, and a state of things would arise which would compel interference. The protectorate would then change into a virtual annexation, and against such a result the Porte might fairly be expected to struggle by intriguing with other Powers. Those other Powers would probably object to such annexation; and we should have to defend a territory larger than France, Italy, and Spain put together. In advancing this argument, Lord Derby seems to have forgotten that under the circumstances supposed the military power of Turkey would probably count for a great deal in combination with that of England. "Hitherto," continued Lord Derby, "we have had this advantage in the prospect of a war with Russia—that we could invade, while we could not be invaded. If, however, we burden ourselves with the defence of Asia Minor, it is evident that that advantage will no longer exist. For the first time, we shall have a frontier open to invasion; and, for the first time as against us, the enormous numerical superiority of Russia in point of military strength will become available. Now that Batoum is occupied by Russia, there is no good port in the Black Sea for our iron-clad fleet, and we should be thrown entirely on our land resources for the defence of Armenia." As to India, argued the late Foreign Secretary, the Russian road to it did not lie through Asia Minor, but through Persia; and, to connect Asia Minor and India in one system of defence, it would be necessary to obtain military control over the Empire of the Shah. The point was cleverly urged; but it was equally felt that Russia, before attacking India, would be very glad to establish her power, not only over Persia, but over Asiatic Turkey. It was to shut out the possibility of such an event that England concluded with Turkey the Convention of June 4th; and the objection, that in this way we had created for ourselves a frontier open to invasion, is an objection only by assuming that our interests would not be imperilled by the complete predominance of Russia over the whole territory of Asia Minor. Should the contrary be granted, the danger is obviously lessened by our taking up betimes a position that would give the greatest facilities for repelling it. If, it was argued by the supporters of the Government, we are to dispute with Russia the possession of Asia Minor, it is far better that we should do so while our opponent is still at the gate, than when he has obtained possession of the citadel.

In replying to Lord Derby, the Marquis of Salisbury put the case very plainly before the House, by stating that, if Russia made any further attack on Asiatic Turkey, we should undoubtedly defend those dominions, and that it was the wisest and most prudent course to declare this intention openly. "I have often heard it said, and I believe it to be true," observed the Foreign Secretary, "that the Crimean War would have been averted if the Emperor Nicholas had known that war would follow his policy. It was because the British Government shilly-shallied and temporised—because they would not declare themselves plainly, thus

leaving the Emperor to speculate on their hesitation—that he was induced to go too far, when retreat became impossible." In concluding the Anglo-Turkish Treaty, the Government had desired to avoid a repetition of any such danger, and they believed they had succeeded in that purpose. The same line of argument was adopted by Lord Beaconsfield in his speech at the Knightsbridge banquet, two days later. "One of the results of my attending the Congress of Berlin," he stated, "has been to prove what I always suspected to be an absolute fact—that neither the Crimean War, nor the horrible, devastating struggle which has just terminated, would have taken place if England had spoken with the necessary firmness. Russia has complaints to make against this country, because neither in the case of the Crimean War, nor on this occasion—and I do not shrink from my own share of responsibility in the matter—was the voice of England so clear and decided as to exercise a due influence in the guidance of European opinion." This was a very important revelation of what doubtless passed in conversation between the Russian Chancellor and the English Prime Minister; and it shows how terrible is the responsibility of politicians who, by factious opposition to the Government, threw a doubt over the policy of England, and encouraged the Czar to persevere in his designs upon the life of Turkey.

LORD WOLSELEY.

The address of Mr. Gladstone, in support of Lord Hartington's resolutions, necessarily took considerable note of the Cyprus question. The speaker observed that there had been cast upon us the enormous responsibility of defending, at any

moment when Russia should be pleased to attack it, a frontier two or three thousand miles distant from our resources, and conterminous with the unbroken territory of Russia. Over that vast extent of country we had undertaken the work of social and political reconstruction. We were to reconstruct the police, the judicature, the revenue, the Civil Service, the appointment of Governors, and so forth; and finally we were to staunch all the fountains of corruption in Constantinople, which had hitherto vitiated the benevolent plans of the reformers. This wild scheme—this mad undertaking—had been carefully concealed from the English people until the engagement was fully contracted. Mr. Gladstone undertook to affirm that no such act would ever have been committed by the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, Lord Aberdeen, Sir James Graham, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Palmerston, Lord Clarendon, or Lord Russell. He doubted whether the late Lord Derby would have sanctioned such a project; on the contrary, he believed that, had such a scheme been presented to him, he would, "like his distinguished son," have refused to entertain the idea, as not being within the limits of rational or practical politics. We should not have allowed Russia to give such an undertaking, and thus acquire power over the Sultan and his realm; and the Government had no right to insist on establishing one law for themselves, and a different one for the rest of the world. Mr. Gladstone denied the competence of the British Government to conclude such a treaty, which, he maintained, was a modification of the Treaty of Paris, and therefore, according to the terms of the Protocols of 1871, not within the right of any one Power to make. They had contracted a treaty engagement with Turkey, which treaty engagement was given to them alone. The great object of the Crimean War, and of the Treaty of Paris, was to defeat all sole interference with Turkey, on the ground that whatever concerned that Empire should be the concern of Europe; and France and England formed a mutual engagement that neither should turn to its own profit anything whatever resulting from the war. But the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, without going to war at all, had turned the recent development of events to the particular profit of England. This was certainly the most effective argument that the opponents of the Anglo-Turkish Convention were able to advance against its provisions. The identification of the policy of England with the policy of the Turkish Government in Asia—the understanding that England was to be responsible for the introduction of reforms, and was even to be concerned in carrying them out—were undoubtedly fruits of that principle of intervention in the affairs of Turkey which Russia had so frequently asserted, and which has been at the bottom of every difficulty connected with the Eastern Question. The most logical, the most thorough, and the most practical mode of opposing that principle, is to maintain, on all occasions and in every direction, the precisely opposite principle of non-intervention, except as a means of resisting the ambitious interference of any other Power. But, as Mr. Gladstone seems always to have regarded with complacency, and even with admiration, the interference of Russia in the concerns of Turkey, he was debarred from any opposition to the same practice when adopted by England. It has always been the contention of Mr. Gladstone and his followers that the governing classes in Turkey would never reform of their own motion; that if the subject races were to be helped, they must be helped from abroad. These political thinkers have never objected to Russia rendering such help, even at the sword's point, with the absolute certainty that by so doing her influence in the East would be largely magnified. But when England proposed to assist in the rectification of abuses, and that by entirely peaceful means, no words were sufficiently strong to express the moral indignation of the Russophiles at so scandalous and unparalleled an act of bad faith. It would doubtless have been much better in every way if England had from the first, and throughout, maintained the principle of non-intervention; but when that principle had been admitted to the gain of Russia—and admitted mainly in consequence of the agitation of the Gladstonites—it was inconsistent to say that it should not also be exercised in a manner which, while opening a prospect of possible benefit to the races of Asiatic Turkey, would also be of service to the British Empire, in guarding against a danger to her Indian possessions.

The arguments of Mr. Gladstone were reinforced, on subsequent nights of the debate, by Mr. Lowe, Mr. Forster, Sir William Vernon Harcourt, and others, but without adding much that was material to the general contention. Mr. Lowe, in particular, threw the utmost contempt on the idea that Cyprus would be of any use to us as a depôt for our forces, from which we might act in discharge of our engagements with Turkey. "If Russia advanced from Batoum," he asked, "how could we resist her by forces from Cyprus? Where should we land them? When we had landed them, how should we get them across the country? It is rugged, it is swampy, it is a desert, it has no roads and bridges. How are we to bring artillery, and all the

machinery of modern armies, from Cyprus to fight Russia? If we could do it, how long would it take us? and how much would be left to the Turks by the time we arrived on the scene?" All this was in Mr. Lowe's favourite style of bantering smartness; but it obviously puts out of view the very important facts that the Turks, whatever their faults, have some knowledge of the art of fighting,—that they are not incapable, at times, of inflicting severe defeats upon the Russians,—and that, although they are generally overwhelmed in the long run by superiority of numbers, they would very probably be able to hold their own in Asia Minor until the English came to their assistance. The whole argument of the Opposition was based on assumptions which, in the judgment of their opponents, vanished into mist at the first touch of criticism.

A further exposition of the Government policy was made by Lord Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury on the 3rd of August, when the freedom of the City of London was presented to them in the Guildhall, and both were afterwards entertained at a banquet. In addressing the assembled company in the evening, the Premier expressed his belief that the people of England were more interested in the Convention of Constantinople than in the Peace of Berlin. There was no parallel between the state of things established at the pacification of 1856, and that which had been settled by the arrangements of 1878. In the Treaty of Paris, the Sultan had contracted no engagement to Europe; in the Convention of Constantinople, he had made a direct engagement to England. We had no right to assume that the Sultan would not initiate and commence reforms; indeed, they had the testimony of a most noble body of men in Turkey—viz., the American missionaries—to the effect that since the Crimean War the improvement in the condition of the Sultan's Christian subjects was most remarkable. The statement was contained in a document addressed by the missionaries to the Emperor of Germany, and it was mentioned in that document that the regard for life and property in Turkey was now most striking, that education was general, and that toleration was almost complete. These changes could only have been effected by the influence of the Sultans themselves, for there was no Power in Europe at that time which had the right to interfere in the Government of the Empire. A day or two before, Lord Beaconsfield had seen an Armenian of great reputation—one who had held a high position in the countries where he had been employed; and he said to the English Premier, "There is only one thing to be done; one word is sufficient to describe the great experiment England is about to undertake. Let your motto be justice. If justice be exercised and maintained, you will find such a change in the character and conduct of the people, that at the end of a very few years you will scarcely believe they are the same race." Before sitting down, Lord Beaconsfield stated that the relations then existing among the Great Powers of Europe were exceptionally friendly, and that the assertions of Mr. Gladstone and others, with respect to a feeling of irritation in France on account of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, were totally at variance with the facts. The real character of that Convention, in its effects on Turkey and on Europe, remained to be proved. It was doubtless an experiment of some danger, and was open to criticism on the ground of its sanctioning the principle of an active interference in the affairs of other lands. But the charge of breach of faith, and of violation of the principles contained in the Paris Treaty, was absurd, considering the different circumstances under which the earlier and the later engagements had been contracted. The object of the Treaty of Paris was to restrain Russia and all other Powers, but particularly Russia, from that kind of intervention which results from violence, and is carried on against the wishes of the country itself. The Convention of Constantinople was nothing more than a perfectly fair bargain between two independent Powers, both of which were at liberty to enter into a mutual understanding. Its object was not aggression, but defence; and whereas, on the one part, England undertook to protect Turkey from any further attack by Russia, and, with a view to that end, was permitted to occupy an island on the coast, Turkey, on the other part, pledged herself to England to execute certain much-needed reforms, and to admit the assistance of England in carrying them out. It may fairly be a question whether this was a prudent engagement; but to say that it was a violation of good faith, and a contradiction of the Treaty of Paris, was regarded in many quarters as the very petulance of baffled antagonism. The Anglo-Turkish Convention had nothing in it of the nature of a conspiracy; it was simply a political measure of a somewhat venturesome order, the precise merits or demerits of which it is even now impossible to determine.

The Plenipotentiaries had not yet affixed their signatures to the Treaty of Berlin when England took possession of the interesting island which was the subject of so much controversy. It was determined that 10,000 troops should be sent there, and that the force could consist of Indian soldiers, and of three British battalions. A transport, conveying a body of Indian sappers and miners, left Malta for

Cyprus before the middle of July, and the 25th Madras Regiment was directed to follow. On the 11th of the month, Mr. Baring, carrying a firman from the Sultan, landed on the island as the representative of Great Britain. Sami Pasha, the representative of the Sultan, had already proclaimed the cession, and the announcement was well received by the inhabitants. Sir Garnet Wolseley had been appointed to the Government of the new possession, if such it is to be called, and he was charged with the duty of making a full inquiry into its condition. On the 15th of July, the British flag was formally hoisted by Admiral Lord John Hay, who acted as temporary Governor. Exactly a week later, the troopship *Himalaya* arrived with Sir Garnet Wolseley and the 42nd Highlanders, fifty men of another regiment, and Sir Adrian Dingli, Crown-Advocate of Malta, who was to assist the General in the organisation of the government. The preparations for landing the troops were superintended by the Duke of Edinburgh, and the men, on disembarking, encamped by the aqueduct near the town of Larnaca. A proclamation was then issued, setting forth the Queen's great interest in the prosperity of the inhabitants, and promising that measures would be devised to



GENERAL SIR GARNET WOLSELEY ENTERING THE ROOM IN WHICH HE TOOK THE OATH AND WAS INSTALLED AS GOVERNOR OF CYPRUS.

HOISTING THE BRITISH FLAG AT NICOSIA.

promote commerce and agriculture, and to establish the blessings of freedom and justice. It was her Majesty's pleasure that the government should be administered without distinction of persons, or in favour of any race or creed. Equal justice would be done to all, under the impartial protection of the law; no measures would be neglected to advance moral and material welfare; and the Queen desired that in the administration of affairs the reasonable wishes of the inhabitants should be regarded respecting the maintenance of ancient institutions, usages, and customs, so far as this was consistent with good government, and the principles of civilisation and liberty. The installation of Sir Garnet Wolseley, as Lord High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the island of Cyprus, took place on the 23rd of July at the Konak of Larnaca. The ceremony was of a very simple character. Among the chief persons present were the Admiral of the Channel Squadron (Lord John Hay), the Duke of Edinburgh, the naval captains, and a numerous Staff. The General was received by a guard of honour, composed of marines, Madrassees, and Turkish infantry, and by the Turkish Kaimakan, the Judge, and the Greek priest. A great crowd, partly Greek and partly Turkish, looked on from a little distance, and Colonel Greaves read the Queen's Commission. Sir Garnet Wolseley having taken the necessary oaths, and signed the forms required by law, Colonel Greaves read his Excellency's proclamation to the Cypriotes, which was repeated in Greek and Turkish for the benefit of the bystanders. The national anthem was then played, and the fleet fired a salute of seventeen guns. A Greek gentleman next read an address, referring to the new era upon which Cyprus was entering; and a Turkish gentleman, glancing at the friendship which had existed from time immemorial between England and the Ottoman Empire, expressed his gratification that the island had been placed under the protection of the Queen, and that she had chosen so distinguished a representative as Sir Garnet Wolseley. Everything passed off extremely well, and great enthusiasm was manifested by the population, whether Turkish or Greek.

The occupation of Cyprus by the British forces immediately attracted attention to this old historic island, and caused a stream of emigrants to pour into its principal towns. People arrived from Egypt, from Malta, from Constantinople, from Smyrna, and from other places. The prices of commodities, and the rents of dwellings, immediately ran up with startling rapidity. Houses for which, a week or two before, only £15 a-year had been asked, were now not to be had under a rent of £250. Everything else was in proportion, and speculators from Malta, who had landed at an early date, were extremely disconcerted at the exorbitant prices which they found already established. Prompt as their arrival had been, they were anticipated by a number of Greeks from Constantinople, who bought up all the large houses, and demanded the most extraordinary rents. As there were scarcely any hotels to go to, people were obliged to give whatever the Greeks asked, and the feeling of discontent was deep and general. Yet it was the belief of all that Cyprus, under its new masters, had a brilliant future before it. The Eastern Telegraph Company immediately offered to lay a cable between the island and the city of Alexandria, and the Anglo-Egyptian Bank sent a number of clerks to establish a branch at the capital. So exorbitant were the demands of the Greeks at Nicosia that Sir Garnet Wolseley and his Staff lived under canvas at a little distance from the town; and in other respects the army depended to a great extent upon its own resources. Medical appliances, supplies, and comforts, as well as medical officers, accompanied the troops from Malta; camp-equipages for the European soldiers, entrenching tools, and other implements, a month's rations for men and horses (excepting fresh meat), a quantity of flour, and ovens for baking it, were also embarked with the troops. Ninety mules with their harness, several carts, two hundred pack-saddles, and a number of drivers, were likewise despatched from the Mediterranean island which formed the base of operations; and six additional Commissariat officers left England in the *Simoom*, taking with them a bakery-train, with its staff of clerks, issuers, &c. Together with these, barrack-stores were provided, as well as a complete establishment for three station-hospitals, and a body of officers and men from the Army Hospital Corps.*

These precautions were by no means unnecessary. Cyprus has for many generations been one of the most neglected parts of the Turkish Empire. The climate in summer is hot and enervating, and drought is frequent, owing to the practice of cutting down the trees for fuel, and not supplying their places with others. Few of the comforts of life were to be found in Cyprus when the English soldiers landed there, and those few were difficult of attainment. It was not long ere disease made its appearance among the troops. This took the form of fever, resulting from heat and malarious air; and, although the number of deaths was but small, the persons attacked suffered much from extreme

* Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, writing from Malta on the 17th of July.

prostration. The Special Correspondent of the *Daily News*, writing on August 15th, stated that a hundred and seventy men of the 42nd Regiment were struck down with fever; that the 101st Regiment had a hundred and thirty-six in the same condition; that six officers of Artillery had been attacked; that eighty-four out of a hundred and thirty-six sailors and marines at Nicosia were ill; and that the whole of a small detachment of twenty men was on the sick list. Colonel Stanley, replying on behalf of the Government in the House of Commons, made light of these statements, and questioned their accuracy; but from subsequent investigations there appeared little reason to doubt that they were true in the main, though the malady was not of so alarming a character as seemed in the first instance to be suggested. Mr. Hepworth Dixon, who was in Cyprus at the time, has since recorded that, except in a few spots, the air is extremely fine; that from the day of landing to the last day of the year, there were only thirty-four deaths from all causes; and that the sickness actually occurring was due in part to the imprudence of the soldiers in eating too much raw fruit.* With better drainage, Cyprus might even become a health-resort.

The first appearance of the island was uninviting, though spots here and there showed how great had been its beauty in former times, when better governed, and inhabited by a more energetic population. That Cyprus may in time be restored to its earlier state, can hardly be doubted; but an initial difficulty presents itself in the absence of convenient harbours. This, however, is an evil not incapable of remedy. A sufficient outlay of money would make Famagosta a very good harbour; and, as it was, Lord John Hay offered to take three of his large ships within the reef. Lord Lilford, who had visited Cyprus in the months of April and May, 1875, stated to the House of Lords, during a discussion on the 19th of July, 1878, that on the eastern side of the island the roadstead of Famagosta is protected from those winds which make the roadsteads on the south objectionable, and that very good anchorage, in from three to four fathoms of water, could be found there. Troops could be landed with facility, and, in the opinion of this traveller, Cyprus is more healthy than Sardinia, Corsica, or Sicily. It has been said that water is scarce there; but Lord Lilford maintained that the inhabitants need nothing more than means for utilising the water which really exists in abundance. Cyprus, in fact, was like a ruinous old mansion which had seen better days. In every direction were the evidences of departed opulence and faded splendour. Its proud escutcheons were defaced; its battlements had crumbled into dust; and the rank overgrowth and undergrowth of neglect had choked and muffled the beauty of its prime. The ancient tenants had departed, or died out, or fallen into poverty; but substantially the place was still what it had been in the epochs of its prosperity. To restore such a heritage to anything approaching what has existed in former days, and of which the evidences are still visible in the land, is doubtless an onerous and a difficult task; but it is certainly a task within the power of the richest and most strenuous Empire in the world. With English capital and English vigour, a new future is secured to Cyprus; and it will be strange indeed if the withered island, once identified with the Goddess of Love and Beauty, do not rise again out of the misery and degradation in which it has been long immersed.

* Lecture at the Royal United Service Institution, Feb. 7th, 1879.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

**Cyprus—Grand and Poetical Associations with the Island—General Character of the Scenery—Relics of successive Dynasties—Barrenness of some Parts—Improvident Destruction of Forests—The Seasons in Cyprus—Remains of Antiquity—Explorations of General di Cesnola—Early History—Phœnician Colonists, and the Worship of Astarte—Greek Colonists, and the Worship of Aphrodite, or Venus—Division of the Island into Eleven small Kingdoms—Cultivation of the Industrial Arts by the Cypriotes—Rule of the Assyrians—Cyprus subject to Egypt, and afterwards to Persia—National Rising of the Cypriotes against the Persian Sovereignty—Great Battle on the Plain of Salamis—Victory of the Persians, and Establishment of an Oriental Despotism—The Phœnician Element in the Population inclined towards Persia—Opposition of the Hellenes—Cyprian Ships in the Expedition of Xerxes against Greece—Attempts of the Athenians to conquer Cyprus—A Period of Decay and Barbarism—Wise and Beneficent Rule of Evagoras—War with Lacedæmonia, and Alliance with Athens and Persia—Rupture with the Persian King—Prolonged and desperate struggle—Increase of the Power of Evagoras—Subsequent Decline of his Fortunes—His Defeat by the Persians—He concludes a Peace, and dies soon after.**

CYPRUS, which must now be considered one of the possessions of the British Crown, though still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire, is an island of which the situation is Asiatic, while the character is mainly European. Planted at the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean, it is in the immediate vicinity of Asia Minor and Syria; but its population is chiefly Greek, and the most impressive events of its history are either classical or chivalrous. In the long stretch of that noble sea which the ancients regarded as the heart of the world, and which still gathers about its shores the most varied and the most majestic memories, there are few islands more interesting, few more poetically attractive, few more radiant with the light of old romance, and of history that takes a romantic colour, than that chosen spot of earth where Venus rose from out the waves, and where Phœnicians, Hellenes, Egyptians, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, the merchant-princes of Venice, and the followers of the Prophet, have in turn held sway. Perhaps Sicily alone can surpass it; but a second Sicily is not to be expected within the compass of one sea. In Cyprus, an extraordinary succession of races has produced a population which inherits the blood of the most famous nationalities, and has left upon the soil the relics of forgotten creeds, of extinguished mythologies, of empires that have crumbled into dust, of arts that have vanished, of dreams that are dreamt out. In Cyprus, fertility and desolation go hand-in-hand; and the brilliant sun, which flushes the earth with many-coloured flowers, shines also on ruins and on neglected wastes—on the wrecks of civilisations that have past, and on the still more melancholy tokens of a civilisation in its decrepitude, which is passing, but has not yet gone.

The general character of the land is no less picturesque than its history. Blue Mediterranean waters circle round its shores, running up into numerous bays, each lovely enough to have been the spot where the sea-born goddess—the Anadyomene of Apelles—wrung out her dripping tresses on the sands. From the western to the eastern end of the island, two chains of mountains divide the territory into unequal parts; and the rugged sides of these mountains are in many places clothed with sombre forests, while in the depths of the precipitous valleys spring multitudes of flowers, of every tender hue and delicate perfume—the hyacinth, the narcissus, the anemone, whose very names are poems. When a south-west wind beats upon the shore, the foam of the moving waves rises in silvery smoke towards the trees that come down to the water's edge, falls among the woodland tracks in momentary snow, and dies beneath the sun. Here and there are the gigantic fragments of old buildings—temples, fortresses, monasteries, and baronial castles, springing out of mountainous hills and rocky wildernesses, as if Art and Nature had combined. The most ancient edifices have disappeared; but far below the surface lie the buried treasures of Greek, and Roman, and Oriental skill, and the modern Cypriote makes his dwellings and his public edifices out of the ruins of forgotten days. Successive waves of nationality have bequeathed their bones, their urns, their monuments, and their architectural grandeur, to form tier above tier of the rich and teeming ground. Larnaca is built upon a cemetery: in the long procession of the ages, one town has risen over the ruins of another, and a third upon the ruins of the second. Nowhere is there a soil more fecund of humanity. The fields still glow and rustle to the harvest, as in the days of Solomon; but beneath the cultivation or the barrenness of to-day, the changeful dynasties of men have left the records of their pride, the testimonies of their evanescence.

The island, however, is not beautiful everywhere, nor under all its aspects. Some of the inland districts are melancholy deserts, parched in summer and in early autumn by the heat of a tyrannous sun. This is owing in part to the poverty of the people,

the bad government of the Turks, the neglect of agriculture, and the improvident habit of cutting down trees for fuel, without planting others in their places. In ancient times, and even in the middle ages, Cyprus was one of the most woody islands of the Mediterranean. Oaks, firs, fig-trees, and nut-trees, covered the ground; and these, attracting clouds from the sea, provided the earth with that moisture which is essential to fertility. Under the Lusignan or Frankish dynasty, of nearly three centuries' duration, timber was cut down in enormous quantities for building merchant-vessels and ships of war, which sailed from the harbours of Cyprus to every part of the Levant. The forests suffered in this way, yet not to so serious an extent but that the Venetians, who succeeded to the island, were enabled to repair the mischief by planting young saplings. The Turks, however, have always acted with entire recklessness. When timber was required for ship-building or other purposes, the custom was to fell many more trees than were necessary, in order to select the best as they lay upon the ground; and the prodigious waste thus occasioned was never repaired by rearing other trees. But the natives themselves are as blamable in this respect as their late rulers. They will hack, hew, and set fire to their trees in sheer wantonness; and forest conflagrations, which are of frequent occurrence, lay bare extensive regions, and add to the desolate aridity of the less favoured spots. Where the woods remain, Cyprus is still fair as of old; but where they have vanished from the soil, the curse of sterility has settled over the land.

By the ancient Greeks, Cyprus was called the Fortunate Island, because of its fertility, beauty, and delicious climate; and in some respects it deserves the title even now. The spring is exquisite. In March and April, the earth once more awakens with that vivid transfiguration of beauty which fired the imagination of Hellenic poets, and found expression in the fables of Proserpine and Adonis—the sleep of winter, and the resurrection of the vernal time. The air is warm, but not oppressive; the sky (in the intervals of vivifying showers) has the clearness of crystal and the hue of sapphire; the tawny fields kindle into emerald light; the wild-flowers blossom with the prodigality of semi-tropical latitudes; and the bees murmur once more about the thymy wastes. A German traveller—Herr von Löher—who visited the island in 1877, says that for one-third of the year Cyprus is a Paradise; but during the height of summer the heat is terrific, and in the autumn the country is shrouded in sultry mists, unstirred by any breath of wind. Rain begins to fall heavily in November, and in the winter the cold is occasionally severe, owing to the winds that blow from the highlands of Syria and Asia Minor. At this period, the mountains are covered with snow; but the sharp weather does not last long. The health of the island is fairly good upon the whole, though in some localities malaria results from absence of drainage; but the dangers and discomforts peculiar to hot climates are not wanting to this neglected spot. Snakes, tarantulas, and venomous insects, hide in the lush vegetation or the rocky clefts; and sometimes clouds of locusts are carried over from the adjacent continent, before whose sudden assault every green thing perishes, and the blackness of desolation passes like a wave across the isle.

The sub-soil of this historic spot is a perfect museum of antiquities. Everywhere are the traces of vanished generations. The work of mortal hands has often a startling immortality; and in all ancient countries the explorer of to-day finds the utensils, the weapons, the personal adornments, the fragile trifles, of many thousand years ago, preserved in the depths of the earth, or stored in the recesses of unnoted caves. This is the case to an eminent degree in Cyprus. Excavations on a large scale have recently been made by General di Cesnola, a gentleman of Italian origin, acting as American consul in the island, who has published a very interesting work on the subject.* Near Baffo, or New Paphos, this inquirer prosecuted his researches into a number of ancient tombs, some of which were cut vertically, and others horizontally, into a long range of rocky cliffs. The graves were evidently pre-Roman. General Cesnola had the rubbish removed from one of the largest, and found it to be an oblong building, with an atrium supported by three monolithic columns, roughly hewn out of the limestone, and with a court-yard in front. The tomb was divided into three chambers, communicating with each other, but having separate entrances. Several graves were here discovered, as well as in the court-yard; but all had been opened long previously. In the opinion of General Cesnola, this place must have been the family sepulchre of some great personage—perhaps one of the kings of Paphos; but many other tombs of a similar character are to be found in different parts of the island. Several were opened at Amathus, and a large number of bronze objects, roughly made, and apparently of native manufacture and great antiquity, were brought to light. The General likewise

* Cyprus: its Ancient Cities, Tombs, and Temples. By General Louis Palma di Cesnola. 1877.

discovered some cylinders of soft glazed clay, probably Babylonian or Egyptian, together with several primitive rings of solid gold, broken earthenware jars, bronze bowls, copper hatchets, and a few iron arrow-heads. Herr Löher says that the whole of Cyprus may be regarded as a huge graveyard, the treasures of which are disclosed at every turn of the spade. In Idalion, the ancient Greeks seem to have made their graves three or four feet above those of the earlier Phœnician colonists. These graves yield, upon examination, an immense number of small earthen articles, trinkets, coins, and various trifles. Amongst other things shown to the German traveller were several elegant little figures, together with sucking-bottles for children, and every variety of vases and cups in glass and clay. What struck him most, however, were some delicate gold chains and earrings, and some yellowish-blue vases of Phœnician glass. In relics of buildings dating back to ages anterior to Christianity, Cyprus is not rich. The continual changes of dynasty, the frequent irruptions of foreign races, the continual wars and revolutions from which the island has suffered, and the vandalism of the Turks, have contributed to the destruction of most of those stately buildings with which the island was at one time adorned. It is in the obscurity of ancient graves that the evidences of antiquity must be chiefly sought; but ruins of mediæval buildings, Frankish or Venetian, with some of earlier date, are to be seen in several places, and often add in no inconsiderable degree to the picturesqueness of the landscape. Cyprus has a long and varied history, of which the opening chapters must be read beneath the earth, while the later may yet be studied in the light of day.



NORTH COAST VIEW OF CYPRUS.

The early history of Cyprus is as little known as that of most other countries; but it appears to be referred to in the Old Testament as the island of

Kittim, or Chittim. Until recently, it has been supposed that the earliest inhabitants of the land came from Phœnicia; but it is now considered probable that there was a still more primitive race. Not only was the island called Chittim, but the principal town bore the same name, and the ruins of this town are yet to be observed between Larnaca and the port of Salines. About the time



RUINED MONASTERY IN CYPRUS.

of Moses, Cyprus was conquered by Thothmes III., King of Egypt, and was for some time a possession of that monarchy. It would seem that the main body of the Phœnician settlers came after this date; but there may have been a few earlier arrivals. Their goddess Astarte was worshipped in Cyprus from a remote period, and this deity has been identified with the Greek Aphrodite, or Venus, who was believed to have first landed from the waves on Cyprian ground. Greek colonies settled in Cyprus about the period ascribed to the Trojan war, and the worship of Aphrodite was particularly associated with that territory. It seems, therefore, not unlikely that the mysteries of Astarte were refined by the more poetical Greeks into the worship of the Goddess of Love and Beauty, and that this worship passed from the Asiatic island into all the other homes of the Greek race. The earliest shrine of Venus was at Paphos: it was towards Paphos that the worshippers of the goddess always turned in thought with peculiar reverence, as the Israelites turn towards Jerusalem, and the Mohammedans towards Mecca. In those days, Cyprus was an island of surpassing beauty; and the service of incarnate beauty itself was carried on in the midst of enchanting groves, under a sky of brilliant clearness, and in a climate which favoured the production of every perfume that could add to the charms of a voluptuous worship. It is recorded in the Talmud that a small portion of Cyprus wine was mixed with the incense used by the Jewish

priests in the daily sacrifice of the Temple at Jerusalem, on account of the strong aroma it was supposed to give out.*

Not until after the arrival of the Greek colonies do we enter within the limits of distinct and authentic history, so far as Cyprus is concerned. Everything before that date is doubtful, and presents nothing but a confused array of names, from which but little instruction can be derived. The Greeks were rapidly absorbed by the population they found already on the island, and which appears to have been partly Phœnician, and partly Aryan, or Indo-Germanic. But they gave to that mixed race a strong infusion of the Hellenic character, which may, indeed, have been modified by Asiatic influences, but which has never been entirely destroyed. Nine hundred years before the Christian era, Cyprus was divided into eleven small kingdoms, each of which took its name from the chief town of the district. The island enjoyed a long period of prosperity, during which its industrious population engaged largely in commerce and the arts, and was known far and wide among the Mediterranean countries. The mineral riches of the soil offered many facilities to an ingenious and enterprising race, and Cyprus not merely exported copper and silver, but was famous for its works in bronze as early as the time of Homer. Though practically independent, the little insular states rendered some species of allegiance to the Phœnician monarchy of Tyre, and, when Tyre was subjected by Shalmanezer IV., of Assyria, the conquest of Cyprus followed in due course. This was some time before the year 707 B.C. Nevertheless, the rule of the Assyrians was little more than nominal: the islanders paid a yearly tribute, and the Great King, in return, granted them his protection. In the reign of Sargon, a Cyprian embassy was received at Babylon. The seven monarchs forming this embassy are described in ancient writings as chiefs of a country which lay "at the distance of seven days from the coast, in the sea of the setting sun." The tribute offered by the monarchs, or their representatives, consisted of gold, silver vases, logs of ebony, and native manufactures; in exchange for which, Sargon presented them with a figure of himself, cut in bas-relief, and bearing a long inscription in cuneiform characters. This sculpture was carried by the islanders to Citium, and was discovered, some thirty years ago, in a garden belonging to a Greek, near the site of that town. The monument is now in the Royal Museum at Berlin, and the inscription upon it states that the Cypriotes had heard of the mighty deeds achieved by the Assyrians in the midst of Chaldæa and Syria, and that, as a consequence, their hearts had failed them, and fear had taken hold of them.† It is therefore probable that they voluntarily submitted to the Great King; but their own petty monarchs were permitted to retain their sceptres, on condition of paying fealty to the powerful Emperor on the Tigris. From an Assyrian cylinder in the British Museum, it appears that ten kings of Cyprus contributed by their gifts to the embellishment of Nineveh. Even at that early period, the graceful spirit of the Greeks was making itself felt, and the capital of Assyria was adorned by the genius of these island artists.

But Assyria was hastening to its ruin. Overburdened by its weight, and debauched by the effeminate luxury of its people, the grand, but semi-barbarian, monarchy fell an easy prey to foes that had arisen within its own boundaries. The Empire broke up into fragments towards the close of the seventh century B.C., and Egypt, which had long been one of the satrapies of the Assyrian King, declared its independence under Psammetichus I. From a position of slavery, Egypt passed, almost at a bound, into that of a conquering Power. In the reign of Psammetichus III., Syria was overrun by the Egyptians, and Cyprus, as well as Tyre, was forced to acknowledge their naval supremacy. Their success, however, was brief, for Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, inflicted upon them a great defeat, and deprived Egypt of every possession which for a short time she had held in Arabia, Palestine, and Cyprus. During a few years, Cyprus owned the sway of Babylon; but about 569 B.C. the island again submitted to Egypt. Nothing is more remarkable in the history of the early world than the continual fluctuations of power from one great monarchy to another. Now it is Assyria, now Babylon, now Egypt, that rules over vast spaces of the globe, fills the broken annals of the time with the clamour of arms and the glitter of embattled hosts, and then lapses into ruin and complete desolation. In the case of Egypt, however, dominion seems to have come, and gone, and come again, in a series of remarkable vicissitudes; while, as regards the Asiatic monarchies, the day of their destruction was irremediable. Neither for Nineveh nor Babylon was there any renewal of predominance; but when the second of those Empires came to an end, another great Asiatic Power arose, under the

* *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1878.

† Cyprus, by R. Hamilton Lang, late H.M. Consul for the Island (1878): a work to which the present writer confesses his obligations.

designation of Persia. Cyrus the Persian was the greatest conqueror of his age, and according to Xenophon he subdued Cyprus, amongst other provinces into which he carried the terror of his sword. This may be doubtful; but at any rate the island belonged to Persia in the reign of his son, Cambyses. That monarch was at war with Egypt, and the petty kings of Cyprus supported his cause, and probably supplied him with ships for the more effectual prosecution of his design.

But the Cyprians never submitted willingly to the Persian yoke, and in the year 502 B.C. they rose in insurrection against their tyrants. As in former ages, the kings of the island had been permitted to exercise a species of sovereignty, but it was only as the vassals of Persia. This state of subjection they now determined to endure no longer. Onesilaus, younger brother of Gorgos, King of Salamis, one of the cities of Cyprus, endeavoured to persuade his relative to defy the foreigners; but, finding that he could not influence him in that direction, he determined to act for himself. The King being absent from his city, Onesilaus closed the gates, and assumed the government in his own name. Gorgos requested aid of the Persians; and in the meanwhile the usurper stirred up the whole island to revolt, excepting the people of Amathus, who refused to join the movement. Darius sent a powerful army against the rebel; but Onesilaus obtained succour from Ionia, which furnished him with a considerable fleet. The combatants were now well matched; for on the side of the enemy was the Phœnician fleet, which confronted that of Ionia in the Bay of Salamis. On land, a magnificent array of Cyprian forces was marshalled on a large plain, and the battalions of Persia were assembled to assert the power of their Emperor over the islanders who had dared to challenge it. Herodotus relates that the Persian commander, Artybius, rode a horse which had been taught to rear up, and strike the opposing combatant with his forelegs. Onesilaus spoke to his shield-bearer, a Carian, well-instructed in affairs of war, on this peculiarity of the steed of Artybius. "Tell me," he said, "which you will watch and strike —the horse, or Artybius himself." His attendant answered, "I am ready to do both, or either; but I will say what appears to me most conducive to your interest. A king and a general ought, I think, to engage with a king and a general; but we servants should engage with other servants. As for the horse of Artybius, do not fear it at all; for I promise you he shall never hereafter rear up against any man." The battle began soon afterwards. Artybius swept down upon Onesilaus, and the horse, rearing up according to his usual practice, planted his feet on the Cyprian's shield. With one blow of a scythe, the Carian struck off the animal's feet, and Artybius, coming to the ground, was immediately slain by his enemy. To inquire whether this romantic incident is true, would be a vain exercise of curiosity. It is one of those picturesque circumstances with which the Father of History frequently enlivens his narrative; and, as it is not absolutely impossible, we may accept it as we accept much in the records of an obscure past, not because it is certain, but because it is effective and dramatic.

Notwithstanding the loss of their general, the Persians achieved a signal victory over the Cypriotes—a victory, however, due more to the defection of some of the islanders than to the skill and valour of the assailants. The ruler of Curium, and the greater number of the Salaminian chariots of war, deserted to the enemy; the forces of Onesilaus, in spite of their desperate courage, were completely routed; and Onesilaus himself was among the slain. Although the victory at sea rested with the Ionians, the defeat on shore determined the general course of events. The allied fleet sailed back to Ionia, leaving the islanders at the mercy of their foes: Gorgos was reseated on his throne, and the Persians overran the whole of Cyprus. The city of Soli made a prolonged resistance of five months; but the Persians undermined the walls, and carried everything before them. Not only in Cyprus, but in Ionia, the Asiatics were triumphant over their antagonists, and their success was marked by every cruelty which barbarian soldiers could inflict upon a people who were their superiors in all but military power. What is even more disgraceful, is the fact that the Cypriotes immediately turned against their former allies, and assisted the Persian monarch in defeating the Ionian fleet at Ladê, near Miletus. Even at this period, the population of the island was somewhat sharply divided into the descendants of Phœnician colonists, and those who were of Hellenic or primeval origin. Probably there had been a mingling of the races in many parts of the island; but in some localities the prevailing element was Greek or aboriginal, and in others it was Phœnician. It was amongst the latter that the Persian monarch found his chief supporters; and for a very obvious reason. The Phœnicians and the Persians were alike Orientals and Asiatics. Their genius and temperament were those of the East, not of the West; their religious and social ideas had doubtless several affinities; and this created a natural tendency to coalesce as soon as the one could bring

to bear against the other a decisive and predominating force. With the Greeks it was far different. They were children of Europe, nurslings of the free West. The ponderous and melancholy despotisms of the East were hateful to their nimble and democratic intellects; the gorgeous ceremonial and oppressive fatalism of Asia affronted their artistic sensibilities, and the audacity of their questioning minds. In Europe, in the islands, and on the fringe of Asia, these Greek colonists were creating a new world—a world of freedom, of philosophy, and of political forms till then unknown. Even where Greeks dwelt in small communities, they found it hard to submit to Oriental despots. Sometimes they were crushed, sometimes they were momentarily treacherous to their own cause; but the great revolt of the Greek genius against the dark and lowering mass of Oriental tyranny and superstition had then begun, and was not to cease until that danger to adolescent Europe was broken and rolled back by the proud invincibility of the Hellenic phalanx.

The defeat of Onesilaus took place about 502 B.C., and for a century later the Phœnician colonists of Cyprus were earnest supporters of the Persian rule, maintaining the predominance of the sovereign power, and holding in check the colonists of Grecian origin. To the vast expedition which Xerxes fitted out against Greece, Cyprus contributed a hundred and fifty ships, and amongst the lieutenants of the Persian monarch were two Cypriotes—Gorgos, King of Salamis, the brother of Onesilaus, and Timonax, the son of Timagoras. We all know how disastrously that expedition failed, and with what brilliant courage the Greeks repelled their adversaries. Notwithstanding some temporary successes on land, the Persians were compelled to withdraw from Hellas, and in 480 B.C. their fleet received a signal discomfiture off the Isle of Salamis.* The Greeks now thought of reprisals, and conceived the project of delivering Cyprus from its Asiatic despots. With a fleet of fifty ships, they landed a military force on the island, and accomplished the independence of some of the principal towns. On the whole, however, the attempt was not very fortunate. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians were jealous of one another; dissensions broke out, and the chief commander, Pausanias the Spartan, was accused of taking bribes from Persia. Many of the Cyprian communities, moreover, were decidedly opposed to the invaders, and the expedition languished after the first impulse of enthusiasm had died out. But there was one man among the Athenian commanders who was determined that the aggressive movement against the Persians should not entirely fail. This was the famous Cimon, who in the first instance acted as the lieutenant of Aristides, the second in command of the whole expedition. Cimon kept the fleet together by his genius and energy, recruited it from time to time with Athenians, and thus secured the preponderance of his own state over the republic of Lacedæmon. The naval force, under the direction of Cimon, who in time succeeded to the chief command, obtained a series of victories over the Persians and their allies, and made the power of Athens felt, not merely in Asia, but in Egypt. In the year 450 B.C., he sailed for Cyprus with two hundred vessels, and conducted an attack by land on Citium, the chief stronghold of the Persian power. The resistance of the citizens was courageous and obstinate, and Cimon died while the siege was yet in progress. His death was concealed from the troops; but there was enough in the general posture of affairs to dishearten them, without the knowledge of their loss. The besiegers suffered from scarcity of provisions, while the city was well furnished with supplies; and it was at length determined to retire, and sail back to Athens. But shortly after leaving the Cyprian shores, the Athenians encountered a Phœnician and Cilician fleet of three hundred vessels, over which they obtained a complete victory, and were so inspired by their success that they once more landed, and defeated a Persian army by which they were opposed. Nevertheless, the independence of Cyprus was not secured; but a peace between Greece and Persia was shortly afterwards concluded, and the freedom of the Greek colonies in Asia was formally acknowledged by the Persian King. Cyprus, however, still remained under Oriental domination, and the Phœnician element in the people was strengthened, while the Hellenic element declined. The Greek colonies, or those which had developed Greek sympathies, were much reduced and wasted by the long series of wars commencing with the attempt of Onesilaus to throw off the yoke of Persia. The Phœnician communities, on the other hand, increased in numbers and in wealth; and it seemed at one time as if the Oriental character of the island would be confirmed, and as if, for the remainder of its history, Cyprus would be completely Asiatic, both in its institutions and its geographical position.

The period was one of tyranny and barbarism, varied by revolutionary changes in the government. The commerce of Cyprus, which had at one time been very considerable, sank to a low ebb; the in-

* The island of Salamis, in the Ægean, must not be confounded with the city of Salamis, in Cyprus.

dustrial arts were almost forgotten; and the people suffered from the baseness and cruelty of their rulers. At length, in the reign of Abdemon, tyrant of Salamis, a man of remarkable powers arose in the person of Evagoras, who is said to have been a descendant from Teucer, the traditional founder of the Salaminian dynasty. This man, being persecuted by Abdemon, went to Soli, in Cilicia, gathered together a band of fifty warriors, and, landing in Cyprus, marched upon Salamis during the night. The guards were taken by surprise, and Evagoras forced his way into the city, entered the palace, where he slew Abdemon, and, after a brief struggle with the troops, established his power in the seat of the late monarch. He had probably many supporters among the citizens, or it is scarcely possible that so desperate an enterprise should have succeeded. But Evagoras had to consider, not merely the populace, but the Persian monarch. By wisdom and policy he conciliated both, and by the exercise of moderation and benevolence he speedily confirmed his rule. The fair and temperate administration of justice which characterised his reign, and endeared him to the people, was in striking contrast with the brutal despotism of his predecessor. His pure and noble life exalted the standard of morals in a country where, from many causes, they were too apt to be debased; and under his able rule the little kingdom once more advanced in prosperity. Commerce again flourished, and agriculture was restored to its former condition. Evagoras raised an army and navy of not inconsiderable size, fortified his capital city, improved the harbour, and invited Greek settlers into his small dominions. After the great naval defeat of the Athenians at Ægospotami, in the year 405 B.C., the Greek admiral, Conon, sought refuge in Cyprus, under the sceptre of the Salaminian King. He was so well treated by that monarch that numerous Athenians emigrated to Salamis, and Cyprus in this way received a new accession of Hellenic blood. The Phœnician population became relatively less, and the arts of Greece took fresh root, under the influence of frequent intercommunication between the island and the main soil of Hellas. Persia was at this time torn by a furious civil war between Cyrus the Younger and Artaxerxes, so that the semi-Hellenised island was practically independent of the great continental monarchy. The country was still divided into a number of little kingdoms; but Salamis was the most important of these petty sovereignties.

In the year 399 B.C., war broke out between Sparta and Persia, owing to the intolerable arrogance of the former state, and was resumed in 396, after a brief cessation. The Athenians, who had once fought side by side with the Lacedæmonians against the invading hosts of Xerxes, now drew the sword upon their fellow-Greeks, partly, there can be no doubt, to avenge their defeat at Ægospotami. Evagoras also took up the quarrel of Persia, and he and Conon equipped a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, which was presently sent against the naval forces of Lacedæmon. Little or nothing, however, was accomplished, and the Spartans were so much stronger at sea that the probable results of the contest looked menacing. In this conjuncture, the cause of the allies was saved by the prudence and energy of Evagoras. The fleet was increased in numbers, and improved in discipline; and in August, 394 B.C., a severe conflict at Cnidos ended in the defeat of the Spartans. It is said that Evagoras served on board one of the Cyprian vessels; at any rate, his powers as a commander and a monarch were so conspicuous that a statue was erected to his honour at Athens, of which he was declared a citizen. His political sympathies, indeed, were not merely Greek, but Athenian. Next to the prosperity of his own island, he desired the prosperity of that noble city which has justly been considered the mother of philosophy and of the arts. It was a cardinal feature of his policy to depress the power of Sparta, which in truth had nothing to recommend it beyond the perfection of its military virtues. At that time, Sparta was supported by Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. To detach the Sicilian monarch from his Spartan alliance, was among the chief objects of the Athenians; and when an Athenian envoy was sent to Syracuse to solicit the friendship of Dionysius, Evagoras did his utmost to incline that sovereign to a favourable reception, and even offered him his sister in marriage. The negotiations led to no result; but the Spartans, though still retaining the goodwill of the Syracusan, felt that they were to a great extent overmatched by the rising force of Athens. The Lacedæmonian rulers accordingly tried to sow dissension between Athens and Persia, and, in the hope of ingratiating themselves with the latter, offered to abandon to the Great King all the Greek colonies in Asia, on the understanding that each city should be allowed a species of municipal government, having a certain character of independence.

As this multiplication of local rule, under the general suzerainty of the Persian court, would have had the effect of weakening the Greek race and the Greek cause, Persia very naturally fell in with the idea; but Athens regarded the project as fatal to the interests of Hellas. Conon therefore proceeded

to Tiribazus, the satrap of Ionia, to dissuade him from favouring any such arrangement. Tiribazus was in the interests of Sparta. He furnished the Lacedæmonians with means for strengthening their fleet, and ordered Conon to be confined in prison. Escaping from captivity, as some historians believe, he made his way to Cyprus, where he shortly afterwards died, but apparently not before he had influenced Evagoras to withdraw from the Persians that active alliance which had previously been a fixed principle of his rule. The rupture between the King of Salamis and the great monarch on the neighbouring continent proceeded from causes of which we have no very certain account. It is probable that his friend Conon helped to give a new direction to the policy of Evagoras; but there seem to have been other motives also. Mr. Grote is of opinion that Artaxerxes treacherously attacked Evagoras, even while he was profiting by his services. This does not appear likely in the nature of things, and one is led to suppose that Evagoras had provoked the wrath of the Oriental despot by acts which that sovereign considered prejudicial to his interests. It is generally believed that Evagoras had enlarged his kingdom by numerous annexations within the island of Cyprus, and that he had evinced a disposition to throw off the yoke of Persia altogether. Several of the Cyprian towns, however, were disinclined to accept his rule, and they appealed for protection to Artaxerxes, who declared war against his vassal. A large army and a powerful fleet were despatched against Salamis, and it is affirmed in some accounts that Artaxerxes himself went to Cyprus in the year 391 B.C. Evagoras had the support of the Athenians, but was opposed by the Spartans; and a war ensued, in which the chances were much against the Salaminian monarch and his friends. Perceiving that the only probability of success lay in desperate measures, Evagoras endeavoured to raise the whole island in revolt. He met with but partial support, and his small fleet was captured by the Spartans almost as soon as it had left the harbour of Salamis. The situation of Evagoras would probably have been hopeless, had he not secretly come to an understanding with Hecatomnus, King of Caria, who had command of the Persian naval forces. As the war progressed, however, he obtained the assistance of an Athenian fleet, and was enabled to take the sea with some prospect of success.

Nevertheless, the marine power at the disposal of Evagoras was inferior to that of Sparta, and the Athenian vessels were entirely defeated by the Lacedæmonian. The Salaminian King saw where his special weakness lay, and at once set about repairing it. He rapidly built a number of ships, and obtained further naval assistance from Athens, then, having reduced the powerful coast-cities of Amathus, Citium, and Soli, he established his authority over the whole island, as the chief of a confederation which ultimately included all its petty sovereigns. He next led an expedition against the city of Tyre, which, as the instrument of Persian despotism, was capable of inflicting many maritime disasters on Cyprus. This old seat of commerce was taken by a sudden assault, and the people entered into an alliance with Evagoras, whom they furnished with twenty ships of war. Thus strengthened, he extended his influence into Syria, and induced Cilicia, or a large part of it, to revolt against Persia. Egypt soon afterwards entered into an alliance with the Cyprian dictator, and supplied him with fifty additional vessels, together with a large amount of corn and money. Evagoras was now a potent monarch, wielding land and sea forces of a truly formidable character, and commanding the services of allies who were capable of disputing for supremacy with the Persian King himself. But the day of his good fortune was drawing to its end. Artaxerxes came to an amicable arrangement with Greece, by which that country bound itself to abandon all interest in the Greeks of Asia and Cyprus, and to acknowledge the latter as a province of the Great Monarchy. By this fatal blow, Evagoras was deprived of one of his most important allies, while a large body of Persian troops was set free to operate against him. It was not long ere Artaxerxes concentrated on the coast of Cilicia, opposite to Cyprus, an army of 300,000 men, including cavalry, and prepared to attack the Salaminian ruler. With his usual energy, Evagoras cut off the supplies of this immense host by a series of adroit operations at sea, and thus caused much inconvenience to the Persian warriors. But the expedition at length sailed for Cyprus, where a desperate engagement was fought off Citium. Several of the Persian vessels were taken or sunk, and it seemed as if the Cyprians would prevail. Their opponents, however, rallied after awhile, and, falling with sudden fury on the ships of the islanders, scattered them with terrible loss. One result of this victory was that Citium was taken; another was that Evagoras retired within the walls of Salamis. Here his forces were blockaded, and, after making a vain appeal for succour to the King of Egypt, whom he managed to visit in person, he felt compelled to treat for peace, which the Persians were willing to grant, owing to their great losses during a war of several years' duration. The terms, however, were




MAP OF CYPRUS.

too hard, and for two years more Evagoras prolonged the struggle, until he had obtained from Persia the acknowledgment of his independence, though his conquests he was compelled to relinquish. This was in 381 or 376 B.C.: not long afterwards, he was murdered by a eunuch, under circumstances which have been variously related by different authors, but which do not seem clear in any. Evagoras must be reckoned among the noblest heroes of the Greek race. His energy and self-reliance were splendid; and his genius, courage, perseverance, and severe justice, shed a light over the early annals of Cyprus, which redeems the beautiful island of Aphrodite from the reproach of being simply the home of effeminate indulgence, luxury, and pleasure.

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## CHAPTER XXIV.

**History of Cyprus continued—A Peaceful Interval—Reigns of Nicocles, Evagoras II., and Pnytagoras—Union of Greece under Philip of Macedon—Expedition against Persia by Alexander the Great—Submission of Cyprus to the Greek Hero—Prolonged struggle in the Island between Antigonus and Ptolemy Soter—Military and Naval Victories of Demetrius—Cyprus again under the Dominion of Egypt—Decline in the Power of the Ptolemies—Rise of the Roman Predominance—Antiochus Epiphanes and the Roman Ambassador—Cyprus Annexed to Rome—Cato the Younger and the Chests of Treasure—Noble Administration of Cicero—Early Planting of the Christian Religion in the Island—Saints and Martyrs of the Church—Insurrection of the Jews—Incidents of Ecclesiastical History—Incursions of the Saracens—Cruelty of Mohammedan Pirates—Reign of Isaac Comnenus—Conquest of Cyprus by Richard I. of England—The Knights Templar—Dynasty of the Lusignans—Religious Dissensions between the Followers of the Latin and the Greek Church—The Sultans of Egypt and the Kings of Cyprus—Marriage of Jacques II. to Catharine Cornaro—Assumption of the Island by the Venetian Republic.**

GLANCING over the long and agitated life of Evagoras, one is struck by a certain similarity in the character and career of that sovereign to those of Napoleon I. Both monarchs were great and daring commanders, who had risen to power through a revolutionary movement; both were ambitious; both had a subtle faculty of forming alliances, and of effecting masterly combinations against adversaries whom it would have been impossible to beat single-handed; both tasted for a time the intoxication of a brilliant success; and both had ultimately to accept the teachings of adversity, although the fall of Evagoras was far less than the utter ruin of the French Emperor. In the one case as in the other, the people suffered from the restlessness of their ruler. When Nicocles, the son of Evagoras, succeeded to the throne of Salamis, he found a territory wasted by long wars, and a treasury alarmingly impoverished by the expenses of numerous campaigns. Peace was absolutely essential to the little State, and Nicocles had the wisdom to nurse his revenues, to conduct the affairs of his small dominion with strict frugality, and to avoid all occasions of quarrel with his powerful neighbours. Gradually, the public debts were paid off without any fresh taxes being imposed; Salamis grew in prosperity and wealth; and Athens once more entered into friendly relations with the chief Cyprian Government. For some years, all went well; but Nicocles seems afterwards to have been corrupted by a life of ease, and by the riches which flowed into his hands. In the latter part of his reign he gave himself up to luxury, intemperance, and sensual delights, and exasperated his people by extravagance and evil administration. An insurrection broke out; the King was dethroned and imprisoned; and a violent death brought his vices and misfortunes to an end. The country, however, had on the whole enjoyed a long period of opulence—a period extending over nearly a quarter of a century. Persia and Egypt were at war, and Cyprus enriched itself by selling its produce to the former, for the supply of the army and fleet. Salamis was especially prosperous, and ancient authors speak of statues in gold as among the adornments of the city.

An epoch of great agitation ensued. Evagoras II., the successor of Nicocles, having been deposed for tyrannical and incompetent rule, his relative, Pnytagoras, who was advanced to the royal dignity, raised a revolt throughout Cyprus against the suzerainty of Persia. The customary payment of tribute was refused, and Artaxerxes Ochus, the Persian King, was not immediately able to assert his authority. Ultimately, however, he entrusted to his vassal, Idrieus, King of Caria, the task of reducing Cyprus to its former submission. The island was speedily overrun, with the exception of Salamis, where Pnytagoras maintained so stout a resistance that the commander of the Carian forces came to terms with him, and agreed to recognise his sovereignty, on condition that he once more

acknowledged the supremacy of the Great King. Up to this time, the deposed monarch, Evagoras II., had found a supporter in Ataxerxes Ochus; but his cause was now abandoned, and Pnytagoras remained in possession of the throne. The Persian ruler bestowed on Evagoras the government of a province in Cilicia; but he was soon expelled by the people, and, flying into Cyprus, was put to death by his enraged countrymen, about the year 346 B.C.

Pnytagoras was still reigning when the most remarkable military character of the ancient world, and perhaps of any epoch, suddenly burst over Europe and Asia like a revelation of supreme power. Greece had recently fallen beneath the concentrated force and energy wielded by Philip of Macedon; but, in losing much of her individual and municipal liberty, she acquired an intensity of national power which had previously been wasted in local jealousies and civil strife. The several States were to some extent united under the dictatorship of Philip, and, at a general assembly of the Amphictyonic Council, of which he had constituted himself the head, it was resolved that all Greece should declare war against Persia, on account of several injuries committed by that Empire, and that the Macedonian sovereign should be made chief commander of the armies, with power to apportion the contingent of each Grecian State. Before the preparations for this expedition could be completed, Philip died by the hand of an assassin, and his son Alexander—then but a youth of twenty—succeeded to the throne of Macedon and the leadership of Greece, B.C. 336. Some of the Greek populations attempted to resist his authority: they were speedily crushed, and the young monarch was appointed, at a general council of the Hellenes, to the command of the forces against Persia. His marvellous career forms no part of this historical sketch; but his name must be mentioned in connection with Cyprus, because the kings of the island offered their submission to him while he was besieging Tyre. The Greek element was now predominant in that insular territory, and Alexander was regarded as the champion of Hellenism, as opposed to the Oriental spirit and genius. The Cyprians made the great conqueror a very acceptable present of a hundred and twenty ships, and the left wing of this naval force was commanded by Pnytagoras, in conjunction with Krateros. Some hard fighting took place before Tyre, and, in a sudden onslaught of the Tyrians, the galley of Pnytagoras was sunk. The Salaminian King was probably drowned: at any rate, his name disappears from history about that time, and his place is seen shortly afterwards to be filled by another. Alexander permitted the island monarchs to retain their small sovereignties, and found them excellent allies. Several of the Cypriotes accompanied the Macedonian conqueror on his expedition against India, and some received the government of provinces as the reward of their fidelity.

The reign of Alexander the Great lasted barely thirteen years; and when, after his premature death in 323 B.C., his enormous dominions were parcelled among his lieutenants, a great struggle ensued in Cyprus between Antigonus of Asia Minor, on the one side, and Ptolemy of Egypt, on the other. The native kings were divided in their allegiance; but, in the end, Ptolemy succeeded in establishing his authority over the whole island. A short interval of peace ensued: then Antigonus made another attempt to seize the beautiful country which was so essential for any one holding the adjacent coast; and war again broke out. The representative of Antigonus was his son Demetrius, who, with a hundred and ten ships, and more than 15,000 soldiers, landed in Cyprus, overthrew the opposing general, Menelaus, a short distance from Salamis, and besieged his forces within the walls of that city. Alarmed at the threatening aspect of affairs, Ptolemy hastened from Egypt with a powerful marine and military force; but fate was against him, and one of his lieutenants was severely defeated by Demetrius. Not long after, the united fleets of Ptolemy and Menelaus were utterly discomfited by the adherents of Antigonus. The Egyptian line of battle was broken to fragments by the fierce impetuosity with which the ships of Demetrius bore down on it. Eighty long galleys were sunk; forty were captured, together with a hundred transports; and 8,000 men fell into the hands of the conqueror. With only eight ships, Ptolemy escaped to Egypt, and a large amount of money, baggage, and material of war, rewarded the skill and valour of Demetrius. The latter had indeed exhibited the highest qualities of a commander, and had completely shattered the naval power of his foe. It has been said that Demetrius concealed his ships behind a promontory, and stationed scouts upon the cliffs, to give notice of the Egyptian galleys as they came sailing along the coast. When the fleet of Ptolemy was rounding the cape, that of Demetrius fell like a thunderbolt on its adversary, and by the sudden and unexpected shock destroyed all order and cohesion. This is a very probable account, and it shows the genius and forethought of the commander, who was thus enabled to achieve a victory of the most decisive character. The disasters of Ptolemy and his

adherents by sea and land put an end to all further resistance. Salamis surrendered, with a large garrison of horse and foot soldiers, and the whole of Cyprus was attached to the dominions of Antigonus in the year 306 B.C. The petty kingdoms were probably abolished about this time, and Demetrius, as the viceroy of his father, held the island with a firm military grip.

Ptolemy, however, was only discomfited for a while. Combining with other Greek kings who had inherited the conquests of Alexander, the ruler of Egypt attacked the army of Antigonus at Ipsus, in Phrygia, about five years after the reverse in Cyprus. The battle was prolonged and desperate, and ended in the defeat and death of Antigonus. In 295 B.C., Ptolemy recovered Cyprus by a well-planned expedition which met with but little resistance. Salamis was made the capital, and became the centre of an elaborate administration, which may have been despotic in its character, but which at any rate ensured good government and prosperity. The Governor combined in his own person the offices of general, admiral, and high priest; and even the priests of Venus, in the sacred city of Paphos itself, were compelled to forego their privileges. For about two hundred years, the island enjoyed a period of tranquillity, with the exception of a few vicissitudes which did not seriously affect its fortunes. During that time, it remained one of the most valuable possessions of the Ptolemies, and its administration was generally placed in the hands of the King's brother. But the power of the Greek dynasty in Egypt was ultimately broken down by the extravagance and licentiousness of the monarchs. The conquests of Alexander had spread the thought, the language, the culture, and the arts of Greece over a large part of Asia, and even into the land of the Pharaohs; but it had created nothing permanent in the way of political institutions, and in the meanwhile a power had been growing up in Italy, which was destined to absorb the whole Grecian world, with much beyond it, and to give the most perfect example then known of the science of government on a large scale. When Alexander died, Rome was a somewhat obscure and feeble commonwealth, still engaged in doubtful struggles with surrounding tribes, and often menaced with violent extinction by the Gauls. Long before the dynasty of the Ptolemies had come to an end, Rome was the most dreaded dominion in the world. This fact was strikingly proved when Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria, was making his way through Egypt (B.C. 168), after receiving the submission of the people. As the conqueror approached Alexandria, the capital of the Greek dynasty, he was met by an ambassador from Rome, who, scoring a line in the sand with his stick, told Antiochus that if he ventured to cross that mark, without first promising to abandon his recent acquisitions, he must prepare for war with Rome. Rather than face such an issue, Antiochus withdrew from Egypt, and the Ptolemies were saved from utter ruin by the mere word of a civilian. The kingdom was by this time little more than a province of the great Republic on the Tiber. The Senate interposed in the arrangement of its private affairs, and received the humble petitions of Egyptian monarchs, as if they had been subjects. By one of these interpositions, Cyprus was transferred from Ptolemy Philometer to his brother, Ptolemy Euergetes. Philometer, however, resisted the interference, overcame Euergetes in battle, and preserved the dominion of Cyprus to himself. The influence of Rome had received a temporary check; but the power of the Republic was in the ascendant, while that of the Hellenised Egyptians was in the wane. Alexandria was still a city of importance; but it had no strength to repel the mighty force which threatened it from Italy.

During many succeeding years, Cyprus continued to share the changeful fortunes of the Egyptian dynasty. For a short period, about a century before the Christian era, the island existed as an independent kingdom, the throne of which was occupied by members of the Egyptian royal family; but after a while it was again united with the African monarchy. Once more it received a separate ruler, but his power did not last very long. The Roman Senate had conceived the design of declaring both Egypt and Cyprus to be Roman provinces, in virtue of an alleged testament by Ptolemy Alexander II. This was in the year 64 B.C.; but the intended measure was not immediately executed. It remained for an accident to hasten the annexation of the island; but of this accident, there can be no doubt, the Romans were delighted to avail themselves. Some pirates of Cilicia seized one day on Appius Claudius, a tribune of Rome, who, seeing no other means of escape, appealed to King Ptolemy of Cyprus for sufficient money to purchase his release. Ptolemy sent only two talents for this purpose, and the pirates refused to set Claudius free until he had given them his word of honour that the sum should afterwards be increased. Exasperated with the meanness of the Cyprian, Claudius swore he would be revenged, and, on returning to Rome in the year 57 B.C., induced the Senate to pass a law confiscating the estates of Ptolemy, and declaring Cyprus a Roman province. Against the military strength of

Rome, the ruler of a small island could do nothing; and Ptolemy unwillingly consented to cede his dominions to the great Republic, on condition of being appointed high-priest of Paphos for life. Not long afterwards, however, he put an end to his days by poison, as the only means of escaping the consciousness of intolerable disgrace. The temporary administration of the island was entrusted to the younger Cato, who, on arriving from Byzantium, whither he had been sent on a mission, found that Ptolemy had left behind him an enormous amount of treasure, which of course was confiscated to the Roman State. It consisted of gold and silver vessels, of jewels, of splendid furniture, and of rich garments, all of which was converted by Cato into money. The sum thus realised amounted to 7,000 talents of silver, and Cato adopted extraordinary precautions to prevent the loss of this mine of wealth on its passage to Rome. He packed the money in cases, each containing two talents and five hundred drachmas. To every box he fastened a long rope with a piece of cork at the end, which, acting after the manner of a buoy, would have served to point out the spot where the money had been sunk, in the event of shipwreck. The voyage, however, was performed in safety; and when Cato arrived at Rome, the magistrates, the priests, the whole Senate, and a multitude of people, went down to the Tiber to welcome him. As the chests of money passed through the streets, the utmost surprise at their number was excited among the crowd; and the feeling of satisfaction was shared by the Senate itself, which in full assembly bestowed upon Cato an extraordinary Prætorship, with the right of attending at public spectacles in a purple-bordered gown. But the severe Republican declined these honours, and simply asked, as his reward, that freedom might be bestowed on Nicias, one of Ptolemy's officers. The treasure of the Cyprian King passed into the hands of the Roman Senate, and Cato contented himself with a statue by Zeno of Citium, the excellence of which he seems to have considered a sufficient reward for all his services.

One of the earliest administrators of the island under the Roman Republic was the illustrious Cicero, who had, however, been preceded for a short time by C. Sextius, and by a proconsul, who had abused his power by gross exactions and cruel tyranny. Cicero expressed the utmost indignation at the brutalities of this man. His own rule was in every respect a contrast to that of his immediate predecessor, and was worthy of the great nature of so illustrious a Roman. He continued to feel an interest in the islanders after he had been removed from his proconsulship; and when C. Sextius was again appointed to the government of Cyprus, he wrote to him :—"I recommend to you the Cypriotes in general, and the Paphians in particular; and I shall feel deeply grateful for all that you can do for them. I urge this the more earnestly as it touches your honour, of which I am jealous, that he who was first Roman Quæstor in the island should leave in it a worthy remembrance, and thus transmit an honourable example to his successors. I pride myself that it will be an easy task, if you follow the laws and directions of your intimate friend Lentulus, and the various institutions which I myself established. I very much mistake if you do not thus confer upon yourself an infinite honour." Such were the humane considerations which this great man urged upon the attention of his successor. It would have been well had the supreme power of Rome been always exercised with so high a regard to the principles of humanity and justice.

While Julius Cæsar was interfering in the affairs of Egypt, as the supporter of Cleopatra, Cyprus once more received an Egyptian Governor, and, after the death of Cæsar, Marc Antony appears to have made it over to the fascinating princess as a part of her dominions; but when Antony was defeated at Actium, in the year 30 B.C., Cyprus again submitted to Rome. Its history during several ages mingles with that of the Empire; but the territory ceased to be prosperous in becoming a Roman province. The people were humiliated and cast down, and for a long while we hear little more of Cyprus in connection with the great military and political events of the world. It acquired distinction, however, as one of the earliest places to receive the faith of Christianity, and it was there that Elymas was struck with blindness for opposing the work of Paul. Among the primitive disciples was one Joses, a Levite and a native of Cyprus. He was afterwards called Barnabas—that is, the Son of Consolation; and it is recorded of him that he sold his land, and brought the proceeds to the Apostles. Other natives of Cyprus were also among the converts, and Barnabas carried the new faith to Antioch, where his preaching had a great effect upon the people of that depraved city. Barnabas subsequently went to his native town of Salamis, and there disseminated the faith among the Jews, who were numerous in the island. He influenced others besides the Jews, however; for Sergius Paulus, proconsul of Cyprus, was among the converts. In this part of the world, Christianity spread more rapidly, and with less persecution, than in other directions; yet Barnabas is said to have been stoned to death by members of



CYTHRŒA.

the Synagogue. Lazarus is reputed to have emigrated to Cyprus, and to have lived there forty years, as Bishop of the infant Church. These are traditions of uncertain value; but they show the intimate connection of Cyprus with the early annals of Christianity.* At the beginning of the second century, several churches existed throughout the island, and the names of many saints are recorded in association with the principal towns. The ancient

Cyprus was not to be long free from the crimes and horrors of religious fanaticism. In the reign of Trajan, the Jews of Salamis, who appear to have been treated with severity, rose in insurrection, and massacred an enormous multitude of persons. The rebellion was not extinguished without considerable bloodshed. Under Lucius, the Emperor's lieutenant, a large number of Jews were slain; the rest were banished under pain of death, should they return;



GATE OF FAMAGOSTA.

worship of Venus had greatly decayed even before the advent of Christianity, and its mysterious rites appear to have maintained but a poor struggle with the rising belief. Yet the old creed influenced the new, as in so many other parts of the Pagan world. Even to the present day, the Cyprians call the Virgin Mary by the name of Aphroditissa, and in old pictures she is represented veiled, and glittering with gold and silver stars, like the still more ancient images of Aphrodite and Astarte.†

and for many centuries the Cypriotes forbade all Jews to enter their country. If any went there voluntarily, or were driven in by force of tempest, they were at once executed; and, although the islanders had a good name for hospitality to all other races, they never could overcome their feeling of repugnance towards the Hebrews, excited in the first instance by the massacre in the reign of Trajan. With this exception, the island enjoyed peace and security under the Roman sway. But, though saved from the continual wars and revolutions of earlier ages, Cyprus suffered in an equal degree from the operations of Nature. Earthquakes, of frequent occurrence, destroyed several cities and

* The allusions to Cyprus in the Acts of the Apostles are numerous.

† Cyprus, by Franz von Löher, adapted by Mrs. A. Batson Joyner.

villages, and in the early part of the fourth century a drought of seventeen years' duration almost depopulated the island. While in this condition of extreme misery, Cyprus was visited by the Empress Helena on her return from the Holy Land, and, according to the legend, God, taking mercy on the people in answer to her prayers, caused a torrent of rain to descend the moment she set foot on the soil. What is more probable is that Helena afterwards persuaded the Emperor to exempt from taxation those natives of the island who had fled from its shores on account of the long drought, but who were now willing to return. The chief events of Cyprian history at this period are for the most part connected with religion. The Church of Cyprus enjoyed an independence which it highly valued; but in the second half of the fifth century the See of Antioch endeavoured to subject the island to its own jurisdiction. This was energetically resisted by the Cypriotes, and in the year 477 an incident is said to have occurred, which happened very fortunately for the islanders. According to the story—which is suspiciously like a good many other stories of the same epoch—a shepherd of Salamis discovered the body of St. Barnabas, together with a copy of the Gospel of St. Matthew, written by the hands of Cyprian saints. This was considered to create so strong a claim on the part of Cyprus, that the Emperor Zeno confirmed the Church of that island in its independence, and bestowed upon its head peculiar privileges.

On the division of the Roman Empire, Cyprus had fallen to the Eastern half, and it shared the vicissitudes of that dominion. In the year 647, the Saracens under Othman sent an expedition against the country, which was completely successful. The Mohammedans, however, were speedily driven out by the Imperial power of Constantinople; but in 688 they obtained entire possession of the island, where, three years before, the Emperor Justinian II. had weakly permitted them to establish a joint dominion with himself. The state of the Christians was now pitiable. Not only were they oppressed by the fanaticism of their Moslem rulers, but bodies of Arab pirates repeatedly desolated the coast, set fire to the towns and villages, murdered large numbers of persons, and re-embarked with money, agricultural produce, men, and cattle. The light galleys of these buccaneers, being designed for speed, could generally escape the heavier Byzantine vessels that were sent in pursuit; and the watery labyrinths of the Grecian Archipelago, with their numerous islands and havens, offered magnificent opportunities for concealment and shelter. It was found necessary to post scouts upon the promontories along the coast of Cyprus, wherever there was reason to fear attack; to build watch-towers, and to kindle beacon-fires when any suspicious craft was seen upon the waters. The rising of the flames against the sky was taken as the signal for a general flight into the interior, where the terror-stricken people remained until another signal told them that the robbers had departed; and, on returning to their homes, it was generally found that a wide tract of desolation had succeeded to the culture which they left. Worse than these sea-rovers, however, were the permanent Arab settlers, who ill-treated the Christians, destroyed their religious edifices, and reduced to ruins the venerable remains of Greek and Roman civilisation. Justinian, feeling himself not strong enough to cope with such formidable enemies, encouraged a general emigration of the Christians; but large numbers of these unhappy people perished on their way to Asia Minor, and the remainder, almost worn out by fever, established themselves at Cyzicus, on the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora. In the early part of the ninth century, Cyprus, which had again passed under the dominion of Constantinople, underwent a great persecution at the hands of the Caliph Haroun-al-Raschid, whose wrath had been provoked by an insolent letter from the Greek Emperor, Nicephorus I. Many of the churches were destroyed; thousands of the inhabitants were massacred, or sold as slaves, and the rest were subjected to oppressive taxation. The Saracens held undisputed sway for a century and a half, when the mischief that had been effected by the first Nicephorus was repaired by the second of that name. A rebellion against the Arab power began in Cilicia in 958, and, under the leadership of Nicephorus II., attained such formidable proportions that the Mohammedans were driven across the Euphrates. Cyprus was completely freed from the Arabians, and once more became a possession of the Eastern Empire. Shortly afterwards, Nicephorus was murdered by his wife and her paramour; the Christian cause lost ground; the Saracens recovered many of their possessions, but Cyprus was not again troubled by their presence. Nevertheless, the Byzantine dominion was rapidly waning; and although, for more than two centuries after, Cyprus continued to be a possession of Constantinople, it was at the mercy of any adventurer who had boldness enough to attempt its subjection. About the year 1184, Isaac Comnenus, a member of the Imperial family, endeavoured to assert his independence while governing Armenia, and, on the failure of that enterprise, established his power in Cyprus, of which he proclaimed himself

the absolute Emperor. His sway was not very prolonged; for a man of singular abilities as a soldier was about to appear upon the scene, and before his superior force Isaac Comnenus was speedily obliged to succumb.

It was the period of the third Crusade. Since the close of the eleventh century, a number of Christian principalities had been established on the coast of Asia opposite to Cyprus; but the kingdom of Jerusalem had recently been suppressed by the great Saladin, and the Moslems were again triumphant in Palestine. Richard I. of England was on his way to the Holy Land, accompanied by the Princess Berengaria, daughter of the King of Navarre, to whom he was betrothed, when, early in May, 1191, a severe tempest off Crete separated the English navy, and cast three of the vessels upon the coast of Cyprus. Another, in which was Berengaria, was compelled to run before the storm into the roadstead of Limasol, on the southern shores of that island. Isaac Comnenus, hearing of what had happened, hastily went to the spot, and imprisoned the shipwrecked mariners. He then offered his hospitality to the Princess, with the design, it is supposed, of obtaining a heavy ransom for her release. The officers of her ship, suspecting his intention, persuaded her to decline the apparent courtesies of the Cyprian monarch; but at the same time she begged permission to obtain fresh water for her crew. Isaac denied the request, and got together a number of small vessels, as if with a view to surrounding that of the Princess. The commander of Berengaria's ship at once raised anchor, and put to sea, where shortly afterwards he fell in with Richard and the rest of the English fleet. The King determined to chastise the insolence of a petty despot to whom the habits of civilization were apparently unknown; and, taking with him a portion of his army, he marched inland, to encounter the enemy. Comnenus, however, took flight to the mountains, and Richard, encamping outside Limasol, sent a message to the fugitive, requesting an interview, in the hope of a pacific arrangement which would enable him to pursue his voyage to the Holy Land, whither he ardently desired to conduct his forces. At the head of a small body of troops, Comnenus descended into the plain, and, presenting himself at the encampment of Richard, made a verbal submission, which at the time appeared satisfactory. He promised to send a body of two hundred men to join the Christian army before St. Jean d'Acre, and offered to give his daughter as a hostage for the due performance of what he had undertaken. But during the ensuing night he escaped, again placed himself at the head of his troops, and threatened to attack the English King if he did not at once quit the island. Comnenus little knew the man with whom he had been brought into such dangerous relations. Richard lost no time in interchange of words, but, at once landing his cavalry, sought out the inhospitable tyrant at Colosse, and entirely crushed his power. In his precipitate flight, Comnenus left behind him a large amount of treasure, together with his so-called Imperial standard, which Richard afterwards presented to the Abbey of St. Edmundsbury. On the 12th of May, Richard celebrated his nuptials with Berengaria, and then followed his discomfited enemy into the interior of the island. He discovered him near the village of Tremithousia, not far from Nicosia, when Comnenus was again defeated, and this time taken prisoner. It is related by the old chroniclers that he besought the English monarch not to put him in irons, and that Richard, by an ingenious equivocation, granted his request in a literal sense, while at the same time commanding that he should be bound with silver fetters. Isaac was subsequently confined at Tripoli, in Syria; but his daughter accompanied Richard to Palestine, and scandal said that she proved a very formidable rival to Queen Berengaria. Immediately after the second defeat of Isaac Comnenus, Nicosia was occupied by the English crusaders, and the Lion Heart found little difficulty in subduing the whole island. The Cypriotes were delighted to be freed from a despicable tyrant, and, being confirmed in all the privileges they had enjoyed under the Eastern Emperors, desired no better fortune than to remain the subjects of King Richard. An old English rhymer has left a particular account of the weapon with which Richard conquered Cyprus:—

> "This King Richard, I understond,
> Ere he went out of Engelond,
> Let make an axe for the nones,
> Therewith to cleave the Saracens' bones.
> The head, in sooth, was wrought full weele;
> Thereon were twenty pound of steele:
> And when he came in Cyprus lond,
> This ilkon axe he took in hond."*

The whole of these events occupied a period of not more than one month. On the 5th of June, Richard continued his voyage to St. Jean d'Acre, leaving a garrison in Cyprus. There can be no doubt that the island might from that time forth have been one of the possessions of the English crown; but its retention embarrassed Richard in the prosecution of his other designs. He wanted the small force of Englishmen whom he had left

* Quoted in a note to Rapin's "History of England," translated by Nicholas Tindal, Vol. I., Book 7.

there to join the operations against Acre; and in the course of a few months he sold the realm to the Knights Templar for 100,000 golden besants, equal, according to M. de Mas Latrie (a great French authority on Cyprus), to £320,000 sterling. The Knights Templar were not well received by the inhabitants. An insurrection broke out almost as soon as they had taken possession of their property, and they were so much disconcerted by the attitude of the people that they expressed a desire to part with the whole territory. When Richard was in the island, he had been joined by Guy de Lusignan, a prince who had advanced some claim to the kingdom of Jerusalem, established by the crusaders about a century before. Finding that the claim was not acknowledged, Guy conceived that he might create for himself another sovereignty in Cyprus, and, with the consent of Richard, repaid to the Knights Templar the 40,000 besants which they had already given on account of the purchase-money. The remaining 60,000, Richard agreed to waive; and in 1192 Guy de Lusignan entered into possession of the island, where he established a dynasty which lasted nearly three hundred years. The period was for the most part one of repose and prosperity; yet it was not altogether wanting in those convulsions which are so frequent in the history of Cyprus. Guy de Lusignan surrounded himself with a large body of knights (French, Italian, German, and English), who had left the western parts of Christendom on expeditions to the Holy Land, and who created a species of military caste, characterised by all the insolence peculiar to such orders. The King held his crown as a vassal of the German Emperor, and the heir-apparent was called the Prince of Antioch; but the sovereigns were sufficiently powerful, between 1285 and 1373, to acquire Smyrna and Alexandria, and to compel the Mohammedan Emirs of Syria to pay tribute. The independence of the Cyprian monarchs, however, was threatened, early in the thirteenth century, by the Emperor Frederick II. of Germany; but his designs were frustrated, and the power of the island kings was acknowledged without dispute until, in 1376, the city of Famagosta was wrested from the Lusignans by the Genoese, who held it until 1464, when it was reconquered by the Cypriotes.

One frequent source of bitter disagreement, during the three centuries of Frankish rule, is to be found in difference of religion. The Cypriotes belonged to the Greek Church; the adherents of the Lusignan dynasty were all Romanists. Eighteen Frankish sovereigns reigned in Cyprus; and although, during that long period, they spared no efforts to impose the Latin Church upon the native population, not the slightest approach to such a result was ever made. It is a curious fact, that to this day the Christian Cypriotes are devoted adherents of the Eastern Church, and that the Church of Rome has scarcely any followers in the country. Equal to the intolerance of the people was the intolerance of the Roman Catholic priests who were set over them. Several of the natives left the island, rather than submit to foreign dictation in matters of conscience; and the condition of the subjects would probably have been even worse, had not the Lusignan kings frequently interposed to moderate the arrogance of the priesthood. During this period, the land was covered with Gothic cathedrals and churches, grand abbeys, and baronial castles; Famagosta and Limasol became the seats of a flourishing trade; and the whole island was regarded as a centre of Christian chivalry, and a harbour of refuge from the predominance of Moslem force. The riches of the nobles and merchants were unparalleled in that epoch. Jewels of the highest value, works of art in pure gold, rich stuffs, and costly woods, were found in profusion in the houses of the wealthy; and the daughter of a citzen of Famagosta is said to have been dowered with jewels exceeding in value those in the crown of France. The nobles led adventurous lives, engaging in tournaments, or hunting leopards in the mountains; and the merchants reaped great advantage from the position of their island, situated in the full stream of commerce, and of the mightiest movements of the world.

Ecclesiastical commotions were not the only troubles which occurred during the Frankish rule in Cyprus. In the reign of one of the kings, who bore the very pagan name of Janus, the island was ravaged by plague, by locusts, and by drought; and before it had recovered from these calamities, the Sultan of Egypt, who had a quarrel with Janus, despatched an army into his dominions. The King's forces were defeated, and the monarch himself taken prisoner, and carried to Cairo, where he remained from 1426 to 1432. The Egyptian Sultan may have conceived that he had a kind of prescriptive right to Cyprus, on account of the old connection between that island and the great kingdom over which he ruled. At any rate, he asserted his power to the full, and did not restore Janus to his freedom and his throne until he had undertaken to pay an annual tribute of 5,000 golden ducats to the Egyptian treasury. Janus died soon after, and was succeeded by his son Jean II., after whom the crown was worn by Charlotte, daughter of Jean, and wife of her cousin Louis, Count of Geneva,

second son of the Duke of Savoy and of Anna of Cyprus. Being driven from the island by a revolution, Queen Charlotte fled to Europe, where, in February, 1485, she abdicated in favour of Charles, Duke of Savoy. It is in consequence of this act that the House of Savoy, now represented by the Kings of Italy, makes a titular claim to Cyprus, as the Kings of England, for many centuries, made a similar claim to France. After the flight of Charlotte, the throne was filled by her half-brother, Jacques II., called the Bastard, who so exhausted the land by his extravagances that he found himself unable to resist an invasion from Asia Minor, and was obliged to call in the assistance of the Egyptian Sultan. The Mohammedan troops threatened to be his masters, and Jacques, surrounding their camp, massacred every one. The furious despot endeavoured to persuade the Sultan that his soldiers had died of disease; but the Egyptian monarch, disbelieving the pretence, increased the Cyprian tribute to 8,000 ducats, and was with difficulty persuaded not to make it 16,000. Jacques was married in 1469 to Catharine Cornaro, daughter of a wealthy Venetian, who possessed property in Cyprus. The death of the usurper followed in 1473, and the Venetian Republic then despatched a fleet to the island, nominally to support Catharine (who had been adopted as a daughter of St. Mark), but in reality to assert its own power over this interesting possession. Venetian troops were sent thither in 1474, together with civil officers, and in 1489 Catharine was induced to abdicate in favour of the maritime Republic. A few months after, she sailed for Venice, where her reception was that of an Empress. Thus, after many previous changes of rule, Cyprus passed under the sway of the Doges—the last mutation in its fortunes previous to the dominion of the Turks, and the administration of the territory by the English.

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## CHAPTER XXV.

**Cyprus under the Venetians—Arbitrary and exacting Government—The Othello of Shakespeare—Designs of Selim II., Sultan of Turkey, on the Island—Despatch of a Military and Naval Expedition from Constantinople—Preparations for Defence—Reduction of Nicosia—Horrible Slaughter and Rapine—Apathy of the Venetian Government—Siege of Famagosta by the Turks—Courage and Devotion of the Garrison—Surrender of the City (Aug. 1st, 1571)—Treachery of Mustapha Pasha—Cruel Death of Bragadino, the Venetian Commander—Government of Cyprus by the Turks—Projects of Napoleon III. with regard to the Island—The Principle of Intervention—Advantages to be derived by England from the Possession of Cyprus—The proposed Euphrates Valley Railway—Five alternative Schemes as to the Route to be pursued—Mr. W. P. Andrew on the important Results of such an Undertaking—Characteristics of the Cyprian Population—Products and Nature of the Soil—Mineral Riches of Cyprus—The Salt Lakes of Larnaca and Limasol—Features of the British Occupation—The District Commissioners and their Duties—Order in Council constituting the Government of Cyprus—Powers of the High Commissioner and his Associates—The Work which has to be performed—The Cypriotes and the Turkish System of Laws—Capabilities of Famagosta—Cyprus as it may be.**

When Cyprus passed under the dominion of the Venetians, it entered on a period of decline. Venice itself was at the height of its power, but the vices of that aristocratical Republic were rampant also. The government of the island by the Doges was arbitrary and unsympathetic; trade was discouraged, and the population dwindled. The Venetians were bigoted Romanists in religion, and this feeling proved an insurmountable obstacle to any cordiality of intercourse between the rulers and the ruled. We have seen that the same cause of division and bitterness existed under the Lusignans; but the princes of that dynasty were at any rate locally identified with the island, and in time became actually national. This softened and moderated the diversity of faith, and, while not preventing a good many serious evils, counteracted them, to some extent, by community of interests. With the Venetians, there was no such qualifying influence or bond of union. They were strangers, ruling the island from a distance, and using it simply as an instrument for promoting their own designs. The policy of avarice defeated itself, as usually happens. Much more might have been derived from Cyprus by a liberal treatment than by a grudging and unjust administration. A few years after its annexation to Venice, Cyprus was of little value to its owners, except as a military or naval station. Its agricultural produce declined, and large spaces of ground became desert. Locusts multiplied to an extent before unknown; poverty and distress fell upon the people, and the national character steadily deteriorated. The presence of the Venetians in Cyprus, however, will always be interesting to Englishmen, because it is associated with one of the greatest works of Shakespeare.

The scene of the larger part of "Othello" is laid in Cyprus, and for this there seems to be some warrant. At Famagosta, visitors are shown a large round tower, called by the natives "Torre del Moro," the Tower of the Moor. It is believed to have been the official residence of Cristoforo Moro, the Venetian Lord-Lieutenant of Cyprus, from 1506 to 1508; and Moro was apparently the Othello of the drama.*

The occupation of the island by the Venetians did not last a century. For several years, Cyprus had paid an annual tribute to Egypt, and, when Egypt became subject to the Porte, in 1517, the money went to the Sultans. This appears to have drawn their attention to the territory, as a land which it might be very desirable to annex to the Ottoman dominions. In 1570, the ruling Sultan was Selim II., a man addicted, like many of his predecessors and followers, to gross intemperance, though the sin is strictly forbidden in the Koran. Selim is said to have been very much delighted with the wines of Cyprus, and to have desired to possess an island which abounded in such admirable vintages. The design was encouraged by one of his boon companions, a certain Portuguese Jew,

SKETCH AT LARNACA—ARRIVAL OF MR. FORBES AT THE CAMP.

* Cesnola's Cyprus.



FAMAGOSTA.

named Miguez Nassy, who had formerly professed Christianity, but had been banished from Venice for some offence committed there. Inflamed with desire of vengeance, Nassy did his utmost to advance the Sultan's project, and is suspected of having despatched emissaries to Venice, by whom the arsenal was set on fire. One day, Selim, in a fit of intoxication, clapped Nassy on the shoulder, and exclaimed, "Thou art King of Cyprus, if Heaven favour my designs!" He then sent out a large fleet and a powerfully-appointed army; and early in July, 1570, the vessels sighted the promontory of Cape Gatto, on the southern side of the island. The pretext for this outrageous expedition was that Cyprus harboured pirates who preyed on Turkish commerce. As Turkey herself was at that very time a most piratical country, the complaint came with an ill grace from her; but it served its purpose as an excuse. After a temporary landing at Cape Gatto, apparently with no other object than to strike terror by acts of pillage, the troops re-embarked, and the fleet sailed for the port of Larnaca, where the whole army effected a landing without opposition. Four years previously, the Cypriotes had been ordered by the Venetian Senate to fortify their capital, Nicosia, to reduce the city to a third of its size, and to surround it with moats, walls, and bastions, beyond the circuit of which all buildings were to be destroyed. This command was obeyed, and the people willingly bore the attendant expenses, so great was the terror of a Turkish invasion. The mansions and country villas of the nobility were pulled down to make room for the new fortresses, and even the Dominican cloister, which contained the graves of the Lusignan monarchs, was sacrificed to the necessities of defence. For the sake of greater protection, the eleven gates of Nicosia were reduced to three; and it was then considered that the capital of the island was safe from assault.

It is not improbable that the Turkish attack might have been foiled if the Venetian authorities had exhibited greater resolution. The Proveditor-General, Marcantonio Bragadino, desired to assume the offensive, and attack the invaders with promptitude and spirit; relying on the fortified towns as places of refuge in case of defeat. But the superior authorities overruled this plan, and determined to await the onset of the Turks behind the walls of Nicosia and Famagosta. Bragadino retired into the latter of those cities, leaving two civilians, named Dandolo and Rocco, at the former. It was against Nicosia that the Turks advanced in the first instance. The place was surrounded and besieged, and, after an attack of forty days' duration, during which two onslaughts of the Turks were repulsed with great valour, it was taken by assault on the 9th of September. Scenes of horrible barbarity followed. The town was sacked; some thousands of civilians were slain in the streets; churches were despoiled, women shamefully abused, and articles of great value carried off. Several of the women flung themselves from the roofs, to save themselves from dishonour, and young girls were slain by their fathers or mothers, as the only means of escaping a worse fate. It is related that a Greek lady, who with many others was sent off to Constantinople, fired the powder-magazine, blew up the ship, and at the same time, by the spreading of the flames, destroyed two companion vessels which were similarly laden. The work of slaughter and rapine in Nicosia continued for eight days, and the place was almost entirely destroyed. Kyrenia, on the northern coast of Cyprus, immediately afterwards surrendered on the first summons, and the conquerors then proceeded to attack Famagosta. All this time, the Venetian Government showed a singular want of intelligence in the defence of its possession. The Doge was seeking help from the chief European Powers, when a prompt effort on his own part might have averted the danger. Rome and Spain were the only Governments which responded to the appeal. In September, 1570, a hundred and ninety-two galleys—Venetian, Papal, and Spanish—assembled in the Mediterranean, off the island of Crete; but, before they could arrive at Cyprus, Nicosia had fallen, and Famagosta was invested. On the news of these facts being received by the fleet, the Admiral of the Spanish contingent refused to go any farther, alleging that the expedition was now hopeless; and, although the Venetian and Papal commanders were not of this opinion, it was considered too venturesome to proceed without the forces of Spain, which amounted to forty-two galleys, and 3,900 men. When, therefore, the Spanish Admiral turned back, the others felt compelled to do the same. The Turkish fleet off the coasts of Cyprus remained unchallenged, and Famagosta was every day pressed closer by a foe whom the utmost gallantry of Bragadino and his companions was unable to shake off.

The city was by this time completely surrounded, both by land and sea. It was almost impossible to throw any reinforcements within the walls; yet the feat was not quite beyond the compass of human valour, for, about the beginning of February, 1571, a Venetian captain, named Quirinus, slipped through the blockading fleet with twelve galleys, and landed provisions, gunpowder, and a small additional force

of 1,700 men. Still the siege went on; Turkish reinforcements arrived from Syria and Cilicia; large supplies were continually despatched from Constantinople; and the Ottoman commander, Mustapha Pasha, having thrown up enormous earthworks, mounted sixty-four pieces of cannon, from which, it is recorded, 1,500,000 shot were hurled against the fortifications. The defenders of Famagosta consisted of no more than 5,000 Venetians and Cypriotes, with two hundred Albanian cavalry. For many weary months, this faithful garrison repelled the attacks of the enemy, and looked with confidence to the arrival of a Venetian fleet, which should scatter that of the Moslem, and relieve the town. But no fleet came, and, as the summer wore away, the day of surrender began to dawn in the immediate future. The walls were battered to pieces by Turkish shot; the men on the ramparts were diminished to a handful; provisions and ammunition were alike drawing to an end; and further resistance became impossible. On the 1st of August, 1571, Famagosta was surrendered to the Turkish General, on condition that the lives, property, and religion of the citizens should be respected, and the Governor and garrison be allowed to leave the island under a safe escort. Mustapha Pasha signed the capitulation; but when Bragadino and his officers appeared in his tent, to deliver up the keys, the treacherous Moslem, irritated by an altercation which took place, had the latter put to death on the instant, and reserved Bragadino himself for a more lingering and terrible fate. After an interval of some days, he caused him to be led naked to the square of Famagosta, where, in the presence of Mustapha, his nose and ears were cut off, and he was subjected to many indignities. Finally, he was flayed alive, enduring his torments to the last with astonishing fortitude and courage. His skin was then stuffed with hay, placed on a cow, paraded through the camp and town in the midst of jibes and jeers, and at length suspended from the yard-arm of the Admiral's ship, in which it was sent as a trophy to Constantinople. Three hundred men of the garrison were slaughtered at the same time that Bragadino's officers suffered a cruel and unmerited death, and the town was given up to pillage for three days. In all these matters, however, it is but fair to recollect that we derive our accounts from enemies of the Turks, who in such a case were scarcely capable of impartiality, or coolness of judgment. Still, it is probable enough that the Ottomans acted on many occasions with gross brutality, though perhaps not to the full extent asserted by their vanquished and exasperated foes. The age was one of general cruelty, and it may be that the Turks, with their fierce Asiatic blood and unregulated passions, were even worse than Spaniards and Venetians.

The skin of the unfortunate Bragadino was for twenty-five years exposed in the gaol at Constantinople where Christian prisoners and slaves were confined. It was then purchased from the Turks, and deposited in the church of Saints John and Paul at Venice, where a monument was erected to the memory of the brave and faithful soldier who had endured torture in the cause of the Republic. Well would it have been for Cyprus if the atrocities perpetrated at the reduction of the island in 1570–71 had completed the measure of its misfortunes under Turkish rule. But the government of the Pashas was for many generations a pitiless tyranny, under which the people groaned, and the whole country languished. It is believed that at one time the population sank as low as 80,000; but, as there was no census, the truth cannot be exactly known. Mohammedans and Christians suffered alike; for the grievances were chiefly fiscal, and resulted from the venality of the rulers, who wrung the utmost out of the wretched people by exactions which reduced them to poverty and ruin. Ultimately, however, reforms were introduced by the Porte, and since 1838 Cyprus has been one of the best-governed parts of the Ottoman Empire. From that date, the Governor has received a fixed salary, instead of being allowed to extort what he could from the people; the taxes also have been fixed; and of late years representative institutions, of a liberal character, have been introduced. Under the influence of these changes, the island regained some portion of its former prosperity; but the great fault of the new institutions was that the Vali for the Greek Archipelago, in which Cyprus was included, resided at the Dardanelles, and that all serious crimes were to be tried there. This imposed a very great hardship on witnesses, and often operated to the disadvantage of justice. But in other respects the Cypriotes had little cause of complaint when they ceased, in all but name, to be subjects of the Porte.

The condition and prospects of Cyprus have for some time past attracted the attention of Europe; and it is probable that, had his reign continued a few years longer, Napoleon III. would have annexed the island to his own dominions. Although he had gone to war to prevent the influence of Russia in the Turkish Empire, it is certain that the French sovereign felt a strong inclination towards interfering in that Empire himself. This was seen in 1860, when he sent a French army into Syria to restore peace between the Druses and the Maronites. The promotion of French interests in Syria has long been a cardinal point in the policy of France, and

Napoleon III. was not the man to let such an idea slip, without endeavouring to make use of it. The possession of Cyprus would have facilitated ulterior operations on the mainland; and accordingly Cyprus was to be obtained by some arrangement, of which the exact features were probably never settled. M. Albert Gaudry was commissioned to make inquiries into the capabilities of the island, and the results of his investigations were published, several years ago, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. When war broke out between France and Prussia, in 1870, the Emperor was carrying on negotiations for the purchase of a fine collection of Cyprian antiquities, at that time possessed by General di Cesnola and Mr. Hamilton Lang, the American and British consuls for Cyprus. It is the belief of Mr. Lang that the Emperor desired to act in concert with England, and that, while he acquired an influence over Syria by the possession of Cyprus, he would have left England to pursue, from her vantage-ground of Malta, any designs she might have formed upon Egypt. "To maintain the power of the Sultan," observes this writer, "in order that anarchy and oppression should triumph in the fair lands which he owned, was not a policy with which either Englishmen or Frenchmen could sympathise; but, on the other hand, to allow Turkey to become Russian was inconsistent with the interests of the Western Powers, and a very questionable advantage to the populations concerned." This remark is open to much criticism; for it is seldom that people have a real interest in being adopted by foreign Powers, whose action is devoted mainly to the furtherance of their own designs. The great objection to the English assumption of Cyprus is that it is based on the pernicious principle of intervention—the very principle which furnished Russia with the pretext for her own policy in the East. There were, undoubtedly, special circumstances affecting the Con-



KYRENIA.

vention of June 4th, 1878, which rendered that arrangement less objectionable than it would otherwise have been, and which may even be regarded as a sufficient excuse; but the principle is bad, and would have had no palliation whatever if carried out in the way apparently contemplated by Napoleon III.

The advantages to be derived by England from the possession of Cyprus are summed up by Mr. Hamilton Lang in a few sentences which comprehensively explain all that could fairly be said upon the subject. The island, he remarks, "forms an invaluable outpost for the defence of the Suez Canal; it will protect the Asiatic terminus of a possibly future Euphrates Valley Railway; it will prove a convenient starting-point, as well as a depôt, for whatever operations may become necessary in the future in Asiatic Turkey. All the great aggressive dynasties of the world—Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian—have found the capture or subjection of Cyprus a first necessary step in the approach upon Egypt. We have therefore good cause to be satisfied that this important position is in our own possession. In proportion as it would be valuable against us in the hands of our enemies, it is precious in ours, as a barrier against the approach of any Power which might menace our communications through Egypt. Masters of India, and determined at all costs to remain so, it is manifestly of the first importance that we should make sure of free and indisputable communication with our far-off Empire. Planting one foot on Cyprus and the other on Malta, we secure this." It may in fact be urged that the possession of Cyprus had become a necessity, in consequence of the unfortunate turn which the war had taken. Russia had approached too near our communications for us to remain indifferent to their safety. Had a resolute tone been adopted from the first, the war, in all probability, would never have occurred, and in that case we should not have been compelled to take a step which, from some points of view, is decidedly objectionable, and which may yet involve us in complications of an embarrassing nature.

Cyprus has been mentioned in connection with the Euphrates Valley Railway, and it may therefore be fitting to give some account of that project, of which a good deal has been heard during the last few years. A Parliamentary Committee on the subject sat in 1872, and five different schemes were then selected as the most important. The first of these was a line starting from Alexandretta, or Suedia, near the mouth of the Orontes, passing through Aleppo to the Euphrates, and then carried down the right bank of that river to Kuwait, on the western side of the Persian Gulf. The second was a line starting from one of the same points, crossing the Euphrates at Belio, passing down the left bank of the river, or the right bank of the Tigris, to a point nearly opposite Baghdad, recrossing the Euphrates, and proceeding to Kuwait. By the third scheme it was proposed that the line should start as before, should cross the Euphrates at Bir, and, thence going round to Orfah and Diarbekir, should follow the right bank of the Tigris, as in the second suggestion. The fourth plan contemplated a similar line, excepting that it was to follow the left bank of the Tigris. According to the fifth scheme, the line was to start from Tripoli, and to proceed across the desert, by way of Damascus and Palmyra, to the Euphrates, whence it might follow one of the preceding routes. Mr. W. P. Andrew, F.R.G.S., who has given much attention to this subject for the last thirty years, has observed that a railway to connect the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf would furnish us with an invaluable and perfectly efficient means of thwarting the designs of Russia, if they should assume a hostile character; of marching hand-in-hand with her, if her mission be to carry civilization to distant lands; and of competing with her in the peaceful rivalry of commerce. The lands watered by the Euphrates and the Tigris were formerly amongst the most fertile and productive in the whole world; and although this has long ceased to be the case, owing to the bad government of many centuries, the soil is still capable of yielding as it did before, if a better system of cultivation were introduced. "These regions," remarks Mr. Andrew, "need only to be again irrigated by the life-giving waters pouring down, cool and plentiful, from Ararat, to yield once more in abundance almost everything that is necessary or agreeable to man. Many acres now wasted, save when, in early spring, they are wildernesses of flowers, may be covered with cotton, tending to the employment of the million spindles of our land. It is not too much to say that no existing or projected railroad can compare, in point of interest and importance, with that of the Euphrates Valley. It will bring two quarters of the globe into juxtaposition, and three continents —Europe, Asia, and Australia—into closer relation. It will bind the vast population of Hindostan by an iron link with the people of Europe. It will inevitably entail the colonization and civilization of the great valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, the resuscitation in a modern shape of Babylon and Nineveh, and the re-awakening of Ctesiphon and Baghdad, as of old." This is perhaps a somewhat overwrought and fanciful anticipation; yet it is highly probable that great good would result to a large part of Asia from the construction of the

proposed railway. The contemplated route is the most direct road to India, and singularly free from engineering difficulties; moreover, having both its termini on the open seas, it is easily capable of defence by a maritime Power like England. Mr. Andrew calls attention to the fact that, in the investigation by the House of Commons Committee, it was demonstrated that the Euphrates line of railway was an eminently feasible undertaking in an engineering sense; that the route of the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf was decidedly preferable, in respect of climate, to that by Egypt and the Red Sea; that, as regarded the safety and facility of navigation, also, the Persian Gulf had by far the advantage; that the proposed undertaking would be of great commercial moment; and, finally, that it would be of the highest political and strategical importance to this country. The establishment of steam-communication by the Messageries Maritimes, on the route of the Red Sea, to Calcutta and other Eastern ports, is referred to by Mr. Andrew as showing the importance attached by the French to the extension of their commercial relations with the East. In addition to this, a Russian line of steamers has lately been established between Odessa and Bombay by the Suez Canal route, and roads and railways are being pushed forward by the Russian Government towards Persia and Afghanistan.

TASTING WINE.

It is therefore very necessary for England to consider her own communications, and the Euphrates Valley route presents peculiar advantages, inasmuch as it would bring India more than a thousand miles nearer to us than she is at present. During the season of the monsoon, the gain, according to Mr. Andrew, would be even greater, as the route between the Persian Gulf and Kurrachee is not exposed to the severity of the annual storms, which render a divergence of five hundred miles necessary during a portion of the year on the voyage from Bombay to Aden. Furthermore, the Euphrates line, though in itself terminating at the head of the Persian Gulf, could be connected with a through line passing from Constantinople to India.*

Supposing the Euphrates Valley Railway to be made, the possession of Cyprus would become doubly important to England, because it would enable us to keep watch and ward over the inviolability of that line. In itself, moreover, the island is capable of being turned to good account, if well administered. We have seen how fertile and prosperous a territory it has been in former times, and there is no reason why it should not again become so, if wise measures are adopted. The population of Cyprus at the present day has been roughly estimated at 186,000. Of these persons, rather more than three-fourths are Christians, and all of the Christians belong to the Greek Orthodox religion, with the exception of a little colony of Maronites, who came to Cyprus about a hundred years ago. This circumstance shows how imprudent it would be for the English Government to introduce any large number of colonists from Malta, where the people are bigoted Romanists. The Cypriotes are generally regarded as Greeks; but Mr. Hamilton Lang, who knows them well, says that their characteristics are essentially distinct from those of the Hellenes. He describes them as docile in the highest degree, industrious, and sober, and bears testimony to their love of home, and devotion to their families. The Mohammedan population lives on amicable terms with the Christian. In several villages, Mohammedans and Christians dwell side by side, and everything goes on quietly. The Christians are more laborious than the Mohammedans, so that for many years land has been passing out of the hands of the latter into those of the former. Brigandage is unknown in the island, and the authority of the Porte has been maintained with scarcely any military force. The inhabitants appear to be singularly honest, though of course a few exceptions to this rule are occasionally to be found. Where sheep stealing or highway robbery occurs, it is generally the result of poverty; and, as the people for the most part are not poor in the extreme sense of that word, they are generally disinclined to acts of violence and theft.

Next to Sicily and Sardinia, Cyprus is the richest and most fertile island in the Mediterranean. In its greatest length it extends about a hundred and forty miles; in its greatest breadth, nearly sixty miles. The superficial area is estimated by Mr. Lang at four thousand square miles. The extraordinary fertility of the land results, according to M. Gaudry, from the great depth of vegetable soil, which in many parts goes down to about eight yards.† The mountain torrents, descending into the plains, bring with them, like the Nile, a fertilizing deposit; and hence the immense accumulation of rich and valuable soil. The most important products of the isle are grain, wine, seeds, locust-beans (growing on the carob-tree), cotton, madder-roots, tobacco, silk, and salt. The wheat is of good quality, but the system of threshing is still so primitive that the grain is considerably injured. Of the Cyprian wines, the best sort is known as Commanderia, a name which it derives from the Comandatore of the Knights Templar. This wine is highly valued in France and Italy, and, as we have seen, it enjoyed the special favour of Sultan Selim. The English public may to some extent estimate the quality of Cyprus wine by that of Madeira, for it was from Cyprus that the vine was introduced into the Portuguese African colony. The common wine of Cyprus is said to be wholesome, but ill-flavoured, on account of the tar which is plentifully spread over the vessels in which it is fermented, and the skins in which it is stored. The production of cotton in Cyprus has never been very large, but it might be larger. The cultivation of the plant underwent a great stimulus during the period of the American civil war, and in 1863 as many as 2,200,000 pounds were exported from the island. This increase was occasioned by the sudden rise in price, in itself resulting from the extreme difficulty of finding the raw material for one of the principal of English manufactures. But the demand was so purely artificial that in 1864 the production dropped to 1,800,000 pounds, and in 1871 it was not more than 770,850. The diminution in the last-mentioned year, however, was partly owing to the severe drought of 1869. Twenty years ago, much tobacco was produced in Cyprus, but this has now fallen off in a very serious degree, owing to the heavy taxes imposed by the Turkish Government.

* Communication by Mr. W. P. Andrew, in Mrs. Joyner's adaptation of Herr Löher's work.

† Recherches Scientifiques en Orient

From the madder-roots produced in Cyprus, the dye known as Turkey red is extracted. A great deal of madder was exported from Cyprus by the old Levant Company, now extinct; but of late years fast-coloured mineral dyes have been scientifically produced at a much cheaper rate, and madder is therefore going out of cultivation. The silk-cocoons of Paphos are said to be unusually good: the silk is strong in quality, and extremely brilliant in surface; but no large amount of it is produced. France is the chief customer of Cyprus in this respect; but the value of the whole produce of silk throughout the country appears not to exceed £35,000 sterling.* All the methods of cultivation employed in Cyprus are rude, primeval, and inefficient. The commerce of the island might unquestionably be increased to an almost incalculable extent by the introduction of capital, and of scientific appliances. As it is, the gifts of Nature are largely wasted, and much of the land lies wholly unproductive. Even the periodical affliction of locusts, to which allusion has before been made, might be greatly lightened by the application of vigorous measures for the destruction of the locusts' eggs. Attempts of this nature have been sanctioned under the dominion of the Turks; but they have generally been languidly or dishonestly prosecuted, and have therefore been productive of but little good.

The mineral riches of Cyprus are very great, and its mines were worked from an early period. Pliny has recorded that the first discovery of copper was made in this island, but that a better quality was afterwards found elsewhere. Strabo, however, speaks of the extreme richness of the copper extracted from the mines of Tamassus, and there were also large copper-works at Soli. Some have even derived the name Cyprus from the Greek word for copper. The principal mines were on the western slopes of Mount Troodos, and at Lisso may be seen to this day extensive heaps of scoriæ, the refuse of ancient smeltings. Vast accumulations of the same material may also be observed in other localities, indicating how immense was this branch of industry in ages long gone by. Malachite, or carbonate of copper, is abundant in the island. Iron is found in large quantities, but does not appear to have been turned to account. Zinc was probably worked in the time of the Greeks, and the stone called asbestos, of which we read a good deal in classical authors, came from Cyprus. From this stone a species of veils were woven, which were incapable of being burned by fire, and indeed seemed to be rendered more white and lustrous by the action of the furnace. To our own day, asbestos is called by the Cypriotes "the cotton-stone," because it seems to have a fibre like that of cotton. Stone for building purposes may likewise be found in the northern range of mountains running from the western to the eastern extremity of Cyprus. Extensive salt-lakes exist near Larnaca and Limasol. These reservoirs are filled with fresh water during the rainy season; and when the moisture has evaporated by the heat of summer, a crust of salt is left upon the ground. This appears to result from the chloride of sodium with which the soil is impregnated, and it is doubtful whether the action of the sea has anything to do with the production of the saline matter. The salt-lakes were in the hands of the Turkish Government until the advent of English rule. Salt, therefore, was a monopoly in Cyprus, and it has been a great source of revenue to the Porte. The salt-lake of Larnaca produced an annual revenue of more than £25,000; and, as nothing was done to improve the quality of the salt by refining, it is very probable that under a different system it might have produced still more.

The British army had not been long in Cyprus before a number of district commissioners were appointed for assisting Sir Garnet Wolseley in the administration of the island. These assistant commissioners were all of them military men; for it was necessary in the early days of occupation to conduct the affairs of the territory on rather strict principles of discipline. For the guidance of his sub-commissioners, Sir Garnet drew up a detailed memorandum of instructions. It was here stated to be the wish of his Excellency that the commissioners should leave untouched, as far as it was reasonably possible, the established laws, customs, and usages of the people. For the present, the existing officials were not to be disturbed. They were to carry out their former duties at the old rates of pay until further orders, and to see that no punishments repugnant to English custom were inflicted. Upon arrival in their respective districts, the commissioners were at once to confer with the Kaimakan, and inform him that he was to continue in the discharge of his duties as before, but under their authority and supervision. The district commissioners were to make it one of their objects to acquaint themselves fully with the character and operations of the various local institutions appointed for the conduct of administrative and judicial affairs; to observe how far, and in what particulars, they were capable of modification and improvement, and in what way they appeared beneficial and effective, or the reverse. They were to acquire full information as to the nature and

* Cyprus, by R. Hamilton Lang.

THE BRITISH KAIMAKAN HEARING AN ASSAULT CASE AT HEPTA-KHUMI.

extent of the taxation, together with the sources from which the revenue was derived, its average amount, and the modes of its collection; discriminating, where occasion might arise, between personal, tributary contributions, should there be any such, and the regular income of the Government, authorised by law or established by custom. They were to observe whether the taxation appeared burdensome or light; whether it was of a nature suitable to the habits of the population, and whether in any cases there were circumstances which seemed to demand its diminution, or to justify its increase. They were to see, as far as practicable, that the revenues were properly collected, and deposited in a place of safety. They were to have power to sit as assessors in all courts, whether civil or criminal, for the trial of all cases whatsoever, and in that capacity to hear causes tried, concurrently with the officials of the existing tribunals. In trials for minor offences of a criminal character, the commissioners were empowered to ratify the sentence when the evidence appeared to be conclusive, and the sentence pronounced by the court seemed just and unobjectionable; but should the finding of the court be unsupported by evidence, be inconsistent with law, or stand in plain opposition to natural equity, they were to withhold their assent to the judgment, which would in that case be suspended; and, in trials of a trivial nature, the commissioner would have the right either to discharge the prisoner, or to award any sentence he might consider just. In matters of great importance, the decision would be reserved for the Lord High Commissioner, who would also have a veto over all cases of gravity entailing prolonged or severe punishments. In the trial of civil cases, the assistant commissioners were to sit as assessors in all courts. A large amount of judicial power was confided to these officials, each of whom had the right of enforcing immediate justice in all cases of oppression or cruelty, without being obliged to await the ordinary formalities of legal procedure. He was moreover to keep a general watch over the whole administration of his district; to report to the Lord High Commissioner as to the character of the population, the relative proportion of Christians and Mohammedans, with the nature of their avocations and habits; and, generally, to keep his Excellency informed as to the existing administration of the district in all matters of importance. He was charged with the superintendence of sanitary arrangements. After due examination, he was to specify the town which seemed best suited for the civil and military head-quarters of his district; and he was to furnish information and opinions as to the various requirements of the occupying force. In short, the whole condition of his district—geographical, ethnographical, military, sanitary, political, social, fiscal, religious, educational, and otherwise—was to come under his view, and to be described by him in specific reports to his superior. The desire of the English Government was to obtain a minute and comprehensive knowledge of the condition of Cyprus, with a view to its improvement; and the assistant commissioners were the agents by whom this information was to be collected.

The Government of Cyprus under British rule was determined by an Order in Council, issued from Balmoral on the 17th of September, 1878, and published in the *London Gazette* of October 1st. By this Order it was determined that the affairs of the island should be administered by a High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief (the two offices being combined in one person), and by a Legislative Council, which Council would consist of the High Commissioner for the time being, and of such other public officers and persons within the island as should be designated for that purpose by her Majesty. The number of the Council was to be not less than four, nor more than eight; and it was to be lawful for the High Commissioner, with the advice of the Legislative Council, to make such laws and ordinances as might be necessary for the good government of the island, with authority reserved to her Majesty, through one of her principal Secretaries of State, to confirm or disallow the acts of the Council. The Council was divided into official members, or persons holding public offices in Cyprus, and unofficial members, that is, private inhabitants of the country. The High Commissioner was to have the power to appoint temporary members, in consequence of the absence from the island, or other disability, of the ordinary members. All questions brought before the Council were to be decided by a majority of votes, and the High Commissioner, who was the official President of the body, was to have a casting vote, if the suffrages should be equally divided. Very great powers and prerogatives were granted to the High Commissioner, who might suspend any Councillor from the exercise of his office, and in cases of emergency might make and proclaim temporary ordinances for the peace, order, and good government of the island, subject to the veto of the Queen. The same official might also make and execute grants and dispositions of land; might constitute and appoint judges, justices of the peace, and other necessary officers; might grant pardons to convicted criminals, remit fines, penalties, or

forfeitures, and in other ways exercise the usual privileges of royalty. In the discharge of his office, he was to be assisted, not merely by the Legislative Council already mentioned, but by an Executive Council, nominated by her Majesty; and the chief of these provisions were to take effect immediately after the issue of the Order in Council. The general character of the arrangements was undoubtedly despotic; but a possession such as Cyprus can hardly be administered in any other way. The Cypriotes, however, have the protection of English public opinion, and of the representative system which prevails at home. In the year 1883 the Courts of Law were thoroughly reorganised; six district courts were then formed; each was presided over by an English barrister, and had one Christian and one Mohammedan judge.

Although Cyprus still remains nominally a portion of the Turkish Empire, it is very unlikely that it will ever again return under the actual sway of the Sultan. England, therefore, has before her abundant opportunities for effecting a favourable and peaceful revolution in the condition of the Cypriotes. If those opportunities are turned to good account, the example may spread to the mainland, and in that case a regenerated Turkey is not beyond the bounds of human possibility.

As regards Cyprus itself, it must always be recollected that the people, although degraded by three centuries of unenlightened rule, have a history which in many respects places them on a dignified footing among the nations of the East. Both in ancient and in modern times, in the days of the Greeks and in those of the Lusignans, the Cypriotes enjoyed a measure of self-government, and distinguished themselves in the annals of the world. Herr von Löher, it is true, describes the bulk of the population as devoid of energy, sluggish in temperament, and obstinately addicted to ancient customs; but Mr. Hamilton Lang, who has known the islanders much longer, gives them a better character, and it must not be forgotten that they have had to pass through a heavy period of suffering and depression, and that many of their moral qualities are exceedingly good. Elementary schools exist in all the larger villages, and others of a better class have been established in the principal towns. The natives, therefore, are presumably capable of being raised several degrees in the scale of intellectual beings, and much may be done in this respect by a due consideration of Cyprian wants. Another favourable circumstance is to be discovered in the fact that the Turkish system of laws, though often corruptly administered for personal profit, are excellent in themselves. Mr. Lang states that the commercial law adopted by the Porte is based upon the Code Napoleon, and is an admirable condensation of it. A very good compendium of criminal law has also been made, and is published both in the Turkish and Greek tongues. "The British public," observes Mr. Lang, "will be astonished to find that Turkey possesses such systems of law. It is not the want of proper laws which causes justice to fail in Turkey; it is their vicious application, and the complete ignorance of their letter, as well as their spirit, on the part of those who have to administer them. Few of the judges have ever received an education suitable for the proper discharge of their duties, and as few have inclination to study the new principles and ordinances of justice which have been decreed at Constantinople." According to the same authority, the constitution of the Chambers of Commerce in Turkey is admirable; but here again the unbusiness-like qualities of the Turkish members neutralize the excellence of the system.

The want of harbours in Cyprus is a defect which in the opinion of Mr. Lang has been greatly exaggerated, though he does not deny that it has an actual existence. In all the roadsteads on the southern coast, he affirms, ships have the very best holding-ground, and with proper care may ride out any storm without the least danger. The sea-room on the northern shore is more restricted; but in this direction harbours would be less required than on the south. Even on the southern coast, the roadsteads have some disadvantages; but during the nine years of Mr. Lang's residence in Cyprus, no casualty ever occurred to a European vessel at anchor, nor was any such vessel obliged to put out to sea for safety. Mr. Lang considers that no difficulty will be experienced in enlarging the Venetian harbour of Famagosta, where the great maritime Republic was able to maintain a small fleet of ships; though of course it must be recollected that those ships were of inferior size to what are now built. As a military depôt, much may be made out of the same city. The place is surrounded by a ditch, and enclosed within walls which are said by some authorities to be in good repair. Mr. Hepworth Dixon, in the lecture on Cyprus referred to in a previous Chapter, observed that at Famagosta (the sea-capital of the island) Nature had built for us a fort and place of arms. A reef of rock, which might easily be converted into a solid wall, runs parallel with the shore for between one and two miles; and on the bluff above is the place of arms. "Entering by the sea-gate into the main

street of Famagosta," said Mr. Dixon, "there lies on the left hand an ancient lion, vast in bulk and rude in art—the genius of the city and the island, which has outlived twenty dynasties. This lion of Cyprus fittingly presides over a heap of stones. Stones great and small, dressed and rough, native and foreign, blister and break in the hot sun, and, dropping slowly to the earth, bury the city in fresh heaps of sand. Church, palace, barrack, law-court, and private house, have fed the wreck. Churches and palaces have left large quantities of stone—squared, dressed, and pointed to the builder's hand. Here lies our quarry, and here our place of arms." It is now too late to discuss the principle of the British annexation. In some respects it may be objectionable; in others, it is worthy of commendation, when taken in connection with the whole course of events during the last few years. But, whatever may be said on abstract grounds, Cyprus is in English hands; and even the most ordinary exercise of prudence, energy, and skill, may be productive of results which shall make it impossible for any but fanatics to object to the policy which attached it to our rule.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

**The Austrian Occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—State of Feeling in those Provinces—The Bosnian Mohammedans—Fanatical Opposition to Reforms—Insurrections of the Begs against the Sultan—Historical Retrospect—Claims of Turkey in respect of the Austrian Occupation—Proclamation of the Emperor of Austria to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian People—Order of General Philippovich to his Army—Crossing of the Save by the Austrians—Issue of a Manifesto, calling on the Mohammedans to resist—Fighting at Mostar, the Capital of Herzegovina—Energetic Opposition in Bosnia—Disaster to Austrian Cavalry in the Neighbourhood of Maglai—Subsequent Expedition against the Town, and Defeat of the Insurgents—Fanaticism of Hadji Loja—Great Battle in the Valley of the Bosna—Violent Storms—Taking of Zepce by the Austrians—Excitement of the Mohammedans—Renewed Fighting—Retreat of General Szapary—Successes of the Duke of Wurtemberg—Capture of Serajevo, after a fierce Resistance—Further Retreat of General Szapary—Acts of Retribution—Formation of a Government at Serajevo—Continued Opposition—Further Advance of the Austrians—Collapse of the Popular Movement Question as to the Complicity of the Porte—Austria's Prize of Blood.**

VERY different from the welcome of the English in Cyprus was the reception given to the Austrians in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Cypriotes were pleased to see the representatives of British authority landing on their island, and anticipated substantial benefits from a more enlightened and vigorous rule. The Bosnians and Herzegovinians, on the other hand, did not desire the presence of the stranger; or, if any of them did, it was certainly not the most influential part of the population. Austria should have known this before entering on so difficult and dangerous a task; but she reckoned on the insubordination to the Porte which had been more or less manifest during the previous three years. It was in the Herzegovina that the disturbances had arisen, out of which the war between Russia and Turkey was ultimately developed. This was in July, 1875; and in July, 1878, that province and Bosnia were still agitated by insurrectionary movements. Lord Beaconsfield, at the eighth sitting of the Congress, alluded to the fact as forming the justification of the proposed measure; and Austria, in her desire for territory, too readily assumed that because the Christians were disaffected to the Turkish rule, therefore the whole population was ready to embrace the dominion of the Hapsburgs. The truth is, that even the Christians were not very desirous of Austrian government, while the Mohammedan landowners, forming the ruling class, and constituting a large military body, were fiercely opposed to the advent of intruders who might be likely to reduce their privileges. These men were devoted adherents of the Porte, as against any Christian Power; fanatical on the score of religion; courageous and able soldiers, and determined to resist to the utmost any infringement of what they considered their rights. Bosnia, in particular, was a perfect hornets' nest of armed and desperate men; and into that nest Austria rashly thrust herself in the summer of 1878.

The Mohammedan lords of the soil have defied the Sultan himself when they apprehended danger to their powers, and have then proved extremely formidable adversaries. Except in a political sense, they are not Turks at all. They are Bosnians, the descendants of those nobles and others who, after the final subjection of Bosnia in the second half of the fifteenth century, became Moslems in the hope of ingratiating themselves with their conquerors. The Turks had announced that all who would acknowledge the Prophet should be allowed to retain their lands and other property; and so



CROSSING THE BOSNA AT MAGLAI.

great was this attraction that a son of the King of Bosnia, together with other persons of distinction, immediately adopted the successful religion. Many of the commonalty, also, abjured Christianity, and in this way a large warrior caste was formed, pledged by every interest to support the cause of the Sultans, but requiring, as the indispensable condition of allegiance, the maintenance of their privileges. It is whispered that some of the renegade families still preserve several of their old Christian observances, and are ready to resume the faith of their ancestors on the first opportunity. But these are probably few in number, and cannot be supposed to exercise any great influence on the general posture of affairs. The Begs, Capitans, or Spahis, as the Bosnian lords are called, perpetuate in many respects the manners of the feudal barons from whom they are chiefly descended. They live in castles of the middle ages; they bear their chivalrous escutcheons, won from Christian kings in fighting the battles of the Christian faith; they still display their rolls and patents of nobility, derived from the old order which the victorious Ottomans displaced; they preserve their family names, and lead forth their retainers under the ancestral banners.* Of the Turkish language they know nothing, nor can they repeat a sentence from the Koran: their speech is pure Sclavonic, and they call the Sultan "the Great Czar of Constantinople." Yet, with all their inheritance of European mediævalism, the Mohammedan faith has struck deep root among these Bosnian landholders. In their wild mountains and secluded valleys, away from the great currents of the world, they have kept the fanatical intensity of their belief unaffected by the moderating influences which are never absent from the seats of government and trade. For many ages they tyrannised over the unhappy Rayahs, and nothing shook their loyalty to Constantinople except the fear that Christians were to be placed on the same footing as themselves, and that their special advantages were to be taken away by the innovations of a reforming zeal.

The condition of Bosnia attracted the attention of Sultan Mahmud II., and he resolved to amend the evils from which the mass of the people suffered. He took steps to extirpate the feudal system, which survived as an instrument of oppression, and to protect the Christians from the cruelty of the Molsems. The latter, alarmed and exasperated at the threatened loss of their predominance, rose in arms, and were with some difficulty reduced to submission, in the early years of the present century. The Sultan then proceeded with his plans for breaking down the system of military caste; but his success was not great. The Begs were highly incensed at the projects of Mahmud for giving equal rights to the Christians, and openly reviled him as a Ghiaour, or infidel. Towards the close of 1838, Vedjihi Pasha, a man of energy and resolution, was sent to Bosnia, and the military chieftains, whose offices had become hereditary, were made to give place to civil servants appointed by the Ministry at Constantinople. Mahmud died in the summer of 1839, and his son and successor, Abdul-Medjid, lost no time in issuing the celebrated Tanzimat, by which the constitution of the Ottoman Empire was reformed in a liberal sense. Civil war again broke out, and the Turkish Vizier was reduced to extremities. Nevertheless, he managed to bring together all the regular troops in the province: with these, amounting to only 4,000, he attacked the rebels, 20,000 strong, near Vitesz, and, after a fierce engagement, defeated them with heavy loss. Those who escaped from the field shut themselves up in Bosna-Seraï, or Serajevo, the old capital of the province; but the Vizier established a close blockade, and compelled the town to surrender.

Although the insurrection was crushed, and the rebels were severely punished, the feudal privileges of the Begs were not abrogated, so extreme was the dread inspired by these fanatical chieftains, even at the time of their subjection. When the attempt at reform was renewed in 1848, under the direction of the Governor-General, Tahir Pasha, another desperate rebellion broke out. A vigorous effort to enforce the Tanzimat was made by this officer; but the difficulties in his path were greater than he could overcome, and, after a defeat at Bihac, he died of cholera, intensified by vexation. For a time, the Begs were triumphant; but in 1850 one of the best officers in the Sultan's army was sent against them. Omar Pasha led a considerable force into the province, and, after gaining two battles at Vranduk, on the Bosna, inflicted a most disastrous defeat on the insurgents assembled in an entrenched position on the hill of Vutshiak, near Derbent. The Bosnian force on this occasion consisted of 15,000 men, led by the principal chieftains; and when the position was carried, the cause of the rebels seemed utterly lost in that part of the province. Elsewhere, however, the struggle was maintained with great determination, and several actions of importance were fought by Omar and Dervish Pashas. At length, towards the end of 1851, the rebellion was put down; but the military chieftains had always declared that they would not accept the Tanzimat,

* Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina during the Insurrection, August and September, 1875. By Arthur J. Evans, B.A., F.S.A. 1876.

and they continued, up to the time of the Austrian occupation, to enjoy many of their old privileges. The insurrection of 1875 and the following years was an attempt on the part of the Christians to shake off the yoke, not so much of Constantinople as of the dominant Begs; but the province was for the most part inclined to support the Imperial Government in the war with Russia. As regarded Austria, there was nothing to show that her interposition would be welcomed.

Previous to the entry of the Austrian troops, in the summer of 1878, Karatheodori Pasha, the chief representative of Turkey at the Congress of Berlin, raised some difficulties, on the ground that certain Turkish demands, with reference to the Sultan's rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, the length of the occupation, and the territory to be occupied, ought to be satisfied before any other steps were taken. These claims, however, were not recognised, and on the 28th of July a proclamation to the inhabitants of the provinces in question was issued by the Austrian Government. It informed them that the troops of the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary were about to cross the borders of their country, not as enemies, but in order that they might put an end to evils which for a long series of years had disquieted Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also the bordering territories of Austro-Hungary. Grave events had made it impossible for the Turkish Government to restore the peace and harmony on which the welfare of a people depends. "The Emperor and King," said the proclamation, "could no longer look on, and see violence and discontent reigning in the vicinity of his provinces, distrust and misery knocking at the frontiers of his states. In the counsels of the peoples, it was unanimously resolved that Austro-Hungary should restore the peace and welfare so long missed." It was then promised that the revenues of the land should be applied exclusively to the needs of the country; that the arrears of taxes should not be levied; and that the troops of the Emperor and King should not oppress nor molest the land, but should pay with money for all things which they had from the people. "The Emperor and King," it was added, "knows your troubles, and wishes your good. Under his powerful sceptre, many peoples dwell together, each one speaking his own tongue. He rules over the votaries of many religions, and each one is free to profess his own faith." At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief, General Baron Philippovitch, issued an order to his army-corps, in which he told his soldiers to expect "wearisome marches, sorry accommodation, privations, and fatigues of all kinds." He was not, he said, "going to lead them on a triumphal march, but to hard work, undertaken in the service of humanity and civilisation." Ere long, his words were realised more completely than perhaps he himself anticipated; but just at first there was no appearance of opposition. On Monday, the 29th of July, a division of the Austrian army, under the Archduke John Salvator of Tuscany, crossed the Save at Brod, and were soon in Bosnian territory. The passage of the river by the troops was effected in three hours, and the Archduke John immediately sent a telegram to the Emperor, announcing that he had been the first to touch Bosnian soil, where he had planted the Austrian flag. General Philippovitch crossed about the same time, and was met by some Turkish functionaries, who wished to present a protest. The General, however, declined to receive it, and the troops continued their advance.

It soon became apparent that popular feeling was not in favour of the Austrians, and that many of the Bosnians were fiercely opposed to the presence of the Emperor's troops. At Serajevo, one Hadji Loja issued a manifesto, calling upon the Mohammedans to rise a hundred thousand strong against the intruders. Mostar, the capital of the Herzegovina, was also the scene of a popular revolt, when the Kaimakan and Mufti were assassinated, and a Ulema was appointed Governor. The military chiefs occupied the defiles in front of the town, and attacked the Austrians at the distance of a day's march. The battle began on the morning of Sunday, the 4th of August, and continued until the evening. Being planted in a good position, the insurgents lost but few of their number, while the Austrians suffered considerably. Fighting was resumed on the following day, but the Austrians at length succeeded in reaching Mostar, which they entered in triumph. Notwithstanding the assassination of the local officers by a portion of the populace, the inhabitants of Mostar were not on the whole inclined to support the movement, and a large number of the Turkish garrison refused to take part in it. The insurgents were openly in league with the Montenegrins, and this very naturally disgusted all true Mohammedans. Resistance, therefore, was speedily at an end.

The chief opposition was in Bosnia. At Maglai, a town situated in a narrow defile on the right bank of the Bosna, the Austrian troops were met by a serious and prolonged defiance. On the 1st of August, Captain Milinkovitch, Chief of the Staff attached to the main column of the army of occupation, and Austrian Vice-consul at Serajevo, proceeded from Derbent with a squadron of Hussars

to reconnoitre the valley of the Bosna, and was apparently received with tokens of rejoicing. Such, at least, was to be inferred from his reports; but he is said to have had a strong conviction that the people were eager for Austrian rule, and this may have coloured his impressions. The captain passed the night of the 2nd at Maglai, and, hearing that an insurrection had been organised at Zepce, went there on the following day (the 3rd), but was received with a volley of musketry at the entrance to the town. It was so obviously impossible to force a way through, that Milinkovitch retreated towards Maglai, but, on nearing that place, found that the friendly reception of a few days earlier had changed into hostility. On their road from Zepce to Maglai, the Hussars had to pass through a narrow defile, where they were attacked on both sides, and likewise in the rear, by a large Mohammedan force, holding more than a dozen fortified positions. "There was no bye-road," said an account in the *Wiener Abendpost*, "except up steep hills. It was terrible to see the horsemen, when in the narrow lane, shot down, and, falling from dying horses, blocking the road against those who were following. Into this confused mass of men and horses, a cross-fire was poured from all sides." The fusillade was concentrated and continuous; half the battalion fell; and the survivors, struggling through the pass at the imminent hazard of their lives, with difficulty got beyond the range of fire. Even when they had at length cleared the defile, and entered Maglai, the troopers were fired on from the windows of every Moslem house. They could take with them only three of their wounded, and there was too much reason to fear that the others would be mutilated. Galled on both flanks by enemies who were often invisible, the Hussars did not check their flight until they had reached the Austrian camp on the banks of the Bosna. Several of their number had been killed; but others, who were for a time missing, reappeared in the course of a day or two. All the villages through which they had passed in their retreat showed the utmost animosity; and even the peasants in the fields fired on their broken and scattered ranks. The Austrians generally were much disconcerted at this disaster; but it was speedily resolved to inflict a severe chastisement on the malcontents. On the 5th of August, therefore, the main army advanced towards the scene of



UHLANS ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS.

the calamity: on this occasion, the infantry, instead of the cavalry, were placed at the head of the column. Nearly all the houses along the route were deserted, and no opposition was experienced until the troops were approaching Kosna, when, at a sharp curve in the road around a point of rock, a galling fire was opened on the Austrians. The infantry, however, charged with great spirit, and, taking the enemy on both flanks, forced him back in every direction. This success was not achieved without some loss; but the Bosnians were in flight, and Maglai was occupied shortly afterwards. Had a sufficient number of men been sent on the first expedition, the calamity of the 3rd of August would in all probability have been avoided.

It was very generally believed that the Porte encouraged the agitation against the Austrians, and emissaries of the Sheikh-ul-Islam were said to be traversing Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the hope of rousing the popular passions against the Christian strangers. However this may have been, some of the recognised leaders of the Mohammedans were certainly filled with a spirit of the wildest zeal. Hadji Loja, in particular, appears to have been almost a madman in the fury of his religious exaltation. Being the tallest man in Bosnia, he presented a remarkable figure, which was rendered still more singular by his tattered and fantastic attire. Both in summer and winter, this fanatical Mohammedan went barefooted, and during the Ramazan period stripped himself nearly naked. Disdaining all regular industry, he found support in begging alms, and was in the habit of feeding a number of dogs around the mosques which he frequented. When excited by the trances into which he occasionally fell, he would slay any Christian who came in his way; but, as these were considered acts of holy inspiration, he was never punished for what he had done. The presence of such a person among so bigoted a race as the Mohammedan Bosnians was certain to produce a disastrous effect; and the Austrian troops suffered bitterly from the species of enthusiasm which Hadji Loja kindled.

The commander of the second expedition against Maglai ordered his men to rest on the following day (the 6th). The town had by that time been deserted by all its inhabitants, excepting a few Christian families, and it was found impossible to inflict any chastisement on the place, without injuring the very persons whom Austria had interposed to protect. The troops again advanced on the 7th, and on the 8th a considerable battle was fought in the vicinity of Maglai. The contest took place at a point where the road crosses a bend in the river Bosna, and then follows a wild and mountainous country, which was occupied by a strong force of the enemy, numbering from five to six thousand. It is said that this force included a large number of Turkish regulars, with several officers in full uniform. They had with them numerous pieces of artillery and some cavalry, and the action began with a well-directed fire upon the Austrian head-quarters, which placed General Philippovitch himself in no little danger. An infantry charge, however, compelled the Turks to fall back, and by this time two flanking columns had been put in motion by the Austrians. One of these was on the left of the valley of the Bosna; the second skirted a ridge of hills overlooking the pass. Another engagement took place in the afternoon, when a detachment of Turkish regulars was cut off, and captured. The prisoners were escorted back to Maglai, and, upon questions being put to them, explained that they had been compelled to fight by the insurrectionary Government of Serajevo. The chief command on the side of the Bosnians was taken by Hadji Loja, who appears to have succeeded in inspiring the Moslem warriors with his own fervid and unflinching spirit, for they fought with the utmost fury and resolution. Nevertheless, the Austrians were more than a match for them, and, at the third attack, which was on the heights above Zepce, the Bosnians were driven round the base of the mountain into the river, over which they swam, and dispersed themselves through the surrounding country.

The difficulties of the Austrians were greatly increased by the nature of the land and the fury of the elements. Heavy rains, with violent thunderstorms, were of frequent occurrence; and, in the intervals of these tempests, the heat was so oppressive that several of the men died of sunstroke. The mountainous country rendered marching extremely laborious. For forty miles south of Maglai, the road traversed a narrow pass, flanked by old castles, in which were several mountain-guns ready for service; and the opposition of the inhabitants intensified every evil in the highest degree. Relying on these aids to their cause, the Moslems fought their best; but, after they had been driven out of their chief positions on the 8th, Zepce was occupied by the Austrians, who found that the Mohammedan population had fled. The recent encounter had had all the characteristics of a regular battle. The Bosnians were excited by the rage of fanaticism, and are said to have lost five hundred in killed and wounded. During eight hours, both armies were actively engaged, and the struggle lasted until dusk. The several positions were not yielded without

a deadly conflict at each, and a blockhouse at the head of the pass was taken from the Bosnians by assault. It was found necessary to reinforce the Austrians in Bosnia with the utmost despatch, for it was now evident that the occupying forces had a people in arms against them. The Porte forwarded instructions to its military representatives in Bosnia, ordering them to receive the Austro-Hungarian troops as friends; but a great many disregarded these injunctions, and the number of the insurgents perpetually increased. Even several of the Christians joined the patriotic force. Mohammedan Arnauts and Albanians swelled the ranks; and it was asserted by friends of the movement that the heterogeneous army exceeded 100,000 men. This was probably an exaggeration; but in any case the force was considerable, and it was well provided with arms and ammunition. The Mohammedan clergy went about the country preaching a holy war; the people responded with the double enthusiasm of patriotic and religious fervour; and the Austrians found every step in their progress savagely disputed, and every day presenting more formidable obstructions than the last.

On the 8th of August, the Seventh Division of the Austrian army encountered a body of five thousand men at about an hour's march from the north-west of Jaice. The force consisted of three battalions of regulars, and a large number of insurgents. Nine hours' fighting ensued; but ultimately the Bosnians were defeated, and put to flight. The greater number of the patriotic forces were now concentrated at Serajevo, and it was plain that a very desperate resistance was being organised in that city. Not less were the difficulties presented in other quarters. The Twentieth Division of the Austrian army of occupation was



GENERAL PHILIPPOVITCH QUESTIONING INSURGENTS.

THE AUSTRIAN CAPTURE OF SERAJEVO: THE 46TH INFANTRY STORMING THE SALUTING OR YELLOW BATTERY.

encountered on its road to Zwornik by several bodies of insurgents, and had to fight for its very existence near Gracanica on the 4th, on the 8th near Hanpirkovac, and on the 9th and 10th in front of Tuzla. The opposition was in fact so obstinate that, after a severe defeat on the last of those occasions, General Szapary, who was in command of the division, was obliged to fall back towards the frontier, to secure his communications. The Austrian official accounts stated that this was entirely owing to the difficulties experienced in obtaining supplies, all the draught animals being exhausted with fatigue; but there can be little doubt that the action of the insurgents had much to do with the General's inability to proceed. The retrograde movement was not performed without considerable suffering. The unfortunate troops were worn out with fatigue, and their rear was constantly harassed by bands of the insurgents. Owing to the want of baggage-animals, the men were in several instances obliged to drag or push the waggons over very bad roads; but the entire force was safely brought back to Doboi, on the western bank of the Bosna. The division under the Duke of Wurtemberg was more fortunate. It succeeded in forcing the insurgent positions between Travnik and Serajevo, after three days' hard fighting; upon which the Duke occupied the former of those towns without any further resistance. Yet the Bosnians continued to gather thickly in the Austrian front and rear as fast as they were dispersed. Communication with the Thirteenth Division was interrupted, and the general situation of the Austrian army towards the middle of August wore a very menacing aspect. The Emperor was both surprised and distressed at the resistance offered to his troops. He had been under the impression that the soldiers would be received with enthusiasm by the Bosnian populace, and he was overwhelmed with astonishment when he found his Government obliged to take measures as against a hostile population. The truth is, that he had believed what he desired to believe; and the awakening was of that rough and painful kind which is the usual termination of such misleading dreams.

The opposition of the Bosnians was not easily exhausted. On the 16th of August, the Twentieth Austrian Division was attacked near Doboi by a considerable force of insurgents; and, although the assailants were ultimately driven back, it was not without serious loss to the other side. The fortified position of the Bosnians near Han-Belalovac was attacked on the same day, when the Austrians obtained a complete victory, but at a cost which rendered success itself disastrous. The main body of the occupying force arrived before Serajevo (otherwise Bosna-Seraï) on the 18th of August; but the country all about swarmed with armed men. Serajevo was not occupied without a fierce struggle. It was attacked by the Thirteenth Army Corps at half-past six o'clock on the morning of the 19th, and at half-past ten the principal position outside the city was taken at the point of the bayonet. The infantry then marched into the town itself; but from every roof, from every window, and from every door, a murderous fire blazed forth upon the attacking regiments. Even the sick and wounded in the military hospital took an active part in the engagement, and it was half-past one before the town submitted. By the latter end of August, the army of General Philippovitch had been raised to a strength of between 125,000 and 130,000 men, for it was obvious that no smaller force would overcome the popular resistance. The Austrians were again attacked at Doboi on the 23rd of August, and the position of Count Szapary in that locality became so threatening that he considered it prudent to withdraw his troops to the opposite bank of the Bosna, and to blow up the bridges. By the 16th of August, the Austrian losses in Bosnia and the Herzegovina amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing, to a total of 976 men. This would not have been much, had the Austrians gone avowedly as conquerors; but their nominal intention was that of friends. In a country which they had been led to suppose was burning with desire to receive them, they were encountered by an opposition so fierce that, in little more than a fortnight, nearly a thousand men had been removed from their effective force, and it was imperative to order up fresh regiments with the utmost haste. The Austrian Government, however, had the support of its people, for the national pride was awakened by the defiance with which they had been met, and the necessity of avenging the defeats they had suffered. Even the Hungarians, who had previously taken the side of the Turks, were eager in their demands that the war (for such it had really become) should be prosecuted with vigour. The men killed at Maglai were Hungarians, and the agitation throughout the kingdom was painfully acute.

Severe measures were taken by General Philippovitch to punish the barbarities of the Mohammedans. A proclamation was issued shortly after the Maglai affair, threatening with death all Bosnians found with weapons in their hands; and large numbers of persons were arrested, and brought to trial. Bodies of Austrian Chasseurs were sent

about the country, searching for persons who were thought likely to have been concerned in the attack on the Hussars. Convoys of men, women, and even children, were brought into head-quarters; a rude form of court-martial was immediately held; and it is to be feared that several poor wretches were convicted on insufficient evidence. A good many were summarily shot, and their dead bodies thrown into the stream which supplies Maglai with water. Large numbers of the Mohammedan population took to flight about the period of these retributive acts, and the fugitives doubtless joined the insurgent bands at the first opportunity. After the capture of Serajevo, Hadji Jamarkovic, one of the ringleaders of the malcontents, was taken, and condemned to death. As he was being led to



AUSTRIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH.

the gallows, he seized the rifle of one of his escort, and fired it among the spectators. A similar spirit of savage fanaticism was observable in most of the Mohammedan chieftains, and the troubles of the Austrians were far from diminishing as they advanced into the country. An order for the disarmament of the inhabitants of Serajevo was issued by General Philippovitch, and an Austrian official bulletin, dated August 27th, stated that more than six thousand rifles had at that time been collected.

Among the prisoners secured at Serajevo were a large number of Turkish soldiers, consisting of Nizams and Redifs, of whom two bodies, to the number of fifty-five officers and eight hundred and thirty soldiers, were escorted to Austrian Brod. Under the direction of General Philippovitch, a Communal Council was formed, composed of eighteen respectable citizens, in the proportion of five Mohammedans, three Catholics, six of the Orthodox faith, and four Jews. From this body, Fazli Pasha, the former Civil Governor, was appointed Mayor. He was a man of unimpeachable reputation, and, being held in great respect by the people of the town, was well qualified to restore order under existing circumstances. The task he had undertaken was most onerous, for Serajevo was in a state of fierce excitement, and acts of violence and fanaticism were of daily occurrence. Early in September, thirty persons were seized and imprisoned for having met in the mosque, and sworn to fire the town simultaneously at several points. The Mollahs and Ulemas incessantly harangued the people in favour of a holy war, and the roads were infested with bands of armed men, whose presence was dangerous to the peacefully disposed. Some of the insurgents had fortified themselves on the banks of the river Save, and every Austrian steamer was fired upon, even when convoyed by a monitor. By this time, the foreign army in Bosnia and the Herzegovina numbered 208,000 men, with 36,000 horses, and 480 guns. Yet, with all this immense array of force, the intruders were far from having obtained a complete grasp over the country. The town of Bihac, on the Unna, was besieged by General Zach; but the place was defended by Turkish regulars, who had constructed strongly fortified entrenchments outside the walls on a hill commanding the plain. The commandant declared —whether truly or falsely may be a matter of some doubt—that he had been instructed by the Ottoman General, Hafiz Pasha, to defend the town to the last extremity, and the Austrians speedily found that they had sent a very insufficient force against a strong position. General Zach sustained a defeat while endeavouring to subdue the place; yet the siege was not abandoned, and on the 19th of September Bihac was taken by assault.

In other directions, the Austrian cause began to prosper. General Szapary re-entered Doboi about the close of August, and on the 30th of that month fought a prolonged artillery engagement with the forces of the Bosnians, when he succeeded in silencing four out of five of the enemy's guns. On the 4th of September, the same officer totally overcame the insurrectionary movement in that quarter, and was enabled to drive his adversaries over the frontier of Bosnia. The insurgents fled in extreme disorder, and the roads were once more in the hands of the Imperial troops. The fortress at Trebinje was occupied without resistance on the morning of the 7th, and further successes were obtained by the Thirty-sixth Austrian Division, on the 8th, in the vicinity of Kliuc, where the country was entirely cleared of insurgent bands. Still, a good deal of isolated resistance was encountered at various points; but in the latter part of September the strongly fortified town of Bielina, together with Tuzla and some other places, fell without a struggle before the Imperial troops. The pacification of the Herzegovina was now complete, and that of Bosnia itself was making considerable progress. Councils were held in Vienna for the formation of laws for the future government of both provinces, and large numbers of the native population, including several Mohammedans, flocked from all sides to Serajevo and other towns, to place themselves under Austrian protection. The Porte at the same time issued a circular to its representatives abroad, repudiating all responsibility for the events which had occurred in Bosnia, and maintaining that that responsibility rested entirely with the Austrian Government. To what extent the Porte was mixed up with the popular movement in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, is a matter not easily to be determined; but that Turkey sympathised with those movements is beyond a question, and it is difficult to believe that no sort of encouragement, even the most indirect, was given to the patriotic revolt. The Turkish Government could not but regard the occupation of its north-western provinces as an act of spoliation, and it would have been almost beyond human nature if some covert assistance had not been given to the Mohammedan population in their desperate endeavours to withstand a foreign and a Christian invasion. The active vehemence of resistance had ceased by the early autumn, but a large amount of popular discontent remained as the legacy which Austria

had inherited. The pretext for her occupation was the inability of Turkey to maintain peace in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Events had proved that she could do but little better herself. The Bosnians, in particular, have a strong sense of what may be called provincial nationality. Often in a state of antagonism to the Government at Constantinople, they were equally disinclined to the Government at Vienna. The Christians themselves did not care to be ruled from that quarter, while the Mohammedans hated the strangers in religion with all the rage of fanaticism. Yet this doubtful possession was what Austria had schemed, and plotted, and equivocated to obtain. The prize was now in her hands, and it turned to blood and ashes in the very moment of its seizure.

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## CHAPTER XXVII.

**Disturbed Condition of Turkey—Prolonged Struggle in the Rhodope Mountains—Report by Mr. Consul-General Fawcett on Bulgarian and Russian Atrocities—Appointment of an International Commission of Inquiry—Continued Outrages—Opposition of the Russians to a full Investigation—Duties of the Commission—Distress among the Refugees—Plan of Operations arranged by the Commissioners—Petko, the Brigand—Endeavours of the Russian Commissioners to stop the Inquiry—Early Stages of the Proceedings—Condition of the afflicted Districts—Flight of the Mohammedan Population before the Russians—Horrible Persecutions—Visits of the Commissioners to several Places—Traces of Pillage and Slaughter—Pitiable State of the Fugitives—Fear of the Russians, and its Causes—Assistance urgently needed—Arduous Work of the Commissioners—The Report—Opposition of Russia and Germany—Withdrawal of Colonel Raab—Explanations of the Conduct of the Austrian and Italian Commissioners—Publication by the English Government of the Report and Evidence—Adverse Criticisms of Russia's English Friends—Imputations against Mr. Fawcett—Nature and Value of the Charges against Russia—Disingenuous and one-sided Arguments—The alleged Cruelties—Affair of Hermanli—Discreditable Excuses—Burning of Villages—Conduct of the Bulgarians—Letter of Lord Shaftesbury—Refusal of Russia to join in any Proceedings based on the Report—The Refugees left without Relief—Vacillating Conduct of the English Government with respect to a Grant in Aid.**

WHILE the events just related were proceeding in Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Turkey continued to be much disturbed in other parts of her dominion. Some fear of renewed collisions between the Ottoman and Russian troops was still felt; for the army of occupation remained close to Constantinople, and the Turks delayed the evacuation of those fortresses which they had undertaken to give up. The European Powers, and Germany in particular, remonstrated with the Porte on this line of conduct; but the summer passed into autumn without any more satisfactory conditions being established. The general complication was increased by the state of affairs in the Rhodope Mountains. Despite all the efforts of the Russians to suppress the Mohammedan rising in that wild district, peace was not restored. There can be no question that the Moslems were being treated with savage brutality by the Bulgarians, and that the Russians, to say the least, took no steps to check the vengeful fanaticism of the Christian peasantry. In July, Mr. Consul-General Fawcett addressed a report to the English Government, embodying the results of inquiries which he and other consuls had made in the localities affected. A series of atrocities, seldom, if ever, surpassed in the annals of human crime, showed (unless the alleged facts could be upset) that the pretence of humanity with which the late war had been commenced was simply a pretence, and nothing more. Not only Mohammedans, but Greeks, Catholics, Jews—all, in fact, who did not belong to the so-called Orthodox Bulgarian faith—were subjected to the most wanton insults and ill-usage. Murder, torture, and violation were committed with impunity; the Bulgarian policemen were described by Mr. F. J. Calvert as a set of thieves and ruffians; and the Russians were said to encourage the native peasantry in their most horrible enormities.* The report of any one man and his subordinates, however, might have been fairly open to suspicion, as being liable to personal bias; and the English Government, acting in accordance with a proposal made at the eighteenth sitting of the Congress (July 11th), joined with the other Powers in sending an International Commission into the Rhodope district.

Even at the very time that the inquiry was commencing, the atrocities continued. The English, French, Italian, and Austrian Commissioners intimated to their respective Ambassadors that they intended proceeding to a certain locality to prevent the commission of outrages contemplated by the Russians outside their own lines. The German Commissioner, true to the policy of his Government

* Full details will be found in Parliamentary Paper, Turkey, No. 42 (1878).

in always upholding Russia, had the bad taste to declare that his colleagues were seeking for Muscovite wrong-doings, instead of examining into the best means of pacifying the district, and arranging for the return of the refugees, as was ordered by the Congress. The Russians themselves exhibited the most extreme distaste to the inquiry—a distaste which can hardly be explained, except on the supposition that they dreaded the revelations which in all probability would be made. At the very first meeting of the Ambassadors, for considering the steps to be taken for organizing the Commission—a meeting held at the British Embassy at Therapia on the 15th of July—Prince Labanoff, the representative of Russia, objected to the inquiries of the Commissioners being extended to territory occupied by the Russian troops, and proposed that, if they commenced in Mount Rhodope, they should end at the Russian lines. As, however, the greater number of the villages that had been destroyed, and whose inhabitants had been massacred or expelled, were within the Russian lines, it was pointed out to his Excellency that the inquiry would lead to no practical results, if his suggestions were adopted.* The proposal was accordingly overruled; but the disinclination of Russia to hold anything like a fair inquiry was not to be overcome, and it will be seen that her Commissioner retired from the body at an early period.

It was finally agreed that the members of the International Commission should go first to Philippopolis, and, after commencing their inquiries in that town, should pass through the country between it and Mount Rhodope, whence the Mohammedan population had been driven, and where they appeared to have suffered most. The members of the body consisted of Colonel Raab, Military Attaché to the Austrian Embassy; Mr. Fawcett, Consul-General of England, and Judge of her Britannic Majesty's Consular Court; M. Challet, Consul of France; M. Basily, Second Secretary to the Russian Embassy; Signor Graziani, second dragoman to the Italian Legation; and Herr Müller, Vice-consul to the Emperor of Germany. Turkish representatives were afterwards added. The persons so appointed were to inquire into the condition of the emigrant population in the Rhodope Mountains and the surrounding country; into their sufferings; and into the motives which had compelled them to leave their several localities, and which still prevented their return. Measures of immediate relief were to be considered. The Commissioners were to consult, if necessary, with the Russian authorities, in order to concert the steps to be taken for effecting the repatriation of the refugees, and for obtaining means of affording them assistance; and it was added that the Russian and Turkish military authorities would assist the Commissioners in the discharge of their duties. The rendering of assistance to the emigrant population was indeed imperatively necessary. It was at that time estimated that the number of refugees in the Rhodope district was 50,000. In the town of Gumuldjina alone (according to a newspaper correspondent), more than six thousand deaths were believed to have taken place within the previous ten months. Many of the refugees had no shelter, and were dying in the open air. In every house there was sickness, and every steamer that arrived at Lagos brought at least two hundred additional wretches, to swell the total of misery, want, and disease.

The several members of the International Commission assembled on the 21st of July at Philippopolis, where they had an interview with Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, the Imperial Russian Commissioner in Bulgaria (so-called). From statements made by Mr. Fawcett, it appeared that the district of Gumuldjina was the scene of the greatest distress: the Commissioners therefore decided to go there at once. The direct road being unsafe in some parts, they proceeded by way of Adrianople, Dédéagatch, and Lagos. At the second of those towns, they were informed by three consuls that a certain notorious brigand, named Petko, was staying there, and that he openly wore the Russian uniform. A correspondent of the *Daily News* has related that the depredations of this man had been committed with impunity for some years; and he and his band were then especially active. He was at the head of two or three hundred Bulgarians, and another chieftain, named Argéle, with whom he had formerly acted, but was now at enmity, commanded a number of Greeks, equally lawless and ferocious. The correspondent had an interview with Petko at the house of Count Steinbock, the Russian commander at Dédéagatch, and found him a most forbidding ruffian, with a complexion of "a greenish-yellow hue, something midway between the colour of an underdone pancake and a half-ripened lemon." His features were of a Mongolian caste, with a flattened nose; and he either could not or would not look any one in the face. Yet this miscreant was evidently one of the chosen agents of Russia for carrying terror and desolation into the midst of the Mohammedan populace. Of Argéle it was stated that members of his band had on several occasions been seen in conclave with the Greek consul. An allegation of this kind,

* Sir A. H. Layard to the Marquis of Salisbury, July 18th, 1878. Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 49 (1878).

which cannot be brought to actual proof, must of course be received with caution; but, in the instance mentioned, it has at least a colour of probability from all we know of the intrigues existing in that part of Europe. The complicity of Russia with Petko does not admit of a doubt.



GENERAL PHILIPPOVITCH.

As early as July 29th, Sir A. H. Layard was obliged to report to his Government that the Russian Commissioner was endeavouring to stop the inquiry, and had already threatened to break up the Commission by withdrawing from it. The British, French, Austrian, and Italian delegates had telegraphed this state of things to their respective Ambassadors at Constantinople, and had been directed to continue their inquiries as long as they were in a majority, notwithstanding the opposition, or even the withdrawal, of M. Basily. The specific ground assumed by the Russian Commissioner was that he objected to his colleagues recording in the minutes, in accordance with their instructions, any answers referring to the sufferings of the refugees. He required that the Commission should suspend its labours until he had received the opinion of his chief on this subject; but, although he was to some extent supported by Herr Müller, the Commissioners of England, France, Austria, Italy, and Turkey, insisted on the immediate prosecution of their work. The President of the Commission was Colonel Raab; its secretary, M. Challet.

At the interview of the Commissioners with Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, on July 21st, the Prince gave very emphatic expression to his opinion that it would be unsafe to let the Turks return to such of the villages as were partly occupied by Bulgarians, because of the animosity existing between the two races; at any rate, their return would not be permitted by the Russian authorities until after an investigation, resulting in an absolute prohibition with respect to all who had been compromised by recent events, who were reputed dangerous, or who were likely to be objects of vengeance. The Prince doubted the ability of the Bulgarian gendarmerie, then in course of formation, to ensure tranquillity and order in the event of an indiscriminate repatriation; and he was of opinion that the return of the emigrants should be in small groups of from fifty to a hundred. A safe-conduct, for circulating freely within the Russian lines, was granted to the Commissioners by Prince Dondoukoff, and guides and escorts beyond the lines were also promised. Thus furnished, the delegates started on their travels, and, after arriving at Dédéagatch on the evening of July 22nd, embarked on the following morning on board her Majesty's ship *Flying Fish*, and sailed to Lagos, whence they afterwards proceeded to Xanthi. It was here that the Russian Commissioner began that series of objections to the proceedings of his colleagues—and especially to the asking of any questions which might tend to inculpate the Russian army—which, on the evening of the 29th of July, resulted in his retiring from the Commission, leaving M. Leschine, dragoman of the Russian Embassy, in his place. M. Basily before his retirement, and M. Leschine afterwards, signed the minutes with a protest against the proceedings of the body; and on the 17th of August M. Leschine resigned, on the ground that the Commission was exceeding its powers in reporting on the conduct of the Russian soldiers. The plan of operations was to examine the witnesses in groups, each answering through a spokesman. The Russian Commissioner desired that the spokesman should be selected by the Commission itself, rather than by the emigrants; but this proposal was rejected by the majority, as being obviously inconvenient. The questions to be put to the witnesses were, however, arranged beforehand by the delegates, and each Commissioner seems to have had an unlimited right of cross-examination.

The labours of the Commission, commencing at Xanthi, were continued across the Rhodope Mountains, the Commissioners stopping at Gumuldjina, Kirkova, Mastanly, Kirdjali, Gabrova, Haskeui, and Artakeui. These towns were taken as the chief centres of their joint operations, and the delegates travelled around them during several days, constantly halting on their journey to hear evidence from the emigrant populations whom they found upon the road. They discovered about 150,000 refugees, distributed in the following manner:—7,000 scattered in the caza of Xanthi; 62,000 in that of Gumuldjina; 10,000 at Kirdjali; an equal number at Mastanly; and the remainder in the regions between Demotica and Nevrecope. All these refugees were Mussulmans, and all had come from parts of Bulgaria and Roumelia under the military occupation of the Russians. "The period of their departure," said the Report drawn up by the Commission at the termination of its labours, "seems to have always coincided with the entry or approach of the Russian troops. They appear to have fled, some from murder, pillage, incendiarism, and violation, of which they had been witnesses or victims; others under the effect of a panic, perfectly intelligible from the account of the cruelties suffered by their co-religionists in the neighbouring villages. According to an account which we have heard from the lips of several thousands of individuals, the invading army, either by the force of circumstances, or possibly by chance, found before it this compact mass of fugitives, who were endeavouring to gain the mountains (the Balkans, as the peasants said), carrying with them on arabas their families—old men, wives, children, and such effects as they had been able to preserve from the cupidity of the conquerors; and this large mass of individuals, driven at the point of the bayonet, when once concentrated and crowded together in the gorge of Hermanli, was shot down, massacred, and drowned in the Maritza and the Ourloudéré. More than two thousand children were thrown into the river by the mothers themselves, driven wild by terror, and believing this death to be gentler for them than that which they would receive at the hand of the enemy."*

The Report went on to observe that the reassembling of families was one of the first measures which the Commissioners recommended to the Ottoman Government. The causes of the emigration they believed to be in no wise futile. The majority of the delegates had no doubt that the Mussulmans withdrew to the country of their exile with the object of escaping from the horrors of a struggle during which, according to their statements,

* Some account of this transaction (based on the observations of the *Daily News* correspondent) will be found on pp. 40–41 of the present volume. The scene of the events was between the villages of Tirali and Hermanli.

everything was pillaged. It was an undeniable fact, remarked the Commissioners, that the Turks delivered up their arms only to the Russians, who placed them in the hands of the Bulgarians. The Mussulmans nevertheless declared that they had no feelings of enmity against their Christian neighbours, and the Report stated that, in close proximity to the rich Bulgarian villages in the district of Gumuldjina, 60,000 refugees were gathered together in the most terrible distress imaginable, and yet that no reprisals had been committed. The Commissioners had seen the same thing in the heart of the Rhodope Mountains, especially at Gabrova, where all the houses, as well as the fields belonging to the Bulgarians, were free from every act of brigandage, although the surrounding Turkish villages had been razed or burned. The authenticity of this fact, the Commissioners had ascertained at a great number of places. "They refused to believe," says the Report, "the accuracy of stories which described to them on all sides an inexorable conqueror, scattering everywhere in his passage death, ruin, destruction, and conflagration. It seemed that an exaggeration, which misfortune made excusable, must have given rise to unheard-of accusations, which imagination can scarcely conceive. They resolved, therefore, to satisfy themselves of the fact: this would be at the same time a means of testing facts of which they might thus obtain proof; and such proof, once obtained, would furnish presumptions towards forming a judgment on other allegations. For this reason, they decided on visiting several districts where these devastations were stated to have occurred. To these distressing excursions several days were devoted, the proceedings of which are related in the *procès-verbaux* in terms only too moderate to depict adequately the pain experienced at the sight of ruins blackened by the traces of conflagration. In a score of villages, taken at random out of the eighty and odd which were mentioned to them as having been burned since the 1st of June—that is to say, after the armistice—the Commission has seen the sad spectacle of destruction. It is death in the midst of a lovely country, the cultivation of which bears witness to recent activity of life. Nothing has been spared. It is noticeable that artillery-fire has been only a secondary agent in this destruction; and that it has been necessary to employ torch and firewood to consume houses isolated one from the other, and often separated by long distances, mosques standing remote on some neighbouring hill, and farms several kilometres distant. It was conceivable to every one that the man who was capable of kindling such a fire might also indulge in pillage and murder. And this devastation stretches along a line of more than a hundred and fifty kilometres, marked out by the advanced posts of the Russian army." Yet there were still those who affirmed that the Turks had no reason to dread the presence of either the Muscovite troops or the Bulgarian peasantry. The whole country for many miles bore eloquent testimony to the brutality of both; but the testimony was denied by those who were ready enough to credit anything that might be alleged against a Turk. In a question which should have been kept sacred from disturbing influences, everything was judged by the distorting lights of party feeling, of personal antagonism, and of religious intolerance.

The Commissioners drew a pathetic picture of the sufferings still being endured by the immense body of fugitives, who, broken down by fatigue, privation, grief, and sickness, stretched from the first spurs of the Rhodope Mountains towards Philippopolis and Adrianople, and ceased only at the borders of the pestilential marshes washed by the Ægean Sea—a forlorn assemblage of men, women, and children, including many widows and orphans, who were encamped upon the open ground, with no other shelter than the foliage of trees; with no other sustenance than a little barley-bread, distributed by the authorities or the inhabitants; without doctors, without medicines, and continually wasting with every kind of infectious sickness. What was required was to provide lodgings, clothes, and provisions, for hundreds of thousands of persons; and the Commissioners implored the Ambassadors of their respective Powers to do their utmost to assist these miserable creatures, and obtain their speedy repatriation. The emigrants, however, expressed fear of the Russian authorities, and affirmed that their lives would not be safe in the keeping of the strangers. It appeared that some of the new functionaries had been to the places of exile of the Mohammedans, offering them permits to return. The Commissioners were shown one of these permits, which the Russian authorities themselves acknowledged to be genuine; and, if the word of the emigrants is to be trusted, the greater number of those who returned under this safeguard were not only subjected to vexatious exactions, but were actually massacred. The emigrants consequently declared that they would not return until Turkish authority had been re-established over the country. It will be borne in mind that the districts affected were for the most part included either in Eastern Roumelia, or in that division of European Turkey which was to remain under the direct sway of the Porte. These districts were still occupied by the

Russian armies, but were of course to be ultimately restored to the Turkish Government. The Russian authorities themselves declared that they were unable to enforce the restitution by the Bulgarians of Mohammedan property seized by them after the departure of the fugitives; and it was therefore not surprising that those fugitives should object to placing themselves once more in a situation from which they had already suffered so grievously, until their own Government was in a position to afford them protection, and to assert their rights.

But even supposing them to be again settled in their villages, it was evident that much assistance would be needed to enable these unhappy people to make even the most distant approach towards the mitigation of their sufferings. Everything, as the Report pointed out, had been taken from them. Their dwellings had been burned, their furniture destroyed, their religious edifices cast down, their crops confiscated, and their flocks and herds carried off. It appeared to the Commissioners, therefore, that their respective Governments should do something towards the succour of these victims of a ruthless war. The Commissioners claimed credit to themselves for having omitted no means of acquiring a knowledge of the facts, even to their minutest details. "We have devoted ourselves to this object," they said, "for nearly a month, during which time we have traversed, without halt or rest, most unhealthy districts, and mountainous regions most difficult of access. Neither rain in torrents, nor the heat of midsummer, nor the attacks of illness from which nearly all the members of the Commission have suffered, have for one moment delayed our forced marches and our incessant work. We shall deem ourselves well rewarded for our labours if they are of service in obtaining some slight relief for so many unfortunate people, whose sufferings are so undeserved."

The Report, as published in the Blue Book, bears no date; but it was enclosed by Sir A. H. Layard to Lord Salisbury, in a communication written on the 28th of August, 1878. The same communication also enclosed a copy of a letter drawn up by the four Commissioners who signed the Report, and addressed by each to his respective chief. From this it appeared that the Commission finished its labours at a sitting held on the 27th of August at Bujukdere, at the house of Signor Graziani. Until nearly the last moment, it had been hoped that all the Commissioners would agree to sum up their labours in a collective Report, the draft of which was read at the sitting of the 17th of August. Russia, however, objected to the conclusions at which the majority of the Commissioners had arrived; the German delegate exhibited from the first, according to the letter drawn up by the four Commissioners who signed the Report, an "obstinate and systematic opposition" to the views of his colleagues; and on the 25th of August Colonel Raab, the representative of Austria, withdrew from the Commission on the ground of ill-health, at the same time intimating that he would present a special report to his Ambassador. In this state of things, the Commissioners of England, France, Italy, and Turkey, agreed to draw up an identical Report, which was severally submitted to the chiefs of their respective missions. These four Commissioners affirmed that they had done their best to soften everything alleged or proved against the Russian army; but this, they said, was the limit of the concessions which their consciences permitted them to make in deference to the requirements of courtesy due to a Government which in their opinion was doing its utmost to prevent the Mussulmans from returning to Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The safety of the emigrants, should they return to their homes, could not, in the view of the Commissioners, be secured without the interposition of some other authority. They accordingly suggested the establishment of an International Commission, and they believed that the difficulties naturally attending such an arrangement might be overcome by the mutual deliberations of the Powers.

In another communication to Lord Salisbury, also written on the 28th of August, Sir A. H. Layard stated that the original draft of the Report was, as he had heard, even stronger in its condemnation of the proceedings of the Russian army than the document ultimately signed by the majority of the Commissioners, and was modified in order to meet the objections of the German delegate, who nevertheless refused to sign. Colonel Raab appears to have been the member of the Commission who most strongly felt and condemned the outrages committed on the Mussulman population, which the witnesses attributed mainly to the Russian troops. It was in consequence of that officer's telegrams to the Austrian Ambassador that Sir A. H. Layard and some of his colleagues instructed their representatives to continue their inquiries, and to ascertain the truth of what had been alleged, notwithstanding the protests of the Russian Commissioner, and his threats of withdrawal. Yet Colonel Raab suddenly and unexpectedly declined to sign the Report, even in its modified form. This conduct certainly required elucidation, and it was subsequently explained in

a despatch from Sir Henry Elliot to the Marquis of Salisbury, dated Vienna, November 26th, 1878. Great stress had by many persons been laid on the abstention of Colonel Raab, which they represented as a proof of his disbelieving the evidence against the Russian troops. The English Ambassador at Vienna was able to inform Lord Salisbury that such was not the case, and that Colonel Raab had stated to his Government that he was too unwell at the time the Report was drawn up to take any active share in preparing it. Although the Austrian Commissioner did not approve the entire Report of his colleagues, which he thought dwelt too much upon the misconduct of the Russian troops, and too little upon other points which the Commission was appointed to examine, he had not, in the separate document addressed to his own Government, represented the proceedings of the Russian troops in a more favourable light than the other Commissioners had done. Up to the time of Sir Henry Elliot writing this despatch, the Austrian Government had suppressed the Report of Colonel Raab—a fact indicating how strong must have been the condemnation of Russian misdeeds to which it gave official utterance.

Another misapprehension was removed by some further correspondence published by the English Government in December. It had been stated that the Report of the Commission originally bore the signatures of the English, French, Italian, and Turkish delegates, but that the Italian representative soon afterwards withdrew his signature, because he did not think the evidence trustworthy. This assertion was contradicted by the Commissioner himself, in a despatch dated November 20th, and addressed to Mr. Consul-General Fawcett. From explanations given to Sir Augustus Paget, the English Ambassador at Rome, it further appeared that, on the proposed collective Report being sent by the Italian delegate to the *chargé d'affaires* of his nation at Constantinople, it seemed to the latter that, as the Austrian, German, and Russian delegates had declined to sign the Report, the presentation of that document in a collective form, by the Commissioners of England, France, Italy, and Turkey, would be an offensive proceeding towards Russia. He therefore directed Signor Graziani to suggest to his English, French, and Turkish colleagues that, instead of signing the Report collectively, each delegate should make a separate Report, but in identical terms; and this suggestion was accepted and carried out.

The Blue Book containing the Report of the Commissioners, and the minutes of evidence on which that document was based, was published by the English Government at the close of October, and was immediately made the subject of a very searching criticism on the part of Russia's English friends. The weak points in the evidence were seized on with avidity; the strong points were either slurred over, or depreciated as amounting to very little after all. Furthermore, the good faith and honesty of those Commissioners who condemned the conduct of Russia, and especially of the English Commissioner, were directly and specifically attacked, though upon grounds which seem purely imaginary, and which indeed it is difficult to state, so much were they obscured by angry and violent language, and by the feverish vexation of the accusers at finding that their model champion of humanity had been convicted of elaborate and systematic guilt. The view of the Turkish Commissioners must of course be set aside as of little value, because Turkey naturally went into the inquiry with feelings of the deepest prejudice and anger against the Power by which she had been overthrown; but the inevitable bias of Turkey on the one side was counteracted by the inevitable bias of Russia on the other. The opinion of the German Commissioner was almost equally a foregone conclusion; for he showed his bent from the first, and, throughout the war and the Congress, official Germany had been the friend of Russia. The views of England, France, Austria, and Italy, were less open to question; although it may be conceded that, on such vexed issues, no Power is entirely free from a certain tendency, either in one way or another. As regarded the English Commissioner, Mr. Fawcett, it was alleged that, as he had himself made a previous investigation, which resulted in a report unfavourable to Russia, he was bound at all costs to maintain his declared opinion. But there is nothing to show that Mr. Fawcett is a gentleman so wanting in candour as to deny the force of anything that might appear antagonistic to a previous impression; while the fact that he had already been over the afflicted districts, and had gathered a large amount of information, gives additional value to his conclusions, unless upon the unwarrantable assumption that, having once said a thing, he would stand to it, in spite of truth itself.

In connection with the Bulgarian massacres of 1876, it has often been remarked that, however indisputable were the main facts, a good many of the particulars must be received with distrust, because they came from declared enemies of the Turks, speaking in a tumult of rage, horror, fear, and animosity. This reasonable caution was never admitted by the English Russophiles. They accepted the most hideous assertions without the slightest

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abatement, and seemed to consider that exaggeration had no place in the record, although, under the circumstances of the time, exaggeration was inevitable, and perhaps in some instances almost excusable. The same remark is equally applicable to the statements of the Mohammedans before the International Commission of 1878, and should equally be borne in mind as a matter of common sense and common fairness. It was curious to observe, however, how the caution which the Russophiles considered absurd, and even infamous, at the earlier date, was clamorously asserted by them at the later period, when their own friends were charged with similar misdeeds. The fact betrayed a lamentable weakness, or rather something much more blameable than weakness; but it must not be suffered to stand in the way of historic impartiality. It should at once be admitted that some of the statements made before the International Commission, to the prejudice of the Russians and Bulgarians, have a look of extravagance. The witnesses were no doubt desirous of making out the worst case they possibly could, and a few of their assertions seem to have been coloured and magnified by the feelings of hatred, or the emotions of nervous excitement, by which the speakers were almost certain to be affected. It is also regrettable that greater pains were not taken to verify such of the charges as were capable of a more minute investigation. But, when this has been granted, there yet remains a large mass of testimony, so probable in its very nature, and so terribly confirmed by what the Commissioners themselves observed in the wasted districts through which they passed, that to doubt its veracity is either affectation or disingenuousness. The friends of Russia everywhere, who believed every tale told by an hysterical or frightened woman in the autumn of 1876, simply because she told it, demanded the most rigid and even impossible proofs two years after, because *then* the tables had been turned upon their clients.

The statements made before the International Commission were to the general effect that old men, women, and children had been killed, without provocation; that villages had been attacked and burned, on which occasions women and children had sometimes perished in the flames; that isolated houses were burned when abandoned; that numerous villagers, after having been induced to give up their arms and return home, had been murdered by the Russians; that frightful tortures had been inflicted; and that a large number of women and girls had been subjected to the worst of outrages. The most wholesale of these atrocities was that which occurred near Hermanli—a series of crimes so horrible that even the warmest supporters of Russia in the weekly and daily press acknowledged that the facts were discreditable to the Russians, although the admission was accompanied by the suggestion of mitigating circumstances. The story, as related by a man named Hassan and some others, was this:—The Mussulmans, to the number of fifty or sixty thousand, were flying towards the south. They had with them from thirty to forty thousand waggons, in which the women were travelling, while the men marched in the rear. In thus pursuing their way, they were attacked by a body of Russian cavalry, whom they withstood with such weapons as they carried—a few muskets, and the knives that are commonly worn by men in those regions. The exact date of this incident does not appear; but it was several days before the conclusion of the armistice on the 31st of January, for it was mentioned by a correspondent of the *Daily News* in a letter dated the 27th of that month. The resistance was so determined that the Russians retreated, but next morning reappeared in greater force, with infantry and heavy guns, and opened fire from their cannon on the waggons containing the women and children. Overpowered by superiority of numbers, and by the force of artillery brought to bear on them, the Mussulmans took to flight; upon which a frightful massacre ensued. Old men, women, and children were slaughtered in cold blood, or at any rate without the provocation of continued resistance. It was then that several of the women threw their children into the river, as the only resource left to them; and the number of children so killed is said to have been two thousand. This may be an exaggerated statement, and indeed there was no opportunity of ascertaining the number of the infants with any exactness; but when such assertions were questioned, on the ground that they were scarcely possible, it must be said that scepticism was carried to lengths as ridiculous as any that credulity itself has ever reached. The *Daily News*, commenting on this terrible story in its issue of November 1st, 1878, said it was for Russia to disprove the tale, "or to punish the miscreants who revived the most heinous crimes of another age, if she cared to keep up a repute for civilization." But then it was suggested that the Russians had really endured some provocation. The Mohammedans had had the audacity to defend themselves when attacked, and had even been so extremely uncivil as to beat the Russians on the previous day. The passions of the Cossacks were "inflamed by defeat," and "it is rare indeed that women, confused among the ranks of men flying after desperate

resistance, have not suffered the worst horrors of war." That is to say, the Russians had behaved badly; but it was to a great extent the fault of the victims themselves, who had been so ill-advised as to fight while there was still a prospect of driving back their foes.

The Commissioners, on visiting Hermanli, found that the whole of the Mussulman quarter, including about a hundred and fifty houses and the mosque, had been burned. Many other devastated villages were likewise seen. All the Turkish hamlets in the Demotica district had been utterly destroyed. "In most places," said Mr. Fawcett, in a despatch to Sir A. H. Layard, dated August 9th, "only a few persons were killed; but, in the large village of Demirler, seven women were burnt alive, being ill and unable to move. In this village, not a house remains. The destruction of the handsome mosque was particularly barbarous. It was situated on a hill half a mile from the village, and was, so they said, bombarded for hours. It is a complete wreck. We picked up pieces of shells from the ruin. There was no pretext that it was defended; it was a mere act of vandalism." The same dismal sights were beheld in other directions. Numerous dead bodies of Turks were found by the waysides, and sometimes wounded men were encountered. In the eyes of impartial observers, this might surely be admitted as confirmatory evidence of what had been stated by the witnesses, or at least of some portion of it; yet it was quietly alleged by the English advocates of Russia that those statements were entirely worthless in themselves, and altogether unsupported. The dead bodies, it was more than hinted, were in every case those of persons who had perished from fatigue and deprivation in a flight which they had not the slightest occasion to make. The wounded might have come by their injuries in some other way; and the burned villages might have been fired by the Mohammedans themselves, in order that the blame should afterwards be charged upon the Russians and Bulgarians. The Bulgarians, indeed, absolutely said as much; and if everything that a Bulgarian alleges is to be believed, and everything a Turk says is to be set down as a lie, we are delivered from all necessity of estimating probabilities, or comparing evidence, and may as well prejudge the case at once, without the trouble of any examination. In one respect, however, the Turks appear to have been under a singular delusion. They averred that many of the seeming Bulgarians engaged in the commission of atrocities were not Bulgarians at all, but Cossacks disguised. The refugees declared with one voice that the Bulgarians in general were their friends; that they could live on peaceable terms with those people, and were willing to return among them as soon as the Russians had withdrawn. In the face of all we know, the alleged fact is most improbable, and it is difficult to account for the delusion expressed in this strange asseveration. The dull ferocity of the Bulgarian is one of the most unquestionable facts in the whole history of the struggle.

There were those who would not be convinced by any amount of evidence that could be brought against the Russians and their Bulgarian allies; but there were others, of a more candid disposition, who confessed that their views with respect to the Czar and his agents had been very considerably modified by recent disclosures. Among these, one of the most eminent was the Earl of Shaftesbury, who had been among the leaders of the agitation against the Turks in the autumn of 1876. The daily papers of November 9th, 1878, contained a letter from this nobleman, with reference to one which had been addressed to him, on the subject of the Rhodope Commission, by Lord Elcho. The Earl of Shaftesbury believed that no one could read the Report of the Commissioners "without coming to the conclusion that, though it has not the usual cold and stilted tone of an official paper, it has the character of authenticity; and that the Russian Commissioner, aided by the German Commissioner, and by the opportune illness of his Austrian colleague, endeavoured in every way to suppress or evade the evidence by trumpery and unjust depreciation of the witnesses at one time, and at another by grandiose expressions about the honour of the Russian army. Probably, since the days when the Goths, the Huns, and the Vandals overran the Roman Empire, there has been nothing in Christendom to equal, certainly to surpass, the cruelties now recorded against the armies of the Czar. We may cry aloud, and proclaim our indignation and horror; but we can go no further. Public opinion may at last do its work, even in the heart of a Government so immersed in barbarism and ambition." With perfect truth, Lord Shaftesbury remarked that "the Mussulmans of Afghanistan may learn, from the narratives of their co-religionists in the Rhodope, what they are to expect from the embrace of the Russian, should he ever enter on their territory, and desire to hold it afterwards, according to his own notions of security of tenure." The personal character of the Emperor was still highly esteemed by his Lordship. "But," he added, "the officials, civil and military, are little in harmony with the true mind of their Sovereign; and he too, if, by wilful and continued

abstinence from the word or action of control (for all is in his power), he become a partaker of other men's sins—he too must be content to be ranked with Attila and Alaric, and like them go down to posterity, and be counted among the scourges of the human race."

It was originally supposed—at any rate, by the English Ambassador in Turkey—that the Report of the Commission, together with any remarks which might be presented separately, would be taken into consideration by the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople, who would decide upon the course to be recommended to their respective Governments. But the Russian Ambassador maintained that the Ministers of the Powers, having named the Commissioners, had no further duties to discharge, and had nothing to do with the result of their inquiries. His Excellency therefore refused to attend any meeting to consider the reports that had been sent in. Thus, as Sir A. H. Layard remarked in a despatch to Lord Salisbury, dated September 27th, "the object which the Congress of Berlin had in view, of finding means to alleviate the sufferings of the Mussulman fugitives in the Rhodope districts, and of restoring them to their homes," was completely frustrated, and the only result of the inquiry was to raise a controversy as to the authors of the cruelties committed on the Mohammedan population of Bulgaria and Roumelia. Those unfortunate people were left without help. Homeless, and almost naked, they had the utmost to dread from the approaching winter; for the local sources of private charity were nearly dried up, and it appeared doubtful to Sir A. H. Layard whether the Porte, if it succeeded in re-establishing its authority in the Rhodope Mountains, could supply even what was necessary to the very existence of the outcasts. The Russian Ambassador and the Russian military authorities, if not the Government of St. Petersburg itself, complained that the Commission had gone beyond its duties and instructions, and beyond the intentions of the Congress, in inquiring into the causes which had led to the sufferings of the Mussulman refugees, and in associating those sufferings with the conduct of the Russian troops. Even supposing this to be the case—and the point is extremely doubtful, seeing that the Commissioners were charged, amongst other things, to ascertain the motives which had led to the emigration, and which prevented the return of the fugitives—the fact was no justification for neglecting these unhappy people, whose afflictions, by whomsoever caused, were excessive. To remedy this serious evil in some degree, the English Government proposed, during the short winter session of 1878, to move a grant in aid of the Turkish refugees. The proposal was brought forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 13th of December, and withdrawn by him on the 16th, owing to the very general opposition it had evoked. The distress existing all over Great Britain at that time disinclined people from giving money towards the relief of distant sufferers; but a great deal of gratuitous party feeling was shown in some quarters, and it is impossible not to see that the Government weakly betrayed a number of starving wretches, whom it had taught to rely on England for help and comfort in their dire extremity.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Disturbed Condition of Albania—Mehemet Ali sent as Extraordinary Commissioner to the Province—His Assassination at Jakova—Agitation of the Lazis—Surrender of Batoum to the Russians—Emigration of the Native Mohammedans—Their disappointed Hopes—Unpopularity of Dervish Pasha, the Ottoman Commander—Threats of Resistance, and Ultimate Arrangement—Superfluous Courtesies—Poverty of the Emigrants and the Army—Progress of the Rhodope Insurrection—Colonel St. Clair, the English Commander of the Patriots—His Methods of Organisation—Measures for feeding the Soldiers and the People—The Russian Lines—Arrival of a Russian Envoy within the Insurgent Positions—Desultory Engagements—Requisitions of the Mountaineers—Attitude of the Insurgents with respect to the Turkish Government—Cattle-lifting Raids—Tendencies to Anarchy—The Insurrection supported from without—Demands of Greece for a Rectification of Frontier—Circular of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs—Arguments of the Porte against the Justice of the Hellenic Claims—Extravagance of the Greek Demands—Circular of the Cabinet of Athens—Action of the Powers in respect to the Frontier Question—Turkey disposed to make Concessions—Appointment of Commissioners on both Sides.

TURNING from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the neighbouring provinces, to the country of the Albanians, we find the spirit of discontent and agitation as prevalent there as elsewhere. The state of Albania was indeed so alarming in the late summer of 1878 that the Ottoman Government considered it prudent to send Mehemet Ali as Extraordinary Commissioner to that province, with instructions to inquire into the grievances of the people, and to effect such compromises as might appear desirable. The malcontents belonged chiefly to the Mohammedan section of the populace, who were exceedingly displeased with the arrangements respecting Albanian territory which had been made by the Treaty of Berlin. It was considered that the national cause had been betrayed by the Turkish Government, and the desire of the people was to join the armed bands then resisting the Austrian advance in Bosnia. The selection of Mehemet Ali as Commissioner of the Porte was not very happy. He had, it is true, been one of the most conspicuous Generals of the late war, and had since then acted as Second Ottoman Plenipotentiary at the Congress. But he had done little as a soldier to promote the Turkish cause, and the Congress altogether was a sore topic with fanatical Moslems. Added to this, Mehemet was a foreigner in his origin, and in early life had been a Christian. His conversion to Islam was always looked upon with suspicion, as not being sincere, and his mission to Albania was set down as an attempt to repress all national feeling, and to serve the cause of Russia and of Austria. A genuine Turk might have had some success. Mehemet Ali was doomed to failure and to death.

The unfortunate Commissioner arrived at Jakova (a small town to the north-east of Scutari) on the 2nd of September, when he found the general aspect of affairs so threatening as to suggest a very gloomy view of his position. He was at once surrounded by nearly five thousand insurgents from Ipek, strengthened by three battalions of Albanian Redifs, who till then had acted as the Pasha's body-guard, but who mutinied on the first opportunity. The Pasha was reproached with having come expressly to hand over the country to Servia; and the wildest excitement was manifested both in words and acts. Those who remained faithful to Mehemet were few in number—little more than two hundred in all. They included some gendarmes, but were for the most part soldiers belonging to a Christian and Catholic force. On the evening of September 2nd, Mehemet Ali telegraphed to Constantinople that he was surrounded, and could not escape. Next day, the house he occupied was assailed by a band of more than a hundred armed men, and set on fire with petroleum. The Pasha and his personal attendants escaped, and took refuge in an adjoining tower; but this also was surrounded, and set in flames about six o'clock in the evening. Seeing the utter hopelessness of the case, Mehemet Ali braved his fate like a soldier, and rushed forth into the midst of his enemies, exclaiming, "Here I am for you!" He was immediately cut down, and several of his followers were slain at the same time—not, it would seem, in cold blood, but in the armed collision which ensued. Two other Pashas were killed, and the Albanians celebrated the event as if it had been a great victory.* The outrage appears to have been long premeditated between the insurgent committees of Jakova and Prisrend. It was followed by renewed insurrectionary movements, directed principally against the Christians.

In Asia, fears were entertained that the Lazis would resist to the utmost extremity the occupation of Batoum by the Russians. The local magnates declared to the Turkish authorities, in the course of August, that the populations of the town and of the surrounding districts were resolved to fight the Czar's troops, but would hand over the port to any

* The day on which this tragical occurrence took place is not clearly apparent in the newspaper accounts published at the time; but it seems to have been on the 3rd of September.

other European Power. The Turkish Government necessarily sympathised with these patriotic feelings; but Batoum had been surrendered to Russia by the Treaty of Berlin, as well as by the preliminary agreement of San Stefano, and there was no retreating from the bond. Dervish Pasha, the Ottoman commander at Batoum, had under his orders twenty-five battalions; the hills round the town were held by Turkish troops; and close in-shore were an iron-clad and a wooden frigate. These forces would have been bound, in the event of actual resistance, to aid the Russians in obtaining possession of the city; but fortunately no such need arose. The unhappy Lazis seem after a while to have been convinced that fate was against them; and, towards the end of August, delegates from Batoum had an interview with General Komaroff, the Russian commander, and undertook to surrender the town peacefully, on certain conditions. Yet the apprehension of violence still continued. The more irreconcilable of the Lazis talked of setting fire to the buildings; but the quietly disposed withdrew to Trebizond, and the dismantling of the forts, together with the removal of the military stores, went on with perfect tranquillity, though not without deep distress on the part of the Turkish soldiers. On the 6th of September, Batoum was transferred to the Russians, who entered into their new acquisition without the least trouble. The Turkish civil authorities had left the city before the arrival of the Russian troops; but the military leaders were at their posts, ready to discharge a melancholy duty.

Prince Mirsky was received by Dervish Pasha at the head of a deputation of the inhabitants, and of the Christian and Mussulman clergy, who went to a short distance outside the town to meet the new-comers. The Russian Commander-in-Chief rode with his Staff along the Turkish line, saluting each battalion and its officers, and then, accompanied by Dervish Pasha, moved towards Batoum, followed by the Russian troops, who had with them three bands of music. At a short distance from the town, 1our battalions ascended the hills lying eastward, while the remainder encamped immediately behind the southern fort which guards the entrance to the harbour. Simultaneously with these movements, four Russian vessels, two corvettes, and two armed transports belonging to the Russian Black Sea Navigation Company, entered the harbour, and anchored close in front of the southern fort.* Some fifteen tabors of Turkish infantry remained in the city; but Dervish Pasha at once made arrangements for expediting their departure.

* *Daily News* Trebizond Correspondent.

The Turkish flag was saluted with twenty-one guns from the Russian vessels; the Russian flag was hoisted in the port, and saluted with a hundred and one guns by the Turks; and the new authorities quietly began the administration of affairs. All was over. The Lazis had preferred emigration to fighting, and they continued to leave the town and its vicinity in large numbers, notwithstanding an offer by the Russians to give each peasant who preferred to remain a subsidy of twenty kopeks (about half a franc), and two pounds and a half of maize, daily, for the ensuing three years.

Dervish Pasha was exceedingly unpopular among the Lazis; but as the representative of the Porte, he was bound to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace. The Mohammedans had for a long while buoyed themselves up with the hope that the Turkish Government would connive at their resistance, and that Dervish would permit them to seize and carry off the Imperial military stores. A plan with this object was actually formed; but it was frustrated by the vigilance of the Ottoman commander, and the popular detestation of that official was thenceforward unbounded. It was expected that Dervish Pasha would act in accordance with sentiment: instead of this, he did his duty. "Far from favouring anything like an insurrectionary movement," said a writer from the spot, "he discouraged it in every way, and threatened to take summary vengeance on any one disturbing public order. The Lazis were for a considerable time unwilling to give credit to what they heard on this subject, and seemed to think it only a ruse on the part of the old General to cover the better his secret support. His public proclamation, however, announcing that Batoum and the adjoining territories were to be given up, and that six days were given for all intending emigrants to take their departure, put an end to this delusion. The civil Governor, styled the Mutessarif, a Laze himself, suddenly left for the Adjara district, where he strove might and main to forward the warlike preparations of his countrymen. Moreover, he sent a message to Dervish Pasha, in reply to the latter's proclamation about the intended evacuation, stating that he and his mountaineers repudiated such an idea, and that they intended to take forcible possession of the material of war at Batoum. In pursuance of this threat, the Mutessarif concentrated ten thousand men in close proximity to the town, and everything seemed to forebode an outbreak of hostilities. Dervish Pasha immediately put his troops on the alert, a portion of them remaining under arms all night for fear of a surprise. He caused several arrests to be made, and two

prominent Laze leaders were condemned by him to be flogged, and were subsequently put in irons on board the flagship, the *Moukbir*, lying in the harbour. He also telegraphed to the Porte, denouncing the a more accommodating mood. This appears to have resulted from the mediation of the Governor of Trebizond, Yousuf Pasha—a person held in high regard by the Lazis. In time, it was seen by all



ALBANIA AND LAKE OF SCUTARI.

Mutessarif, Osman Pasha, as a rebel, and asking permission to have him shot or hanged. The reply was to the effect that the offender, if taken in arms, should be immediately shot, but that if captured previous to the outbreak of actual hostilities, he should be sent under escort to Constantinople." Ultimately, the Mutessarif came in, and made his submission; and the Lazis generally began to exhibit but the most fanatical that nothing was to be effected by a spasmodic insurrection, which Russia would speedily have quenched in blood; and the peaceful submission of Batoum followed as soon as this truth was clearly apprehended. Nevertheless, Dervish Pasha continued to be disliked, and went in terror of assassination until he could quit the neighbourhood. Whether he may not have been



COLONEL DIMITRIEF BEFORE THE RHODOPE INSURGENT CHIEFS.

too demonstrably courteous to the Russian commander and his officers, is perhaps a question. He appears to have attended banquets given by Prince Mirsky, and by the Admiral in command of the Muscovite fleet, when the representatives of the Czar spoke of him with greater praise than was desirable under the circumstances. There was a good deal of visiting on board one another's ships, and more than enough firing of salutes in mutual honour of the two flags. But, in spite of all these objections, the fact remains that Dervish Pasha had a duty to perform, which, however painful, he could not honourably have shirked; and that this duty he carried out, even at the risk of his life, and certainly to the loss of his reputation among the Lazis.

Nothing could exceed the misery of the emigrants at Trebizond. Their property was in land and agricultural produce, and they had had no means of taking the latter with them. By the middle of September, between four and five thousand Lazis were crowded together in this city of refuge. Some had succeeded in bringing away their bedding and a few household utensils, and occasionally the familiar goat was seen in association with his master. Very few of the refugees, however, were in a position to support themselves. The authorities at Trebizond were obliged to feed them; but relief was necessarily given in very sparing measure. Each adult received daily a pound and a quarter of black bread, and the younger members had only half that quantity. This miserable dole—probably the utmost that the city could afford—was all the refugees obtained in the way of sustenance, though many were persons who had been accustomed to a life of comfort. Plans were formed for settling them in various parts of Asiatic Turkey, and the Russian authorities announced that the emigrants would be at liberty to sell their lands within three years, should they still determine not to occupy the position of Russian subjects. But in the meanwhile the change of fortune was hard to bear. The troops also were reduced to the extremity of destitution. The uniforms of most were worn to rags; many were shoeless; and even the officers presented a shabby and neglected appearance. No pay had been forthcoming for a long time—in some instances, not for two years. Under these conditions, it is surprising that the army should have held together at all; yet, in spite of suffering, defeat, and humiliation, the Turkish soldier remained faithful to his flag, and to the sovereign who represented for him the principles of political order and religious supremacy.

While the International Commissioners were inquiring into the causes of the Rhodope insurrection, and into the action of the Russians in that part of Turkey, the armed movement of the Mohammedan populace was continuing with scarcely any diminution. The insurgents were commanded by an Englishman, formerly a captain in the 21st Fusiliers, but who now went by the designation of Colonel St. Clair, or Sinclair. A correspondent of the *Daily News* saw this gentleman, about the middle of August, at the headquarters of the insurgent armies, which were then at Kara-Tarla, in the province of Sultanyeri. He described him as about thirty-six or forty years of age, of middle height, and of striking appearance, owing chiefly to the deep, piercing blue eyes which he turned upon any one with whom he was speaking. He was a fluent linguist, capable of expressing himself in half a dozen languages, and seems to have been an excellent soldier, cool in action, and almost worshipped by his men, although a strict disciplinarian. He had shared in a good deal of fighting with the Turkish army on the Lom during the recent war, had spent many years in Turkey, and in earlier days is said to have fought with the Poles against the Russians. It was not until after the commencement of the Rhodope insurrection that he appeared upon the scene; but the people received him as one who sympathised deeply with their cause, and who was willing to fight with them against the oppressor. His services in the field being not unknown to the Mohammedan peasantry in those parts, he was unanimously elected as their chief, and even the power of life and death was granted him. This power he did not scruple to use whenever there seemed to be fitting occasion, and two men who, on trial by court-martial, had been found guilty of cattle-stealing shortly after the arrival of Colonel St. Clair, were by his orders sentenced to be shot.

The energetic Englishman introduced a stricter discipline into the insurgent ranks than had existed before his arrival. He persuaded the mountaineers that little was to be gained by attacking the Russians, and that they must confine themselves to opposing any attempt on the part of the enemy to invade their own territory. "The next thing to look after," said the *Daily News* correspondent, "was the internal administration of the country, which he divided into three districts—Pashmakli, Kurdjali, and Sultanyeri, each being under the jurisdiction of one of the native insurgent chiefs, who in cases of importance received his orders direct from the Commander-in-Chief. A very great difficulty was experienced in the first instance in finding food for the soldiers. The neighbouring country had been devastated by Suleiman's army, and, later

on, some parts of it by the Russians; and, fertile as it is, it could not stand such a pressing call upon its resources. The products of last year's harvest were nearly all gone, and there were at least four months before the harvest which had just been garnered could be gathered in. At first, the difficulty seemed an almost insurmountable one, especially as the population was at that early date gradually becoming more numerous, in consequence of the return of batches of refugees. But the difficulty was found not to be so insurmountable as it appeared at first sight." There were certain rich persons in the surrounding country who had corn stored up, but who were not likely to give it out for the public benefit, unless they received payment, or some valid security. The holders of this corn were for the most part the mayors of villages, and the grain consisted of the harvest-tithes which were due to the Turkish Government. Colonel St. Clair summoned the mayors before him, and told them that the insurgents were fighting for the protection of their homes and families, and that they had chosen him as their Commander-in-Chief. If they placed in him that confidence which he hoped to find, they would give him the corn for distribution amongst the soldiers and villagers, some of whom were very badly off for food. He would take the responsibility for the tithes upon his own shoulders, and would pay the amount to the Government in due course. He would also return to the holders of the corn an amount equal to that which had been received, with interest at the rate of twenty per cent., as soon as the coming harvest was gathered in. The colonel told the representative of the *Daily News* that to a man they all handed him over the grain; and when, some weeks after, he was able to repay them the advance, he found only one man who would accept the interest of twenty per cent., and some even refused to take back their principal. The insurgent Government, if such it can be called, was doing more for the refugees than the Turkish Government. Upwards of 20,000 of these miserable creatures were being supported by the organization of which Colonel St. Clair was the directing head. The rations they received consisted of corn, maize, rice, sometimes bread, and occasionally mutton-soup. The fighting men had meat-soup every day, although only in small quantities. The main forces of the insurrection were taken at the rate of ten per cent. from the male population of each village; the remainder ninety per cent., excepting those who were too old, or otherwise incapable, formed the reserve. The funds for supporting this large body of soldiers and refugees appear to have been derived from the rich men of the surrounding villages, although it is said that some portion came from the Turkish Government itself. Colonel St. Clair was among the witnesses examined by the International Commission, the members of which addressed him as "His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of the National Army of the Rhodope." His position, therefore, and the legitimate nature of his functions, were fully recognised by that body.

The Russian lines were at no great distance from the position occupied by Colonel St. Clair. About four miles off, in the valley beneath the heights held by the insurgents, Russian tents were plainly visible, and the invaders appeared to have made up their minds to remain during the ensuing winter. At the approach of autumn, they set to work striking their tents, and erecting huts of branches cut from the neighbouring trees, the interstices of which were filled up with mud and clay. They had been compelled to retire from a more advanced position, and had lost many hundred men in endeavouring to hold their former ground; but they were now doing their best to lose no more. While the International Commission was at Kara-Tarla, a *parlementaire* was exchanged with the Russians, partly to see whether there was any possibility of coming to an arrangement. Colonel Dimitrief was the officer employed upon this service, and he was conducted into the insurgent lines with all the formalities usual upon such occasions. His eyes were bandaged, and his horse was led by a soldier. He at first exhibited some nervousness at finding himself thus blindfolded in the midst of Bashi-Bazouks; but, on being assured by the officer in command that no harm should happen to him, he adopted a jocose manner, and made himself agreeable to those with whom he had been brought into contact. It was soon apparent, however, that no arrangement with the insurgents was possible. The Russians were determined to remain in occupation of the country; the patriots, on the other hand, were equally resolved not to yield anything to the invaders. No animosity towards Colonel Dimitrief was shown by the inhabitants of the villages through which he passed. Considering the outrages which, not many months before, had been committed by the Muscovite soldiers, this may appear remarkable; but, unless when under the immediate influence of rage or fanaticism, the Turks are a charitable and forgiving race. They had no especial quarrel with Colonel Dimitrief, and probably looked upon him simply as a soldier performing his duty. The interview with the insurgent chief being at an end, the Russian officer left the headquarters of his adversary, and, again

blindfolded, was conducted back whence he came. Some days later, Colonel Dimitrief sent a message to Colonel St. Clair, asking him to enter the Russian lines, so as to confer once more upon the matters in dispute. The insurgent chief refused, and it was thought not improbable that there would be a speedy renewal of hostilities on a large scale. A species of truce had existed for some time past; but it was a truce of a very lax description, and several minor encounters had recently committed. They also demanded the punishment of several officers and soldiers for being concerned in the burning of villages, and for having, contrary to a promise given by Russia, attempted in several respects to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano before those stipulations had been ratified by the general agreement of the Powers. These conditions were embodied in a document which was conveyed to the Russian military authorities as early as May; but three months later the demands of the insurgents were still unsatisfied, and the patriot bands remained on the defensive against any attack by the opposing forces. The Russians are said to have offered at a later period to pay ten liras for each house they had destroyed; but this was refused, as not being sufficient. In excuse for their acts, the Russians alleged that the villages were burned down in consequence of the sympathy with the insurgents manifested by their inhabitants, and because of a night-attack on a party of one hundred-and-fifty Russians encamped at the foot of the Rhodopes, on which occasion more than half their number were killed. But this was an admission that non-com-



GREEK FÊTE AT ATHENS.

taken place between the Russians and the patriots. On the 14th of August, two battalions of Russians and Bulgarians, ultimately reinforced by two squadrons of cavalry, attempted to surround the village of Karamusala, but were defeated with considerable loss. Still, these actions were on rather a small scale, and for the most part the two sides regarded one another with jealous watchfulness, but with evident disinclination to come to a general engagement.

The insurgents, however, were determined not to make peace, unless an indemnity were paid by the Russians for offences contrary to international law which the mountaineers charged them with having

batants had been made to suffer for acts committed by combatants in the ordinary prosecution of a state of war; and was therefore no excuse at all.

The position of the insurgents was very peculiar. They were not merely in opposition to the Russians; it might almost be said that they were in opposition to the Turkish Government as well. At any rate, they were waging on their own account a war in which the Turkish Government had no share, and which was directed against a Power with whom Turkey was professedly at peace. Yet there was no disloyalty to the Sultan on the part of these humble mountaineers. Every evening at sunset, they shouted "Long live the Padishah!" and all judicial sentences were executed in the Sultan's name. Nevertheless, the patriots refused to pay rates or taxes to the Government at Constantinople, excepting the tithes on corn. They argued that if the rates and taxes were expended for the benefit of the country, it would be quite another matter, and they would in that case feel not the least objection to paying them; but they were disgusted with the profligacy of Turkish Pashas, and the rapacity of Turkish officials. While nominally loyal to the Sultan, and really determined to support the independence of the Empire against a relentless foe, they had in fact established a species of local republic, characterised by those severe and simple virtues which are often found among the inhabitants of mountains. The Ottoman Government cannot have been altogether satisfied with the position of the insurgents towards itself; yet to a great extent it must have sympathised with their efforts to keep the Russians at bay. The situation, altogether, was perplexing, and was one of many awkward results proceeding from a peace which necessity had enforced, but against which all the instincts of the popular heart rose in angry and wild defiance.

While the forces of the insurrection and the forces of the Russians were thus watching each other, the mountaineers frequently committed raids on villages just beyond the border line. The Bulgarian peasants seldom offered any resistance, being too much afraid of the consequences. The object of these attacks was simply to obtain cattle, and the insurgents would often send word to the Bulgarians that they contemplated such a visit, but would defer it if a certain number of cattle were forthcoming. The hamlets so attacked were those in which no Russian troops were stationed. The assailants were therefore sure of having it all their own way, and the Russian advanced posts were at such wide distances along the line that the insurgents were able to slip between them under cover of the night. The Russians alleged that on some of these occasions the Bulgarian villages were burned; yet they took no steps against similar catastrophes. General Panteleef, who was in command at Haskeui, told the correspondent of the *Daily News* that he did not conceive existing circumstances warranted the Russians in making any serious attack on the insurgents, as they had little to gain by so doing, and could achieve success only at the price of very heavy losses. He thought that Turkey herself should undertake the task of restoring order; but Turkey had no motive for putting herself in a position of antagonism to men who, after all, were asserting the rights and dignity of Islam against a Christian invader. Some pacific arrangement, however, was clearly desirable, for a very anarchical state existed in some portions of the Rhodope country. The Mohammedans were inflamed with animosity against the Bulgarians and the Greeks alike; the Greeks and the Bulgarians, while equally detesting the Mohammedans, were at issue with one another. The Hellenic population was in a minority, and the belief was general that its interests were to be sacrificed to those of the Sclaves. Colonel St. Clair did his best to control the excesses of his irregular troops; but many of those troops were men whose predatory habits it was almost impossible to hold in check. The insurgent army was believed to amount to nearly 40,000 men; and an officer high in command admitted that at least fifteen per cent. consisted of professional brigands. Most guerilla forces contain a very considerable proportion of doubtful characters, and, as the discipline is necessarily more lax than in regularly constituted armies, acts of violence and theft are certain to occur in numerous instances. It cannot be questioned, however, that the vast majority of the insurgents were men of high character and patriotic aims, whose action had been provoked by Russian and Bulgarian cruelties, and who had no other object than to deliver their country from an alien and remorseless tyranny. The Turkish authorities continued to shut their eyes to the various methods by which the movement was supported from without. It was the population of the Rhodope Mountains themselves who supplied the fighting men; but weapons and money were conveyed to them from other parts of the Turkish Empire. In the month of August, three hundred rifles arrived from a port in the Ægean, and it is difficult to see how they can have reached their destination without the connivance of the Turkish officials. The Russians were undoubtedly entitled to protest against such secret assistance, and, in September, the Turks, acting under

severe pressure, put a stop to the importation of arms and ammunition. Yet the Russians had themselves, at the period of the Servian war of 1876, attacked Turkey while nominally at peace with her; so that Turkey was now doing nothing more than paying them back in their own coin, with a degree of moral justification which was entirely wanting to their own transgression.

this reservation a Turkish circular was issued on the 8th of August. It would seem to have been called forth by a note from the Athenian Cabinet, dated July 17th, requesting the Porte to nominate Commissioners, in common with the Greek Government, to settle the question of the boundaries. The Porte made no direct answer to this note; but the circular of August 8th was apparently in-



TOWN AND FORT OF DOMOKO, FRONTIER OF THESSALY.

The demands of Greece for a rectification of frontier were much discussed in the summer of 1878. By Article XXIV. of the Treaty of Berlin, the Great Powers, following a suggestion made at the thirteenth sitting of the Congress, reserved to themselves the right of offering their mediation to the Sublime Porte and to Greece, in case the two Governments should not agree on this subject. The Ottoman Plenipotentiaries declared that the Porte reserved to itself the right of explaining to the Powers what they regarded as the real condition of affairs concerning Greece; and in accordance with tended as an indirect reply. At the outset, it was remarked that the Cabinet of Athens had endeavoured to prove that it was owing to the counsels and assurances of some of the Great Powers that it had abstained during a long period of time from any act of aggression against the estates of the Sultan, hoping in this way to show that the Powers who had thus paralysed the action of Greece were now its debtors, and loyally bound to support the Hellenic claims. The Turkish Government conceived it had a right to affirm that the abstention of Greece from any direct act of hostility



THE INSURRECTION IN CRETE: FORT PALEOCASTRO.

towards Turkey was due, not merely to regard for the counsels and promises of certain European Powers, but more especially to the constant defeat of all its measures for getting itself guaranteed against the results of such an enterprise. Yet it was now demanded by Greece that Epirus, Thessaly, and the island of Crete, should be annexed to the Kingdom; and this requirement was justified by arguments which the Turkish Government entirely repudiated. Such a demand, it was contended, contradicted all the principles of political right, and rested on entirely erroneous historical data. The inhabitants of Crete, according to the circular, had never taken up arms against the legitimate authority of the Sublime Porte, or against each other, except at the instigation of intriguers from abroad. Their country had been invaded by bands of foreigners organized in Greece; and the object of these bands was not to give succour to brethren already in arms, but to involve them in war, without provocation or pretext. "Thus," said the despatch, "to consider only the third Cretan insurrection—that of 1867, the longest and the bloodiest: it is a fact that the island itself did not rise in insurrection, but experienced a veritable Greek invasion. On the very day the invasion ceased—that is to say, when the insurrection found nothing more to nourish it from without—the island was pacified as if by witchery. The result of this sad enterprise was the ruin of Crete, the removal of three-fourths of the unfortunate inhabitants, who were obliged to expatriate themselves, the exhaustion of Greece, and the loss of many brave Ottoman soldiers, defenders of their Sovereign's rights. It was also, or it ought to be, a striking and painful proof of the true character of Cretan movements, always and exclusively egged on by Greece, who takes no thought of the calamities which she periodically calls down on this unhappy island."

The annexation of Crete to Greece had, however, been disallowed by the Congress, and the Turkish despatch therefore proceeded to examine the arguments adduced by the Cabinet of Athens in favour of removing Epirus and Thessaly from the dominion of the Porte, and transferring them to that of the Hellenic monarch. It was alleged by the Greeks that those two provinces had for many years been plunged into a state of suffering, discontent, and effervescence. In opposition to this statement, the Turkish Government affirmed that from 1829, when the feudal system was abolished, to 1853, the provinces in question had lived in perfect tranquillity, excepting only for a brief period in 1845, when the Mussulman population of Lower Albania rose in rebellion—a rebellion which was soon quelled, and which had nothing whatever to do with the claims for independence attributed to the Christians. "In 1853," said the Turkish despatch, "Epirus and Thessaly were invaded by two Greek army-corps, who laid the country waste, and perpetrated on the property and persons of the Christians themselves, whom they pretended they had come to deliver, such excesses as compelled France and England to occupy the Piræus in order to put an end to them. Again, after fifteen years of quiet, these two provinces were troubled afresh with hostile attempts, publicly prepared under the eyes of the Hellenic Government. Bands of volunteers crossed from Greece into Thessaly and Epirus, carrying into those countries fire and sword, obliging the inhabitants, as the Imperial Government is prepared to prove, to rise against their lawful rulers, but finally failing before the wisdom and loyalty of all the people. Then it was that in view of these failures the Government of his Hellenic Majesty, discouraged by the inflexible refusal of Russia to give Greece a share in the fruit of her victories, and feeling that opportunities slip away, caused its army to invade Ottoman territory without rupture of diplomatic relations, and in full peace, in order to secure what M. Delyannis called the objects of the national aspirations." It was contended by the Turkish Foreign Minister (Safvet Pasha) that the inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly had always lived in peace under the Ottoman authorities; that they had never taken up arms to assert supposititious claims; that they had sometimes endured, but never invoked, the intervention of a neighbouring country; and that, if rendered secure from the enterprises set on foot by that neighbour, they would continue to live happily and prosperously under the laws of the Ottoman Empire. Greece had contended that, by giving Epirus and Thessaly to her, Europe would close for ever the era of struggles and conflicts between that Kingdom and the Turkish Empire, and would thus consolidate its work of peace; but M. Delyannis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and chief representative of his country at the Congress, had taken pains to deprive this argument of all credibility and force by letting it be understood, at the very outset of his communication to the High Assembly, that the true and only wishes of the Hellenic Government were, and always had been, to unite under the same sway all countries inhabited by Greeks. It was therefore evident that, even if her present demands were allowed, similar claims would speedily be made in respect of other provinces. "Such," concluded Safvet Pasha, "are the chief facts and considerations which impose on the

Sublime Porte the duty of appealing to Europe itself from the opinion expressed in the Congress concerning the granting to Greece of some additional territory." The Sultan and his Government were convinced that the Great Powers would modify their first opinion, and would urge on the Cabinet of Athens counsels of rectitude and prudence, calculated to turn it from an enterprise equally unjust and impolitic.

The arguments contained in this Turkish despatch were warmly upheld by some parties in England. If Greece had joined in the late war, as Servia and Roumania had done, and had obtained definite successes, as in the case of those two Principalities, the demand for a rectification of frontier would have been reasonable, and indeed impossible to resist. A successful belligerent is in a position to make his own terms, and the defeated party can, at the best, only hope to modify them. But a country which has taken no part in a war has no ground for coming forward at the close, and saying, "I must have this or that province, in satisfaction of what I believe to be my rights." The Greek argument, that Greece was entitled to receive something on account of her generosity in abstaining from a junction with the enemies of Turkey, was absurd. She had every disposition to join in the crusade; and that she abstained was due not so much to the dissuasions of England as to the fear of consequences if the issue should be against her, and if Russia (as was highly probable) should decline to support her cause. The upholders of Turkey argued that the demand for Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, was a request that Turkey, without being under any military compulsion so far as Greece was concerned, should make that Power a present of three large and valuable provinces, without getting anything in return. If the same requisition had been made of any other Power in the world, its absurdity would have been universally acknowledged. But for many years past it has been the custom, in certain quarters, to make Turkey an exception to all rules, and to deal with her on assumptions which in the West of Europe would be condemned as at once dishonest and ridiculous. The principle of nationality is admirable from the point of view of popular right; but it is one which no Government is entitled to urge against any other Government. Such a principle being once admitted within the ordinary circles of diplomacy, there is no great composite Empire which might not be required at any moment to relinquish a large part of its possessions. If the people of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, could by their own efforts have thrown off the Turkish yoke, and united themselves to Greece, they would have had the most indefeasible right to do so; and any foreign Power which should have stepped in to aid Turkey in re-establishing her sway over populations that had cast it off would have committed an outrage upon moral and political right, as flagrant and detestable as that which Russia committed in 1849 in the case of Austria and Hungary. But the Government of Greece had no right to require of the Government of Turkey that the Ottoman Empire should dismember itself for the aggrandisement of the Hellenic Kingdom; nor had any other Power the right to make such a demand, or to support Greece in making it. There was not even any evidence, of a convincing nature, that the Epirotes, Thessalians, and Cretans, speaking in the general, desired the contemplated transfer. That the local movements were powerfully stimulated from without, is unquestionable; and the degree of internal support which they obtained is a matter still involved in very considerable doubt.

Greece, however, was not disposed to give up her cause without making an effort to obtain success. On the 7th of September, the Hellenic Government sent a circular note to the Six Powers, soliciting their mediation, in order that the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin might be carried into effect. The Grand Vizier had told the Greek Government that the Porte could not act upon the invitation of Greece before receiving from the Powers an answer to its recent despatch. "This evasive reply," said the Greek circular, "is calculated to prejudice any understanding between the two Governments as regards the execution of the decision formed by the Congress, and tends to drive the Hellenic Government into a vicious circle, by placing insurmountable difficulties in its path. In presence of this attitude of the Porte, the Greek Government considers that the time has arrived for addressing itself to the Powers who have the right of mediation." The appeal did not meet with a very warm reception at the time. England was disinclined to take any immediate action, and the other Powers were apparently not willing to move without the concurrence of the British Government. The proposed cession to Greece sanctioned by the Congress included the greater part of Thessaly and Epirus, though not the whole of those States; but the demands of Greece went farther. Turkey was not opposed to a moderate satisfaction of the Greek desires, and it was unfair to expect that she should denude herself of important provinces for the satisfaction of a

neighbour whose demands seemed to have a faculty of endless growth.

The question, after going to sleep for awhile, was revived in the later autumn, when the French Cabinet made proposals for joint action on the part of the Six Powers, with a view to obtaining from the Porte a recognition of the principle that the Greek frontiers ought to be rectified. The suggestions contained in this circular were accepted by Italy, Germany, and Russia, and urgent representations were made by France and Italy combined to induce the Porte to yield. In response to these solicitations, the Turkish Ministry evinced some willingness to grant a slight rectification of the Turko-Greek frontier; but the Greek demands underwent no abatement, and even exceeded what had been sanctioned by the Congress, for the Government of Athens required the district of Janina, in the southern part of Albania, which was north of the line traced out by the assembled Powers. This unaccommodating mood, however, did not prevent Turkey from endeavouring to effect some amicable arrangement, and, at a Cabinet Council held at Constantinople on the 15th of November, Safvet Pasha pointed out the necessity of coming to an understanding with Greece before any foreign mediation should intervene for the execution of the Berlin Treaty. Ultimately, the Council advised the Sultan to accept the frontier line recommended by the Congress, so far as Thessaly was concerned, but, as regarded Epirus, suggested that Turkey should cede only a fourth part of the province, and should not give up Janina. The English Cabinet soon joined the other Powers in their endeavours to put pressure on the Porte with reference to the demands of Greece. Near the end of December, the Sultan appointed a Commission for the arrangement of the Greek frontier in accordance with the suggestions of the Berlin Congress. On the Greek side, also, commissioners were named, and the matter stood over for settlement in the new year then about to commence. Turkey even appeared desirous of concluding a defensive alliance with the Hellenic Kingdom; but the day of fraternisation between Turks and Greeks is probably far off in the future, if it is ever to arrive at all.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

The Russian Army in European Turkey—Prevalence of Sickness—Embarkation of Russian Troops at San Stefano, and Retirement from the Vicinity of Constantinople—Evacuation of Erzeroum by the Russians—Intrigues in Eastern Roumelia—Lord Donoughmore and Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff—Official Reproof of the Latter—The Real Intentions of Russia—New Interpretation of the Treaty of San Stefano—Re-occupation by the Russian Troops of the Lines before Constantinople—Pretexts for that Step—Proposals by Russia to conclude a definitive Treaty of Peace with Turkey—Heads of the desired Agreement—First Meeting of the International Commission for the Organization of Eastern Roumelia—Arbitrary Conduct of Prince Dondoukoff—Military Power of Russia south of the Balkans—Intrigues for setting aside the Treaty of Berlin—Insurrection in Macedonia, fostered by the Russian Commanders—Personal Communication from the Czar—Visit of Prince Dondoukoff to Livadia, and of Count Schouvaloff to Pesth—Petition of Southern Bulgarians to the Ambassadors at Constantinople—Macedonia and Bulgaria—Dislike of the Greeks—The Ethnographical Question in the Southern Parts of Turkey—Want of a true Nationality—The Revolt in Albania—Programme of the National League—Efforts towards the Creation of a Federal Empire—The Rising in Crete—Negotiations of Mukhtar Pasha, as Imperial Commissioner, with Deputies from the General Assembly—Turkish Concessions, and Conclusion of a definitive Arrangement.

DELAY in returning to the usual state of peace was observable on the part of both the late belligerents. Turkey was in no hurry to give up Varna, Batoum, and the other cities that were to be yielded to the Czar, or to make those re-arrangements of frontier which had resulted from the struggle just concluded; while, on the other hand, the Russians seemed gladly to avail themselves of every excuse to prolong their stay in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople. Yet the latter had some ground for desiring to remove from that locality as soon as might be. The climate was fatal to a large number of the troops, and nothing but a more northern air appeared likely to restore their health. On the 27th of August, according to official statements, the Russian army south of the Balkans had 14,300 sick, whereas the force north of the Balkans had only 1,950. In the reserve troops there were 4,200 sick; so that, altogether, 20,450 men were disabled by ill-health. This had been the case for a long while; but Russia was not disposed to move her army until the Turks had on their part fulfilled some of the conditions of the peace. After the evacuation of Varna in the early part of August, and the manifestation of a disposition to restrain the patriotic party in other quarters, the invaders began to set their forces in motion. Large bodies of men were assembled at San Stefano, for embarkation

on board the Russian vessels, on the 24th; and the process of removal continued from day to day. When the Grand Duke Nicholas, at the close of March, desired that the embarkation should take place at Bujukdere, he declared that it would be "impossible" to conduct the operation at San Stefano, that all idea of doing so had been abandoned, and that the army would remain where it stood until the British fleet had quitted the Sea of Marmora. By the latter end of August, his successor had discovered that to embark at San Stefano was quite within the range of possibility, and that the departure of the English vessels was not indispensable as a preliminary to the retirement of the Russian troops.

The headquarters of General Todleben were speedily removed from San Stefano to Rodosto, some way farther west on the sea-shore. The evacuation of Batoum by the Turks on the 6th of September was followed by the departure of the Russians from Erzeroum on the 13th and succeeding days; yet abundant opportunities of dissension still remained. While removing from the neighbourhood of Constantinople, the Russians were resolved to retain a large force in other parts of European Turkey; and, although the Treaty of Berlin said that the militia and gendarmerie in Eastern Roumelia should be of a mixed character, and commanded by officers appointed by the Sultan, a Russo-Bulgarian army was being formed in those parts, with a view, doubtless, to the promotion of intrigues having for their object the union of the province with Bulgaria. General Skobeleff is stated to have declared at a public table at Pera, in the presence of Lord Donoughmore (one of the members of the Commission for Eastern Roumelia), the French Consul, and other persons of distinction, that, in the very teeth of the Berlin arrangement, to which Russia had bound herself in common with the other Powers, the Emperor would maintain a force of 100,000 men in Bulgaria, and of 45,000 in Roumelia.* This statement receives some confirmation from a despatch written from Philippopolis on the 21st of September by Lord Donoughmore, and published by the English Government in an official Blue Book.† On the previous day, his Lordship had had a conversation with Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, who said that he desired to speak with him as a private gentleman. "He began," writes Lord Donoughmore, "by saying that, as far as he was able, he should put every obstacle in his power against the carrying out of the English programme, whatever it might be. There was no use disguising the fact: we were face to face as enemies, and he and his countrymen were, as it were, upon their trial. He said there would be disagreements, and very serious disagreements, at and from the very first sitting of the Commission [the European Commission for the Organization of Eastern Roumelia]. He ridiculed the Treaty of Berlin, the Rhodope Commission, the Eastern Roumelian Commission, and everything that had been done at or since the Congress, by the titles of 'Offenbach-isms,' '*comédies, bouffonnades, bouffonneries,*' and such like expressions." These and similar observations having been brought under the notice of the Russian Government by Lord Augustus Loftus, a reply was sent from Livadia (where the Emperor was then staying) on the 5th of November. M. de Giers, the writer of the reply, observed to Lord Augustus that Lord Donoughmore seemed to have attributed to the words used by Prince Dondoukoff in a private interview, and with the warning that he was speaking simply as a private individual, an importance and a signification which did not appear to be in any way justified. "The Imperial Government," said the writer, "have given so many incontrovertible proofs of their conciliatory and pacific disposition that it is really difficult to admit that the least doubt should be entertained of their sincerity in consequence of some imprudent expressions which one of their agents may have let fall in an entirely private conversation. While deploring this fact, I will not fail to warn the Imperial Commissioner in Bulgaria of the unfortunate misunderstanding which has resulted. I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity to assure your Excellency that, the intention of my august master being to secure to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin all the respect which is due to them, and to establish on the basis of their faithful execution the peace and tranquillity which are so generally desired, none of his Majesty's officers is likely in any respect to depart from this course, or to fail in the duties which result from it."

The disavowal contained in this communication from M. de Giers was precisely what might have been anticipated. No Government could adopt such blunt sincerities as those of Prince Dondoukoff, or so far forget the traditions of diplomacy as to show its hand at the very beginning of the game. Yet it is impossible to doubt that the Prince spoke frankly and truly, and that the Russian Government equivocated. The original design of Russia, as shadowed forth in the Treaty of San Stefano, was to create one large Bulgarian Principality, reaching from the Danube to the Ægean, and from the Black Sea to within the borders of Albania. When,

* Pera Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*.

† Parliamentary Papers on Turkey, issued in March, 1879.

owing to the interposition of England, this proposed State was divided into two, of which that called Eastern Roumelia was to remain much more under the direct government of the Porte than the other, all the opponents of Lord Beaconsfield maintained that, supposing the Czar to have any sinister designs, the new arrangement would give him much greater facilities for carrying them out than the plan which it superseded. The absurdity of the remark is obvious; for it is clear that underhand work to neutralise as far as possible the adjustment which had been sanctioned by the Powers. The troops of the Czar controlled every manifestation of independent life in Eastern Roumelia; and Prince Dondoukoff, whose removal, after the language he had recently employed, would seem to have been imperative, continued to exercise his functions on both sides of the Balkans.

In October, Russian policy underwent a new development, and one which caused considerable



KAVALA, ON THE SEA-COAST OF ROUMELIA.

influences can be more readily exercised in a single State than in two States, as in the latter case two distinct sets of agencies must be maintained, and two local Governments, instead of one, must be cajoled or bribed, counteracted or intimidated. At the Congress, Russia did not consent to the duality without considerable opposition and unwillingness, nor without such pressure on the part of England as amounted to a clear intimation of her resolve to go to war, rather than allow the creation of a Bulgaria such as Prince Gortschakoff and General Ignatieff had sketched out in their imaginary map. It is certain that Russia accepted the English project on compulsion, and that she immediately set to uneasiness, both in England and on the Continent. It was contended that, as between Russia and Turkey, the Treaty of Berlin was not the final and absolute Treaty of Peace; and reference was made to the Twenty-fifth Article of the preliminaries of San Stefano, which provided that the evacuation of Turkey in Europe, excepting Bulgaria, should be complete in three months after the conclusion of the definitive peace between the Emperor and the Sultan. By a strange and not very creditable omission, no stipulation was made in the Treaty of Berlin as to the evacuation of Turkey Proper, whether in Europe or Asia. The Russians, therefore, fell back on Article XXV. of the earlier

THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF BULGARIA: SOLDIERS MAKING THEMSELVES AT HOME IN A BULGARIAN COTTAGE.

agreement, and asserted their right to remain in the Sultan's territory until a quarter of a year after the definitive treaty had been concluded. Negotiations with a view to such a treaty were urged upon the Turkish Government, which exhibited no great readiness to comply; and immediately afterwards the retirement of the Russian troops was arrested. Again setting their faces towards the south, they once more occupied the lines of Tchekmedje and Tchataldja, in the vicinity of Constantinople, about the 10th of October. The pretext for this menacing step was found in an alleged series of outrages committed by the Turks upon the Christians as soon as the Muscovite soldiers had turned their backs. It is only too probable that the fanatical Mohammedans, on finding themselves released from control, revenged upon the equally fanatical Bulgarians some of the ferocious crimes which, under Russian protection, they had been committing in the Rhodope Mountains. Ever since the game of massacre had been set going by the Bulgarians, acting at the instigation of Pansclavist agents, in May, 1876, there had been a horrible alternation of atrocities, according as each side got the upper hand. But the Russians would have been better occupied in curbing the excesses of their own troops, and of their brutalised peasant allies, than in interfering with the administration of Turkish affairs. The true motive for the reoccupation of the lines before Constantinople seems to have been the desire to coerce the Porte into granting a definitive treaty of a nature favourable to the demands of Russia.

By the terms of the proposed document, the Czar and the Sultan alike engaged themselves to respect the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty, as well as those provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano which were not abrogated or modified by the Congress of Berlin. In Article IV., the following principles were laid down as to indemnities, territorial occupation, &c. :—"(*a*) The Porte shall pay an indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles, exclusive of territorial concessions. (*b*) The Porte shall pay an indemnity of 10,000,000 roubles to Russian subjects whose interests have been injured. (*c*) The Porte shall pay to the Danube International Commission 500,000 francs for the purpose of putting the Sulina Channel into a proper state, and shall accept any further outlay for repairing the damages caused by the military operations. (*d*) In the territories ceded to Russia, the Mussulman inhabitants shall, during a term of three years, have full liberty to sell their property, and emigrate to Turkey. (*e*) In the territory temporarily occupied by Russian troops, the existing administration shall continue, and the Porte shall not interfere therein till the expiration of the term agreed on. (*f*) At the expiration of this term the Russian troops will retire, according to the treaties, in an order which will be determined by a special convention, to be hereafter concluded. (*g*) The Turkish authorities shall not, after the retirement of the Russians, bear themselves revengefully towards the inhabitants who may be supposed to have compromised themselves. (*h*) A general amnesty shall be granted to all Bulgarians and others who are, justly or unjustly, supposed to have shown sympathy with and given assistance to the Russians; and all who are at present imprisoned on such charges shall be at once liberated." By Article V., it was declared that all previous treaties and stipulations, in so far as they were not affected by the new act, would remain in force, and be duly respected by both contracting parties; and Article VI. provided that for all matters of detail arbitrators would be appointed. This projected treaty was submitted to the Porte in the latter part of September, but did not meet with a very favourable reception. It was then that certain isolated outrages, committed by Mohammedans on Christians, were magnified into something like a general massacre; and the Russian troops were ordered to return to their former lines. On the 10th of October, Prince Labanoff informed the Grand Vizier that the Czar's soldiers would not be withdrawn from Adrianople until the signature of the definitive treaty. The pistol was in fact levelled point-blank at the head of Turkey, and it was intimated that she must yield, on peril of a permanent occupation.

The European Commission for organising Eastern Roumelia held its preliminary meeting on the 30th of September. The Commissioners assembled in the Grand Vizier's summer residence at Kanlidja, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus; and, on receiving the several members, Safvet Pasha made a short speech, in which he said that the Sultan and his Government were most anxious to further the welfare of the province in question, and that a Turkish Commissioner would shortly lay before his colleagues a scheme of reform with that object. It was proposed by the chief Russian Commissioner that one of the Turkish representatives should act as president at the preliminary sittings. The concession to the Porte was somewhat remarkable, because the Russian Commissioners had at first contested the right of the Sultan to be represented at all. In this view, however, they were supported simply by Germany, which supported Russia in all things; and they then abandoned their opposition, and seemed desirous of gaining

their objects by a show of courtesy. The business transacted at the first meeting was chiefly formal, and it was arranged that the Commission should ultimately remove to Philippopolis, where the duties of President would be fulfilled by all the First Commissioners in rotation. After many preliminary negotiations, the Commission passed, on the 17th of October, a resolution enumerating and defining the rights and obligations conferred upon it by Article XIX. of the Treaty of Berlin, which provided that the European Commission should be charged to administer the finances of the province, in concert with the Sublime Porte, until the completion of the new organization. It was further resolved that the Commission should at once enter upon its financial duties; and for this purpose a sub-commission was appointed, composed of the French, English, and Turkish Second Commissioners, whose first duty would be to inquire into the existing Russo-Bulgarian administration. Under the directions of Prince Dondoukoff, the Russians had been taking upon themselves a much greater share in the government of Eastern Roumelia than they were entitled to assume. One of the Russian members of the Commission frankly declared that the Muscovite authorities would rule the province in accordance with the Treaty of San Stefano, and not with reference to the Treaty of Berlin. Hereupon, Sir Drummond Wolff, one of the English members, said he had received orders from his Government to insist on the Treaty of Berlin being carried out in Roumelia. The other Commissioners supported this view, and the Russian representative abandoned the position he had rashly taken up. The first meeting at Philippopolis was held on the 30th of October, when the place of assembly was immediately surrounded by a crowd of Bulgarians, who clamoured for the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria. On subsequent occasions, several of the Commissioners were mobbed and insulted by the people, especially the women; and petitions were presented in favour of incorporation with the new Principality north of the Balkans. The excitement in particular circles was great; but the agitators found little encouragement among the representatives of the Powers.

Yet the unconciliatory mood of Russia still made itself felt in various ways. Prince Dondoukoff was resolved not to hand over the administration of Eastern Roumelia to a Christian Governor appointed by the Porte, so long as the Russian military occupation of the province continued; alleging as his justification that the Treaty of Berlin did not fix a date for the Governor to enter upon his functions. The Porte insisted on the financial administration of the province being transferred to its agents, subject to the control of the Commission. But this demand met with little support, and the deliberations of the Commissioners soon came to a deadlock. Meanwhile, the military position of the Russians in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia became stronger every week. In the latter country alone, it was believed that there were 80,000 troops in the final days of October. The native armies in course of formation in both provinces were placed under Russian officers, equipped with Russian arms, and commanded in the Russian tongue. Forcible enlistments were frequent, and the military authorities laughed at the idea of ever giving up Eastern Roumelia to the Turks. Prince Dondoukoff and the Bulgarian Exarch came to an agreement that the Russian language should be forthwith introduced into the Bulgarian Church; and a certain number of Bulgarian priests at once set out for Russia, to learn the ecclesiastical ceremonies commonly practised in that Empire. In every way, Russia was seeking to identify the territory occupied by her armies with her own immediate possessions. General Ignatieff, or, failing him, Prince Dondoukoff, was talked of as the future ruler of Bulgaria; and, for the present, the latter of those officers was actually exercising all the rights of sovereignty. In an official despatch, written on October 22nd, Prince Dondoukoff openly spoke of Eastern Roumelia as Southern Bulgaria. When conversing with a correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, he observed that, it being impossible to allow any more Bulgarians to be butchered by the Turks, there was no chance that the grotesque idea of an Eastern Roumelia, conceived by the Berlin Congress, could be realised. The Russians, he said, would not evacuate the country; and he related that when the troops began to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Constantinople, a hundred and sixty-two Christian villages south of Adrianople sent in petitions, conjuring them to remain. Some of these Bulgarians observed that they had it in their power to bring the Russians back, whether they wished it or not. They, the Bulgarians, would kill all the Turks living among them. The Turks of the neighbouring districts would in their turn kill all the Bulgarians they could lay their hands on; and this general massacre would speedily lead to the reoccupation of the country by the Russians. Prince Dondoukoff, in his conversation with the Vienna correspondent, seemed to regard the argument as conclusive; and the general tenor of his remarks was in perfect accordance with those reported by Lord Donoughmore to the English Government.

At the same period, the union of Adrianople with Eastern Roumelia was demanded in addresses got up in that city by a number of Bulgarian revolutionists. The establishment of a united Bulgaria, according to the delimitation of the San Stefano preliminaries, was also required; and it was well known that all these movements were encouraged by the Russian officials, and prosecuted under their immediate protection.* But the agitation was not simply confined to the presenting of petitions. An insurrection broke out in Macedonia, where the peasantry were armed and equipped by the Sclave committees of Russia. Numerous Russian volunteers acted with the rebels, and the avowed object of the rising was to extend the new Bulgaria to the Ægean Sea. The ranks of the insurgents were further augmented by the Bulgarian militia, then being organised under Muscovite supervision. It was asserted that from time to time whole regiments marched for the south, with the knowledge of their superior officers. The rebels thus aided were enabled to inflict some defeats upon the Turkish troops; but the Mohammedan populace rose in considerable numbers to support the authority of the Sultan, and in some quarters the Bulgarian bands were put to flight. The Porte protested against these open attempts to destroy its rule in provinces which the Treaty of Berlin had still left beneath the government of Constantinople; yet Russia, while denying her complicity, took no effectual measures to suppress the evil.

In the early part of October, the heads of one hundred and twenty Bulgarian communities assembled at a village near Kuprili, on the Vardar. At this meeting, a Bulgarian notable, after describing the misery endured by his countrymen from the cruelties inflicted on them, said he had recently visited Bulgaria and Roumelia, where he had met high personages and patriots, to whom he made his complaint. Their answer was that they should rise and help themselves; upon which he promised to lead his brethren in the holy war that appeared to be desired. The assembly unanimously passed a resolution, which they sealed with an oath, to fight until they had achieved their freedom; and the appearance of several bands in various parts of Macedonia speedily followed this meeting. The total number was estimated at 8,000 men, who were said to be divided into four commands. The seat of the working committee of the insurrection was believed to be at Kustendil, a town on the south-western borders of the Bulgaria created by the Treaty of Berlin, and a position very favourable to the prosecution of operations in Macedonia. The annexation of the town had on this account been strongly opposed by Turkey in the Committee of Delimitation at the Congress; but her very reasonable objections were disregarded. Other revolutionary bodies sat at Sophia, Rustchuk, Philippopolis, Adrianople, and various large towns of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The insurgents were well armed with weapons of the newest kinds; the committees appeared to be in possession of ample resources; and the Turks asserted that the rebel bands constantly passing into Macedonia were regularly organised, equipped, and drilled, in the districts bordering on Sophia.

The complicity of Russia became in time so notorious that the Czar considered it necessary to communicate a personal note to the Powers, with a view to removing this impression. The note was written from Livadia on the 4th of November, and declared that a strict observance of the Treaty of Berlin formed the basis of the Imperial policy. A note was likewise sent off, announcing that the Czar had enjoined the execution of the Treaty on all his functionaries. But not long after the despatch of these communications, Prince Dondoukoff proceeded to Livadia to report on the existing state of things in Bulgaria, and to represent that the execution of the Treaty of Berlin was a sheer impossibility, as the Bulgarians would take up arms to oppose the separation of Eastern Roumelia from their own State. In those November days, the political circles of Europe were also much interested in a journey by Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador at London, to the Hungarian capital, where he had interviews with the Emperor of Austria and Count Andrassy. The intention of his visit was to persuade the Austro-Hungarian monarch to support the desire of Russia for the appointment of another Congress, charged to revise the stipulations of the Berlin Treaty. The Count, however, did not meet with any encouragement at Pesth, and Russia was compelled to rely on indirect efforts for the realization of her plans.

After his visit to the Emperor at Livadia, Prince Dondoukoff was a little more cautious in his public utterances, and even went so far as to advise the Bulgarians not to compromise the success of their cause by unseasonable and inopportune manifestations. Yet it does not appear that his conduct materially differed from what it had been before. In a more guarded way, but none the less effectually, he gave encouragement to the leaders and agents of the Pan-Bulgarian movement, and the scattered insurrections in the southern parts of Turkey

* Berlin Correspondent of the *Times*, writing on October 28th, 1878.

continued with undiminished violence. The malcontents had for some time past been recommending their case to the judgment of Europe. On the 28th of October, a deputation of southern Bulgarians presented to the British and French Ambassadors at Constantinople a petition of considerable length, the object of which was to prove that the Principality of Bulgaria should include all the territories contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano. "The Congress," said this petition, "while endeavouring to better the condition of the Christians, has done the greatest wrong to the Bulgarians of Roumelia and Macedonia—the two provinces which have suffered most. Roumelia, occupied by the most highly developed section of the Bulgarian people, and for this reason the most severely martyrised, deserved a better fate. In no case should she have been left outside the Principality. Forming part of the latter, she would have contributed largely to the formation of an intelligent administration, and would have become the nucleus of a progressive State. Macedonia, the cradle of the Bulgarian people, is unjustly separated from Bulgaria, and, to crown the injustice, she is left completely under the rule of the Turkish Government. The promise of the Turks, that they will carry out in Macedonia the charter granted to Crete in 1868, leaves but slight hope to the Macedonians that their condition will be ameliorated. The separation of Macedonia was decided upon under the pretext of protecting the Greek element against a pretended absorption into the Bulgarian. A more unjust decision could not have been imagined. It has been found expedient to abandon a million and a half Bulgarians to groan under the Turkish yoke, in order to save from an imaginary absorption the Greeks of about a hundred villages, all situated on the south-eastern frontier of Macedonia. We believe that the measure does not even protect the true interests of the Greek minority. Encircled within the Principality, that minority would have enjoyed the benefit of a Constitutional Government, which would have secured to them, in common with all the other subjects of the country, equal rights before the law, while, under the Turkish law, the Greeks are condemned to remain indefinitely mere despicable Ghiaours. But if the guarantees which the Bulgarian system would afford to the Greeks for the preservation of their nationality had been deemed insufficient by the Congress of Berlin, it would have been easy to place those villages outside the frontiers of Bulgaria."

The petition went on to remark that Macedonia deserved the attentive consideration of Europe from another point of view, as in many parts of that province the Beys were the exclusive proprietors of the land, while the Christians were reduced to a state of serfdom. When the Congress assembled at Berlin, the inhabitants of Thrace and Macedonia believed that the period of slavery and suffering had come to an end, and that better days would dawn upon them; but it had since appeared that they were to remain under the very Government which was responsible for the innumerable woes they had been made to suffer. Who, they asked, was to guarantee the carrying out of the reforms promised by the Treaty of Berlin? It could not be doubted that the Porte would use every effort to give preponderance to the small number of Mussulmans who remained in the provinces, while other influences would perhaps be brought to bear in favour of the Greeks. But this would be simply an attempt to annihilate the nationality of the Bulgarians, who, according to the petition, formed the overwhelming majority of the population in Roumelia and Macedonia. The petitioners were as much averse from a Greek domination as from a Turkish. Their countrymen, they alleged, had for twenty years been struggling single-handed to release themselves from the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Greek Patriarch, because they regarded that supremacy as the beginning of a political despotism, which the insignificant Greek minority believed they could establish. "The Bulgarians," said the petitioners, "wish to oppress no other nationality which may be formed in their country. They will give full liberty to all to develop themselves; but they will likewise use every means at their disposal, rather than submit to a minority, and accept a decree which would slowly bring about their national death at the purest and most ancient centre of their race."

The representations contained in this petition were not altogether wanting in truth. The Bulgarians of Macedonia and Roumelia had no doubt suffered in some respects from Turkish misgovernment, and it was probable that they would continue to suffer from the state of anarchy produced by the events of recent years; but they appear to have greatly overstated their case as regards their numbers and position in the southern provinces of Turkey. The aboriginal population of those regions was not Bulgarian, nor even Sclavonic in any modern sense of the word, though there may perhaps have been some remote ethnographical affinity. The Macedonians of the ancient world were Illyrians mingled with Greeks, and in more modern times a large infusion of Hellenic blood (such as Hellenic blood now is) has been poured into the race. The Greeks and semi-Greeks, if they do

not form the majority, are at any rate the most intelligent and progressive element of the population, and it is certain that, if they were to be subjected to Bulgarian predominance, the interests of civilisation would suffer. There is in fact no distinct nationality in that part of Europe. A large number of detached communities, Bulgarian, Greek, Turkish, and nondescript, are loosely scattered about the land; and if the right of government is to be taken from the Turks, who have so difficult to appease. Where antagonistic races dwell side by side, without any prospect of their intermingling, the mailed arm of the soldier is the only thing which can restrain them from murderous attempts at mutual extermination. This office had been performed by the military government of the Turks; and that government was attended by some practical benefits which the Bulgarians should have been the last to forget. When they talked of releasing themselves from the ecclesiastical domination



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exercised it, with more or less success, for many centuries, it is hard to say who should have the reversion. By right of numbers, it might possibly go to the Bulgarians; by right of intelligence, it would certainly go to the Greeks; but neither race is qualified to assume the task of administration in a spirit of wisdom and tolerance. Remove the strong hand of military force, and a relentless war of races at once ensues. The weakening of Turkish power by Russian intrigues and invasion at once produced this effect, as all intelligent observers knew beforehand that it would. Whatever the faults of Turkish rule, it had at least prevented those internecine struggles which are so deadly and of the Greek Patriarch, they should have recollected that it was the Ottoman Porte which delivered them from the bondage they had long deplored.

There were few portions of the Turkish Empire in Europe which were not convulsed with revolution in the autumn of 1878. In Albania, the disturbances which had already resulted in the death of Mehemet Ali continued with accelerated force. By October, the Turkish authorities had lost all control over the province, and the National League was supreme. Several clans refused to send contingents to fight against the Christian insurrection in Macedonia, unless upon the most positive assurances that their demands

would be granted. The people had been much exasperated by those provisions of the Treaty of Berlin which took away certain portions of Albanian territory for the aggrandizement of other provinces; for the Albanians have a decidedly national feeling, capable, when sufficiently excited, of over-riding even distinctions of religion. At this period of danger to Albanian integrity, Mohammedans and Catholics were seen acting together, and the rule of the Sultan was opposed, not so much because it was despotic, as because it had failed to guard the independence of the country. The programme of the National League was written by a Roman Catholic—one Pasco Bassa. It was here affirmed that no portion of Albanian territory should be annexed to any other nation; that the vilayets of Scutari, Kossova, and Janina, should be formed into a single province, the administration of which should be given to a capable and honest Governor, familiar with the country, and with the character and wants of the populace; that all branches of the administration should be confided to officials acquainted with the Albanian language; that the Communal Councils, those of the sandjaks, and the General Council of the province, should be elected by universal suffrage, irrespective of race or religion; that the affairs of the country should be managed by its own Councils; that Albanian should be the official language of the administration and of the tribunals, though Turkish should still be admitted as the language of intercommunication with Constantinople; and that a national militia, of two hundred battalions, should be formed, in which all those capable of bearing arms should be enrolled, without distinction of class or creed. The authority of the Sultan was not repudiated in this programme; on the contrary, it was distinctly affirmed; but the Albanians, like the Cretans, and the natives of other portions of the Turkish Empire, desired local independence from the bureaucratic despotism of Constantinople. The promises of reform from that quarter had been so frequently broken that men not unnaturally refused to trust them any longer. Through all this tumultuous waste of scattered insurrections, affecting the whole of European Turkey, one principle came very plainly into prominence. This was the principle of Federalism—the institution of some form of local government, by which local necessities should be satisfied, and the abuses of excessive centralization be corrected. If Turkey is to exist in the future—if any new day for her is yet to dawn—it will probably be through the establishment of a species of Federal Empire, held together by submission to the common rule of the Sultan, yet delivered from the tyranny of corrupt Pashas, appointed on the banks of the Bosphorus through the agency of Palace intrigues. With separate Legislatures for each province, and an Imperial Parliament at Constantinople, such as that which was established in December 1876, and suddenly suspended in February, 1878, there is reason to believe that Turkey might still be a powerful and a contented Empire; always providing that the underhand interference of Russia shall be successfully resisted, either by the renewed energy of the Porte, or by the determination of Europe no longer to permit perpetual incentives to rebellion in some of the finest regions of the world.

Much the same demands were made in Crete as in Albania. The opposition to the Sultan's authority in the island was so serious that Mukhtar Pasha, the hero of the Asiatic campaign, was sent thither to see whether by the granting of concessions he could not induce the islanders to abandon their hostility. In his capacity as Imperial Commissioner, he arrived at Canea on the 3rd of September. On landing, he received the salutations of the civil and military authorities, and at once proceeded to the Serai where he had two interviews with Mr. Sandwith, the English Consul. It appeared from the statements of Mukhtar Pasha that the Porte rejected all idea of transforming the island into a Principality, or of giving it an autonomy similar to that of Eastern Roumelia. It was simply proposed to revive the organic law of 1868, with such modifications as experience had proved to be necessary. Mr. Sandwith, representing the views of the British Government, believed that a rather more extensive autonomy should be granted to the islanders, and suggested that certain modifications might be made in the electoral law, and in the constitution of the tribunals; but the Cretan insurgents were not satisfied with even these concessions, and desired a series of reforms expressly contrived to secure a Christian majority in all the Councils established by the organic statute. Mukhtar Pasha expressed the most decided opposition to any such arrangement, which he said would inevitably result in the oppression of the Mussulmans by the Christians. The Porte was not disposed to admit that the Governor-General should necessarily be a Christian, but was ready to grant the exclusion of all officials from the Administrative Councils, and to concede some other reforms calculated to reduce the power of the Imperial Government.

After discussion with the British Consul, it was decided to address a letter to the General

Assembly, inviting that body to send deputies to Canea, for the purpose of holding a consultation. This letter was despatched on the 4th of September, and a conciliatory answer was returned the following day. The Assembly expressed itself willing to send delegates, but requested that some spot outside the town of Canea should be designated as the place of meeting, in order that the members should be in constant communication with the Assembly. This being granted, Mukhtar Pasha, accompanied by his secretaries, met ten delegates on the 9th of September at a place called Haleppa, distant about a mile and a half from Canea. Very little of importance was transacted on the first day; but next morning Mukhtar Pasha opened the proceedings in a speech setting forth the object of his mission, which he said was to remove the grievances alike of Christians and Mohammedans, and to re-establish tranquillity, order, and legality, so as to inaugurate a new era of prosperity and progress. The spokesman of the Cretans then presented, in the name of his fellow-Christians, the following demands:—"1. That all the inhabitants of the island, without distinction of race or creed, should enjoy complete equality before the law, should be subjected to the same obligations, and should have the same civil and political rights. 2. That the first General Assembly should elaborate, in accordance with the wants of the population, a series of laws, which might afterwards be modified as necessity should suggest, but which ought not to be altered continually by arbitrary edicts from Constantinople. 3. That the island should receive a complete system of self-government, and that the Governor should be chosen by the inhabitants, with the sanction of the Sultan. 4. That the maintenance of order, and all other functions of the police, should be intrusted exclusively to a local gendarmerie, while the regular troops should remain only in the forts on the sea-coast, and the inhabitants of the island should be exempted from military service."

An animated discussion ensued, during which Mukhtar Pasha observed that complete equality had already been granted and confirmed by various Imperial edicts, so that there seemed to him no reason why any fresh demands should be made on this head. Legislative autonomy, he conceived, would be very injurious to the unity of laws existing throughout the Empire; and he was therefore disinclined to admit what was required in that respect. One of the deputies then said:—"Equality has been granted by edict, but has been only very imperfectly realised. In certain branches of the administration, the Christian element forms only a small minority; in others it does not appear at all. The number of officials and elected deputies is by no means in proportion to the number of Christian inhabitants. Though these latter form two-thirds of the population, the Mussulmans elect an equal number of representatives. In the Administrative Councils, the presence of Government officials gives the Mussulmans a decided majority. The same remark applies to the courts of law. The apparent Christian majority of four votes in the General Assembly has in reality no practical significance." The discussion was continued on the following day (the 11th), and, with regard to legislative autonomy, the deputies at length accepted a compromise proposed by the Governor and the Imperial Commissioner. According to this proposal, the laws of the Empire were to continue in force for the island of Crete; but if the General Assembly should consider certain regulations as not in conformity with the wants of the country, it might request their modification, or the addition of a supplementary article. It was required by the representative of the Sultan, however, that all demands of this description should be voted by a majority of three-fourths, subsequently altered to two-thirds. So far, the difficulties were fairly over come; but the constitution of the General Assembly could not be satisfactorily arranged. The deputies would not grant the Mohammedans any great amount of representation, and Mukhtar Pasha was disinclined to accept the arrangements which they proposed.

On the 16th of September, after a meeting of three hours' duration, the deputies returned to Cambo, where the General Assembly sat, in order to obtain fresh instructions. The discussions were renewed on subsequent days, and ultimately Mukhtar Pasha received orders from the Porte to grant the demands of the Assembly with respect to the elections, according to which three Christians and one Mussulman were to be returned for districts where the former were in a majority, and three Mussulmans and one Christian in those localities where the contrary state existed. The deputies then put forward a demand for an Orthodox Christian Governor-General, to hold office for a term of five years. The prolonged tenure of office was at once conceded by Mukhtar Pasha; but his instructions did not permit him to allow the appointment of a Christian Governor of the same creed and race as the majority—in other words, an Orthodox Greek. Thus, most of the Cretan demands were granted, and a very considerable measure of self-government was secured to the island. But the requirements of the deputies went on increasing

from day to day, and Mukhtar Pasha was at length obliged to remind his auditors that, although the Porte was willing to admit very much of what the islanders desired, the Sovereign rights of the Imperial Government must nevertheless be maintained. This was a principle which, while they dared not actually deny it, the deputies seemed little disposed to recognise; and the result was that about the end of September the negotiations came to a standstill. A fortnight later, however, it was announced that a definite arrangement had been concluded between the Imperial Commissioner and the General Assembly; and Mukhtar Pasha then left Canea to re-establish the Sultan's authority throughout the island.* The victory, on the whole, was with the Cretans, although their more extreme demands had been refused; and it remained to be seen whether they would use their power with the moderation and fairness which alone could justify them in its exercise.

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## CHAPTER XXX.

Return of Midhat Pasha to Turkey—His chequered Career—Opinions expressed by him on the Position and Prospects of the Ottoman Empire—Interview with Turkish Bondholders—Financial Troubles in Turkey—Alarming Depreciation of Paper Money—Midhat Pasha in Crete and Syria—Turkey and Austria—Refusal of the Porte to conclude a Convention with the Austrian Government—Charges of Cruelty against the Austrian Troops in Bosnia and the Herzegovina—Turkish Circular on the Subject—Reply of Count Andrassy repudiating the Accusations—Austrian Projects for the Government of the Two Provinces—Difficulties of the Future—The Transfer of Bessarabia to Russia—Meeting of the Roumanian Chambers, and Sanction of the proposed Cession—Occupation of the Dobrudscha by Roumanian Troops—Address by Prince Charles—Message to the Roumanian Chambers—Necessity for Reform in various Branches of the State—Opposition to the Roumanians in the Dobrudscha—Projects in Russia for a Turkish Alliance—Articles in the *Golos* foreshadowing the combined Action of the Two Powers—Objects of the Special Treaty with Turkey demanded by Russia—Nursing "the Sick Man" with a view to his Inheritance—Attempts to undermine the Treaty of Berlin—Action of England—Turkish Reforms and their Value—Change of Ministry at Constantinople.

In the midst of numerous convulsions, consequent on unsuccessful war and intestine revolution, a remarkable man returned to Turkey—a man associated with the earlier events out of which the war arose, and also with the Parliamentary system which enjoyed so brief a trial. Midhat Pasha, a man of ability, of intellectual culture, and of liberal ideas in politics, was one of the Ministers mainly concerned, at the end of May, 1876, in deposing Abdul-Aziz, and placing his nephew, Murad, on the throne. Whether he had much to do with the substitution, three months later, of Abdul-Hamid for Murad, is uncertain; but he was connected with the Government at the time, and cannot have been ignorant of what was intended. The elevation of Midhat Pasha to the Grand Vizierate followed in the closing days of November, and he was appointed to that high position expressly as the Minister of a Parliamentary Constitution. But his tenure of the chief office was very short. On the 5th of February, 1877, he was suddenly dismissed and banished, for reasons which have never been clearly revealed, and he was not permitted to re-enter the Ottoman dominions until September, 1878. Midhat was staying in Paris, and, on the 15th of that month, Aarifi Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to the French Republic, delivered to the fallen statesman a letter from the Sultan, authorising him to return, and to take up his residence in Crete, where he desired to live with his family. The letter added that a vessel would be placed at the disposal of the exile, and a high functionary would be sent to Crete to give him a fitting reception. Instructions, moreover, were sent to the Ottoman Bank in London to pay him the sum of £1,000 for his travelling expenses, and his family was offered a pension of £200 a-month; so that Midhat returned to the East, not only with toleration, but with honour.

During his absence from Turkey, the dismissed Minister had visited various parts of Europe, and for awhile had stayed in London. He continued to take great interest in the political affairs of his country, and in June, 1878, contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* an interesting paper on "The Past, Present, and Future of Turkey." In the course of this article, the writer contended that the Mohammedan faith was essentially a tolerant religion; that in the height of their power the Moslems did not force the Christians to embrace Islamism; and that in more recent times his countrymen had left to the conquered the enjoyment of their belief, language, and property, and had even granted them the privilege of directing the affairs of their own communities, and of organising their

* Letters from Crete in the *Times*.

schools, which the Government had never controlled. Midhat Pasha admitted that in the eighteenth century Turkey fell behind other parts of Europe in the development of civilisation; but he averred that much had been done of late to recover lost ground. A good deal still remained to be done; but the evil effects of misgovernment had fallen quite as much on the Mohammedans as on the Christians. The Mohammedans, however, suffered in quiet, while the Christians made the world resound with their complaints. For this reason, it was generally supposed by foreigners that the latter were the only persons oppressed; and thence ensued the interference of Russia and of other Powers. With respect to Bulgaria, Midhat Pasha suggested (it must be borne in mind that this was before the Congress had met) that a Bulgarian province should be formed north of Roumelia, with a local Government tributary to the Porte. In Turkey Proper, the writer desired a firm, unswerving prosecution of the constitutional schemes which he had introduced a year and a half before. On this subject he observed that, of all plans of administration which could be desired, the Ottoman Constitution, loyally carried out, would be the best for the East, since, in the estimation of Midhat, it bore in itself the germ of her regeneration "by the intellectual and material development of all the nationalities." The wish to see constitutional government acclimatised was general in Turkey, if we may rely on the testimony of Midhat Pasha. "Europe," he remarked, "which has so harassed the Porte by its often unjust interferences, would have a perfectly legitimate opportunity of exerting an active superintendence over the enforcement of this charter, which sums up all progress possible for the East. An united superintendence would have, besides, this result, that it would neutralise the action of Russia in the East—an action which has been exerted hitherto to her own advantage only, and to the greatest prejudice of European interests."



INSURGENT CAMP AT GATSKO, HERZEGOVINA.

In meditations such as these, Midhat Pasha passed the days of his exile; and the same ideas were still prevalent in his mind as he made his way through France to take ship for the East. At Marseilles, on the 20th of September, some Turkish bondholders had an interview with the returning statesman, who expounded to them his views on Turkish finance. "I can assure you," he said, "that, even should I not come into office, the financial question will be regulated by the

Turkish Government as soon as political complications are at an end. This is the Sultan's chief desire. I know how much misery was caused by the Ottoman catastrophe; but in a short time, I believe, we shall mitigate it in great part. The cessation of our payments was the signal of our decline; the resumption of them, if not in full, at least in part, will be the signal of our recovery. The Turkish nation must win back the place it has lost, and it can only do so by re-organising its finances." This was a truth which every day made more clear. Turkish credit was at that very time in a desperate condition. The paper money which had been liberally issued during the last few years bore only a third of its nominal value, and was still falling rapidly. It was no longer accepted in payment of tithes, and, as this was equivalent to the Government dishonouring its own signature, the *kaimés* soon came to be regarded as having almost no value at all. The Treasury had neither ready money nor credit, and the inaction of the Government in many necessary matters was explained by the fact that it was unable to move from sheer poverty. One of the Ministers, on being urged to despatch troops to Northern Albania, to suppress the risings there, replied that it would be dangerous to send against Mussulman insurgents men who had received no pay for nearly two years.* The Sultan, however, changed his Finance Minister about the middle of September, and affairs then entered on a new stage. Kiani was succeeded by Zuhdy Pasha, who immediately instituted a Commission, composed of bankers and State functionaries, to study the question minutely. Some of the members of this body, unfortunately, were men who knew nothing of finance, so that their deliberations were not fruitful of results. An attempt was made to restore the value of the *kaimés* by reducing their number; and a quantity of paper, representing nominally more than £1,000,000 sterling, was gradually bought up and burned. Nevertheless, the depreciation continued; and it was not until the Government determined, in the latter part of October, to accept once more the payment of tithes in paper, that that form of currency began to recover some of its original value. A new Commission was appointed about the same time, and the Sultan showed himself fully alive to the necessity of improving his financial position as a preliminary to all other reforms.

In addressing the Turkish bondholders at Marseilles, Midhat Pasha spoke almost like a Minister designate; but it was not intended to re-admit him to the Cabinet. He was not even to enter Constantinople, but was to proceed at once to Crete. The Sultan seems only partially to have overcome his distrust of the ambitious and reforming Pasha; and indeed the latter was suspected to entertain some ideas which were not likely to be favourites at the Porte. It was said that before leaving London he explained to the English Cabinet his views with regard to the Greek claims, which were to the effect that the territory which it was proposed to detach from Thessaly and Epirus should be reduced, and that, as a compensation to Greece, the island of Crete should be made over to the Hellenic Kingdom. This suggestion was thought to have been favourably entertained by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield; but it was not at all likely to be pleasing to the Sultan. Midhat Pasha denied the truth of the statement; and it was doubtless nothing more than idle rumour. Eastern potentates, however, are always suspicious, and the prospects of Midhat may not improbably have suffered in some degree from this report. Still, his proposed residence in Crete was not forbidden, and he arrived in that island about the beginning of October. It was even believed at first that he would be appointed Governor-General; but the Governorship of Syria—a much more important post—was shortly afterwards conferred on him.

In addition to her other troubles, Turkey was now involved in a dispute with Austria. The occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina by that Power was a sore topic with the Sultan and his Ministers. Under the best of circumstances, the occupation could not have been otherwise than humiliating in the present, and menacing as to the future. But the refusal of Austria to give a distinct undertaking as to the duration of her military intervention, before sending her troops across the Save, necessarily added in no inconsiderable measure to the objectionable nature of the proceeding. That the Austrians were not desired in either province was made evident by the vigorous and even passionate resistance which their troops encountered; and now that that resistance was at an end, it appeared as if Austria intended to treat those regions as conquered territory. The Cabinet of Vienna was indeed desirous of concluding a Convention with Turkey as soon as order had been restored; but the proposed guarantees with respect to the temporary nature of the occupation, and the maintenance of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, were considered insufficient by the Constantinople Cabinet. These, however, were not the reasons for refusal most prominently advanced. In a despatch sent to the Government of the Austrian Emperor, and afterwards communicated as a

* Constantinople Correspondent of the *Times*.

Circular to the other Powers, the Porte alleged that the Austro-Hungarian army of occupation had been guilty of great cruelties to the natives of the two provinces, and that, consequently, the Sultan found himself unable to sign a Convention, any association with which would seem to make him a partaker in the destruction of Mohammedans. It was stated that the Austrian troops had performed their task in an inhuman manner; that they had burned and devastated towns and villages without necessity, and had wantonly slaughtered, not only men, but women. The Sultan could therefore only adhere to the declaration already given at the Berlin Conference with regard to the temporary character of the occupation, and the maintenance intact of his sovereign rights. Nevertheless, it was added, the Sultan attached the greatest value to a continuance of cordial relations with Austria. He would do all on his part to strengthen the ties of friendship and alliance. He would send neither arms nor men into the occupied districts, nor in any way encourage resistance to the Austrian

TYPE OF BOSNIAN PEASANT.



TULTSCHA, A TOWN IN THE DOBRUDSCHA.

troops; and he hoped that on her side Austria would act in the same spirit, and not urge for the present her right of garrison in the Pashalik of Novi-Bazar, conferred on her by the Treaty of Berlin, as, in the excited state of the popular mind, such a step would lead to a repetition of the disastrous events in Bosnia.

The charges of cruelty contained in this despatch do not appear to have been substantiated, or even very precisely described. The impeachment was vague and general, and, although it may have been true in some few instances, it is doubtful whether any very extended basis could be found for its support. The Austrian army is a more civilised force than that of Russia, and there is less presumption of probability, in respect of such accusations, in the one case than in the other. The Mohammedan population which had taken to flight, and even the Herzegovinian Redif battalions, were at that very time beginning to return from their places of refuge, which they would hardly have done had they been apprehensive of cruel usage. It seems likely, therefore, that the Turkish Government was misinformed, or had too easily credited exaggerated statements as to the proceedings of the Austrian troops. At any rate, the Vienna Cabinet was highly indignant at so grave a charge against the soldiers of the Empire; and on the 14th of October Count Andrassy addressed to Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, a specific reply to the allegations of the Porte. "It is repugnant to us," said Count Andrassy, "to refute in detail the accusations which the circular enumerates. We must, however, record that at Banjaluka our soldiers have confined themselves to repelling the attack undertaken by barbarous hordes against the hospital occupied by sick, wounded, and dying Bosnians, as well as Austro-Hungarians; and that at Serajevo only a few houses have been burnt, not as a measure of retaliation after the taking of the town, but as a natural consequence of the street fight. Although fanatics fired on our troops from the windows and the attics, the town has been neither burned nor sacked. There has been no act of pillage on the part of our troops. Frequently, on the contrary, our soldiers have prevented and stopped pillage on the part of the natives. As regards all that precedes, foreign and military correspondents confirm the official bulletins. Let the Porte compare the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Imperial and Royal troops with that accomplished in 1851 and 1852 by Omar Pasha, with the object of introducing the Tanzimat. We had to fight the same elements with which Turkey had to do then—elements which the Turkish Ministers themselves have characterised to you quite lately as untamably savage. We have accomplished in two months what it took Omar Pasha two years to accomplish. While his army lived on requisitions, and while he drew up long lists of proscriptions and executions, which he kept at the disposal of the Porte, and in which figured distinctly a large number of persons of every religion, and, above all, several Pashas and many Beys, we have paid ready money for everything, and our military tribunals have only executed a few individuals, whose participation in the horrible atrocities committed on our soldiers, or on Turkish functionaries and foreigners, had, after the most scrupulous trial, been proved by evidence."

In the course of his despatch, Count Andrassy charged Hafiz Pasha with connivance in the disturbances in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. This, he said, was no secret to any one: the Austrian Consul-General in Serajevo had notified and proved it some time before. The Turkish accusation of having transported into Austria Ottoman soldiers who had not even fought, was warmly repudiated by the Austrian Minister, who alleged that, without waiting for the end of the struggle, the army of occupation had sent back to their homes thousands of men who had refused to participate in an insurrection organised by the scum of the populace, by whom a reign of terror and plunder had been established. The respectable classes, according to Count Andrassy, had for the most part abstained from the movement, though to this rule it was admitted that there were a few exceptions. "If," said the despatch, "instead of proclaiming respect for all confessions, we had unfurled the flag of deliverance for the Christians, the task we are accomplishing would certainly have demanded fewer sacrifices. But this would have been a signal for the extermination of the Mohammedans, whom it was our duty to protect as much as the Christians." Count Andrassy concluded his rejoinder by again repudiating the calumnies which had been launched against his country, and by notifying to the Porte the bad effect which they could not fail to produce in Austria.

As the autumn progressed, the pacification of the two provinces was sufficiently assured to enable the Austrian Government to withdraw a great number of its troops. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were being steadily given up to the Austrian military authorities, and, although there was still a probability that conflicts would occasionally take place with robber-bands, it did not seem likely that these would be of a serious character.

In the meanwhile, the civil organisation of the country was proceeding with as much celerity as circumstances would allow. The financial question was receiving particular attention, and it was hoped to make the revenues of Bosnia cover the expenses of its administration. The average revenue of that province, under favourable conditions, was about 60,000,000 piastres, equal in English money to £600,000. Of this, about 18,000,000 piastres, or £180,000, went to Constantinople, while the remainder was devoted to local needs. The Austrians believed that the expenditure could be much reduced, and that at the same time the indirect taxation might be made to yield considerably more than it had done under the Turks. It was hoped that in this way the cost of the foreign occupation would be defrayed without imposing fresh burdens on the people. But the Austrians were confronted by many questions more difficult than that of taxation. They had to reconcile the Mohammedan and the Christian sections of the populace; to recommend their own rule to a people not at all disposed to receive it; to regulate the tenure of land, and the position of the peasantry towards the great agrarian lords; and, generally speaking, to insure that state of social repose without which prosperity is impossible. These onerous duties Austria had voluntarily taken on her own shoulders, in pursuance of a very questionable policy; and she had no ground of complaint because the task turned out to be of greater magnitude and more complex difficulty than she had contemplated in her dreams of extended empire.

Another objectionable feature of the Berlin Treaty, springing from the earlier agreement of San Stefano, was that having reference to Roumania, and to the transfer of Bessarabian territory to Russia. An extra session of the Roumanian Chambers commenced at Bucharest on the 27th of September, and, in the message of Prince Charles, one of the first subjects of remark was this question of territorial loss. "There is not a Roumanian, from the sovereign to the least of our citizens," said the message, "who does not deplore the dismemberment of our patrimony by the decree of Europe. But, apart from the sentiments of regret which penetrate your bosoms, you have, Messieurs, in your quality of national executors, and of men of mature experience, whose patriotism is unalterable, the right and the duty to examine with coolness the different circumstances in which we find ourselves, and to take such decision as will not only refrain from compromising the present, but will assure the future of our country. . . . . The Roumanians, knowing the circumstances under which the Treaty of Berlin was signed, and far from despairing of the future, have an abiding faith that what has been denied them to-day, in consequence of rival interests and the immediate necessities of the hour, will be given them to-morrow by the more clearly-informed justice of Europe." The Roumanian Government shortly afterwards appointed three Commissioners to deliver up Bessarabia to the Russian officials—an act which followed in due course. On the 9th of October, a committee of the Senate, appointed the day before to draw up a report on the Treaty of Berlin, brought in a resolution sanctioning the retrocession of Bessarabia, and accepting the Dobrudscha in exchange. In the opinion of this committee, the Government should, for the final solution of questions raised by the Treaty of Berlin, summon a Constituent Assembly for the revision of the Roumanian Constitution, and for altering the organic law of the land, so that it should conform to the decisions of the Congress. This suggestion had reference to the requirements for the better establishment of religious freedom which had been made by the Powers at Berlin. A resolution similar to that in the Senate was passed by a large majority of the Chamber of Deputies on the 12th of October; and, the transfer of territory being thus completely authorised, the extra session came to a close.

The occupation of the Dobrudscha by the Roumanian troops took place on the 26th of November. The soldiers of the Principality crossed the Danube at Ibraila about one o'clock in the afternoon, and Prince Charles then issued a proclamation to the people, explanatory of the principles on which he proposed to govern the country. He said that the Roumanians did not enter their territory as conquerors, although Roumanian blood had been shed for the liberation of the people dwelling on the right bank of the Danube. Whatever their religion or nationality, the inhabitants of the Dobrudscha (which the Prince described as the country of Stefan the Great) would become, from that day, part and parcel of Roumania, and in future would not be subject to the arbitrary rule of any one man, but would be shielded by a Constitution which, their new sovereign assured them, was an object of envy to many other nationalities. Their religion, their families, and their domestic thresholds, would be protected by Roumanian law; and if any one dared to attack them, punishment would assuredly follow the commission of the wrong. The Roumanian authorities, according to the proclamation, entered the Dobrudscha to put an end to the troubles which had so long harassed its people, to heal the wounds made by the recent war, to protect personal property,

and to develop the moral and material well-being of the land. The Roumanian authorities would make it their first duty to examine and satisfy the requirements of the people, and, as a first proof of this, it was announced that the population was released from all payment of tithes for the year 1879, and that at the beginning of the ensuing January a tax less onerous to the agricultural population, and more just in itself, would be substituted for the objectionable impost. Several taxes of an oppressive nature were entirely abolished, while others were regulated by a definite cash-payment. Remission of taxation is always a popular measure, and Prince Charles did wisely in propitiating his new subjects after this fashion. But the flourish about Roumanian constitutionalism, and the toleration of all kinds of religious opinion, came badly from a Power whose habits of persecution had necessitated a special provision by the Congress on behalf of its proscribed communities.

The regular session of the Roumanian Chambers commenced on November 27th, when the Prince opened the proceedings by an address of considerable length. He here remarked that the neighbouring Powers had placed their diplomatic representatives at the Court of Roumania in a rank and condition conformable to the newly-acquired independence of the country, and that Roumania had responded to that action by similar appointments. It now remained for the national legislators to carry out the principles of freedom in such a way as to respond to the expectations of Europe. They must efface from the Constitution the principle of political inequality on account of differences of religious belief. Various branches of the public service also imperiously demanded reform, and the rural population of the country, which had exhibited so much valour and self-abnegation during the war, stood in need of measures for the improvement of their condition. Other political subjects of importance were indicated by the Prince, and it was remarked that experience acquired on the field of battle had shown that improvements were wanting in their military organisation. "During the existence of the present Legislature," concluded the Prince, "the greatest European events have occurred on the frontiers, and in the interior of Roumania. In spite of the most cruel sacrifices, the Roumanian nation has come out of this grave period more free, more powerful, and more highly esteemed, than ever before. You have taken part, Messieurs, in these events; you have accomplished great deeds; you have proclaimed, you have assured, the independence of the Roumanian State; you have sustained with vigour and dignity the national rights. By the heroism of her soldiers on the field of battle, by sacrifices of all kinds on the part of her children, and by your support, so enlightened and patriotic, Roumania regains among nations the place she formerly occupied. To you belongs a great part of the credit of all this. Be assured, therefore, that posterity will not forget the great deeds accomplished in our day, any more than history will efface from its pages the names of those who have contributed to their accomplishment."

The addresses of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, in reply to the Prince's message, expressed the determination of both those bodies to remove from the Roumanian Constitution all articles antagonistic to the spirit of religious toleration, such as the Congress of Berlin had condemned. The Prince, in responding to these promises of the Legislature, expressed his satisfaction at the prospect of a great improvement in the political state of the land, and observed that Roumania would in this way cause all traces of suspicion and prejudice against the country to disappear from the hearts of foreign nations. It is more easy, however, to alter laws than to effect a radical change in the habits and disposition of a people. Several years will probably elapse before the Roumanians have acquired that liberality of thought which is now common in the West; but the abrogation of bad laws is an important step in the right direction, and it is to be hoped that in this respect the requirements of the Berlin Treaty will have sown good seed. As regarded the Dobrudscha, the difficulties of the Roumanian Government seemed likely to be rather considerable. The people of the Dobrudscha are in the main Bulgarians, and the Bulgarians detest the Roumanians with all the venomous hatred of their race. When the Roumanian Commissioner and other authorities arrived on the southern bank of the Danube, their reception was as unpleasant as the people dared to make it. The Mayor of Tultscha, a man who had been actively engaged on several Bulgarian committees, addressed the Commissioner in a style of insolence which it must have been very difficult for that official to bear with equanimity. He told him that the Bulgarians of the Dobrudscha owed their deliverance from the Turkish yoke to the Russians, to whom also the Roumanians owed their acquisition of the Dobrudscha. This being the will of the Czar, he added, the Bulgarians had submitted; but he plainly gave the Commissioner to understand that his countrymen did not regard themselves as Roumanians in any sense. The Roumanian Commissioner quietly replied that his Government knew its rights and obligations perfectly well, and was resolved to assert the former

and fulfil the latter towards all, irrespective of race and religion. For the development of her own plans, Russia had established on the southern bank of the Danube a conflict of races which promised to be little less bitter than that just terminated. The antagonism thus fostered may in times to come prove an excellent pretext for further intervention; and, if so, Russian policy, considered from the point of view of Russian aims, will scarcely in this respect be chargeable with failure.

The changed aspect of affairs was curiously illustrated during the autumn by a strong disposition on the part of the Russians towards a Turkish alliance. Among the official classes of Turkey, there were some who scarcely concealed a corresponding desire for a Russian alliance; and for a time the Sultan himself was suspected of this inclination, though it would appear without sufficient reason. The wish was doubtless stronger and more general in the Muscovite than in the Ottoman Empire. Russia had accomplished several of her objects, but not all. She had been to some extent baffled by England, and it seemed not improbable that an alliance with Turkey, if it could be accomplished, would enable her to defeat the designs, in respect to Asia, with which England was credited. Projects such as this belong to the sphere of secret diplomacy, and are not authentically revealed until the time has arrived for putting them into execution. In the meanwhile, however, they are often foreshadowed by political writers in the press. During the autumn of 1878, most of the Russian newspapers advocated the conclusion of a direct alliance between Russia and Turkey. An article in the *Golos*, one of the most intellectual and well-informed of Russian papers, gave expression, in the early days of October, to these views of future policy. That journal reminded its readers that even in the midst of the war, when national excitement was at the highest, it had attributed to the Ottoman race certain commendable qualities, such as are necessary to the prolonged maintenance of any sovereign domination. If present assurances were to be trusted as sincere, it would seem that the bitter and revengeful spirit displayed by Turkey towards Russia during the war had greatly evaporated. There was ample evidence, in the opinion of the *Golos*, that the atrocities which made some denounce the Ottomans as so many irreclaimable savages were a transitory though frequent phenomenon, brought on by special circumstances. They showed the defective political organisation of Turkey, but did not prove the entire race to be cannibals.

"The Osmanlis, after all," continued the patriotic Russian journalist, "have shown themselves competent to vindicate the rights of the conqueror, and a people possessed of other qualities likewise. When our armies were liberating the subject races, they had sufficient opportunity to become convinced that, although the Rayahs had no political rights, they were very well off indeed in point of property and finance. The tens of thousands of Turkish prisoners, too, who had been sojourning in Russia for so many months, have convinced our people that, far from being savages, the Osmanlis are willing and industrious, though not very expert at work. The Osmanlis, in their turn, thanks to the prolonged presence of our troops under the walls of Constantinople, and the accounts given by Ottoman soldiers returning from captivity, have learned something about the Russian people. Direct contact, notwithstanding the acrimony raised by vain-glorious and narrow-minded talkers, has not only diminished the painful impression created by Rayah sufferings, but has also produced in both nations a favourable disposition towards each other. When we began to respect the Turkish army as a worthy adversary, we made the first step towards modifying our views of the Turkish people; and at present it is impossible not to admit that our returning soldiers speak much more of the wealth they have seen in Turkey than of the barbarism of the Turks." The writer characterised this spontaneous awakening of a friendly disposition between the Turk and the Russian as one of the most important results of the war, and as a fact which, by skilful management, might secure the pacific solution of the Oriental question, to the mutual advantage of both parties. These significant observations were made at a period when England was about to enter on a difficult contest with Afghanistan; and it was more than hinted that if Russia and Turkey, in alliance, could make a demonstration against English interests in Asia Minor, the complication in the far East would so fetter the hands of England that she would be unable to counteract any Russian designs in the direction of the Mediterranean. Such utterances, though professedly non-official, are not without considerable significance. They indicate the tendencies and aspirations of influential classes, and may often be accepted as indirect evidence of purposes that it might not be prudent to avow in Ministerial writings. Russia was feeling her way, and the future looked ominous. Every month made it more certain that the English Government had grievously erred in not having, from the first, put her veto on the ambitious policy of Russia,

and in withholding from a direct support of Turkey when her power was threatened with annihilation.

A subsequent article in the *Golos*, published a few days later, discussed at great length the supplementary or final treaty of peace which was then being secretly negotiated between Russia and Turkey. The writer controverted the arguments of many English and continental politicians, to the effect that the Berlin Treaty, by putting the relations between Russia and Turkey upon a new




MAP OF TERRITORY CEDED TO RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

footing, deprived the former Power of the right to enter upon any special agreement with the latter. The Treaty of San Stefano, contended the *Golos*, was specifically described as preliminary, and was therefore necessarily a mere temporary arrangement, liable to subsequent modifications. There was no statement in the Berlin Treaty showing that it replaced the agreement of San Stefano, and, in the estimation of the Russian journalist, there could be no doubt that the Berlin Congress did not question Russia's right to convert a preliminary into a definitive settlement. "But this is not all," continued the *Golos*. "Russia has not only the right, but the obligation, to sign a new and conclusive instrument with the Porte. In his capacity as President of the Congress, Prince Bismarck expressly divided the San Stefano stipulations into two parts — the first affecting the interests and rights of other Powers, the second touching Russia and the Porte alone. If the Chancellor opined that the stipulations coming under the first category were re-discussed and settled by Congress, those belonging to the second remained to be exclusively dealt with by the belligerents. This view was endorsed by all the members of the Berlin Congress, and hence Russia is positively obliged to draw up another treaty for the solution of those questions left unsolved in the Berlin instrument." The writer could perfectly well understand that, from the Western point of view, very unpleasant reflections would be engendered by the conclusion of a new and separate treaty between the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Such a treaty would bring Turkey into nearer and more binding relations with Russia than with any of the outside Powers, and would confer upon the Czar a distinct right of enforcement unshared by other Potentates. Russia would thus recover an independent position in her

ROUMELIANS.

dealings with Turkey, and the importance of such a treaty to Russian interests in the East was pronounced by the *Golos* to be immeasurable. No one, it was observed, believed in the continued existence of an independent Mohammedan State on the shores of the Bosphorus. "In point of fact," continued the *Golos*, "the Ottoman Empire has even now ceased to exist, being placed under the absolute control, not indeed of victors and enemies, but of friends and protectors. In consequence of the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and of the first division of Turkey, completed at Berlin, all the provinces of the Turkish Empire are in the market, and awaiting purchasers. The Power that pays best, and is most acceptable to the Turk, will henceforth rule at the Golden Horn." The writer added that the final dissolution and fall of the Ottoman Empire appeared inevitable; that at any moment it might be necessary to consider the division of the inheritance; and that Russia must prepare for contingencies, so as to make her voice heard at the death-bed of the Sick Man.

The object of the *Golos* in these articles seems to have been twofold. Russia was to enter into an alliance with Turkey as long as Turkey lasted, and was thus to defeat the designs of England and of other Powers. She had also to hold herself in readiness for the moment of dissolution, so that the greater part of the "inheritance" might pass into her hands. The style in which these articles were written had very much the tone of a State paper, and, assuming them to have been inspired by the Russian Chancellery, they indicated in a very noticeable manner the true drift of Russian policy. That in any case the Government of the Emperor was resolved on setting aside the Treaty of Berlin to the utmost extent possible, wherever its provisions were antagonistic to Muscovite plans, is an unescapable inference from many facts. Prince Dondoukoff was doing his utmost, with scarcely the affectation of concealment, to obliterate the distinction between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia which the Congress had established. The Russian language, Russian customs, and Russian laws, were being imposed on the people. Revolt was actively fomented all over the European dominions of Turkey; and a fresh treaty was to be wrung from the Sultan by undisguised threats, and by the renewed presence of Russian armies before the lines of Constantinople. In all this, Russia was simply following out those methods of policy which she invariably pursues. No Power will grant more under pressure than that of St. Petersburg; but, the moment after, intrigue is at work, to approach by tortuous ways what could not be taken by direct assault.

It was not altogether without reason that the Sultan regarded England as his only friend. Even England had not been so good a friend as either justice or policy dictated; but she had at any rate saved the Ottoman Empire in Europe from almost complete extinction, and she had pledged her word for the future protection of the Asiatic Empire. The Porte had therefore abundant reason for seeking to propitiate the English Government and people; and the demands for internal reform, presented by Sir A. H. Layard in the course of the autumn, were received with but little demur. The British Ambassador had several interviews with the Grand Vizier with reference to the new institutions which were to be introduced into Armenia and Asia Minor. England's demand for the appointment of European judges in the Courts met with some objection, because such officials would be unacquainted with Mussulman law. Turkey suggested that the presence of European inspectors would be sufficient for the purpose. It was subsequently agreed that the Armenian tribunals should be composed of only two Mussulmans and four Christians; and in other respects the assent of the Porte was signified in a note forwarded to the English Ambassador on the 24th of October. A new system of taxation was to be speedily introduced into one or two vilayets, and, if found successful, would be extended to all the provinces of the Empire. A hope was expressed that the British Government would be satisfied with the concessions of the Porte; but it was at the same time distinctly stated that there must be no infringement of the Sultan's sovereign rights.

These reforms resulted from the Convention of June 4th, and were the price which Turkey undertook to pay for the protection promised her by England in the event of another invasion. Whether the Ottoman pledges possessed any value may be open to grave doubt. No nation is well disposed to reform itself at the dictation of another, and Turkey has always shown the most extreme disinclination in this respect. Unquestionably, reforms are needed to the well-being of Turkey; and the continued existence of Turkey, both in Europe and Asia, is necessary to the policy of England, as a Power having the deepest interests in the East. But reforms arbitrarily enforced by a foreign Government, and proceeding from no impulse on the part of the nation itself, or of the nation's rulers, are only of the smallest value. It would perhaps be more correct to say that they are of no value whatever, and are more likely to produce

mischievous than good results. Turkish Sultans, throughout the whole of the present century, have recognised the advisability of reform, and to some extent, though very imperfectly, have amended the political conditions which they found. But they have had to encounter, not merely the conservative feelings of their Mohammedan subjects, but the prejudice not unnaturally excited by foreign dictation. Had the whole of Europe agreed to treat Turkey as it treats other independent Powers, the condition of that unhappy Empire would probably at this moment have been far better than it is. But Russia set the example of interference, and England followed in the very path which she has seen so much occasion to disapprove.

In himself, the Sultan was well disposed towards the development of a liberal policy, and on the 4th of December a change of Ministry took place, from which much was expected in the way of intelligent reform. Khaireddin Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier in place of Safvet; Ghazi Osman, the hero of Plevna, took the post of Mustapha Phosphor at the War Office; Karatheodori Pasha, the First Plenipotentiary of Turkey at the Berlin Congress, became Minister of Foreign Affairs; Said Pasha was made Minister of Justice; Safvet Pasha accepted the Ministry of Police; and Mollah Effendi was constituted Sheikh-ul-Islam. The other changes were of less importance; but all indicated the same general tendency. The Grand Vizier was a Circassian, but had spent the greater part of his life in Northern Africa, where at one time he was Prime Minister to the Bey of Tunis, a vassal of the Sultan. His liberal views in politics were expounded in a small book, in which he sought to prove that modern ideas of liberty and progress are not at all inconsistent with the cardinal principles of Islam, as contained in the Koran, and expounded by the most learned doctors of the law. Contrary opinions on this subject he attributed to ignorance, or to an erroneous interpretation of the sacred writings; and he maintained that, if Turkey was to be regenerated, it must be done by Mussulmans themselves in accordance with the principles of their own religion, and that the clergy must be induced to take an active part in the work. Islam, he said, enjoined justice and good government for men of all creeds, and did not prevent men of other religions from being placed in administrative positions. Khaireddin was in favour of increasing the political power of the Ulemas, or doctors of the Sacred Law; but the upper ranks of the Turkish clergy are said to be much more liberal than is generally supposed.* The new Sheikh-ul-Islam, Mollah Effendi, was a very enlightened man, who thought that the only means of saving and regenerating the Empire lay in the development and application of the progressive principles which are to be found in Mohammedanism. Said Pasha was a special favourite of the Sultan. It was he who, as First Secretary at the Palace, exercised so great a personal influence over the Sovereign that, in April, Ahmed Vefyk (at that date Prime Minister, the dignity of Grand Vizier having been for a time abolished) lost his position as a sacrifice to the predominance of Said. More recently, the latter had been Governor of Broussa; but he was now recalled to Constantinople as one of the new Ministry. Continual changes of Government in Turkey are among the evils of its political state; but the appointments made in December seemed to promise some good results. Reform has too often been planted in the Ottoman Empire as an exotic. It was now to be seen whether, rooted in a true Mohammedan soil, it could produce a native and perennial growth.

* Constantinople Correspondent of the *Times*.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

Russia and Central Asia—Connection between the Central Asiatic and Turkish Questions—Southward Progress of Russian Power from the Commencement of the Nineteenth Century—The Frontier in 1836 and in 1863—Acquisitions on the Sea of Aral, and in the Direction of China—Despatch of Prince Gortschakoff on the Union of Two Lines of Russian Frontier (November, 1864)—Pacific Promises and their Worth—Ambitious Designs of General Tchernaieff—His unsuccessful Attack on Tashkend—Character and Population of Turkistan—Military Action of Tchernaieff—Tashkend taken by Storm—Arbitrary Conduct of Tchernaieff towards the Bokharans—Retaliation of the Ameer, and Rupture with Bokhara—Unsuccessful Attempt to subdue the Country—Tchernaieff superseded by Romanovsky—Russian Successes in Bokhara, and Designs on Khokand—General Kryjinovsky and his Projects—The Advancing Frontier—Spread of Annexation—The Doctrine of "Imperious Necessity," as laid down by Prince Gortschakoff—Morality of the Question—General Kauffmann in Turkistan—Operations against Bokhara—Further Advance of the Russian Frontier—Policy of the Gladstone Government with respect to Central Asia—Operations of General Kauffmann against Khiva—Explanations given by Count Schouvaloff to Earl Granville—Annexation of a Portion of Khiva—Official Defence of Russian Conduct—A Questionable Plea—Anglo-Russian Advocates—Treaty of Peace with Khiva—War with Khokand, and Annexation of the Khanate—Civilisation by Cruelty—The Disraeli Cabinet and its Eastern Policy—Designs of Russia on British India.

RUSSIAN policy, as affecting the Ottoman Empire, is so intimately bound up with Russian designs on Central Asia, and on the countries adjacent to our Indian possessions, that the present narrative would be incomplete were it not to include some account of those events which in the autumn of 1878 drew the attention of the world to Afghanistan, but which had a plain connection with the war then just concluded, and with the position assumed by this country towards the Government of the Czar. England and Russia are rivals for the dominion of the East, and the movements of each are watched by the other with the jealousy of antagonistic interests. The policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Government with respect to Turkey was largely based on the assumption that that Empire is necessary to our continued rule in India, and that its subjection by Russia would be the preliminary to an advance upon our Asiatic realm. On the other hand, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has mixed up the Turkish and Central Asiatic questions in a way which shows its full appreciation of the affinity existing between the two. The direct route from Russia to the northern frontiers of India is undoubtedly through Central Asia; but the acquisition of Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Armenia, would be no mean assistance to any Muscovite design on Hindostan. "It would probably signify little to the rest of Europe," said Mr. Layard in a despatch dated May 30th, 1877, "whether Russia retained Armenia or not. But England has to consider the effect of the annexation to Russia of this important province upon the British possessions in India. Russia would then command the whole of Asia Minor, and the great valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, which would inevitably fall into her hands in the course of time. Persia, moreover, would be placed entirely at her mercy." To the fulfilment of Russian designs on Armenia, England is the great obstacle. Russia has therefore indemnified herself as much as possible by continual advances through Central Asia, and by intrigues, more or less covert, with the ruler of Afghanistan.

The action of Russia with respect to Central Asia did not attract much attention in this part of the world until after the period of the Crimean War; but the movement had commenced a good deal earlier. Even while the century was still young, military settlements, forts, and detached posts, were pushed forward from the rivers Ural and Irtish, in Siberia, to the valley of the Ili, while in another direction the Sea of Aral was approached. As the years wore on, and Russia was seen to be creeping round that inland water, the rulers of Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand began to feel alarmed for their independence. In 1836, the Russian frontiers were considerably to the north of the Sea of Aral; in 1863, they were overlapping its shores, both on the eastern and the western side. Russia had by that time reached the mouth of the Syr Darya, the ancient Jaxartes, which falls into the Aral waters on the north-east; she had also advanced a long way down the western flank. Independently of this slight division, there were two separate lines of march, and it was considered advisable to unite that which bordered on China with that which lay in the direction of the Caspian Sea. On the 21st of November, 1864, Prince Gortschakoff wrote a despatch to the foreign Powers, in which he said it had been judged indispensable that the two lines of Russian frontier—one reaching from China to Lake Issyk Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral along the Syr Darya—should be united by fortified points, so that the posts might be in a position to give support to each other. Expounding the several motives which had determined this step, the Russian Chancellor observed:—

"We have adopted the line between Lake Issyk Kul and the Syr Darya, by fortifying Chemkend, which has been recently taken by us . . . . We find ourselves in the presence of a more solid, compact, less unsettled, and better organised social state, fixing for us with geographical precision the limit up to which we are bound to advance, and at which we must halt; because, while, on the one hand, any further extension of our rule, meeting, as it would, no longer with unstable communities, such as the nomad tribes, but with more regularly constituted States, would entail considerable exertions, and would draw us on from annexation to annexation, with complications which cannot be foreseen,—on the other, with such States for our future neighbours, their backward civilisation, and the instability of their political condition, do not shut us out from the hope that the day may come when regular relations may, to the advantage of both parties, take the place of the permanent troubles which have, up to the present moment, paralysed all progress in those countries . . . . . It is unnecessary for me to call attention to the evident interest that Russia has in not extending her territory, and, above all, in avoiding complications on her frontiers, which would only delay and paralyse her domestic development. Of late years, people have been pleased to assign to Russia the mission of civilising the countries which are her neighbours on the continent of Asia. The advancement of civilisation has no agent more efficient than commercial relations. These last, to become developed, require order and stability; but in Asia this necessitates a complete change of customs. Asiatics must be made to understand that it is more to their interest to favour and insure the trade of caravans than to pillage them. These elementary notions can only penetrate the public conscience when there is an organised society, and a Government to direct and represent it. We accomplish the first part of this task in advancing our frontier to the limit where these indispensable conditions are to be found. We accomplish the second by endeavouring henceforward to prove to the neighbouring States, by a firm system, so far as the suppression of their misdeeds is concerned, but at the same time by moderation and justice in the use of our strength, and by respecting their independence, that Russia is not their enemy, that she entertains towards them no ideas of conquest, and that peaceful and commercial relations will be more profitable than disorder, pillage, reprisals, and permanent warfare. In consecrating itself to this task, the Imperial Cabinet is inspired by Russian interests. It believes that at the same time it serves the interests of civilisation and humanity. It has the right to count on an equitable and loyal appreciation of the steps which it pursues, and of the principles by which it is guided."

Chemkend, to which Prince Gortschakoff here alluded as having been "recently taken" by Russia, is a long way south of the frontier existing in 1863, so that in one year the Czar had extended his power materially in the direction of Khokand. It seemed, however, to be intimated that Chemkend was to remain the southern limit of the Russian Empire in that quarter. But, whatever the real intention of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, it very soon appeared that the military Governors of Orenburg and Western Siberia were not disposed to abide by such a policy. Dissensions between native States were artfully encouraged, as a pretext for interference; and General Tchernaieff, who had been appointed a few months before to what was designated the Khokand line of frontier, and who afterwards distinguished himself in the Servian War, was particularly active in endeavouring to carry his ensigns into new lands. He advanced upon the city of Tashkend, and made an attempt to take it by storm, but was successfully resisted. The alleged reason for this attack was that Tashkend had entered into relations with the Ameer of Bokhara. It might be supposed from such a statement that Bokhara was an enemy of Russia, and that the action of Tashkend was intended in a hostile spirit. But such was not the case, and it is therefore difficult to discover any fair reason why Tashkend should have been assailed. General Tchernaieff seems to have acted without the express authority of his Government; yet he was not reprimanded for what he had done. The St. Petersburg Cabinet simply refused its sanction to his further designs on the unfortunate city, while at the same time furnishing him with strong reinforcements, on the ground that it would be easier, when thus armed, to defend the district already occupied.*

The policy of aggression went on steadily from that time forward, and, on the 12th of February, 1865, the Minister of War issued an order of the day, stating that the advanced line established in the previous year in the Trans-Chú region was to be connected with the line of the Syr Darya, and that a single province was to be formed, under the title of the province of Turkistan, out of the territory bordering on the Central Asiatic possessions from the Sea of Aral to Lake Issyk Kul. The administration of this new province was to be entrusted to a special military Governor, and it was

* Captain Burnaby's Ride to Khiva (1877), Appendix A.




MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA.

decreed that the same official should also command the forces stationed within the province. The



PALACE OF THE KHAN OF KHOKAND.

military Governor so appointed was no other than General Tchernaieff, and he was at once provided with fresh troops in order that his ambitious and restless nature might not be wanting in the means necessary to carrying out its conceptions. Turkistan, or, as it used to be called, Independent Tartary, is an immense region of Central Asia, inhabited by several nomadic tribes, and bordered on the north by Russia, on the east by China, on the south by Afghanistan and Persia, and on the west by the Caspian Sea. A large proportion of the country consists of an elevated plain, intersected by numerous

deep and narrow valleys; but in many parts there are high mountains, and the surface of the land altogether is very irregular. Of this vast country, very little is known even at the present day. It contains few cities or towns, and travelling is not easy in so wild a land. One of the predominant tribes of Turkistan is the family of Tartars from whom the Turks are descended, though their physical appearance is very different from that of the modern Ottomans. In some of these wandering communities there is evidently a considerable infusion of Mongolian blood, while others appear to be almost unmixed Caucasians. Their life is the free life of the desert; they dwell in tents, and move from place to place about the steppes, according as their necessities or their pleasures dictate. In the southern parts of this region, comprising what are still the Independent Khanates of Turkistan, a greater amount of civilisation is to be found. Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand, and Kashgar, have more the usual characteristics of Oriental principalities; but the country through which Russia has of late years been advancing is almost entirely a desert, and its possession could not be of any value to a great empire, unless as a means of obtaining richer dominions lying beyond the barren and inhospitable wastes. Western Turkistan was known to Alexander the Great, who crossed it from the western termination of the Hindoo-Koosh to the south-west curve of the Syr Darya. A Greek dynasty ruled the country as far north as the Sea of Aral till about a hundred and twenty years before the commencement of the Christian era, when an irruption of barbarians from the east put an end to its dominion. This part of the country was afterwards subjected by the Parthian kings, who introduced the worship of fire, traces of which are still frequently to be recognised in Central Asia. But no sovereignty, however powerful, seems to have endured beyond a few generations in those wild and open tracts. Tartary, the Scythia of the later classical ages, has given conquering races and conquering warriors to Asia; but it has never long submitted to any established rule. Ghenghiz Khan and Timur were natives of the Scythian desert, and the empires they established were amongst the greatest that the world has known; but they had no principle of perpetuity, and they vanished with the feverish breath which raised and could alone sustain them.

Such was the region into which Russia had been penetrating for many years, which she has not yet entirely subdued, but which seems as if it would fall ere long before her arms and her diplomacy. Tchernaieff was no sooner appointed to the Governorship of Turkistan than he began forming projects for the extension of his master's power. In three months after his assumption of office, he reported to the Minister of War at St. Petersburg that the Ameer of Bokhara was marching troops in the direction of Ura-Tube, a town about sixty miles south of Tashkend; and he feared from this circumstance that the Ameer was bent on seizing a territory which Tchernaieff desired to secure for Russia. Straightway he set his own force in motion, and, having seized Fort Niazbek, advanced on Tashkend, which was stormed and taken on the 4th of July, 1865. The city was large and populous, with a length of wall which has been calculated at sixteen miles; but the people are unwarlike, and, although the Russian force was something less than 2,000 in number, the place appears to have been reduced with no great difficulty, and at a very small expense of life. The seizure of this town advanced the Russian frontiers more than three hundred miles beyond the line where they had been drawn a year before. At one stride, Tchernaieff had moved a considerable distance towards Bokhara; and Bokhara itself next occupied his attention. A cause of quarrel was made out of the seizure by the Bokharans of the town of Hodjent, situated about six days' march from Tashkend. The former city is important as a military post, as it is situated on the Syr Darya at a point where the roads to Khokand, Tashkend, Bokhara, and Balkh, cross each other; and its possession by Tchernaieff would enable him to sever Khokand from Bokhara. It was therefore in every respect a very desirable place to obtain, and Tchernaieff resolved to obtain it. He issued an order to arrest all the Bokharans who could be discovered within his province, and to seize their property. For this high-handed proceeding, an excuse was found in the alleged fact that the Bokharans had demanded the evacuation of Tashkend and Chemkend, pending the receipt of the Czar's decision as to whether those towns were to be restored or not, and had intimated that, in the event of a refusal, he would cause a rising of the Mohammedans.* How far the statement was true, cannot be exactly ascertained; but it is certainly not surprising if the Bokharans protested against the continual advances of Tchernaieff towards their frontier—advances which were wholly antagonistic to the terms of Prince Gortschakoff's despatch. In

* In relating these facts, we have in the main followed the authority of Captain Burnaby, who derives some of his information from General Romanovsky's "Notes on Central Asia"—of course, a Russian work. But regard has also been had to the writings of Mr. Schuyler and Prof. Arminius Vambéry. and to the official papers. Vambéry's "Coming Struggle for India" gives a full account of recent Russian advances.

any case, the arrest of peaceable Bokharans was an extremely unjustifiable measure, and the Ameer not unnaturally retaliated by arresting all the Russian merchants in his capital. The forces under Tchernaieff were too few in number to enable that commander to do much; but he took possession of a fertile district close to Tashkend, and there awaited his opportunity for more extended enterprises.

Fearful of offending the great Czar, and yet desirous of obtaining justice for himself and his subjects, the Ameer of Bokhara despatched a mission to the Emperor at St. Petersburg, to represent the state of the facts, and to protest against the imprisonment of Bokharan merchants. In making their way northwards, the members of this mission fell in with General Kryjinovsky, the military Governor of Orenburg, who had been requested by Tchernaieff to co-operate with his designs, and who was in fact Tchernaieff's superior. The former of those officers would not permit the Bokharan envoys to go any farther, alleging that he was himself empowered to negotiate with them. It does not appear, however, that they obtained any satisfaction for the grievances of their countrymen; and shortly afterwards Kryjinovsky and Tchernaieff came together, and consulted what they should do with Tashkend. They did not agree on this subject; and, towards the latter end of 1865, Kryjinovsky was summoned to St. Petersburg. In the meanwhile, Tchernaieff sent a Russian mission to Bokhara, with the ostensible object of establishing friendly relations, and re-opening suspended trade. This mission presented so very military an aspect, owing to the presence of several officers, that the Bokharan sovereign, who was still chafing under the indignity offered him in the person of his envoys, put his Russian visitors under arrest. The act was, of course, perfectly unjustifiable; but the provocation by which it had been challenged must not be left out of view. The Ameer's proceeding furnished Tchernaieff with an excuse for doing what he desired to do. He had now a *casus belli* against Bokhara, and he speedily crossed the Syr Darya, at Chinaz, with fourteen companies of infantry, nine hundred Cossacks, sixteen guns, and twelve hundred camels. It was not long before a battle ensued in the wide deserts across which the Russian General was endeavouring to make his way. In this encounter, the Bokharans were more successful than might have been anticipated, and Tchernaieff found it convenient to retreat to the Syr Darya. The discomfiture took place in March, 1866, and it proved the termination of Tchernaieff's power in those parts. The General urgently begged for reinforcements; but, instead of being entrusted with a still larger army, he was recalled by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, who sent General Romanovsky to supersede him in the command. Still, it must not be inferred that the Russian Government disapproved of Tchernaieff's policy. They only disapproved of his failure, and his successor was permitted, if not actually enjoined, to follow the same course.

Romanovsky attacked the Bokharans at Irdja, and inflicted upon them a very serious defeat. This victory was speedily followed by another; the army of the Ameer was entirely scattered, and the sovereign himself compelled to fly into Samarcand. Romanovsky then took possession of Hodjent, after an eight days' siege, and, flushed with success, determined on permanently occupying the whole left bank of the Syr Darya. He also desired to seize Namangan, a large town in the direction of Khokand; but in this he was not supported by his Government, which feared to arouse the jealousy of England by taking too much at a time. General Romanovsky, however, was as restless and intriguing as Tchernaieff himself, and he could not resist the temptation of making a further extension of Russian power to the east of Bokhara. He was on good terms with Hudoyar Khan, the Prince of Khokand, who, by the Russian General's own admission, had conscientiously fulfilled his promises to the representatives of the Czar, and had acted at all times in the spirit of an ally, rather than in that of an enemy, or even of a neutral. Nevertheless, this did not in the slightest degree protect him from the ambitious schemes of Russia. After his arrival at St. Petersburg, General Kryjinovsky had many interviews with the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff, and seems to have imbued them with his own ideas of Central Asiatic policy. In the course of 1866, he sent a despatch to General Romanovsky, in which he stated that it was considered necessary to occupy the entire Khanate of Khokand, and to extend the Imperial dominions still further in the direction of China. Shortly afterwards, Kryjinovsky proceeded to Tashkend, from which he forwarded a report to St. Petersburg, recommending the immediate commencement of hostilities against Khokand. Some Russians, he said, had been attacked in that country by a band of robbers, and the Khan had been concentrating his forces in a way which the Russian General chose to regard as menacing. At this period, Romanovsky appears to have felt some qualms of conscience. He urged that the Khan was not acting in bad faith, and that his failure in punishing

the robber hordes arose from want of power. For a time these views prevailed, and Khokand was not then attacked; but all the country occupied up to May, 1866, was incorporated with the Russian Empire.

In the interval, Kryjinovsky turned his attention to Bokhara, the sovereign of which state was desirous of concluding a treaty of peace. The Russian Governor would not listen to this proposal, unless was disinclined to extend the limits of the Empire. This intimation, however, had not much effect on the course of affairs, and perhaps was not really intended to have. Kryjinovsky left the banks of the Syr Darya for Orenburg in November, 1866; but in the spring of the following year another Bokharan fort was seized by the Russians, and the Government showed no inclination to withdraw from the advanced positions taken up by its military representatives.



TROOPS OF THE KHAN OF KHOKAND.

the Ameer consented to pay a large war-indemnity. The emissary from Bokhara refused to concede any payment, probably thinking that Russia was wrong in the first instance, and that the seizure of the Bokharan merchants was the origin of all that had happened since. Soon afterwards, the negotiations were broken off, and it was determined to attack Bokhara with the utmost available speed. A large army crossed the frontier, and the forts of Ura-Tube and Djizzak fell before the invaders. The very day after the capture of the second of these strongholds, Kryjinovsky received a telegram from St. Petersburg, stating that the Government

Prince Gortschakoff, in his circular despatch of November 21st, 1864, excused, or rather explained, the action of Russia in Central Asia by the argument that a civilized Power, brought into contact with semi-civilized races, is obliged in self-defence to annex territories which otherwise it would not covet. There are raids and acts of pillage, he observed, which it is necessary to put down; the frontier tribes must be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission, and, when that has been accomplished, those very tribes are in themselves attacked by others more distant. "The State," continued the Russian Chancellor, "is bound to defend

them against these depredations, and to punish those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically-recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organisation makes it impossible to seize. If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten, and the withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason, and of the interests of civilization, has as yet no hold upon them. The work has, then, always to be done over again from the beginning. In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced submission. But soon, beyond this second line, other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten the same dangers, and necessitate the same measures of repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives: either to give up this endless labour, and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilization, an impossibility; or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance." Nothing could be put with greater ability; but it is not difficult to perceive that the statement was intended less as a justification of what had already occurred than as an excuse in anticipation for acts that were contemplated in the near future. Russia had her eyes fixed on Bokhara, on Khiva, on Khokand, possibly on Afghanistan, and on the Indian plains; and it was well to be prepared with a reason for all such movements—a reason which should not appear to be suggested by the movements themselves, but to be based on purely abstract considerations.

Pursuing his argument, Prince Gortschakoff maintained that every country in a similar position has been obliged to adopt a similar policy. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India,—all have been driven forward by imperious necessity, and have equally experienced the difficulty of not knowing where to stop. The policy of the Emperor, he alleged, consisted, not in enlarging the regions under his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to his rule, and in developing the commerce, well-being, and civilization of the lands he governed. But the unsettled state of the frontier, which had extended unequally in two different directions, the continual inroads of robber tribes into districts lying between the two lines of advance, and the disturbed condition of the independent Khanates, had necessitated the spread of Russian power over regions to which it had hitherto been a stranger. These, briefly stated, were the principles upon which the annexations of the next few years were vindicated beforehand by the chief Minister of the Czar. In the abstract, it is impossible to deny that they have a certain amount of force. A civilized State is sometimes brought into such embarrassing contact with one of a barbarian character that annexation is an absolute necessity. It is in this way that all great empires have arisen, and the fact has not been without its good results on what may be called the education of the world, no less than its evil characteristics. In considering such matters, we should always allow the possibility of a justification, while requiring the strictest proof of its existence in every individual case. To say that no such annexations are ever to be sanctioned—that the feeblest and most vicious types of political and social life are to be perpetually exempt, under every conceivable circumstance, from the domination of nobler forms—were to limit the progress of the world, and to make the spread of civilization an impossibility. But this tendency of force to assert itself over weakness—of the higher civilization to subject the lower—is liable to many temptations which are but seldom resisted, and which often involve a large amount of moral wrong. Every great Power is open to the same reproach, and England is no exception to the rule.

In judging the conduct of Russia, no Englishman has any right to assume the ground of superior virtue; but he has a clear and indisputable right to examine every case on its own merits, and to see whether it has really been dictated by necessity, or whether it has not rather been prompted by covetousness. Our own annexations in India would fall partly under the one head, partly under the other; and the remark applies equally to the multifarious annexations by which the Russian Empire has been built up. But there is no dominion in the world which has so frequently yielded to the worst motives for enlarging its boundaries as that which has its seat at St. Petersburg. In Europe and in Asia, pretexts of quarrel have repeatedly been sought; a long course of subtle intrigue has prepared the way for open violence; the weakness of neighbouring States has been fostered, the jealousies of bordering tribes have been developed, in order that at the fitting moment the independence of other lands may be extinguished, and the shadow of the Imperial eagles be still further extended over the circumference of the globe. The forward march of Russia through the deserts of Central Asia is a sufficient

proof of this. These territorial acquisitions were certainly not in all cases dictated by necessity. They resulted from a clearly-conceived scheme, which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, or the military Governors, or both in concert, had carefully elaborated; and it is obvious that in some instances the almost without excuse, and wholly without justification. To say that it was necessary as a matter of self-defence, is an abuse of language. It was one of many chapters in a long and painful history of ambition, and is susceptible of no rational explanation, except upon the theory that Russia

KHAN OF KHIVA.

state of war was unrighteously forced upon the independent races. * The treatment of Bokhara is is determined to march on India, and will not permit any of the independent States to stand in her way. Prince Gortschakoff, in addressing the Powers, made a distinction which in itself was not unreasonable. He observed that the nomadic tribes, which could neither be seized, nor punished, nor effectually kept in order, were most inconvenient neighbours; while, on the other hand, agricultural and commercial populations, attached to the soil, and possessing a more advanced social organisation, were neighbours with whom there

* Mr. Schuyler, in his interesting and valuable work on Turkistan (1876), gives a more favourable view than either Captain Burnaby or Mr. Vambéry of the action of the Russians in Central Asia. But it is apparent even from his account that the Russian Generals (whether with or without the sanction of the St. Petersburg Government) were constantly intriguing, so as to get the Khans into their power, and that encroachments were frequent. It may, nevertheless, be perfectly true that the native rulers gave some degree of provocation by attacks on Russian traders and others. Yet this is not sufficient to justify all that was done.

4 B

MENDICANT DERVISHES OF CENTRAL ASIA.

was a possibility of entering into relations. "Consequently," said he, "our frontier line ought to swallow up the former, and stop short of the limits of the latter." This might have been a tolerably fair rule, had it only been observed; but, in attacking the independent Khanates south of the deserts, Russia was directing her arms against those very populations, possessing a more advanced social state, which she had described as being beyond her range. The people of Khokand and Bokhara were not nomadic tribes: they were settled communities, having a moderate amount of civilization; and they were attacked on pretexts of the most insufficient nature. Desire of territory was the real motive for subjecting them to the miseries of war; and even the acknowledged friendliness of Khokand was not sufficient to protect that country from the march of Russian invasion.

Much had been done in the three years following the despatch of Prince Gortschakoff's circular; but more remained to be accomplished. Romanovsky was succeeded by a new Governor on the 17th of November, 1867. This was General Kauffmann, who carried on the aggressive policy of his predecessor with the utmost energy and zeal. After destroying the Bokharan town of Ukhum, he conducted his forces, in April, 1868, through the valley of the Zerafshan to Samarcand, which surrendered to his arms near the end of May. On the 2nd of July, the Ameer was defeated on the Zerabulak heights, and compelled to sign a treaty of peace, by the terms of which he bound himself to pay an indemnity, and to acknowledge the right of Russia to all the territory she had acquired since 1865. By this time, the subject of Russian aggressions in Central Asia was beginning to attract some attention in England, and many politicians felt alarm at what they considered a menacing advance towards our Indian frontiers. The danger, however, was too remote to affect the popular imagination in any appreciable degree. Several of our most eminent statesmen declared that there was in fact no peril at all, and the public generally felt disinclined to take any active steps in the matter, or even to study the bearings of the case as it affected our Indian possessions. The treaty between Russia and Bokhara was signed in November, 1868. On the 9th of the next month, Mr. Gladstone came into office as Prime Minister; and, it must be borne in mind, the particular section of the Liberal party with which that gentleman is identified has always been prone to take the most favourable view of Russia's intentions. Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues in the Government did not greatly trouble themselves about the state of affairs in Central Asia. They were, indeed, a little disturbed at the seizure of Samarcand by Russia, which thus acquired a complete control over the whole of Bokhara; but, after making some representations on the point to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, they were abundantly satisfied by Prince Gortschakoff's assurance that Samarcand should be restored to the Ameer. This restoration, however, has never been effected, and at the present time Bokhara lies completely at the Czar's mercy. A large part of the State was permanently annexed to Russia, and what was left to the Ameer was insufficient to maintain that Prince in anything like a position of independence, or even of dignity.

Further conquests were made by General Kauffmann, or by his subordinates, in the north-eastern division of Turkistan, where a fort was erected on the Naryn (the main affluent of the Syr Darya), and whence a military road was opened in the direction of Kashgar. Khokand was almost surrounded, and thus reduced to a condition in which resistance to attack would be hopeless. After a good many movements on the Chinese frontier, the nature of which it is not easy to determine, but which at any rate resulted in the increase of Russian territory, General Kauffmann turned his attention towards Khiva, a State situated to the north and north-west of Bokhara, and at that time lying on both sides of the Amou Darya, the Oxus of ancient history. Russia has had rather intimate relations with Khiva from an early period. Intercourse between the two countries commenced as far back as the fourteenth century, and the Czars even then seem to have had some idea of opening a trade with India through the deserts of Turkistan. In 1602, the Cossacks took Khiva, and twenty years later the Khan of that State offered to become a vassal of Russia. Peter the Great cast his eyes in the same direction, and Khiva has never ceased to be an object of attraction to Russian statesmen. In 1872, it was alleged by the Imperial Government that many outrages against Russian subjects had been committed by the ruler of the Khanate, and it was soon after known in England that an expedition was to be sent to Khiva in the ensuing spring. The Emperor considered it advisable to despatch a special envoy to London, to efface from the minds of the English Ministers and the English people any unfavourable impression which might have been created by this intelligence. The statesman selected for the task was Count Schouvaloff, who afterwards succeeded Count Brunnow as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. Count Schouvaloff was received by Earl

Granville, then Foreign Minister in Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet, on the 8th of January, 1873; and on this occasion the Central Asiatic question in general, and the Khivan question in particular, were discussed at considerable length. From the representations of the Russian envoy, it appeared that the matters which should in any way ruffle the good relations of England and Russia towards each other. With regard to Khiva, an expedition was certainly about to start; but it was of such an insignificant character that it was to consist of only four battalions and a half. "Its object," said Lord Granville,

GENERAL KAUFFMANN.

Emperor Alexander had been greatly surprised to learn from various sources that a certain amount of susceptibility had been excited in the public mind of England by the recent acts of Russia. The Emperor, according to Count Schouvaloff, knew of no questions in Central Asia which could affect the good understanding existing between the two countries. There were, it was true, some few matters of detail, as to the boundaries of Afghanistan, to be settled; but there was nothing in those summarising the assurances given to him by Count Schouvaloff, "was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as

could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva."* Count Schouvaloff added that Earl Granville might give Parliament the most positive assurances on the subject. In responding to these explanations, the English Foreign Minister observed, when referring to Khiva, that if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with the object, and within the limits, described by Count Schouvaloff, it would meet with no remonstrance from her Majesty's Government. Lord Northbrook, at that time Governor-General of India, had given the strongest advice to the Khan to comply with the reasonable demands of Russia; and there was evidently a disposition on the part of the English Government to put a flattering interpretation on everything the Emperor said, although doubtless that disposition was not entirely without limits.

The Russian expedition against Khiva started in February, 1873, and, after the Khan's troops had been several times defeated, the town of Khiva surrendered unconditionally on the 10th of June. The Khan himself took to flight, but soon perceived that his wisest policy was to return, and make submission to the conqueror. He declared himself a vassal of the Czar on the 5th of July; but the national spirit was not so easily quelled as that of the sovereign. An insurrection broke out in August, but was speedily suppressed, and severely punished. The annexation of a part of Khiva followed soon after. The territory thus appropriated was that portion of the Khanate which extended along the right or eastern bank of the Amou Darya, in the direction of the Syr Darya. Part of this territory was afterwards made over to Bokhara; but, inasmuch as Bokhara was now completely under the power of the Russian Government, the land so transferred remained in all but the name a possession of Russia itself. A special treaty was concluded between General Kauffmann and the Ameer of Bokhara on the 10th of October, 1873, which, under pretence of promoting commercial relations, materially added to the power of Russia over the vassal State. The sceptre of the Czar now reached to within a few hundred miles of Afghanistan, and the Emperor's pledged word of honour, as conveyed by Count Schouvaloff to Lord Granville, had been openly and shamefully broken.

The four battalions and a half, which, according to Count Schouvaloff, were all the troops Russia intended to send against Khiva, were speedily increased to 10,000 men; but it was said that this was only on account of the tremendous difficulties presented by the route. The members of the English Government appear, with a most amiable simplicity, to have believed everything they were told; but of course it was necessary to give some sort of explanation for these breaches of faith, and explanations are always forthcoming when there is a purpose to serve. The annexation of a large part of Khiva, after Count Schouvaloff's positive assurances that the occupation would be temporary and brief, was excused in a rather elaborate article published in the St. Petersburg *Messager Officiel* of November, 30th, 1873. The causes of the war were stated to have been "continual acts of brigandage, exactions imposed upon the Kirghiz subject to the Russian rule, incitement to revolt among those nomadic tribes, and the capture and enslavement of Russian subjects." The expedition, according to the official writer, was not undertaken until after frequent representations had been made to the Khan, which he had either left unanswered, or met by a haughty refusal of redress. After the occupation of Khiva, the Russian authorities, it seems, were convinced that, even with the best intentions, the Khan would be unable to maintain neighbourly relations with the Russians, since his influence over the wandering Turkomans was very slight, and he was himself frequently compelled to acknowledge the supremacy of those robbers. "It was therefore," said the official article, "considered indispensable to establish a fortified position, provided with a sufficient garrison, in order to secure our frontiers against the attacks of brigands, to protect our caravans and those of the Khivans, and at the same time to support the Khan if he should be threatened by the Turkomans. The best point to have chosen for the erection of this fort would perhaps have been the southern shore of the Sea of Aral, which would have assured us a communication by water with the mouths of the Amou Darya. Unfortunately, this coast, surrounded by uninterrupted marshes, presents no favourable spot for the erection of a fortified station. We had therefore to construct the fort on the right bank of the Amou Darya." But it was also considered necessary, in order to ensure the communications of the fort and its garrison with the province of Turkistan, to annex the arid desert which lay between. The official writer even went so far as to affirm that the Khan of Khiva himself desired the existence of a fort, and of a body of Russian troops, within the limits of his territory; that is to say, if we are to believe the statement, he desired the subjection of his sovereignty to that of the Czar. On this point, indeed, his wishes were so insatiable that he "urgently requested the

* Despatch of Earl Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, January 8th, 1873.

maintenance of Russian troops in the town of Khiva itself."

Prince Gortschakoff called the attention of Lord Augustus Loftus to this article as an authoritative exposition of the facts, and the Emperor himself gave a similar explanation. His Majesty was profuse in his assurances of the most friendly intentions, and Prince Gortschakoff observed that, if a portion of Khiva had not been taken, the whole must very speedily have been annexed, since the withdrawal of the Russian troops would have been followed by extreme disorders. The assertion of a state of anarchy, existing in a country which it is desired to annex, is the excuse commonly advanced in justification of such acts. It is an excuse difficult to disprove, but one which from its very nature should be viewed with the utmost distrust. Nothing is easier than to create a state of anarchy by intrigue and interference, and then to allege the condition thus established as the reason for a more complete intervention. This, indeed, is the favourite Russian method, and it has so often been crowned with success that its frequent repetition is not surprising. The partition of Poland was justified after the same fashion, and the interposition of Russia in the affairs of Turkey has seldom taken place under any other plea. Even supposing the statement to have been true with regard to Khiva, it is impossible to believe that the Russian Government was ignorant of the asserted anarchy when its envoy assured Lord Granville that the Emperor had given positive orders against annexation, and had directed that the conditions imposed upon the Khan should be such as would not in any way lead to the prolonged occupation of Khiva. Yet there are men, and Englishmen too, who can zealously, and even passionately, argue that there was no breach of faith on the part of Russia; that no promise was made; that no contract was entered into; that the Emperor never pledged his word of honour in the matter; and that the right of Great Britain to ask for a promise was neither claimed by us, nor admitted by Russia. According to these advocates, there had been nothing more than a statement of what was at one time expected and intended; but circumstances altered, and that led to another course being taken.* When a foreign potentate is thus defended by independent gentlemen of experience and position, it is difficult to see what more can be said for him by official exponents in his own dominions.

* "Causes of the Afghan War; being a selection of the Papers laid before Parliament, with a connecting Narrative and Comment" (1879)—a volume prepared and issued by the Afghan Committee.

Khiva was now entirely in the power of the Czar. Besides the cession of territory on the right bank of the Amou Darya, the treaty of peace concluded on the 24th of August, 1873, provided that the Khan should acknowledge himself the humble servant of the Russian Emperor. By the same instrument, he renounced the right of maintaining any direct and friendly relations with neighbouring rulers and Khans, or of concluding with them commercial or other treaties of any kind whatever; and he bound himself not to undertake, without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, any military operations against such neighbouring countries. Russian steamers, and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the Government or to private individuals, were to have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amou Darya. Khivan and Bokharan vessels might enjoy the same right by permission from the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, but in no other way. Russians were to have the right to construct wharves or landing-places on the left bank of the river—that is, the bank still left under the nominal sovereignty of the Khan. The native Government was to be responsible for the safety and security of such wharves, but the approval of the localities selected was to rest with the representatives of Russia. Independently of these wharves, Russians were to have the right to establish factories on the left bank of the Amou Darya, for the storage and safe keeping of their merchandize. Provision was made for the free passage of Russian merchants and their caravans throughout the entire Khanate; for the freedom of such traders from the payment of customs' duties, and of all kinds of dues on trade; for the establishing of commercial agents in Khiva and other towns; for the right of holding immovable property in the province; and for the granting of various other privileges. Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects were to be referred to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction, even in the event of such complaints and claims being alleged against Russian subjects within the confines of the Khanate. The Khan undertook to capture and surrender to the nearest Russian authorities all runaways from Russia having no permit from the Russian authorities, without regard to the nationality of such individuals. In short, the native ruler was reduced to the position of a mere agent of the Czar, holding his office on the plain understanding that he did his master's business rather than his own. As if these humiliations were not sufficient, he had to suffer the burden of a war-indemnity to

the extent of 2,200,000 roubles; but he was permitted to pay the fine in annual instalments, with the addition of interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, extending over a period of twenty

A good deal of desultory fighting with the Turkomans succeeded to this arrangement, and Kauffmann pursued his victorious career, constantly adding to the power of Russia in those remote

RUSSIAN HEAD OF DISTRICT IN KHOKAND RECEIVING REPORTS FROM NATIVE CHIEFS.

years. This was in some respects a concession to the Khan's poverty and weakness; but it is obvious that it had also the effect of retaining the province for a lengthened period in a state of miserable subjection to its powerful neighbour.*

regions, and reducing to submission the wild tribes occupying the newly-annexed territory. In 1875, the General took advantage of the disturbed condition of Khokand to establish his rule in that direction also. By the recent progress of events, Khokand had been isolated from Khiva and

* The provisions of the treaty with Bokhara (October 10th, 1873) were very similar to those in the Khivan treaty; only there was no war-indemnity. The object in both cases was virtually to subject the province to the dominion of Russia.

Bokhara, neither of which States had any ability to render her the slightest help. The game of annexation had been played with masterly skill, and every move on the board made the next move easier and more certain of success. The war with Khokand began in the late summer of 1875. An army of 30,000 men was defeated by the Russians on the 4th of September, and the capital was entered without resistance on the 16th of the same month. The independence of the Khanate was now practically at an end; but a new Khan was appointed, who was in fact the creature of Russia. The people expelled this sham ruler on the 21st of October, and part of Khokand was then annexed to Russia, not only in fact, but in terms. Some of the inhabitants are said to have expressed a desire to become subjects of the Emperor; but it is certain that the greater number had no such wish. A popular insurrection resulted in the massacre of the Russian garrison stationed at the capital, and General Kauffman found himself opposed by a serious rebellion. This was suppressed about the



CROSSING THE MONGOLIAN SAND DESERTS.

close of January, 1876, and the whole of Khokand was then added to the Russian dominions, under the title of Ferghana. On the Eastern shore of the Caspian Sea also the Russians have not been idle. The Turkomans met with defeat after defeat, culminating in the capture by Skobeleff of Geok-Tepe. The Russians made Ashkabad their centre of administration, and finally, in 1884, occupied Merve. Here for the present the Russian annexations have come to a stop.

The pretence throughout all these appropriations of territory was that the cause of civilization and humanity was being advanced, and that the flag of Russia protected all it covered from the cruel tyranny of savages. It is undeniable, however, that, in the act of establishing her rule, Russia committed atrocities enough to cast a sanguinary stain on any system of government she might found in those regions. Mr. Schuyler, Secretary of the United States Legation at St. Petersburg, published in 1876 a work describing what he had observed in a tour through the province of Turkistan, performed at the very time the Russians were executing their civilizing mission. This gentleman (though on the whole well inclined towards the Russians) testified to the unrestrained ferocity with which the Cossacks attacked men, women, and children. He also made a report to his Government on the exactions, corruptions, and despotic rule of General Kauffmann's agents. Kauffmann maintained the state of a sovereign prince, and was so little concerned in the character of his subordinates that he would not inquire into charges against their honesty. Civilization, according to the standard of St. Petersburg, may have been advanced; humanity and honour had little occasion but to grieve. When the power of his arms was not disputed, General Kauffmann could behave with consideration and forbearance; but to resist his arbitrary acts was a crime he did not fail to punish with the unsparing rigour which Russia has inscribed upon every page of her history. The annexation of Khiva was accomplished a little before the retirement from office of Mr. Gladstone, whose Administration made room for that of Mr. Disraeli in February, 1874. The former of those right honourable gentlemen had hardly time to formulate any policy with reference to the new position of Russia in the Central Asiatic Provinces; but so cordial an understanding existed between his Government and that of the Czar up to the last moment of the former retaining office, and Mr. Gladstone and his followers have since then taken so friendly a view of Russian proceedings in the East, that there is no reason to suppose any different sentiment would have been entertained, had the Liberal Cabinet continued in office.

The new Government did not very speedily examine into the state of Central Asia; but on the 6th of November, 1874, Lord Derby, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, directed the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to call the attention of the Russian Government to a circular from General Llamakin, in which that officer styled himself commander over the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and the Goorgan, and to point out that the territory between those points belonged to Persia, and was therefore beyond the range of General Llamakin's operations. In the absence of Prince Gortschakoff from St. Petersburg, M. de Westmann, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave some personal explanations to Lord Augustus Loftus, to the effect that the incident referred to by Lord Derby had resulted from an error, and that this had been made clear to the entire satisfaction of the Persian Government. He added, however, that he felt surprised at the English Government having asked for any explanation of a circumstance, trifling in itself, which solely concerned Russia and Persia. It was not customary, his Excellency observed, to interfere in the international relations existing between two independent States; and he could not comprehend in what way the incident in question could affect Great Britain. M. de Westmann was apparently very sore on the subject, and doubtless expressed the feeling of the Emperor with respect to Lord Derby's inquiry. The position of the two Governments towards one another had altered since the accession of Mr. Disraeli to power. The mutual complaisance of the Gladstonian era had given place to something of reserve and distrust. But complaisance is not always the highest virtue in a statesman.

The approximation of Russia towards the boundaries of British India was in fact becoming serious, though she was yet a long way to the north. Officially it was still asserted that nothing more was meant than to protect Russian traders from the violence of banditti, and to spread the benefits of civilization over a half-savage region. But private Russians often talked without disguise about the future possession of India by their countrymen, and the idea was known to be popular in the army. Captain Terentieff has issued a work on "Russia and England in the East," which probably expresses the thoughts of many minds. According to this author, Russia has gained a great advantage by her acquisitions in Central Asia, in the fact that, from the position thus obtained, her power of threatening British India has become real,

and has ceased to be visionary. "If, in the time of Paul I.," says Captain Terentieff, "an overland expedition to India was considered feasible, it is certainly much more so at the present time, when we have shortened the interval by such an immense stretch of country. Asia will of course never form the avowed object of dispute between England and Russia; but, in the event of a war produced by European complications, we shall clearly be obliged in our own interests to take advantage of the proximity to India which is afforded by our present position in Central Asia." When such are the views commonly held by Russian soldiers and Russian civilians, it is impossible that England should not regard with jealous watchfulness the continual advance of the Czar's armies towards the confines of Afghanistan, and therefore towards the vicinity of British India.

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## CHAPTER XXXII.

Relative Position of England and Russia on the Central Asiatic Question (1874-5)—Conversation between Count Schouvaloff and Lord Derby on the Future of Afghanistan—Supposed Russian Designs on Merve—Geography of Afghanistan, and Character of the People—Methods of Living, Religion, Political and Social State, &c.—Afghanistan in Early Times—Relics of Buddhism—Ancient Coins, and their Historical Testimony—Origin and History of the Afghans—Successive Dynasties and Conquests—Modern Revolutions—Shah Soojah and the Koh-i-Noor Diamond—Rise of Dost Mahomed—Attempt of Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, to open Relations with that Sovereign—Failure of the Mission of Captain Burnes—Mistaken Policy of the Anglo-Indian Government—Intrigues of Russia and Persia—Siege of Herat—Declaration of War against the Ameer (1839)—Plan of the Campaign—Toilsome March of Two British Divisions through the Bolan Pass—Surrender of Candahar—Capture of Ghizni by Sir John Keane—Flight of Dost Mahomed—March of Colonel Wade through the Khyber Pass, with a Body of Afghans and Sikhs—Complete Discomfiture of the Enemy—Results of British Interference—A terrible Calamity approaching.

ENGLAND and Russia were now fairly face to face on the question of Central Asia. The Government of Mr. Disraeli was less easily satisfied than the Government of Mr. Gladstone with respect to the Czar's intentions. It began to be acknowledged, even in the official circles of London, that the friendly assurances of the Emperor were not altogether so satisfactory as it had been the fashion to suppose. The progress of Russian arms in Turkistan was a fact which might be variously explained, but which it was impossible to view without some degree of uneasiness; and directly that uneasiness found expression through the mouth of a Cabinet Minister, the relations between the two Governments lost much of their former cordiality. This was in fact inevitable sooner or later, for the position of antagonism was real, and could only for a time be disguised by the insincerities of compliment. But the feeling of suspicion was not confined to one side. If England was jealous of Russian advances in the direction of India, Russia was equally apprehensive—or at least professed to be so—of English movements on the north-western frontier of India. Count Schouvaloff, who had by that time succeeded Count Brunnow as Russian Ambassador in London, had some conversation with Lord Derby, in March, 1875, on the subject of these movements; and the English Foreign Minister, in a despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, dated the 19th of the month, gave an account of what had passed. It appeared that Count Schouvaloff had asked Lord Derby whether he was right in believing there was no inclination on the part of England to advance farther in the direction of the Russian possessions, unless such advance were considered necessary for actually defensive purposes; and Lord Derby had replied that his view was undoubtedly correct. So far from desiring to annex any part of Afghanistan—which was the country supposed by Russia to be threatened in its independence—the English Government would deprecate such a result, as bringing only increased cost and trouble without advantage. The Cabinet, according to the explanations of the Foreign Secretary, wished to be on good terms with the Afghan ruler, and to exercise a friendly influence over his policy; but the only case in which an advance of British troops westward seemed at all likely, was in the event of a Russian movement tending to the occupation of Merve.

Merve is a town situated a little to the north of Afghanistan, but capable of being approached by a force from Khiva. The distance between the two cities, according to Captain Burnaby, is about four hundred and thirty miles, and the time occupied by a caravan in performing the journey is seventeen days. A hundred and seventy miles of desert interpose an obstacle at one part of the route; but

even in that region wells are to be found, and the longest interval traversed without water is not more than fifty-six miles. In former times, the Khivans took Merve, and subsequent events have proved how justified were English fears. The safety of this town was a subject which very naturally engaged the attention of the English Government. "I reminded Count Schouvaloff," said Lord Derby in the despatch of March 19th, "that I had warned him some months back of the great importance which the English Government attached to Merve, and of the danger to our relations that would ensue if it were meddled with. He said that he remembered what I had told him on that subject, and had communicated it to his Government. He quite saw the danger that might arise if the two Powers were brought face to face in the neighbourhood of Herat. 'Was he justified,' he asked, 'in assuming that our action in this matter would depend on that of Russia—that England would not move if Russia did not?' I said I thought he might feel safe on that point; we only desired the maintenance of the *status quo*, and certainly should not be the first to take steps that might be considered aggressive. He said his Government would be perfectly satisfied with this expression of intentions from me, hinting that the language of some of our newspapers had created distrust and suspicion in Russia."



WITHIN THE FORTIFICATIONS OF MERVE.

It will now be desirable to consider the position of Afghanistan with reference to the contending parties. Afghanistan—or Cabul, as it is sometimes called after the capital city—is an Asiatic country lying to the west of British India. The length from north to south is some four hundred and fifty miles; the mean width, from east to west, about four hundred and seventy miles. North of this territory is Turkistan; on the east are Scinde and the plain of Peshawur; Beloochistan lies to the south, and Persia to the west. Beloochistan, or Kelat, was at one time considered a part of Afghanistan, but has long been separated from it. That which at the present day is understood as Afghanistan is an elevated table-land, the eastern base of which is washed by the river Indus. From the banks of this stream, a comparatively narrow strip of low ground, now forming part of British India, leads up to the Suleiman Mountains, which rise steeply to an elevation of six thousand feet above the sea, and constitute the eastern limit of Afghanistan. These highlands are greatly inferior in altitude to the ranges of the Hindoo-Koosh (the Indian Caucasus of Alexander the Great), which, in places on the north-eastern frontier, rise to a height of twenty thousand feet. They are an offset from the Himalayas, and are sometimes considered as forming part of that system. Arid, rocky, and treeless, with numerous deep and narrow valleys, these mountains make an admirable barrier against invasion, and, taken in conjunction with the Pughman Mountains, the Koh-i-Baba range, and the system still known by the ancient Greek designation of Paropamisus, form the boundary of Afghanistan Proper on the north, where the mountains follow an irregular line tending to the south-west.

To the south, there is, for the most part, no great natural division between Afghanistan and Beloochistan; nor is there to the west, on the side of Persia: the east, however, is well protected by the Suleiman range. The northern mountains are cleft by numerous ravines, all of them difficult for the advance of an army; the eastern are penetrated by the valley of the Cabul river, and by several narrow passes, tragically associated with the English retreat in 1842.

In a country so uncivilised and so little known, it is impossible to fix the population with any accuracy: that of Afghanistan has been variously stated at from five to ten millions. Of these, the ruling classes (forming a minority of not much more than a third) are men of the true Afghan race; but the country also includes considerable bodies of Persians, Arabs, Hindoos, Armenians, Abyssinians, and Kalmucks, with some humbler tribes who maintain a separate existence in the midst of other communities. The large towns are inhabited chiefly by Persians and Hindoos, for an Afghan considers it beneath him to engage in any species of trade. The members of the dominant race dwell in the mountainous regions, yet less on the heights than in the valleys and on the table-lands. They call themselves, not Afghans, but Pushtaneh, and have a language and literature of their own, which they highly value. Their origin is unknown, and has given rise to a good deal of speculation. Among other guesses, it has been supposed that they are descended from the lost tribes of Israel, and it is said that something of a Jewish character is observable in their features. The belief in a Jewish origin is shared by themselves, and even asserted with much confidence. However this may be, their habits and dispositions are very different from those of the Jews, as Jews are now known to the world. They are essentially a martial race; courageous, proud, high-spirited, and vain; not at all disinclined to robbery, yet hospitable in the highest degree, and so chivalrous towards all who trust to the protection of their roof, that an enemy is safe if he enter their walls, and claim their generosity. Nevertheless, their vindictiveness in the prosecution of personal or tribal quarrels is extreme. These quarrels are of frequent occurrence, for the Afghans are turbulent and aggressive. The *vendetta* is with them as cherished an institution as it is with the Corsicans, and sanguinary feuds are handed down from generation to generation, with the inevitable result of creating fresh dissensions out of the original stock. Sir Herbert Edwardes has observed that nothing can be finer than the *physique* of the Afghan, or worse than his *morale*. The criticism is doubtless true in several respects; yet the Afghans have some good qualities to set against their bad ones. They are said to be more truthful than is usual with Orientals; they reverence old age; they behave respectfully to women; and their love of freedom is a passion.

Being a race of warriors, accustomed to a mountain life, and to vigorous exercises in the open air, the Afghans are alert and hardy, and their personal appearance is striking. Though for the most part swarthy and black-bearded, they are not unfrequently as fair as Europeans. This would seem to indicate diversity of origin, and indeed the Afghans of the Cabul valley—the original home of the race, from which successive conquests have spread the Pushtoo dominion over other parts—look upon their more distant countrymen with some degree of contempt, as coming of mixed blood. The houses of the rich are stately after the Eastern fashion, with court-yards, gardens, and fountains, and are not wanting in the adornments of rich stuffs, carvings, paintings, and mirrors; but the poor have little to mitigate their lot, and pass their days in squalid misery. The Afghans are Mohammedans of the Sunnite communion, and therefore regard the Turkish Sultan as the head of their faith. They are remarkably tolerant, however, admitting on terms of equality into their country, not only Hindoos and Christians, but even members of the Shiite branch of the Moslems, whom the Sunnites generally detest more than the outer infidels. Many Persians, who belong to the Shiite body, are employed in high official stations, and it is only required that they shall abstain from uttering the curses on their opponents which are often considered by them a part of religious duty. The whole Afghan nation is divided into tribes, each of which has considerable power in itself, though all are subordinate to the Ameer. The tribes are subdivided into clans, which elect their own chiefs out of the oldest families; and amongst these bodies a strong feeling of republican independence seems to prevail. Certain it is that Asiatic despotism is far less apparent in Afghanistan than in most other countries of the East. This freedom from personal rule, the Afghans are willing to purchase at the expense of continual turbulence and frequent bloodshed. Elphinstone, the traveller, after representing to them the many advantages which would attend the establishment of a more settled government, received for answer the emphatic declaration, "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood; but we will never be content

with a master." Those who speak thus, however, are the ruling military class: the tillers of the soil, belonging to another race, are mere serfs, compelled to acknowledge the mastery of their feudal lords, and, though industrious, intelligent, and honest, systematically oppressed by men who will brook no oppression of themselves.



CABUL.

Very little is known about Afghanistan during the early ages of history. In ancient times, it formed part of the Persian Empire, but, being remote from the more civilised regions of Asia and Europe, left few records of itself in the annals of the world. The people are thought to have been Buddhists, and some curious antiquities are still found in the country, to which inquirers are disposed to assign a Buddhistic origin. These are certain monuments, called by the natives *topes* or *stupas*, which occur principally, though not entirely, in the valley of the Cabul river. They are constructed of layers of large stones, connected with beaten earth, and vary considerably in size. Their situation is on the skirts of hills, or on elevations separated from each other by ravines; and numerous caves, which seem to have been used as dwellings, are found in the immediate neighbourhood. Each of these buildings is crowned with a cupola, sometimes much flattened, in other cases approaching the form of a cone. The entrance is on the eastern side, and is approached by a flight of steps. Within, a perpendicular story rests upon the basement, and the centre consists of a small apartment, from which passages or tunnels extend to the circumference of the edifice. Caskets or vases, of copper or steatite, are found in the various recesses; and these vessels, which are sometimes globular and sometimes cylindrical in shape, generally contain cylinders of gold or silver. A few fragments of bone are occasionally discovered in the smaller

vessels, and the relics are carefully wrapped up in an envelope of fine linen. The large vases, in the greater number of instances, contain a quantity of fine, pulverised earth, or of ashes in which are found burnt pearls, beads, rings, seals, gems, coloured stones, pieces of crystal, and fragments of mother-of-pearl shells. Minute gold and silver cups, beads of pearl, crystal, agate, or coral, small ornaments of gold or precious stones, coins, and some species of vegetable production inscribed with characters, but so fragile as to crumble into dust on being handled, are also found in several of the vases stored in these singular structures. The most probable supposition as to their original use is that the buildings were erected for the preservation of the relics of Buddha. Two Chinese pilgrims, one of whom visited Hindostan about the year 400 of the Christian era, and the other some two hundred and fifty years later, state that a hundred years after the death of Buddha the adherents of that prophet began to settle in Afghanistan, and to build their towers or *stupas*. At the time of their travels, the Chinese pilgrims found several of these monuments along the road; and it is not unlikely that what they then saw are the very edifices which still exist.*



INTERIOR OF THE CITY OF CANDAHAR.

By the ancient Greeks, Afghanistan was called Ariana—a term, however, which included a considerable part of Persia as well. The whole region was subdued by Alexander the Great, who planted it with colonies, some of which seem for a time to have enjoyed great prosperity. In the northern parts of Afghanistan there is a large plain, from which an enormous number of ancient coins, chiefly copper, but some of silver and gold, have been dug

* English Cyclopædia, Art. "Afghanistan."

up from time to time. An English inquirer, Mr. Masson, who devoted several years to the search, succeeded by 1837 in collecting 60,000 of the baser coins, together with others more valuable, and a large number of engraved seals, amulets, rings, figures of men and animals, and other objects in metal. It appeared that, from time immemorial, coins had been collected on this plain in such extraordinary profusion that in some years as many as 30,000 were transmitted to Cabul, to be melted down. The oldest of these coins seem to have been struck 256 years before the birth of Christ; the latest, a thousand years after that period. Many of them belong to the Greek dynasty of Bactria—a country lying on both sides of the Oxus, and therefore to the north of what is now understood by Afghanistan. For about a hundred years, Bactria formed part of the immense kingdom of Syria founded by Seleucus Nicator, one of Alexander's generals; but it became an independent sovereignty in the year 256 or 255 B.C. This newly-created dominion included the eastern part of Ariana; the western part of that country acquired importance and renown, about the same time, as the formidable kingdom of Parthia. The Greek kings of Bactria enjoyed their possessions till about 120 B.C., when the country was subjected by a Scythian conqueror. A portion of eastern Ariana was in the hands of the Parthians; but their power decayed shortly before the Christian era, and the Scythians do not appear to have established themselves for any great length of time in those regions. Cabul was acquired by an Indian king about 56 B.C.; and figures of Hindoo deities are found on the coins, together with Greek inscriptions. Another Scythian irruption took place at the close of the first Christian century, and a singular combination of Hindoo, Scythian, and Greek ideas in religion would seem, according to the testimony of the coins, to have existed in the northern parts of Afghanistan for some ages. The use of the Greek language, though in a form more and more debased with each successive generation, lasted in Afghanistan to the close of the fourth century, about which period, as far as can be ascertained, the country once more passed under the sceptre of the Persian monarchs. When the Sassanian rulers of Persia were overpowered by the Mohammedan caliphs and their Arabian followers, Afghanistan still remained for a while under the dynasty that had been expelled from the more western parts of Persia; but the princes of that house were speedily subjected by the Turkoman tribes beyond their northern boundaries, and it was then that the race of Afghans, or Assakanes, first entered the land which is now called after them. This was in the latter part of the seventh century, and in time they became the predominant race in that part of the world. The Afghans themselves trace their descent from Saul, King of Israel, and include the early history of the Jews in the annals of their own race. The conversion of the people to Mohammedanism was very gradual. Even as late as the tenth century of our era, the majority of the nation followed a different faith from that of Mohammed.

The country passed through many vicissitudes during what, in this part of the world, we call the middle ages. It was temporarily conquered both by Genghiz Khan and Timur, and princes belonging to the family of the latter warrior governed Afghanistan from the Imperial capital of Samarcand until the year 1504, when the Mogul conqueror, Baber, took possession of Cabul. An Afghan dynasty had been long established at Delhi, in Hindostan; but in 1526 this was overthrown by Baber, who, establishing himself at Agra, annexed Afghanistan to the Mogul Empire of Northern India. Under this rule it remained for a hundred years, when, for the third time, it was incorporated with Persia, owing to the conquests of Shah Abbas the Great. The Afghans, however, revolted in the early part of the eighteenth century, and not only acquired their independence, but in their turn invaded Persia, and placed an Afghan dynasty on the throne of Ispahan. This dominion was very short-lived; for the celebrated Nadir Shah vanquished the Afghan Sultan in a series of battles, one of which, fought near Persepolis, in 1730, proved his ruin, and led soon afterwards to his death. On the assassination of Nadir Shah, in 1747, Afghanistan once more obtained its independence under Ahmed Khan, the founder of the Durani dynasty. Ahmed was a great conqueror, who made his power felt in the Punjaub, at Delhi, at Candahar, at Herat, in Cashmere, and in other directions. He was frequently at war in Northern India, and, in a great battle fought on the 7th of January, 1761, he broke the threatening power of the Mahrattas. Notwithstanding his military genius and his great success, Ahmed Khan had much trouble in defending the Punjaub from the continual incursions of the Sikhs; yet he preserved his power until his death, in 1773. The seat of his government had been at Candahar, a town of somewhat central position; but his son, Timur Shah, removed the capital to Cabul, in the north. This monarch had inherited from his father an immense empire, which extended from Herat into Hindostan, and from the banks of the Oxus to the Arabian Sea;

but his power was being constantly threatened by insurrectionary risings, and the Punjaub he found especial difficulty in retaining beneath his rule. He was succeeded, in 1793, by the second of his sons, Shah Zeman, whose reign of seven years was a succession of rebellions on the part of his relatives. A period of civil war followed under the rule of his step-brother, Mahmud, and matters were but little improved under Shah Soojah, who deposed Mahmud in 1802, but was in turn deposed by him in 1809. Both these monarchs were powerful and enterprising warriors, and both were successful for a time; but neither was able to establish his power permanently, and both experienced the most bitter reverses of fortune. When Mahmud died, in 1829, he was in possession simply of Herat and the adjacent country. The vast empire which only a few generations before had obeyed the rule of the Afghans was now broken up into a number of petty states, and the greatness of Cabul had come to an end. Of Shah Soojah an anecdote is recorded which is worth repeating. After his deposition from the throne, he went to Lahore, where he was the guest of Runjeet Singh, the leader of the Sikhs, who appears to have acted rather as his jailor than as his host. He had with him the celebrated Koh-i-Noor diamond, which excited the cupidity of Runjeet. This jewel is said to have been worn by one of the great Hindoo warriors 4,000 years ago; but a more probable account is that it was found in the mines of Golconda in 1550. It formed one of the ornaments of the famous peacock-throne of Delhi, and afterwards came into the possession of the Afghan princes. In its uncut state, it was the largest diamond in the world, and Runjeet Singh offered to purchase it of Shah Soojah for the revenues of three villages. Soojah agreed to the bargain, but never received one rupee in exchange for the jewel. This is the diamond which in 1849 passed into the hands of the British, on the annexation of the Punjaub to our Eastern dominions. It was then presented to the Queen, and formed an object of attraction in the Great Exhibition of 1851.

The plain of Peshawur, with Cashmere and Moultan, had now passed from the possession of the Afghans and become portions of the Punjaub sovereignty. Scinde was independent in all but the name; and Afghanistan west of the Suleiman Mountains was divided amongst several rulers, of whom the principal was Dost Mahomed. This remarkable man was one of the brothers of Futteh Khan, the Vizier of Shah Mahmud, by whom Futteh had been barbarously tortured, and afterwards assassinated, for acting in opposition to his power. In 1836, Dost Mahomed was ruling at Cabul, and, being desirous of strengthening himself by an alliance with the British Government of India, he addressed a complimentary letter, on the 31st of May, to the Governor-General, Lord Auckland. At that time, as at the present, great fears were entertained in British India of an alliance between Russia and Afghanistan, to the detriment of our interests. Lord Auckland considered that he might come to some terms with Dost Mahomed. He therefore sent an envoy to Cabul in the person of Captain Alexander Burnes, who reached the Afghan capital on the 20th of September, 1837.



THE BOLAN PASS.

He was received with great pomp and magnificence; but the Ameer was speedily disgusted by the meanness of the presents which Captain Burnes brought with him, and which consisted simply of a telescope, a pistol, and some pins and needles for the ladies of the harem. Dost Mahomed, however, would probably have overlooked this slight, had the English authorities in India been prepared to render him the support which he desired. Captain Burnes was strongly impressed with the advisability of granting that support; for the Ameer was seeking alliances by which he hoped to recover those portions of Afghanistan which had recently been lost, and was certainly not unwilling to receive favours from Russia, if he could not obtain them from England. He had already listened to overtures both from Russia and Persia; but he told Captain Burnes that he would gladly abandon all co-operation with those Powers—which were in fact acting together for the advancement of their mutual purposes—if England would give him the assistance he needed. A Russian envoy, Captain Vicovich, was at that very moment on his road to Cabul. Dost Mahomed apprized Captain Burnes of this fact, and offered to repel the Russian if his terms were accepted. There can be little doubt that at this period Dost Mahomed would have preferred the English to the Russian alliance; but Lord Auckland determined that he should at any rate not have the former. Impressed with the gravity of the issues involved in this great question of policy, Captain Burnes urged upon the Governor-General to guarantee the integrity of the Ameer's dominions, or at any rate to promise him a subsidy in case they should be attacked. Lord Auckland refused both alternatives, and, while denying the Ameer every species of help, peremptorily required him to abandon all negotiations with Russia and Persia. Captain Vicovich arrived soon after, and, as might have been expected, made liberal promises of assistance. An annual subsidy was to be paid to Dost Mahomed, and he was to be furnished with troops to assist him in recovering Peshawur from Runjeet Singh. Russia was playing a very subtle game; for, while she thus offered to support Dost Mahomed, not merely in the dominions which he still possessed, but in the acquisition of others, she promised to assist Persia in laying siege to Herat, at that time governed by Kamran, son of Shah Mahmud, and also tempted the three brothers of Dost Mahomed, who ruled jointly at Candahar, with the possession of Herat, as feudatories of Persia. A Russian battalion was actually sent to take part in the siege of that city, which was already beleaguered by a Persian army of 30,000 men. The place would probably have been taken, but for the heroism of a young English officer, Eldred Pottinger, who happened to be staying there. Nothing, however, could have ultimately saved it, had it not been for the tardy interposition of the Anglo-Indian Government, which in 1838 sent a naval squadron to the Persian Gulf, and despatched Colonel Stoddart with a message importing that any further operations in Afghanistan by the Persian Shah would be taken as an act of hostility against England. Upon this, the blockade of Herat was at once abandoned, and the city was secured from a Persian occupation, which would have been simply a Russian intervention in disguise.

Had our interposition been vigorously followed up, there can be little doubt that the subsequent calamities in Afghanistan would have been avoided. Everything invited the Anglo-Indian Government to the pursuit of a resolute and decided policy. The Emperor Nicholas, disconcerted at the failure of his plans in connection with Herat, repudiated the proceedings of his agents, both there and at Cabul, and even disavowed a letter which he had sent by Captain Vicovich to Dost Mahomed. The conjunction of affairs was singularly favourable to the conclusion of an alliance with Afghanistan; for the Ameer was willing at that period to forget the slight which had been put upon him by England. But Lord Auckland was possessed by no such ideas. He resolved, on the contrary, to enter into a treaty with Runjeet Singh and Shah Soojah, with a view to maintaining the former at Peshawur, and restoring the latter to the throne of Cabul. It was now nearly thirty years since Shah Soojah had been driven from his dominions. He had few adherents amongst the people; he was old, feeble, and profligate; and there seems to have been no one reason why we should have endeavoured to force him back upon a reluctant nation. The Anglo-Indian Government, however, had constituted itself the patron of Shah Soojah, who had for some years been in the enjoyment of a pension from the English authorities; and it was now determined to take him to Afghanistan at the head of an English army. Dost Mahomed was accused of treachery, and of a too great readiness to contract a Russian alliance. That he had not acted treacherously up to that time, seems to be now generally allowed; and his leanings towards Russia had been almost necessitated by our own refusal to enter into the friendly understanding which he himself earnestly desired. Instead of supporting a sovereign who had much in his favour, and who was certainly willing to act with us, provided we were

equally willing to act with him, Lord Auckland took the fatal, and in every sense unjustifiable, resolution to depose Dost Mahomed, and to reinstate Shah Soojah.

On the 26th of April, 1838, Captain Burnes left Cabul on his return to the British dominions, and, after visiting Runjeet Singh at Lahore, went to Simla to meet Lord Auckland. He here learned that, two months previously, a treaty had been made with Runjeet Singh, in which that potentate undertook to prepare the way for the advance of a British army through the Sikh country into Afghanistan. The declaration of war against Dost Mahomed was not, however, issued until the 1st of October in the same year. The Commander-in-Chief of the whole army of India at that date was Sir Henry Fane, who immediately raised the forces to a total of 203,000 men. The expeditionary army consisted of about 15,000 British troops, accompanied by an enormous array of 38,000 camp-followers, and 30,000 camels. There was also a contingent of Afghan troops, adherents of Shah Soojah; and Runjeet Singh promised to contribute a number of Sikh warriors, together with an army of observation, 5,000 strong, to be stationed at Peshawur. The invading force was divided into three corps: the Bengal column, under the orders of Sir Willoughby Cotton; the Bombay column, under Sir John Keane; and a force of Afghans and Sikhs, the former commanded by British officers. At the last moment, Runjeet Singh refused to fulfil his promise of providing a passage through his dominions, and this altered the whole plan of the campaign. It was now found necessary to come to an understanding with the Ameer of Scinde, who allowed the Bombay column, accompanied by Shah Soojah in person and a number of his adherents, to rendezvous at Shikarpoor, and to provide supplies and means of conveyance. The Bengal column assembled at Ferozepoor, while the combined Afghans and Sikhs joined the standards at Peshawur. According to the new scheme of operations, the columns from Bombay and Bengal were to march from Shikarpoor and Ferozepoor to the head of the Bolan Pass, a ravine traversing a line of mountains in Beloochistan; to effect a junction at Quetta, not far from the Afghan frontier; and thence to march on Candahar and Cabul. The Sikhs and Afghans were to proceed by the more direct route of the Khyber Pass to the Afghan capital, where all three bodies were to unite.

The march of Sir Willoughby Cotton's division, consisting of 9,500 troops, and the immense body of camp-followers already mentioned, was of a very distressing character. Sir Willoughby started on the 20th of February, and reached Dadur, at the south-eastern extremity of the Bolan Pass, on the 10th of March, 1839. The degree of military opposition was slight and insignificant; but the way was long and fatiguing. First, the country leading to the Bolan Pass had to be traversed; then, the defile itself spread out before our wearied men to the length of about sixty miles. The road was tortuous, rugged, and flanked by high rocks; and the farther the troops advanced into this wild gorge, the greater the obstacles became. At its commencement, the ravine measures about three miles across; but this gradually dwindles to a hundred and fifty feet, and the ground is such as to try infantry, cavalry, and artillery to the utmost. Neither forage nor water was to be obtained throughout the whole sixty miles, and men and horses suffered from fatigue and want of provisions. When the Bengal column arrived at the entrance to the pass, food was already so short that the camp-followers were put on half-rations. Even at the beginning of the march through this dreary defile, the baggage-cattle were repeatedly falling dead by the wayside, and the waters of the Bolan river were tainted with the bodies of camels. The road, covered with loose flints, ascends in the first instance by an easy gradient, but afterwards leads by a steep acclivity over the Brahoo chain of mountains. The passage of the gaunt defile—a wilderness of barren stone and almost unmitigated desolation—occupied many days; and it may appear surprising that, under circumstances of such great disadvantage, a vigorous attempt was not made to attack our troops, and inflict upon them a crushing disaster. It must be recollected, however, that the invading army was not at that time in Afghanistan proper, but in Beloochistan. Nevertheless, a few desultory attacks were made by wandering Beloochees, who were constantly hovering about, murdering stragglers, and carrying off baggage and cattle; but these assaults, though vexatious, were attended by no serious results, as affecting the army at large. The real difficulties proceeded from the toilsome ruggedness of the way, and the deficiency of food and water. Many horses were lamed by the sharp stones, and all were exhausted by the terrible effort of moving over so rough a country. The men were nearly worn out, and the spirits of most were depressed by the melancholy and threatening nature of their surroundings. Every night they pitched their tents in the midst of a rocky wilderness, and every morning they awoke to another day of desolation and fatigue. At length they cast away much of their baggage, abandoned their tents and stores, and divested themselves of every impediment which

could hamper their march through the desolate ravine. On the 26th of March, they emerged into the open country beyond the pass; but the supplies they expected to find at Quetta were not forthcoming, and Mehrab Khan, of Khelat, the ruler of Beloochistan, though offered a lakh and a half of rupees yearly if he would furnish the army with food, refused all assistance, saying that his own men were living on herbs and grass.

At the outset of these operations, Sir Henry Fane resigned the command from ill-health, and Lord Auckland appointed Sir John Keane to the direction of the whole army of advance. The Bombay column, numbering about 5,600 men, and accompanied by Shah Soojah and his contingent, entered the Bolan Pass towards the end of March. They encountered even greater fatigues and privations than their comrades from Bengal, and were much harassed by the tribes of freebooters infesting the hilly country round about. Nevertheless, nothing in the nature of a serious attack was made upon their ranks; and on the 4th of April the two chief divisions of the invading force effected their junction in front of Quetta. But the position of the troops was desperate, and they pushed forward in a half-famished state to Candahar, a distance of a hundred and fifty miles, rendered difficult by the precipices of the Khojuk Pass, across which, owing to the loss of their cattle, our wearied men had to drag the heavy guns. Candahar was reached on the 25th of April, by which time the troops had marched more than a thousand miles from their points of departure.

The city surrendered without a struggle, and the army still numbered 10,400 fighting men. This, however, shows a loss of several thousands since the expedition set forth, and the ridiculously large body of camp-followers had been terribly reduced. On the 27th of June, Sir John Keane set out from Candahar for Ghizni, two hundred and thirty miles distant. At the former city, Shah Soojah had been proclaimed with much pomp, and with a salute of a hundred and one guns, though the people remained sullenly indifferent to the monarch thus imposed on them; but at Ghizni the English force was destined to encounter a decided opposition. The place was garrisoned by Dost Mahomed's son, Gholam Hyder Khan, who had a force of 3,000 men under his orders. Sir John Keane had been misinformed as to the strength of the place, and, having left his battering train behind, had only a few guns of small calibre with which to assail the walls. With one exception, all the gates had been blocked by the Afghans; but that one was blown up, on the night of July 22nd, by the English engineers, and early on the following morning a storming party rushed into the breach. Three hours' fighting ensued: in the end, Gholam Hyder Khan was taken prisoner, and the British flag waved from the battlements. The young prince, Dost Mahomed's son, was placed under the care of Sir Alexander Burnes, who had been knighted previous to the advance of the troops; and on the 30th of July Sir John Keane started with the main army for Cabul. The Afghans had fought with great resolution and courage at Ghizni, and their losses in killed and wounded were much more serious than those of the British. The capture of this stronghold inspired the adherents of Dost Mahomed with



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

CABUL FROM THE BEMAROO HILL, WITH THE BRITISH CANTONMENTS IN 1839–40.

a feeling of despair. The Ameer himself was full of determination, and would have braved the worst, if he could have found support. But his officers believed that nothing was to be done, and the Dost fled with a few personal attendants to the mountain ranges of the Hindoo-Koosh. The British troops pursued their way, with scarcely any opposition, to the Afghan capital, and, on the evening of the 6th of August, Sir John Keane and Shah Soojah encamped under the walls. Next day, the Shah, accompanied by the British officers, and glittering with jewels, entered his former capital; but his reception by the people was cold and discouraging, while the English troops were denounced as infidels, and regarded with the utmost detestation.

While these events were taking place, the auxiliary body of Afghans, commanded by Colonel Wade, and officered by Englishmen, though under the nominal direction of Prince Timur, the son of Shah Soojah, were joined at Peshawur by Runjeet's Sikhs. This corps, which was further strengthened by a small detachment of Anglo-Indian infantry, and accompanied by two howitzers, was to march through the Khyber Pass; but the Indian soldiers dreaded the defile so much that they mutinied several times, and it was at length found necessary to send a portion of them back to Lahore. These mishaps delayed the advance, which was still further postponed while attempts were being ineffectually made to bribe the Momunds, on the left bank of the Cabul river, and the Khyberee tribes in the mountain fastnesses. In the meanwhile, Akbar Khan, eldest son of Dost Mahomed, strengthened the fort of Ali Musjid, which stands at a narrow part of the defile, and prepared for a stern resistance. The Afghan troops at this point were posted in the fort itself, and on the summits of the mountains which command the valley. The place was a very awkward one to attack; but on July 26th Colonel Wade's troops ascended the heights at different points, advanced along the ridges, and dislodged the garrison with their shells, assisted by the two howitzers in the hollow beneath. A hand-to-hand combat ensued, when the Afghans were compelled to give way, and Wade, after having established a chain of forts along the mountain route, took Jellalabad without resistance, and pursued the retreating enemy with so much vigour that Mahomed Akbar abandoned all his artillery, his camp-equipage, horses, and bullocks, together with seven thousand rounds of ball-cartridge, which became the prize of the conquerors. Wade then joined the British troops at Cabul, which he reached on September 3rd, without encountering any further opposition.

It now appeared as if Afghanistan were completely subdued. The resistance of the Ameer's adherents had indeed been far less than any one had anticipated, and the people seemed thoroughly cowed by the force brought against them, and by the successful advance of Sir John Keane's divisions through the difficult country they were obliged to traverse. Not very many years before, the Duke of Wellington, then Lord Wellesley, had regarded the Afghans with considerable apprehension, as a warlike race who might not improbably contest the dominion of India with the English themselves. But the martial enthusiasm of that earlier date had died out, and in the course of a few months the whole country was subdued by a small Anglo-Indian army. The success of the invaders was due more to this lack of spirit on the part of the mountain tribes than to any marked exhibition of military capacity on that of Sir John Keane and his companions. The greatest honours of the war must be bestowed on Colonel Wade, whose progress through the Khyber Pass showed much ability and power. But the fortunate result of the whole series of operations was so satisfactory to the English people that rewards were showered on the heads of all who had been principally concerned. The Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, was made an Earl; Sir John Keane became a peer, under the title of Baron Keane, of Ghizni, with a pension of £2,000 a year; Mr. Macnaghten, who had accompanied the expedition in a political capacity, under the designation of Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary to Shah Soojah, was created a baronet; and the dignity of Knights Commanders of the Bath was conferred on Sir Willoughby Cotton, Burnes, Sale, and other officers accompanying the troops. Runjeet Singh was now dead, and it was considered that the position of Shah Soojah would be perfectly safe under the protection of 8,000 men, British and Sepoys, who were to occupy the country in combination with the Shah's soldiers. The Bombay column accordingly quitted Cabul on the 18th of September, and a small portion of the Bengal division followed. It was believed that the power of Dost Mahomed was entirely broken, and that English influence would be secure under the restored rule of Shah Soojah. The spirit of misapprehension and blundering which had presided over the whole enterprise still retained possession of the British authorities, and was now preparing the way for a disaster of appalling dimensions, which, when a knowledge of the facts arrived in England, spread a cloud of gloom and horror over the whole land. We had embarked in an undertaking devoid of justice, and in opposition to every consideration of policy. A brief

and delusive success had intoxicated the popular heart, and lulled the Anglo-Indian authorities into a false security. At the end of 1839, all looked hopeful and promising; but a black misfortune lay in the near distance, and it cannot be said that that misfortune was unmerited, or that reasonable care had been taken to avert its dread advance.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

Rule of the restored Afghan Monarch—Exposed Position of the English Troops in the Vicinity of Cabul—Insurrectionary Movements against Shah Soojah—Dost Mahomed in Arms against the English—His Surrender to Sir William Macnaghten—Critical Position of the Army of Occupation—Fatal Indifference of the British Authorities—Spread of the Rebellion—Murder of Sir Alexander Burnes and Others—Want of Energy on the Part of the English Commanders—Opening of Negotiations with Akbar Khan—Murder of Sir William Macnaghten—Humiliating Conditions accepted by the British—The Troops leave their Cantonments (Jan. 8th, 1842)—Terrible Passage through the Mountains—Sufferings from Cold and from the Enemy—Delivery of the Women and Children into the Hands of Akbar Khan—Dreadful Mortality and Continual Fighting—The Final Struggle—Escape of Dr. Brydon, the only Survivor—Appointment of Lord Ellenborough as Governor-General of India—Position of General Sale at Jellalabad—Determination of that Commander to hold his ground—His skilful and energetic Measures—Ineffectual Search for Stragglers from Elphinstone's Army—The Defences of Jellalabad strengthened—The Walls destroyed by an Earthquake—Gallant Sorties of the Garrison—Defeat of the Afghans before the Walls—Expedition of General Pollock to relieve Jellalabad—Progress of Affairs at Cabul—General Nott at Candahar—Advance of Nott, Pollock, and Sale, on Cabul—The City pillaged—Rescue of the Prisoners and Hostages—Withdrawal of the British Army from Afghanistan.

On the conclusion of the Afghan war of 1839, Shah Soojah appeared to be firmly re-seated on the throne from which he had been driven thirty years before. It is true that he was not loved by the people generally, though he had his adherents; but Oriental nations are always ready to accommodate themselves to any order which is established by superior strength, though they may be eager to revolt upon the first opportunity that promises success. For the present, all was quiet, and the Shah, in gratitude for his restoration, created, with the permission of Queen Victoria, an order of knighthood, entitled, after the tribe with which he was connected, the Order of the Durani Empire. The insignia of this chivalrous body were bestowed by Shah Soojah on the English officers who had assisted him in the recovery of his power, and for some months reviews and grand ceremonials succeeded one another with dazzling rapidity. The climate of Cabul is favourable to Europeans, and the officers of the occupying force, knowing that they should have to remain an indefinite period, sent to India for their wives and children. But it was not long before a change for the worse took place in the position of the British troops. A portion of them had in the first instance been housed in the Bala Hissar, a palace having some of the characteristics of a fortress, and so strongly built and well situated that Captain Havelock, afterwards one of the most famous heroes of the war for the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, declared that it was the key of Cabul. The Shah, however, resolved on making his own abode there in the spring of 1840, and the English regiments were obliged to remove. They then took up a position in exposed cantonments on the neighbouring plain, where, with no other protection than a low parapet and a few outlying forts, they were at the mercy of any adversary by whom they might be assailed.

Shah Soojah soon intensified the dislike with which he had been received by the great majority of the people. Had there existed no other reason for this detestation, it would have sufficed that he was the creature of a foreign Power—the favourite of infidels. The deceitful calm of the first few months was speedily succeeded by scattered insurrections. About the time that the Shah was removing into the Bala Hissar, frequent attacks were made on British outposts, and, as the summer advanced, these became so serious that they were not suppressed without severe fighting. Dost Mahomed had escaped from Bokhara, where he had been confined by the Khan, and, moving rapidly about from point to point among the northern mountains, he raised a formidable insurrection within the dominions of the Shah. Even when defeated, he managed to get off with the bulk of his followers, so that soon afterwards he reappeared in some other spot, and commenced a fresh assault. In the autumn of 1840 he was joined by a large body of Afghan chiefs and their retainers, who had been exasperated by the severe taxation imposed on them by Shah Soojah, and extorted by the power of the English arms. Thus

strengthened—though at the same time he lost the support of a body of Usbegs—Dost Mahomed took up a position in the Purwandurra valley, where, on the 2nd of November, he was attacked by Sir Robert Sale. The action was disastrous for the English. Our officers behaved with conspicuous courage; but some Hindoo cavalry were defeated by a small body of Afghan horse, and compelled to seek shelter among the British guns. The troops were nearly surrounded, and with some difficulty cut their way back to Cabul. At this date, Sir William Macnaghten was still acting as envoy at the court of the Shah, and Sir Alexander Burnes was his assistant. The latter was with the defeated army, and he at once sent word to Sir William, urging him

AKBAR KHAN.

DOST MAHOMED.

to concentrate all available troops at the capital. His message was received by the envoy as he was taking his evening ride on the following day, and almost immediately afterwards Dost Mahomed himself rode up, alighted from his horse, and, presenting his sword to Macnaghten, sought his protection. He had ridden sixty miles from the battle-field of Purwandurra, and, although the victor on that occasion, had considered it prudent not to provoke the English power too far. Sir William Macnaghten, returning the fallen Ameer his sword, promised him the protection he desired; and on the 12th of November he was sent to India under a strong escort.

The surrender of Dost Mahomed did not put an end to the insurrection. It continued with scarcely diminished vehemence; but the Anglo-Indian authorities were beginning to shrink from the expense of maintaining an army of occupation, and the Court of Directors of the East India Company (then the actual rulers of the British possessions) recommended Lord Auckland to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan. The number of men was in fact reduced during the year 1841, and the compensation granted to native chiefs for abstaining from plunder was also considerably lessened. This course added to the general discontent, and the powerful tribe of the Ghiljies raised so serious a rebellion that Sir Robert Sale, on being sent to quell it, found his communications with Cabul gravely threatened. Sir William Macnaghten seems to have been besotted in his view of affairs. While the whole country was quivering with insurrectionary excitement, he repeatedly declared that it was in a condition of entire repose and content; and although, in May, 1841, he was warned by Major Pottinger that we were dangerously situated in Afghanistan, owing to the insufficiency of the military force in some places, and the badness of the cantonments in nearly all, nothing was done, or even recommended. This overweening confidence was fully shared by Sir Alexander Burnes, who, on the 1st of November, was advanced to the post of chief envoy, in succession to Macnaghten, recently appointed to the Governorship of Bombay. On the return of Sir John Keane to England (where, as already related, he received the honour of a peerage), the chief command of the British forces devolved on Sir Willoughby Cotton—an able and cautious officer; but he was afterwards superseded by General Elphinstone, whose age and infirmities made him signally unfit for such a post. Elphinstone regarded the state of Afghanistan with placid reliance on everything going well, and could not be roused into taking any special precautions at Cabul. The air was full of rumours of approaching trouble; yet the General and the envoy seemed equally under the influence of some strange and paralysing fascination.

Cabul itself, as the autumn deepened, was sur-

rounded by predatory bands, and in October several English officers were insulted in their cantonments. On the night of November 1st, a few hours after Burnes had congratulated Macnaghten on leaving Afghanistan in a state of "profound tranquillity," a number of Afghan chiefs held a meeting, at which they pledged themselves to destroy the Christian strangers. Next morning, Cabul itself was in wild excitement. Shops were plundered, and the different factions began fighting. The opponents of the existing order concentrated their rage for the present on the British envoy, Sir Alexander Burnes. They surrounded his house, uttering threats. Burnes came out on to the balcony, accompanied by his brother, Lieutenant Burnes, and his military secretary, and addressed the crowd. They replied by shooting the secretary, Lieutenant Broadfoot, and renewing their menaces against the others. One of the mob then entered the house, and swore by the Koran that he would convey the brothers safely to the fort, which was close at hand. As soon as they had arrived in the garden, the treacherous guide pointed them out to the raging mass of fanatics, and they were instantly despatched with knives. The house was then set on fire, and every one in it—including women and children—was murdered. In the neighbouring cantonments, the British officers seemed stupefied with amazement, and did literally nothing. This indecision appears to have resulted from the nervous prostration and imbecility of General Elphinstone, who, on learning that the envoy was being besieged in his house, simply replied, "We must see what the morning brings, and then think what can be done." It was a crisis in which every moment was laden with fatal issues; yet the General thought it would be better to wait until the morning.

The energy which General Elphinstone lacked, and which possibly might have saved the British army, was abundantly exhibited by Shah Soojah. He sent one of his own regiments to put down the revolt; but the troops were intercepted in the crowded parts of the city, and unable to continue their march. The treasury and the commissariat fort were seized by the malcontents, and the English troops and their families were placed in danger of starving. Elphinstone transmitted urgent messages to Sir Robert Sale, who was then on his way from Gundamuk to Jellalabad, to return with all speed to Cabul; but Sir Robert considered it more prudent to keep open the communications with India, and therefore did not proceed to the Afghan capital. To keep open the communications was indeed a most important object. The English regiments in Afghanistan were almost completely isolated. Their base of operations was the British Indian territory; but that base was far distant, and intercourse was at all times extremely precarious. Our military commanders, moreover, had not laid in sufficient provisions for the coming winter, so that in every sense the position was in the highest degree alarming. To the relief of the Cabul garrison, General Nott despatched three regiments from Candahar; but they were daunted by the severity of the weather and the difficulties of the way, and after a while turned back. On the 13th of November, the insurgent Afghans planted two guns on a hill commanding the cantonments, into which they fired; and the troops, after more than once vainly attempting to break out into the open country beyond, found themselves absolutely incapable of taking any further steps. Sir William Macnaghten, who had not left for Bombay, and in fact was unable to leave, met his death on the 23rd of December at the hands of Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mahomed, and now the leader of the insurrection. The last act of this unfortunate officer was to open negotiations with the chiefs for the safe retreat of our army, and the supply of provisions. The conduct of the Afghans was marked throughout by the utmost treachery. They required, as a preliminary to all other proceedings, that the forts near the cantonments should be placed in their hands. This was done, but still no supplies were provided. The insurrection in the surrounding country became every day more formidable; the English regiments were surrounded, and reduced almost to their last morsel of food. Macnaghten therefore rightly judged that the time had arrived for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan, upon the understanding that food and means of transport should be provided by the native chiefs. It was also conceded that Dost Mahomed and his family should be set at liberty; and on their side the insurrectionary leaders promised that Shah Soojah should have the option of accompanying the English troops (who were to leave their cantonments within four days), or of remaining in Afghanistan with a pension.

The conditions altogether were humiliating to the English power; but they were the best that could be made under the circumstances. Had they been fairly observed by the Afghans, the result would have been simply humiliating, and not tragical; but the murder of Sir William Macnaghten was an earnest of what was to follow. A meeting was appointed, at which the British envoy and the Afghan chief were to make final arrangements. The day before the fatal interview, the former had given a pistol to Akbar, and it was with this very weapon that he was shot by the Khan. The

mutilated body was carried in triumph through Cabul, and the English troops, who seem to have been utterly cowed, made no attempt to recover it, or to punish the wrong-doers. They were in truth helpless. The cantonments, weak under the best of circumstances, were now completely at the mercy of the forts, which had been handed over to the insurgents without being first demolished. The troops were caught in a trap, from which they could not issue without being subjected to a murderous fire. For some time previously, Shah Soojah had been willing to allow them once more to occupy the Bala Hissar, and Sir William Macnaghten was most desirous that this should be done; but General Elphinstone, with his amazing inability to realise the situation, refused to consent. Never in the history of England, or indeed in that of any other country, has such a series of fatal and incomprehensible errors been committed.

KOHISTAN FOOT SOLDIER.

Major Pottinger, who succeeded Sir William Macnaghten as British envoy, desired to annul the treaty which had just been concluded with the chiefs; but, a council of war having been called, the officers refused to fight, seeing that there was no probability of success. The treaty was accordingly ratified, with fresh conditions, still more favourable to the insurgents. It was finally agreed that all the guns, with the exception

of six, should be left behind; that all the treasure should be relinquished; that four officers should be put in the hands of the chiefs as hostages; and that 40,000 rupees, in bills drawn upon India, but negotiated on the spot by some Hindoo bankers, should be paid to the Afghans. It was a hard bargain, and not only that, but a treacherous bargain too. Akbar Khan promised to conduct the English regiments in safety to Jellalabad, ninety miles distant from Cabul; but he never intended to do anything of the kind, and had in fact already determined to destroy the miserable soldiers and their companions in the desert country which lay between. The English military authorities performed their share in the stipulations with the fidelity which might have been expected. Guns, waggons, and ammunition were given up, though not without many expressions of indignation on the part of the men. Four officers were left behind as hostages; and on the 6th of January, 1842, the army began to file out of its cantonments. The number of troops was 4,500, and they were accompanied by 12,000 camp-followers, including the families of the officers. The Ghiljies immediately began to attack the rear-guard, and the miserable soldiers, cast down by their recent humiliation, and wanting the self-reliance inspired by a firm commander, had scarcely courage to defend themselves against the assaults of their pursuers.



VALLEY OF JELLALABAD.

Jellalabad was at that time held by Sir Robert Sale; and it was thought that, if our men could once attain that spot, they would be safe from further attack. The town is situated west of the Khyber Pass, and is approached from Cabul through a very difficult and perilous country. It was now mid-winter, and the ways were deep in snow. On the 8th of January, the doomed army entered the fatal and gloomy pass of the Khoord-Cabul. The thermometer was considerably below freezing point; the fugitives were ill-furnished with provisions; and all around, upon the rocky crags and in the recesses of the mountains, were hidden foes,

who rained death upon them from their matchlocks. The scene became appalling in its horror. Men, women, and children, either struck by the bullets, or overcome by cold and fatigue, dropped upon the snow, and were left to perish in that desolate valley. Some of the younger women were carried away into captivity; infants were snatched from the arms of their mothers, and ruthlessly slain. The artillery-men grew mutinous, seized upon the stores of brandy, and drank to intoxication. Lady Sale received a ball in the arm, and her son-in-law, Lieutenant Sturt, was killed. It is surprising that the Afghans did not make a more decisive attack upon the straggling and disorganised column. They were in great force on the surrounding heights, and the English troops could not have offered anything like an effectual resistance to a combined and resolute onslaught. But either they shrank from the cost of such an encounter, or they preferred to lengthen the misery of their victims. As it was, a gallant dash was made at the enemy by the 44th Regiment and a company of the 37th Native Infantry. The Afghans recoiled before this sudden exhibition of spirit, and Major Thain took up a position on a commanding height, which for a time gave some protection to the column. In the course of that day, three additional hostages—Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie—were delivered up to the Afghans. They were to be regarded as pledges for the surrender of Jellalabad by General Sale; in other words, for the complete evacuation of Afghanistan by the English army of occupation.

Through the whole of that terrible 8th of January, the Afghans continued to fire upon our soldiers and their companions, as they weariedly struggled forward through the snowy tracks of the defile; and when the darkness closed in, 500 of the troops and 2,500 of the camp-followers had fallen dead or dying by the way. In the ensuing night, many more perished from extremity of cold. Break of day showed the fugitives nothing but the same fearful prospect of rugged passes, overshadowing rocks, deep snow, and implacable enemies. Three-fourths of the fighting men hurried on without waiting for orders, and the camp-followers accompanied them as best they could. Several were frost-bitten and wounded, and movement was painful and difficult almost to the verge of impossibility. The army had only three camel-loads of ammunition left; many of the soldiers had not a single cartridge; and in a little while even the feeblest attempts at resistance would be impracticable. The position of the women and children was so peculiarly distressing that any escape from it was advisable. On the 9th of January, Akbar Khan offered to conduct them safely to Peshawur, and Major Pottinger, then in Akbar's hands as one of the hostages, advised Lady Macnaghten, Lady Sale, and the others, to accept this proposal. It was felt that they could not possibly be in a worse position than that which they then occupied, while, on the other hand, there was at least a chance that their lives might be respected, even by the faithless savage who offered them his hospitality. Accordingly, eleven ladies, accompanied by fifteen children and eight married officers, were sent to Akbar's tent; and the troops continued on their way, relieved at any rate of the terrible responsibility of guarding women and children under conditions which made it extremely doubtful whether they could protect themselves.

The ensuing night was as cold as that which had preceded it, and again large numbers perished from exposure in the snow. The disorganization of the army became more excessive with each succeeding day. In truth, it was now no longer an army; it was a mob of famished, frozen, and desperate wretches, each animated by the one thought of escaping from that murderous pass, indifferent as to the fate of his comrades, and lost (as who can wonder?) to all considerations of national honour, or of military self-respect. Those who could find a horse or a camel mounted it, that they might fly with greater rapidity from the savage desert and the deadly foe. Those who could find no animal to their hands, and whose power of locomotion was now exhausted, sank in utter feebleness by the way. Some who had already mounted were torn down by others stronger than themselves. To enhance the universal misery, snow fell more thickly than at first, and the drifts became so heavy that it was a matter of sore labour to force a passage through. The Afghans still pierced the reeling mass of weary and maddened fugitives with their unerring shots. The men of the rear-guard dropped every minute; the Sepoys, against whom the Afghans were particularly savage, perished in countless numbers; and the English soldiers were reduced to a shadow of their former strength. The Dark Pass, as one of the defiles is called, now lay before them. This was only fifty yards long; but the Tezeen Pass, three miles long, came next, and the Afghans grew more unsparing in their attacks as the miserable remnant penetrated deeper into the gorges of the hills. Suddenly, Akbar Khan presented himself at the head of a small body of horsemen, and entered into conversation with some of the English officers. He asserted his inability to restrain the fanaticism of the Ghiljies, but offered

to protect the surviving officers if they would give up their weapons. This was of course declined, as no reliance could be placed upon the word of such a proved assassin. At nightfall on the 10th, only 4,000 men remained, including the soldiers and the camp-followers. For these the situation was desperate, and it was determined to march all night, in the hope that by the following morning they would have got through the Jugdulluk Pass. The defile so named is about two miles long, and, being very narrow, is commanded at all points from the precipitous hills which flank it.

The fugitives were now tormented both by hunger and thirst. Their stock of provisions was well-nigh exhausted; and whenever they approached a running stream to drink, they were picked off by the watchful Afghans, who hovered about them like demons. Their case was rendered the more desperate by a powerful moonlight, which shone upon the snowy waste, and revealed their straggling lines to the horsemen on the rocks above. Jugdulluk was distant twenty-four miles, and that long and desolate road was the road of death to many. During the 11th, Akbar Khan again entered into negotiations with the English officers, and undertook to send water and provisions, if General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, and Captain Johnson, were given up to him as additional hostages. Those officers surrendered themselves into his hands; but the promised supplies were not provided. The wounded, and all who lagged behind from weariness, were pitilessly assailed. They passionately entreated the relentless Ghiljies to furnish food and water, for which enormous prices were offered; but the barbarians replied by redoubled and more furious attacks. The others pushed on; and when Jugdulluk was at length reached, on the 12th, their numbers were found to be fearfully diminished. At night, the Jugdulluk Pass, lying beyond the city, was entered by the tired and harassed soldiers. Here the enemy opened a furious attack upon them from all sides, and a large number perished; but after a time the Afghans were driven back by the despairing courage of those half-dying men. Then the march was resumed, though without the wounded, whom it was found impossible to remove, and who were therefore of necessity left to their fate, whether it came from the elements or from the Afghan weapons. Entering a gorge between low, steep hills, the fugitives perceived that the enemy had thrown across the road two strong barriers of prickly holly-oak, stretching from side to side. The paths also had been flooded, and were frozen into a mass of ice. Escape was impossible. The Ghiljies rushed down upon their victims, knife in hand. The camp-followers fell back upon the meagre body of exhausted troops, whose disorder was increased by the few remaining troopers of the cavalry galloping through and over the infantry, in the hope of securing their own retreat to Jellalabad. The infantry, maddened by this conduct on the part of their comrades, fired into them, and a scene of wild confusion and savage conflict ensued. At length the survivors got free of their enemies, and moved on, though with painful difficulty, to the head of the gorge. They had shrunk to a mere handful; yet, with the courage of despair, and the discipline which had returned to them in the hour of their extreme agony, they sustained several other conflicts with the Afghans, and inflicted even greater losses than they sustained. At break of day on the 13th of January, the remnant of the column struggled towards Gundamuk; but the force now consisted of only twenty officers, fifty men of the 44th Regiment, six of the Horse Artillery, and four or five Indian troops. Amongst the whole company there were but twenty muskets left; yet three hundred camp-followers still survived. Another body of assailants presently appeared in sight, and the hunted fugitives tried to avoid them by quitting the main road, and taking up a position on a neighbouring hill. Some Afghan horsemen were observed at a short distance, and, on being beckoned to, approached. The firing ceased, and terms were proposed by Captain Hay, who requested that the force (such as it then was) should be allowed to proceed without further molestation to Jellalabad. This was promised; but hostilities were suddenly resumed shortly afterwards, and the Afghans even snatched at the weapons of men and officers. A terrific fire was opened upon the few remaining soldiers, and several attempts were made to drive them from the hill they occupied; but these were repulsed with wonderful steadiness until the ammunition was entirely expended. No more than thirty fighting men now occupied those fatal slopes; and when the Afghans bore down upon them with their long knives, the enfeebled wretches were unable any longer to resist, and were simply massacred as they stood. The final struggle took place at Gundamuk; and from the walls of Jellalabad, on that awful and sanguinary day, one man, wounded, worn out, yet still holding in his almost nerveless grip a broken sword, was seen making his way towards the fort. Excepting one hundred and twenty captives, Dr. Brydon was the only person

left alive, to tell the story of the destruction of more than 16,000 men.

Before the news of these events reached England, the Afghan policy of Lord Auckland had excited so much discontent that he was removed from the post of Governor-General, and succeeded by Lord Ellenborough, who arrived at Calcutta on the 13th of February, 1842. It was not until after landing in India that he became acquainted with what had happened in Afghanistan, and he was called upon to take measures of redress and protection under circumstances of the utmost difficulty. Not only had we lost a considerable British army, but our Indian troops were alarmingly disconcerted at the fate which had overtaken their comrades on the other side of the Indus. There was one favourable circumstance, however, to set against these misfortunes. General Sale had been able to hold his position at Jellalabad. The calm hopefulness, courage, and self-reliance of that officer contrasted brilliantly with the lamentable folly and hesitation of some others, whose want of military genius, and even of ordinary sense, had brought upon the nation a series of terrible catastrophes. Sale was beleaguered in his mountain stronghold, and the Afghans hoped to drive him out, and to force his army into the Khyber Pass, where, doubtless, all would have been slaughtered, as Elphinstone's troops had been in the other defiles. If Sale had lost his nerve, he would probably have endeavoured to escape; and in that case nothing could have saved him. But he perceived that his only chance lay in clinging to his fortifications, and opposing an undaunted front to the assaults of the foe. He was not without great temptations to act otherwise. A few days after the evacuation of Cabul, a band of horsemen presented themselves, under cover of a flag of truce, at the gates of Jellalabad. Having intimated that they were the bearers of a letter from the capital, the strangers were conducted into the presence of General Sale, to whom they presented a despatch, written in English, and signed by General Elphinstone. It contained the surprising intelligence that a convention had been entered into with Akbar Khan, and that the country was to be immediately evacuated by the English army. Consequently, General Sale was directed to march at once, with arms, stores, and ammunition, to Peshawur. Elphinstone was the superior officer of Sale, and by strict military law the latter should have done precisely what he was told to do by the former. But there are circumstances under which even the rigidity of military law should be made to bend. The consequences of obeying such an injunction would in all probability be most serious. It was the depth of winter; the Khyber Pass, with all its lurking possibilities of danger, must be traversed before Peshawur could be reached; and it was obvious to any man of intelligence that an assurance given by Elphinstone, to the effect that the Afghans would give all the assistance in their power, possessed no value whatever, since its fulfilment depended on the fidelity of a treacherous and barbarian antagonist. Sale therefore sought the advice of a council of war, at which it was formally resolved that it would not be prudent to act upon such a document, and that the garrison should remain where it was until further orders. This wise and bold resolution was the salvation of the army; but even that would not have sufficed, had not Sale exhibited in other respects the qualities of an able commander. At the commencement of his occupation of Jellalabad, nothing could be more precarious than the immediate future, and it was only the tireless energy of Sale, seconded by that of his officers and men, which converted a weak into a strong position. The English had entered the city in November, 1841, with only two days' provisions; and at that time the fortifications were a mere heap of ruins. The ditches had been filled up, the *enceinte* was too extensive for our small force to hold, and the place was beset by 5,000 Afghans, who might at any moment force their way into the town. Sale attacked them with spirit, and defeated them with loss; after which he had sufficient leisure to repair the walls and revictual the fortress. This enabled him to hold out while another army was organised by General Pollock, and despatched to his relief through the Khyber Pass. The arrival of Dr. Brydon gave additional proof of the wisdom of Sale's determination not to relinquish Jellalabad. Three days after it had been resolved to disobey the orders of General Elphinstone, a sentry, keeping guard upon the walls, and glancing towards Gundamuk, saw a mounted man in the distance, painfully making his way across the rocky country. He immediately gave notice of the fact, and the stranger was curiously observed by the aid of field-glasses. He seemed to be a European, and he was probably wounded; for, as he bestrode his half-starved pony, his figure drooped with faintness, or it might be even with coming death. Some time elapsed before he could reach the walls, and many conjectures were hazarded as to the story that he brought. Dark foreshadowings of calamity were felt by many; but it could hardly have been supposed that that staggering figure was one of the very few survivors of

a host which only a week before had been counted by its thousands.*

The information given by Dr. Brydon was appalling; yet it did not shake the resolution of Sir Robert Sale and his companions. They immediately took such measures as they could for the relief of any other survivors who might be straying about the pass. The cavalry were ordered out, and directed to patrol the Cabul road as far as might seem compatible with their own safety. Ere they had yet ridden four miles beyond the town, they came upon the mutilated remains of three of our troops; but not a single living creature was visible as far as the eye could reach. The patrol lingered until the shadows of night began to fall, and then sorrowfully returned to the fortress. Lanterns were suspended from the ramparts, and ever and anon the bugle sounded the advance, in the hope that some wanderer in the darkness might hear the welcome notes, and be guided to the place of refuge. This was repeated for several days and nights; but the desert was as silent as the grave it had become. The Afghans had done their bloody work too well. The defiles of the mountains were burdened with dead bodies; but not a living ear responded to the bugle-notes—not a living eye beheld the glimmer of the lanterns on the fortress-walls.

The great thing now was to save the garrison of Jellalabad. Communication with Peshawur was cut off by the successful Afghans, and again there was a fear that provisions might fail. Foraging parties were sent out, and in two days brought back a hundred and seventy head of cattle, and between six and seven hundred sheep. As there was no fodder to maintain the cattle, they were slaughtered immediately, and preserved by being salted. The sheep were turned out every morning to graze in the marshes between the river and the town walls, and the shepherds who tended them were protected by a covering party. The non-combatants in the city were trained to handle pikes manufactured out of old iron; and these men were found useful for doing duty on the ramparts when the regular troops were otherwise engaged. External trees and bushes, which might afford cover for marksmen, were cut down, and the houses outside the walls were stripped of their timber, that the stock of winter fuel might be increased. Every day, the arrival of General Pollock's army of relief was anxiously expected by the garrison; but the hosts of Akbar Khan made their appearance before Jellalabad while the beleaguered garrison was yet awaiting succour. Their tents were first observed on the morning of the 15th of January, when they appeared on the further side of the river, at a distance of about six miles from the walls. The defences, however, were rapidly becoming stronger; but an unexpected incident now occurred, which in a moment undid what had been so laboriously accomplished. On the 19th of January, the men were at work as usual with their pickaxes and spades, when the ground trembled, and a great noise was heard, as of a vast number of heavily-laden waggons rolling over an ill-paved street. Not understanding the cause of this commotion, but naturally apprehending danger of some description, the parties in the trenches stood to their arms, and made for the glacis. Immediately afterwards, the whole plain began to heave in huge, dark billows, and walls and houses came down with a resounding crash upon the space which just before had been crowded with the working parties. An earthquake had shaken the defences into ruins. The parapets were shattered and cast down; the walls were cloven into wide breaches; and the whole works were damaged. Of the houses in the town, many were destroyed altogether, and not one escaped without some degree of injury. A portentous cloud of dust swept over the city, and it seemed for a while as if all were lost; but not many persons were killed, and the stores, both of ammunition and salted provisions, sustained no damage. Still, had Akbar Khan immediately assaulted the place, there can be little doubt that he would have taken it. Probably he was himself astonished and awe-stricken by this convulsion of nature; and before he could make up his mind to strike any blow against his adversary, the mischief had been to a great extent repaired. The siege, however, was not abandoned, and every now and then encounters took place between the foraging parties and the hovering bands of Afghan cavalry. The beleaguered garrison effected several brilliant sorties; large numbers of the Afghans were killed, and for a time their skirmishers were swept back. On one occasion, in the month of March, a party of cavalry and infantry made so sudden and bold a dash upon the enemy's flocks that five hundred head of sheep were secured, and driven triumphantly into the town. Nevertheless, food and ammunition began to fail in the early part of April, and it was clear that offensive must soon be substituted for defensive operations, if the army was to be saved at all.

Under these circumstances, General Sale determined to issue forth in strength, and engage the

* It is said that Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Foot, then in Jellalabad, always declared, by a remarkable foreboding, that the whole of the Cabul army would be destroyed, with the exception of one man, who would arrive to tell the tale. This, however, was actually the intention of the Afghan chiefs, and Dennie may have heard some rumours of the design.

enemy before the walls of Jellalabad. The attack was delivered on the 7th of April, when a prolonged and sanguinary struggle (for the Afghans fought well) resulted in a magnificent victory for the English arms. The legions of Akbar Khan were completely shattered; camp-baggage, artillery,



THE GROVE AND VALLEY OF JUGDULLUK.

ammunition, horses, and an immense number of small arms, were taken by our resistless soldiers. Akbar fled towards Cabul with what remained of his army; and thus, with one strong and well-directed blow, Jellalabad was free. On the day following the battle, a market was opened outside the gates, and the country people brought provender, which was gladly purchased by the English army. By their own courage alone, the members of that army had been saved from extinction; but all this while Pollock was painfully struggling towards Jellalabad through a country abounding in natural difficulties, and infested by a watchful antagonist. The Khyberees (otherwise called the Afridees) are a particularly warlike tribe, and the almost inaccessible mountains which they inhabit are very favourable to the kind of guerilla tactics in which semi-civilised races excel. In January, they had successfully resisted an attempt by Brigadier Wild, with two Sepoy regiments, to make his way to Jellalabad; and they had compelled Colonel Moseley, at the head of two other regiments of native infantry, to abandon the fort of Ali-Musjid, which he had seized a few days before. Pollock, however, succeeded in forcing the pass, and on the 16th of April he arrived at Jellalabad. The Khyberee



GROUP OF AFRIDEES IN THE KHYBER PASS.

chiefs, feeling disinclined to encounter so large a force, had offered to clear the defile from Jumrood to Dhaka for 50,000 rupees; but Pollock trusted rather to his steel than to his gold. The Khyberees then did their best to oppose his progress; upon which the English General sent his light troops up the heights on each side of the gorge, while the main body advanced along the valley, after demolishing a barrier which the enemy had drawn across the narrow way.

During this anxious period, General Nott and Major (now Sir Henry) Rawlinson were holding Candahar, while Colonel Palmer, with one native regiment and some artillery, kept Ghizni until it was wrested from him by the superior forces of the enemy. Shah Soojah, who had his supporters among the Afghan chiefs, was able to maintain himself in the Bala Hissar for a time; but in April, 1842, he was assassinated by adherents of his elder brother, the blind Zeman, who had been deposed by Mahmud as far back as 1800, but who was now chosen by some of the tribes as supreme ruler over the nation. Before his death, Shah Soojah had shown a disposition to abandon his English friends, and his son, Sufder Jung, had actually taken command of some insurgent cavalry. The position of General Nott at Candahar was exposed to imminent danger, and General England, who was despatched to its relief from Sukkur, acted with so much hesitation in his passage through the Pisheen Valley that General Nott derived little advantage from the forces thus sent to his assistance. When, however, he was at length relieved, General Nott was ready to co-operate with Sale and Pollock for an advance on Cabul; but Lord Ellenborough shrank from the responsibility of such a step, and desired the British garrisons of Jellalabad and Candahar to withdraw from the country. Against this determination, the three commanders warmly protested, and they were finally permitted to follow their own course, which was to advance upon the Afghan capital, and avenge the slaughter of their countrymen on the tribes who had committed it. The forward movement upon Cabul did not commence until August. A body of nearly 10,000 British troops, accompanied by some 6,000 Sikhs, and 40,000 camp-followers, pressed on through the passes of Jugdulluk and the Koord-Cabul, which they found whitened by the bones of those who had fallen eight months before. The Ghiljies offered some opposition, but were defeated with but little difficulty. Ghizni was retaken by General Nott, who was now Commander-in-Chief of the entire army; and on the 17th of September the three divisions—Nott's, Pollock's, and Sale's—effected their junction at Cabul. Pollock and Sale had marched together, carrying everything before them, and had reached Cabul on the 16th, after inflicting severe chastisement on the mountain tribes.

On the death of Shah Soojah, his son Futteh Jung was nominally appointed to the regal position; but he was a mere puppet in the hands of Akbar Khan, who was doing his utmost for the restoration of his father, Dost Mahomed. This arrangement was of course terminated by the arrival of the English troops, and Cabul was for a time ruled by the military commanders who had taken it. It was resolved to destroy the great Bazaar in which Sir William Macnaghten's body had been exposed to insult. The building was one of considerable beauty and grandeur; but it was now undermined and blown up. This act was ill-judged and unjustifiable, and it led to a terrible series of events. The troops appear to have understood that Cabul was to be given up to pillage, and for three days scenes of horror were enacted, such as the history of the English army has not often paralleled. The hostages, together with the women, their husbands, and their children, had on the whole been well-treated during their captivity; but they had been moved from place to place, and near the close of August had been sent across the Hindoo-Koosh to Bamian. Here the commander of their Afghan guard was induced, by liberal promises of money, to set them free, and even to escort them back to Cabul. Elphinstone had died on the 23rd of April; but the other members of the party survived their fatigues and anxiety. On the 17th of September they set out on their return to the Afghan capital, but were soon after startled by the sight of a party of horsemen in the distance. It was at first apprehended that these were Afghans, sent on no friendly errand; but an officer rode forward, waving a white handkerchief, and he was presently recognised as Sir Richmond Shakespeare, who, at the head of a native troop, had been sent out to search for the prisoners. Three days later, Sir Robert Sale arrived with his column, and the heroic wife and daughter of that brave commander were once more folded in his arms. On the 12th of October, the British army departed from Cabul, traversing once more those terrible passes which were still whitened by the bones of the slain. The walls of Jellalabad were destroyed, together with the greater part of the city; the fort of Ali Musjid, in the Khyber Pass, was blown to atoms with gunpowder; and before the close of the year the invading forces had quitted Afghanistan, bearing with them a load of tragical memories, the bitter fruit of an expedition unjust in its origin, and carried through many of its stages by gross and fatal incompetence.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

Restoration of Dost Mahomed to the Throne of Afghanistan—His Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with England—Persia and Herat—Death of Dost Mahomed—Troubled Reign of his Son and Successor, Shere Ali—His Causes of Complaint against England—The Conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa (1869)—Discontent of the Ameer—Letter of Lord Mayo to the Afghan Sovereign—Policy of the Viceroy, as defined by himself—Demands of Shere Ali—Revolt of Yakoub Khan — Succession of Lord Northbrook to the Governor-Generalship — His Decision with respect to the Seistan Boundary—Negotiations at Cabul with a View to a Conference—Distrust of Russia expressed by Shere Ali—His earnest Desire for a close Alliance with England—The Simla Durbar (1873)—Conversations on the Advance of Russia in Central Asia—Assurances proposed to be given by Lord Northbrook—Comments by the Duke of Argyll (Indian Secretary)—Lord Cranbrook on the Policy of the Liberal Government—Vague Promises given to Shere Ali—Attitude of the Gladstone Administration towards Afghanistan and Russia—Agreement between Russia and England as to a Neutral Zone in Central Asia—Difference of Opinion on the Boundaries of Afghanistan—Concession by Russia—Growing Discontent of Shere Ali with the Policy of England under Mr. Gladstone's Government—Subserviency to Russia—Afghanistan considers herself abandoned—Further Correspondence between Lord Northbrook and Shere Ali—Sarcastic Tone assumed by the Ameer—His Vexation and Anger—Intrigues with Russia.

Lord Ellenborough was sent to India to carry out ideas very different from those of his predecessor, Lord Auckland; and in announcing the withdrawal of the British forces from Afghanistan, which he did in a proclamation dated from Simla on the 1st of October, 1842, he observed that "to force a sovereign upon a reluctant people would be as inconsistent with the policy as it is with the principles of the British Government." The fatal misconception out of which the Afghan war arose was thus abandoned, and the consequences were soon apparent. Shah Soojah was now dead, and his country was in a state of anarchy. The sovereign most likely to reconcile contending factions was undoubtedly Dost Mahomed. He was a ruler of ability and force of character, and he had many supporters among the tribes. His release by the Anglo-Indian Government followed almost necessarily upon the principles laid down by Lord Ellenborough in his Simla proclamation. He was therefore permitted to return to his own land, where, in 1843, he re-established the dominion to which we had put a temporary stop. In the Sikh war of 1848–9, he coalesced with the Punjaubees in opposition to the English power; but in subsequent years, especially during the Indian Mutiny, he proved himself our friend. Two years before the breaking out of the rebellion of 1857, a treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded between Dost Mahomed and the East India Company, by which each engaged to respect the territory of the other, and the Ameer promised to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of our rule. The war between England and Persia occurred in 1856–7. It resulted from the seizure of Herat by the Persian troops, and ended in a treaty of peace, by which the Shah engaged to abstain from all interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, to recognise the independence of Herat, and to refer disputes to the friendly arbitration of the British Government. On the 26th of January, 1857, Dost Mahomed concluded a treaty with Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub, by which, in consideration of his receiving a British mission, we promised the Afghan ruler protection against his Persian neighbour, and undertook to supply him with arms for military purposes, and with a monthly payment of a lakh of rupees (£10,000) during the continuance of the war with Persia. The mission met with a very unfriendly reception from the people; but the Ameer himself was faithful to our cause through the terrible years, 1857 and 1858. He died on the 26th of May, 1863.

The succession in Oriental countries is often determined beforehand by the reigning prince in favour of the youngest son. It was so with Dost Mahomed, who gave the reversion of the sovereignty to Shere Ali, a younger brother of Akbar by the same mother. Akbar himself, and Gholam Hyder Khan (who had been heir-apparent), were dead; but Shere Ali had two surviving brothers, older than himself, who speedily raised a rebellion against him. In 1866, Afghanistan was once more divided into separate parts under rival Ameers. Shere Ali ruled at Candahar, and also held possession of Herat; Afzul Khan, another son of Dost Mahomed, established himself at Cabul. Both solicited the support of the Anglo-Indian Government, and both received it, each in his own dominion. But the fortune of war went against Shere Ali, and in 1867 Afzul Khan obtained possession of Candahar as well as Cabul. His reign over the re-united territory of Afghanistan was extremely short, for he died in October of the same year, and was succeeded by his brother, Azim Khan, at whose court a British agent was speedily appointed. Nevertheless,

Shere Ali, who retained Herat, still asserted his right to the Afghan throne, as the heir appointed by his father; and he applied to Sir John (now Lord) Lawrence, at that time Governor-General of India, for assistance. Responding to this appeal, Sir John made Shere Ali a grant of money and arms, but with the condition that this grant, should he succeed, was not to be regarded as an annual subsidy, though it might be renewed from time to time, according as the Indian Government should be satisfied with his conduct. Thus aided, Shere Ali prevailed against his rival, mainly through the exertions of his eldest son, Mahomed Yakoub Khan, who, in April, 1868, took Candahar, and proclaimed his father sovereign of Afghanistan. The resistance of Azim Khan ceased in September, and he died early in the following year; from which date, the power of Shere Ali was undisputed.

It will be seen from this brief sketch that the Anglo-Indian Government had for some time been impressed with the advisability of keeping on good terms with the existing ruler of Afghanistan, and of maintaining the independence of that State as a barrier against Russia in one direction and Persia in another, though the latter Power was doubtless to be dreaded only as the tool of the former. Yet the Afghans had no great cause to like us. We had endeavoured to force an unpopular monarch upon them in 1839; we had desolated their country with war in 1842; and since then we had expected from them much more than we had either given or promised. The treaty of 1855 was undoubtedly a one-sided compact, as Shere Ali afterwards described it. The Ameer, as already set forth, undertook to be the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, of the East India Company (now represented by the Imperial Government); but the Company made no such engagement with respect to the Ameer. We gave Shere Ali a sum of money to aid him in seizing once more the throne which we desired to see him fill; but we coupled the present with an intimation that it would not be repeated unless he did exactly as we wished. It does not appear that at that time the Ameer ran counter to our interests; yet Lord Mayo, who succeeded to the Governor-Generalship in October, 1868, represented to the Afghan Prince in the following year that the original subsidy was merely intended to help him in the attainment of a special end, and that its repetition might at any moment be stopped. Shere Ali seems to have considered himself aggrieved by being denied a permanent subsidy. However, he dissembled his annoyance, and, during his conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa, beginning on the 27th of March, 1869, made privately a solemn declaration of good-will to the Viceroy, who, in response, presented him with his own sword, which he accepted as a token of peace with England. Against that country, he said, it should never be unsheathed: when he looked upon the sword, it should mean to him, "Peace with England."

On March 31st, while the conference was proceeding, Lord Mayo wrote a letter to the Ameer, in which he promised to use his best endeavours for strengthening the Government of his Highness, so as to enable him to exercise with justice his rightful power, and to transmit to his descendants all the dignities and honours of which he was the lawful possessor. "It is my wish," continued the Viceroy, "that your Highness should communicate frequently and freely with the Government of India and its officers on all subjects of public interest, and I can assure your Highness that any representation which you may make will always be treated with consideration and respect." The Government of Mr. Gladstone, which was then in power, seems to have thought that Lord Mayo had committed the Anglo-Indian Administration to something like a yearly subsidy, and to have desired that it should be made quite clear to the Afghan sovereign that any assistance from us would depend, not merely on the relations of the Ameer towards ourselves, but to some extent also on the good conduct of that monarch towards his own people. The Indian Secretary, the Duke of Argyll, accordingly wrote to the Viceroy on the 14th of May, 1869, giving expression to these views; and the Indian Government replied on July 1st, expounding at great length the precise nature of the promises made by Lord Mayo, and showing that in all respects he had carried out the general ideas of the Government—viz., that we should abstain from any active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, that we should nevertheless give occasional assistance towards the maintenance of a strong and just Government in that country, but that this assistance should always be entirely at our own discretion. "The object of the Viceroy in agreeing to Shere Ali's request for a meeting," said the despatch of the Indian Government, "was to show to him and to the world that we desired to establish with him a friendly and faithful alliance; to encourage him in his efforts to create a thoroughly independent kingdom, and a just and merciful government; to acknowledge him as the rightful ruler of Cabul, not only as having inherited his throne by his father's will, made public in the lifetime of Dost Mahomed, but as the *de facto* sovereign of the country. But the objects of the Ameer in coming to Umballa went

far beyond this. It was evident from his communications with the Viceroy, the conversations of the Foreign Secretary with his Minister, and the paragraphs which he suggested for insertion in the letter to be addressed to him, that he desired a treaty supplementary to that made with his father in 1857 (which he termed one-sided), and which would declare that we should be 'the friend of his friends, and the enemy of his enemies.'* He further desired that we should publicly declare that we should never acknowledge 'any friend in the whole of Afghanistan save the Ameer and his descendants;' and he evidently expected a promise of a fixed subsidy. But this was not all. He desired and asked that the British Government should not be the sole judge of when and how future assistance was to be given, but earnestly pressed that the words in the Viceroy's letter, 'as circumstances may require,' should be altered to 'as his (the Ameer's) welfare might require.'"

In the opinion of Lord Mayo, compliance with these desires was impossible; but he considered it necessary to furnish the Ameer with some declaration which would be of present service, and satisfy him that his journey had not been in vain. It was therefore made clear to him that, although he was to have no treaty, no fixed subsidy, no European troops, officers, or Residents, and no dynastic pledges, he might reckon upon our warm countenance and support, our discouragement of his rivals, such material assistance as we might consider absolutely necessary for his immediate wants, and friendly communication with the Anglo-Indian Government through our Commissioner at Peshawur, and our native agents in Afghanistan; he, on his part, undertaking to do all he could to maintain peace on our frontier, and to comply with our wishes in matters of trade. But one of the great objects of the Ameer was to obtain from the Indian Government a recognition, not only of himself as Sovereign of Afghanistan, but of his lineal descendants, or successors in blood. Merely to acknowledge the ruler *pro tem.* and *de facto*, was in his opinion to invite competition for the throne, and to stimulate the hopes of various candidates. If the British Government, he said, would recognise him and his dynasty, there was nothing he would not do to evince his gratitude. He would in that case comply with the wishes of the Government in any particular. He would support them with his means and his life; and it should be understood that the slightest failure on his part, or on that of his descendants, should vitiate all engagements on the other side. Lord Mayo, however, distinctly and repeatedly refused to give any such engagement; and on this account, as well as on the question of the subsidy, Shere Ali (though loaded with valuable gifts) left Umballa in a mood of extreme dissatisfaction with what he had obtained. The Duke of Argyll subsequently expressed his entire satisfaction with these explanations; and the Umballa Durbar presently passed out of memory, as far as the English Government was concerned, but not at all out of the recollections of Shere Ali.

The Ameer prepared trouble for himself about this time by nominating as the successor to the throne his youngest son, Abdulla Jan, to the exclusion of Yakoub, who by his military prowess had secured the whole of Afghanistan to his father. Yakoub was not inclined to submit quietly to injustice, and in the spring of 1870 he rose in rebellion, and seized Herat, the usual bone of contention. The Ameer was but slightly troubled at this, and in 1871, at the instance of Lord Mayo (for whom, personally, he seems to have had a regard), he pardoned his son, and made him Governor of Herat. All this time, Russia was acquiring an influence over the Afghan monarch by supporting his designation of Abdulla Jan as the successor to the throne. We have seen that by 1871 the Russian power had been carried far into the heart of Central Asia. Twenty years before, it would not have greatly concerned the ruler of Afghanistan whether Russia was friendly or not; but with the armies of the Czar rapidly absorbing the independent principalities of Turkistan, and continually advancing nearer to the northern boundaries of the Ameer's dominions, the question assumed a very different character. Shere Ali thought it prudent to be friendly with the great Christian Emperor, and the Emperor understood how to make himself agreeable to the Mohammedan potentate.

In February, 1872, Lord Mayo was assassinated by a Mohammedan fanatic (whose name, by a curious coincidence, was Shere Ali), and Lord Northbrook was appointed his successor. The lamented nobleman, whose premature death was so tragical in its character, had been sent out by the Conservative Government of Mr. Disraeli; and, although his views, upon the whole, seem to have been much in accordance with those of Mr. Gladstone's Administration, they cannot be taken as the most exact and authentic expression of the Indian policy which the Liberal Government desired to pursue. Lord Northbrook was the chosen representative of that Government, and we now enter on a period of great importance, as indicating in some respects a new departure in the field of Indian politics. Shortly before Lord Mayo's death,

* The allusion here seems to be to the treaty of 1855, not of 1857.

the Persians and Afghans had agreed to refer to the arbitration of the British Government a dispute of long standing between them, as to whether the border country of Seistan belonged to the one nationality or the other. In the autumn of 1872, soon after the accession of Lord Northbrook, a decision was given, which, by awarding to each party a portion of the disputed territory, dissatisfied both. However just this award may have been, it was an unfortunate commencement to Lord Northbrook's rule, so far as Afghanistan was concerned; for there can be no question that it largely increased the feeling of animosity towards England which Shere Ali had been cherishing ever since the period of the Umballa Conference. It was for a long while very doubtful whether he would obey the decision of the arbitrator; but it was hardly his policy to place himself in direct opposition to a powerful Government. Although, in January, 1873, the unfavourable impression on the mind of Shere Ali was in some degree counteracted by our inducing the Russian Government to recognise the sovereignty of Afghanistan over certain districts bordering on Independent Tartary, the sense of irritation at the Seistan award still existed strongly in May, 1873, when negotiations for a conference were being carried on at Cabul between Shere Ali and our Vakeel, or Native Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan. Lord Northbrook had desired that an interview should take place between the Ameer and the Commissioner at Peshawur; but this plan was subsequently altered at the desire of Shere Ali,

SHERE ALI.



INTERVIEW OF SHERE ALI WITH LORD MAYO.

who proposed that his Prime Minister, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, should wait upon the Viceroy at Simla. Hence the preliminary discussions with the British Vakeel, and hence the Simla Conference, which took place in July. In his conversations with the Vakeel, the Ameer expressed great distrust of the Russians. The security of Afghanistan, he thought, would be imperilled unless the British Government speedily showed some cordiality towards himself. He desired the English authorities in India to organise the Afghan troops, and to send from time to time large sums of money, together with guns and magazine stores, in order that his Highness might be able in a few years to put his kingdom in a satisfactory condition of defence. "If," he said, "an emergency arises, for the Afghan Government to oppose the Russians, such opposition cannot take place without the co-operation of the disciplined troops of the British Government. Should the British Government desire that I should at once organise the Afghan troops, and make arrangements for the security of the border against the Russians on a favourable occasion, I think it is impossible to do so. It is plainly obligatory on the British Government to show their cordiality in this matter before anything happens." The Ameer also required that the Anglo-Indian authorities should set aside some property, either in India or Europe, for his support, in case he should be compelled to retire from Afghanistan. If such an assurance were given him, he would work with zeal and high spirit for the security of the Afghan border, which, he observed, was in truth the border of India.

When Noor Mahomed met the Viceroy at Simla, in July, this great question of the advance of Russia was discussed at considerable length. The Ameer was alarmed at the progress of Russian power, and his Prime Minister desired to know definitely how far he might rely on our help, if Afghanistan were invaded. On the 24th of July, Lord Northbrook telegraphed to the Duke of Argyll, making these facts known to him, and stating the assurances he proposed to give Noor Mahomed. He wished to promise the Ameer that, if he unreservedly accepted and acted on our advice in all external relations, we would help him with money, with arms, and even with troops, if necessary to repel unprovoked invasion, but that we were to be the judges of the necessity. In reply to this communication, the Duke of Argyll telegraphed from the India Office on the 26th of July, to the effect that, in the opinion of the Cabinet, Lord Northbrook should inform the Ameer that the Home Government did not at all share his alarm, and considered there was no cause for it, but that the Viceroy might assure the Afghan representative that the Government would maintain its settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if the sovereign of that country abided by our advice in external affairs. This intimation was understood by the Viceroy as sanctioning the assurances which he proposed to give Noor Mahomed. The words employed by the Duke of Argyll were, however, so exceedingly vague, cautious, and guarded, that the Ameer was not unnaturally dissatisfied with their tenor, and inclined to regard them rather as an abandonment of his cause than as a promise of active assistance.

Lord Cranbrook (formerly Mr. Gathorne Hardy), the Secretary of State for India in the Government of Lord Beaconsfield after the transfer of Lord Salisbury to the Foreign Office, referred to this correspondence of 1873 in his despatch to Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India, dated the 18th of November, 1878, and laid himself open to severe criticism for what was considered a disingenuous suppression of some of the facts. The ninth paragraph of the despatch was thus expressed:— "Finding that the object of the Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the help of the British Government if his territories were threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, the Government of India would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression. But her Majesty's Government at home did not share his Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the discussion of the question would be best postponed to a more convenient season." Lord Cranbrook's despatch professed to be nothing more than a summary of events that had occurred during several years, and it is obvious that a summary cannot go into every detail, or its very character and purpose as an abstract would be destroyed. Still, it must be granted that no summary should omit important facts having a grave bearing upon the general issue; and it is certain that the ninth paragraph of Lord Cranbrook's despatch was not complete as a representation of the facts. The reasonable inference from its statements is, that Lord Northbrook desired to promise the Ameer the military assistance of England in case of unprovoked aggression by Russia, and that the Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone bluntly refused it, without any qualification whatever. When all the diplomatic papers were produced, it was seen that the Duke of Argyll, in the telegram of July 26th, conveyed a species of implied promise that we would support Afghanistan if the Ameer did as we wished, and that Lord Northbrook accordingly gave assurances in this sense. The

expressions of Lord Cranbrook were therefore (however inadvertently) calculated to produce an impression not entirely consistent with the truth.

The incident was unfortunate, but it called forth more angry criticism than the facts justified or required. After all, the assurances of the Gladstone Cabinet, conveyed in the Duke of Argyll's telegram, were of a very indefinite character. The words, "our settled policy in favour of Afghanistan," were capable of many interpretations, although Lord Northbrook seems to have understood them as confirming his own wishes; and the demand that the Ameer should abide by our advice in external affairs, was little short of a requisition that he should make himself a vassal of the English Crown, in exchange for a promise of support so evasively expressed, or rather so entirely dependent on inference and construction, that it might at any moment be repudiated. The engagements ultimately given to Noor Mahomed by Lord Northbrook were subject to many qualifications. His Excellency told the Afghan Prime Minister that the British Government did not share his master's apprehensions, but that, as mentioned in a previous conversation, it would be the duty of the Ameer, in case of any actual or threatened aggression, to refer the question to the British Government, who would endeavour, by negotiation, and by every means in their power, to settle the matter, and avert hostilities. No interference with the power of the Ameer as an independent ruler was intended by the British Government, according to the explanations given to Noor Mahomed; but it was added that assistance could not be afforded without previous reference of the dispute to the consideration of the Anglo-Indian authorities. That reference having been made, and the endeavours of the British Government to bring about an amicable settlement having failed, England would afford the Ameer assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would even, in case of necessity, aid him with troops; but the British Government was itself to decide the occasion when such assistance should be rendered, and would also define its nature and extent. Moreover, the assistance was to be conditional upon the Ameer himself abstaining from aggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of the British Government in regard to his external relations. Such were the assurances given by the Viceroy of India to the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. They appear to have gone farther than is necessarily implied in the telegram from the Duke of Argyll, but, even as they stood, were obviously ill-calculated to

CENTRAL ASIAN TYPES: TADJIK AND KARA KALPAK.

satisfy the Ameer, or to deliver him from his apprehensions of Russia. It was proposed that, as regarded his foreign policy, he should be the nominee of the English Government; and, supposing him to consent to these conditions, the Viceroy simply undertook to give him assistance against his dreaded enemy at such times, and in such manner, as the British Government should itself determine. That Shere Ali would accept such conditions, and make himself our sworn ally and friend on such terms, was in the highest degree improbable.

The extremely grudging spirit in which Mr. Gladstone's Government was disposed to treat with the Ameer, had already been made manifest to Lord Northbrook in a telegram from the Duke of Argyll, dated July 1st, 1873, in reply to one from the Viceroy, despatched on the 27th of June. Lord Northbrook had communicated to the Indian Secretary his views as to the desirability of rendering material assistance to Afghanistan in case that country should be unjustly attacked. He wished a communication of this nature to be sent to Russia through the Foreign Office; and the Duke of Argyll replied that, although he did not object to the general sense of the suggested paragraph, great caution would be necessary in assuring the Ameer of material assistance, since "undue and unfounded expectation" might thus be raised. "He already," said the Duke, "shows symptoms of claiming more than we may wish to give." The great difference between the Ameer and Mr. Gladstone's Government was this: that the former looked with the greatest apprehension on the advances of Russia in Central Asia, placed no confidence in the statements of the Czar's officers that Afghanistan would not be attacked, and (as Noor Mahomed stated to Lord Northbrook) would never rest satisfied until he was assured of aid from the British Government; while the latter was disposed to receive in the most trusting spirit whatever was asserted or promised by Prince Gortschakoff. The Anglo-Indian Government declared in 1869 that it did not share in the exaggerated fears expressed in many quarters as to the danger to India from the extension of Russian influence in Turkistan. It was considered that a frank and clear understanding as to the relative position of British and Russian interests might be established without much difficulty; and negotiations were set on foot between the Governments of England and Russia for the creation of a neutral zone. It was agreed on both hands that an antagonism between the two Governments in Central Asia would be detrimental to their mutual interests, as well as to the general interests of humanity and civilization; that they ought to afford each other what help they could to maintain peace and uphold justice within their respective spheres; that in order to do this it would be advantageous to arrive at a general agreement as to the domain within which either should acknowledge the right of the other to exercise an exclusive influence; that an international agreement on the point would be useless, and might even produce difficulties, because, owing to the instability and vicissitudes of native rule in Asia, the existing frontiers of England and Russia in the East could not be regarded as absolutely incapable of alteration; but that nevertheless a friendly understanding was most desirable. These general views were discussed between the English Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, and the Russian Chancellery, in the spring of 1869; and during the negotiations Prince Gortschakoff gave a distinct assurance, on the word of the Emperor himself, that Russia regarded Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which she might be called on to exercise her influence.

In discussing the matter with Baron Brunnow, Lord Clarendon mentioned that the Secretary of State for India had arrived at a decided opinion that Afghanistan would not fulfil the conditions of a neutral territory, and he therefore proposed the Upper Oxus (Amou Darya) as the boundary line which neither Power should permit its armies to cross. Prince Gortschakoff objected to this proposal, on the ground that a portion of the country south of the Oxus was claimed by the Ameer of Bokhara—a fact which might lead to differences between the Russian and English Governments. In the autumn of 1869, Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortschakoff met at Heidelberg, when the Russian statesman declared that both he and his master considered extension of territory equivalent to extension of weakness, and said that Russia had no idea of going further south; it was not even intended to retain Samarcand—which, nevertheless, has been retained. Lord Clarendon explained that the relations entered into with Afghanistan (which had excited some jealousy in Russia) had no reference to the advances of the Czar's troops in Central Asia, and were not indicative of a hostile feeling on the part of England. About the close of 1869, the two Powers came to an understanding, thus set forth by Prince Gortschakoff in a despatch to Count Brunnow, dated November 1st, 1871, by which time Lord Granville had become the Foreign Minister of England:—"(1) That the territory in the actual possession, at the present moment, of Shere Ali Khan, should be considered to constitute the limits of Afghanistan. (2) That beyond these

limits the Ameer should make no attempt to exercise any influence or interference, and that the English Government should do all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at aggression. (3) That for their part the Imperial Government should use all their influence to prevent any attack by the Ameer of Bokhara upon Afghan territory." These principles were unreservedly accepted, both by the Cabinet of London and the Viceroy of India; but a difference of opinion arose as to the precise boundaries of Afghanistan to the north-east. England was disposed to include within the Ameer's territories the provinces of Badakshan and Wakhan, beyond the Hindoo-Koosh; but Russia objected that they lay outside the limits which could be fairly claimed. After some negotiations, the Russian Government gave way, and at the close of 1872 accepted the boundary line laid down by England. "We are the more inclined to this act of courtesy," said Prince Gortschakoff in a despatch to the Russian representative at London, "as the English Government engages to use all its influence with Shere Ali, in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or of further conquest. This influence is indisputable. It is based, not only on the material and moral ascendency of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace."

In accordance with this understanding, the influence of the Anglo-Indian Government was exercised, not without success, to dissuade Shere Ali from any attempt at encroachment on the territories beyond his frontier, and the Russian Government discouraged any aggression by Bokhara on Afghanistan, as well as all endeavours on the part of Abdul-Rahman Khan, nephew of the Afghan Ameer, to disturb his uncle's sovereignty. For a time, the good understanding seemed to be complete, and Mr. Gladstone, addressing the House of Commons on the 22nd of April, 1873, presented a satisfactory view of our relations with Russia in respect of Central Asiatic politics. This was before the Conference at Simla, and the observations of the Prime Minister had a very unfortunate effect upon Shere Ali, as they were considered by him to indicate a decided leaning towards Russia on the part of that statesman. Shere Ali was a man not wanting in ability, and he had every reason to be extremely watchful of Russian designs, so far as they affected the Central Asiatic Khanates lying on the borders of his dominions. He could not but perceive that Russia was continually advancing southward; and although, in deference to so strong a Power as England, she had acted here and there in a conciliatory spirit, the general fact remained the same. Accordingly, the Afghan Prime Minister represented to Lord Northbrook, at the Simla Conference in July, 1873, that the assurances of Russia were not to be trusted, and that the independence of Afghanistan was imperilled by the ever-encroaching power of the Czar. He requested that, in the event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, the British Government would distinctly state that they would consider the aggressor as an enemy. This being refused, he asked that the contingency of aggression by Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to be given to the Ameer. Lord Northbrook replied that, setting aside the inexpediency of causing needless irritation to a friendly Power by such specific mention, the suggestion was one which could not be adopted, inasmuch as it implied an admission of the probability of such a contingency—an admission which the British Government were not prepared to make, in face of the repeated assurances given by Russia to the contrary. All this was sufficiently discouraging; but worse remained behind. Noor Mahomed asked what answer should be given by the Ameer to the request which the Turkomans had preferred, for advice touching the Russian demand that the Imperial troops should be allowed to pass through Turkoman territory. The reply of Lord Northbrook was to the effect that the Turkomans were robbers and kidnappers; that the Ameer would do a most unwise thing to make himself responsible to such people in any way whatever; and that no countenance should be given to any opposition on their part to the march of Russian troops. Everything, in fact, was put in the most favourable light for Russia, and it was impossible for the Ameer to come to any other conclusion than that England and Russia were in league, and that he was to be the victim of their insidious friendship.

Each step taken by Lord Northbrook deepened the unfavourable impression which he had made from the first. Writing to the Ameer on the 6th of September, 1873, he said:—"I have had some conversation with your envoy on the subject of the policy which the British Government will pursue in the event of an attack upon your Highness's territories. But the question is, in my opinion, one of such importance that the discussion of it should be postponed to a more suitable opportunity. I do not entertain any apprehensions of danger to your Highness's territories from without, and I therefore

do not consider that it is necessary that your Highness should at present incur any large expenditure with the view to such a contingency." That is to say, Afghanistan was to make no special preparation from her own defence, but was to rely solely upon the vague and shifty promises of Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll. If there had really been a design to drive the Ameer into open or concealed antagonism to England, it is difficult to conceive how any better course could have been pursued. The Afghan Prime Minister suffered himself to be talked over at the Simla interview, and with Oriental suavity professed to agree with several of Lord Northbrook's arguments; but Shere Ali was not so easily satisfied. He was a man of a melancholy and brooding nature; his spirit was overshadowed by the mighty Power from the North which seemed to him to be gradually swallowing up the whole of Central Asia; and the reliance which he had placed on the friendship of the British Government suddenly failed him. He had for some time past begun to question our good will. From the period of the Simla Conference he questioned it no longer, but rather placed it amongst those things which are worthless, and indeed almost non-existant.

In a report addressed by the Indian Government to the Duke of Argyll on the 15th of September, 1873, it was stated that Noor Mahomed had at the Simla Durbar made use of expressions indicating his belief that England had in previous years bound herself to comply with any demands of the Ameer.

SYED NOOR MAHOMED SHAH.

Lord Northbrook, however, had given the envoy distinctly to understand that, while the policy adopted towards Afghanistan by Sir John Lawrence and Lord Mayo would be maintained, the British Government reserved to themselves the right of judging as to the propriety of any request preferred by Shere Ali. It had appeared to the Indian Administration, nevertheless, that the time had arrived for affording the Ameer some assistance. He was accordingly promised five lakhs of rupees, to aid him in adjusting the claims of his subjects, who had suffered from raids in Seistan; and it was afterwards resolved to present his Highness with another sum of the same amount, together with 10,000

Enfield and 5,000 Snider rifles, for which he had asked previous to the Envoy's arrival. A smaller number of arms had been offered by the Viceroy in the spring of 1873, and refused by Shere Ali in a



SIMLA IN WINTER.

very disrespectful letter, demanding a much more considerable gift. Lord Northbrook now suggested the expediency of deputing a British officer to examine the western and northern boundaries of Afghanistan. "Though we think," said the despatch to the Duke of Argyll, "that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and possibly also Candahar, would for many reasons be desirable, we are fully alive to the difficulties in the way of such a measure until the objects and policy of the British Government are more clearly understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It is with the view of removing some of these difficulties that we have proposed the deputation of an officer to examine the boundaries. Independently of the valuable information, both geographical and political, that might be collected, a judicious officer would have it in his power to do much towards allaying any feelings of mistrust that may still linger in the minds of some classes of the people in Afghanistan, and towards preparing the way for the eventual location of permanent British representatives in that

country, if such a measure should at any time be considered desirable or necessary." We see here that the idea of sending British Agents into Afghanistan was entertained by Lord Northbrook some time before that policy was pressed upon the Viceroy by the new Indian Secretary, Lord Salisbury—indeed, before the Gladstone Administration had ceased to hold office.

The reply of Shere Ali to Lord Northbrook's letter of September 6th was dated November 13th, 1873. It was characterised by a tone of irony, and plainly expressed the dissatisfaction of the writer with what had been promised by the Indian Viceroy. The Ameer thanked God that peace and tranquillity had been established among all States in perpetuity; that doubts and disputes had been removed; that such security had been established that thenceforth no aggressions would take place, nor would any Power raise discussions or disputes with another; that the use of inimical expressions had been discontinued in diplomatic correspondence; and that peace and tranquillity had been secured to the whole world. He then continued:—"The friendly declaration of your Excellency, to the effect that you will maintain towards myself the same policy which was followed by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, has been the cause of much gratification to me. My friend! under this circumstance of the case, it was not necessary to hold all those conversations with Syed Noor Mahomed Shah at Simla. The understanding arrived at in Umballa is quite sufficient. As long as the beneficent Government of her Majesty the Queen of England continues firm and constant in its friendship, I shall also, please God, remain firm in my sincere friendship, as on the occasion of my meeting at Umballa with Lord Mayo, whose writing I hold in my possession, as also a document from Lord Lawrence. Of this friendship your Excellency may rest assured." In the course of this reply, the Ameer referred to his recent refusal to allow Colonel Valentine Baker to pass through Afghanistan from Teheran to India. "My envoy," said he, "at interviews and conversations with your Excellency, explained the many objections that exist to men like Colonel Baker and others travelling in Afghanistan. I therefore do not think it necessary to allude to the subject further." The style of this document was undoubtedly blunt even to rudeness; but the Ameer's irritation is not difficult to understand. Lord Northbrook had already received one impertinent despatch without taking any notice of it; but he now felt it high time to vindicate in some slight degree the dignity of his office and of his country. On the 23rd of January, 1874, he wrote in reply to the Ameer that he was anxious to give him "assurances of support even more explicit" than had been given by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo; that the views of the British Government had apparently not been fully understood by his Highness; but that, as it was not easy for friends to adjust the details of important questions by means of letters, the Ameer would probably agree that it would be preferable to postpone further discussion till some more convenient opportunity—apparently a favourite expression with Lord Northbrook. "My friend!" continued the Viceroy, "with regard to the request made by Colonel Baker through the Commissioner of Peshawur, that officer returned to England some time ago, and abandoned his intention of travelling to India through Afghanistan. I am aware of the difficulty in which your Highness is placed with regard to the reception of guests in Afghanistan. It is usual, however, to express regret when the request of a servant of a friendly Power, preferred through the constituted authorities, cannot be complied with; and I feel sure that your Highness regrets your inability to welcome the servants of her Majesty the Queen, in the same manner as I receive your Highness's servants and subjects in India."

Shere Ali responded on the 10th of April, 1874, in a letter which contained some rather singular allusions to his people as a set of "rude mountaineers, unendowed with knowledge and wisdom," but whom he hoped in time to enrich with those qualities. With respect to the Viceroy's assurances of friendship, he sullenly observed:—"The arrangements made by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo at the Umballa Conference are sufficient, and there is no need to repeat all this discussion. . . . Your Excellency! since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, especially the former, possessed an intimate knowledge of Afghanistan and its frontiers, and your Excellency also must certainly have acquired the same knowledge, I therefore am desirous that your Excellency, after full and careful consideration of the approval expressed by her Majesty the Queen, the *sunnud* of Lord Lawrence, and the decision of Lord Mayo, will remain firm and constant in order that Afghanistan and its territories may be maintained inviolate and secure." The continually-increasing exasperation of the Ameer is visible throughout this correspondence. He had at one time hoped much from English assistance; it was evident that he now expected nothing. During the previous year (1873), he had found an additional cause of mortification in the flattering reception of the Shah of Persia by the English Government and people. This was particularly annoying, inasmuch

as, by the Seistan award, territory to which he believed himself entitled had been handed over to his rival. He thought at one time of visiting London himself, that he might lay his grievances before her Majesty in person. When Noor Mahomed went to Simla, he took with him a letter on this subject, in which the Ameer asked why the invitation to the Shah had not been extended to himself, and expressed his readiness to visit England, if he were invited. He was not invited, and the sense of personal humiliation rankled deeply in his breast. The Government of Mr. Gladstone seems, indeed, to have omitted no possible opportunity for exasperating a sovereign whom it was highly advisable we should conciliate as an ally against the perpetual encroachments of Russia. By 1874, Shere Ali had in effect broken with England, and was already turning his eyes towards that other Power which threatened to be his enemy, but which, he thought, might possibly, by judicious conduct on his part, be converted into his friend.

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## CHAPTER XXXV.

**The Central Asiatic and Afghan Questions in 1875—Uneasiness of the Russian Government with respect to English Designs on Quetta—Treaty Rights of England in connection with that Town and the Territories of the Khan of Khelat—Antagonistic Opinions as to the Advisability of occupying Quetta—Disturbed Condition of the Khanate—Correspondence between England and Russia on the subject of Independent Tartary and Afghanistan—Indirect Proposals of the Russian Government—Views of the English Cabinet, as expressed by Lord Derby in October, 1875—The "Neutral Zone" abandoned—Communications between General Kauffmann and Shere Ali—The Ameer still desirous of English Assistance—His Conduct in 1873—Suggestions of Lord Salisbury for the Introduction of English Residents into Afghanistan (1875)—Dissent of Lord Northbrook and his Council—Appointment of Lord Lytton to the Viceroyalty (1876)—Lord Salisbury's Instructions to the New Governor-General—Refusal of Shere Ali to receive English Agents in his Dominions—Correspondence of 1876—Continued Interference of General Kauffmann—Russian Agents in Afghanistan—Complaints of the British Government, and Disingenuous Replies of Prince Gortschakoff—Occupation of Quetta by the English—The Step necessitated by Russian Intrigues.**

HITHERTO, the progress of the Central Asiatic and Afghan questions has been so distinct as to necessitate two separate lines of narrative; but from the spring months of 1875 the streams coalesce, and move forward in the same channel, to which in fact they had from the first been tending. By that time, the Governments of England and Russia were becoming mutually watchful, each suspecting the other of a design to overstep the boundaries of the "neutral zone" which had been settled a few years before. Russia, in particular, was disquieted about Quetta; and Lord Augustus Loftus, writing to Lord Derby on the 30th of March, referred to this feeling of uneasiness as being caused by the belief that it was the intention of the Anglo-Indian Government to occupy the town in question, which it was feared would be the precursor of the occupation of Herat. In answer to his despatch, Lord Derby, on the recommendation of the Marquis of Salisbury, then the Indian Minister, reminded the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, for his own information, that the Indian Government had a treaty right to station troops in any part of the territory of Khelat, otherwise called Beloochistan. On the 15th of September in the same year, Lord Derby instructed our *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg (in the temporary absence of Lord Augustus Loftus) to explain this fact to the Russian Government, but at the same time to state that her Majesty's Government had no intention of using their right, unless a necessity for it arose. Quetta is situated at the head of the Bolan Pass, and was a place of considerable importance to us in the Afghan war of 1839. Owing to the unfriendly conduct of the Khan then ruling, the city of Khelat was stormed by a force under General Willshire, on October 15th, when the sovereign Prince, Mehrab Khan, fell with eight of his principal officers, after a defence distinguished by the utmost gallantry and resolution. By a treaty, dated October 6th, 1841, his son and successor, Meer Nusseer Khan, was compelled by us to give up the town of Quetta, together with the province of Shāl, in which it is situated, to the Ameer of Afghanistan, and at the same time to acknowledge himself and his descendants the vassals of the Afghan monarchs, as his ancestors had been in former ages. He also bound himself not to hold any political communication with foreign Powers without the consent of the British Government and of Shah Soojah, and in all cases to act, subordinately, in co-operation with the Governments of British India and Afghanistan. At a subsequent date, however, the province of Shāl and the town of Quetta were restored to the Khan of Khelat, who

then became a feudatory of the Anglo-Indian Government. In 1854, a new treaty was made with Meer Nusseer Khan, by which the ruler of Khelat agreed to act in "subordinate co-operation" with the British Government, and to allow British troops to occupy any positions in the territory of Khelat of which it might be considered desirable to take possession. Thus, the dominions of the Khan became, to all practical intents, a part of British India long before Russia began to object to the possible seizure of Quetta.

Previous to 1875, the occupation of that town had for some years been advocated with earnest persistence by such eminent Eastern statesmen as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Lewis Pelly, who urged that to take Quetta would be to secure a strategical advantage against the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in Afghanistan and Persia. But the project was discountenanced by successive Viceroys, by their Councils, by the Home Government, and by several persons of authority in the politics of Asia; and for a time the idea seemed to be abandoned. Its revival was due to the continued progress of Russia through Turkistan, and the manifest unfriendliness of Shere Ali after the Simla Conference of 1873. On the 12th of June, 1874, Sir Bartle Frere addressed a letter on the subject to Sir John Kaye, and this letter was circulated by the Indian Secretary (the Marquis of Salisbury) among the members of the Council of India. Lord Lawrence, formerly Governor-General of India, strongly opposed the movement, as he had done before; but the suggestion seems to have sunk deeply into the minds of Mr. Disraeli and his colleagues, though they did not at once act upon it. The affairs of Khelat, or Beloochistan, had fallen into great confusion since the death of Nusseer Khan in 1857, and in 1875 the state of anarchy was extreme over nearly the whole country. The reigning Khan, moreover, was unfriendly to the English; yet Lord Northbrook was averse from any interference, and at that period Lord Salisbury supported him in his policy of abstention. The Indian Secretary's approval of that policy was conveyed in a despatch dated July 8th, 1875—rather more than two months before his assurances to the same effect, sent to the *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg for the information of the Russian Government.




IN THE BOLAN PASS.

The agreement with respect to the neutral zone did not remain long in force, and the Russian undertakings as to Central Asia had a remarkable tendency to alter their character, or to fade away into nothingness, at the convenience of the Generals in Turkistan, who either carried out secret instructions different from those which were paraded before the world, or were able to shape the policy of their master to their own ends. In a despatch to Count Schouvaloff, communicated to Lord Derby on the 11th of May, 1875, Prince Gortschakoff repeated his former assurances that the Emperor had no intention of extending the frontiers, such as they then existed in Central Asia, either on the side of Bokhara, or on that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek. "We shall cause those frontiers to be

respected," said the Russian Chancellor, "and shall protect our commerce; we shall punish any acts of violence and pillage in such manner as to prevent their recurrence; we shall endeavour to extirpate brigandage, and to establish the security of our possessions. . . . Nothing, however, should be done beyond what is indispensable for the purpose. The orders of the Emperor are formal in this respect. They have been notified by his Imperial Majesty to the military authorities, who are charged with their execution." Yet this very despatch was accompanied by a historical Memorandum, in which, after alluding once more to the limits of the influence to be exercised by the respective Governments in Central Asia, Prince Gortschakoff said:—"While we are resolved strictly to observe the limit thus fixed, we consider that the two Governments have maintained their full liberty of action in the countries adjacent to them, and placed outside the line. They have each of them, in this respect, to consider only their own interests and necessities." This statement was preliminary to the further remark that the understanding arrived at, towards the end of 1869, between England and Russia, left to the latter complete liberty of action over the territory situated between her frontiers and those of Afghanistan. Afghanistan was to be considered the neutral ground, and each Government might "exercise its influence" up to the borders—northern or eastern, as the case might be—of that kingdom. Thus, all the assurances of the Emperor and Prince Gortschakoff with regard to the independent Khanates of Tartary were reduced to the very smallest value, since it was intimated that they might at any moment be set aside. The posture of affairs was in fact totally altered, in a manner equally sudden and unexpected; and the policy of the English Cabinet necessarily altered with it.

In replying to the Russian Memorandum, Lord Salisbury wrote:—"By this assumption, his Imperial Majesty's present declarations, of the sincerity of which there can be no doubt, are qualified to a grave extent. It must not be forgotten in the consideration of this important question that declarations as specific and as sincere have been followed on former occasions by acts inconsistent with their tenor; indeed, the Memorandum itself dwells on a justification of this course of policy, under the plea of necessity. Lord Salisbury neither desires to raise bygone questions touching that necessity, nor to enter into any examination of the policy to which it may have given rise; he merely wishes to express his fear that, if the present claim be allowed to pass unchallenged, it may, sooner or later, lead to complications affecting Indian interests, in regard to Merve, which may seriously embarrass her Majesty's Government. It must be borne in mind that the establishment of Russian supremacy in Khiva and on the south-east coast of the Caspian has taken place since the course of negotiations described in the general body of the Memorandum; while the occupation of the Attrek districts by Russian troops may at any time materially affect our relations with Persia. On these and other considerations it is inexpedient, if not impossible, in Lord Salisbury's opinion, for her Majesty's Government to accept the position of inaction which Prince Gortschakoff's letter apparently wishes to force upon it, whatever may be the character of future operations by Russia against the Turkomans." Russia had by that time thrown off the mask as regarded the Central Asiatic Khanates, and desired to commit England to an approval beforehand of any annexations she might make.

This idea came out more strongly every day. Writing to Lord Derby from St Petersburg, in July, 1875, Mr. Doria (in the absence of Lord Augustus Loftus) reported a conversation he had had with Baron Jomini, who dwelt much on the probability of the Russian and English boundaries in Asia becoming contiguous. If the Empires of Russia and Austria, or Russia and Germany, having a common frontier, could exist on terms of peace, why, he asked, could not Russia and England? His Excellency added, according to Mr. Doria, that "if England found it to her interests to annex Afghanistan to her Indian Empire, the Russian Government would not regard it as a menace to them, nor would they endeavour to prevent it, and that, therefore, they could not comprehend why the future absorption of Bokhara and Khokand should raise such excitement and alarm in the minds of Englishmen." Baron Jomini seemed to view with satisfaction the statement that the correspondence between the English and Russian Governments had not led to any agreement as to the limits of a neutral zone; and Mr. Doria reported that many Russians of political position, and in official service, entertained a full persuasion that the maintenance for any number of years of a great neutral territory between the two Empires of Russia and India was an impossibility, and that the notion must be abandoned. Russia evidently wished England to take Afghanistan, in order that she might have an excuse for seizing Bokhara and Khokand; though she would probably go her own way, whether with or without excuse.

The Russian Memorandum of 1875 received a reply from Lord Derby as well as from Lord Salisbury, since it concerned the Foreign no less than

the Indian Department. The despatch of Lord Derby was dated October 25th, and had reference to Prince Gortschakoff's assumption "that, in arriving at an understanding with respect to Afghanistan, the common policy of the two Governments has been completely fulfilled, and that it is a part of such understanding that entire liberty of action is left to Russia in all the territories lying between her own frontier and that of Afghanistan." On this topic, Lord Derby observed:—"The point of departure of the two Governments in exchanging their views was the mutual desire to arrive at some common understanding as to the best means of preventing the contact of their respective possessions in Central Asia. Various combinations were proposed and discussed with this object—the creation of a neutral zone, the delimitation of frontiers, the recognition of the Oxus as a line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross, the maintenance of Afghanistan and Bokhara as independent States, the former under British and the latter under Russian influence. This last combination, as represented in the Memorandum under consideration, appears to be the only form of an arrangement with regard to which any definite understanding has been found practicable, and her Majesty's Government have always fully appreciated the conciliatory spirit in which this question has been approached by the Russian Government. But it is obvious that the settlement made with respect to Afghanistan can only partially effect the object which the two Governments desired to attain—namely, that of averting possible causes of future collision between them. Her Majesty's Government fully accept the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet as to the extension of the southern frontiers of Russian territory; but they equally admit the force of the arguments which have been advanced to explain the repeated annexations which, in spite of these assurances, have taken place. However sincere, therefore, the desire of the Russian Government to avoid future extension of territorial responsibilities, her Majesty's Government cannot regard the present line of Russian frontier as fixed and immovable. The recurrence of similar causes may lead to similar results; and her Majesty's Government could not regard with indifference, and as a matter with which they had



APPROACHING QUETTA.

no concern, further occupation and absorption by Russia of the regions which still separate Afghanistan from the Russian territory." Nothing could be clearer or more specific than this; but Russia was already engaged in operations against Khokand, and the complete annexation of the Khanate followed on the 29th of February, 1876.

Four days previous to this, Lord Derby received a communication from Prince Gortschakoff (dated the 15th), in which the Russian Chancellor said that he was willing to regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which had been recognised as impracticable. He once more repeated that Afghanistan was to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, and added that the two Powers, while retaining their entire freedom, should be guided by a mutual desire to pay due regard to their respective interests and necessities, by avoiding, as far as possible, any immediate contact with each other, and preventing collisions between the States placed within the circle of their influence. Such was the state of affairs in the early part of 1876; but long before then, General Kauffmann had been entering into communication with Shere Ali. Letters had been sent by the Russian commander to that potentate as early as August, 1870. Lord Mayo tried to persuade the Ameer that General Kauffmann's only object was to make it known everywhere in Central Asia that a perfect understanding existed between the Governments of Great Britain and Russia with reference to the affairs and interests of the two countries; but the Ameer himself was not disposed to take this cheerful view. On the contrary, he was much troubled at the receipt of letters from the Russian authorities at Tashkend, and, amongst other things, asked what they meant by soliciting a reply "agreeably to their aims." Shere Ali considered it would not be surprising to find Russian officials establishing themselves on the actual borders of Afghanistan, and he pronounced it impossible that complete measures could be carried out for the protection of those borders without the help and assistance of the British Government.



PALACE OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDIDJAN, KHOKAND.

Lord Mayo advised the despatch of friendly and conciliatory answers to General Kauffmann's letters, and Lord Northbrook followed in the same course; but the Ameer, though acting in accordance with English suggestions, was very far from satisfied. With each succeeding year, he had additional reason for doubting the desire of the English Government to give him any effectual support against the encroachments of Russia; and the upshot of the Simla Conference aggravated this doubt in no insignificant degree. Still, he forebore from anything like a rupture with the Anglo-Indian authorities. He accepted the Seistan award, by which he had been so deeply mortified, and to which at one time it seemed very doubtful whether he would submit. He conformed to the advice of Lord Northbrook in matters affecting the border tribes, and he responded to the friendly offers of the

Viceroy to the extent of taking the arms that were offered to him, though he let the money (£100,000) lie untouched in the Kohat Treasury.

Yet his ill-humour burst forth now and then in very unmistakable ways. It has been seen that he refused to allow Colonel Baker to travel through Afghanistan in 1873, and in the following year he denied Mr. (now Sir) Douglas Forsyth a passage through Cabul. The reason of these refusals is said to have been the disturbed state of Afghanistan, consequent on the rebellion of Yakoub Khan, the second son of Shere Ali. In November, 1873, the Ameer had declared his younger son, Abdulla Jan, heir-apparent to the throne, and a year later he invited Yakoub to Cabul under a safe-conduct, and then flung him into prison. Lord Northbrook remonstrated with the Ameer on his cruelty and bad faith; but this was in truth an interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the Ameer was greatly offended at it. At the same time, General Kauffmann's friendly and disinterested missives continued to be received by Shere Ali, and to be communicated by him to the Viceroy of India. Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook thought they were very harmless matters indeed; but the Home Government became uneasy, and on the 22nd of January, 1875, Lord Salisbury, writing from the Secret Department of the Council of India to Lord Northbrook, observed that, although no immediate danger appeared to threaten the interests of her Majesty in the direction of Central Asia, Persia, and Afghanistan, the aspect of affairs in those regions was sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution. No specific reference to Russia was made in this despatch; but it was evident that Lord Salisbury had Russian intrigues in his mind when he wrote it. The Indian Secretary believed that more exact information was required concerning the progress of affairs in Afghanistan. We had already a Native Agent at Cabul; but it was considered by Lord Salisbury that the presence of an Englishman at that capital was imperatively necessary.

The Indian Government were opposed to this suggestion, on the ground that the Ameer himself had on several occasions expressed the utmost repugnance to receiving a British Agent in his dominions. It also appeared to Lord Northbrook and his Council that the Native Agent at Cabul discharged his duties very efficiently, and that it was highly unadvisable to force upon Shere Ali the reception of British officers whom it was known he was unwilling to entertain. "We recommend," said the Viceroy, in a despatch written on the 7th of June, 1875, "that no immediate pressure be put upon the Ameer, but that advantage be taken of the first favourable opportunity that his own action or other circumstances may present, for the purpose of sounding his disposition, and of representing to him the benefits which would be derived by Afghanistan from the proposed arrangement. The object in view is, in our judgment, more likely to be attained by taking this course than by assuming the initiative now." Lord Northbrook did indeed think that the case would be altered, should the Russians advance to Merve. It would then become necessary to give more specific assurances to the Ameer that we were prepared to assist him to defend Afghanistan against attack from without; a treaty engagement would probably become desirable, and the establishment of a British Resident at Herat would be the natural consequence of such an engagement, and of the nearer approach of the Russian frontier. The Marquis of Salisbury, resuming the subject on the 19th of November, believed that the time had already arrived when such an appointment had become necessary, owing to the recent advances of Russia, which had placed her outermost posts, in some places, almost on the frontier of Afghanistan—in others, upon roads which lead to it by easy and well-supplied marches. The Home Government, therefore, continued to attach very serious importance to the presence of a British Agent at Afghanistan. They were not disposed to wait until Russia had occupied Merve. "If ever the Russians," said Lord Salisbury, "should accomplish the permanent occupation of Merve, the time would possibly have passed by when representations to the Ameer could be made with any useful result, for the influence of your Government at Cabul, already enfeebled, would, for such a purpose, have in a great measure disappeared." The Indian Secretary called the attention of the Viceroy to the fact that the Ameer had frequently warned the British Government that one Russian advance would follow another; "and," added Lord Salisbury, "his prediction, disregarded when made, has been shown by the issue to be true." Should the Russians advance to Merve, the Ameer would not unnaturally believe that no Power existed which was able to stay their progress, and in that case he would do nothing which might cause him to lose favour in the eyes of so strong a neighbour. Lord Salisbury then proceeded:—"The first step in establishing our relations with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing will be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his capital. It need not be publicly connected with the establish-

ment of a permanent mission within his dominions. There will be many advantages in ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller political interest, which it would not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create. I have therefore to instruct you, on behalf of her Majesty's Government, without any delay that you can reasonably avoid, to find some occasion for sending a mission to Cabul, and to press the reception of this mission very earnestly upon the Ameer. The character you would give to it, and the amount of escort, if any, that it will require, I must leave entirely to your judgment. The envoy whom you may select will be instructed to confer with the Ameer personally upon the recent events in Central Asia; to assure him of the earnest desire of her Majesty's Government that his territories should remain safe from external attack; and at the same time to point out to him the extreme difficulty which will attend any effort on your part to ensure this end, unless you are permitted to place your own officers upon the frontier, to watch the course of events."



RUSSIAN FORT AT TASHKEND.

Lord Northbrook still retained his opinion that the sending of British officers into Afghanistan would be resisted by the Ameer, and that to force him to submit would be a most impolitic and dangerous measure. A Resident appointed under these circumstances would be exposed to considerable personal risk, would be dependent for information on untrustworthy sources, and would be placed in a position at once humiliating and useless. The Viceroy and his Council consequently deprecated, as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan, and to the interests of the British Empire in India, the execution, under existing circumstances, of the instructions conveyed in Lord Salisbury's recent despatch. The date of this communication was January 28th, 1876, and it must be taken as determining the limits of Lord Northbrook's Administration. It was by this time obvious that the views of the Viceroy and of the Home Government were so diametrically opposed on the question of Afghanistan and Central Asia that it was impossible any longer for Lord Northbrook to continue in the post which he had occupied since the early part of 1872. Another Governor-General was clearly indispensable, if the Cabinet was to carry out its fixed policy. Lord Northbrook, as we have already observed, was appointed by the Government of Mr. Gladstone, and he represented those opinions on Asiatic politics with which Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bright, and their immediate followers, have enthusiastically identified themselves. Up to the period we are considering, he had got on tolerably well with the Administration of Mr. Disraeli; but there had always been a want of cordiality in their relations, and a question had now arisen, with respect to which compromise was impossible. Either Lord Northbrook or Lord Salisbury must give way, or the former must be relieved of an office

which he could no longer retain in harmony with the views of the Home Government. Accordingly, Lord Lytton was appointed to the Viceroyalty in the early part of 1876, and in the April of that year he took the oaths of office at Calcutta.

On the 28th of February, before his Lordship quitted England, the Indian Secretary furnished him with instructions, ordering the immediate execution of the plan of sending a temporary mission to the Ameer, with a view to establishing a permanent European mission in his dominions. It will be observed that these instructions were dated three days after the receipt by the Government of Prince Gortschakoff's despatch intimating that the discussion as to an intermediate zone was considered to be closed. Lord Lytton was reminded that in 1873 Lord Northbrook had given the envoy of the Ameer a personal assurance that, in the event of any aggression upon the territories of his Highness, which the British Government had failed to avert, that Government would afford him assistance in the shape of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, furnish him with troops. The terms of this declaration were described by Lord Salisbury as "too ambiguous to secure confidence, or inspire gratitude, on the part of his Highness." The Government of Mr. Disraeli were therefore prepared to sanction and support some more definite declaration; but they must still reserve to themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the circumstances involving the obligation of material support to the Ameer, and it was to be distinctly understood that only in some clear case of unprovoked aggression would such an obligation arise. Moreover, the British Government could not guarantee the integrity of the Ameer's dominions, unless their agents were allowed to have undisputed access to the frontier positions of Afghanistan. "They must also have," continued Lord Salisbury in his instructions to the new Viceroy, "adequate means of confidentially conferring with the Ameer upon all matters as to which the proposed declaration would recognise a community of interests. They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels, and the Ameer must be made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country and the character of the population, territories ultimately dependent upon British power for their defence must not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who may be duly authorised to enter them." The despatch then proceeded to recommend the establishment of a telegraphic line from some point on the Indian frontier to Cabul, *vid* the Kurum Valley, and the permanent presence at the Viceregal Court of a properly-accredited Afghan envoy. These general conditions being fulfilled, the Government were willing to comply with any reasonable demand on the part of Shere Ali for more assured support and protection, such as pecuniary assistance, the advice of British officers as to military matters, or a promise, strictly guarded and clearly circumscribed, of adequate aid against the actual and unprovoked attack of any foreign Power. Communication with the Ameer was to be opened either by means of a special mission, charged with the duty of announcing to the Ameer and the Khan of Khelat the assumption by the Queen of her new title of Empress of India, or by directing the Commissioner of Peshawur to inform the Ameer, privately, that the Viceroy intended to send a complimentary letter to him, as well as to the Khan of Khelat. The British Agent, when sent, was to oppose a frank but firm refusal to any demands which there was no intention of conceding, and such demands were to be prevented from becoming subjects of discussion. Furthermore, if the language and demeanour of the Ameer promised no satisfactory result, he was to be distinctly reminded that he was isolating himself, at his own peril, from the friendship and protection it was his interest to seek and deserve.

The main object of these instructions was to bring matters back to the position in which they stood before the Simla Conference of 1873, and to repair, as far as possible, the errors and shortcomings of Lord Northbrook's policy at that date. What the Ameer then required was a distinct and definite promise of assistance, in case of attack by Russia; he received only a vague promise, so qualified by conditions, and so dependent upon construction, rather than upon precise engagements, that the Afghan Prince felt he could place no reliance upon such shadowy undertakings as a protection against the solid and ever-approaching mass of Russian aggression. The promises of Lord Salisbury were more clearly defined, and, had they been given at the earlier period, would probably have sufficed. But three years had intervened; the Ameer had learned to distrust the English Government; he had old recollections of disappointment and annoyance; he had been forced to look to the Power in the North, rather than to the Power in the East; and the continual encroachments of Russia had inspired him with so great a fear of that Empire that he dreaded to offend its representatives. What, therefore, might have appeared satisfactory in 1873, had become distasteful by 1876. Moreover, even

Lord Salisbury's assurances were clogged by conditions which, however reasonable in themselves, were very disagreeable to the Ameer. There is some dispute as to whether the Prime Minister of Shere Ali had not, at the Umballa Conference, expressed on behalf of his master a desire, or at least a willingness, to receive English Residents in his dominions. But one thing is certain—that in 1876 the Ameer looked upon the presence of such officials as something offensive to his dignity and dangerous to his independence. He had thought so even in 1873, and it is questionable whether in 1869, when Lord Mayo met Shere Ali at Umballa, the Prime Minister, Noor Mahomed, did not incorrectly represent his sovereign's wishes upon this particular point. However it may then have been, the Ameer was decidedly hostile to the reception of British Agents when Lord Lytton assumed the Viceroyalty. It is doubtless very difficult to see how we could have committed ourselves to an armed support of the Ameer, under certain contingencies, without having a representative in the dominions of that monarch, who should keep the Indian Administration and the Home Government duly informed as to the progress of affairs. Yet it is manifest that this condition predisposed Shere Ali to reject our offers of assistance in 1876, even supposing him to have had no other reason for not accepting them.

On his arrival in India, Lord Lytton took immediate steps to ascertain whether Shere Ali would be willing to receive an English envoy. He resolved to send to Cabul a special mission, ostensibly to announce the Queen's assumption of the Imperial title as regarded India, but secretly authorised to renew the negotiations of 1873; and a native officer was sent with a letter from the Commissioner of Peshawur to prepare the way. The Afghan ruler replied, on the 22nd of May, 1876, by a refusal, expressed in courteous words, but with perfect decision. In a letter from our Vakeel, written at the same time, three reasons were assigned for the Ameer not complying with our wishes: first, that the persons of Englishmen would not be safe; secondly, that European officers might make demands which would give rise to quarrels; thirdly, that, if English Agents were permitted, Russia would require to be represented also. Should a conference be desired, Shere Ali was willing that an Agent of his own should wait upon the British Government; but he would suffer no European representative within his dominions. The Anglo-Indian Government then prepared two letters—one to be sent direct to the Ameer by the Commissioner of Peshawur, the other addressed to Atta Mahomed, our Vakeel in Afghanistan. Both communications were dated July 8th, and in the first of them the Commissioner observed that his Highness's advisers, in counselling him not to receive the Viceroy's envoy, might have been influenced by a misconception of the objects of his Excellency, or might not have fully considered the light in which such a refusal might be regarded by the British Government. The Commissioner had therefore explained to the Native Agent at Cabul the views of his Excellency on the relations between the two Governments, and on the causes to which he attributed the reluctance of his Highness to receive the mission. The letter to Atta Mahomed entered at greater length into the sentiments with which the Anglo-Indian Government regarded the Ameer's refusal. The Viceroy, it was here stated, was surprised by the Ameer's argument that he would be obliged to receive Russian Agents, if he admitted those of England. Following what had already been laid down by the Marquis of Salisbury in his instructions to Lord Lytton, the Commissioner of Peshawur referred to the written pledges which the British Government had obtained from the Government of the Czar not to interfere, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of Afghanistan. "The reception of a British envoy," said the Commissioner, "cannot, therefore, necessitate the reception of a Russian one, for in refusing to receive the Russian envoy his Highness would only be acting in conformity with the policy thus solemnly agreed upon." It was then intimated that, should the Ameer desire to rescind his former decision, Sir Lewis Pelly (the envoy whom it was originally intended to despatch) would still be authorized to wait upon his Highness at such place as he might appoint, and that, should the interviews consequent on this meeting lead to a more cordial and reliable understanding between the two Governments, the Viceroy would be happy to meet the Ameer in person, at Peshawur, in the following November.

When these two letters were being discussed before the Indian Council, three members of that body—Sir Henry W. Norman, Sir William Muir, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse—expressed their dissent in separate notes. The reasons of their dissent were to the general effect that the Ameer was within his right in refusing English envoys; that he had legitimate grounds for refusal; that we were not entitled to coerce him; and that it was dealing unfairly with the Afghan sovereign to represent Sir Lewis Pelly's mission as merely temporary and complimentary when it was intended as the preliminary to a permanent mission, as the Ameer well knew. It was pointed out that the

Ameer had no sufficient inducement to grant what it was notorious he greatly disliked, because he knew that for our own sakes we should defend Afghanistan from Russian aggression. The three

LORD LYTTON.

dissenting members of the Council advised that we should wait until difficulties had come upon Shere Ali, when, as he would probably want our assistance, we could make what terms with him we pleased. In consequence of these objections, the original drafts of the letters of July 8th were in some respects moderated; but in the main the original ideas of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton were carried out. In reply to these communications, Shere Ali sent a courteous answer on September 3rd. He still declined the proposed mission, but suggested that Atta Mahomed should see the British authorities, and explain matters to them. The Vakeel was therefore required to appear at Simla, which he reached on the 6th of October.

But, before his arrival, matters had become

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more complicated with the Russian Government in respect to the influence which General Kauffmann was clearly endeavouring to exercise over the Afghan sovereign. A despatch on this subject was addressed by Lord Lytton to Lord Salisbury on the 18th of September, 1876. General Kauffmann's letters to the Ameer were here described as not merely complimentary expressions of friendly sentiment, but as having reference to matters of importance, affecting not only the foreign interests, but even the internal affairs, of Afghanistan. It appeared that they were increasing in frequency, and that latterly they had on more than one occasion been transmitted by a special envoy, though in 1869 Prince Gortschakoff had agreed with Lord Mayo that Russian Agents should not visit Cabul. The Ameer, though he at first regarded the communications with distrust, and loyally sought the advice of the British Government as to the tenor of his replies, had begun to acknowledge their receipt in cordial terms, without consulting the English authorities. In August, 1876, another Russian Agent arrived in Afghan territory. He left Balkh on the 7th of that month on his way to Cabul, and took with him another letter from General Kauffmann. The previous envoy still lingered at Cabul, and the Anglo-Indian Government was in receipt of unofficial information that secret nightly conferences were taking place between him and the Ameer. Up to that date, the Government of India had not thought it necessary to request her Majesty's Government to make a formal objection to these acts of the Russian Generals, although, in a despatch dated May 1st, 1874, the attention of the Cabinet had been drawn to the tone of a letter written by General Kolpakovsky. But the Indian Administration now desired to submit, for the consideration of the Cabinet, that the time had arrived when it was expedient that the attention of the Russian Government should be seriously called to the correspondence which had so long been conducted between the Russian Generals in Turkistan and the Afghan sovereign. It was at the same time suggested that steps should be taken by her Majesty's Government to prevent a continuance of proceedings which were clearly inconsistent with the assurances given by Prince Gortschakoff to Lord Clarendon in 1869, and frequently since, to the effect that Afghanistan was beyond the sphere of Russian influence.

The question involved was in truth, as Lord Lytton observed, the important one, whether or not the influence of England was to be superseded and replaced by that of Russia at the Court of Shere Ali. The Czar's assurances of non-interference in Afghanistan had from time to time been transmitted, with every expression of confidence in their sincerity, by the Government of India to the Ameer of Cabul. But communication with that sovereign was now being systematically carried on by the Russian military authorities in Central Asia; and to the Indian Viceroy it was obvious that the Ameer could only attribute their increasing frequency and prolonged toleration, either to the acquiescence of the British Government, or to its inability to resent an open disregard of pledges frequently repeated.* In consequence of these representations, the Cabinet communicated with Lord Augustus Loftus at St. Petersburg, and in October, 1876, our Ambassador at the Russian Court stated that, according to information from a reliable source, General Kauffmann had sent an agent to Cabul, with the object of inducing Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Russia, as well as a treaty of commerce. Shortly afterwards, Count Schouvaloff called on Lord Derby, and, on the authority of a telegram from his Government, denied categorically that General Kauffmann was acting at Cabul, either through an agent, or in any other manner. Lord Derby, however, was prepared to place in Count Schouvaloff's hands a copy of General Kauffmann's letter of February, 1876, from which it would appear, as the Foreign Secretary observed to Lord Augustus Loftus, that the Russian Government was kept in ignorance of the General's proceedings. This was the polite, diplomatic way of convicting that Government of a deliberate falsehood; for it is not at all likely that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg knew nothing of the intrigues of its own representatives in Turkistan. The Foreign Secretary also submitted to Prince Gortschakoff the despatches of the Indian Government, showing that General Kauffmann had for many years been keeping up a correspondence with Shere Ali. Some conversation on the subject took place in November between Lord Augustus Loftus and the Russian Chancellor. The latter affirmed that there was no Russian Agent at Cabul, so far as he knew, and that General Kauffmann had merely forwarded a complimentary letter to the Ameer, as he was occasionally in the habit of doing. "But," added Prince Gortschakoff, glancing at the troubles with Turkey which were then becoming serious, "when we have a whale on our hands, we cannot occupy ourselves with little fishes." The reported expedition against Merve, he said, was without any foundation, and he evidently desired to produce the impression that Russia was doing nothing

* Despatch of September 18th, 1876.

in Central Asia. Two days later, M. de Giers, the Director of the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that there was no question of General Kauffmann entering into political communication with the Ameer, nor was there the remotest idea of any treaty engagements. He spoke of Kauffmann as the Governor-General of a State bordering on Afghanistan, from whom certain courteous observances were to be expected; but Lord Augustus Loftus replied that the General was not the Governor of a neighbouring State, inasmuch as the Khanate of Bokhara was still to be regarded as an independent country. Consequently, it appeared necessary that General Kauffmann should receive express orders from the Imperial Government to desist in future from sending envoys to Cabul, and from entertaining political communication with the Afghan Prince.

It was in this same month of November, 1876, that Quetta was occupied by a detachment of Sikh infantry under Captain Scott. Lord Derby, as already related, had written to our *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg on the 15th of September, 1875, that her Majesty's Government had no intention of using their treaty right to station troops in the territory of Khelat, unless an occasion for doing so should arise. A sufficient occasion was now apparent in the intrigues of Russia with the Ameer of Afghanistan; and the occupation of Quetta was therefore no violation of the conditional promise given in the September of the previous year. The occupation was in truth simply an extension of certain proceedings which had commenced under the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, who, in October, 1875, directed Captain (now Major) Sandeman, Deputy Commissioner of one of the districts of the Punjaub, to proceed at the head of a military escort into the territories of the Khan, that he might settle amicably the disturbed affairs of that Government, and devise plans for protecting the trade-route *vid* the Bolan Pass. It was doubtless not intended by Lord Northbrook that the military force with which our Commissioner was accompanied should remain permanently at Quetta; but Lord Lytton, in a despatch dated March 23rd, 1877, gave very convincing reasons why the original intention of the Indian Government should undergo some modification. "Whatever," wrote the Viceroy, "may have been the personal disinclination of this Government, in times past, to exercise active interference in Khanates beyond our border, it must now be acknowledged that, having regard to possible contingencies in Central Asia, to the profound and increasing interest with which they are already anticipated and discussed by the most warlike populations within as well as without our frontier, and to the evidence that has reached us of foreign intrigue in Khelat itself (intrigue at present innocuous, but sure to become active in proportion to the anarchy or weakness of that State, and its alienation from British influence), we can no longer avoid the conclusion that the relations between the British Government and this neighbouring Khanate must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British border." The occupation of Quetta was in short the earliest result, so far as the action of the British Government was concerned, of that system of underhand intrigue which Russia had long been pursuing in Afghanistan, and of which the object was plainly to acquire a position in that country, such as might in future years be used with a hostile purpose against English supremacy beyond the Indus.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

**Phases in the Feeling of Antagonism between Russia and England—Letter of General Kauffmann, denying Interference in Afghanistan—Russian Evasions and Subterfuges—Character and Position of the Russian Agents employed in Afghanistan—Kauffmann's Tactics and Powers—Atta Mahomed at Simla—His Exposition of Shere Ali's Grievances—State of Affairs in Afghanistan, and Remarks of the Indian Viceroy—Lord Lytton's threatening Message to the Ameer—The "Earthen Pipkin between two Iron Pots"—Return of Atta Mahomed to Cabul—The Afghan Prime Minister, Noor Mahomed, at Peshawur—Occasions of Mutual Jealousy and Suspicion between England and Afghanistan—Interviews of Noor Mahomed with Sir Lewis Pelly—Determined Resistance to the English Proposals—Suspension of the Conference—Letter of Sir Lewis Pelly, containing a Statement of the Viceroy's Charges against Shere Ali—Withdrawal of the Offers of Assistance—Provisions of a Draft Treaty, ultimately abandoned—Close of the Peshawur Conference—Intrigues of the Ameer of Afghanistan—Attempts to excite a Jihad—Feeling of the Afghan People towards the English—Misleading Statements of the Government in Parliament with respect to the Position of Affairs in the East—The Policy of Equivocation.**

THE antagonism of England and Russia in the East became more strongly marked in 1876 than it had been in previous years; but it was no new condition. Even in the reign of the Emperor Nicholas it had existed, with a tendency every now and then to break forth in sudden gusts of flame out of the smouldering ashes of diplomatic caution and reserve. Such feelings, however, are apt to be spasmodic and transitory, though, if they have any real justification, they are certain to recur after every period of lapse. The Crimean War seemed to expend and dissipate a large amount of ill-feeling against Russia, and was followed by a reaction which lasted several years. Even as late as the 26th of December, 1867, when the Muscovite Generals had made considerable progress in Central Asia, Sir Stafford Northcote, Indian Secretary in the Derby-Disraeli Administration, wrote to Sir John Lawrence, then Governor-General of India, that her Majesty's Government saw no occasion for uneasiness or jealousy with respect to the operations of Russia in Independent Tartary. Sir Stafford observed that to himself and his colleagues the conquests which Russia had made in those regions, and was apparently still making, seemed the natural result of the circumstances in which she found herself placed. The Viceroy had asked whether it was desirable to make any communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, in order to obviate possible inconveniences; but the Government of the late Lord Derby considered there was no ground whatever for representations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly communications had at various times passed between the two Governments on this subject of Central Asia, and might do so again; but that was the utmost the Cabinet was disposed to say. In 1867, the Conservative Administration occupied the identical position afterwards taken up by the Gladstonian party. Even as late as May, 1876, Mr. Disraeli declared in the House of Commons (to the intense delight of the *Moscow Gazette* and the official circles of St. Petersburg) that he hoped to see Russia pursue her career of conquest in Central Asia, from which he anticipated great benefits to civilization; and on the 11th of June, 1877, Lord Salisbury, both in the House of Lords and at a meeting, ridiculed the idea of there being any danger to British India from the advances of Russia. It is these equivocations which have done more mischief than any other influence which has been brought to bear.

Yet a change had for some time taken place in the relations of England and Russia as concerned Central Asia. At the close of 1876, each Power clearly understood what the other was thinking about, and both regarded the Ameer of Cabul with jealous watchfulness. The explanations of M. de Giers were renewed in December, when he transmitted to Lord Augustus Loftus a letter from General Kauffmann, written in reply to inquiries from the Imperial Government, and dated November 9th. The General averred that his relations with Shere Ali had been limited to interchanges of civility, and that he had never despatched agents to Cabul. "My personal convictions," he added, "do not admit the necessity of any stratagem or subterfuge for the satisfactory transaction of affairs; and I venture to hope that a long series of years has convinced the Imperial Government of the absence of any political intrigues in my relations with the Asiatic Khanates—intrigues contrary to my personal character, which is as much opposed to deception in political as in private life." In sending this letter to Lord Augustus Loftus—which he did on the 15th of December—M. de Giers called attention to General Kauffmann's astonishment at the news which seemed to have disturbed the British Government; but the Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield was by no means reassured by the statements of the Russian General and the Russian Administration. Lord Salisbury, reviewing the answers of M. de Giers and General Kauffmann on

the 27th of January, 1877, observed that it was impossible to regard as a mere letter of courtesy the communication to Shere Ali written in February, 1876, which contained a detailed account of the Russian conquest of Khokand, "with justificatory remarks of a suggestive character." The advocates of Russia allege that this letter could not have been the production of Kauffmann, as he was at that time in St. Petersburg: it was written, they say, by a subordinate.* As, however, it does not appear that the act of the subordinate was ever reproved or disavowed, the distinction seems perfectly immaterial.

Another quibble was raised, as to the exact nature and proper designation of the persons who conveyed the missives which, it is acknowledged on all hands, Kauffmann frequently transmitted to the Afghan Prince. The bearers, it was alleged, were not Russian Agents, but messengers employed by the Ameer of Bokhara. We have seen that for some years the Ameer of Bokhara had been a mere vassal of Russia, retaining, it is true, a nominal independence as regarded that part of his dominions which was not incorporated with the Muscovite Empire, but in all respects bound to do the bidding of his subjugators. Some of the messengers, indeed, are said to have been natives of Samarcand, which was by that time annexed to Russian Turkistan; so that, politically, these were as much Russians as if they had been born at Moscow. Even, however, supposing all of them to have come from those parts of Bokhara which were still nominally ruled by the native Prince, they were servants acting in the interests of a Russian employer. Prince Gortschakoff's declaration to Lord Augustus Loftus, that there was no Russian Agent at Cabul, was therefore at the best a highly disingenuous equivocation. It is equally far from truth to say that these messengers, or letter-carriers, were not political agents, and had no official character. They were understood at Cabul to possess such a character, and were treated in that light. M. de Giers himself admitted as much in an explanation which he gave to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg in the early part of 1877. He stated that he had sent a communication to General Kauffmann, in which he had remarked that the character of a Russian envoy, assumed at Cabul by a recent messenger, was "incorrect, liable to misconception, and consequently to be guarded against for the future." The way in which the intercourse between Kauffmann and the Ameer was carried on—at least, on one occasion—appears, according to M. de Giers, to have been after this fashion:—A letter was sent by the Russian General to the Ameer of Bokhara for transmission to Balkh, whence it was forwarded to Shere Ali at Cabul. Of course, the Bokharan Prince selected the messenger, and this enabled Kauffmann to say, with a certain evasive truthfulness, that the man was not "personally employed" by him, or "personally known to him." But the very subtlety of the transaction was suspicious, especially when we remember that the Ameer of Bokhara was bound in all things to be the humble servant of Russia. It is difficult to believe in the necessity for these indirect and circuitous modes of approach, had there really been nothing to conceal.

From an early period, it was foreseen by the late Baron Brunnow, when representing Russia at the Court of St. James's, that Kauffmann's intermeddlings with Afghanistan would be an occasion of trouble with England. He therefore urged, in a despatch written on the 30th of March, 1870, that there should be no direct relations between the General and the Afghan sovereign, and that all such despatches should be sent through St. Petersburg. Kauffmann, however, considered this an infringement of the full powers he had received from the Emperor, and accordingly paid no attention to the suggestion.† The correspondence began in 1870, and was still going on seven years later. It has been shown that Lords Mayo and Northbrook almost encouraged the despatch of these missives, by representing to Shere Ali that he ought to consider himself much favoured by such civil letters, and that his apprehensions of Russian intrigue and encroachment were not worth a thought. Through a series of years, therefore, the letters continued to be sent, and at last the Ameer began to receive them in a friendly spirit, as opening the possibility of a Russian alliance, into which he was being driven by the coldness of Lord Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll. The matter had become extremely grave by 1877, and it is not surprising that Lord Derby, writing to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 7th of February in that year, should have suggested the desirability of orders being sent to General Kauffmann to discontinue his communications with the Ameer. But M. de Giers, while renewing, on March 5th, his previous assurances that the letters of the General had contained nothing more than expressions of courtesy, took no notice of this suggestion, and therefore, in effect, declined to prevent the further despatch of missives from the Russian General to the ruler of Afghanistan.

It was the existence of these intrigues which

* "Causes of the Afghan War," issued by the Afghan Committee, pp. 279-80.

† Schuyler's Turkistan, Vol. II., p. 314: a work favourable to Russia, and to Russian policy in the East.

induced the Government of Lord Beaconsfield to require the presence of an English Agent in Afghanistan; and it was to carry out this policy, which Lord Northbrook resisted, that Lord Lytton was appointed to the Viceregal post in India. The disinclination of the Ameer to receive an English Resident was not to be overcome. From the statements of the British Native Agent, Atta Mahomed, when he arrived at Simla on the 6th of October, 1876, it appeared that Shere Ali was inflamed against the Anglo-Indian authorities for various reasons. He resented the rebuffs which he had received in former years, and was resolved not to incur any repetition of what he regarded as injurious to his dignity. The communication from Lord Northbrook on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakoub Khan, he characterised as an unwarrantable interference in his domestic concerns (as indeed it was), and a support given to his personal enemies. The decision in the matter of the Seistan boundary was another sore point; and the Ameer had felt grievously offended with the late Viceroy for having sent gifts direct to the Chief of Wakhan, who was a tributary of his Highness. Finally, he was profoundly mortified by the repeated rejection of his requests for a defensive alliance, and for our formal recognition of the order of succession, as established by him in the person of his youngest son. Further conversation with the Vakeel made it apparent that the Ameer was greatly in want of money, and extremely unpopular with his subjects on account of his expedients to obtain it; that his real motive for refusing to receive British officers was not (as he alleged) a feeling of apprehension for their personal safety, but a dread of their interference in the internal affairs of the country; that he no longer felt his old dread of Russia, but relied with confidence on his own army, which gifts of British money had enabled him to equip; that, following the suggestions of Lord Northbrook, he had recently improved his relations with the Russian authorities in Central Asia; that a constant succession of special Agents was sent by General Kauffmann to the Ameer; that "permanent diplomatic intercourse" was in this way virtually established; and that the subjects and results of frequent conferences between Shere Ali and the Russian Agents were kept entirely secret from our representative.* "In short," wrote the Viceroy to the Indian Secretary, "the information gradually extracted from our Cabul Agent convinced us that the system on which we had hitherto conducted our relations with Shere Ali had practically resulted, not only in the alienation of his Highness from the Power which had unconditionally subsidised and openly protected him, but also in the increased closeness and confidential character of his relations with the only other Power that can ever cause serious danger to our Empire in India. The Vakeel, however, represented to the Viceroy that the Ameer, though strongly disinclined to admit British officers into any part of Afghanistan, would probably, if the point were pressed, accept such a condition, rather than forfeit the advantage of a long-desired alliance with the British Government, upon terms certain to strengthen his personal position at home, about which his Highness was chiefly anxious."



VIEW OF KHOKAND.

During the interviews between Lord Lytton and

* Despatch of Lord Lytton to the Marquis of Salisbury, May 10th, 1877. Blue Book on Afghanistan, published November 28th, 1878.

Atta Mahomed, the former delivered an address, the substance of which was to be faithfully conveyed to the Ameer. The object was to convince that sovereign that, if he would not accept our alliance, we might not improbably give our support to one or other of the rival claimants to his throne, and that we might even come to an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether. "If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us," observed Lord Lytton, "Russia does, and she desires it at his expense."* The Viceroy explained to his Vakeel that the British Government was able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan, either for the protection of the Ameer or the vindication of its own interests, long before a single Russian soldier could reach Cabul. If the Ameer remained our friend, this military power, he said, could be spread round him as a ring of iron; if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed. England desired to be the friend of the Ameer; but the Viceroy could not help a State which would not allow him the opportunity of helping it, nor undertake responsibility for the protection of a frontier which he was unable to look after by means of his own officers. The Vakeel had observed that the Ameer was strong; but Lord Lytton called attention to the fact that his own son was his opponent, and was so formidable an enemy that Shere Ali dared not quit Cabul.



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR LEWIS PELLY, K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

There were reasons to believe that conspiracies were rife in favour of that son; that the people were discontented on account of the conscription; that the treasury was empty; and that the Ameer was surrounded by difficulties. "This," said Lord Lytton, "is the man who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia, independent of either! His position is rather that of an earthen pipkin between two iron pots." To make matters still more unpleasant to the Ameer, it was argued that Lord Mayo's letter, written on the 31st of March, 1869, during the Umballa Conference, upon which Shere Ali greatly relied, had not the force of a treaty, and did not commit the British Government to any unconditional protection of the

* The Viceroy may here have alluded to the observation of one of the Russian Ministers (Baron Jomini) in July, 1875, to the effect that England might annex Afghanistan for anything Russia cared, but on the understanding that they were to be free to absorb Bokhara and Khokand without any opposition on our part. (See previous Chapter.)

Afghan Prince, or to any liabilities which were not dependent on his future conduct towards us. Finally, the Viceroy proposed a meeting between Sir Lewis Pelly and Noor Mahomed, the Ameer's Prime Minister; but only on condition that the British demands should be accepted in principle beforehand. If the Ameer was disinclined to grant this condition, it would be needless to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's representative, and his Excellency would in that case be free to adopt his own course in any re-arrangement of frontier relations, without paying the least regard to Afghan interests.

Atta Mahomed was dismissed by Lord Lytton with a present of £1,000, and a gold watch and chain, "in acknowledgment of the appreciation of the Government of his past faithful service." He left Simla on the 11th of October, carrying with him a letter from the Viceroy to Shere Ali, in which the Ameer was invited to the forthcoming Imperial Assembly at Delhi. On his return to Cabul, the British Vakeel was informed that the Ameer was too unwell to receive him. As, however, he was not too unwell to transact other business, this was regarded by the Viceroy as a mere pretext for avoiding discussion; but it was repeated until the Vakeel was instructed by Lord Lytton to insist on its abandonment. The Native Agent was at length admitted to the presence of his Highness, only to be informed that he was still too unwell to discuss business, or even to receive the Viceroy's messages. On the 21st of December, however, Atta Mahomed wrote two letters, stating that the Ameer, though still disliking to admit English officers, would yield the point out of deference to the British Government; but he required as a preliminary that his Minister should at the approaching conference state all the difficulties attending such a step.

The Prime Minister, Syed Noor Mahomed, arrived at Peshawur on the 27th of January, 1877, and Sir Lewis Pelly at once proceeded thither. By that time, the relations between the Anglo-Indian Government and the Afghan sovereign were those of mutual suspicion and dislike. We had abundant reason for believing that Shere Ali was disposed to abandon the English for the Russian alliance; on the other hand, Shere Ali was beginning to question our designs upon his country, and to think we intended to annex either the whole or a portion of that realm. Early in 1875, Sir Henry Rawlinson, then a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, published a book which was understood by some to advocate the seizure of Candahar and Herat, though Sir Henry has since denied that his recommendation had such a meaning. Supposing any knowledge of this work to have reached the Ameer, it probably caused him considerable uneasiness, and the occupation of Quetta in November, 1876, must certainly have increased that feeling, however necessary the act may have been, for reasons not at all affecting the independence of Afghanistan. Shere Ali was also alarmed at certain movements of British troops in the North-western parts of India; and the tone adopted by Lord Lytton to Atta Mahomed was calculated to aggravate any sense of apprehension which the ruler of Cabul had previously entertained. The Afghan Prince was undoubtedly angry with the Government of India: first, on account of its rejection of his friendly offers some years previously; secondly, because of the threatening tone now being assumed towards him. It was believed in India that he was endeavouring to excite a *jihad*, or religious war, among the Mohammedan population on our borders, and that he was carrying on intrigues with several tribes who had taken our pay. All these feelings of suspicion and antagonism formed a very unfortunate preparation for the conference at Peshawur; but the prospect of an agreement was still not absolutely hopeless, and an elaborate discussion of the chief points involved seemed to open some probability—though in truth it was never great—of an understanding being at length effected.

The first interview between Sir Lewis Pelly and Noor Mahomed took place on January 30th, 1877, when the English representative stated in emphatic terms that the admission of British Agents into Afghanistan was a *sine quâ non* in any agreement that might be entered into between the two Governments. The Afghan Prime Minister was desirous of postponing this question until a later period of the negotiations; but Sir Lewis Pelly gave him distinctly to understand that until this principle was accepted he could not even commence the proposed discussions. In a conversation which took place on the 7th of February, Noor Mahomed recited various objections entertained by the Ameer to the presence of British officers, and then said, "It is a very serious business, and this is the last time that the Ameer will treat with the British Government. God grant that the issue be favourable! But you must not impose upon us a burden which we cannot bear; and if you overload us, the responsibility rests with you." Sir Lewis Pelly here interposed, and asked the Cabul envoy the nature of the burden to which he alluded. He replied, "The residence of British officers on the frontiers of Afghanistan." He enlarged upon the

objections of the Afghan people to the presence of foreigners in their country, and believed the Ameer would not be able to protect them from insult and injury. He could not see why they were wanted on the frontiers, or what good they could do if they were there; and he went on to say, "We mistrust you, and fear you will write all sorts of reports about us, which will some day be brought forward against us, and lead to your taking the control of our affairs out of our hands." It seems not improbable that the Ameer's extreme disinclination to the presence of British officers was to a great extent due, at this period, to his consciousness of having identified himself very largely with Russian intrigues. He may have feared the complete discovery of these intrigues, if English officers were permitted to enter his dominions; and he doubtless counted on Russian support for resisting any hostile action on the part of England. Although it is easy to understand that, even without the existence of compromising intrigues, the Ameer may have disliked the presence of Englishmen in his cities, it is difficult to believe that that dislike would have been carried to such extreme lengths, had there not been some reason beneath the surface, which it was not convenient to avow. Shere Ali knew well the power of England; yet, sooner than admit a few English representatives, he braved that power in its wrath, and was prepared to suffer war, rather that concede the point demanded.

The discussions between Noor Mahomed and Sir Lewis Pelly were continued during many days; and on one of these occasions the Afghan Prime Minister explained the grievances which his sovereign alleged against the Anglo-Indian Government. These were in the main what had already been expounded by the British Vakeel in his interviews with Lord Lytton at Simla. Proceeding to unfold the reasons why English envoys should not be admitted into his master's realms, he said:—"In the first place, the people of Afghanistan have a dread of this proposal; and it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their hearts, that, if Englishmen or other Europeans once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass out of their hands. In no way can they be re-assured on this point, and it is impossible to remove these opinions from their minds." The envoys, he said, would very probably be assassinated, and in proof of this he referred to the case of Colonel Macdonald, who was slain in 1873 by a chief of the Momund tribe. Any such act would of course lead to quarrels, and the alienation of the two Governments would be certain to ensue. Sir Lewis Pelly received these explanations with great dissatisfaction, and in the interview of February 15th hinted at strengthening the frontiers of British India, and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire in some way which, though not specifically mentioned, seems to have included the seizure of Afghan territory. Every endeavour on the part of Sir Lewis to induce Noor Mahomed to accept the appointment of British Agents was met either by a direct refusal, or an evasion of the point at issue; and on the 19th of February the conference was broken off for this reason. It was agreed, however, that the matter should be referred to the Viceroy, and that further instructions should be awaited. Before Lord Lytton's answer could arrive, Noor Mahomed, who had been in broken health for a long time, became dangerously ill, and his death followed on the 26th of March. The final views of the Viceroy had been embodied by Sir Lewis Pelly in a letter which was transmitted to the Afghan Prime Minister on the 15th; but he seems by that time to have been beyond the power of attending to matters of business, and the communication met with no response.

The letter of Sir Lewis Pelly, based upon the Viceroy's answer to the request for further instructions, contained a list of accusations, showing that the Ameer had for some years acted in an unfriendly spirit towards the British Government. It was alleged that he had refused permission to Sir Douglas Forsyth to pass through his dominions, when that gentleman was bound on a peaceful mission to a neighbouring State. He had given his reasons for this refusal in terms scarcely consistent with courtesy; and when Colonel Macdonald was murdered, on the borders of Afghan territory, by a person subject to the authority of the Ameer, nothing was done to avenge the crime, and the murderer was suffered to remain at large. "The Viceroy," continued the letter, "forbears to dwell upon the Ameer's discourtesy in leaving wholly unanswered the proposal made to his Highness by the late Viceroy for the demarcation of his boundaries, in refusing to receive a complimentary mission from the present Viceroy, and in taking no notice whatever of the very friendly invitation to Delhi which was subsequently addressed to his Highness. More serious grounds of complaint exist in the fact that the closing of the Khyber Pass for the last two years appears to be mainly attributable to the unfriendly influence of the Ameer; that his Highness has openly received at Cabul in an authoritative manner, and subsidised, the heads of frontier tribes who are in the pay and under the control of the British Government; that he has for some time past been speaking and acting in such a manner as to indicate hostile

designs upon territories beyond his own, and in the neighbourhood of the British frontier; and that, even since the commencement of the present negotiations, he has been openly and actively endeavouring to excite against the British Government the religious animosities of his own subjects, and of the neighbouring tribes, by misrepresenting the policy and maligning the character of the British Government." It was maintained that neither by the Treaty of 1855 nor by that of 1857 had the Anglo-Indian Administration incurred any liabilities towards the Ameer; that the fulfilment of the assurances given by Lord Mayo were dependent on the fulfilment of the conditions on which they were made; and that those conditions, having reference to the establishment of a firm and merciful rule, the promotion of the interests of commerce, and the maintenance of frank, cordial, and confidential relations with the British Government, had been violated. In the concluding portions of the letter, Sir Lewis Pelly said that, as the Ameer seemed no longer to desire the British alliance and protection, the Viceroy withdrew the offers made to him in the previous October. But, in thus withdrawing from the Ameer offers of material assistance which his Highness was not disposed to accept, it was distinctly intimated that the British Government harboured no hostile designs against Afghanistan. That Government had no sort of quarrel with the Afghan people, and would not only respect their independence, but, in case of necessity, would afford them assistance in defending their country against foreign aggression. The Viceroy, however, repudiated all liabilities on behalf of the Ameer and his dynasty, and would never, under any circumstances, assume the obligation of protecting him, without first obtaining adequate guarantees for his satisfactory conduct.

Amongst the instructions to Sir Lewis Pelly was a draft treaty, which was to be discussed at the Peshawur Conference, but which the sudden close of the negotiations prevented our representative from bringing forward. This draft consisted of two parts, the second of which was called a subsidiary or secret agreement, and was supplementary to the first. It was provided that between the British Government and that of the Ameer there should be perpetual peace and friendship; that the friends of the one Government should be the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one Government the enemies of the other. In the event of the Ameer's territories being invaded by a foreign enemy, the British Government would aid his Highness in the defence of those territories with men and materials of war; it being, however, clearly understood that the conduct of the Ameer and his Government should be in strict conformity with the preceding declarations, and that his Highness should refrain from all provocation of, aggression on, or interference with, the States and territories beyond his existing frontier, except with the knowledge and consent of the British Government. In other words, his Highness agreed to conduct his relations with foreign States in harmony with British policy. The Ameer was to bind himself to abstain from all discussion of political, international, or State matters with any foreign Government, save in friendly concert with the British Government, to whom his Highness would unreservedly communicate all correspondence or overtures of that nature. For the better protection of the Afghan frontier, it was to be agreed that the British Government should depute accredited British Agents, to reside at Herat and other places in Afghanistan, and that the Ameer should depute an Agent, to reside at the Court of the Viceroy, and at other places in British India. The Ameer was to guarantee the personal safety and honourable treatment of the British Agents, and the British Government undertook that they should in no way interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan. Unless otherwise arranged, no other than a Native Agent was to reside in the city of Cabul; but, whenever circumstances might seem to require it, a special British envoy was to be deputed on a temporary mission to the Court of the Ameer. The principal duty of the British Agent or Agents was to consist in watching events outside the frontiers of Afghanistan, and in the supply of timely information to the British and Afghan Governments of any political intrigues or dangers threatening the peace, stability, or integrity of the Afghan dominions. Furthermore, it was stipulated that the local Afghan authorities should cordially co-operate with the British Agent or Agents for the common interests of their respective Governments. The British Government agreed to acknowledge whomsoever his Highness might nominate as his heir-apparent, and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival claimant to the throne. Article X. was thus expressed:—"The British Government, its officers and agents, will, as heretofore, abstain from all interference in the domestic administration and internal affairs of Afghanistan, except in so far as their assistance may at any time be required and invoked by the Ameer, his heirs and successors, to avert from that country the calamities of a recurrence to civil war, and protect the peaceful interests which this Treaty is intended to establish

and promote. In that case, the British Government will afford to the Government of Afghanistan such support, moral or material, as may, in its opinion, and in general accordance with the foregoing declaration, be necessary for the assistance of the Ameer, his heirs and successors, in protecting equitable authority, national contentment, and settled order, from disturbance by the personal ambition of unlawful competitors for power." As, however, the British Government had no desire to change its settled policy of non-interference with the internal affairs of Afghanistan, it was to be understood that material assistance would be afforded to the Ameer only at his express request; and it was likewise provided that such request should be accompanied by timely and adequate information, and that the British Government should be the sole judge of the manner, time, and expediency of furnishing such assistance. The Ameer was to decline all communication with Russia, whose agents were to be referred to us. A mixed commission of British and Afghan officers was to determine the limits of the Ameer's frontier. Arrangements for telegraphs and trade-routes were also to be made, with the assistance of the British Government; and Afghanistan was to be laid freely open to Englishmen, official and non-official, for whose safety the Ameer was to make provision, as far as practicable. Finally, the Ameer was to receive £200,000 down, and £120,000 a-year afterwards, in addition to such assistance in men and money as the two Governments might deem beneficial to their interests.

The concessions thus made, qualified as they were by a number of stipulations very distasteful in their general effect to a man of Shere Ali's character, were not likely to give satisfaction in the quarter which it was desired to propitiate. They imposed on the Ameer the necessity of receiving British Agents in his dominions—a thing abhorrent to him, and possibly to his people also. In respect of foreign affairs, they made the Afghan Prince as much a vassal of the English Government as the terms offered by Lord Northbrook, and rejected by the Ameer, in 1873. Their purpose was undoubtedly to subordinate Afghan policy to British policy, and Afghan interests to British interests; and it was provided, as on the former occasion, that we should be the judges as to how far the ruler of Afghanistan had a just claim to military assistance. To some extent, therefore, the later proposals were likely to be as objectionable to Shere Ali as the earlier; and, as regarded the introduction of British Agents, they were even more so. On the other hand, the engagement to defend Afghanistan against unprovoked aggression, was far more distinct and absolute in the second case than in the first. It was specifically declared that the friends of the one Government should be the friends of the other, and the enemies of the one Government the enemies of the other. In almost any case, invasion was to be resisted, the promises in this respect not being so hampered by conditions, reservations, and saving clauses, as in 1873. The offers made in 1877 might not improbably have been accepted four years earlier; but Shere Ali was now exasperated and estranged, and he preferred the Russian to the English alliance.

The Peshawur Conference came to a close on March 30th, in accordance with telegraphic commands to that effect issued by the Viceroy. The Mir Akhor, the surviving colleague of Noor Mahomed, had declared that he possessed no authority to answer any questions of the British Government, and it was therefore decided that Sir Lewis Pelly should leave Peshawur at once. It happened that at that very time Shere Ali was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong the discussion by every means at his disposal. A fresh envoy was already on his way from Cabul, and it was reported that he had power to accept, eventually, all the conditions of the British Government. Lord Lytton admits, in his despatch to the Marquis of Salisbury dated May 10th, 1877, that he was aware of these facts when he instructed his representative to close the conference; but the investigations of Sir Lewis Pelly and others had revealed a state of things which, in the estimation of the Viceroy, rendered it unadvisable to continue the negotiations upon the grounds originally assumed. Information had been received through secret agents that the Ameer had despatched a confidential envoy to the Russians at Tashkend; and this information had been confirmed by a telegram from her Majesty's Minister at Teheran. The object, apparently, was to play off the two Governments, Russian and English, against one another; but Shere Ali had miscalculated his opportunity. The Czar was then on the very eve of his great struggle with Turkey, and could not afford to embarrass himself with the affairs of Afghanistan. The "whale," to adopt Prince Gortschakoff's metaphor, would in all probability give a good deal of trouble, and it was therefore hardly the time for undertaking any responsibility with respect to such "little fishes" as Shere Ali and his family.

The manner adopted by Lord Lytton towards the representative of the Afghan Prince may have been too arrogant and peremptory; but it is impossible to deny that the general aspect of affairs was menacing, and that it was necessary to take

some measures towards the protection of our own interests, threatened by the unfriendliness of the Ameer and the intrigues of the Russians. An agent from General Kauffmann was at that time at Cabul, and was believed to be in secret communication with the Prince. From May, 1876, Russian messages to Shere Ali had been constant. The reports of our Native Agent, after his return from Simla, were infrequent, vague, and unintelligible. It was known, in the words of Lord Lytton, that "the Ameer was straining every effort to increase his military force; that he was massing troops on various parts of the British frontier; that he was publicly exhorting all his subjects and neighbours to make immediate preparation for a religious war, apparently directed against his English rather than his Russian neighbours, both of whom he denounced, however, as the traditional enemies of Islam; that, on behalf of this *jihad*, he was urgently soliciting the authoritative support of the Akhoond of Swat, and the armed co-operation of the chiefs of Dhir, Bajour, and other neighbouring Khanates; that, in violation of his engagements with the British Government, he was, by means of bribes, promises, and menaces, endeavouring to bring those chiefs and territories under personal allegiance to himself; that he was tampering with the tribes immediately on our frontier, and inciting them to acts of hostility against us;



ENGLISH CHURCH AT PESHAWUR.

and that, for the prosecution of these objects, he was in correspondence with Mohammedan border chiefs openly subsidised by ourselves."

During the conference at Peshawur, Noor Mahomed had himself acknowledged that since his absence from Cabul the Ameer had fallen under mischievous counsels, which were much to be deplored and condemned; and he added that he would lose no time in addressing to his sovereign strong remonstrances on this subject. For several years, the influence of Shere Ali, so far as Lord Lytton could judge, had been passively opposed to ours among the Mohammedan tribes



STREET IN PESHAWUR.

occupying the wild tract of country still left between the British and the Russian outposts; and in the promotion of his designs he had attempted to persuade the Akhoond of Swat (who possesses a spiritual authority over the Mohammedans) to join him. The attempt to raise a *jihad*, however, resulted in failure. The Akhoond distrusted the objects of the Ameer, and the chiefs to whom he appealed did nothing in exchange for the money which he gave them. These projects were still being pursued during the early part of the Peshawur Conference; but they collapsed before its termination, and the Ameer immediately afterwards sent messages to the authorities and population of Candahar, informing them that his recent designs had been abandoned, and that his relations with the British Government were eminently satisfactory. The accuracy of this statement was very questionable; but Lord Lytton was able to report to the Home Government that our intercourse with the people of Afghanistan was as friendly as it had ever been. The chiefs and head-men of Sibi had recently crossed the border into Beloochistan, and had waited on the British Agent at Khelat, for the purpose of inviting his mediation in their domestic and intertribal quarrels, and his protection from their neighbours, the Murrees. Some British officers, who had recently been to Thal on a mission of inspection, were received by the Ameer's people, invited inside their frontier-posts, and treated with every demonstration of cordiality. As regarded the Ameer himself, there was evidently much disaffection, even among his own troops; and his pecuniary affairs were in so bad a state that it was doubtful how far he would be able much longer to maintain his position.

Rumours as to the Peshawur Conference, and its unsuccessful results, reached England in the second half of April, and on the 20th of that month Mr. Grant Duff asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether any change had recently taken place in the relations of the Government of India with Afghanistan, and whether he was able to give the House any information with respect to the negotiations at Peshawur. To these questions, Lord George Hamilton replied that no change whatever had occurred in the relations between the British Government and the Ameer of Afghanistan; that there were several matters upon which communications with the Ameer had been considered desirable; that, as Shere Ali was reluctant to receive a British officer in his own dominions, it had been thought better to discuss them at Peshawur; that the death of the envoy had interrupted those negotiations, and that no conclusion had then been reached. "Have the negotiations with the Ameer entirely ceased?" asked Mr. Grant Duff; and to this Lord George Hamilton replied, "I believe the Ameer has expressed a wish to carry on negotiations, and the matter is under the consideration of the Government of India." These answers were certainly hardly consistent with the actual state of the facts, and it is difficult to believe that the Government at that time knew nothing of what had been occurring at Peshawur before the end of March. It is certainly impossible that Ministers should have been ignorant of the facts as late as June 11th, when Lord George Hamilton, in replying to Sir Charles Dilke, who had moved for papers relating to the Peshawur Conference, said that no change in our obligations to the Ameer had resulted from the interviews between Sir Lewis Pelly and Syed Noor Mahomed. Lord Lytton's despatch giving the results of the negotiations is dated May 10th, and must by that time have been at the India Office. Yet the Government persistently endeavoured to persuade the public that, with respect to Afghanistan, we stood exactly in the same position as in former years. On the 15th of June, Lord Salisbury, in response to some observations by the Duke of Argyll, denied that we had endeavoured to force an envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul; that we had supported this demand by a great assemblage of troops on the North-western frontier; and that we were preparing boats on the Indus. Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul, he said, had undergone no material change since the previous year; and he did not believe that he was worse disposed towards us than previously, or that his feelings were in any way more embittered towards the British Government. "I only wish," added the Indian Secretary, "emphatically to repeat that none of those suspicions of aggression on the part of the English Government have any true foundation; that our desire in the future, as it has been in the past, is to respect the Afghan ruler, and to maintain, as far as we can, the integrity of his dominions. . . . . There is no reason for any apprehension of any change of policy, or of any disturbance in our Indian Empire." The utmost ingenuity of sophism cannot disprove the lamentable fact that the general effect of these statements was untruthful and misleading. Literally interpreted, it was no doubt perfectly correct to say that we had not endeavoured to force an envoy upon the Ameer "at Cabul;" for the name Cabul, used in this grammatical connection, must be taken to mean, not the country of Afghanistan, for which it is occasionally used, but the capital city, where it was not proposed that any British Agent should

be established. But the expression was capable of being misunderstood, and was in fact misunderstood by the Duke of Argyll, Lord Northbrook, and two other eminent authorities on Anglo-Indian affairs, who were present at the time. Had the expression stood alone, it is possible that it might not have been misinterpreted, and at any rate there would have been more justification for saying that its real intent and meaning should have been apparent. But the statements that our relations with the Ameer had undergone no material change since the previous year,—that we still desired to respect that potentate, and to maintain the integrity of his dominion,—that he was not worse disposed towards us than before, and that his feelings were in no way more embittered,—produced by their general effect an impression which was distinctly false, and which could not possibly have been other than it was. In the winter session of 1878, shortly after the publication of the Afghan Papers, Lord Salisbury was required to give some explanation of these statements to the House which he had misled; but he failed to show that his words were in accordance with facts known to him, but not revealed to the country, at the earlier date. The truth is, that Lord Lytton's policy, whether in itself wise or not, had for the present fallen short of success, and the Cabinet desired to maintain a cloud of secrecy as long as they could. To men of intelligence, the futility of such a course should have been as apparent as its want of candour; but even men of intelligence are sometimes blinded by a false view of their interests. It is impossible to deceive the public long, and the truth, when it is at length revealed, recoils with terrible force upon the heads of those who would have perverted it. Such tactics are fatal to a bad cause, and damaging in no slight degree even to a good one. But it was the vice of the Beaconsfield Cabinet, throughout the whole progress of the Eastern Question, to equivocate with facts, and never to trust the people, who would have trusted them.

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## CHAPTER XXXVII.

Shere Ali's Reliance upon Russia—State of Affairs in the Spring of 1877—Withdrawal of the British Native Agent from Cabul—Continued Movements of Russian Troops to the North of Afghanistan—Explanations of M. de Giers—Turkish Mission to Afghanistan—Conversations between the Ottoman Envoy and the Ameer—Disinclination of Shere Ali to support Turkey against Russia—Letter from the Ameer to the Sultan—Bitter Feeling of the Former towards England—Alleged Formation of a Corps in India for raising Central Asia against the Russians—Project for a Russian Mission to Cabul—Charges of Intrigue against the Anglo-Indian Government—Russian Negotiations with Bokhara for facilitating a hostile Movement towards India—Russian Threats against Shere Ali—The Ameer alarmed and coerced—Departure of the Russian Mission to Afghanistan—Its Progress through the Deserts—Brilliant Reception of General Stoletoff and his Companions—Russian Military Expeditions towards the Northern Borders of Afghanistan—Official Explanations to the British Representative—Interviews between General Stoletoff and the Ameer—Perplexity of Shere Ali—Correspondence between the Indian Administration and the Home Government—Determination to insist on the Reception of a British Mission—Prospects of approaching War.

SHERE ALI seems to have looked for Russian assistance, if any serious difficulties resulted from his opposition to our wishes. But he chose a bad time for the exhibition of his contumacy. When the Peshawur Conference came to a definite close, on the 30th of March, 1877, the last chances of peace between Russia and Turkey were nearly exhausted. The celebrated Protocol of London was, it is true, signed on the ensuing day; but that attempt at compromise may almost be said to have died in the very moment of its birth. The futility of the proposals made by the Great Powers became apparent as soon as they were stated; and the Russian declaration of war followed on the 24th of April. Even allowing for the time required by Western news to reach so remote a place as Afghanistan, it should have been obvious to the ruler of that country, when Noor Mahomed was conducting negotiations with Sir Lewis Pelly, that a war between the Czar and the Sultan was among the probabilities of the near future. In that case, it was not to be supposed that Russia would be able to render any assistance to the Ameer in the event of a rupture with England. But Shere Ali was playing a subtle and very dangerous game, and the state of affairs at Constantinople hardly entered into his calculations. He was offended with England; he was partly alarmed by the progress of Russia in Turkistan, partly attracted by the fascinations of Russian power; and he was inclined to play with both Russia and England until he had discovered which country would bid most for his friendship. Hence he secretly despatched a confidential envoy to the Russians at Tashkend, at the very

time he was endeavouring to come to some arrangement with Lord Lytton's representative at Peshawur. Hence, also, he evinced a willingness to prolong the discussion after the death of his Minister and envoy, and at once sent another official, with instructions, indeed, to resist the demand for the admission of British Agents as long as possible, but also with authority to grant what was required, if it was still insisted on, and if no better could be done. The Ameer, in short, was intent on driving the best bargain he could, either with Russia or with England, but with a manifest leaning towards the former; and Lord Lytton did not care to be treated after this fashion.

Our Vakeel, Atta Mahomed, seems to have been withdrawn from his official post at Cabul immediately after the Peshawur Conference. He was present during the discussions, but did not at their close return to the Afghan capital. The Indian Viceroy had determined to abandon the Ameer, and it was resolved to make him feel his isolation in the keenest manner possible. Of course it was to be anticipated that the effect of this would be to throw him still more into the arms of Russia; but Lord Lytton remarked that the war then beginning between that Empire and the great Mohammedan Power of the West would render it extremely difficult for Shere Ali to receive open support from the Russian authorities of Central Asia, in face of the religious fanaticism he had himself aroused. Nevertheless, the movements of General Kauffmann towards the northern boundaries of Afghanistan still continued, and there is reason to believe that the Ameer encouraged them, in the hope that his complicity would ultimately operate to his own advantage. On the 13th of June, 1877, Lord Derby instructed Lord Augustus Loftus to make renewed representations to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg on the subject of the movements of Russian troops then taking place on the Turkoman Steppe, and pointing out that the occupation of Merve would be held, throughout the neighbouring regions of Asia, to announce a design on the part of the Emperor to extend his influence into territories with which it was understood his Majesty had himself promised not to interfere. M. de Giers replied, on the 18th of July, that the sole object of the expedition to Kizil Arvad was to punish the Turkoman hordes who had for some time past infested the route from Krasnovodsk to Khiva, and threatened the Russian caravans. These tribes, he explained, belonged to a branch of Turkomans quite distinct from that which was found about Merve—a point one thousand versts distant from Krasnovodsk. The movement on Kizil Arvad was nothing more, according to M. de Giers, than a simple military expedition, such as the Russian troops in the Caucasus undertake every year, to keep order on the frontiers. The English Government, however, continued to regard such movements with distrust, and the uneasy relations with Afghanistan rendered the southward advance of Russia even more disquieting than before.

But the feeling of apprehension was not entirely on the side of England. As the war between Russia and Turkey progressed, the Czar began to fear lest Afghanistan should give some assistance to her co-religionist, and indeed it was suspected that the Anglo-Indian Government was ready to further such a design as much as it could. M. de Giers complained to Lord Augustus Loftus, on the 12th of September, that an envoy from the Sultan to the Ameer had been suffered to pass through India. He stated that the object of the envoy's mission was to preach a religious war among the Mussulman populations of Central Asia, and, through the Ameer of Afghanistan, to induce the Ameer of Bokhara to excite the subject races to rebel against Russia. To this, Lord Derby replied, on the 17th of October, that, at the request of the Porte, a Turkish envoy to Afghanistan had in truth been allowed to travel through Indian territory, but that her Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that the object of his mission was to preach what M. de Giers, by a strange use of the word, had called "a crusade" in Central Asia. The Turkish mission to Cabul attracted great attention in India at that time, and some account of its character and objects was given by Mr. Grattan Geary, editor of the *Times of India*, while he was on a visit to Constantinople. It appeared that the Turkish envoy had represented to the Ameer that the Sultan had the interest of all Mussulman States at heart, as he was himself the head and champion of Islam. He had therefore sent a mission to Cabul, in order to acquaint the Ameer with the real source of dangers which threatened the whole of Mohammedanism. The envoy endeavoured to persuade the Ameer that England had long since given up all idea of annexing Native States in that part of the world, and could have no possible motive for desiring to take Afghanistan. "But on the side of Russia," the envoy continued, according to Mr. Geary's report, "the real danger was to be found. That Power was the enemy of all Mussulman States, without exception. She was assailing the Sultan himself; she had destroyed the independence of Bokhara, of Khokand, of Khiva; she had not left a single State in Central Asia its independence.

The fact that some of them were quite as poor as Afghanistan had made no difference: what she wanted was territory, and to gratify her enmity towards all Islam by keeping it in subjection. It was therefore necessary that his Highness should see plainly that his real enemy was not England, for from her he had nothing to fear, but Russia, which would assuredly treat him as she treated the other Mussulman princes." The point of view of Turkey was clearly very different from that of Afghanistan.

The Ameer, in answer to these representations, denied that he was hostile to the British Government, or wished to make war upon England. But England was pressing him, and had recently taken possession of Quetta; so that it was necessary he should not be caught unprepared. The envoy, however, entirely disbelieved that the occupation of Quetta was any menace to Candahar, as Shere Ali supposed. But, in any case, would it not be wiser to come to some understanding with England than to play into the hands of Russia, who was the real enemy of Islam, and consequently of Afghanistan? His Highness had recently received two, if not three, Russian envoys, and had himself sent one to Tashkend. People, therefore, could not avoid thinking that the Ameer was showing greater favour to Russia, which was at war with Islam, than to England, the only Christian Power inclined to support the Moslem nations. In reply, Shere Ali said he had not shown any special favour to Russia. He had received General Kauffmann's envoys because the Russian frontier had very nearly approached his own, and it was necessary to know what was being contemplated. As regarded his despatching a messenger to Tashkend, that, he explained, was owing to the Russians having sent five thousand men to the neighbourhood of Balkh, not far from his boundaries, and he naturally wished to find out the object of their coming. But he had no desire to ally himself with Russia, and he would willingly have received an English Agent at Cabul, but for fear of the consequences. The Turkish envoy was not persuaded by these arguments and statements, but urged that, by coming to a good understanding with England, the Ameer would find his hands free to assist the oppressed Mussulman States of Central Asia, and materially to aid the Sultan in defending the cause of Islam from Muscovite aggression. The Afghan Prince, however, not unreasonably replied that his realm was too distant from Turkey to give assistance to the Sultan, or to receive aid from him, and that for Afghanistan to make war against Russia would be to incur certain defeat, without doing any good to the Ottomans. "But why," he asked, "did not the English help Turkey? They could send their soldiers everywhere, for they had a great number of ships; they could give the Sultan all the assistance that would be necessary to beat the Russians: Afghanistan was too weak and too far away to be of any weight in the struggle. If the English were the friends of the Sultan, why did they not help him?"*

Turkey's attempts to obtain Afghanistan for an ally, in the autumn of 1877, resulted in complete failure, and the war proceeded, with those fatal issues which have already been described. In the meanwhile, Afghanistan became still more cordial with Russia; and, however reasonable may have been the Ameer's remark, that his country was too far from Turkey to render her any help, and that its position was too precarious to run the risk, there can be little doubt that Shere Ali was glad of the excuse, and that he now desired the friendship of the Czar. All his acts for some years had testified to this desire, and the period of the Russo-Turkish war made the fact additionally apparent. On the return of the Turkish envoy to Constantinople, Shere Ali charged him with a letter to the Sultan, which, according to the version of it which has been published in the English press, was an elaborate eulogy on Russia and diatribe against England. The letter was written on the 19th of January, 1878, and pointed to the fact that the English, after more than once affirming their goodwill towards the Sultan, had remained neutral, which, in the opinion of Shere Ali, was what they meant to do from the first. "Knowing for some time past," continued the Ameer, "that the English willingly desert the bond of friendship and candour, my efforts are constantly directed to holding them at a distance. I consider that the Russians possess as much energy as the English, and they always surpass them when it is a question of good faith. I am positively unable to afford the slightest confidence to English promises. I know well that your Highness did not approve of what I said in my last, that the friendship of the English was only a word—a word written on ice; but now your Highness has been able to convince yourself by your own experience how little reliance there is to be placed in their friendship, and you see that the English always abandon their friends, when in misfortune, to their fate. I therefore no longer doubt that you will grant the necessary attention to my humble opinion of the English. If their conduct were conformable to justice, all difficulties on my side would be removed without the least doubt; but, confident

* Through Asiatic Turkey. By Grattan Geary. 1878.



BURREE SINGH KA BURJ—THE EXTREME OUTPOST OF THE BRITISH INDIAN ARMY AND AFGHANISTAN FRONTIERS.

in their power, they have always acted in an arrogant and disdainful manner. Through the several interviews I have had with the Russian envoy, who has been here some time, I have acquired the conviction that in every case the Russians are more honourable and sincere than the English. Thus it is that I consider it my duty to entreat your Highness to reject all alliance with England, and to come to an understanding with the Russians." Subsequently to this, the Ameer declared in open Durbar that he had seven crores of rupees, every one of which he would hurl at the head of the British Government; and that he would roll the border tribes against the English like blasts of fire.* His animosity knew no bounds, and was almost insane in its extravagance.

Towards the latter end of the Turkish war, the relations of England and Russia created a feeling of apprehension on the part of the Indian Government, of which Afghanistan was the more particular object. The Simla correspondent of the official *Pioneer* of Calcutta stated, in a letter to that journal dated August 28th, 1878, that, had war broken out between England and Russia, we should not have remained on the defensive in India. A force of 30,000 men would have purchased its way through Afghanistan, and been thrown into Samarcand and Bokhara, where, in the opinion of the writer, it would have had little difficulty in beating the scattered Russians back to the Caspian, as the whole population would have risen in our favour. The Russians themselves, it was said, believed in the feasibility of such a programme, and it would doubtless have been carried out with vigour, if hostilities had really ensued. This statement is believed to have been confirmed by Colonel Brackenbury in a letter to the *Times* of October 5th, 1878. While the Colonel was acting as one of the war-correspondents of that paper, he had a conversation with the younger General Skobeleff. It was on the day, he thinks, when the Russians captured the Shipka Pass—viz., January 9th; and Skobeleff suddenly asked, "Have you any news from India?" Colonel Brackenbury replied that the Russian postal authorities took care he should have no news from anywhere; to which Skobeleff rejoined, "I cannot find out what has become of that column of 10,000 men that has been organised by your people to raise Central Asia against us." Other accounts state that the British troops were to form the nucleus of a large native force, and that the whole was to be furnished with a surplus staff of officers, to take command of the Turkoman and neighbouring Asiatic tribes which, according to the rumour, it was intended to raise against Russia. It will be observed, however, that the statement in the Calcutta *Pioneer* is very far from justifying the wild assertions of General Skobeleff. The Anglo-Indian writer said nothing more than that a certain military expedition would be undertaken in a contingency which never arose. Skobeleff alleged that the invading column had actually been formed, and seemed to hint that it had been sent upon its march. Assuredly, the project which the Indian Government may possibly have entertained, as a thing to be realised in case of war, offered no excuse to Russia for positively equipping and sending forth expeditions which compromised the independence of Afghanistan, and therefore threatened the security of British India.

Early in 1878, Russia resolved upon despatching a mission openly to Cabul. On the 7th of June, the Government of India first heard of this intention, and on the 2nd of July Lord Augustus Loftus, at the instance of Lord Salisbury (then at the Foreign Office), questioned M. de Giers on the subject. The Russian Minister replied that no such mission had been, or was intended to be, sent to Cabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kauffmann. Upon this, Lord Augustus remarked that for some time past a Russian Agent had resided at Cabul, and that intrigues had apparently been carried on, with a view to create dissensions between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Indian Government. Such a course, he urged, was not in conformity with the arrangement entered into between the Governments of England and Russia, and he observed that, if continued, it must inevitably produce results prejudicial to the good relations between the two countries. The rejoinder of M. de Giers contained a remarkable admission. He said that there had been a moment when war —that was to say, war between England and Russia on account of Turkey—appeared to be almost imminent, and that under those circumstances the military commanders had no doubt conceived it to be their duty to take such measures as might be necessary and serviceable to their country. But he denied that, "as far as he was aware," there had been any intrigues with the Ameer of Cabul, of the nature to which Lord Augustus Loftus had alluded. He admitted, however, that he had sent M. Bakouline, the Russian Consul at Astrabad, to Meshed, to watch the movements of two English officers, Captains Butler and Napier, who were reported to be inciting the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia. That these officers had been making some inquiries amongst the Turkomans appears certain; but it

* Calcutta Correspondent of the *Times*, writing on September 15th, 1878.

is not so clear that they were acting on behalf of the Anglo-Indian Government. According to the statements of Lord Augustus Loftus to M. de Giers, Captain Butler was simply a traveller on his own account, and urgent orders had been sent to him by the Commander-in-Chief in India to return at once to his military duties. M. de Giers asserted that he had refused to obey those orders, and still persisted in his intention to visit the Akhal tribes. This officer has been described by the *Bombay Gazette* as a Central Asiatic explorer, and it was stated by the same journal, when war was being commenced against Afghanistan, that he had been successful in his interviews with the Turkoman chiefs, who were willing to co-operate with the British against either the Afghans or the Russians. Still, if the statement of Lord Augustus Loftus was true—and there is nothing to show that it was false—Captain Butler was not clothed with any official capacity, and was even acting in defiance of his Commander-in-Chief. M. de Giers referred to a letter which Captain Butler had addressed to certain native chiefs, and of which the Russian Government appeared to have received copies. But all this was little to the purpose, unless it could be shown that Captain Butler was really acting on behalf of the Government, notwithstanding the formal disavowal which had been put forth. It is very remarkable that throughout the conversation M. de Giers made not the slightest allusion to that column of 10,000 men which, according to the younger General Skobeleff, had been organised in India, in order to raise Central Asia against the Russians. There is accordingly every reason to believe that the column had its existence solely in the excitable brain of the Russian hero, whom the Grand Duke Nicholas himself described on one occasion as a madman, with a special craze on the subject of war with England.*

It is certain that, during the warlike agitations and alarms of the year 1878, England and Russia watched one another narrowly and jealously across the intervening territory of Afghanistan. Each was prepared to act against its opponent if war should break out; but there was this great difference in the position of the two countries—that whereas Russia was continually encroaching, continually organising expeditions against the independent tribes still remaining to the north of Afghanistan, and continually endeavouring to draw that country itself into an alliance against the English, England was making absolutely no advance whatever at the period to which we are now referring (the first seven months of 1878), but was simply holding herself in readiness to resist any intrigues which might be directed against her interests. The Embassy from General Kauffmann to Shere Ali, which M. de Giers so emphatically denied to Lord Augustus Loftus, was fully admitted, and to some extent foreshadowed, in an article in the *Turkistan Vedomist*, quoted in the *Moscow Gazette* of July 18th, 1878, and sent to Lord Salisbury on the 31st of the same month by the British *chargé d'affaires* at St. Petersburg. A mission was in the first instance undertaken by M. Weinberg, the Diplomatic Agent attached to General Kauffmann, who was furnished with special instructions to arrange with the Ameer of Bokhara for the passage of Russian troops along the upper course of the Amou Darya, or Oxus—the part nearest to Afghanistan and British India. M. Weinberg arrived at Karsh on the 21st of May, and next day was presented to the Ameer, to whom he handed a letter from General Kauffmann, stating that his Excellency calculated on the assistance of the Bokharan authorities for facilitating the progress of the Russian detachments. If anything were needed to show how completely Bokhara is now the slave of Russia, it would be found in this Russian account of M. Weinberg's negotiations. At the commencement of the interview, the Bokharan sovereign had seemed "somewhat agitated;" but, although it was evident that the service required of him was exceedingly distasteful, he ended by professing his perfect willingness to carry out the wishes of the Governor-General, "trusting by those means to strengthen the amicable relations existing between Bokhara and Russia." The Ameer then asked in what way Russia intended arranging her affairs with Cabul. M. Weinberg replied that General Kauffmann nourished no ill-feeling against Afghanistan, but meditated despatching an Embassy to Shere Ali, by which means his relations with that monarch would in all probability become defined one way or the other, either in an amicable or a hostile sense. Everything would depend on the

* The late Mr. MacGahan, writing to the *Daily News* on the 26th of February, 1878, with reference to the hesitation of Mukhtar Pasha to give up his lines at Kujuk Tchekmedje, recorded:—"The Grand Duke [Nicholas], who was excited and indignant at the situation, asked Skobeleff, it is said, what he thought of it. The latter, with the reckless indifference which characterises him, replied, 'For my part, Monseigneur, I think we shall have to fight England.' 'Oh, but you are a madman!' exclaimed the Grand Duke in a half angry manner, turning from him, and spitting as every Russian peasant spits when anything displeases him. It is the highest expression of displeasure or anger." Mr. Archibald Forbes also described the younger Skobeleff as "a little mad." Yet both Mr. Forbes and Mr. MacGahan greatly admired the wild, hare-brained officer.

straightforwardness and good sense displayed by the Ameer. "We entertain no ulterior views in respect to him," added M. Weinberg; but the statement seems altogether inconsistent with what had just been alleged. The previous intercommunication between General Kauffmann and Shere Ali had not definitively settled their relations towards one another; and, besides, the complications between England and Russia with respect to Turkey had introduced a new element into the problem, which it was thought necessary that the Governor-General of Turkistan should settle without delay. Kauffmann threatened the Ameer of Afghanistan that he would help his nephew and rival, Abdul-Rahman, to drive him from the throne, if he sided with the British Government against Russia.*

It has been said that the Russian General began to adopt these tactics when news reached him of the despatch of the Indian troops to Malta; but the contemplated Mission was only the latest of a long series of movements tending to detach the Ameer from the side of England. Kauffmann had for several years been conducting secret negotiations with Shere Ali, of which, though it may be impossible to define the exact features, it would be affectation to doubt the general aim. The threat held over the Ameer's head in May, 1878, which is confessed even by the most ardent advocates of Russia, and the details of which have been derived from Russian papers themselves, was a plain violation of the undertaking given by Russia many years before, and several times repeated, that Afghanistan was to be considered entirely beyond the sphere of her influence. There was in truth nothing to justify it. Had a state of war actually existed, the case would have different, for war annuls all engagements between the hostile parties; but, though the relations between England and Russia were greatly strained in the early part of 1878, it was by no means certain that war would

AKSAKALS.

* "Causes of the Afghan War," issued by the Afghan Committee: a work favourable to Russia.

ensue, and in fact it was averted by the arrangements of a few months later. Even supposing hostilities to have broken out, it still did not follow that Afghanistan would take the side of England. Indeed, everything tended to show that her action would be unfriendly to the British Government, and far from cordial towards Turkey itself. The threat of General Kauffmann was therefore a manifest breach of his Imperial master's engagements towards England; but there is nothing to prove that the Imperial master was not well content that his pledged word should be outraged by a subordinate who had been doing his best to make it of no avail ever since it was uttered.

When M. Weinberg told the Ameer of Bokhara, on the 22nd of May, that General Kauffmann "meditated" despatching an Embassy to Shere Ali, he would seem not to have been aware that an Embassy of some sort had already been despatched. A correspondent of the Indian Government, writing from Peshawur on the 30th of April, mentioned that the new envoy from Russia had arrived at Cabul a short time before, and that the Ameer had more than once granted him interviews. A Russian emissary had long been residing at Cabul, and the Ameer was now thoroughly converted to the Russian alliance, to which, indeed, he had been inclined for several years. He exhibited great activity in the prosecution of warlike preparations, and frequently inspected the manufactories of guns and muskets. Whatever hesitation he had previously felt, as to committing himself to the cause of Russia, was now entirely removed by General Kauffmann's threat with respect to Abdul-Rahman. From a letter written in the early part of May by the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, and addressed to the Ameer himself, it appears that the Russians intended to induce Abdul-Rahman to submit to them a petition setting forth his claims, and offering his services to capture Balkh with the aid of a small contingent from the Czar, and then to subdue the whole of Afghanistan, which, he said, would not be a difficult task. In this communication it was stated that the object of the envoys then waiting upon the Ameer was to request him to grant a passage through his country "to the Russian troops going to India, and returning therefrom, should a necessity arise for such a passage;" and it further appeared that the petition of Abdul-Rahman was to be forwarded to Shere Ali to terrify him, if he refused to comply with the request of the Russian Government.

The Ameer was terrified accordingly; but he was displeased at the demands of the Russians, and there can be no doubt that, if he could have had his own way, he would have excluded all envoys from Christian Powers, the Russian as much as the English. However, he was *not* able to have his own way. He had chosen to offend England; he had for a long time been coquetting with Russia; and the time had now come when Russia was determined to do what England had desired in the previous year. Major Cavagnari, Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur, states in his diary, under date June 7th, 1878, that the Ameer had exhibited considerable annoyance at hearing that a Russian envoy, with powers equal to the Governor-General of Tashkend, would shortly reach Cabul, but that Kauffmann had informed him that the envoy was being sent by order of the Emperor, and could not then be detained. Thus Russia was doing the very thing which England attempted to do a few months later, and which the Ameer resisted at the cost of war. The fact is, Shere Ali wished to have all the advantages of Russian support, as he had desired to have all the advantages of English support, without the vexation of a Christian Agent constantly residing in his capital. But what he subsequently denied to England, he granted with but little opposition to Russia. The envoy who arrived in or about April seems to have been sent merely to prepare the way for the more powerful representative who followed in the summer, and who was doubtless the person to whom M. Weinberg alluded in his conversations with the Ameer of Bokhara. The later Mission was of a very dignified and ceremonious character. It consisted of seven officers (among whom was one General), of twenty-two Cossacks, four servants, and fifteen Kirghiz horsemen. Such is the account of its composition given by a member of the Embassy, in a letter printed in the *Golos* of November 26th, 1878. There is some doubt as to the precise date of departure from Samarcand; but the point is not one of great importance. It was stated in certain of the English papers that the Mission started on July 14th, the day after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin. It seems more probable, however, that the real day was the 14th of June. The unfriendliness of the step towards England would perhaps be a little more obvious supposing it to have taken place the very day after the signature of a treaty designed to compose those differences which had long been creating a sense of irritation between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg. But the distinction is in truth much more apparent than real; for the Russian authorities at Samarcand could not have known on the 14th of July what had occurred at Berlin on the 13th, whereas even on the 14th of June there was sufficient reason to believe in the

probability of peace to render the proposed step objectionable from every point of view.

The route of the Russian Mission to Cabul lay through Bokharan territory, and, as the Ameer of Bokhara was then at Karsh, the members of the Embassy proceeded to that town. The Bokharan sovereign showed his visitors every courtesy, and all the members of the Mission were presented to him. The head of the Embassy was General Stoletoff, who, with his companions, traversed a hilly and rocky country leading to the Amou Darya. At Shirabad they met an Afghan messenger, bearing a letter from the Governor of Afghan Turkistan, in which the gentlemen of the Mission were requested to wait ten days at the place they had then reached, as the Governor had not made necessary preparations for the reception of the visitors, nor organized the honorary escort which was to accompany them through the territories of the Ameer.* General Stoletoff, however, considered it advisable to pursue his march to the Amou Darya, and to halt there, if it were really necessary to halt at all. The river was crossed by the Russians in very primitive boats, and on the further bank they waited three days until they were joined by an Afghan escort, consisting of two hundred men and two commanders. These officials received the Russian Mission with great politeness, and apologized for having caused its detention. The party then proceeded by slow stages, and were everywhere greeted, according to the Russian chronicler, with much popular enthusiasm. The journey was long and fatiguing, for the road lay over sandy deserts and vast mountain ranges, so that it was not until after some weeks that they arrived in the vicinity of Cabul. As they approached that city, they encountered the chief Ministers of the Ameer, and were supplied with elephants, mounted on which they advanced towards the capital. At a distance of seven versts from Cabul, they were met by Prince Abdulla Khan, Shere Ali's nephew. This court dignitary rode on an enormous elephant of ashy-grey colour, with long gilded tusks. The prince himself was seated in a basket profusely adorned with gold. He invited General Stoletoff to sit beside him on the same elephant, and in this way they entered the city together. The rest of the Embassy followed on other elephants, the howdahs of which were ornamented with silver. Cavalry in brilliant uniforms followed in the rear, and the way was lined with crowds of people, who clung even to the rocks and trees in their eagerness to behold the strangers. In this triumphal fashion they entered on a wide plain, which was discovered to be filled with regular troops. In front of a large body of cavalry stood twelve cannons of brass and steel, the polished metal of which flashed back the sunlight. A salute of thirty-six guns welcomed the arrival of the Russian envoy, and the mournful strains of the Afghan National March were played by an attendant band. The music, however, was speedily drowned by the cheering of the people; and in the midst of these resounding acclamations the Mission entered the Bala Hissar, or citadel of Cabul. Passing through some of the streets, they at length reached the Royal Palace; but the Ameer himself did not come out to meet them. It was only on the following day, August 11th, that, with General Stoletoff at their head, the members of the Embassy were formally received by Shere Ali in his Hall of State, and in the presence of the highest nobles of Afghanistan.†

At that very time, the British Government was in receipt of detailed reports concerning four Russian military expeditions, comprising nearly 20,000 men, which were converging on points commanding Merve and the Akhal country, and therefore menacing the northern frontier of Afghanistan. Mr. Plunkett, writing from St. Petersburg to the Foreign Secretary on the 13th of August, related an interview he had just had with M. de Giers in respect of these movements. He requested some information touching the march of the Russian columns which had left Tashkend and Krasnovodsk, and desired to know what measures had been taken for arresting their progress, now that all probability of a war between England and Russia was at an end. With an obvious weighing of his words, as if he were afraid of committing himself, M. de Giers replied that in questions of military movements he could not be held responsible for the details, with which he was naturally unacquainted. He could only answer for the policy of the Govern, ment. He then proceeded to deny that any Russian emissary had proceeded to Cabul with a letter from the Emperor to the Ameer, though possibly there might have been a letter from General Kauffmann. Orders had been given to arrest the march of all

* Such is the account given in the *Golos*. From this it has been inferred by some writers that the Ameer made an ineffectual attempt to stop the Mission. It appears, however, that the Governor of Afghan Turkistan acted entirely on his own authority, pending the receipt of directions from the Ameer, who ultimately sent orders forbidding opposition to the Russian Embassy. (Telegram from the Viceroy to the Indian Secretary, July 13th, 1878, based on report of a British native medical officer, recently returned from Cabul, where he had been in attendance on the Ameer.)

† *Golos*, November 26th, 1878.



CITADEL AND BAZAAR, CANDAHAR.

the columns which had been put in motion at Tashkend, and he believed that the troops had by that time resumed their former stations, though he would not assert as much positively or officially. Mr. Plunkett, however, was unable to obtain any distinct reply to his inquiry whether the column which had left Krasnovodsk under General Lamakin had also returned. With a most extraordinary confusion of ideas, M. de Giers observed that Russia had as much right to take special measures in Central Asia, in view of the impending risk of war, as Great Britain had to bring Indian troops to Malta. He seems to have forgotten that Malta is a part of the British dominions, and that the movements of the Russian troops, with respect to which the British Government complained, affected countries which form no part of the Russian Empire. But these movements, M. de Giers asserted, had now been stopped. Mr. Plunkett asked whether his Excellency could give equally

THE NAWAB GHOLAM HUSSEIN KHAN, C.S.I.

welcome assurances concerning those political steps which had been commenced in view of complications with Great Britain. M. de Giers replied, "Everything has been stopped—the political as well as the military precautions which we thought ourselves justified in taking against you." From these and other explanations, Lord Salisbury inferred that all the former assurances of the Russian Government in regard to Afghanistan had recovered their validity; yet the Russian Embassy still remained at Cabul, and did not retire until near the end of the year.

What passed between the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Russian Ambassador (for such in truth he was) cannot be stated with exactness; but, judging by a communication from the Peshawur Agent of the Anglo-Indian Government, dated August 3rd, 1878, it would appear that Shere Ali was embarrassed by the visit of his guests. This does not by any means show that he was disinclined to an alliance with Russia, injurious to English interests. It simply shows that he was as much annoyed at the presence of a Russian Agent in his capital as he would have been at the presence of an Englishman. General Stoletoff proposed that the friendship which had for some time past existed between the Russian and Afghan Governments should be strengthened and perpetuated by a treaty of amity. The Ameer is said to have remarked in reply that the matter required consideration, and that he must consult with his Ministers and nobles, after which a proper answer would be given. At the same time, he was nervously desirous of putting himself on a better footing with regard to England than he had occupied since the early part of the previous year. He expressed a wish (though it does not appear to whom) to receive an English officer at Cabul for a few days, so that he might personally discuss with him the misunderstanding that had arisen, and acknowledge any blame which might justly be thrown upon his shoulders. The expression of this wish, however, was accompanied by the stipulation that the British envoy, supposing one to be sent, should equally acknowledge the commission of error on the part of the Anglo-Indian Government, if the soundness of his Highness's objections should be made apparent. He frankly acknowledged his position as that of a weak Power between two strong Powers, and confessed that he would incline towards the one whose alliance might seem more beneficial to him than that of the other. The fact is, that he felt very acutely the truth of Lord Lytton's simile about the earthen pipkin between two iron pots; but he could not fail to perceive that the iron pot called Russia was just then pressing him much more closely than the iron pot called England. It was therefore to his interest to make terms in that direction rather than in the opposite; and, however much he might dislike the presence of the Russians at Cabul, the facts remained that they were there, that the forces of Russia were constantly approaching nearer to his northern boundaries, and that the omnipotent General Kauffmann was willing to bid handsomely for the Afghan alliance. Lord Salisbury, writing to the Viceroy of India on the 4th of October, 1877, in reply to Lord Lytton's despatch reporting the abortive results of the Peshawur Conference, had remarked that, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government, the Ameer might well be left to reflect for a time upon the new position to which his obstinacy had brought him. This seems to have been an unfortunate error of policy, and the withdrawal of the Native Agent from Cabul completed the mischief. Had Atta Mahomed been suffered to return to his post, he would doubtless have been able to exercise some influence on the mind of Shere Ali, and to encourage in him any disposition he may have shown towards re-considering or modifying his former resolution. At any rate, he would have reported what was being done in the matter of the Russian alliance. As it was, the Ameer was kept in the dark with respect to the British Government, and the British Government with respect to the Ameer. Afghanistan lay completely open to Russian intrigue, and Russia of course was not slow to avail herself of the opportunity thus afforded.

The presence of the Russian Embassy at Cabul made the Indian Viceroy sensible that it was high time to take some further steps for the support of British interests, and he therefore telegraphed to Lord Cranbrook on the 30th of July, requesting instructions as to how he should proceed. Lord Lytton desired to know whether the existing state of affairs would be treated by her Majesty's Government as an Imperial question between England and Russia, or left to the Indian Administration to deal with as a matter between India and Afghanistan. The situation was undoubtedly grave. A Russian officer, with a considerable military escort, had been received by the Ameer at his capital, and the same ruler persistently refused to receive an English Agent. To Lord Lytton it appeared fitting to insist on the immediate reception of a British Mission, and he pointed out that the only alternative would be a continuation of the policy of complete inaction—a policy which he described as difficult to maintain, and very injurious to our position in India. The Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield, however, was disinclined to act

with undue haste. Lord Cranbrook telegraphed to the Viceroy on the 1st of August that he was to make himself certain of the alleged facts before insisting on the reception of a British envoy. It was suggested that he might send a native to ascertain whether the Russians were really at Cabul, and he could telegraph to the Home Government when the truth was exactly known. On the 2nd of August, Lord Lytton telegraphed twice to Lord Cranbrook, urging immediate action. Further information was transmitted on the 5th and 19th of August; but it was information of a very vague description depending altogether upon rumour. The Ameer, it was stated, had handed to the Russian envoy a written reply to the letters which he had brought with him, and that reply was immediately despatched by special horsemen to Russian Turkistan; but the contents of the missive were altogether unknown, and it was impossible to say whether the Ameer's answer was favourable or unfavourable to the Russian demands. The Governor-General, however, had by this time received the sanction of the Home Government to his proposal for insisting on the reception of a British envoy. The Indian Secretary had signified his acceptance of that plan on the 3rd of August, though personally he was of opinion that the Russian Cabinet alone was responsible for the acts of its Agent (General Kauffmann), who, rather than Shere Ali, was pursuing a policy dangerous to India;* and on the 19th of the same month Lord Lytton wrote from Simla to the effect that he had offered the appointment of British envoy to Sir Neville Chamberlain, who had accepted it. This distinguished officer was to be accompanied, for political duties, by Major Cavagnari, C.S.I., Major St. John, R.E., Captain Hammick, and a medical officer, and by an escort of two hundred and fifty sabres. The mission was to start early in September; and the Indian Government had also decided to send a special native emissary in advance of the Mission, in order that the Ameer might have due notice that the envoy was coming, and that necessary arrangements might be made for his passage through Afghan territory. For the performance of this duty, the Viceroy had selected the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C.S.I., formerly British Agent at Cabul, who was to leave Peshawur on the 23rd of August.

Lord Lytton had lost no time in making his arrangements, and in truth the emergency was one with which it would have been unsafe to trifle. But the probability of war resulting from the proposed measure must have been obvious even to those who took the most favourable view of the situation. The Ameer was to be offered one more chance of propitiating the British Government: if he still refused, it would be impossible to refrain from active measures of coercion. "The British Government," Lord Salisbury had said in his despatch of October 4th, 1877, "stands unpledged to any obligations, and in any contingencies which may arise in Afghanistan will be at liberty to adopt such measures for the protection and permanent tranquillity of the North-west frontier of her Majesty's Indian dominions as the circumstances of the moment may render expedient, without regard to the wishes of the Ameer Shere Ali, or the interests of his dynasty." The juncture thus foreshadowed had now nearly arrived. The Ameer was to be once more pressed to make those concessions which he had often before refused; and, in the event of his continued obstinacy, he was to face the naked sword.

* Communication to the Foreign Office, August 8th, 1878. Blue Book on Central Asia, No. 1 (1878).

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Painful Position of Shere Ali in the Early Autumn of 1878—The Motives which probably determined his Action—Convention with Russia—Petition to the Ameer requiring him to engage in a Religious War—Letter from Lord Lytton to Shere Ali, announcing the despatch of a Mission—Death of Abdulla Jan—Despatch of peremptory Missives—Anger of the Ameer—Explanations and Promises—Shere Ali under the influence of Russia—Starting of the Mission—Interview beneath the Walls of Ali Musjid—The Embassy turned back—The Ameer's Complaints and implied Threats—Nature and Bearings of the Insult—Proposed Measures of the Indian Government—Letter to Shere Ali, demanding an Apology—Undignified Way of sending it—Declaration of War against Afghanistan—Popularity of the War in India—Preparations for Hostilities—Offers of Help from Native Tribes—Debates in Parliament on the Afghan Policy of the Government—Large Majorities in Favour of the Administration—Ought England to have gone to War with Russia?—Explanations of Lord Beaconsfield—Reply of the Ameer to the English Ultimatum.

UNDOUBTEDLY, Shere Ali had brought his misfortunes upon his own head by his want of prudence and good feeling—by his vacillations between Russian and English support, and his angry mood towards the Indian Government. But it must be admitted that his position was in many respects a very hard one. He had been driven into the arms of Russia by the grudging spirit of Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, and Lord Northbrook; and now that he found himself there, he was threatened with condign punishment by Lord Lytton, unless he accepted a condition to which he had always professed the greatest repugnance. He might, no doubt, have avoided the imminent prospect of war had he instructed Noor Mahomed, at the Peshawur discussions, to accept at once the proposition for placing British Agents within the Afghan frontier. Yet some allowance must be made for the ruler of a semi-barbaric and wholly fanatical people, little inclined to obedience, and hating the presence of Christian strangers in their principal cities. The great mistake of the Ameer was in so conducting himself towards the Russians as in effect to invite the despatch of an Embassy, though, when it came, he keenly felt the embarrassment of its presence. His animosity against the British authorities was at the bottom of this mistaken policy, and the same feeling dictated all his subsequent acts, and precipitated his downfall. In the progress of events, he found himself between the two powerful Empires which he had brought into a position of rivalry; and it was doubtful whether either would be his friend, while it was probable that one would be his foe. From the moment he received the Russian Embassy, he must have known that such was likely to be the result; but he did his best to fence it off by equivocating civilities, with which he hoped to please both parties, while in fact he satisfied neither. With the Russians, however, he concluded a convention, which, according to a letter from Cabul to the *Golos*, related to the administration of Afghanistan generally, to the question of the succession to the Afghan throne, and to the recognition by Russia of the existing dynasty. By this convention, no offensive and defensive alliance was concluded, but Russia bound herself to support morally the integrity and independence of Afghanistan. In the natural course of things, such an undertaking would have led to military intervention, and Afghanistan would soon have become a fief of the Russian Empire, as Bokhara was already.

During the summer of 1878, an anonymous writer, dating from Peshawur, sent a petition to the Ameer, stating that the British and Russian Governments were on friendly terms with one another, that Persia was on the side of Russia, and that the three Powers desired to partition Afghanistan amongst themselves. The writer further remarked that, in the prosecution of this plan, Turkey had first been weakened, and that Russia, England, and the other Powers had then interfered in the administration of the Ottoman Empire, and encumbered the Turkish Exchequer with a large war-indemnity. Under these circumstances, in the opinion of the petitioner, the Ameer should not be lax in the government of his country, but should issue arms and money to the different tribes inhabiting the hills and plains, and induce them to engage in a religious war on his behalf.* However far from the truth this reported alliance of England, Russia, and Persia, there were circumstances which, as affecting the two first Powers, may well have induced an Oriental politician, at that juncture, to believe in the rumoured agreement. The abandonment of Turkey to her fate, and the secret understanding between the Russian and English Governments (secret until divulged by the unauthorised act of a Foreign Office clerk), must have seemed to most Mohammedans conclusive proof that an

* The substance of this petition is mentioned in a news-letter from the Government Agent at Peshawur, dated August 3rd, 1878.

alliance, having for its object the subjugation of the East, had been concocted between the two great Empires of the North and West. Shere Ali had refused to aid the Turks in their great struggle for existence, or, at the request of the Sultan, to propitiate England in preference to Russia. He must by this time have seen his mistake; but he also saw that he dared not offend either Power, and still less both Powers, by exciting a religious war against the Christians. On the Peshawur petition being read to him, he uttered hundreds of abusive words against the writer, and tore it into pieces. From this it has been rashly inferred that the Ameer was at that date animated by a very friendly sentiment, not only towards Russia, but towards England. The incident proves nothing of the kind. It simply shows that he felt himself in no position to undertake a *jihad*—that he saw the risk to be too great, and success to be too uncertain. He had made the attempt in the early part of 1877, and egregiously failed; and the penalty of failure was now manifestly much greater than before.

Having obtained the permission of the Home Government to insist on the reception of a British envoy, Lord Lytton, on the 14th of August, wrote to the Ameer, stating that the authentic intelligence which he had received as to the course of recent events at Cabul, and in the bordering countries, had rendered it necessary that he should communicate fully and without reserve with his Highness upon matters of importance concerning the interests of India and Afghanistan. For this reason he had considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British envoy of high rank—viz., General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain—to visit his Highness immediately at Cabul, in order that he might converse personally with him. This intimation was to be conveyed in advance by the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, who would explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the envoy's visit. Sir Neville Chamberlain was an officer of great distinction in the East; so also was Gholam Hussein Khan, who had served the British in a military capacity, and had formerly been our Vakeel at Cabul. To neither of these representatives, personally, could there be any objection; but the Ameer might still urge his original dislike to the admission of an Englishman, simply as such. Three days after the date of Lord Lytton's despatch, Shere Ali's favourite son, Abdulla Jan, whom his father had nominated as successor to the throne, died at an early age; and, on arriving at Peshawur on the 21st of August, Gholam Hussein was stopped by the melancholy intelligence. Business was suspended during the period of mourning, and on the 23rd of the month Lord Lytton sent a letter of condolence to the Ameer, which was conveyed by the Nawab when he resumed his journey. "I desire," said the Viceroy, "to express to your Highness personally the sincere regret which this intelligence has caused me; but life and death are in the hands of God, and resignation to His will is unavoidable. In consequence of this calamity, I have directed my envoy to postpone for a short time his departure, in order that your Highness may not be troubled by any public business, however important and urgent, until the usual period of mourning shall have elapsed." On the 8th of September, Lord Lytton reported to the Home Government that he had ordered the Ameer's officers to be informed that Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission would leave Peshawur about the 16th; that its object was friendly, but that a refusal of free passage and safe conduct would be considered acts of open hostility. The matter was thus brought to a definite issue, and the choice of peace or war lay with the Ameer himself.

But it must be admitted that the tone adopted by the Commissioner of Peshawur (Major Waterfield), in some communications to the Ameer's officers, was too peremptory and dictatorial. Addressing the Mustaufi on the 7th of September, he said, after the usual compliments of the East:—"I write this friendly letter to inform you that the 16th or 17th of September has been fixed for the departure of a Mission of high rank from the British Government to Cabul, and that the Mission will start whether the Nawab Gholam Hussein shall or shall not by that time have had the honour of waiting on his Highness the Ameer. The object for which the Mission is deputed is friendly, and the refusal of free passage to it, or interruption or injury to its friendly progress, will be regarded as acts of hostility. I am to explain that the Mission will not in any case enter the capital of Cabul before the expiry of the month Ramazan. In conclusion, may you keep well!" A communication to our own agent, Gholam Hussein, was couched in similar language down to the word "hostility," after which it was added:—"You should, under all circumstances, use all endeavours to reach Cabul soon. Should any impediment be interposed to your journey, in such case it is fit you should act firmly." The Indian Government explained that these letters were a continuation of preceding correspondence between the English and Cabul officials, in which the latter had said that the question must be wholly deferred, pending the

Ameer's pleasure. Still, even with this allowance, the style appears too arrogant. The letter to Gholam Hussein was opened by the Ameer himself, and afterwards handed to the Nawab; and this of course helped to envenom matters.

ALI MUSJID, AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE KHYBER PASS.

When the Nawab Gholam Hussein arrived at Cabul, he was received by the Ameer in a private interview, when no other person was present. Shere Ali was much displeased with the letters which had been sent to Gholam Hussein and his own officials. He objected to the harsh words employed, and said, "It is as if they were to come by force. I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner; and until my officers have received orders from me, how can this Mission come? It is as if they wished to disgrace me. It is not proper to use pressure in this way; it will tend to a complete rupture and breach of friendship. I am a friend as before, and entertain no ill-will. The Russian envoy has come, and has come with my permission. I am still afflicted with grief at the loss of my son, and have had no time to think over the matter. If I get time, whatever I consider advisable will be acted upon. Under these circumstances, they can do as they like." The last sentence, though vague and ambiguous, almost looks like a



MAJOR CAVAGNARI AND FRIENDLY AFRIDEES AND PATHAN MULLICKS.

permission to Sir Neville Chamberlain and his companions to enter the country, if they thought fit. But Gholam Hussein advised that the advance of the Mission should be delayed, fearing that some harm would occur if it were not. In short, he anticipated resistance in the event of any attempt being made to impose the Embassy by force. A few days later, the Nawab had an interview with the Wazir Shah Mahomed, who assured him on his oath that the Ameer had intimated he would send for the Mission, in order to clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there were no attempt to force it upon him without his consent, for in that case he would oppose it as an indignity. With respect to the Russian Mission, he said (and this appears to have been the truth—a truth which may be taken as the key to the whole business) that he had not invited the representatives of the Czar, but that, his country being quite exposed, and himself estranged from the English, he was obliged to let the Russians come on after they had crossed the Oxus. No doubt, the Ameer, while seeking the support of Russia, as he had previously sought the support of England, was averse from having Russian officers and envoys at his capital; but he had for several years been pursuing a policy of which the almost certain result was the despatch of a Russian Mission, whether he liked it or not. The Mission had now arrived, without so much as saying "By your leave;" and the Ameer received it with pomp and ceremony, because it was conditional to the Russian alliance which had become a necessity to him. At the same time he prepared to repel an English Mission sent under similar circumstances and with a similar object, because he no longer desired the English alliance, and was intriguing against English interests.

In his interview with Gholam Hussein, the Wazir Shah Mahomed denied that the Russians had come for any other purpose than to exchange civilities, in consequence of their having a common boundary with Afghanistan. But, in the first place, the Russians had *not* a common boundary with the Ameer's dominions, for Bokhara, however much under the dictation of General Kauffmann, was still nominally independent; in the second place, we know from the *Golos* that General Stoletoff's Mission was at Cabul for the arrangement of a convention putting Afghanistan under the patronage of Russia. It is very possible, however, that the Ameer desired to see the departure of his Northern visitors, and Shah Mahomed declared that, immediately on the recovery of some who were lying ill, his Highness would arrange for their leaving, and would then send a confidential messenger to escort the British Embassy. Shere Ali desired the Mission to remain a short time longer at Peshawur; averred that he did not wish to destroy the friendship which had existed between his country and England; and promised that in two or three days he would send for the Nawab Gholam Hussein, and, after consultation with him, fix a date for the coming of Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission. In the meanwhile, he asked the Nawab to write and say that the sending of the Mission without his (the Ameer's) consent would be considered as a slight. These facts (derived from the letters of Gholam Hussein) were reported by Sir Neville Chamberlain to the Viceroy on the 18th of September; but the very next day the English envoy had to describe a change. The Ameer, according to our representative at Cabul, was in a very irritable humour, and complained of the unbecoming communications which had been addressed, some to him, and some to his officers. Nevertheless, the Afghan Ministers still hoped that the Mission would be satisfactorily arranged, if the English would wait the Ameer's permission; otherwise, the results would be unfortunate. But no time for the reception of the envoy was mentioned; and Sir Neville believed that the Ameer was trifling with us. The resolution which he had really taken, and the motives for it, have been made clear in a letter written from Cabul on October 13th, and published in the *Golos* during the ensuing December. Shere Ali, it is here stated, asked General Stoletoff for advice regarding the reception of the English Mission. The Russian envoy replied in an evasive manner, but gave the Ameer to understand that the simultaneous presence of Embassies from two countries which were almost in hostile relations (this, be it observed, was after the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty) would be inconvenient. The Ameer, it is added, then decided to refuse admission to the English Embassy.

These events occurred in September, and were immediately reported to Lord Lytton. But the Viceroy was not disposed to countermand the Mission, or to delay its advance; and on the 21st of the month the several members moved forward from Peshawur. The number of persons forming the Embassy was not quite a thousand, and included eleven British officers, and two hundred and thirty-four soldiers. The rest were private gentlemen and camp-followers, accompanied by three hundred and fifteen camels, two hundred and fifty mules, and forty horses; the whole forming a line of considerably more than a mile in length Sir Neville Chamberlain proceeded to Jumrood, just within the British frontier, while Major

Cavagnari, with a small escort, and accompanied by two native gentlemen who had joined the Embassy, pushed on to Ali Musjid, an Afghan fort guarding the entrance to the Khyber Pass, to which he was conducted by the chiefs of the Afridees, who consented to perform that service at the risk of offending the Ameer. The fort is reared upon a hill rising six hundred feet above the level of a stream which runs along the bottom of the pass. Immediately in front, a flat ridge or spur strikes out, and Major Cavagnari, with his companions, took up his position on a similar ridge a few hundred yards off. A message was sent to Faiz Muhammad Khan, the commandant at Ali Musjid, inviting him to come out and confer with the small English party; but a considerable time elapsed before any answer was received. Directly the Englishmen were seen, the walls of the fort were manned, and shortly afterwards a number of troops lined the opposite ridge. One or two shots were heard, but it was believed they were only signals. "At last," says a correspondent of the *Times*, "Major Cavagnari's patience was becoming exhausted, and he was preparing an ultimatum, when, a couple of hours or thereabouts having elapsed, Faiz Muhammad Khan sent word to say that he was coming out to meet the Englishmen at a spot half-way between the two ridges, in a grove of trees by a watermill on the bank of the stream. A few minutes afterwards, he was seen descending the hill, and Major Cavagnari, accompanied by Colonel Jenkins and a couple of his men, went down the hill to meet him at the indicated place, leaving Captain Battye to cover their advance or retreat, as the case might be, as well as possible from his position on the ridge." The commandant was accompanied by a number of Afridee chiefs, and about two hundred armed men. He and the Major shook hands, and a conversation began, the details of which were afterwards reported by Major Cavagnari and Colonel Jenkins.

Faiz Muhammad was asked if he would allow the Mission to proceed, and, in reply, distinctly stated that he would oppose its further progress by force, and that it was waste of time to argue with him. Major Cavagnari then said to the Afghan official, "You are a servant of the Ameer, and you take upon yourself to stop a Mission going to him from the British Government, with which he has long been on friendly terms. How do you know that the Ameer himself will not be very angry with you for doing this?" The commandant replied, "What friendship is there in what you are doing now? If the Ameer had given me orders, I would have come down to Jumrood to meet you, and bring you up the pass; but now you come here on your own account, and bribe the Ameer's servants to give you a passage. You are setting Afridees against Afridees, and will cause strife and bloodshed in this country; and yet you call yourselves friends!" Several of the Afridee tribe were standing round at the time, and they loudly applauded the remarks of the commandant. Fearful of getting into an altercation which might have led to unpleasant results, Major Cavagnari simply rejoined, "We are both servants—you of the Ameer of Cabul, I of the British Government. It is no use for us to discuss these matters. I only came to get a straightforward answer from you. Will you oppose the passage of the Mission by force?" "Yes," replied the commandant, "I will; and you may take it as kindness, and because I remember friendship, that I do not fire upon you for what you have done already." This was sufficiently plain language, and it was evident that the only thing for the small party of English to do was to retire without provoking any further chance of a collision. Major Cavagnari and the commandant accordingly once more shook hands, and the English, mounting their horses, rode off from the neighbourhood of the fortress, and returned to Jumrood. According to the Major's report, Faiz Muhammad behaved in a very courteous manner; but this must be understood as referring to his demeanour towards the English officer personally. The insult to the Power he represented, conveyed in the observation of the commandant that he would have fired on the party but for old friendship's sake, was gross and palpable.

The Afghan commander had received a formal summons from Sir Neville Chamberlain to allow the passage of the Mission, before Major Cavagnari and his escort appeared upon the spot. He was therefore fully prepared for the advent of the English party, and he seems, moreover, to have been in previous communication with the Ameer, and to have acted in harmony with his orders. An officer from Cabul had arrived at Ali Musjid several days earlier, and was followed, on the 18th of September, three days before the setting out of the British Mission, by the Mir Akhor, a confidential servant of the Ameer in charge of frontier affairs, and a very bitter enemy of the English. Sir Neville Chamberlain, however, received no authorization for the passage of the Embassy, and was at length induced to put the matter to the test by sending forward the little troop under Major Cavagnari, and requiring a plain answer to the plain question whether the party would be permitted to continue on its way. The garrison of the fortress

had been hastily augmented, to resist any attempt which might be made to overcome the Afghan resistance; and it was beyond a question that, had the Mission attempted to proceed, all would have been slaughtered by the Afghan guns. Moreover, a resort to force, on the part of the visitors, would have been quite unjustifiable without a previous declaration of war. On hearing of this untoward commencement to the contemplated Mission, the Viceroy at once ordered Sir Neville Chamberlain to return to Peshawur, and the Indian Government proceeded to consider what further steps had been rendered necessary by the incident of the 21st. Had any additional proof been needed of the unfriendly sentiments entertained by the Ameer towards England, and of his preference of the Russian to the British alliance, that proof was now before the Indian Government in the most unmistakeable form. The Afghan sovereign had received a Russian Mission, and had refused an English one. It is impossible to conceive an affront more marked, signal, and unqualified. Any objection which applied to the one Embassy was equally applicable to the other; yet the one was received into Cabul itself, and the other was ignominiously turned back at the frontiers of Afghanistan, with a menace of deadly violence if it dared to proceed. When one of the Afghan chieftains desired to delay the progress of the Russian Embassy in its passage across the deserts, the Ameer sent orders to the effect that his visitors were to be suffered to advance, although it does not appear that they had obtained any previous permission, but had gained their ends by undisguised threats of what they would do if opposed. The English Embassy may have been accompanied by a greater show of military force than the Russian; but military force was not wanting to the latter, and, if this was the cause of offence, it existed in each case, while it was suffered to operate in only one. If the presence of a foreign Mission was distasteful at all, it was equally so in both instances; and indeed it is evident that the Ameer did not like the Russian visit any more than the English; yet he allowed the Russians to come, while he spurned the English from his very doors. The inference is plain—that he desired to propitiate Russia in some way which would have been injurious to England, and which the presence of an English Mission might have thwarted. In a despatch from the Indian Government, dated from Simla on the 26th of September, it is very reasonably remarked that the growing estrangement of the Ameer, and his attitude of scarcely veiled hostility during the previous twelve months, had given to his formal reception of Russian emissaries the character of a grave political declaration. "To have asked the Ameer whether he would receive the Mission, and to have awaited his time and pleasure, would have been," says this despatch, "a futile repetition of an experiment which had failed already. The repulse of Sir Neville Chamberlain by Shere Ali at his frontier, while the Russian emissaries are still at his capital, has proved the inutility of diplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Ameer of all claim upon our further forbearance."

The reply of Shere Ali to the Viceroy was written on the 6th of October, and received by Lord Lytton on the 19th. It was full of complaints as to the harsh and injurious words which had been addressed to the writer in the various communications from the British authorities, and alluded to the unfriendliness of forcing a Mission upon him at a time when, owing to the death of his son, he was suffering from the extreme grief and affliction which had fallen upon him by the decree of God. Nevertheless, he said, his officials would not evince any hostility or opposition to the British Government. "Moreover," added the Ameer, "they do not entertain any hostile or antagonistic feelings towards any Government whatever. But, should any Government entertain without cause any hostile and inimical feelings towards this God-granted Government, I commit all my affairs to the merciful God, upon whose will and intention all matters depend. He alone suffices for us, and He is the best to be trusted." This communication from the Ameer was conveyed to the Viceroy by Gholam Hussein Khan, who, in accordance with his instructions, had asked leave to return, and to whom the requisite permission had been granted. It will be seen that the Afghan Prince gave not the least undertaking that he would receive an English Mission, in whatsoever form it might present itself. The verbal promise to Gholam Hussein, that after he had got rid of the Russians he would send a confidential messenger to escort the British Embassy, was therefore evidently nothing more than an attempt to gain time while he still further trifled with the Indian Government. The repulse of Major Cavagnari is sufficient evidence that such promises were unreal, and uttered in bad faith. It cannot be correctly said that the Mission which started from Peshawur on the 21st of September implied an attempt to force a passage against the will of the Ameer, nor was any such attempt made. Due notification of its advent had been despatched beforehand, and the Ameer had been requested by Lord Lytton, in his letter of August 14th, to issue commands to all authorities upon the route between Peshawur and Cabul, that

they might make arrangements for effectually securing to the British Envoy, "the representative of a friendly Power," safe-conduct and suitable accommodation while passing with his retinue through the Afghan dominions. Both before the Mission set out, and after the appearance of Major Cavagnari's party under the walls of Ali Musjid, the commandant of that fortress was requested to permit the passage of the Embassy, and, upon meeting with a refusal, the strangers retired beyond the Afghan frontiers. No excuse exists for saying that there was any pretence of violence previous to the declaration of war. If the mere fact of Sir Neville Chamberlain being accompanied by a certain number of armed men is to be taken as evidence of an attempt or desire to force a peaceful Mission upon the Ameer against his wishes, the same attempt existed in the case of the Russian Ambassador, General Stoletoff, who had with him six officers, twenty-two Cossacks, and fifteen Kirghiz horsemen, but who nevertheless was permitted to advance. The main facts are perfectly insurmountable. The Russians sent an armed Mission, and were escorted, with every demonstration of honour, and every exhibition of Oriental magnificence and hospitality, into the presence of the Ameer himself. The Viceroy of India requested that *his* representatives also might be received into the country, and accompanied, with due provision for their safety, to the metropolitan city. The Ameer, while professing his willingness to receive the English at some indefinite future period, denied them access, as a matter of fact, the moment they appeared across his frontier. If there is any such thing as an insult between nation and nation, here was an insult of the grossest kind. If the interests of one country can be injured by intrigues with another, here was irrefragable evidence that such intrigues were proceeding, and that such injury would as a consequence be wrought. If war is ever justifiable for the support of national dignity or national well-being, here was an occasion on which the sword might be fitly drawn, and when to leave it in the scabbard was to accept humiliation in the face of countless myriads, who will never continue to yield obedience where they suppose there is not the power or the resolution to enforce respect.

In the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub, of Sir Neville Chamberlain, Mr. Lyall, and other persons familiar with Oriental style, the tone of the Ameer's letter of October 6th was intentionally rude, and conveyed a direct challenge. Lord Lytton gave expression to this view in a telegram to Lord Cranbrook, despatched on October 19th, and added that the letter would certainly be so regarded by all our native subjects, as it was written after the Ameer had been informed by the Nawab of the affront at Ali Musjid, and of the light in which we viewed that act. On the same day, a special Council assembled for the consideration of the Ameer's conduct, and it was proposed to issue immediately a manifesto, defining our cause of offence, declaring the friendly disposition of the Indian Government towards the Afghan people, and its reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and fixing the sole responsibility for what might ensue upon the Ameer himself. The other measures proposed were a forward movement into the Kurum Valley, on the completion of the force then being collected at Thal, the expulsion of the Ameer's garrison from the entrance to the Khyber Pass, and an advance from Quetta on Pisheen, or, if necessary, to Candahar. The Viceroy at once requested the sanction of the Home Government to these measures, observing that the advantages of delay were none, and its disadvantages obvious; that distrust of our resolve to act already prevailed widely, and would increase every day, with the effect of raising the Ameer's prestige while lowering ours; and that by any postponement we should lose the existing opportunity of securing the adherence of the independent tribes. In the opinion of Lord Lytton, a demand for apology would be useless, and would only expose us to fresh insult, while losing valuable time. This, however, was not the view taken by the Indian Minister, Lord Cranbrook, who telegraphed on the 25th of October that he considered it right, before crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan, to make a demand, in temperate language, for an apology, and for the acceptance of a permanent British Mission within the Afghan frontiers. A reply to this demand should be required within a time sufficient for the purpose; and in the meanwhile the massing of troops, which had already commenced, should be continued, and adequate forces should be assembled at the various points from which attack would be made in case of war.

The letter to be sent to the Ameer was drawn up by the Home Government, and telegraphed to Lord Lytton on the 30th of October. It pointed out that the Ameer had refused in 1876 to admit a British Mission into Afghanistan, on the grounds that European envoys would not be safe in that country, and that the reception of a British Mission might afford Russia a pretext for forcing one of her own nationality upon the Ameer; that the British Government had accepted these excuses, although such a refusal is contrary to the practice of allied States; but that nevertheless his Highness had



CAMP OF THE BRITISH MISSION TO CABUL AT JUMROOD, NEAR THE KHYBER PASS.

received a Russian envoy at his capital, at a time when war was believed to be imminent between England and Russia. This was in contradiction of the reasons asserted by the Ameer for not receiving a British Mission, and gave to his conduct the appearance of being actuated by motives inimical to the British Government. The letter went on to observe that the escort attached to Sir Neville Chamberlain's Embassy did not exceed two hundred men, and was therefore much less numerous than that which accompanied Shere Ali himself into British territory. The Mission, however, had been repelled by force, and for this act of enmity and indignity to the Empress of India, in the person of her envoy, the letter of the Ameer afforded no explanation or apology. "In consequence of this hostile action on your part," continued the missive, "I have assembled her Majesty's forces on your frontier; but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and sufficient apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of rank. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent Mission within your territory. It is further essential that you should undertake that no injury shall be done by you to the tribes who acted as guides to my Mission, and that reparation shall be made for any damage they have suffered from you; and if any injury be done by you to them, the British Government

GENERAL SIR F. P. HAINES, G.C.B., C.I.E.

will at once take steps to protect them. Unless these conditions are accepted fully and plainly by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th of November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government."

The mode of conveying this letter to Shere Ali was peculiar. It was feared that if a messenger was sent with it to Cabul, according to the usual custom, he would very probably be slain by the exasperated Ameer; and the communication was therefore hurriedly placed in the hands of the commandant at Ali Musjid, while another copy was put into his Highness's private post-office at Peshawur. Those who held that war should have been declared immediately after the repulse on the frontier — and they included nearly all Anglo-Indians—said that the Government had been compelled to approach the Ameer like an infuriated bear in a pit, handing him the ultimatum at the end of a long pole, and being at the same time ready for a speedy retreat in the event of a dangerous outbreak.* But, if the thing was to be done at all, this was the only safe method.

No answer to the ultimatum was received within the prescribed time, and on the 21st of November a declaration of war was issued by the Viceroy in English, Persian, and Urdu. This document recited the various benefits conferred upon the Ameer by the British Government, such as the numerous presents of money and arms which he had received, the aid which had been given to him in securing his position and extending his authority, and the influence exerted by England in order to obtain from Russia the recognition of the Ameer's sovereignty over Wakhan and Badakshan. "For all these gracious acts," said the Viceregal proclamation, "the Ameer Shere Ali Khan has rendered no return; on the contrary, he has requited them with active ill-will and open discourtesy. The authority over Badakshan, acquired for him by the influence of the British Government, was used by him to forbid passage through that province to a British officer of rank, returning from a Mission to a neighbouring State. He has closed against free passage to British subjects and their commerce the road between India and Afghanistan; he has maltreated British subjects, permitted British traders to be plundered within his jurisdiction, giving them neither protection nor redress; he has used cruelly, and put to death, subjects of his own, on the mere suspicion that they were in communication with the British Government; he has openly and assiduously endeavoured, by words and deeds, to stir up religious hatred against the English, and incited war against the Empire of India." The proclamation then proceeded to set forth the recent offences of the Ameer in receiving a Russian Mission at a time when such an act derived special significance from the character of contemporaneous events in Europe, and in forcibly repelling an English Mission, of whose coming he had had formal and timely announcement. "The Ameer Shere Ali Khan, mistaking for weakness the long forbearance of the British Government," said the Viceroy in conclusion, "has deliberately incurred its just resentment. With the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Government has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved from all responsibility for the recent acts of the Ameer, and, as they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere with them, nor will the British Government tolerate interference on the part of any other Power in the internal affairs of Afghanistan."

The die was now cast, and war was certain. In England, much difference of opinion existed as to the policy, and even as to the justice, of the coming struggle; but in India the whole British population was in favour of coercive measures. It was considered that the Home Government had exhibited great weakness in compelling the Viceroy, much against his own will, to send another letter to the Ameer, requiring an apology for the repulse of our Mission at Ali Musjid. War ought to have been declared immediately, in the opinion of these enthusiasts, who averred that nothing but mischief could result from any further attempts at conciliation. It was believed by many that the result would be to embolden the Ameer in his hostile attitude, and to enable him to use the apparent timidity of the Indian Government as a stimulus to the martial zeal of his adherents. To more dispassionate observers, however, it seemed advisable to give the Ameer another chance of retreating from his false position; not because there was much probability of his doing so, but because his refusal would place him still more obviously in the wrong, and improve the moral position of the British Government when hostilities were actually commenced. The interval, moreover, could be turned to good account in making preparations for a war which seemed almost inevitable. The military authorities in India were not slow to avail themselves of this opportunity. Numerous bodies of troops were brought together at Mooltan, Peshawur, and other places, and every precaution was taken that the several columns should start

* Correspondent of the *Times*.

perfectly equipped. The Ferozepoor Arsenal rapidly sent up supplies of tents, ammunition, accoutrements, and entrenching tools. Maps were issued to the various corps, and it was ordered that all available tents belonging to the Sepoys should be given up to British regiments. The troops were so eager to start on their expedition that the dangers of an advance into so wild a country as Afghanistan —a country, moreover, peopled by many warlike and ungovernable tribes—were entirely overlooked, and it was confidently anticipated that we should see no repetition of the disasters which had attended us in the same regions in 1841 and 1842. The Ameer's powers of resistance were in truth known to be not very great. Sixty per cent. of his troops were invalided with fever; many of the tribes were opposed to his rule, and a large proportion of the Afridees showed a disposition to aid the English. Two chiefs, accompanied by about four hundred followers, went to Peshawur in the latter part of October, and tendered the allegiance of the whole body to the Commissioners. The return to British India of the Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan increased the general feeling of satisfaction. It was feared that he might not be permitted to return, or that he might even be killed; but the Ameer had given him an escort of thirty men, who, on arriving at a ford near the encampment at Thal, insisted on a written receipt for his safe arrival, as they had been threatened with death if any evil befell him. Gholam Hussein had proceeded by way of the Shutargardan and Peiwar Passes, and he described those routes as being easy for the passage of troops. The chief of one of the principal Beloochee tribes offered his services to the British commanders, and the Khan of Khelat sold our forces 20,000 maunds of his own wheat at current prices, besides volunteering to procure the numerous camels required for the invading army. The Punjaub chiefs eagerly pressed their services upon the Government, and the troops of some of these small potentates were possessed of good soldierly qualities, such as would, on an emergency, render them useful as a reserve. The prospects of the campaign were therefore exceedingly hopeful, and it was only in England that dismal prophecies were uttered as to what might ensue.

How strong a feeling against the war existed at home, was shown during the autumn by a large section of the press, and by numerous public meetings. The same views found earnest expression on the very first evening of the winter session of Parliament which had been rendered necessary by the state of affairs upon our Indian border. Lords Granville, Grey, and Northbrook, in the Upper House, severely censured the Government for the course they had taken; and on the 9th of December a long and animated debate began in both Chambers upon the general aspect of affairs, and upon the policy of successive Governments, through which the existing position had been reached. It was proposed by the Indian Minister, Lord Cranbrook, "That, her Majesty having directed a military expedition of her forces, charged upon Indian revenues, to be despatched against the Ameer of Afghanistan, this House consents that the revenue of India shall be applied to defray the expenses of the military operations which may be carried on beyond the external frontiers of her Majesty's Indian possessions." The motion gave occasion for a complete review of all the circumstances out of which the war had arisen, and Lord Lawrence, as one of the previous Viceroys of India, argued at great length against the policy that had prevailed since the accession to office of Lord Lytton. England, he thought, should, as a matter of justice, bear the cost of the war; and this was the ground generally assumed by the Opposition. The debate was remarkable in many ways, and in none more than by giving still further evidence of the complete estrangement of the Earls of Derby and Carnarvon from the policy of their former colleagues. An amendment was moved by Lord Halifax, with a view to throwing censure upon the Government for their recent conduct of Indian affairs; but at the conclusion of the debate, on the 10th of December, the amendment was rejected by 201 votes to 65, thus giving the Government a majority of 136. A motion of censure was also brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. Whitbread, and this too was discussed on the 9th and 10th, and again on the 12th and 13th. One of the principal speeches was that of Mr. Gladstone, who, as might have been expected, vehemently reproached the Government for their treatment of the Ameer, and repelled the charge of having brought about existing difficulties by the policy of his own Administration towards Afghanistan. The division in the Lower House gave the Government a majority of 101, the figures being 328 to 227, and the majority included seven Liberals, together with six Home Rule members who ordinarily sat on the Opposition side of the House. In the House of Lords, as many as thirteen Liberal peers voted with the Government. Five Conservative peers, including Lords Derby and Carnarvon, ranged themselves with the Opposition; but in the House of Commons only one Conservative went into the same lobby with the Liberals.

In the course of these discussions, the question

was raised, whether, supposing we had a cause of offence at all, it was not rather against the Emperor of Russia than against the Ameer of Afghanistan. If, it was argued from this point of view, Russia had, by sending a Mission to Cabul, broken her undertaking to consider Afghanistan completely beyond the sphere of her influence and action, that was *her* wrong-doing, and not the wrong-doing of the Ameer. It was therefore said that we had acted in the spirit of cowards, because, where our quarrel was with the strong Power, not with the weak, we had struck the weak Power, and suffered the strong one to go untouched. This view was entirely repudiated by Lord Beaconsfield, who argued that we had no existing cause of quarrel with Russia. When the Russian Embassy to Afghanistan, and the movements of Russian troops in Central Asia, came to the knowledge of the British Government, courteous representations were made to St. Petersburg, and the Emperor, in the estimation of the English Premier, acted with entire frankness. It was admitted by the Cabinet of the Northern Power that, at a time when war seemed probable between Russia and England, certain steps had been taken by the former country with a view to acting on Afghanistan; but, when the danger passed, the Czar immediately ordered his troops to retire to their old station beyond the Oxus, and it was announced that the Embassy would be withdrawn as soon as possible. The new-born enthusiasm of the Gladstonian party for a war with Russia met with no encouragement from official quarters. There was in truth no longer a *casus belli* against the Russian Government in respect of Afghanistan. However objectionable and unfriendly its conduct may have been, the cause of quarrel ceased directly the Embassy and the army were withdrawn. When Parliament assembled on the 5th of December, these acts were either accomplished, or on the eve of being carried out; and to have made war with Russia when she was doing all that in that particular matter we had asked, would have been a policy without justification, and one which the followers of Mr. Gladstone would have been the first to denounce. But our quarrel with Afghanistan remained the same as before. The offence committed by the Ameer did not consist simply in his receiving a Russian Mission, nor simply in his refusing an English Mission; but in his doing both, and that in such a way as not merely to imperil the interests of England, but to affront her dignity by an open and designed insult. For this insult no apology was offered, and, as the affairs of this world are conducted, it was impossible not to take notice of such conduct in the only fashion which, under the circumstances, is practicable between one nation and another.

It was not until after the declaration of war, and the actual commencement of hostilities, that the Ameer's reply to the ultimatum was received by the Indian Government. The document is dated November 19th, but is believed to have been sent off some days later, as it did not reach Dakka before the 30th. It began with a complaint that during the last few years the goodwill of the English Government had been evidenced by words only. Proposals, which from their very nature it was impossible to comply with, had been made to the Ameer, and one of these had reference to his undutiful son, "the ill-starred wretch, Mahomed Yakoub Khan." Other grounds of complaint were referred to as having increased the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of Shere Ali. "With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission," continued the Ameer, "your Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British Government. I assure your Excellency that, on the contrary, the officials of this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered; but they were afraid that the independence of this Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two Governments for several years might be annihilated." The Ameer furthermore stated that, had the object been really friendly, and had no force or threats of violence been used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage. He would always maintain the friendship which existed between the two Governments, and he cherished no feelings of hostility or opposition; but he considered it incumbent on the officials of the British Government that they should not inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours; "and if," said the Ameer in conclusion, "the British Government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small escort, not exceeding twenty or thirty members, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission, this servant of God will not oppose its progress." The reply was not such as could be deemed satisfactory by the Anglo-Indian Government. It contained no apology for the repulse of the Embassy at Ali Musjid; on the contrary, it justified the action of the officers at

that fort, who had in truth only carried out the orders of their sovereign. A war that was to be fatal to Shere Ali had been precipitated by his own obstinacy, and it was now too late to avert the consequences for which he had himself prepared.

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

The North-western Frontier of India—Contradictory Opinions as to the Advisability of securing fresh Territory—Speech of Lord Beaconsfield at the Lord Mayor's Banquet (Nov. 9th, 1878)—Contemplated Arrangements with respect to the Frontier—Ambiguous Utterances—Further Explanations of the Premier—Probable Intentions of the Government at the Outset of the War—The Mountain Passes to be secured—Composition of the English Army for Service in Afghanistan—Friendly Disposition of the Native Princes—Reliance of the Ameer on Russia—Presentation of a Sword by General Kauffmann to the Afghan Sovereign—Opinion in the Russian Papers—Commencement of the War—Attack on Fort Ali Musjid—Hard Fighting—Deaths of Major Birch and Lieutenant Fitzgerald—The Afghans outflanked—Abandonment of the Fortress—Proceedings of the Kurum and Quetta Columns—Opposition of the Afridees—Artillery Action in the Peiwar Pass—Occupation of the Pass by the British—Disorderly Rout of the Afghans—Difficulties and Fatigues of the English Force—Condition of the Country—Approach of Winter—Generals Biddulph and Stewart on the Beloochistan Frontier—Address of Lord Lytton to the Indian Contingents—Disaffection in the Native Regiments—Hostility of the Afridees—Proclamation of a Jihad by the Afghan Sovereign.

BEFORE the war with Afghanistan had actually begun, speculation was rife as to what would be its effect on the future of our Eastern dependencies. Questions of frontier were a good deal discussed in the autumn of 1878, and it was the opinion of many military authorities that the confines of British India on the North-west were ill marked out, and that advantage should be taken of the state of hostility to exact from Afghanistan certain territorial concessions which might have the effect of increasing our security. The idea had been mooted some years before, but was revived by the course of events following on the Ameer's refusal to receive our envoy. It was argued that if our possessions terminated with the Indus, that river, which is unbridged by any permanent structure, and the current of which is so strong that the bridge of boats at Attock is frequently carried away, would be a sufficient protection. But when Scinde, and afterwards the Punjaub, were annexed by the Anglo-Indian Government, a long strip of territory on the western side of the stream fell under British dominion; so that the Indus ceased to be either a boundary or a defence. The frontier towards Afghanistan since then has been the line of the Suleiman Mountains, and of the other ranges that are connected with those highlands. The mountains are pierced by several passes, of which the celebrated Khyber Pass is one; and it was believed by many that British India would not be safe unless the further ends of these passes were within our grasp. To others it was equally clear that to take up a number of positions on the Afghan side of the mountains would be to add very considerably to our dangers, and that the wisest plan was to remain on the eastern side, and leave to any invading force the difficulty and fatigue of struggling through the defiles before they could attack us. Lord Beaconsfield adopted the first of these views, and gave expression to his ideas on the Indian frontier at the Lord Mayor's banquet on the 9th of November.

The annual civic feast had for some years acquired a character similar to that of New Year's Day in France during the reign of Napoleon III. Some important announcement—some new development of policy—was almost looked for, in the one case as in the other. In 1876 and 1877, the Guildhall speeches of the Premier had had an important bearing on the fate of the Ottoman Empire; and in 1878 the military position of our Indian realm was made the subject of remark. Lord Beaconsfield assured his auditors that her Majesty's Government were by no means apprehensive of any invasion of India by way of the North-western frontier—the base of operations of any possible foe being so remote, the communications so difficult, and the aspect of the country so forbidding. "But," he added, "our North-western frontier is a haphazard and not a scientific frontier. It is in the power of any foe so to embarrass and disturb our dominion that we should be obliged to maintain the presence of a large military force in that quarter, entailing on this country and on India a proportionate expenditure. These are unquestionably great evils, and former Viceroys, under different Administrations, have had their attention called with anxiety to the state of our frontier. Recently, however, some peculiar circumstances have occurred in that part of the world, which have convinced her Majesty's



BRIDGE OF BOATS AT ATTOCK.

Government that the time has arrived when we must terminate all this inconvenience, and prevent all this possible injury. With this view, we have made arrangements by which, when completed—in all probability, at no distant day—all anxiety respecting the North-western frontier of India will be removed. We shall live, I hope, on good terms with our immediate neighbours, and not on bad terms, perhaps, with some neighbours who are more remote. I do not wish, my Lord Mayor, in making these remarks, that you should understand that her Majesty's Government are of opinion that an invasion of India is impossible or impracticable. On the contrary, if Asia Minor and the valley of the Euphrates were in the possession of a very weak or a very powerful State, it would be by no means

impossible for an adequate army to march through the passes of Asia Minor and through Persia, and absolutely menace the dominions of the Queen. But her Majesty's Government have contemplated such a



THE KURUM VALLEY, FROM THE PUNJAUB SALT RANGE.

result, and have provided means to prevent its occurrence by our Convention with Turkey, and our occupation of the isle of Cyprus." These utterances were undoubtedly somewhat ambiguous and contradictory. If the invasion of India by our North-western frontier was impracticable, except by a previous approach through the valley of the Euphrates and the dominions of Persia, and if the danger thus existing had been effectually guarded against by the recent agreement with Turkey, there seems to have been no occasion for altering the boundaries of our Eastern Empire. But precision was never the virtue of Lord Beaconsfield, and a statement seems to have had all the greater charms for him in proportion as it was dim and oracular.

The opponents of the Government, however, assumed too much when they maintained that the Premier had described the very object of the war as being the rectification of the North-western frontier. Mr. Gladstone, in a letter to the Bedford Liberal Association, dated November 12th, seems to have understood his great rival's words in that

sense; at any rate, such was the view confidently asserted in some quarters. But it is by no means a necessary inference from the words of the Prime Minister, in which the incompleteness of the frontier and the occurrence of the Afghan War are indeed associated, as subjects having a bearing on one another, but are not placed in the relation of cause and effect. Lord Beaconsfield repudiated this interpretation when addressing the House of Lords on the 10th of December. "It has been said," he remarked, "that on a recent occasion—not in this House—I stated that the object of the war with Afghanistan was a rectification of boundaries, and that we were to have a scientific instead of a haphazard frontier. I never said that that was the object of the war. I treated it as what might be a consequence of the war—a very different thing. Our application to the Ameer was, in fact, founded upon the principle of rectifying our frontier without any disturbance of territory whatever. What was our difficulty with regard to Afghanistan? We could gain no information as to what was going on beyond the mountain-range, or what was preparing in the numerous valleys, of Afghanistan. What we wanted, therefore, was eyes to see and ears to hear; and we should have attained our object had the Ameer made to us those concessions which are commonly granted by all civilised States, and which even some Oriental States do not deny us—namely, to have a Minister at his capital (a demand which we did not press), and men like our Consuls-General at some of his chief towns. That, virtually, would have been a rectification of our frontier, because we should have got rid of those obstacles that rendered it utterly impossible for us to conduct public affairs with any knowledge of the circumstances with which we had to deal, as regarded Afghanistan." The Premier went on to explain that, in a military sense, the difference between a scientific and a haphazard frontier was that the one might be defended by five thousand men, while the other might need a hundred thousand, and even then would not be safe against attack. The "scientific frontier," however, was not the reason for which the war was made, though it might be one of the results aimed at, as soon as war had become inevitable. This explanation was sceptically received by the Gladstonites, and they contended, a few months later, that their interpretation of the Guildhall speech was entirely confirmed by some remarks of Lord Beaconsfield on the 13th of February, 1879, when Parliament reassembled for the usual session. Alluding to Afghanistan, the Prime Minister said:—"Her Majesty's Government have the satisfaction of feeling that the object of their interference in that country has been completely accomplished. We are now in possession of the three great highways which connect Afghanistan with India, and I hope that this country will remain in possession of those three great highways. They have secured the object for which the expedition was undertaken; they have secured that frontier which will, I hope and believe, render our Indian Empire invulnerable; and in attaining this object we shall trench as little as possible upon the independence and self-government of Afghanistan." Even this statement, however, was very far from conclusive. There is surely a vast difference between declaring that the war was actually brought about in order that territory might be extorted from the Ameer (which was what in some quarters Lord Beaconsfield was said to have in effect acknowledged), and admitting that, war having been forced upon us by the obstinacy of the Afghan Prince, it was determined not to make peace without a rectification of frontier. The object of the expedition was not necessarily the occasion of the war. At the same time, these Ministerial ambiguities were much to be regretted. They spread a cloud of darkness over what should have been open to public scrutiny, and furnished ground for comments which wore an effective and convincing air.*

Had the Government really determined from the first to discover "a plausible excuse for forcing a quarrel on the Ameer, and wresting from him a portion of his territory," † they would have seized with avidity on the opportunities which were offered them. But we have already seen that they were slow to admit the accuracy of Lord Lytton's statements as to the Russian Embassy at Cabul, and it was only on the Viceroy's repeated requests for authority to act that they sanctioned the despatch of an English Mission. When, later on, the English envoys were turned back at the frontier, the Cabinet would not immediately declare war (though the whole of British India was burning to

* How far the individual policy of the Premier may have outrun and anticipated the collective policy of the Cabinet, is a matter which it was entirely impossible at the time to determine. But it was asserted by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in October, 1878, that Lord Lytton was sent to India with instructions from Mr. Disraeli personally (not from the Government or the Indian Secretary), which instructions were to the effect that he was "to deal with and finally settle the North-west frontier question as an Imperial question, on general lines of Imperial policy." Lord Salisbury (then the Secretary for India) is, moreover, said to have been "violently opposed" to the whole of the scheme; whence arose the delay in carrying it out.

† "Causes of the Afghan War," issued by the Afghan Committee.

avenge what was regarded as an insult), but required that the Ameer should in the first place have an opportunity of apologising. This does not look like excessive eagerness to find a pretext for hostilities; yet it is probable enough that, when war was seen to be unavoidable, a rectification of frontier was contemplated as the great object to be attained by the expedition. Thus much, indeed, was foreshadowed by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times*, writing on the 29th of September, 1878. We were furnished by Russia herself, according to this authority, with ample justification for taking such immediate action as would be pregnant with lasting results, and for guarding against the disastrous consequences which might otherwise flow from the systematised intrigue and aggressive movements of Russia in Central Asia, and her threatened interference with Afghanistan. The occasion would accordingly be seized, in order to secure the various passes piercing the mountain-ranges along the whole frontier from the Khyber to the Bolan; and it was added that further strategic measures would be adopted to dominate entirely the Suleiman Mountains and the Hindoo-Koosh. But these hostile steps were still dependent on the conduct of the Ameer himself; for at that time it had yet to be seen whether he would take advantage of the opportunity for making apology and reparation which had been afforded him.

Pending the receipt of the Ameer's answer, the military preparations of the Indian Government were actively pushed forward, and the invading force (supposing its services to be needed) was to consist of three armies: the Peshawur Valley Army, 16,000 strong, with sixty-one guns; the Kurum Army, 6,000 strong, with twenty-four guns; and the Quetta Army, 12,000 strong, with sixty guns; together with a division for protecting the communications, and a strong siege-train. The total was to be 34,000 men (exclusive of reserves and auxiliaries), with a proportion of one-third Europeans. These numbers, however, were in the result considerably reduced. The Madras and Bombay armies were to furnish reserves, and several of the independent Rajahs placed their troops at the disposal of the British Government. The Nawab of Bhawulpore, indeed, offered not merely his troops, but the whole resources of his State, and even made a pressing request to be permitted to take the field in person. Other petitions to be allowed to serve were sent in from numerous chiefs of lesser dignity in various parts of the Punjaub, and several of the native papers expressed the heartiest wishes for the success of the campaign. Thus, the Anglo-Indian authorities were certain of abundant support, while it was doubtful if the Ameer would have anything like the general countenance of his own subjects. The malcontent of many of the hill-tribes was known to be deep and unappeasable; and even in the interior, Shere Ali had many enemies. In his despair, he looked to Russia for aid and comfort, but found little solace in the friend for whose sake he had incurred the wrath of England. The *St. Petersburg Gazette* stated in the course of October that the Afghan ruler had addressed a letter to General Kauffman, in which he said, "Our hope is in you, and in you alone." It was asserted in Berlin, and very generally believed, that several thousand former Russian soldiers and officers had been permitted to volunteer for service in Afghanistan. This was undoubtedly the course pursued by Russia in the Servian War of 1876, and it is very possible that it was repeated two years later on a more distant stage. But the Russian Government did not give any great encouragement to the Afghan sovereign, and the Emperor is even thought to have put some pressure on Shere Ali to induce him to come to terms with the English. The Czar may have been willing, if war really ensued, that his subjects should go unofficially to the assistance of the Ameer; but he was probably desirous of preventing hostilities altogether, if he could, as nothing would be more likely to derange his plans in that part of Asia than the success of the Indian Government.

That Shere Ali, however, had some reason for supposing he might rely on General Kauffmann, is exceedingly probable. Kauffmann unquestionably desired the Afghan alliance, and was ready to give something for it. In November, 1878, it was reported to the *Times* from Berlin that the Russian Governor of Turkistan had delivered a costly sword to Munsha Mohammed Hassan, chief of the Afghan Legation at Tashkend, for transmission to the Ameer. In presenting the sword, General Kauffmann is alleged to have said:—"My illustrious Sovereign, in whose Empire the sun never sets, and whose raised finger causes millions of soldiers to take up arms, sends this pledge of friendship and unchanging affection to his friend and ally, the noble and chivalrous ruler of the Afghans and Beloochees. History teaches that Russia ever espouses the just cause, and that she has always known how to protect her allies from the attacks of any enemy, however powerful. Whoever sides with Russia need not fear that a hair of his head will be injured. The power of the Russian sword is great. This is a fact well known to the enemies

of Russia, as well as to her allies. May God protect and preserve the two powerful Sovereigns—the Czar and the Ameer! May God promote the welfare of the two allied countries, to the benefit of the Afghans, the Russians, and humanity at large! May the echo of these words awaken consolation and hope where oppression and tyranny are paramount!" The date of this presentation is not mentioned, and it has been supposed that the incident occurred a long time before the rupture between England and Afghanistan. The allusions in Kauffmann's address, however, seem rather to refer to what, in the autumn of 1878, was impending in the Ameer's dominions. The statement was altogether disavowed by the St. Petersburg journals; but it is not unlikely that some such incident really took place.

The press in Russia seldom goes very strongly against what is approved, or at least tolerated, at head-quarters; and the Russian press was nearly, if not quite, unanimous in advising that indirect aid should be given to the Ameer, while some journalists even clamoured for an open rupture with England. "Russia and England," said the *Telegraph* of St. Petersburg, "require a definite delimination of their respective spheres of influence. An arrangement must be come to, whether in peace or by force of arms. Russia sent an Embassy to the Ameer to inquire whether she might count upon him in the coming crisis, and Russia, if the Ameer deems it expedient to side with her, will have to protect him. Relying upon the accession of strength he has gained in joining Russia, the Ameer has thrown down the gauntlet to England. Whatever may happen, Russia will never permit the incorporation of Afghanistan by the English. They may punish the Ameer; but if they attempt to do away with him, an Anglo-Russian war is sure to ensue." The *Golos* said that the Ameer might count upon the "friendly neutrality" of both Russia and Persia—a phrase implying a vast amount of active, though secret, co-operation; and the St. Petersburg correspondent of the Berlin Ministerial *Norddeutsche Zeitung*—a writer believed to reflect the views prevailing in Governmental circles on the Neva—stated that, should Shere Ali be beaten, and his territory annexed, Russia would occupy Merve and Balkh, when the fiction of a neutral territory would cease to exist. The *Bourse Gazette*—a paper strongly opposed to the Turkish war—said that Russia should make the Ameer's cause her own, and by the despatch of a sufficient force render Afghanistan invincible. "A small Russian corps," it was added, "would suffice to force England to stake her Asiatic position on the issue of the struggle. For Russia to defend the Ameer is to vindicate her own Imperial interests—an office altogether different from the Quixotic defence of the Sclave." These observations show how deeply Russian opinion was excited by the coming war.

The principal of the three armies—that intended for operation in the Peshawur Valley, thus occupying the extreme right of the whole series of operations—entered the Khyber district, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Samuel Browne, in the early morning of November 21st, 1878. Fort Ali Musjid, the scene of Sir Neville Chamberlain's repulse, was the first objective point; and, while Sir Samuel Browne himself advanced to a front attack, he ordered the first and second brigades, under Brigadier-General Macpherson and General Tytler, to make their way by a circuitous route to a hill above and a village behind the fort, so that in this way they might outflank and cut off the retreat of the garrison. A piquet of the enemy's cavalry was visible on the summit of the Shagai ridge, opposite Ali Musjid; but the advanced guard marched on quickly, and, having crested a neighbouring height, opened a skirmishing fire at ten o'clock in the morning. The Afghans replied in a very desultory fashion, and presently retired, allowing the British advance to reach the Shagai ridge without further opposition. From this point Ali Musjid was clearly visible, standing on an almost perpendicular rock in the centre of the valley. At noon, the Afghan fort fired the first shell, which burst in the air; a second flew over the Staff of General Browne, who were then standing on the Shagai ridge, and fell beyond without bursting. On the whole, however, the Afghan guns, which had been practising for the previous three weeks, had got the range with considerable accuracy, and most of their shells fell close to our troops. Whenever one of these missiles dropped unusually near, there were exclamations of, "That's a Russian!" Orders to advance were eagerly desired; but for the present the Sikhs were sent forward to the right, to distract the attention of the enemy, while the rest of the infantry were withdrawn out of the direct line of fire, and the guns of the Horse Artillery replied to the Afghan fort. The firing soon became brisk, but it was some time before our heavy battery could be brought up to the ridge. When at length it arrived, the fire of the assailants grew much more serious, and the lighter batteries were then moved forward into the valley, where they took up several positions, and opened a desultory, but not ineffective, fire on the walls of the fortress. About two o'clock in the afternoon, two

40-pounder shells struck the central bastion of Ali Musjid, crumbled a great portion of it into fragments, and apparently dismounted the guns. The order for a general movement was then given, and, covered by the artillery, the infantry skirmishers began to mount the slopes of the Rhotas. The 81st and 24th Native Infantry advanced on the right hand of the valley, and climbed the opposite heights, while the 51st, the 6th Native Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs, made their way to the left. The scene was now very striking. The sides of the hills were dotted all over with infantry, and from every rock and bush came the quick flash of the rifles. The roar of the cannon, and the sharper report of the musketry, were re-echoed by the hills, and after a time nothing but one confused noise seemed to fill and pervade the air. Pushing steadily on, the skirmishers got nearly up to the fort; but, in the absence of any evidence that the First and Second Brigades, under Macpherson and Tytler, had effected the flanking movement with which they had been charged, it was considered that it would be running too great a risk to order the Third and Fourth Brigades to attempt an attack in front. Manderson's battery, which had for some time been moving along the bed of the stream at the bottom of the valley, encountered opposition from the enemy in places where it was not supposed he possessed any guns; and, as the evening was coming on, it was decided to suspend the further prosecution of the attack until the following day. The order was therefore given to cease firing; but precautions were taken to protect the positions already acquired, and the troops bivouacked for the night on the ground they had won.




PLAN OF ALI-MUSJID.

General Appleyard's advanced guard of the Third Brigade, consisting of a detachment of the Twenty-seventh Brigade of Infantry, had by that time reached the steep slope leading to the mountain peak which formed the right flank of the Afghan position. Here the commander of the band, Major Birch, found successive lines of entrenchment occupied by the enemy. In the eagerness of his advance, he seems to have thought he could carry the position before him, and, under the

waning light of evening, the Punjaubees whom he commanded endeavoured to make a rush over the broken ground at the concealed Afghans from whose fire they were suffering. This attempt, however, was met by so hot a volley from behind the entrenchments that many of the native soldiers fell of Sepoys then retreated, leaving the dead body of the Major exposed to the wrath of the Afghans. Lieutenant Fitzgerald—a young Irishman, who had won the high esteem of his comrades and superiors—called on the men of his own command to follow him to the rescue; but they hung back.



LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I.

killed or wounded, and two British officers were shot dead. These were Major Birch himself, and Lieutenant Fitzgerald. The incident was marked by all the finest characteristics of military heroism, and gave an air of grandeur to the commencement of the war. A young officer named Maclean found himself, with his handful of native infantry, overmatched in an exposed position. He called back for assistance, and Major Birch (an old hero of the Indian Mutiny days) rushed forward, and was almost immediately struck down. The small party He demanded fifteen volunteers from an adjacent detachment of Sikhs, who furnished the required party, and gallantly dashed on towards the body. Fitzgerald was twice wounded ere he reached it, but still pressed forward, and was helping to remove the corpse, when a third shot killed him. The greater number of the Sikhs also fell, and it was found necessary to leave them where they lay, as the Afghan fire was too hot to be any longer encountered.* Even without this misfortune, it would

* *Daily News* Correspondent.

ATTACK ON ALI MUSJID.

have been evident that the position was not to be carried by so small a force, and, as darkness was rapidly falling, General Browne sent orders that the effort was to be abandoned, and the Punjaubees were to fall back upon their supports. These orders were conveyed by Lord William Beresford, one of Sir Samuel Browne's *aides de camp*, across a valley swept by the artillery and infantry-fire of the Afghans; but it was some time before the bugle-call could be heard by the more advanced parties. The Afghans redoubled the quickness of their fire as the attacking force withdrew, and some additional losses were incurred; but it had at least been shown that a small detachment, boldly handled, could advance close to the walls of Ali Musjid.

During the night, dispositions were made to strengthen the left attack; on the right also, a good position had been obtained at a very trifling loss. The night air was cold, and daybreak was eagerly expected as the signal for a decisive struggle. But just as dawn was beginning to appear over the hills, a man cautiously approached the advanced piquets at the end of the hollow. He was at once secured and brought into the lines, when it appeared that he was a Cashmere merchant who had been a prisoner in Ali Musjid during the last four days, and had now run the risk of being shot, in order that he might inform the British troops that the fortress was abandoned. The Afghan commander had heard during the previous evening that General Tytler's Brigade was approaching in his rear; and immediately the fact was known, a panic arose among the soldiers of the Ameer. As this report might possibly be a deception, a young officer of the 9th Lancers rode out towards the Afghan lines, to ascertain exactly how matters stood. Some flags were still visible about the works, and at first a few people were observed at different points; but when the young lancer reached the fort, he found that it was actually in possession of some of our own Sepoys, under the command of two officers. Of Afghans there were only a few stragglers, who quietly submitted to their reverse. Fires were burning, which had been lit by the late garrison; guns were loaded and placed in position; the tents in the outer camp were undisturbed; but the enemy had fled, leaving behind him his dead and wounded in considerable numbers. The officer who had made this discovery rode off to General Browne with the welcome intelligence; and, accompanied by his Staff, the English commander at once entered the enemy's lines, which were found to be designed after European methods, and with formidable skill. The panic among the garrison had been so great that everything was left behind, including not merely large and small arms, but stores, provisions, and equipments. The main body of the army arrived soon after their chief, and the British flag was run up from the ramparts, amidst loud and enthusiastic cheers.

The two other columns began their advance simultaneously with the Peshawur Army—viz., on November 21st. The Kurum force, under Major-General (Sir Frederick) Roberts, assembled at Thal, in the Kohat district, about seventy miles from the town of Kohat, and passed the Afghan borders immediately after beginning its march. A small fort, just within the frontiers, was found to be deserted, and, proceeding on his way, General Roberts came to Ahmadshana, where another fort, apparently but recently evacuated, fell into our hands. At this point, the English commander convoked an assembly of the hill-tribes, and arranged with them for a supply of forage and fuel. The road immediately beyond Ahmadshana was found to be exceedingly bad. Enormous boulders of rock blocked up the way, and the Royal Horse Artillery were unable to advance until the pioneers had created a path for them by blasting. The Quetta column, commanded by General Biddulph, and forming the extreme left of the expeditionary forces, also commenced marching on the 21st, and advanced to Pisheen without any opposition. The cold in this locality was intense, and in each regiment there were about a hundred sick. Dakka (or Dhaka) was occupied by Sir Samuel Browne's column on the 23rd of November, and the General then pushed forward a reconnoitring force, which returned to Dakka with a report that Jellalabad was being strengthened, and that a large body of troops was being concentrated at Cabul. It now became evident that some trouble would be experienced from the Afridee tribes, who obstructed the Khyber Pass whenever they had an opportunity, and at times assailed detached parties whom they thought they were strong enough to overpower. Several convoys were obliged to return, and on one occasion the Afridees seized upon a mail with despatches to the Viceroy. On the whole, however, this irregular opposition was not very serious, though occasionally causing trouble, and entailing small losses. Some of the native chieftains were well-disposed towards the English; supplies came in freely from all parts; and several head-men of villages offered their services to the invaders. The malcontents were sharply punished for the outrages in which they had been concerned, and it was believed that these hostile combinations would be speedily broken up.

On the 28th of November, the Kurum Valley force reached Habib-Kala, a village close to Peiwar, with two brigades of infantry, four Horse Artillery guns on elephants, and one mountain-battery. The enemy was encountered during the prosecution of a reconnaissance; but the action was of an insignificant kind, and on the following day General Roberts encamped at the entrance to the Peiwar Pass. The column proceeded a considerable distance up the pass on the 30th, and were preparing their camp for the night when the Afghans suddenly opened fire with shell and round shot from a commanding ridge at the top of the defile. The position of the Afghans was altogether very strong. They occupied a high range of pine-clad hills and precipitous cliffs, and presented a front of several miles, where, behind breastworks of felled trees, 4,000 men, with twenty-four guns, were drawn up in imposing array. The English troops took up a position on a somewhat flat plateau surrounded by mountains. Hundreds of villagers were clustered on the rocks around, and each of these appeared to be armed with numerous weapons—some carrying as many as half-a-dozen. Firing was soon heard from the valleys, and the smoke of shells was seen coming over the top of the pass. The shells were extremely well aimed, and orders were given that every man should take shelter beneath the neighbouring rocks. At four o'clock in the afternoon, a large number of elephants arrived, carrying the guns of the Royal Artillery on their backs; but it soon became evident that these immense animals were attracting the enemy's fire, and they were ordered to be removed. A battery of the Royal Artillery was then got into position on the plateau, and at once began a shell-fire on the enemy. One of these shells dismounted a gun belonging to the Afghans, and did considerable execution in their ranks; but, on the whole the opposing fire was much more effective than the English, and towards nightfall it was found necessary to withdraw the entire force from the mouth of the pass. The Afghans were very numerous, and their bivouac-fires were visible all round upon the crags, and towards the head of the defile. Obviously, the position was one of no little danger to the invaders, as the camp was completely commanded. General Roberts therefore ordered an immediate retreat, although his troops were already exhausted by a march of twenty-four miles without food.*

This retrogression, however, was only temporary, and on the night of December 1st General Roberts's force again advanced, and soon achieved a decided success. A direct attack upon the pass was considered, after minute reconnaissances, to be impracticable, and it was therefore resolved to turn the position. The force detailed for this operation consisted of the 29th Punjaub Infantry, the 5th Ghoorkas, and a number of mountain-guns, under Colonel Gordon; the 72nd Highlanders, the 2nd Punjaub Infantry, and the 23rd Pioneers, under General Thelwall; and four guns of the Field Artillery. The whole body, which was commanded by General Roberts in person, was under arms by ten at night, and a toilsome march over rugged and mountainous country brought the leading brigade, just before dawn on the 2nd, to a strong barricade of the Afghans, stretching across the pass. The first company of Ghoorkas, under Major Fitzhugh and Captain Cook, supported by one company of the 72nd Regiment, made a dash at the obstacle, and carried it in very brilliant style. The advance then continued to the south-west, and the enemy, abandoning one position after another, kept retreating before the resistless British force, which by ten o'clock in the morning had taken all the heights immediately in front of it, with one exception. Here the defence was conducted with greater determination than at the other points, for the position was strong and easily held. Two attempts to carry it were repulsed, and at three o'clock in the afternoon a turning movement was begun, which resulted in our men getting to the rear of the fort situated at the entrance to the pass. But, before this movement could be completed, the Afghans, seized with sudden panic, fled from their works, leaving eighteen guns behind them; and when the turning force arrived at the spot, they found the fort deserted. The day's success, however, was rather dearly purchased. The Punjaub mountain-battery, which was under the orders of Captain Kelso, was magnificently handled; but the commanding officer was unfortunately killed. Major Anderson, of the 23rd Pioneers, was also slain, and Brigadier-General Cobbe, together with Lieutenant Munro, both of the 72nd Highlanders, were wounded. The death of Major Anderson (whose body was shockingly mutilated by the foe) took place in an obstinate struggle occurring in the thick pine-woods which cross the heights. "Two mountain-guns, admirably placed," says a correspondent of the *Standard*, "threw their shells right into the camp on the top of the pass, and rendered it untenable. But still we were unable to advance upon Peiwar itself. General Roberts then led a second turning movement in the direction of the enemy's line of retreat, behind their centre. This, combined with the admirably-directed fire of Major Parry's three field-guns from below the heights, together with the hot fire kept up by the regiments who had

* Correspondent of the *Standard*.



VILLAGE OF THAL, AND ENCAMPMENT OF THE KURUM FIELD FORCE.

now captured the woods in the heart of the enemy's position, caused the Afghans at last to retreat, leaving behind them their guns, a quantity of ammunition, and all their stores. The retreat soon became a perfect rout, but the troops were too much fatigued to pursue. All those who accompanied General Roberts in the long turning movement had marched from camp at ten P.M. the previous night; had had a most wearisome struggle for miles in the dark along the dry bed of a mountain-torrent, now covered with boulders; and were fighting more or less all day, from day-break till two P.M., when

they again had to march round behind the enemy's centre. Here they bivouacked for the night, at a height of 9,000 feet, under a bitterly cold sky." The Afghans had fought well, but, with so strong a position, and with such numerous forces, they ought to have been able to repel the British assault. Four fresh regiments from Cabul, accompanied by guns, had joined them the day before; yet the entire army was scattered at the close of the day. General Roberts had scarcely three thousand men of all ranks wherewith to make his attack, and these he was compelled to form in single line, without any supports in their rear. But Oriental troops are invariably disconcerted on finding themselves outflanked, and the unexpected appearance of the British behind them changed their former resolution into sheer despair. The whole movement was admirably conducted, and crowned with the entire success which it deserved. The greater part of the operations took place at an altitude of nearly 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, where the troops appear to have suffered much from cold. Almost all the guns captured from the Afghans were of rifled brass, iron, or steel, and could carry 2,500 yards with great precision; so that the large sums of money with which, on various occasions, we had supplied the Ameer, seem to have been turned by him to very good military account.

After the chief position had thus fallen into the hands of the attacking force, the greater number of our troops moved forward to an Afghan village lying beyond the crest of the Peiwar Pass, and immediately below the highest peak but one of the Sufeid Koh. All around was a prospect of towering cliffs, winding ravines, and deep valleys, dark with woods, or white with snow, which was then beginning to lie thickly over the whole mountainous land. The air was extremely cold, and the temperature told severely on the sick and wounded, who were sent to the captured fort for better care and attendance. In the several villages through which the General and his Staff rode on their reconnoitring expeditions, the inhabitants seemed desirous of propitiating the conquerors, to whom they revealed numerous hidden stores of provisions, and large magazines of ammunition for Enfield rifles. It would seem that the Afghans had believed their position to be impregnable, and had accumulated all these supplies for use during the winter months. The immense stores of provisions greatly relieved the commissariat of the invading force, and for the present it was determined to make the village of Ali Kheyl the immediate base of operations for General Roberts's column. Huts were erected in the Peiwar Pass for a portion of the army, and the men made themselves as comfortable as circumstances would permit. The tents were thickly strewn with young fir-branches, which served for beds; provisions were plentiful; and every night large bonfires were lit, about which the soldiers gathered, to tell tales or sing camp-songs until the hour of retiring to rest.

Having secured his conquests, General Roberts pushed on to the Shutargardan Pass, hoping to overtake the enemy; but, on reaching the summit, he discovered that the Afghans had passed it two days before. Six abandoned gun-carriages and four limbers were found by our men, but the guns themselves had apparently been carried off, or were so well hidden as to baffle detection. For miles around, the country was entirely clear of the Ameer's troops, and General Roberts accordingly returned to the fort, leaving a garrison on Peiwar Kotal. Notwithstanding the intense cold, the soldiers were in good health, and their spirits were much raised by a message of congratulation from the Queen, which had been telegraphed to them. They said it was as good as a great-coat; and certainly, in the existing condition of the temperature, extra great-coats were much needed. The Shutargardan Pass is about two miles and a half long, with a gradual ascent, presenting no serious difficulties. The height was found to be about 11,000 feet, which was considerably less than had been supposed. Rugged mountains extend all round the defile, and in one direction the Logar Valley stretches to Cabul, with many intervening villages. The Ameer's capital was not more than fifty miles off; but a large force was collected in the valley, and Roberts's column was not strong enough to offer battle. The position was attended by some anxiety, for the neighbouring hill-tribes were manifestly unfriendly, and the telegraph-wire was being continually cut. The bulk of General Roberts's force was now assembled round Kurum, and it seemed likely that a period of some difficulty lay before it.

General Biddulph, who was operating from Quetta, reached the foot of the Khojuk Pass on the 9th of December. From this point he pushed a reconnaissance to Chuman, on the east side of the pass, the whole of which he subsequently occupied. A column under General Stewart was operating in conjunction with General Biddulph's force; but the country, which was on the borders of Beloochistan, presented many difficulties of a distressing character to our men. It has been described as a mere waste of sand, flooded one half of the year, and baked during the other. "Mineral salt-springs," said a correspondent of the *Standard*, "here and there ooze up through the sand, and

disappoint the traveller who hopes to quench his thirst at them. Springs of fresh water are rare; no trees grow in this desolate region, and nothing breaks the expanse save a few withered shrubs and patches of coarse grass." Marching was extremely painful in so arid and wild a tract, and sometimes officers. Many of the southern camels, being without coverings for the night, succumbed to the extreme cold of the Bolan Pass before the expedition had entered Afghan territory. The native camel-drivers also proved troublesome, and, not being properly overlooked by European officials, were



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK S. ROBERTS, V.C., G.C.B., C.I.E.

only a few miles could be accomplished in the best part of a day. The halts were necessarily dependent on the springs of fresh water which were scattered so thinly over the waste, and the strength of the troops was speedily broken down by the harassing nature of their services. During the day, the heat was exhausting; after sunset, the cold was equally intense. A good deal of responsibility lay with the transport service; but this, fortunately, was fairly well organised, though liable to occasional derangement, owing to the inexperience of some of the prone to desert whenever they could find a chance, sometimes taking their beasts with them, and selling them for a trifle. Still, the service was successful in many respects, and mitigated the hardships of the country.

In order not to discourage the loyal enthusiasm of the native Princes, the Indian Government determined, at an early period of the war, to accept the services of the feudatory contingent—consisting of rather more than 3,000 men, with ten guns—which had been offered by the rulers of Puttiala,

Jheend, Nabbha, Kuperthula, Sermoor, and Faridkote. These regiments were reviewed by Lord Lytton on the 17th of December, and, in addressing the corps of each State separately, his Excellency referred in warm terms to their services in 1857, and to their present readiness to assist the Government. England, he observed, was never an ungenerous foe; but justice must precede generosity. The Government would be unworthy of the loyalty of its subjects and of its noble allies were it unable

MAJOR-GENERAL A. S. BIDDULPH, C.B., R.A.

or unwilling to punish an unprovoked insult, or to protect from foreign menace the peace and prosperity which it was endeavouring to promote within its own borders. For this, and not for spoliation, the British Government had drawn the sword; but the Viceroy trusted that the disasters already suffered would induce the Ameer to conclude a speedy peace. The acquisition of the native contingents was of considerable service to the Indian Government; not because the force was of great value in a military sense, but because it was likely to produce a moral effect of no little importance on the native population generally. This effect was far from superfluous, for amongst the Indian regiments in the British service there were occasional manifestations of sympathy with the enemy, which, had they been unchecked, might have led to serious results. In the action of the 2nd of December at the Peiwar Kotal, two rifles were discharged at early dawn by men of the 29th Regiment, as a signal to the Afghans that the British advance was in motion; and eighteen men of the same body deserted from the ranks. The traitors were all Pathans—natives of Afghanistan, of whom there are several in our Indian regiments. A court-martial was subsequently held, and, after a searching investigation, a Pathan Sepoy was hanged on Christmas Eve in front of the troops. Others were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, ranging from one year to fourteen years; and it was but too clear that a dangerous spirit existed in the regiment, although the great majority of the men were loyal.

A more open danger existed in the continued hostility of the Afridees, who, after being temporarily dispersed, gathered again in formidable numbers, and attacked small parties of the British troops from the vantage-ground of their rocky glens and ravines. In the Khyber Pass, towards the end of December, Colonel Tytler's force, returning from the Bazar Valley, was suddenly assailed with

great vehemence. Two soldiers of the 17th Foot were killed, and eight wounded; and it was not without some difficulty that the rear-guard drove off their antagonists. On another occasion, twenty-five camels and six mules were stolen by Afridees who professed themselves our friends. Even before the final rupture with England, though after the repulse of the Mission at Fort Ali Musjid, Shere Ali proclaimed a religious war against the British. An address to the Afghan people was found at Peiwar Kotal, in which the Ameer exhorted all Mussulmans to rally round him on behalf of their religion, promising paradise to those who might die in battle, everlasting punishment in the next world to those who should fly, and ten thousand torments to all who accepted the enemy's money. The consequences of such an exhortation might have been grave, had it not been already proved that Shere Ali had but little influence, on religious grounds, over Mohammedan believers. It was doubtless known throughout that part of Asia that the Sultan of Turkey—the acknowledged head of the Sunnites, to which division of the Moslem world the Afghans belong—disapproved of the Ameer's conduct towards England, and had counselled a complete submission. Subserviency to Russia established no claim to the implicit obedience of Mohammedans; and, in demanding a *jihad*, Shere Ali simply confessed the desperate extremity to which, as a consequence of his mismanagement, and of his intrigues with the Muscovite Governor of Turkistan, he found himself reduced.

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## CHAPTER XL.

**Party Politics and the Afghan War—The *République Française* on the Errors of the Opposition—Continued Opposition to English Interests in the East—Strength of the Government Positions in the Winter of 1878-79—The Financial Question, as affecting India—Opinions of Members of the Indian Council on the Costs of the Campaign—Flight of Shere Ali—Communications between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg, resulting in the Withdrawal of the Russian Embassy to Cabul—Despair of the Ameer—March of General Browne to Jellalabad—Expedition against the Zukkur Khels—Jellalabad entered by the British—The Mangals and their Mountain Country—A Perilous Pass—Attack on a Baggage Train—Gallant Resistance of the Ghoorkas—General Roberts at Kurum—Continued Outrages—Expedition into the Khost Valley—Destruction of Mangal Villages—Advance of General Stewart's and General Biddulph's Columns—Laborious Marches—Skirmish with Afghan Horsemen—Triumphal Entry into Candahar—Appearance of the Town and of the People—Outbreaks of Fanaticism in Candahar—Irruption of Afghans into the Town of Tank—Movements of British Troops—Disaffection of several of the Tribes towards Yakoub Khan—Subserviency of Shere Ali to Russia—Difficulties of the British Armies—Yakoub Khan devoid of Authority—General Kauffmann on the Policy of the Future—Entire Failure of the Russian Plans.**

PARTY politics are never more furious and envenomed than when a war is either contemplated or in progress. Questions of a domestic character, which might be thought to offer a more appropriate field for the contentions of rival sects, seldom excite anything like the amount of angry bitterness which is exhibited on the country being involved in a dispute with some foreign potentate. When it was probable that England would come into collision with Russia in respect of Turkey, the Northern Empire had no such hearty and uncompromising advocates as among a certain set of English politicians. Again, when war was declared against the ruler of Afghanistan, the same persons transferred their admiration and loyal support from the Emperor Alexander to the Ameer Shere Ali. They then displayed something like an eagerness for challenging the Russian to single combat—an eagerness which may perhaps have been in proportion to the depth of their conviction that no such challenge would be given; but at the same time they adhered steadfastly to their former principles, of which the inevitable effect, if not the object, was to extend the predominance of Russia over half the globe. The disastrous error of these thinkers was apparent on the Continent to men who, on abstract grounds, belonged to their own communion. M. Gambetta's paper, the *République Française*, had an article on the 17th of December, in which the conduct of the Opposition in the English Parliament was very severely criticised. "If the Opposition," said the writer, "had the slightest political good sense, they would immediately abandon a system of attack which the enemies of English influence in the East have turned to such account." Russia had calculated on party conflicts in England, and had applied them to profitable uses. It was beyond doubt, in the opinion of the French Republican paper, that the declaration of war in 1877 was accelerated by the attitude and declamations of English Liberals; and the crossing of the Balkans by the Russian armies, followed by their advance towards the

Bosphorus, was due to the restraining influence on the policy of the Government exercised by the followers of Mr. Gladstone. "To judge by their leading speakers in the late discussion," said the exponent of M. Gambetta's views, "the Liberals have now abandoned these pernicious tactics. Mr. Goschen and the Marquis of Hartington declared that they condemned Russian intrigues; that they viewed with disapproval the extension of Muscovite influence both in Europe and Asia; and that by every possible means that influence should



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be excluded from Afghanistan." The change, however, had been tardy, and it was probable that but little advantage would be reaped from it. Nevertheless, the writer thought that the repentant wrongdoers were to be congratulated "on having renounced the sacrifice of national interests to party triumph;" and he expressed a hope that English Liberals would soon be convinced "that nowhere, not even at Berlin, had the Russians found so powerful a support for the realisation of their projects as in their ranks."

Unfortunately, the change had not in truth been so great as the French journalist supposed. The Marquis of Hartington had always been moderate in his criticisms on the Eastern policy of the Government, and had checked the Russianising tendencies of some among his party. But the tone adopted with respect to Afghanistan by the extreme adversaries of the Government had precisely the same characteristics as that which had prevailed throughout the Turkish war. There was still the old feverish anxiety to prevent anything which might have the effect of thwarting the intrigues or curbing the ambition of Russia. There was still the well-known disposition to flout the interests of England as something essentially vicious, the promotion of which was no less than a crime of the first magnitude. The mismanagement, cowardice, and perpetual equivocations of the Government throughout the recent struggle in Turkey had enabled the Opposition to carry out a considerable measure of their policy; and in the winter of 1878-9 they hoped to enjoy a similar success by the help of the same weakness on the part of their opponents. But the Administration now had matters more under their own control, and were consequently less inclined to temporise. They had not to consider the views and probable action of other Powers; nor was there anything like the autumn agitation of 1876 to tie their hands, or embarrass their treatment of a great political question which was not to be settled by a mere appeal to emotional excitement. The Afghan war was discussed

at public meetings, and much adverse opinion was expressed in various quarters; but antagonism to the Government never assumed a menacing form. The nation generally seemed persuaded that the conflict was necessary; and it was believed that the campaign would be conducted to a successful issue, without any inordinate sacrifice, and at no great distance of time. Under these circumstances, the attacks of the Opposition produced very slight effect, and the controversy speedily narrowed itself into the merely historical topic, whether or not the policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government, some years previously, had necessitated more recent events.

In India, the popularity of the war was increased by the early successes of the invading columns; yet many protested against the intention of the British Government to charge the expenses on Indian revenue. Lord Cranbrook in the House of Lords, and the Under-Secretary for India in the House of Commons, had declared that the finances of our great Asiatic dependency were in a flourishing condition, and well able to bear the additional burden; but this was an error which Ministers were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, and the demand on Indian revenue ultimately assumed the form of a species of advance, which might at some future time be repaid in whole or in part. An order was issued by the Bombay Government in December, in which it was directed that, in view of the immediate importance of avoiding or deferring expenditure, where it was possible, until the ensuing year, no new works were to be commenced, and all allotments provided for them were to be cancelled; that all works in progress were to be suspended, except in cases of urgent necessity; that no repairs were to be effected, beyond such as were absolutely essential; that no further purchases of tools or plant were to be made; and that all applications for grants for public works were to be retained until such time as the state of the finances would permit. This showed how little India was prepared to meet the demands of an expensive war, and made out a strong claim in favour of relieving her finances by the help of the Imperial Government. The war was undertaken for Imperial no less than Indian purposes, and it was therefore but fair that the burden should be divided. Among the native population, there was a good deal of discontent as to the policy in this respect announced by the Home Government. The leading Bengal journal, the *Hindoo Patriot*, denounced it as specially cruel, coming so soon after the famine of 1877. On the other hand, the *Koh-i-Noor*, the oldest vernacular paper of Upper India, defended the measure, on the ground that the campaign might save India the still greater cost of a war to prevent invasion, and that no other country could show such benefit accruing from foreign rule. It is certain that the war excited no general feeling of opposition on the part of the native populace.

The necessities of the struggle led very speedily to an increase of the Indian army—a measure which was sanctioned by the Indian Secretary's Council, and which was to the general effect that each regiment of cavalry in the Bengal Army and the Punjaub Frontier Force should be raised by a strength of sixteen sabres per troop, while the infantry battalions were to receive an addition of twenty-five men per company. The order was to be equally applicable to certain of the Madras and Bombay regiments, then on service in connection with the Afghan invasion. Those who objected to the war altogether were consistent in censuring any increase of the Indian army; but the step was not adopted without previous deliberation. The opinions of several members of the Indian Council, both on this subject, and on the wider question whether the expenses of the war should be borne, wholly or in part, by India herself, were issued by the Government on the 14th of December, in compliance with an address of the House of Commons, dated four days previously. Sir Erskine Perry was wholly opposed to the war, and thought that no portion of the expenses should be thrown on Indian revenue; yet he voted with his colleagues in favour of so throwing them, because he looked upon the charge as only an advance to the Imperial Government, and conceived that, as war had actually begun, no time should be lost in providing for the necessities thus created. The proposition had been placed before the Council as an urgent measure, to be passed at once, and not permitting of even two or three days' delay, so as to secure the attendance of a full Council—a fact which Sir Erskine Perry deeply regretted. Sir Barrow H. Ellis had no doubt as to the propriety of agreeing to the proposed increase of the Indian army; but he was not in favour of making India pay. "Had the war," he wrote, "been undertaken on account of aggression by Shere Ali, or because the Afghans menaced the peace and security of India, then doubtless, at whatever cost, the charge would fairly have been debitable to India; but surely no one would allege these to be the causes of the war. It is not anything that Shere Ali has said or done that *per se* justifies the extreme step of declaring a war that must at best cost much money and many valuable lives. The war is clearly the outcome of events in Europe, and the necessity for it has arisen from the action

of Russia, which action, again, was devised as a support to schemes in Europe. It is thus in the interests of the Empire, and in furtherance of European policy, that the war has been brought about, and it is in these considerations that its justification must be found. I trust, therefore, that it will be borne in mind that the mere fact of the *locale* being on the Indian frontier ought not to be made an excuse for placing a new burden upon India. In any case, substantial aid will be freely given by India in the supply of war-material, and in meeting the ordinary cost of a large portion of the troops engaged. The additional charges involved ought to be accepted by the British nation; and this liability, I doubt not, will be generally recognised."

The same views were expressed by Sir Robert Montgomery, while Mr. R. A. Dalyell conceived that the additional expenditure should be divided between India and Great Britain, though he entirely dissented from the views of Sir Erskine Perry as to the unjustifiable character of the war. Sir William Muir entered into the origin of the quarrel with the Ameer, and argued at some length that the war had been undertaken for Imperial purposes, and was precipitated by European events connected with ideas of European policy. If our Native Agent at Cabul had not been withdrawn, and diplomatic communication with Afghanistan been thus suspended, it was probable, in the opinion of Sir William Muir, that Shere Ali would never have entered into intimate relations with Russia; but the fact remained that the proximate cause of the war was to be found in our dispute with Russia arising out of the overwhelming success of the Northern Power in its operations against Turkey. "That," said Sir William, "was an affair in which India had small concern. The citadel of Eastern Europe was in check, and the British Government moved to release it. It was, again, as a counter-move that Russia stretched her hand out in the far East to touch us in what she conceived our tenderest and most vulnerable point. Thus it was a matter arising out of British interests, dependent, at least, on the balance of power in Europe, and having relation to India only in so far as the power and *prestige* of her protector was involved, which originated the war. A Russian Mission was sent to Cabul: the Ameer, deserted by us, was unable longer to maintain his isolated position; and so he fell into the hands of Russia. But it was a European, not an Indian, cause which led to this." Consequently, the writer questioned the fairness of burdening India with the cost of the war; and assuredly this seems to have been the plain reason and justice of the matter, if we qualify the statement by saying that, while bearing a proportion of the cost, India ought not to bear the whole.

While these discussions were proceeding, the war was being vigorously and successfully pushed—so successfully, indeed, that Shere Ali, seized with despair as to his powers of resistance, and finding that he could not rely on the loyalty of his own subjects, fled with his family on the 13th of December, intending to visit General Kauffmann at Tashkend. Before quitting Cabul, the Ameer released his rebellious son, Yakoub Khan, from captivity, and, having exacted from him an oath that he would obey his father in all his directions, left him at the capital, to carry on the government of the country, and to maintain the national resistance, if no arrangement with the enemy could be effected. Yakoub was even proclaimed Ameer by the chiefs of the Ghiljies, and the prospects of the campaign materially altered from that moment. From what was known of his character, it was believed that Shere Ali, who had a large and well-appointed army at his disposal, would have offered battle to the English before the walls of Cabul, and perhaps have died fighting, as became the martial race to which he belonged. But he was broken in health and in spirit, and he suddenly found that the Russians, on whom he had relied, would do nothing to protect him from the enemy he had provoked. In December, the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg were in active communication with reference to the affairs of Afghanistan, and the Russian Mission to Cabul was, as a consequence, formally and officially recalled; whereupon the previous understanding between England and Russia, in respect of the Ameer's dominions and Central Asia, became once more mutually binding. The members of the Embassy left Cabul in company with the Ameer; and thus, in ignominious flight, and in the midst of general disruption, the Russian interference in Afghanistan collapsed and withered.

Shere Ali believed almost to the last that the Russian Emperor, and his powerful representative in Turkistan, would grant him military assistance in repelling the English attack; but the British Government knew, even before the war commenced, that such would not be the case. The explanations given by M. de Giers, to which allusion has been made in a previous Chapter, received some important additions from Prince Gortschakoff himself on the 22nd of September, when Lord Augustus Loftus had an interview with the Russian Chancellor. That statesman was evidently very desirous of explaining away the Russian Embassy, and of

ATTACK ON A POST ESCORT.

exonerating his country from any responsibility for the Ameer's future. Like M. de Giers, he said that the mission of General Stoletoff was one of courtesy and of a provisional nature; but he added that the Emperor could never forego his right of sending complimentary missions to any foreign Sovereign or neighbouring Prince. "Do not forget," said his Highness, "that the Emperor

GENERAL ROBERTS'S BRIGADE CROSSING THE KUNAR RIVER.

is an independent, sovereign ruler over 80,000,000 of subjects." Lord Augustus Loftus replied that he was aware of this fact, but observed that his own Sovereign ruled over more than 200,000,000 of subjects. "Yes," said Prince Gortschakoff, "but they are dispersed and scattered; the Russian Empire is one and united." The English Ambassador then remarked that in his opinion the very fact of sending an Embassy to Cabul was a violation of the engagements which Russia had entered into with England; and he added that it was the more incomprehensible to him, inasmuch as on a late occasion M. de Giers had expressly denied that there had been, or was, any intention, on the part either of the Emperor or of General Kauffmann, to send a mission to Cabul. Prince Gortschakoff thereupon gave specific assurances that the Imperial Government would maintain their engagements with England in regard to Afghanistan; that they had no wish to interfere in the affairs of that kingdom; and that, in the event of war, the Ameer would receive no assistance whatever, either in arms or money, from Russia. It is extremely doubtful whether this resolve of the Czar was made plain to Shere Ali, for, if it had been, it is scarcely conceivable that he would have exhibited so much obstinacy in resisting the English demands. He appears to have reckoned on the ability and the willingness of Russia to give him help; and perhaps, had Kauffmann been left to himself, such help would have been rendered. But the Cabinet of St. Petersburg knew well that assistance to the

Ameer would mean war with England; and that was an issue which the Emperor did not care to face so soon after an exhausting struggle with Turkey, with incipient revolution shaking the very bases of his throne, and national bankruptcy hanging like a sword above his head. Orders were therefore despatched for the immediate withdrawal of the Embassy from Afghan soil; and when those orders reached Cabul, Shere Ali saw that his desperate game had reached its end. He could probably have maintained a frantic struggle for a little while longer; but he perceived that success was hopeless, for many of the tribes were against him, and some of his regiments were being thinned by desertions. In utter despondency and dejection of soul, he turned his back upon the land which he had doubtless loved, but knew not how to serve, and took his melancholy way towards the Tartarian steppes, perhaps with some lingering hope of even yet persuading the great Czar to adopt his cause. But the Czar was too astute a politician to undertake any such risk, and, having made one mistake with regard to Afghanistan, was not so mad as to aggravate his error by heaping on the top of it another and a greater.

Sir Samuel Browne began his advance towards Jellalabad on the 17th of December, after a pause rendered necessary by the defective state of his commissariat. Previous to his starting, some leading men from that city came into camp, offering submission and assistance, and it was believed that no opposition would be experienced. The Afridees, however, continued to give some trouble, and, to guard against all contingencies, it was thought advisable to open an alternative route, called that of Abkhana, which leads from Dakka along the Cabul river to the Peshawur frontier—a route neither shorter nor easier, but one which had the advantage of passing through the territory of less hostile tribes. The tribe of the Zukkur Khels, occupying portions of the Khyber Pass, frequently attacked the invading column; and it was at length determined to assume the offensive towards them, and deliver an effective blow in the destruction of their principal stronghold, situated in the valley of Terah, about ten miles south-west of Ali Musjid. The place was difficult of access; but a force under the command of General Maude started on the 20th of December with three days' provisions. The detachment consisted of 1,400 men, with four mountain-guns; heavier artillery it was found impossible to take, owing to the ruggedness of the ways. The plan of action was to divide the column into two parts, one setting out from Jumrood, the other from Dakka, with directions to converge by carefully-selected routes, so as to surround and surprise the enemy. It was hoped also to occupy the exits of the valley, and entirely prevent the retreat of the marauders; but the expedition, though well planned, failed of success, owing to the unexpected length of the night march. The Zukkurs (who, a few nights before, had made a descent on Ali Musjid, and carried off twenty-five camels) had been forewarned of the approach of General Maude's column, and had fled, driving their flocks before them, but leaving the forage behind. The village of Wallai was found to be deserted; but the adjacent country had at any rate been cleared of a troublesome foe.

The column under General Browne reached Jellalabad on the 20th of December, with drums beating and colours flying; and strong connecting links were posted at various points in the rear as far as Ali Musjid, which was occupied by an advanced brigade of General Maude's Reserve Division. Overtures were speedily made by many of the tribes dwelling to the north of Jellalabad and the Khyber Pass. About the same time, Major Biddulph, the British Resident at Ladakh, marched into Chitral, near the source of the Kunar river, when the ruling chief of the Lower Kunar Valley tendered his allegiance to Sir Samuel Browne. The other invading forces were still slowly making their way through an intricate maze of precipitous mountains and rocky valleys, which tried both men and beasts to the utmost. No actions of importance were fought; but scattered attacks by independent tribes continued to be frequent. One of these had been made on General Roberts's column on the 13th of December. The General was at that time in the country of the Mangal tribe—a very fierce and warlike set of mountaineers. It has been said that, with sufficient notice, the tribe can turn out 10,000 fighting men. This is probably in excess of the truth; yet the Mangals are certainly numerous, courageous in the defence of their own territory, and so little inclined to obedience that they have always defied the Ameer, and for some time previous to the war had been left undisturbed by the Cabul authorities. General Roberts was warned that if he violated their territory he would be attacked; but the march continued none the less. A body of pioneers was sent on before to occupy the heights about Ali-Khel, and here they bivouacked on the night of the 12th, without being molested. The General's camp was struck at two o'clock on the morning of the 13th, and the column, followed by a long train of camels and mules, carrying baggage and supplies, started for the perilous

country where they were threatened with opposition. A good deal of delay resulted from the camels finding a difficulty in making their way down a steep descent which it was necessary to traverse before scaling the final ascent to the pass. The roads were covered with a thick coating of ice, and the poor animals slipped about so much that progress was necessarily very slow. At half-past eight, however, the top of the pass was reached; but at that time no enemy was in sight. General Roberts then ordered the Mountain Battery and the 72nd Highlanders to proceed with part of the baggage, leaving the whole of the 5th Ghoorka Regiment as rear-guard.

A formidable defile now lay before the troops. It was about four miles long, and in no place more than one hundred yards broad; while on both sides rose precipitous rocks, very difficult to scale, yet presenting admirable hiding-places for the armed mountaineers. As soon as the Ghoorkas entered this dangerous ravine, dropping shots began to be fired; but the native troops marched on with great steadiness, occasionally wheeling about when the enemy came too near, and driving him back to his coverture. Towards noon it was found necessary to halt, as the camel-drivers had deserted in great numbers, and the frightened animals were getting into confusion. On the re-establishment of order, the advance continued; but, at half-past two in the afternoon, General Roberts, who had gone on with the main body of the force to the camp at Kuriah, saw that the stream of baggage-animals had again stopped. He sent out a small party of four hundred men to the assistance of the train; but this support proved not to be needed, though it afterwards appeared that a very obstinate skirmish had taken place in the defile. The Mangals suddenly descended on the train of camels and the guard by which they were surrounded, and the fighting soon became sharp. Captain Goad, the assistant-superintendent of transport, was shot through both legs, and fell. The assailants then made a rush towards him; but four soldiers of the 72nd Highlanders covered him with their bayonets, and poured so rapid a fire into the Mangals that they were checked. It is said that some of these men approached with gestures of friendliness, making repeated salaams after the Oriental fashion, and that as soon as they were close they unslung their matchlocks, and delivered a heavy volley. Nevertheless, only one of the Highlanders was wounded, although the Mangals fired from behind the rocks, and were exceedingly pertinacious in their attack. After a time, the 5th Ghoorkas, under Major Fitzhugh, arrived upon the scene, and, charging their adversaries home with the bayonet, ultimately put them to flight. Further up the defile, the mountain-warriors made another rush upon the baggage-train, and cut to pieces two Hindoo camp-followers, besides mortally wounding two others. This time, however, they were beaten off by the baggage-guard, and on both occasions they failed to obtain any plunder, which is believed to have been the main object of their attack. Several of the Mangals were killed and wounded, and others were taken prisoners; but on our own side we had to mourn some rather serious losses. On the following day, Captain Goad suffered amputation of the leg, but gradually sank from exhaustion. Captain Powell, of the 5th Ghoorkas, also received a wound, from which he expired a few days after. The Ghoorkas themselves had three men killed, and thirteen wounded; but, considering all the circumstances of the case, it is surprising that the loss was not greater. General Roberts, with the Headquarters Staff, proceeded on the 14th of December to Kurum; and here the bulk of the column went into camp for the winter.

Notwithstanding their frequent defeats, the native tribes maintained a hostile front, and proved themselves vexatious, if not harmful, foes. In the Durwaza Pass, a body of Hussars and Royal Artillery, who had started on the morning of December 26th from Kurum, were attacked in the rear by hordes of Waziris, who fell upon a crowd of sick and wounded, together with their bearers, and cut six of them in pieces. Four men concerned in this outrage were afterwards hanged, and large numbers of Afghans gathered on the surrounding hills to witness the scene. The gallows was formed of three telegraph-poles, and the offenders were escorted to the place of execution by a company of the 21st Punjaub Native Infantry. They submitted without any resistance, and conducted themselves in that self-restrained and impassive manner which is so common with Oriental races. A man among the crowd of natives shouted to the criminals on the scaffold that their deaths would be avenged; but he was immediately taken off under an escort, and flogged. About the same time, traffic in the Khyber Pass was stopped by a strong party of Kahar Khels under Abdulla Mir, who blocked the way, and cut the telegraph-wires. It was found necessary to send a force of two guns, three companies of the 12th Regiment, and part of the Maharwarra Battalion, to clear the pass; and at one time it was feared, by those inclined to take a gloomy view of the campaign, that the invading forces would be cut off by a combination of hostile tribes in their rear.

The country about Kurum being secured, a detachment of Roberts's force entered the Khost Valley on the 2nd of January, 1879, without, in the first instance, encountering any obstruction. The inhabitants seemed amicably disposed, and the Afghan Governor made his submission on the 3rd of January; but this appearance of friendliness soon proved deceptive. On the 7th, General Roberts found the enemy collected in threatening numbers, and at once commenced an attack with three small columns. The cavalry did great execution, and the troops took one hundred prisoners, besides capturing a large quantity of cattle and grain. The success of the British forces was complete, and the loss was comparatively small, though the Afghans were well posted, and their fire had been heavy and sustained. Two days later, the detached column arrived at the capital of the Khost district, when the garrison immediately surrendered, and delivered up the fort. In consequence of the attack on the 7th, it was considered necessary to burn several Mangal villages. The drivers of the camels and mules were in the first instance sent to these hamlets, where they secured a quantity of grain and salt. Some horses and cattle were also brought out, and, when everything useful had been removed, the roofs were set on fire, and the whole settlements were speedily in a blaze. A large village to the south, from which the enemy had fired on our troops, was surrounded by a body of infantry, and searched. A great many arms and fighting men were found concealed about the place, which was then set in flames. These operations, however objectionable on the score of humanity, seem to have had the effect of striking terror into the Mangals; for on the following morning (the 8th) large numbers of them were observed through telescopes making their way back to their own country. Affairs in the Khost Valley shortly afterwards began to settle down. The principal authorities tendered their submission, and the people exhibited a more friendly demeanour; but this apparent change was dependent entirely upon our ability to enforce obedience, and did not proceed from any genuine inclination to accept the rule, or tolerate the presence, of the strangers.



THE 10TH HUSSARS ATTACKING THE AFGHANS IN THE KHOST VALLEY, JAN. 7TH.

The advance of General Stewart's column into the southern part of Afghanistan was surrounded with difficulties. The artillery-waggons were frequently upset by the ruggedness of the paths, and bullocks died in large numbers. In many instances, the soldiers themselves were compelled to drag the waggons, with the assistance of elephants. The bullocks were entirely broken down at the end of a three days' march, and their sufferings were often painful to behold. The sharp fragments of rock cut their hoofs to pieces, and tore off the fetlocks; so that they were scarcely able to support themselves, and quite incapable of dragging the waggons. Two of the elephants died on the road, and the soldiers who hauled the guns complained that they were terribly over-worked and irregularly fed. A large proportion of General Stewart's division marched on the 31st of December, 1878, through the Gharvaja Pass, while General Biddulph's division crossed that of the Khojuk. The latter was a very difficult expedition, for the upper part of the ascent was exceedingly steep, and the descent on the other side almost precipitous for about half a mile. It was found necessary that the guns should be unlimbered, and the carriages and pieces lowered separately down a prepared slide by means of ropes; but the passage was effected without casualties, nor did the enemy make any attempt at interruption. The forces of both officers were now converging on Candahar, and, when united, General Stewart was to take the chief command. Just before reaching the town, an advance brigade of Stewart's cavalry, under Colonel Palliser, encountered the horsemen of the enemy, to the number of seven hundred, at a place called Tuk-i-put, and defeated them after a sharp encounter, in which the Afghans behaved with great spirit. In the meanwhile, another body of Afghan horsemen had planted themselves along a range of hills fronting the camp; and when Colonel Palliser returned there, he was encountered by desultory firing. After a time, the Afghans were driven back; but they maintained a dropping fire until dark, and held their positions up to midnight. The Governor and all the officials of Candahar, except the Deputy-Governor, fled during the night of January 6th, 1879, to Herat, disarming the infantry, and taking with them the remnant of the cavalry. The Deputy-Governor then made his submission to the British, and on the 8th of January the first brigades of General Stewart's and General Biddulph's forces marched through Candahar unopposed.

The ceremonial, according to a correspondent of the *Standard*, was impaired by a variety of delays and mistakes. "During the night," said this writer, "the dykes running by the roadside had been flooded, partly by an accident to an artillery-waggon which got off the road, and broke down a dam, partly by the wilful action of the natives, who wished to prevent our men from straying over the fields. The whole force were therefore obliged to follow a narrow causeway; the road was, moreover, detestably bad. Thus it happened that, although we started at half-past nine, with but eight miles to traverse, it was four o'clock before we passed through the Shikapoor Gate. As we approached the city, we found some thousands of the inhabitants squatted under trees, and among some ruins outside the gate. They viewed us as we passed with that tranquil gravity characteristic of the people. In the streets, a considerable crowd had assembled, many of whom were considerably whiter than our own troops after their dirty march. On the house-tops were numbers of women, who looked calmly down upon us, evidently enjoying a far greater degree of freedom than they would possess in Mohammedan cities in India. Mingled with the crowd, too, in the streets, were large numbers of women, some of whom were scarcely veiled. The large Hindoo colony who inhabit the town pressed forward, and welcomed us with delight. The populace in general, quiet as they were, appeared visibly and favourably impressed by General Stewart's lofty figure and kindly face, as he rode past, the main figure of the martial pageant." The people conducted themselves in the most peaceable manner, and the trading classes openly expressed their satisfaction at being relieved from the despotism of Cabul. It was not considered necessary to retain any large body of troops within the town, and accordingly the greater portion of the column, together with General Stewart and his Staff, encamped outside. A hospital was established in the citadel—a rambling old place, with half-closed colonnade in front, which had been used for Durbars, and as a Court of Justice. The interior presented a scene of wild confusion, showing the haste with which the Governor had taken flight. Jars of powder were standing open in many of the rooms, from which it was to be inferred that the original intention was to stand a siege. The defeat of the Afghan horsemen by Colonel Palliser had, however, entirely daunted the spirits of the Governor and his subordinates; and the result was seen in the quiet submission of Candahar.

But, although the people of that city offered no resistance to the entry of the British troops, and accepted the new conditions with much philosophical

resignation, an outbreak of fanaticism occurred soon after the arrival of the invaders, which resulted in injury to two English officers. An Afghan, flourishing a large knife, was seen rushing through the streets on the 17th of January, with the evident intention of wounding every stranger he should meet. He was himself wounded in several places, for, as he thrust at the English soldiers with his knife, they made lunges at him with their bayonets, without, however, inflicting any mortal stroke. At length, he drove his weapon into the body of a rifleman, and was immediately afterwards cut down by a native cavalry officer, and despatched upon the spot. Two officers, a sergeant, and a gunner, had been wounded, besides the rifleman; and at the same time a Sepoy, belonging to the disbanded infantry of the Ameer, had seized the bridle of Major St. John, and fired a pistol at him. The Major was fortunately not touched, and the fanatic, after being slightly wounded by a native attendant, was secured and disarmed. Similar outrages occurred from time to time; but these were only isolated acts. A more serious outbreak of fanaticism took place a little earlier in the year, when a band of Mahsud Waziris made an incursion into British territory, where they plundered and burnt the town of Tank. They afterwards retreated to the hills, but were pursued by cavalry, by whom several were cut off and destroyed. Some Mollahs from Cabul were known to be very active in preaching resistance to the utmost, and re-inforcements were sent to Dera-Ismail-Khan and Bannu, to prevent a repetition of such acts. A few attacks on neighbouring villages were in fact attempted; but these were easily repulsed, and the clansmen very shortly found themselves encountered by a force against which it was vain to struggle.

CHARGE OF FIFTH PUNJAUB CAVALRY, AT MATUN IN THE KHOST VALLEY, JAN. 7TH.

In the course of January, General Stewart despatched General Biddulph, with an adequate array, to occupy Girishk, on the road to Herat. He himself, after detaching a suitable garrison to Candahar, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, marched to Khelat-i-Ghilzai. The town so called was reached by his advanced guard on the 20th, and the cavalry entered quietly the next day. Khelat-i-Ghilzai is situated eighty-eight miles north-east of Candahar, on the road to Ghizni and Cabul. It is built upon an isolated plateau, 5,500 feet above the sea-level,

and the surrounding country is not to be surpassed throughout the whole of Afghanistan for general barrenness and rigour. By this time, it can hardly be said that there was any organised resistance at all to the progress of the British arms. Yakoub Khan was scarcely able to exercise authority beyond the limits of Cabul; for even the Ghiljies, who were mainly instrumental in obtaining his release from prison, were beginning to turn against him. The chief of that tribe evinced a disposition, towards the end of January, to make terms with the English invaders, and some even of the Mangals came into General Roberts's camp to pay their respects. The representatives of other tribes also showed a willingness to forsake the Ameer for the more powerful alliance of the British; the Khan of Kunar, whom Shere Ali had endeavoured to engage in a *jihad*, proffered his friendship to the English; and Wali Mahomed Khan, half-brother to Shere Ali, who had commanded the Afghans at the affair of the Peiwar Pass, deserted the cause which he found himself unable to defend, and, fearing lest he should be executed for his recent failure, placed himself in the hands of the conquerors. The Russian Generals in Turkistan alleged that these defections were due to English gold; but they appear to have judged to a great extent by what had been their own practice in dealing with the Afghans. On the dead bodies of several of these people were Russian gold coins, bearing the date of 1878.* The complicity of Shere Ali with the intrigues of General Kauffmann was being constantly proved by fresh evidence. It is said that previous to his departure from Cabul the Ameer held a Durbar, in which he declared his readiness to recognise the suzerainty of the Czar, and submit to his military command.† This known subserviency to Russia was one of the reasons why Shere Ali, when con-



SUBMISSION OF THE KHAN OF KUNAR.

* Correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*.

† St. Petersburg telegram in the *Presse* of Vienna

fronted by an English invasion, found he could obtain scarcely any support from the mountain tribes. He distributed money in the hope of getting them to fight; but, if the money was Russian gold, it will sufficiently account for their determination not to uphold a rule which was little else than the rule of the Czar, or at any rate of General Kauffmann. One of the Ameer's officers informed the Indian Government that for two years after the Conference at Umballa Shere Ali would have done anything for the British Government, but that after the return of Noor Mahomed from Simla, in 1873, his feelings were quite changed, and he scarcely disguised his hatred of us.* From that time forward, he threw himself more and more every year into the arms of Russia, and his reward was, that Russia deserted him in the moment of his need. In seeking the hospitality of General Kauffmann, the Ameer had doubtless hoped to obtain the mediation, if not the absolute assistance, of the Czar; but he was not long in discovering that "respectful sympathy" was the utmost that would be granted him. A correspondent of the *New York Herald* reported to that journal that Shere Ali had had a long conversation with a Russian surgeon and a Russian general officer, in which he declared he was more than ever convinced that Afghanistan was the key to India for the Russians. To place that key in their hands, was the object of his policy for several years; but when the hour of his misfortune came, and the key had passed into English possession, the Ameer was left to break his heart in utter misery and despair, for anything the Czar of All the Russias would do to help his cause.

Nevertheless, the invaders had their troubles, as well as the invaded. General Stewart was in want of supplies, and especially of forage, and this was his main reason for moving from Candahar to Khelat-i-Ghilzai. An elephant-battery attached to his force lost four elephants from cold and inadequate food; the camels and bullocks also perished in large numbers; the horses suffered greatly; and the commissariat was so badly regulated that stores were not sent up to the front in sufficient quantities for the requirements of the men. In the Khost Valley, General Roberts was again attacked by the Mangals with such fury that he found it necessary to abandon the neighbourhood, being convinced that similar disturbances would be incessant. The more the British forces penetrated into the land, the more apparent it became that the mountain-tribes were on the whole disinclined to accept our interference, although, as we have seen, the rule was not without exceptions! Still, we had been enabled to take possession of the country in several places, and the utmost efforts of the people were unavailing to cast us out, however much they might cause annoyance in particular localities by sudden inroads, or outbreaks of fanaticism. Two other fortunate circumstances were the absence of union among the several tribes of Afghans, and the want of authority on the part of Yakoub Khan to compel a general war of resistance. While the British columns were piercing into the land like so many wedges, thus still further breaking up the loose cohesion existing at the best of times, the new Ameer (if he may be so regarded) was vainly struggling with a state of anarchy which necessarily inclined him to an alliance with the dominant English power. His adherents were few, his opponents were many and strong. He seemed to lack the art of conciliation, nor had he that commanding character which compels obedience from the unwilling. In the immediate neighbourhood of his own capital, he was successfully defied; and even the weak sway of Shere Ali became weaker in his hands. It is to be recollected, however, that at this time he had all the responsibilities of sovereignty, without the actual name and office. He was simply the representative of his father, who was simply the puppet of the Russians. A high-spirited and martial race, like the Afghans, was not likely to pay much regard to a ruler such as this. He wanted the stamp of authority. He was but the shadow of a shade; and the shade itself was cast by that distant Russian luminary which every patriotic Afghan detested as well as feared.

A rather interesting conversation on this subject, between General Kauffmann and the Tashkend correspondent of the *New York Herald*, was reported by that writer on the 4th of February. The correspondent suggested the possibility of Yakoub Khan dethroning his father, and asked what then would be the course of Russia. The General replied that the Ameer would in that case descend from the position of a sovereign to the level of a pretender, and that this would no more disturb Russia than had the previous usurpations of the Afghan throne. "But," said the correspondent, "supposing Yakoub, in dethroning his father, makes a treaty with the English, by which the latter shall be entitled to keep a diplomatic Agent at Cabul, while yours has been sent away. Will you then demand that Russia shall be represented near the throne of the new sovereign?" "No," replied General Kauffmann. "We have

* Telegram from the Viceroy to the India Office, December 31st, 1878.

a treaty with the English, which prohibits us from interfering with the affairs of Afghanistan, and we shall respect it." He added that even if the English occupied the whole of Afghanistan, including Herat, the Russians would suffer them to do so, unless a European war should break out, in which England and Russia were not on the same side. He repeated the former assertions with respect to the recent Embassy to Cabul having been prompted by the disturbed relations between his country and England, and characterised it as nothing more than a visit to a neighbour. But throughout this conversation it is impossible not to see the changed condition of the Russian mind, consequent on the masterly handling of affairs by the Anglo-Indian Government. If there is anything certain in history, it is that General Kauffmann, acting as the agent of the Russian Emperor, and doubtless in harmony with instructions from his sovereign, had endeavoured to obtain virtual possession of Afghanistan, as a base of operations, at some future period, against the dominion of British India.* If there is any other fact equally certain, it is that the scheme was shattered into fragments by the victorious advance of the British army into the territories of Shere Ali, and by the utter collapse of that potentate before the pressure of a vigorous hand.

## CHAPTER XLI.

State of Afghanistan in February, 1879—Collapse of the War—Meeting of Mollahs antagonistic to the late Ameer—Death of Shere Ali—His Career and Character—Faction-fights as to the Succession—Informal Negotiations with the English—Dismissal of the Afghan Embassy from Tashkend—Cavalry Action at Khushk-i-Nakhud—Position of the English Forces in March—Adverse Criticism on the Conduct of the Campaign—Designs of Yakoub Khan—Battle with the Shinwarries near Peshbolak—Agitation among the Mountain Tribes—Arrival of Spring—Disinclination of the New Ameer to grant the British Demands—Afghanistan finally abandoned by Russia—Action with the Khugians, and Death of Major Wigram Battye—Sir Frederick Haines (Commander-in-Chief) at Thal—Renewed Expedition towards Cabul—Address of General Roberts to the Jagi Tribe—Accident to the 10th Hussars—Collision with the Momunds at Little Dakka—Disappointing Character of the War—Renewed Negotiations—Arrival of Yakoub Khan in the British Camp at Gundamuk—His Appearance and Reception—Signature of a Treaty of Peace—Provisions of the Several Articles—Return of the Ameer to Cabul—Results and Value of the Afghan War.

DIFFICULTIES of various kinds surrounded the Afghan expedition; but they were not for the most part of a military character. The people, indeed, would not fight, except in a scattered and haphazard way, which was troublesome rather than dangerous to the invader. All systematic resistance ceased after the defeat of Wali Mahomed on the Peiwar Kotal; and the flight of Shere Ali left the country in a state of complete anarchy. Several of the tribes still kept up a show of warfare; but they could do nothing to drive back the advance of British power. They were not even agreed among themselves, and a campaign was impossible where there was no military commander and no civil ruler. Those who had formed the lowest estimate of the Afghan powers could hardly have imagined that the failure would be so sudden and so extreme. What to do with the land—how to create some settled form of government, with the responsible heads of which an arrangement might ultimately be concluded—was now the real gist of the problem. It was no longer a question of fighting with any foe worthy of the name; nor was the shadow of Russian interference any more to be dreaded. General Kauffmann drew back the moment he was boldly confronted, though his intrigues had known no check until he was thus encountered. Well might Shere Ali, journeying sadly to the north, give frequent expression to his painful surprise at the abandonment of his cause by the friend on whom he had relied. The Czar would not even utter a word of intercession for him, much less draw a sword or fire a rifle on his behalf. The turbulent mountain-tribes were equally disinclined to support either Shere Ali or his son. As far as

* A correspondent of the *Moscow Gazette*, describing the movements of the Russian detachment which marched in the summer of 1878 from Petro-Alexandroffsk along the Oxus, wrote:—"We ascended the Oxus along the right [north-eastern] bank, gradually approaching Bokhara. The men were in remarkably buoyant spirits No doubts as to the practicability of marching to India were entertained; but the famous Berlin Congress pronounced its mandate. We retraced our steps. The extreme point of our advance was Kizil-Rabat." (Translation enclosed in a despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus, dated January 1st, 1879.)

they fought at all, each fought for its own little space of barren territory, for its local independence, and for its individual chiefs. The campaign dwindled down to the most insignificant proportions, and it was found perfectly safe to withdraw some of the invading columns. The Zukkur-Khels having, in the early part of February, made terms with the political agent attached to the forces of General Maude, that officer returned from the Bazar Valley without suffering any molestation. Shortly afterwards, General Stewart left Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and returned to Candahar. A portion of his army soon retraced its steps to India, and General Roberts removed his head-quarters to Thal, within the limits of the British possessions.

The Russianising tendencies of Shere Ali cost him the allegiance of a large number of his subjects. A meeting of Mollahs (interpreters of the sacred law of Islam) was held at Jellalabad on the 20th of February, in the presence of Wali Mahomed, at which it was unanimously agreed that, as Shere Ali had sought Russian help, it would be unlawful to make a religious demonstration on his behalf. The Mollahs severely condemned the commission of acts of fanaticism, and admitted the toleration practised by the English in religious matters. If these facts were made known to Shere Ali, they must have increased the despondency with which he pursued his way towards the Russian settlement of Tashkend. He was ill when he started; grief and mortification conspired to depress his spirits and lower his physical strength; and his malady deepened with every remove from Cabul. He suffered from an extensive gangrene; and, although he struggled for some time against its exhausting effects, he broke down at last, and could proceed no farther on his way, but sent Ambassadors forward to represent his cause before General Kauffmann. Death terminated his career at Mazar-i-Sherif on the 21st of February, after two days of agony, mitigated as far as possible by the Russian doctor, Javorsky. He appears to have been rather less than sixty, but had passed a singular and eventful life, which made up by variety of experiences for what it lacked in fulness of years. In his youth he shared the exile of his father; in middle life he had to struggle hard for his throne; and his closing days were those of a fugitive. As one of the younger sons of Dost Mahomed, by whom he was designated to the succession, he speedily found himself confronted by the armed rebellion of two elder brothers and one younger, and tasted largely of misfortune and grief. When he had fully established his power, it was not long ere he became involved in those discussions with the British Government which finally led to war, and to the ruin of his sovereignty. The deaths of two favourite sons—the second occurring only a few months before his own decease—created a deep sentiment of melancholy in his nature, which doubtless affected his conduct in many ways, and which was visible in his whole expression and bearing. He was a man of a moody rather than a passionate disposition, although not incapable of those outbursts of rage from which Asiatic despots are seldom entirely free; and it was probably a kind of sulky dissatisfaction with our coldness towards him, more than deliberate and calculated treachery, which suggested his advances towards Russia, and inclined him to receive overtures from that quarter.

Many far worse tyrants than Shere Ali have disgraced the annals both of the East and of the West. He made some intelligent efforts to improve the condition of his country, and to introduce the order, stability, and civilisation of European lands; and his attempts in this direction were not entirely devoid of success. Like Mahmud II., the reforming Sultan of Turkey, he set the fashion of wearing European clothes, and seems to have relied much on this rather trivial detail for breaking down the spirit of Orientalism in more important respects. The army of Shere Ali was reorganised on Western models, and, although at the push it broke down in his hands, the machine thus created was not devoid of qualities such as might, under happier conditions, have produced striking results. The power of the Sirdars, or great military chieftains, was curbed by some wise enactments; the mass of the people were considered more than they had ever been before in Afghanistan; Cabul and some of the other large cities were placed under police regulations which gave a degree of protection to life and property; a postal service was introduced, with excellent effect; and an attempt was made, though without success, to substitute a money currency for payments in land or kind. Yet, with all these good intentions, Shere Ali could be despotic enough in his actions when his will was crossed. Nevertheless, it was not so much his occasional tyranny which disgusted the Afghans with his rule. In the East, tyranny is a matter of course, and may generally be exercised within certain limits, though perhaps less easily in Afghanistan than in most other Asiatic countries. The Ameer had offended rather by his spirit of innovation; by his tendency to imitate the ways and manners of the Ghiaour; and, finally, by his policy of alliance with Russia, which every Moslem felt to be the most deadly and insidious enemy of

his faith in the whole world. These things made Shere Ali hateful to the great majority of his subjects, so that, when he died in his loneliness and desolation, scarcely an Afghan wept his loss, or wished him again upon the throne which he had filled.

Mazar-i-Sherif, where the Ameer breathed his last, is situated in the northern part of his dominions, though beyond what is understood as Afghanistan Proper, and in the vicinity of Balkh. He had therefore not reached the Russian boundaries when death arrested him. Before the breath was out of his body, a series of faction-fights began among the pretenders to the throne. The several parties espoused the cause of Yakoub Khan, of his brother, and of his nephew; and in the end the supporters of the first-named got the upper hand. Dr. Javorsky was thrown into prison, but ultimately released; and a great many massacres were committed. Yakoub Khan, who was still at Cabul, lost no time in communicating the intelligence of his father's death to the Viceroy, which he did in a very brief letter, written on the 26th of February, and simply stating that, as the late Ameer was an old friend of the British Government, the information was sent out of friendship. This letter had been preceded by one dated the 20th, the object of which was to make overtures for the renewal of friendly relations. Some informal negotiations were at once begun; but the new Ameer was disinclined to grant the required conditions, or possibly, in face of the excitement of his people, was afraid to do so, until the necessity for compliance should be more apparent. This, however, was not likely to be much delayed. The Russian authorities in Turkistan evinced no readiness to enter into relations with Yakoub Khan, and the Afghan Embassy which had been despatched to Tashkend came to a sudden and undignified conclusion. While there, the Grand Vizier of Shere Ali had an interview with the correspondent of the *New York Herald*, to whom he stated that the English had achieved all their successes in the war by means of bribery, adding that a forced occupation was impossible "in territories purchased, not conquered." This was the salve which Afghan self-love laid to its wounds, and which the Russians also were not sorry to apply to their own disappointments. It is probable that some of the tribes were subsidised; but it is certain that there had been opposition, and that this had been encountered at the sword's point, and quelled. The death of Shere Ali was an additional misfortune, coming on the head of many others. General Kauffmann seemed almost to welcome the opportunity of escaping from a situation which had become embarrassing even to the extent of humiliation. He notified to the Afghan Ambassadors that their powers had expired by the death of the late Ameer; and on the 9th of March they left for Cabul, without any message for the new sovereign. The Czar had himself sent instructions to his representative in Turkistan that no fresh negotiations were to be opened with Afghanistan; and Yakoub Khan was left face to face with the English, unencumbered with any delusive hopes of succour from without.

For some time past, the war had made but little progress, and the tendency was rather to contract than to extend the area of military operations. The stay of General Biddulph at Girishk, which he entered on the 29th of January, was not prolonged, and appears to have been attended by no very marked results. The people at first seemed friendly, and professed their gratification at being delivered from the tyranny of the Ameer; but when General Biddulph was on his return march, on the 26th of February, his rear-guard, consisting of 268 sabres of the 3rd Scinde Horse, and 120 men of the 2nd Beloochee Cavalry, was attacked at Khushk-i-Nakhud by 1,500 of the Alizais, who suddenly swarmed over a neighbouring ridge, and bore down in two bodies on the English camp. Their right wing, which advanced in dead silence and in very fine style, arrived at charging distance just as the British officers had hurriedly told off their squadrons. These rapidly galloped towards the enemy, who unflinchingly accepted the collision. The Afghan ranks were six or eight deep, but were speedily shattered by the impetus of the encounter. Still they continued to fight with savage desperation, and endeavoured to reach the left of the camp; but a fresh squadron was wheeled up, breaking in their flank and rear. After a gallant struggle, the Alizais acknowledged their defeat, and took to flight, closely followed by their victorious adversaries. The combat and pursuit lasted two hours, and the estimated loss of the assailants was 150 killed. Among the few killed on our side was Major Reynolds, who fell early in the fray. While extricating his sword from a man's body, his charger stumbled, and four Afghans immediately despatched him, but were themselves cut down the next moment. Dost Mahomed, the Alizai chieftain, who had apparently espoused our cause, was in the camp when his clansmen made their appearance; but he escaped in the confusion, and seems to have acted the part of a traitor.

In the general uncertainty of the future, it was considered desirable for the present rather to remain

on the defensive than to undertake any new expeditions. Sir Samuel Browne's division was stationed at Jellalabad towards the middle of March, in readiness for an advance should events render further operations necessary; and General Maude's forces were moved up to occupy the ground vacated by Sir Samuel Browne. General Roberts concentrated his division towards Peiwar and Ali-Khel, and improved the road towards the Shutargarden Valley, so as to be ready for a forward movement when the ground should be less encumbered with snow, which at that time lay to the depth of four feet. Khelat-i-Ghilzai was evacuated and made over to Mahomed Aslam Khan Ghilzai, to whom, in common with other friendly chiefs, conciliatory presents were given, without, however, any positive engagements being contracted. The Afghans, it was clear, could do nothing serious against the British armies; but the difficulties of the country and the severity of the season compelled the withdrawal of our expeditionary columns from the more advanced positions which had at first been taken up. These measures were doubtless prudent; but they gave great dissatisfaction in India. The retirement of General Roberts from the Khost Valley was regarded as particularly unfortunate, being likely to produce a bad effect upon the neighbouring hill-tribes. The Waziris and similar clans were represented as in a state of ferment, and emissaries constantly passed to and fro between them and Cabul. It was apprehended that, if Yakoub Khan was in a position to give them material assistance, they might gravely interfere with the freedom of General Roberts's movements. A correspondent of the

YAKOUB KHAN, EMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.



RECONNOITRING PARTY OF THE GUIDES.

*Standard*, whose telegrams to his journal were so unfavourable to General Roberts that on the 6th of February he was excluded from the camp, described the Khost expedition as a farce, resulting in the British troops being compelled to leave the country, after a great loss of life, not only from fighting, but from sickness and exposure. The native authorities, it was observed, had succeeded in maintaining a certain amount of order; but in putting an end to their rule, and afterwards abandoning the valley, the British commander had left the whole district a prey to anarchy. The campaign seems to have been in the first instance arranged on too large a scale, and, although no actual reverses had been sustained, it was found imperative to contract the extended operations which formed such important features in the original scheme.

On the other hand, Yakoub Khan had to consider his position as the ruler of a land torn with internal anarchy, and occupied in several parts by an invading force. He would doubtless have been glad to make peace immediately, for, in succeeding to his father's throne, he did not inherit his father's quarrel. But he knew that England would not be content without a concession of territory, and this was a sacrifice which it was exceedingly hard and exceedingly difficult to make. He therefore still continued the state of war, hoping, perhaps, to tire out his enemy, and to obtain some advantage by which, when terms of peace were at length discussed, he should be enabled to occupy a better position for the final arrangement. Negotiations with the Indian authorities were not, indeed, discontinued; but they proceeded very slowly, and in the meanwhile scattered actions took place among the mountains. A battle of some importance was fought on the 24th of March, when General Tytler successfully attacked a force of 3,000 Shinwarries near Peshbolak. The object of his movement was to punish the villagers of Mausum and Mubarik Shah, four miles to the south of Peshbolak, for an attack on an English Commissariat agent, who had gone there to purchase forage. The force started at one o'clock in the morning, and consisted of seven hundred men, who, after a tedious march, got sight of the enemy as day was beginning to break. There was some fear that the Afghans would escape, and accordingly General Tytler, with a hundred and fifty spears, hurried forward at full speed, leaving the infantry to follow as quickly as they could. The Shinwarries were presently attacked by cavalry on three sides, and the infantry, on arriving at the spot, added their strength to that of the horsemen. In front of the English position was a plain, seven hundred yards from the village of Mausum, the walls and towers of which, together with the open ground at their foot, were held by matchlock-men. The artillery soon opened fire on Mausum, towards which point the skirmishers gradually advanced. General Tytler then left two companies to hold in check the village in his right rear, and at the same time ordered the cavalry across a nullah, or deep, narrow valley, from the other side of which several hundreds of the enemy were directing a heavy fire. The walls of Mausum were speedily cleared of their defenders, and the village itself was occupied by the British infantry. The Afghans retreated to other villages in the rear, and the cavalry, having reached the plain on the further side of the nullah, made a brilliant charge on the men who occupied it. The Afghan warriors, after delivering a volley from a distance of sixty yards, scattered before the fervour of the English attack, and endeavoured to escape over broken ground to the opposite hill. The cavalry pursued, and, getting to close quarters with their enemy, cut down fifty in a few minutes. Two villages on the left were seized, and the towers prepared for blowing up. The Shinwarries had assembled in gangs of from fifteen to fifty at no great distance from these operations, and our men, after mining the walls and setting lighted fuzes in position, retired to a point some two hundred yards to the rear of the ground originally occupied. The Afghans were apparently unaware of what had been done, for they rushed forward, and re-occupied the village just as the towers blew up—a catastrophe which caused the death of some of their number. The troops then destroyed another village in the same manner, and retreated to Peshbolak, with their guns in the centre. They were followed by the Afghans, who rushed on yelling, waving black and white flags, and keeping up an unbroken fire. This was answered with shells and musketry, from which the Shinwarries suffered heavy losses, but were not deterred from continuing the pursuit. Nevertheless, they refrained from actually charging, but dodged about from rock to rock, and abandoned the chase when the English troops had reached smooth ground. The Afghans are supposed to have lost at least three hundred, while our own loss was very small.* The whole affair was exceedingly well managed, and added greatly to the popularity which General Tytler already enjoyed among his troops.

The Shinwarries were not the only tribe which continued to exhibit opposition to the English forces. In many other quarters, the mountain clans showed an unfriendly, and in several cases

* Correspondent of the *Times*.

hostile, disposition; and the less sanguine of Indian politicians feared that we might in time be worn out by a succession of petty troubles, more difficult to encounter than resistance on a larger scale. These persons contended that the war should be brought to a close with the utmost expedition, and expressed their conviction that the whole of the frontier tribes were awaiting a signal from Yakoub Khan to attack our communications. This signal, it was added, would follow immediately on the breaking off of negotiations, and would doubtless have been given before, had not the tribes been kept in check by Yakoub telling them that they would have to reckon with us for anything they might do. Nevertheless, some of the petty chiefs in the Candahar district had recently sent messages to Major St. John, saying that, although they were bound to fight for Shere Ali as long as he lived, they now considered themselves the servants of the British. Another hopeful circumstance was to be found in the rapid change of winter into spring. The weather was severe and rigorous at the beginning of March; towards the end of the month, it was soft and warm, with abundant rains, and all the genial influences of a southern country. The corn had grown as high as a man's knee; the fruit-blossoms had fallen; and a week or two later the heat was becoming oppressive under canvas. The climate, however, varied in different localities, and in the higher passes snow still lingered when the lower passes were clear. Between the inclemency of winter and the oppressive heats of summer, there would be a season favourable to the operations of an English army; and every care was taken to make those operations as effective as possible, supposing them to be found necessary.

These preparations did not put a stop to the discussion of terms of peace. Major Cavagnari was for some time at Cabul, endeavouring to effect some arrangement with the new Ameer, though as yet without any result. By the latter end of March, the Major had returned to Lahore, where, on the 26th, he conferred with the Viceroy on the latest aspect of affairs at the Afghan capital. He was unable to report anything definite, and it still appeared probable that Yakoub would defy the English to the last. His authority over the Afghans was by this time very generally accepted; for the fierce opposition by which he was at first encountered, and which actually assumed the proportions of a civil war, even in Cabul itself, gave way when it became known that Shere Ali had on his deathbed appointed Yakoub as his successor, though on the understanding that, at the next vacancy, the sovereignty should revert to Ahmed Ali Khan, the child of Shere Ali's favourite son, Mohammed, who was killed at the battle of Kujbaz, in 1865. Yakoub was in fact temporising, to get the best terms he could; but in the meanwhile he organised his army, and addressed them in a manner which raised their enthusiasm, and increased his popularity as a prince to whom the national honour was not indifferent.

The communications of Major Cavagnari to Lord Lytton induced the Indian Government to order an immediate advance upon Cabul, as the only means of determining the Ameer's mind in favour of a pacific policy. The time for waiting had passed, and it was now evident that nothing short of the imminent presence of the British in his capital would induce Yakoub Khan to abandon his hesitating attitude, and accept the terms which the British Government had resolved to enforce. That he must yield sooner or later, was obvious to all intelligent observers; but as long as the British forces hung back, it was not unnatural in a semi-barbaric potentate to imagine that he was still in a position for hurling defiance at his enemies. Yakoub, however, was choosing his course with eyes fully open to the situation in which he stood, and to the probable consequences of his obstinacy. The representative of the *New York Herald* at Tashkend telegraphed to his journal on the 26th of March:—"We have arrived at the solution of the Afghan question. General Kauffmann declared to me categorically to-day, that matters were finished here. Afghanistan is totally abandoned to the English, who are free to take and even keep Herat, if it so pleases them, without any danger of interference from the Russians. General Kauffmann is convinced that the Afghans are powerless to effect anything unaided. The success of the English is now only a question of time and money." This determination on the part of Russia must have been known to Yakoub Khan, or, at the least, he could have had no reason to suppose that the Czar would render to him the help he had refused his father. He probably imagined that, by raising the frontier tribes against the British, he should obtain some success, by which his position would be improved. But the Indian authorities had every reason to be certain that they could defeat all such calculations, and force the Ameer upon his knees without any great expenditure of life.

The frontier tribes, however, responded with considerable alacrity to the demands upon their patriotism, and almost every day brought news of some fresh attack upon detached bodies of British

troops, who were, indeed, always enabled to drive back their assailants, but who were sometimes roughly handled before the enemy could be beaten off. One of such incidents occurred on the 2nd of April, when General Gough sent out two small reconnoitring parties from Futtehabad. These were fired on by the Afghans, and retired before superior numbers. Later piquets reported that large masses were assembling close to the camp; upon which General Gough got his men under arms, and, on advancing, found a number of Khugians holding a strong position two miles from the camp. From this point they soon afterwards advanced, and the artillery withdrew until it had obtained the support of the infantry, who were rapidly pushed forward. A sharp collision ensued, and the Afghans, who were 5,000 strong, fought with much determination. The action was decided by a cavalry charge, which completely broke the ranks of the enemy. The discomfited Afghans were pursued four miles, and lost four hundred killed, and one hundred wounded. Our own losses were not immaterial, and included a very gallant young officer, Major Wigram Battye, who was in command of the Guides, and therefore at the head of the cavalry charge. Early in the action he was shot in the leg, but continued on his course, though his companions pressed him to go back. Shortly afterwards, his horse was shot under him, and he himself was wounded in the arm and body. His orderly called out, "You are wounded; you had better stop." Major Battye replied, "Keep quiet;" charged, and killed four men before he was slain. Lieutenant Wiseman, of the 17th Foot, was also killed, together with a native officer of the Guides, and some soldiers. The wounded amounted to thirty-seven; but the success was complete, and the Khugians made no further attempt upon the British camp.



BLOWING UP THE TOWERS OF MAUSUM.

In order that he might personally inquire into

the state of affairs in Afghanistan, Sir Frederick Haines, the British Commander-in-Chief in India, arrived at Thal, close to the borders, on the 18th of March. He was accompanied by a large Staff, and the troops then stationed at Thal were ordered to parade for his reception. On the following day, the English forces under General Roberts once more crossed the frontier, accompanied by Sir Frederick Haines, and made their way along the military road then being constructed on the northern bank of the river Kurum. After an uneventful march of twelve miles, the party reached the camp at Munduri, where Major Channer was in command of a wing of the 29th Native Infantry. Thence they steadily pursued their way towards Cabul, the object of the expedition being to confront the Ameer in his own capital, and extort from him the peace which he seemed so loth to grant. General Roberts arrived at Ali-Khel on the 13th of April, and on the 3rd of May reviewed his troops, numbering 5,000 infantry and eighteen guns. A durbar for the reception of the Jagi tribe was afterwards held, and General Roberts, addressing his auditors, said :—"I promised five months ago to meet you again. I have fulfilled my promise. During this time, you have received many letters from Yakoub, urging the good followers of the Prophet to attack the British, and raise a *jihad*. Many of your leading Maliks are implicated; but the past shall be forgotten. Seeing that many false reports have spread regarding the terms demanded by the British, I may tell you that the British Government does not intend to station troops at Candahar, Cabul, Herat, Balkh, or Jellalabad. Its only desire is to secure a frontier by which it may have the power of entering Cabul whenever that is wanted. Those imprisoned for crimes by me will be released on the conclusion of peace. We have nothing to do with the independent tribes. Our only wish is to live in friendship. Be careful to keep your agreement about guarding the road and telegraph between Sirkaie Kotal and Ali-Khel. You will be well paid." In the first half of April, Sir Samuel Browne advanced to Gundamuk in three marches, and there took up a position of considerable strength—one, moreover, which had the advantage of being well adapted by its elevation to the residence of European troops during the summer. Pressure was brought to bear upon the Ameer from various directions; but he still continued obstinate, and seemed almost to demand severe coercion before he would yield.

Some detached incidents of a lamentable character occurred from time to time while the main course of events proceeded slowly towards its consummation. One of these was a melancholy casualty which happened to the 10th Hussars on the night of the 31st of March. A squadron of this regiment was crossing the Cabul river near Jellalabad, when, owing to a sudden wave coming down the channel, the column was carried away into deep water, with the loss of Lieutenant Harford and a large number of men. The depth of water at the ford was not more than three feet, and the Bengal Lancers, who were in front, got across in perfect safety. The Hussars had orders not to lose the direction taken by those in advance; but, although they pushed forward so as to keep close to their comrades, it would appear that they entered the water too low down the stream. "Hence," says a correspondent of the *Daily News*, "before they got into the middle, the water was rising high upon them; but they saw those ahead all safe on the other side, and, supposing they were on the same track, pushed ahead, till they found themselves with the water up to their saddles. The water at the ford runs at the rate of nine miles an hour; in the rapids, not many yards below the ford, it is still more swift. The horses, feeling it difficult to keep their feet, began to get restive, and the strong current forced them downwards into still deeper water, where the whole squadron was soon swept away, and became a struggling mass of confusion, horses and men fiercely contending with the rushing waters for life. Horses and riders were carried along as if they had been merely rolling logs. Where the rapids cease, there is a deep piece of water; and here the river lulls a little in its course. At this place, those who had strength left tried to struggle out; some succeeded, but many failed. The roll-call after the accident had only thirty answers to the names out of seventy-six who had started, showing a total loss of forty-six men. Captain Spottiswoode managed to keep on his horse, a very fine animal, not long out from England. The horse was able to swim, and reached the other side in safety. The principal difficulty was at the bank, where the horse got twice into quicksands, and sank up to the middle, the last time falling on the rider, and lying on him, so that Spottiswoode ran a very narrow escape of drowning, from his head being for a short time below the water." The incident was of a very deplorable nature; but it does not appear that blame was attributable to anyone.

Another unfortunate occurrence took place in April. A party of one hundred and fifty men of the Maharwarra Battalion was sent to the village of Little Dakka in order to protect the people from an expected attack. When the troops reached the

spot, they were begged by the inhabitants to return, as their presence would probably bring upon them the vengeance of the Momunds; but the officer in command determined to fulfil his orders, and accordingly encamped for the night. The villagers immediately gave notice of their presence to the neighbouring tribe, and at daybreak next morning nearly two thousand Momunds had surrounded this small body of Hindoos, who, without guns,

A RECONNAISSANCE IN THE BAZAR VALLEY: TAKING OBSERVATIONS.

were encamped in an exposed situation. Rough entrenchments were hastily thrown up in the cemetery, and a determined resistance was offered to the attacks of the assailants. In the afternoon, however, the ammunition of the battalion was nearly exhausted, and every man would in all probability have been massacred, had not reinforcements arrived. The detachment was then withdrawn, with a loss in killed and wounded of twenty men; but during the retreat to Fort Dakka, two British soldiers were killed, and five wounded. Incidents such as these contributed to disgust the Indian public with the Afghan war. The campaign had begun in a brilliant and promising manner; but it had long ceased to present any features of interest, save those which were associated with small disasters and petty mismanagement. Military operations in so mountainous a country as Afghanistan, peopled as it is with a large number of warlike tribes, each fighting for its own purposes, are doubtless very difficult; but there seems, in this particular war, to have been a want of commanding ability in the direction of affairs. The division of the invading army into distinct columns, separated from one another by wide tracts of desert country, prevented anything like concentrated action on a large and effective scale, though doubtless the plan was not without advantages of a special character. The campaign was one in which none but the highest genius could have effected any extraordinary results; yet the utter inglorious-ness of the whole proceedings created a feeling of weariness on the part of the Indian public, and a strong desire for some arrangement by which the business might be brought to a conclusion, and

ACCIDENT TO THE 10TH HUSSARS.

the troops withdrawn from positions which were perilous without glory, and fatiguing without gain. The several expeditions were independent of one another, and it seems most improbable that any striking results could have been achieved where there was so entire an absence of combination, and of the force that is derivable from one directing mind.

Renewed negotiations with Yakoub Khan were carried on in April, and on the 23rd of that month a messenger from Major Cavagnari, who had been despatched to Cabul, returned to Gundamuk with an intimation from Yakoub Khan that he would be willing to receive a Mission. It was believed that Major Cavagnari, accompanied by a suitable escort, would proceed to the Afghan capital as soon as the details had been arranged. But, in the first instance, the messenger was sent back to Cabul with instructions as to the terms on which alone the British authorities would make peace. A cession of the Khyber and Kurum Passes was to be demanded; and permission for an English Resident to be established at Cabul was another of the conditions which the Ameer was to understand were imperative. By this time Yakoub Khan was convinced that further resistance could be attended by no beneficial results. Several of the hill-tribes were submitting themselves to English rule; in Candahar, the second city of the country, everything was quiet; and it was very generally acknowledged that the English were in a position to make their will prevail, even although the circumstances of the case did not permit of their fighting brilliant engagements, or achieving decisive victories. The only course open to the Ameer was to make the best terms he could, without further procrastination; and accordingly he quitted Cabul on the 2nd of May, with the intention of negotiating personally with Major Cavagnari at Gundamuk.

Yakoub Khan arrived in the British camp on May 8th, and himself telegraphed a friendly message to the Viceroy, announcing his presence there. Major Cavagnari, with a guard of honour of fifty Hussars and fifty Guides, had met him six miles off, and the troops awaited him outside the camp, drawn up in extended files. He was received with a Royal salute, and was accompanied by Mustaufi Habbibullah (his Finance Minister), by General Daoud Shah, and by six of his near relatives. He was a young, good-looking man, apparently not more than thirty-four years of age, with features of the aquiline type common among the Afghans, and a somewhat careworn expression, mingled with indications of a resolute nature. He wore an Afghan cloak, of light brown native material; but the rest of his costume was European, with the exception of his head-dress, which consisted of a close-fitting cap of Astrakhan wool, with a tassel. His horse was a handsome chestnut Turkoman charger, and his mode of sitting the animal was dignified and princely. When the procession had arrived between the two lines of troops, Sir Samuel Browne joined it, and the Ameer seemed much impressed and gratified by the military demonstration made in his honour. In the afternoon, Major Cavagnari paid his first visit of ceremony, accompanied by General Browne, and the former handed the Ameer a letter from the Viceroy, addressed to him under the style and title of "The Ameer Mahomed Yakoub Khan, Wali of Cabul," which amounted to a virtual acknowledgement of his position as *de facto* ruler of the country. The purport of the letter was to offer the Viceroy's condolences on the death of Yakoub's father, and to introduce Major Cavagnari as the plenipotentiary appointed to conduct the approaching negotiations. This communication was read to the Ameer by his Minister, Mustaufi Habbibullah, and was received by him with dignified composure, such as entirely prevented the on-lookers from determining how far he was pleased with its contents. After some formal conversation, tea was handed round in small china cups, and the British officers then withdrew, attended to the outside of the tent by Mustaufi Habbibullah and Daoud Shah. On the 9th, Yakoub Khan returned the visit of Sir Samuel Browne and Major Cavagnari, on which occasion the whole Divisional Staff, and the general officers commanding brigades, were present. Some representatives of the press were also admitted, and, together with the officers, were introduced to the Ameer. In the course of the ensuing conversation, Yakoub Khan expressed a fear that the English officers had experienced much discomfort in advancing so far into a country like Afghanistan. There was doubtless a slight touch of irony in this remark; but it was well received, and on the whole the Ameer's manner created a very favourable impression. Both these meetings were purely complimentary; but they were speedily succeeded by frequent interviews of a business character. The Ameer proved to be a man of less ability than had been supposed, and his want of acquaintance with State affairs, owing to his long imprisonment, caused frequent delays, which his Ministers had not sufficient adroitness to prevent.

At length, however, on the afternoon of May 26th, a Treaty of Peace, in ten articles, was signed between Yakoub Khan and the British Government, the principal features of which were speedily

made known in England. The First Article of this agreement declared that peace and friendship should thenceforward subsist between the contracting parties. Article II. proclaimed an amnesty, guaranteeing the Ameer's subjects from all punishment or molestation on account of their intercourse with the British forces. In Article III. it was stipulated that the foreign affairs of the Ameer should be conducted under British advice, and that Yakoub Khan should be supported by the British Government against foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government might judge best for the purpose. By Article IV. a British Resident was to be appointed at Cabul, provided with a proper escort, and having power to depute British Agents to the Afghan frontier on special occasions; the Ameer, on his part, being permitted to depute Agents to India. By the Fifth Article, Yakoub Khan guaranteed the safety and honourable treatment of British Agents in his dominions; and the British Government, on its part, undertook that its Agents should never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness's domains. Commercial facilities were to be made the subject of a separate agreement, to be concluded within twelve months. Telegraphic communication was to be established with Cabul *viâ* the Kurum Valley; and the territory then in British occupation was to be restored to the Ameer, with the exception of the Kurum, Pisheen, and Sibi Valleys. These were to remain attached to the British Government; but the Ameer was to receive the surplus revenue, after payment of the administrative expenses, and the districts in question were not to be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The British authorities were to have entire control over the Khyber and Michni Passes, as well as over the relations of the frontier tribes in the

MAJOR CAVAGNARI NEGOTIATING PEACE WITH YAKOUB KHAN.

mountainous districts where those passes are situated. Finally, it was stipulated that the Ameer should receive an annual subsidy of six lakhs of rupees, contingent on his strict execution of the foregoing articles.

The Ameer returned to Cabul in June, after addressing to the Viceroy a letter, in which he stated that, towards the close of the next cold season, he hoped to have "a joyful meeting" with his Excellency, for the purpose of making firmer the basis of their friendship. Lord Lytton replied in a similar tone of cordiality, and Yakoub Khan left Gundamuk with no reason to complain of the manner in which he had been received. But he left it with diminished territories, and in the position of a vassal to the English Government. He had obtained the alliance of that Government, but at a cost which must have been grievous to his pride as an independent monarch. The possessions he relinquished were of no great value in themselves, for they were peopled by tribes who had always defied the authority of Cabul. Yet the abnegation of sovereignty, even if it be over a desert, is always mortifying, especially when it comes as the result of an unsuccessful war. Moreover, the territory to be occupied by the English placed the whole of Afghanistan at the mercy of the Anglo-Indian Government. An alien Power was planted within the very borders of the Ameers' former dominions, and it was almost avowed that the object of this intrusion was to exercise an effective control over the conduct of the Afghan Prince. The foreign policy of the Ameer was no longer to be his own; it was to be that of his conquerors. He might follow out his individual ideas of government in internal affairs; but in the relations of his State towards foreign Powers he was to be ruled implicitly by the advice of England, who would of course consult her own interests as the first consideration. In exchange for this sacrifice of sovereign prerogative, Yakoub Khan was to receive the support of English bayonets, in the event of his dominions being attacked by any other Power. To put the matter more bluntly, he insured his country's life against the advances of Russia by surrendering a portion of that life to the requirements of England. The alternative was painful; but the Ameer chose the smaller of two evils. He could at any rate plead that the dilemma was none of his creating. On succeeding to the throne, he inherited a situation which the folly and petulance of his father had made in the highest degree perplexing and unhappy. It was beyond his power to place matters on the ground they might have occupied in 1876, in 1877, or even in the early autumn of 1878. The posture of affairs is never the same at the conclusion of a war as before its commencement. Yakoub Khan paid the penalty of his father's insane attachment to the Russian cause; and Afghanistan was lowered in the rank of Asiatic Powers because Shere Ali, offended by the distrustful and parsimonious policy of Mr. Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll, had made her independence a standing menace to the safety of British India. The new condition had its sorrows for the Ameer. For England, it had special responsibilities of a peculiarly onerous nature —perhaps it should be added, special dangers also, of which only the future can reveal the exact bearings and extent. By the Treaty of Gundamuk, the two great rivals for dominion in Asia are brought into more distinct relations towards one another than they acknowledged before; but at least the element of uncertainty is removed, and England has no longer to fear a masked battery among the Afghan mountains and defiles.

## CHAPTER XLII.

State of Turkey in January, 1879—Doubts and Difficulties of the Future—Official Correspondence on the Subject of Turkish Reforms—Sir A. H. Layard and the Marquis of Salisbury on the Concessions of the Porte—The Policy of Interference—Establishment of Councils-General—Financial Crisis at Constantinople—Ineffectual Attempts to contract a Loan—Fears of revolutionary Disturbances—The Definitive Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey—Declaration of Prince Labanoff and Karatheodori Pasha—Articles of the Treaty, with the accompanying Protocol—New Position of Russia towards Turkey, in its Bearings on the Treaty of Berlin—Final close of the War—Disagreement between Russia and Roumania on the Boundaries of the Dobrudscha—Agitation in Eastern Roumelia for Union with Bulgaria—Mobbing of the Commissioners—Oppression of the Mohammedans—Illegal Interference of the Russian Officials—Election of Delegates in Eastern Roumelia to the Bulgarian Assembly—Subjection of Bulgaria to Russian predominance—Meeting of the Assembly of Notables at Tirnova—Opening Address of Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff—Constitution of the Assembly—Situation and Character of Tirnova—Proceedings of the Bulgarian Chamber—Formation of a Liberal Constitution—Relations of Bulgaria towards Russia.

TURKISH affairs have been left in the background while we traced the origin and development of the Central Asiatic and Afghan Questions, which are so intimately associated with the position of the Ottoman Empire and the future of Mohammedanism, and while we related the circumstances of the Afghan war. But it is now time to revert once more to Constantinople, and to follow with some attention the consequences of that great struggle which reached its formal close in the Treaty of Berlin. The conclusion of peace found the Sultan with dominions considerably reduced, and in a certain position of dependence towards the Great Powers, especially Russia and England, which imposed on him peculiar difficulties as the ruler of a nation which had once been great and predominating. In January, 1879, Turkey had scarcely recovered from the first shock of her terrible defeat and shattering downfall. Her territory was occupied by hostile forces; her army was in a state of disorganisation; her material prosperity was almost mortally injured; her finances were on the edge of bankruptcy; and the insolence of her late enemy was such that it appeared doubtful even then whether a renewal of the deadly conflict would not be precipitated. Yet Abdul-Hamid was still the sovereign of a large and important Empire, exercising powers in Europe, Asia, and Africa, which made his position a matter of interest to a very considerable section of the globe. The regeneration of Turkey, if regeneration were still possible, would secure the happiness of many millions of human souls; her final ruin must necessarily be attended by a vast amount of misery and evil. The war of 1877–8 had by no means settled what is usually understood as the Eastern Question; nor was there ever the slightest probability that it would have such an effect. Rather had it increased the difficulties of the problem, and embittered the whole controversy by additional elements of hatred and revenge. The attention of Europe was still directed towards Turkey at the beginning of 1879; but it was with little faith in a favourable issue that statesmen watched the struggles of the Porte to disengage itself from the embarrassments of a political and social condition, attributable in part to native faults and vices, but still more to external plotting, and to those continual interferences which, under the mask of philanthropy, concealed a selfish end.

The subject of Turkish reforms received some illustration from the publication by the British Government, on the 1st of January, of certain official correspondence on the measures proposed to be introduced. The first of these despatches bore date August 8th, 1878, and was from the Marquis of Salisbury to Sir A. H. Layard. It explained the views of the Government upon the reforms which were considered necessary, and pointed out that, while the measures to be accomplished in Europe had been entrusted to a European Commission, those affecting Asia were to be devised and executed by the Sultan, in direct agreement with, or under the general supervision of, other Powers. In particular, the reforms required by Armenia were, by the Convention of Constantinople, to be arranged in concert with the English Government; and the Foreign Secretary accordingly directed our representative at the Porte to lose no time in inviting the Ministers of the Sultan to commence the negotiation. The difficulties experienced by Sir A. H. Layard in carrying out these instructions were in part attributed by him to a strong section of the Ministry, supported by persons of great influence in the country, who resolutely opposed all interference by foreigners in the internal affairs of the Empire. These politicians looked upon the reforms demanded by the British Government as a violation of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and of the independence of Turkey. It appeared that foreign influence had been employed very energetically, and with some effect, to encourage and support this opposition; and the usual dilatoriness of the Porte in matters of business had added to the

delay in obtaining an answer. The English Ambassador was obliged to use his influence to prevent a reply being returned which would have been altogether unacceptable to the British Government; but he admitted that neither the Sultan nor his Foreign Minister (at that time, Safvet Pasha) was answerable for the procrastination which he said had well nigh exhausted his patience. The concessions at length sanctioned by the Porte, and explained in a despatch to Sir A. H. Layard, dated October 24th, 1878, have been briefly related in an earlier Chapter.*

Writing to the English Ambassador at Constantinople on December 4th, the Marquis of Salisbury gave expression to the views of himself and his colleagues on the promised improvements, which he described as not in all respects corresponding with the suggestions of her Majesty's Government, but yet as presenting the conditions of an effective reform in a sufficient degree to justify the Cabinet in accepting them as an adequate instalment of the changes to which, under the Convention of the 4th of June, the Porte had generally pledged itself. Lord Salisbury exhibited a correct appreciation of the needs of Turkey when he wrote:—"The precautions which the Sultan's advisers felt themselves bound to take, lest, under the guise of reform in the administration, the Sultan's sovereignty should be threatened, betray apprehensions for which your Excellency well knows there is no cause; but the motive which dictated them is worthy of respect. Undoubtedly it will not be challenged by her Majesty's Government; for they are well aware that, whatever abuses have attended its exercise, the authority of the Sultan is the only bond which at the present moment holds together the shattered fabric of society in Asiatic Turkey. The more anxious they are to carry into execution the necessary reforms, the more they will desire to respect and sustain the only sanction by which reform can be imposed, either upon the ruling class or the subject population of those regions." Yet the course adopted in the Constantinople Convention was a distinct departure from the principles thus laid down; and indeed the main reason why the policy of the Government towards Turkey had been to a great extent a failure, and had resulted in Russia obtaining the major part of what she sought, was that the divided Cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield preached the independence of Turkey with one voice, and with the other sanctioned the very principle of interference which was all that Russia wanted to justify her own action. From the moment Lord Derby sent off his famous despatch of September 21st, 1876, denouncing the Bulgarian massacres, and haughtily calling on the Porte for reparation and justice, the game was handed over to Russia; and the error was confirmed by the Constantinople Conference of a few months later. Such were the inconsistencies of a Government which either had no clear conception of what it desired, or was wanting in the power to enforce its will.

At the beginning of 1879, the Sultan appointed the Valis for each Governmental district, who were to hold office for a term of five years; and the Porte was authorised to select the Mutessarifs, or Governors of Sandjaks, from (in each case) three candidates proposed by the Vali. The functionaries in the several provinces were selected, wherever it was practicable, from the inhabitants of the vilayets; and a Council-General, composed of two delegates from each caza, was to be appointed in every vilayet. It was decided that, with the exception of the customs and land-taxes, the revenues of each province should be devoted to meeting the expenditure of the province itself, in such matters as public works and the maintenance of the gendarmerie. These tribunals are free, and hold their sittings in public, and the sentences are to be pronounced both in the Turkish tongue and the language of the majority of the inhabitants. Among the duties of the Councils-General are the reorganization of the taxes and expenditure, and the protection of religious liberty. They are, in short, a species of local Parliaments, and upon their successful working must to a great extent depend the reality of reforms in Turkey, and the prospects of a national regeneration which may perhaps even yet be accomplished.

The financial difficulty is always one of the greatest with which a Turkish Ministry has to contend. This chronic disease was of course immensely aggravated by the war, and it was extremely doubtful whether the Porte would be able to contract a new loan. The credit of the country was seriously impaired, and the value of the *kaimés* fluctuated in the most alarming manner. Zuhdy Pasha, who had been appointed Minister of Finance on the faith of his assurances that he could so manage as to withdraw the paper currency altogether, or, at the very least, raise its value materially, was dismissed towards the end of January, after about four months' trial, because he had entirely failed to secure the desired results. He was succeeded by his immediate predecessor, Kiani Pasha, and shortly afterwards the Government made arrangements for a loan with a French company, the representatives of which were the

* Vol. II., p. 350.



JELLALABAD, FROM THE SOUTH.

Marquis de Tocqueville and M. de Kératry. According to this financial scheme, the guarantees to be given by the Porte were to comprise the future Bulgarian tribute, the amount received from Cyprus, and the portion of the Turkish debt to be paid by Montenegro, Servia, and Bulgaria: the Porte was also to cede two-thirds of the Customs revenue. The collection of the indirect taxes was to be controlled by two Ottoman, two British, and two French administrators; and £8,000,000 were to be advanced to the Porte, at six per cent., in order that the Government might withdraw the *kaimés*, and redeem the mortgaged revenues. On the 18th of February, the Porte requested the Cabinets of London and Paris to name two specialists, to join the deliberative body thus called into being. The Russian Government, however, objected to the whole plan, because the mortgage on the Bulgarian tribute would interfere with the priority to be given to the war-indemnity, and because, among foreign Powers, only France and England were to be represented on the Commission; and, as the first instalment of the loan was not paid on the 18th of March—the day fixed for that purpose—the Porte intimated that it considered the Convention at an end. This caused a still more desperate condition of the Turkish finances, and on the 20th of March an Imperial *iradé* was issued, declaring that thenceforth the Government would pay in coin, and accept only one-fifth of the taxes in paper, which paper, when paid into the Government treasuries, would be destroyed under the eyes of the holders themselves. The effect of the measure was almost completely to expel the *kaimés* from circulation. Merchants and shop-keepers refused to take them at any price, and it was only at a reduction of about a tenth of their nominal value that the lowest class of dealers would receive them. The Sultan sent a large number of gold and silver vessels to the Mint, to be melted down for coin, and applied to the redemption of the paper money—a measure by which it was hoped to realise £100,000. But it was soon found impossible to apply with any strictness the decree for the withdrawal of the *kaimés*, owing to the inability of a large part of the population to pay four-fifths of the taxes in coin; and in April the Porte decided that, during the ensuing three months, paper would be accepted for the arrears of taxes.

To financial embarrassment was added the fear of revolution. The Sultan was in a state of continual alarm lest some palace intrigue or popular rising should deprive him of his throne, and perhaps of his life. Numerous arrests were made from time to time, and the sense of insecurity was so general and so great that several persons belonging to the official class sought refuge on foreign ships and at foreign Embassies. The position of this class (with the exception of those occupying the higher ranks) was in many respects very deplorable. Its members were popularly regarded as oppressors of the poor, upon whose sufferings they themselves grew rich. Yet they were in truth reduced to the very brink of poverty by the ruin which had seized on all things. Being paid in *kaimés*, which were almost worthless, their salaries were little more than nominal, while at the same time prices were exceptionally high. Among the lower classes, the utter stagnation of business created an extremity of distress which in many nations would have resulted in sanguinary riots, and the spread of socialist doctrines. The Turkish poor, however, are not imbued with such ideas, and in Constantinople revolutions generally proceed from the military and bureaucratic orders—from those who have been dispossessed of office, and who desire once more to seize the direction of affairs. The Government, moreover, may always be relied on for doing its best to help the needy, though by methods not strictly within the limits of political economy. In the winter of 1879, the prices of bread and meat were fixed by an Imperial decree, and the loss to the butchers and bakers was repaid to them out of the national exchequer.

The definitive Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, which the former Power insisted was none the less necessary on account of the Treaty of Berlin, was for many weeks the subject of long and anxious discussions between the representatives of the Czar and the Ministers of the Porte; but it was at length signed on the 8th of February, after a sitting of the Council of Ministers which lasted four hours. New difficulties had arisen at the last moment; but these were finally overcome, and the formality of signing commenced at seven o'clock P.M. Previously to appending his name to the document, Prince Labanoff made the following declaration to Karatheodori Pasha:—"At the moment of attaching my signature to the Treaty of Peace which has just been negotiated, I am authorised to declare to the Sublime Porte that the order to evacuate those parts of the Ottoman Empire situated beyond Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia will be given to the troops immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty; always supposing that at that date all authority and troops are withdrawn from Spitz and Podgoritza. The evacuation will continue without interruption, and, on the thirty-fifth day after the order has been given, the

Imperial troops, unless prevented by unforeseen impediments, will cross the borders of Eastern Roumelia. In view of this determination, it becomes indispensable that means should be taken to ensure order and tranquillity in the localities thus evacuated, and to re-establish Turkish civil and military authority as soon as those localities are abandoned by the Russian troops. To give effect to these measures, a cordial understanding should subsist between the commanders of the two Imperial armies."

The treaty consisted of twelve articles, the leading features of which may be briefly stated. Article I. declared that peace and cordial relations were re-established between the two Empires. Article II. provided that those clauses of the Treaty of San Stefano which were not modified by the Treaty of Berlin should remain in force. In Article III., the contracting parties agreed upon the execution of the articles of the earlier treaty, after the manner set forth in the succeeding clauses. By Article IV. the indemnity was fixed, after deducting the value of the ceded territories, at 802,500,000 francs; the mode of payment to be settled by a subsequent understanding between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan. It was arranged by Article V. that the Russian Government and the Porte would determine the distribution of the compensation to be made to Russian subjects in Turkey for losses they had sustained during the war. The total amount of this compensation was not to exceed 26,750,000 francs (£1,070,000). All claims by Russian subjects were to be sent in during a fixed term; and after a period of two years from the exchange of the ratifications they would no longer be received. By Article VI. it was decided that the cost of the maintenance of Turkish prisoners, up to the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, would be fixed by a Commission, and be payable, in twenty-one instalments, at the end of every four months, after deducting the expenses incurred for the maintenance of Russian prisoners in Turkey. Inhabitants of the territories ceded to Russia would, according to Article VII., have the right of choosing which nationality they would adopt. Those determining to emigrate into Turkey would be allowed a delay of three years to effect the sale of their property; but, if they had not emigrated by that time, they would be regarded as Russian subjects. Each of the contracting parties engaged in Article VIII. not to prosecute, but on the contrary to amnesty, any persons who had been openly or secretly in the service of its opponent during the war. By Article IX., individuals arrested or sentenced for their connection with recent events in Roumelia were pardoned. Article X. declared that all treaties and conventions which had been suspended in consequence of the war should again come into force. By Article XI. the Porte engaged to see to the execution of judgments in favour of Russian subjects; and Article XII. provided that the treaty was to be carried out immediately after its ratification, which was to be effected in a fortnight.

In addition to the treaty itself, the engagements between Russia and Turkey were further expressed in a Note presented to the Porte by Prince Labanoff, and, secondly, in a Protocol or Annex. The Russian Note declared that the Russian troops should commence to withdraw from the territory occupied by them as soon as the ratifications were exchanged, and that the evacuations should be completed within forty days. The Protocol stated: Firstly, that the recognition of the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin in the new treaty implied no innovation, and changed neither its character nor its range; secondly, that all claims put forward by Russian subjects for damages sustained during the war should be examined by a Russian Commission, at which the Porte also would be represented by a delegate; thirdly, that the article in the Treaty of San Stefano relating to the war-indemnity which might be claimed by Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, was modified in consequence of the independence of those States, and that as, under those altered circumstances, Russia could not treat for them, they remained free to come to an understanding upon this question with the Porte; fourthly, that the amnesty did not prevent either State from taking measures of police against persons who might be considered a source of danger.

The terms of the treaty were more satisfactory than at one time seemed probable. Russia had started with very haughty pretensions, and had originally required that the modifications made in the Treaty of San Stefano by that of Berlin should be subject to confirmation by the definitive treaty between Turkey and herself. In the result, it was recognized by both parties that the Treaty of Berlin had replaced all those stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano which the Congress of Berlin had discussed, and that the new instrument merely settled those points of the Treaty of San Stefano which were not touched upon by the Congress of Berlin. Even towards the end of the preliminary negotiations, the Russians still demanded that the definitive treaty should contain a specific confirmation of the Berlin decisions; the object clearly being to relieve Russia from the appearance of submitting perforce to a

European decision, and to give the final treaty the air of allowing that which, had it been so chosen, might have been set aside. This requirement seems to have been in some degree satisfied (though rather by implication than by direct statement) in the opening words of the protocol annexed to the treaty of February 8th, which speak of the stipulations contained in the Treaty of Berlin as being "recognized" by the new treaty; but it was at the same time stated that this recognition implied no innovation on the agreement to which the Great Powers of Europe had appended their signatures on the 13th of July, 1878. The discussion of these vexed points prolonged the negotiations over several weeks, and the Russians complained of the extreme suspiciousness of Karatheodori Pasha, the Foreign Minister of the Porte, who appears to have apprehended at every turn some subtle device of the enemy to gain an advantage over the Turkish Government. Under all the circumstances of the case, this feeling can hardly excite surprise, and the obstructiveness of the Turkish Ministers was not entirely without a good effect in reducing the pretensions of the Czar. The treaty had at any rate this great recommendation, that it delivered Turkey from the presence of foreign armies, and restored her once more to the position of an independent Power. The war-indemnity, however, was a thorn still remaining in her side, and, owing to the extreme poverty of the Ottoman Empire, it was doubtful when that thorn would be removed. On the whole, both nations had reason to be glad that the war was now finally at an end, and that, as far as was practicable, definite arrangements for the future had been concluded between the two Powers. The Russian Emperor gave expression to his sense of satisfaction at a review of the Imperial Grenadier Regiment, which took place at St. Petersburg on the 9th of February. After the troops had paraded, his Majesty addressed the officers, announcing the signature of the separate treaty of peace, and thanking them for the services they had rendered during the war. He expressed a hope that they might be spared bloodshed in future; but he was sure that, in case of necessity, his troops would be ready and willing to defend their country. On the 16th of February, an Imperial proclamation was published at St. Petersburg, announcing the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey, and stating that orders had been given for the return of the Russian troops; and this may be taken as the last echo of that fierce clamour of contention which for several months had swept like a storm over the south-east of Europe and the west of Asia, and drawn the attention of the whole world towards the blood-stained battle-fields of Turkey.

The work of the different Commissions for marking out the new boundaries proceeded very slowly, for there were many antagonistic views to be harmonized, and in several instances Russia created obstacles to a settlement, in the hope of obtaining still more decided advantages than she had already won. As regarded the delimitation between Bulgaria and the new Roumanian province of the Dobrudscha, she strongly objected to the decision of the Commission to fix the Danube frontier, near Silistria, at eight hundred mètres from the outworks of that city. She wished to refer the question to the Ambassador at Constantinople; but this suggestion was warmly opposed by France, on the ground that such a proceeding might be regarded as a precedent likely to be quoted in all cases where differences arose among the various Commissions, and that this would indefinitely prolong the work in hand, besides establishing that species of joint control over the execution of the treaty stipulations which all the Powers, with the exception of Russia, had disapproved during the Congress of Berlin. The representatives of the Czar then desired that the Commission of Delimitation should again be summoned, to hear once more the objections of Russia to the decision already taken. The members of that body, however, were by this time dispersed in several directions, and it was found inconvenient to call them together again. Roumania was much incensed at the Russian attempt to deprive her of a considerable portion of territory, and, for the protection of her own interests, took forcible possession of Arab Tabia, a point on the Danubian shore dominating the fortress of Silistria, which, according to the Treaty of Berlin, was to be included in Bulgaria, after having been dismantled. A Russian garrison was there at the time, but, being feeble in numbers, withdrew under protest. The Bucharest Cabinet protested to the Foreign Powers against an extension of frontier which would leave communication with the Dobrudscha entirely at the mercy of Russia; but by some of those Powers the action of the Roumanians in seizing upon Arab Tabia was considered irregular and objectionable. The Russian press was very violent against the subjects of Prince Charles for the course they had taken, and the *Golos* went so far as to call their Ministers "conceited Machiavellis," who would soon be made to perceive the impossibility of opposing Russia. The disagreement was composed after a while through the informal mediation of the Powers, by whose advice (combined with

the marching of a Russian brigade from Babadagh to Silistria) Roumania was induced to evacuate the fortress of Arab Tabia, and to withdraw within the line proposed by Russia. As usual, the representatives of the Czar had gained their end, partly by their own resolution, and partly by the pusillanimous subserviency of other nations to the will of St. Petersburg.

But it was in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia that the interference of Russia was seen in its most objectionable forms. The constitution of those two provinces, as political organizations distinct from one another, was never heartily accepted by Prince Gortschakoff; and his subordinates on the spot did their utmost to defeat the arrangement which had been sanctioned at Berlin on the initiative of England. Every kind of agitation on the part of the populace was encouraged by the Russian officials, and the Commission for the delimitation of Eastern Roumelia found its work opposed by riotous assemblages, demanding that the two provinces should be united under a single Government. In the latter part of December, 1878, the members of the Commission were stopped at the first station on the railway from Adrianople to Philippopolis, and surrounded by a clamorous mob, consisting chiefly of women and children. These persons approached the Commissioners, and thrust petitions into their hands, at the same time declaring that they would never submit to the proposed delimitation, and that they were resolved to be Bulgarians. It was found that the bulk of these petitioners were not inhabitants of the villages on the border, but had come from distant places, belonging unquestionably to Turkey. On this fact being pointed out to them, they replied that they did not want Turkish rule, but desired to be included in Bulgaria. The Commissioners appealed to the commander of the Russian escort to disperse the crowd; but he answered that he had no instructions in the matter. It was evident that the demonstration had been arranged beforehand, and that it had the countenance of the Russians; and the Commissioners, believing that interruptions would constantly recur along the whole route, returned at once to Adrianople, whence they had set out. Here also they found the same indisposition to place any curb upon these popular demonstrations, and they accordingly retraced their steps to the Turkish capital. On their way thither, several of the villages furnished indisputable evidence that the interruption to their labours had proceeded from an organised plot. It was likewise perceived that the Mohammedans had been systematically driven out of that part of the country, and replaced by Bulgarians. The very houses and mosques of the former had been levelled with the ground; and this had been done not merely in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, but in a large portion of the territory west of Adrianople which was to revert to the Turks. The Russians had in many places gone considerably beyond the line of demarcation stipulated by the armistice, and the Turks, having very few troops in those quarters, were compelled to submit quietly to the outrage.* When the Commission urged the repatriation of the Mohammedan refugees, Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff replied that there was no room for them, as the Bulgarians had taken their places. This was unquestionably the fact, but it was a fact which the Prince himself had had a considerable share in bringing about.

The illegal interference of the Russians was in truth so notorious that it was at length found necessary to restrain in some degree the undiscriminating zeal of the Czar's officials. In the early part of 1879, the conduct of Prince Dondoukoff in Bulgaria, and of General Stolepine, the Russian Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia, underwent an alteration for the better, and the agitation among the Bulgarians became somewhat less in consequence. Nevertheless, the relations between the European Commission at Philippopolis and the Russian administration did not greatly improve. Several of the Commissioners complained that the Muscovite officials were endeavouring to prevent the execution of the Berlin Treaty, and a motion to this effect was proposed at a meeting of the Commission, and supported by the representatives of Austria, England, and France. The German and Italian delegates, however, voted against the resolution, and no action was taken in the matter. This encouraged the schemers, whether in Bulgaria or in Eastern Roumelia, who were in favour of uniting the provinces, and setting at naught the arrangement which had received the sanction of the Great Powers. Russia opposed herself with the utmost determination to the speedy appointment of a Turkish Governor in Eastern Roumelia, hoping in this way to retain the administration of the country in her own hands for an indefinite time. She argued that the Treaty of Berlin contained no stipulation by which she could be forced to give up the civil government before the military occupation had come to an end, and, whatever may have been the pretences to the contrary, she made the best use of her opportunities for assisting the malcontents in their efforts to include Eastern Roumelia within the limits of the new Bulgarian

* Vienna Correspondent of the *Times*.

Principality. The persons favouring that design openly declared that they would send representatives to the Bulgarian Assembly, which was soon to meet at Tirnova; and they did in fact hold elections for that purpose. The party of action, as it was called, was organized into committees in all the principal towns, and delegates from these places held a meeting at Philippopolis. The designation of Eastern Roumelia was not recognised by these enthusiasts: they called their country South Bulgaria, and demanded that it should be acknowledged as such. The meetings, however, were a little too open and undisguised in their object to be tolerated by the Russian authorities. General Stolepine accordingly issued a proclamation, threatening to break up the gymnastic clubs, if any further attempts should be made to give them a political colour, or to render them accessory to the preparation of armed resistance. Yet the meetings continued to be held; the deputies to Tirnova were elected; and it does not appear that any active steps were taken to prevent what was manifestly illegal, and in defiance of the settlement to which Russia had herself agreed, in common with the other Powers.

Notwithstanding all they had done, and were still doing, the Russians were not popular with the Bulgarians. Many of the latter complained bitterly of the dictatorial ways assumed by their liberators, and there was a widespread disposition to thwart the designs of Russia, and to look towards Europe generally for support in a policy of independence. This, however, was rather an aspiration than a settled intention; for, after all, the Russian armies were on the spot, and with those powerful legions there was no disputing. A Bucharest paper, called the *Orient*, pointed out the lamentable position of enforced subserviency to Russia into which Bulgaria had been brought. Referring to the Assembly of Notables for which



CITADEL AND PALACE OF THE ANCIENT KINGS OF BULGARIA AT TIRNOVA—THE MEETING-PLACE OF THE BULGARIAN ASSEMBLY.

elections were then taking place, the Bucharest writer observed that Prince Dondoukoff had already decided on the organization of the Bulgarian Government, and that consequently the representatives of the people need not give themselves much trouble on the subject. The Bulgarians, no doubt, would carry his plans into execution the moment he made known his will; but they would not do so with enthusiasm. The Assembly would be simply incapable of resistance or independence. It would number, said the *Orient*, about two hundred and thirty members, of whom seventy-five would be presidents of tribunals, and thirty would consist of Archbishops and Bishops. The remainder were to be elected; but three-quarters of this remnant would be officials, so that nearly the whole Assembly would be stipendiaries, paid in Russian coin. The elected Prince would of course be the choice of Russia. The Bulgarians themselves avowed their powerlessness. "It is necessary," they said, "that we should obey; we owe it to our liberators; their will should be our law." This, in the opinion of the Roumanian journalist, was a very wise decision on their part, since, if they attemped any resistance, they would assuredly be coerced into obedience. But the feeling of discontent was none the less strong because concealed. The Bulgarian patriots were deeply offended with Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff for having filled nearly all the administrative posts with Russians, on the plea that there were no natives capable of efficiently discharging the required duties. The corruption of the Russian



ENTRY OF PRINCE DONDOUKOFF KORSAKOFF INTO TIRNOVA.

officials, and the insolence of their demeanour, rendered them extremely unpopular with those whose cause they affected to advance; and many Bulgarians were found to question whether the province was any better off under the despotism of the Czar than formerly under the Government of the Sultan.

The elections for the Bulgarian Assembly having been completed about the middle of February, the deputies began to arrive at Tirnova from all parts of the country, and even from Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia. The latter immediately began discussing among themselves the form of an address to be sent to the European Powers, praying them to combine the provinces under one rule, or at least to occupy Eastern Roumelia by a mixed corps of troops, so as to avoid the outbreak certain to follow any attempt of Turkish soldiers to enter the country. Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff arrived at Tirnova on the 20th of February. An arch of welcome had been erected over the principal highway, where two lines of Turkish and Bulgarian school-children (the former having the post of honour in the front) occupied the sides of the road. At this point the Prince was met by the clergy, who conducted a brief religious ceremony; and the procession then wound its way through a dense crowd to the Cathedral, where a more elaborate service was celebrated. The diplomatic corps and the local authorities were received by the Prince next day, and on the 22nd the Bulgarian Notables assembled in the old Turkish Konak, or Government House. Prince Dondoukoff entered the hall at eleven o'clock in the morning, and, having mounted the platform, read the following address to the deputies:—

"Honoured Representatives of the Bulgarian Principality,—By the will and designation of my master, the Emperor of Russia, I congratulate you on the opening of the first National Assembly of your emancipated country, which is to establish a firm foundation for the State Government of the new Principality. In my capacity as Russian Imperial Commissioner, I present to you for approval the project for your organic Constitution, which determines in a general manner the rights of the future Bulgarian Prince and people. With this project I also communicate the regulations which will govern you in discussing the proposed Constitution. It is incumbent on you to discuss this Constitution in all its bearings, without any partisan feelings, and solely with a view to advancing the social and moral interests of your country. The programme now presented is only a skeleton Constitution, designed to facilitate your labours. This programme should not in any way hamper your convictions as to any changes you may deem necessary. The regulations for your discussions will be read to you. I may remind you that the existing Russian administration has been acting under adverse circumstances, which, I hope, will justify in your minds my previous orders and regulations, as I have only endeavoured to replace disorder by order, thus preparing the population for a higher political life. I hereby appoint M. Loukianoff as my substitute in presiding over your labours. He will give you all needed explanations of matters arising in your discussions, and concerning the details of your Constitution; but the last and decisive word belongs to you alone. May God assist you in the accomplishment of your sacred task, for the good of your country, so dear to the Russians by blood, by the sacrifices Russia has made for you, and by the magnanimous feelings towards you of our Emperor, the liberator of your nation! I announce as open the first Bulgarian National Assembly. I call upon you now to repair to the Old Cathedral of Tirnova, to pray for the successful termination of your important labours, and to offer thanks to the King of Kings, who has enabled us to witness the great historical work of the regeneration of your long-oppressed country."

After the reading of this address, and the delivery of a few remarks by the Archbishop of Druowst, who begged the Prince to assure the Russian Emperor of the lasting gratitude felt by the whole Bulgarian nation, the deputies, the Bishops, the Turkish Mufti, the Jewish Rabbi, and Prince Dondoukoff, followed by the foreign representatives, proceeded to the Church of the Forty Martyrs—a building originally erected in the year 1230, afterwards transformed into a mosque, and restored to Christian worship in 1877. Here a *Te Deum* was performed by the Exarch, assisted by all the Bishops, and this was followed by a grand breakfast, given by Prince Dondoukoff. One of the most noteworthy incidents of the day was that the Ottoman commissary and the Austro-Hungarian delegate refused to sign the protocol of the proceedings at the opening of the Assembly, on the ground that they were not furnished with a translation, and afterwards absented themselves from the breakfast, where the British delegate returned thanks for the foreign representatives. The deputies from Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia were admitted only as spectators at the opening of the Assembly, and no reference was made to affairs south of the Balkans. The Czar subsequently congratulated the Bulgarians upon the inauguration

of their Parliament, but at the same time cautioned them against imprudences which might embarrass Russia in her relations with Europe. The caution was needed, and may not have been altogether without effect.

The constitution of the Assembly differed somewhat from the outline given by the Bucharest *Orient;* but the statements of that journal were not very far from the truth. The Chamber consisted of 222 Notables, of whom 108 were *ex-officio* members, 92 were elected by popular vote, and 22 were nominees of Prince Dondoukoff. The last-named category consisted of eleven Mohammedans, eight Bulgarians, one Greek Bishop, one Mufti, and one Rabbi. It was proposed that the office of the Prince, who had yet to be chosen, should be hereditary, with a civil list of 1,000,000 piastres, and the Ministry would be responsible to a Chamber which would have the legislative, financial, and administrative departments under its control. Tirnova, where the national representatives assembled, was at one time the capital of Bulgaria, and it was there that the power of the Bulgarian Czars was finally extinguished by the Turks. It is a very picturesque old town, situated in the Balkans, on the river Jantra. The style of the houses presents a curious admixture of the East and the West, of Europe and Asia, of Christian and Mohammedan traditions. The city has been described by a newspaper correspondent as clinging in seven distinct divisions to the steep declivities and overhanging precipices caused by the windings of the Jantra through the northern chain of the Balkans. With a few exceptions, the streets are so narrow and crooked that waggons cannot penetrate them. The principal part of the town lies on a mountain slope, and, as seen from the river, bears a striking resemblance to Genoa. Nothing can exceed the variety and fantastical character of the domestic architecture. Many of the houses are so old that the wood of which they are partly composed has acquired the hardness of a metallic substance; but by the early part of 1879, nearly all the Turkish dwellings had been demolished by the Russian soldiers and the Bulgarian citizens. The population of Tirnova has been estimated at about 30,000. Large numbers of silkworms are maintained in the district, and the city boasts a silk-manufactory of respectable dimensions. The mineral riches of the neighbouring Balkans would, it was hoped, render Tirnova a prosperous seat of industry, when the ravages of war were overcome, and the capacity of the people for self-government had been proved.

The second sitting of the Assembly of Notables was held on the 1st of March, when the committee on the regulations of debate reported a schedule of thirty-six articles, which were at once submitted to discussion. Some of the members exhibited a praiseworthy desire to conduct their proceedings in a business-like fashion, and to repress any disposition to wander into abstract or theoretical discussions; and, although this rule was not always observed, fourteen out of the thirty-six articles defining the laws of the Chamber were adopted during the sitting of the 1st of March, and the remainder were passed at the third sitting, which was held on the 5th of the month. The claims of Eastern Roumelia were brought forward on the 11th, when the Assembly appointed a committee to draw up a memorandum to the European Powers, expounding the difficulties foreseen by the Bulgarians in consequence of their division by the Treaty of Berlin. From time to time, informal meetings of the deputies were held in the intervals of more regular business, that the question of Eastern Roumelia might be discussed with greater freedom than was possible on other occasions. In this way, however, a good deal of time was lost; and on the return of Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff to Tirnova, after a short absence, he sent a message to the Constituent Assembly, expressing his regret at hearing that its members had deviated from the line of duty marked out by the Treaty of Berlin, and had been occupying themselves with subjects entirely outside their jurisdiction. He desired that more time should not be wasted in debating matters concerning which the Chamber had no power of action, or even of suggestion. The message caused much excitement; but it was finally agreed that the discussion of the Constitution should be immediately commenced. This all-important business, which was in truth the main purpose for which the Assembly was elected, then progressed with but few interruptions, and the articles of the Constitution were examined seriatim, and sanctioned, with several modifications and additions. The political state thus settled was of a very democratic character; indeed, the motion to establish a Senate was rejected by a majority of the deputies, as an attempt to create a privileged class of legislators. Some feeble endeavours on the part of the clergy to limit religious freedom were in the main defeated; but it was finally determined to give the Bishops a censorship over the Bibles and religious text-books used in the schools. The work of the Constituent Assembly being finished, that body was dissolved on the 28th of April.

The Constitution as originally submitted to the

Assembly was described by a correspondent of the *Times* as "an artfully-drawn document, designed to deliver the Bulgarian people into the hands of their Prince." Under the draft Constitution, the Prince would have appointed a large proportion of the deputies, and various high dignitaries would have held seats by virtue of their office, so that the popular voice would have been stifled. It was decided, however, that the Legislature should consist entirely of elected members, and that, as a further guarantee of freedom and self-rule, the Principality should be divided into districts and arrondissements, each with power to manage its own affairs. Had the Assembly adopted the original project, and then elected a Russian candidate for the Bulgarian throne, the St. Petersburg Cabinet, it was justly remarked, need only have issued its orders to the Prince, and the people would have been powerless to oppose them. But in the hands of the deputies the Bulgarian Constitution was so altered as to become a model of simplicity and decentralization. The Russians were astonished, and of course not a little annoyed, at the result. They had hoped to make Bulgaria a passive tool in their hands for the furtherance of ulterior projects, and they were doubtless quite unprepared for the degree of independence which the representatives of the nation had exhibited. To all others, the fact was highly gratifying, as in this way the domestic concerns of the Bulgarians were saved from the blight of Russian despotism. Yet it must not be supposed that Russia will be deprived of Bulgaria as a base of operations against Turkey whenever the Czar determines to renew that war of destruction which has now been proceeding at intervals for more than a century. The people of the Balkans may be left to manage their internal affairs as they please; but when the day has come for assaulting Constantinople, the Emperor will issue his orders to Bulgaria, as in 1877 he issued them to Roumania, and Bulgaria will have no choice but to obey.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

Candidates for the Bulgarian Monarchy—Views and Intentions of Russia—Election of Prince Alexander of Battenberg to the Bulgarian Throne—Career and Character of the Prince—Address of a Delegation from Bulgaria—State of Affairs in Eastern Roumelia—Correspondence between England and Russia on the Subject—Proposal for depriving Turkey of the Crests of the Balkans—Plan for a European Occupation of Eastern Roumelia—Circular from St. Petersburg—Persecution of Mohammedans by the Bulgarians—Abandonment of the Scheme for a Mixed Occupation—Choice of Aleko Pasha as Governor of Eastern Roumelia—Organic Statute for that Province—Creation of a Local Militia—Negotiations between Russia and Turkey—Proclamations of the Czar to the People of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria—Installation of Aleko Pasha at Philippopolis—The "Fez" Question—Concession by the Porte as to the Right of garrisoning Eastern Roumelia—Weak Position of Turkey towards Russia—The Insurrection in the Rhodopes—Suleiman Pasha—The Delimitation of the new Boundaries—Convention with Austria as to Bosnia and the Herzegovina—Dissatisfaction in Albania—Proposed Accession of Territory to Greece—Reluctance of Turkey, and Interposition of the Powers—Concluding Remarks.

BULGARIA had settled her Constitution, but she had yet to elect her Prince. Rumour had for some time past mentioned the names of several persons as probable candidates, and it was believed that Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff himself aspired to the office. General Ignatieff was also put forward as a person well fitted to preside over the destinies of the Bulgarians; but the names most prominently advanced were those of Prince Waldemar of Denmark, Prince Reuss, and Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Many of the people themselves—though with little reason—would have preferred a Russian; but Prince Dondoukoff made it known that the Emperor would not allow any Russian to be a candidate for the sovereignty, and at the same time recommended Prince Battenberg. The English Commissioner recommended Prince Waldemar. The chances of Prince Reuss were considered to be very slight, and he finally refused to accept the throne, even should he be elected, as he could not submit to the clause in the Constitution which made the adoption of the Greek religion a *sine qua non* in the Prince's heir and descendants. In Russia itself, great disappointment was felt at the Emperor having forbidden the appointment of a Russian subject. The act looked disinterested; but it has been explained after a fashion which would seem to show that the Czar was not considering the independence of Bulgaria. Russia was at that time convulsed with incipient revolution, and the Emperor appears to have apprehended that Bulgaria would be made the centre of the Panslavist agitation, which had come to be intimately associated with extreme views in politics. He

therefore declined to be closely connected with the new Principality, and reserved to himself liberty of action against Bulgaria, should his anticipations prove true.* It was certainly most improbable that the Emperor would renounce all control over the country he had created as another station on the line of march to Constantinople.

A new Assembly met on the 29th of April, for the express purpose of choosing a monarch, though, after the recommendation of Prince Battenberg by the Czar's representative, the result was a foregone conclusion. The members of this body were 250 in number, and twenty-two were Mohammedans. Having assembled for the appointed work, the delegates were addressed by Prince Dondoukoff Korsakoff, who told them that they were to elect their ruler with closed doors, and to communicate the result to him by formal notice. The public then left the hall, and the Archbishop of Tirnova made a short address, pronouncing in favour of Prince Battenberg, and recommending him to the suffrages of the deputies. On this the whole Assembly rose, and cried with one voice, "Long live Prince Alexander of Battenberg! Long live Alexander, the First Prince of Bulgaria!" There was in fact no opposition whatever, and every one must have known from the beginning that the candidate approved by Russia would be inducted into the throne. The result of the election (if the word be permissible) was straightway communicated to the people outside, who of course received the intelligence with regulation hurrahs; and at night the customary illuminations gave brightness and colour to the picturesque streets of Tirnova. At ten o'clock on the following morning (April 30th), Prince Dondoukoff delivered an address to the National Assembly, congratulating its members on their unanimous choice of a ruler for Bulgaria; and separate telegrams were received from the Emperor and Empress of Russia, expressing their satisfaction with what had been accomplished. Thus every one professed to be very well pleased, and the comedy reached its termination in the midst of fireworks and general fanfaronade.

Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the first reigning Prince of Bulgaria, is a son of Prince Alexander of Hesse, brother of the Grand Duke Louis IV. of Hesse, and of the Empress of Russia. It will be seen, therefore, that the Czar, although certainly not as closely identified with the new Bulgarian State as if one of his own subjects sat on the throne, was yet sufficiently connected with it to be able to exercise a considerable influence over the course of affairs. The mother of the Prince was the daughter of a Polish Minister of War, and was raised to the rank of Princess on her morganatic marriage with the elder Prince Alexander. Prince Alexander of Battenberg served with the Russian army during the war; was at the siege of Plevna, and crossed the Balkans with General Gourko. He is a tall, soldierly-looking man, and at the time of his election had barely reached his twenty-second year. Through his uncle, the Grand Duke Louis of Hesse, husband of the late Princess Alice, and through his brother, Prince Henry, the husband of Princess Beatrice, he is connected with the Royal Family of England. On returning to Germany after the close of the Russo-Turkish war, Prince Alexander was transferred from a Hessian Regiment of Dragoons, with which he had been associated, to the Prussian Life Guards, with whom he did garrison duty at Potsdam. He was at Berlin, however, and at the Russian Embassy there, when he received news of his election. Thence he went to one of the grand *cafés* in the Unter-den-Linden, where (according to a correspondent of the *Standard*) his elevation to sovereign rank was celebrated with a number of boon companions. Afterwards he proceeded to Darmstadt, to meet his father, and there received a delegation from Bulgaria (including one member of Turkish race), who presented to him an address, in which they said:—"The representatives of the Bulgarian people, appreciating your noble qualities, and feeling certain that your Highness will not only be imbued with the interests of Bulgaria, but will defend them to the utmost of your power, as you have already defended them during the war of liberation, have confided to your lofty sentiments the future destinies of their country, electing your Highness, voluntarily and with unanimity, Prince of Bulgaria. A deputation will wait on your Highness with the notification of your election, we having learned, through the medium of the present Government of our country, that your Highness has honoured us with your acceptance. We offer you our humble congratulations, and assure you of our sincere devotion. We pray God to grant us the happiness of soon seeing you in a country which rejoices at the choice it has made." In the course of May, the Prince visited Livadia, in the Crimea, that he might pay his respects to the Russian Emperor, and while there was presented with the formal notification of his new dignity. Before practically assuming the duties of his office, the ruler of Bulgaria went the round of the chief European capitals, with the object of explaining his policy to the Cabinets, and of removing any prejudices that might exist in certain

* Paris Correspondent of the *Times*.

quarters against the work which he had been chosen to perform. The chief fear was that he would foster the agitation for uniting Roumelia with Bulgaria; but on this point his assurances were held to be satisfactory. Having completed his European tour, he returned to Bulgaria in July, and made a triumphal entry into Tirnova on the 8th of that

PRINCE ALEXANDER OF BATTENBERG.

month. On the 11th he departed for Sophia, the capital of his dominions, which he reached, in the midst of much enthusiasm, on the 14th.

That a powerful party in Eastern Roumelia was doing its utmost to annul the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, so far as that province was concerned, was beyond a doubt; and that Russia, in a furtive and guarded way, was helping the movement, might fairly be inferred from a variety of circumstances. The more gross infractions of legality were repressed; but, on the whole, the people did pretty much as they pleased. At the same time, Russia pretended to be much shocked at difficulties alleged to be interposed by England to the work of the International Commissions; and on the 3rd of January the Cabinet of St. Petersburg addressed a letter on the subject to Lord Augustus Loftus, in which it was observed that a situation might be thus created, for the dangers of which the Imperial Government would not be answerable. To this Lord Salisbury replied on the 26th of the same month, accusing the Russian agents of adopting a course calculated to imperil the execution of the Berlin Treaty, and complaining that the supreme administration of Eastern Roumelia was not in the hands of an independent commander or Governor resident in the province, but was subordinate to the Governor-General of Bulgaria (Prince Dondoukoff), resident



ASSEMBLY ROOM OF THE NEW BULGARIAN PARLIAMENT.

in Sophia, and not in Philippopolis. It was also asserted that a large number of recruits from Eastern Roumelia were being drilled in Bulgaria by Russian officers; and the Foreign Minister concluded by expressing a hope that the Russian Government would take early measures for remedying such irregularities. Responding to this despatch on the 8th of February, Prince Gortschakoff said he would not enter into a polemical discussion, of which he did not see the practical utility, but alleged that her Majesty's Government had in some respects mistaken the intentions of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, and those of its agents. "The treaty," said Prince Gortschakoff, "has laid down certain principles. Their interpretation and application may give rise to differences of opinion. Our agents are, by the course of events, called upon to support, within the limits of the treaty, the interests of the population for whose defence we have made war. We believe that a general understanding would be greatly facilitated if, on the other hand, those populations acquired the conviction that their interests will be effectually defended by Europe within the same limits when our troops are no longer there to protect them." Together with this despatch, the Russian Chancellor enclosed a Memorandum, explaining the position of affairs in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, as connected with the action of the Emperor's representatives, and stating that measures had already been taken for separating the militia of the province from that of the Principality.

The action of the Russian agents was a little more cautious after the interchange of these diplomatic notes between the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg; but the state of Eastern Roumelia was still very unsettled, and the popular agitation often broke out with extreme violence. It was feared that after the departure of the Russian troops something like a condition of anarchy would ensue, and it was openly stated by many of the Roumelians that the entry of the Turkish forces would be violently resisted. To make matters worse, the Bulgarians, supported by the Russians, now advanced a claim that the frontier between Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia should not be on the crests of the Balkans, as in the main was contemplated by the Treaty of Berlin, but on the southern slopes of the mountains. The effect would be to hand over the line of the Balkans, in every strategic and military sense, to the Bulgarians (who would of course simply be the custodians of the Russians), and to deprive the Turks of that protection which it had been the object of most of the Powers to secure. In addition to this motive for putting forward the proposed alteration, there was another—viz., the hope of delaying indefinitely the entry of the Turkish troops; for, as those troops were to be allowed only to pass through the province to the forts which they were to garrison, and were not to remain in any other place, it is evident that the regiments of the Sultan could not make their appearance in Eastern Roumelia until the line of frontier, along which the forts were to be erected, had been settled. The idea of a European occupation of Eastern Roumelia was advanced as a possible means of preventing lamentable catastrophes; but to this the Turks very reasonably objected, on the ground that it would deprive them of the sovereignty they would soon be entitled to exercise. They appealed to the Treaty of Berlin, which not merely permitted them to occupy the Balkan frontier, but authorised the Governor of Eastern Roumelia to seek the assistance of Turkish troops in case of need. The proposal for a mixed occupation originated with Russia, and had a certain look of disinterestedness, but was clearly dictated by the desire to keep Turkey as long as possible out of one portion of her territory which had been restored to the dominion of the Sultan by the Treaty of Berlin. It would have been in flagrant opposition to that treaty had the Czar retained his legions in Eastern Roumelia after the 3rd of May; therefore it became necessary to devise some fresh contrivance for excluding the Turkish soldiers, with whose presence the authority of the Porte would be once more established.

A circular was accordingly issued from St. Petersburg in the course of March, the object of which was to recommend this idea of a joint occupation to the Cabinets of Europe. The Russian Chancellor here repeated his former assurances of Russia's intention to conform strictly to the Treaty of Berlin; but, while prepared to evacuate the Turkish provinces still occupied by her at the time fixed by the treaty, Russia drew attention to the state of unreadiness in which Eastern Roumelia was likely to be found when the evacuation fell due. It was scarcely to be expected, in the estimation of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, that the statute then being elaborated for that province could be so soon introduced, nor was it probable that the organization of the militia and *gendarmerie*, in the sense of the treaty, would be so far advanced as to offer the security contemplated by the Congress for the maintenance of internal order. It was therefore suggested that it might be advisable, or even necessary, to make some temporary provisions, calculated to tide over the transition between

the cessation of the existing provisional rule and the definitive organization of the province. The circular called attention to the fact that at the fifth meeting of the Congress the possibility of such measures becoming necessary had formed the subject of discussions, during which the Austro-Hungarian Plenipotentiary had proposed that in this event a mixed corps of 15,000 men should take the place of the Russian army of occupation. The Russian Government considered that there could be no better means to ensure the execution of the treaty, so far as it concerned Eastern Roumelia. Supported by such a corps, the International Commissioners might, after finishing the organic statute, return to Philippopolis, and, in concert with the Governor appointed by Turkey, introduce the instrument they had created.

This circular was not sent to Turkey, and it must have been obvious to all Ottoman statesmen that the design was to humiliate the Sultan still further, and to make his authority of no account, even in a portion of his realm which the Treaty of Berlin had spared. The Turkish Government not unnaturally repudiated any such scheme, and the Grand Vizier drew up a counter-project, in accordance with which the occupation would be entrusted to Turkish regular troops, while the European Powers would appoint the Governor. If Turkey consented to a mixed occupation at all, it would only be on the understanding that Turkish soldiers should form the majority of the occupying corps; and indeed such a stipulation was beyond impeachment. Turkey could not have consented to a mixed occupation from which she was to be herself excluded, without running the most imminent risks of internal revolution. The Mohammedan population in every part of the Ottoman Empire was at that very time painfully excited by reports (which, even if exaggerated, can hardly have been without considerable basis) concerning the ill-usage of Moslems in Eastern Roumelia by their Bulgarian fellow-subjects. The Porte issued a circular on the subject about the close of March, and it was here stated that the victims, reduced to despair, were leaving their homes, and settling in other parts of the Empire. Adrianople had already received a large body of these emigrants, and their number, which was constantly increasing, had become a source of grave embarrassment to the Turkish authorities newly installed there on the departure of the Russian troops. These facts rendered it all the more difficult for the Porte to accept the original plan for a mixed occupation, and the proposal speedily fell through, like so many other schemes for the management of Turkey. In the first instance, the plan had been accepted in principle by all the Powers; but it was soon perceived that the obstacles to such an arrangement were immense, and that it would very probably result in serious dissensions among the occupying forces. Accordingly, first one Power, and then another, withdrew its adhesion to the project, and by the middle of April it had been entirely abandoned.

Turkey then brought forward a scheme of her own, by which Aleko Pasha was to be appointed Governor of Eastern Roumelia, the powers of the European Commission were to be prolonged, Turkey's right of garrisoning the Balkans was to be suspended, and, in case of need, resort was to be had to Article XVI. of the Treaty of Berlin, conferring on the Governor-General of the province the right of summoning Ottoman troops, in the event of the internal or external security of the country being threatened. England and Russia at once signified to the Porte their approval of Aleko Pasha—a Christian of the Eastern Church—as the future Governor of Eastern Roumelia; and the other Powers gave in their adhesion soon after. Aleko is of Bulgarian race, but is allied to several influential Greek families in Constantinople, although his father was of very humble origin. When the island of Samos was made an autonomous Principality, the father of Aleko, who had received an excellent Greek education at Constantinople, was appointed its ruler by the Sultan, and was thenceforward known as Prince Vogorides. His third son, Aleko, was educated both in the Oriental and Western languages, and, after studying for some years in Berlin, served for a long time as Secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in London. More recently, he had been Ambassador at Vienna, and he enjoyed the reputation of an honest and upright man.* On the 26th of April, shortly after the appointment of Aleko Pasha to the Governorship of Eastern Roumelia, the organic statute for that province, on which the International Commission had been engaged for several months (having obtained an extension of the time mentioned in the treaty), was signed in the Lyceum of Galata-Serai. All the members of the Commission were present, excepting the English Assistant-Commissioner (Lord Donoughmore), who was at Philippopolis, and the Russian First Commissioner, who had been summoned to St. Petersburg to supply his Government with information as to the existing difficulties. The statute contained liberal provisions for the local self-government of the country by means of a Provincial Assembly, and it was decided that the organic laws could

* Constantinople Correspondent of the *Times*.

not be changed without the consent of the Powers, although the development of those laws, in the form of particular regulations, might be modified by the Provincial Assembly, with the assent of the Governor-General. Great pains had been taken to create sufficient protection for the rights and property of the Mohammedans; but the followers of the Prophet were leaving Eastern Roumelia in such large numbers that it appeared doubtful whether much protection of that nature would be needed. The document was a very elaborate production, consisting of fifteen chapters with 495 articles, and of thirteen annexes with 637 articles. It recognized the sovereignty of the Porte, as regards the amount of tribute to be paid into the Imperial Treasury, and the sanction to be given by the Sultan to the domestic legislation of the province; but local self-rule was also secured. The Governor-General was to be subject to the control of the Porte in certain contingencies, but in the main was to be independent of Imperial supervision. The Provincial Assembly was to be partly official, partly elective, and partly nominated by the Governor. Its powers of initiative were not very great, but no laws could be passed without its sanction. Special provisions were made for liberty of conscience, freedom of worship and education, and the civil administration of justice; and the rights of citizens were fully guaranteed in the second chapter. The Governor was to have a regular Ministry, like an independent Prince, so that Eastern Roumelia was to a great extent severed from Ottoman rule.

While the Russians were in occupation of the province, they did their utmost to form a local militia which should be prepared to maintain order as soon as the Czar's troops were removed. This, in itself, was a very proper measure; but attempts were made to give the citizen soldiers a political character, and to counteract as far as possible the legitimate authority of the Porte when it should be again established. The militia received an organisation similar to that of regular armies, and steps were taken for securing certain positions of strategical importance. Mohammedans were excluded from the ranks of the force, and it was hoped that with a militia so constituted the designs of Russia would be almost as well carried out in the future as during the Muscovite occupation. Yet it was at this very time that Turkey, apparently disgusted with the small amount of support which she obtained from the other Powers, once more evinced a disposition to seek a direct understanding with Russia alone. She suddenly relinquished her claim—before then very strongly urged—to send garrisons to three important frontier positions in Eastern Roumelia: viz., Burgas, Ichtiman, and Hermanli. This course was adopted a little before the arrival at Constantinople of General Obrutscheff with a letter from the Emperor to the Sultan, the ostensible purport of which was to respond to a communication from the latter sovereign, congratulating the former on his escape from the bullet of an assassin, but which unquestionably had reference also to the future of Eastern Roumelia. The Czar is understood to have declared that he was firmly resolved to carry out the Treaty of Berlin, but to have expressed an opinion that the International Commission should be prolonged for another year, and that during that time the Ottoman Government should refrain from placing garrisons in the Balkans.

General Obrutscheff reached the Turkish capital about the commencement of May; but shortly before then the Czar had addressed two proclamations—one to the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia, the other to the Bulgarians of the Principality. In the first of these, dated April 22nd, the Emperor said he was determined to observe the Treaty of Berlin in all respects, and was convinced that only by adhering to its stipulations could the rights acquired for the people by the Russian arms be guaranteed, without fresh sacrifices and renewed struggles. He had therefore ordered his troops to begin the evacuation of Eastern Roumelia upon the expiration of the term appointed for its occupation. A new civil organization was about to be established, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, and with the organic statute drawn up by the International Commission; and the Czar hoped that in this respect the populace would justify the expectations he had entertained of them, and would avoid furnishing a pretext for the accusation that they were breaking the peace, and disturbing the tranquillity necessary, not alone for their own welfare, but for the happiness of their brethren, the Bulgarians of the Principality. "I am aware," said the Emperor, "that there are many amongst you dissatisfied with the condition created by the treaty, and who desire by violence and revolt to obtain an object not in harmony with the determinations of the Powers. I cannot approve these intentions, the accomplishment of which, without the consent of the Powers, is impossible, and might bring fresh sufferings upon your country. Strive, therefore, to resist illegitimate aspirations; and may God protect you on the road of your progress!" The address to the Bulgarians of the Principality was dated on the following day (the 23rd), and expressed the satisfaction of the Czar at the gratitude and devotion of the whole people, who had dis-

played towards the Russians the truest sympathy and brotherly love. God had blessed the sword drawn in defence of their just cause, and permitted the Emperor to fulfil his intentions. The Powers, actuated by a feeling of justice, had recognized the civil rights of the Bulgarians, and the Berlin Treaty had finally confirmed those rights by creating the Bulgarian Principality, and thus laying a solid basis for the ultimate development of the nation. The Constitution which had been elaborated would secure the future domestic organization of the country, and the Prince Elect would be the leader and defender of the national interests before the Powers of Europe. "In saluting the future first Prince of Bulgaria," said the Emperor, "I hail in his person the resurrection of the Bulgarian people." The issue of these addresses (which, though not published to the world until nearly a month later, were written and signed before the election of Prince Battenberg) marked what may be regarded as a turning point in the course of events since the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. As long as it could possibly be done by any underhand means, the Czar and his representatives in Turkey had worked against the strict fulfilment of that treaty; but when it was understood that neither England nor Austria was inclined entirely to abandon those checks on Russian aggression which had been considered necessary in the summer of 1878, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg exhibited a greater readiness to observe its engagements, and to repress the plots of Bulgarian agitators and Muscovite Generals. The Emperor, indeed, did not wholly abandon what was called the National Party in the Balkan peninsula; but at the same time he warned its leaders to be careful, and gave them to understand that open and undisguised intrigues would not be supported from St. Petersburg.

Aleko Pasha, or, as he was afterwards called, Prince Alexander Vogorides, entered Philippopolis, the capital of Eastern Roumelia, on May the 27th. His appearance there had been preceded by a discussion which in itself may seem trivial enough, but to which considerable importance was attached on both sides. The question was as to whether he should wear a Turkish fez or a European hat. The fez was construed by the Eastern Roumelians as a symbol of Turkish rule and Mohammedan predominance, and was therefore detested with a cordiality which bordered on fanaticism, if it did not actually overpass those limits. For the very same reason, the Turkish Government was naturally disinclined to give up that which the other side professed to regard as an evidence of the Porte's supremacy. The matter was debated with considerable animation; but the authorities at Constantinople insisted that, as Aleko Pasha was not an independent prince, but an Ottoman official, he must wear what it is customary for Ottoman officials to wear, and not a species of head-gear which it was plainly intimated would be used as a sign of disloyalty and insubordination. When, however, the Governor-General arrived at Philippopolis, it was found that he was wearing neither the fez nor an ordinary European hat, but the Bulgarian *kalpak*, or sheepskin cap. The Porte afterwards informed the Powers that the action of the Prince in thus substituting the kalpak for the fez was a violation of engagements previously entered into by him; and it was intimated that Aleko Pasha would be formally summoned to wear the fez, and to hoist the Turkish flag on the Government House, on pain of dismissal, combined with the sending of Ottoman troops into the province.

At the ceremony of May 27th, the Prince was greeted by an enormous crowd, and received all the members of the Consular body, the English, Austrian, and German delegates to the Eastern Roumelian Commission, a large number of Russian Generals and officers, and several representatives of the clergy. The Christians of Turkey are not a lively people; and although, probably, they were well pleased to have Aleko Pasha as their Governor, they made but few demonstrations of a festive nature, so that the streets of Philippopolis, except for their ordinary character of picturesqueness, looked rather dull. Prince Vogorides at once made his way to the Bulgarian church, which had been decked with flowers for the occasion. Here the Exarch, in his sacerdotal robes, met him at the door, and, after removing to the centre of the edifice, offered up a short prayer, and then proceeded to address the Prince in a political discourse. The burden of this speech was to the effect that, although Eastern Roumelia had suffered terribly from Turkish oppression, and although autonomy would not in itself be sufficient to prevent a recurrence of former horrors, the country had been inspired with confidence by the nomination of his Highness as Governor-General, and by an assurance recently given by Turkey that garrisons would not habitually be sent into the province. The address was delivered in the Bulgarian tongue; but, notwithstanding his Bulgarian origin, it was necessary to translate these remarks into French for the benefit of Aleko, who made a brief reply in Greek. The formal investiture of the Governor-General took place on the 30th, when an officer read in Turkish an Imperial firman, ordering the execution of the organic statute of Eastern Roumelia.

This was followed by a speech from the Governor-General, who said that the Sultan had appointed him the administrative chief of Eastern Roumelia for a period of five years, in order that he might carry into effect the new institutions which had been prepared by the European Commission. "The entry of Ottoman troops into the interior of Eastern Roumelia," he said, "being dependent on the maintenance of public order, and on my own request for that purpose, addressed to the Porte—a request which is not to be made except upon my personal appreciation of the circumstances requiring it—I rely with confidence upon those of the inhabitants who are attached to their country that they will abstain from all acts of a character which would justify the entrance of the Ottoman troops. Those who seek to create a belief that the entry of Turkish troops will be carried out, thereby causing alarm to the inhabitants of Eastern Roumelia, completely ignore the real intentions of the Sublime Porte; for, whenever the Imperial Government shall deem it necessary to occupy the frontiers and certain other localities, this will only be done in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, without giving cause of alarm to the inhabitants. What proves this is the fact of my arrival in the chief town of the province without the presence of any Ottoman troops." So far, all looked fair and peaceful; but the Prince soon showed how little disposed he was to meet the friendliness of the Sultan in a similar spirit. Of sixty functionaries appointed by him to administrative posts, only two were Turks; his Ministry consisted entirely of Bulgarian Christians; and his conduct generally was marked by so much favouritism and injustice that the British Government strongly protested against it in the early part of July. Such, however, are the inevitable results of that policy of interference which the Powers have adopted towards Turkey.

ALEKO PASHA, GOVERNOR OF ROUMELIA.

The Turkish concession to which Aleko Pasha alluded was one of a very important description, and had probably resulted from the recent discussions at Constantinople between the Turkish Government and General Obrutscheff. The Porte had in truth voluntarily deprived itself, excepting under special circumstances, of the right to give a military character to the line of demarcation between Eastern Roumelia and the Principality of Bulgaria. This was a considerable departure from the arrangements made at Berlin, chiefly at the instance of Lord Beaconsfield. The distinction between the autonomous province and the vassal Principality was gravely diminished by the undertaking of the Sultan that, as a rule, his forces should not occupy the former any more than the latter territory. The fanatical opponents of Turkish supremacy in Eastern Roumelia could not be conciliated by the complaisance of their sovereign, for they were conciliated by nothing. On the other hand, the opportunities for intrigue were sensibly increased, and Turkey could now scarcely be said to possess a frontier against Russia. Still, the right to send garrisons into Eastern Roumelia in cases of urgent necessity was not given up; and, in the prospect of a renewed war with the Northern Power, this right would, it was thought, be exercised, unless the malcontents of Eastern Roumelia should be able to defeat the attempt.

Before passing on it will be as well very briefly to remind the reader of certain important incidents in the later history of Eastern Roumelia. In 1884, at the expiration of the five years for which Aleko Pasha had been appointed, he was succeeded by M. Chrestovich, under the title of Gavril Pasha. His own re-election was prevented by the resentment felt against him by Russia, owing to his refusal in 1883 to comply with arbitrary military demands of that Power. Gavril Pasha's reign was but short. In September, 1885, he was deposed by a bloodless revolution which effected the junction of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria.

Nothing could surpass the helplessness of Turkey throughout the months of prostration and uncertainty succeeding the war. A gleam of hope seemed at one time to shine from the fastnesses of the Rhodope Mountains, when the Mohammedan insurgents kept the Russians at bay, and inflicted on them considerable losses. It was of course quite out of the question that these brave mountaineers could undo the results of the war; but as long as they remained in arms, they furnished some sort of counterpoise to the predominance of Russia, and rendered further encroachments less probable. In the winter of 1878–9, however, the insurrection dwindled to a shadow, and Turkey was left more completely at the mercy of her late antagonist. Unfortunately, the patriots suspected their English leader, Colonel St. Clair, or Sinclair, of intriguing with the Russians, and, rising against his authority, they caused him to fly for his life. The insurrection seems then to have fallen into a state of disorganization, and by the spring of 1879 it no longer existed as a force capable of exercising any influence on the progress of events. Another circumstance which contributed to the weakness of the Porte was the suspicion of treachery that attached to several of the Ottoman officers. In the case of Suleiman Pasha, this suspicion is held to have been confirmed. An inquiry was made into his conduct during the war, and on the 3rd of December, 1878, he received official communication that he had been sentenced to fifteen years' confinement in a fortress. Against this judgment he appealed, alleging that all he did was in obedience to orders from Constantinople; but opinion was very much against him.

The delimitation of the several frontiers affected by the Treaty of Berlin led to considerable discussion in 1879, and to a clashing of interests, which it was no easy task to reconcile. A long negotiation with Austria ended in April in the Porte assenting to a convention with that Power, by which the right of maintaining a garrison in Novi-Bazar was conceded to the Emperor. This convention resulted from the Twenty-fifth Article of the Treaty of Berlin, which, after providing that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, stated that the Government of the Empire did not desire to undertake the administration of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, but that, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria reserved to herself the right of keeping garrisons, and of having military and commercial roads, in the whole of that part of the ancient vilayet of Bosnia. The arrangement, so far as that vilayet was concerned, depended on an ulterior understanding between the Governments of Austria and Turkey; and the matter was found to be one of great difficulty. At length, however, the Sultan, though much pained at the necessity, saw that it was advisable to place himself on good terms with Austria; and the convention of April, 1879, recognized the new relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina to that Power, while sanctioning the special arrangements concerning Novi-Bazar which were the main objects of the negotiations. On the frontiers of Servia and Albania, a great deal of trouble resulted from the attempts of

the Albanians to possess themselves of certain places within the limits of the Principality—attempts which were said to be countenanced, and even assisted, by the Turks, but which there is quite as much reason to believe were on some occasions provoked by the oppression and insolence of the Servians in dealing with those Mohammedan populations newly handed over to their sovereignty. The Albanians considered that their country was being dismembered, and their nationality sacrificed, to satisfy the ambition of neighbouring lands; and they lost no opportunity of declaring that they would fight on their own account, if the process of encroachment were carried any further.

Yet it was in part from Albania that some among the Powers considered the new territory to be granted to Greece should be derived. The Greek question was one of those which were left by the war for subsequent arrangement; but it presented many points which threatened to set diplomatists at issue. Greece is the most considerable nationality in that part of Europe, and it cannot be questioned that the Hellenic Kingdom, as formed in 1829–30, after the conclusion of the War of Independence, was most imperfectly constituted, with insufficient dimensions, inadequate boundaries, and a national life only half developed. The retention of Thessaly and Epirus by Turkey was singularly ill-judged; for the Thessalians and Epirotes being Greeks ethnographically, historically, and geographically, as long as they were excluded from union with their fellows, there would evidently be endless occasion for intrigue and insurrection. In 1878–9, the Greeks alleged that they had a claim on Europe, no less than on Turkey, in consequence of what had occurred at the Congress of Berlin. It will be recollected that, at the ninth sitting of the High Assembly, on the 29th of June, 1878, the representatives of the Hellenic Kingdom were introduced to the council-chamber, and requested to make a statement of what was required by their country; and that they then claimed the annexation of Crete, and of the provinces bordering on the Monarchy. On the 5th of July, when the Congress met for the thirteenth time, certain rectifications of the Greek frontier were proposed to Turkey by M. Waddington, the First Plenipotentiary of France, who in this respect acted in concert with the representatives of Italy. The line thus suggested gave to the Hellenic Kingdom the greater part of Thessaly, and a good portion of Epirus, but not the whole of either; and it excluded several places, such as Mount Olympus, which are necessarily dear to the heart of every Greek. The result therefore was, that while the Turks were offended at this attempt to deprive them of still more territory, and that to the advantage of a Power which could show none of the rights of a conqueror, the Greeks were dissatisfied, because they did not obtain all they wanted. Karatheodori Pasha, addressing the Congress on the subject, reserved the opinion of the Sublime Porte, as he had no knowledge of the assent of his Government to any rectification of the Greek frontier; but the proposals of the French and Italian Plenipotentiaries were unanimously accepted by the Powers, with the exception of Turkey.*

It will be as well to consider the exact form which these proposals assumed. The Congress "invited" the Sublime Porte to arrange with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, the general character of which was then stated; and the Plenipotentiaries expressed their confident belief that the interested parties would succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, "to facilitate the success of the negotiations," the Powers were willing "to offer their direct mediation to the two parties." The allusion to the matter in the Treaty of Berlin was contained in Article XXIV., which stated that, "In the event of the Sublime Porte and Greece being unable to agree upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the Thirteenth Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, reserve to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties, to facilitate negotiations." It will thus be seen that neither in the proceedings of the Congress, nor in the terms of the treaty, was there anything which could justify the smallest approach to coercion. The assembled diplomatists recommended Turkey to come to an understanding with Greece for a certain specified rectification of frontier, and the Governments represented at Berlin professed their readiness to assist the two interested parties in effecting an agreement, if they should find the difficulties more serious than they could surmount without such aid. The six Great Powers "offered their mediation;" but it is impossible to deduce from this a right, not merely to make suggestions, or to proffer good offices, but to impose their will by force on one litigant, to the advantage of the other. The interference was sufficiently ill-advised and objectionable, even as it stood; but to carry it to the extent of coercion would be a monstrous violation of the right of every independent State to

* See Chapter XIX. of the present volume.

arrange such matters for itself, without being compelled to adopt the arbitrary dictation of foreign Powers.

Karatheodori Pasha, in some remarks which he addressed to the Congress on the 5th of July, 1878, very reasonably observed that the demand of the Hellenic delegates had no connection, either with the goal which the Congress had set itself, or with the ruling idea by which it was guided. "The opportuneness or the advantage," he added, "to be found in annexing the provinces of a neighbouring State, does not constitute a sufficient reason." That Greece should desire to annex provinces so intimately associated with her history and her national life, is in the highest degree natural, and such an arrangement might perhaps be the best for both parties in the end. But it is also natural for Turkey, as for any other State, to dislike giving up possessions which have been hers for centuries, and it is impossible to see upon what ground of political justice she can be forced to commit such an act of self-sacrifice at the bidding of six Powers to whom she is under no obligation of obedience. The principle of intervention in the affairs of other States is radically false and infinitely mischievous; and it may be doubted if it has ever assumed a much worse form than it took in connection with this demand of Greece to be aggrandized at the expense of Turkey. But bad as the arrangement was, as formulated by the Plenipotentiaries of Berlin, it presently assumed a character still more objectionable. It was hardly to be expected that the Porte would exhibit much alacrity in submitting to the process of vivisection; but, by the close of 1878, Turkey, as already related, had evinced a willingness to discuss the matter by means of commissioners appointed on both sides. Several meetings took place in the early months of 1879, when Mukhtar Pasha was the chief commissioner on the side of Turkey; but, as the concessions of the Porte were less than what had been suggested at the Berlin Congress, by which the Sultan would not allow that he was bound, the negotiations were broken off by the Greek delegates. The demands of Greece, however, were excessive. Even while the Congress was sitting, the representatives of the Hellenic Kingdom clearly showed that the Cabinet of Athens would not be content with the territory which the Plenipotentiaries wished to see annexed. In his speech in the House of Lords on the 18th of July, Lord Beaconsfield lamented these extreme requirements; but Greece was not inclined to abate her demands, and Turkey found it difficult, consistently with self-respect, to admit the pretensions of the little kingdom. What the Greeks desired was not merely Thessaly and Epirus, according to what is generally understood by those terms, but a considerable portion of Albania, including the town of Janina. The interest of Greece in the whole of this region is not difficult to understand. Janina is believed to lie not very far from the site of Dodona, so intimately associated with the religion of ancient Hellas. The population is largely of Greek origin, and the people of Greece generally have always regarded the city and its neighbourhood as part of their immemorial patrimony. But, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Turks have held possession of this region since the year 1432, and that under their rule a distinct nationality, not Greek, but Albanian, so far as the ruling classes are concerned, has sprung up in and around Janina. It was therefore bad policy of the Greeks to extend their demands so far north as this interesting city, which, in the days of the famous Ali Pasha, acquired importance as the capital of his almost independent sovereignty. The Government of Lord Beaconsfield were disinclined to support such large demands: they were also disinclined to use coercion against the reluctant Turks; and the question therefore stood in abeyance.

The subject of the Greek frontier was brought before the House of Commons on the 17th of April, 1879, when Mr. Cartwright moved a resolution, declaring that no satisfaction of the just claims of Greece could be considered adequate which did not ensure execution of the recommendations embodied in the Thirteenth Protocol of the Berlin Congress. The spokesman of the Ministry in answer to this motion was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who stated that negotiations on the subject were still going on, and that a satisfactory result would probably be attained. As the direct communications between Greece and Turkey had not at that time come to an end, it was considered premature to offer that mediation which had been proposed by the Treaty of Berlin. The resolution was accordingly rejected by 63 votes to 47; but the debate made it abundantly clear that the feeling of the Opposition was in favour of something very like coercion, should Turkey still object to satisfy the demands of Greece. This was the view entertained by the Continental Powers, especially by France; and in the early part of May the British Government adopted a proposal made by M. Waddington, and agreed to join in mediation between Turkey and Greece, such mediation to be conducted by the Ambassadors at Constantinople. It was just at this period that Sir A. H. Layard, who had for some time been absent, owing to indisposition, re-

sumed his duties at the Turkish capital; and certainly the juncture was one at which an able and experienced diplomatist was imperatively needed.

The state of affairs in the East of Europe during the summer of 1879 was in every respect disturbed and unsatisfactory. The war had settled nothing; it had unsettled much. A war more deeply penetrated with corrupt, insidious, and selfish motives has never been waged; one more craftily masked with hypocritical assumptions of humanity and religion is not to be found in the long and ghastly annals of bloodshed. The vice of its conception tainted its course throughout, and gave a peculiarly revolting character to its incidents. Originating in fraud and false pretence, it found its fitting development in acts of immeasurable cruelty, of which both sides must bear the equal blame. The object of this frightful convulsion was seen from the first by a few independent observers, and is now known beyond any further possibility of denial. We have it on the authority of Lord Derby that the war was planned and settled in 1873 by the Continental Emperors, in order that Russia and Austria might be aggrandized at the expense of Turkey.* The motive determining the policy of the German Empire was a matter of discussion; but there could be no question as to the complicity of that Power in the conspiracy of 1873. Some years of careful and secret preparation were needed before the first part of this conspiracy could be brought to bear; the remainder still lies in the future, and can only be obscurely, and perhaps erroneously, guessed. One thing, however, is plain. The events of the last few years, dating from the Franco-German war of 1870–71, down to the resignation of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria in 1886, have shown that the Divine Right Monarchies are the arbiters of Europe. Russia, Germany, and Austria—or rather the crowned heads of those States—understand one another perfectly well, and may be expected to act together on important issues. England will not oppose them, unless her own interests are assailed in the most direct, immediate, and palpable manner. France, under the Republic, has lost much of her old position as a first-rate Power. Italy is, more or less, the servant of the Triple Alliance, in the hope of getting something which she is not likely to get by such service. In no other direction is there any State capable of forming a balance to the military force of the three Emperors. A generation hence, the map of Europe will probably be still further modified, and it will be mainly to the advantage of the armed dictators, unless some yet unforeseen change should take place in the position, powers, and aims of Western Democracy. Meanwhile, the Eastern Question is as menacing as ever. The Mohammedans are oppressed instead of the Christians; and the shadow of fresh calamities rises dim and gigantic behind the shadow whose vicissitudes we have in these pages endeavoured to bring before our readers.

* See Appendix I.

# APPENDIX.

# APPENDIX.

## I.

## THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

ALLUSION has frequently been made to the Triple Alliance, by which the three great military Empires—Russia, Germany, and Austria—decided on their respective lines of policy when war should break out in the East, and on the results that were to be accomplished by that war. The alleged understanding was first denied by official and semi-official writers and speakers, then explained away, and finally all but acknowledged in its fulness. A remarkable article, throwing some light on this subject, was published in *Macmillan's Magazine* for June, 1879. It is entitled "Lord Derby at the Foreign Office, 1876–78," and is written by Mr. T. Wemyss Reid, who asserts that for all he says on the subject he has authority on which he can absolutely rely, and which enables him "to speak with confidence and certainty, even regarding those phases of the question which may seem to be most remote from the view of the outer world." We here read:—

"Of course it will be obvious that the secret plans of Governments can never be proved by evidence such as we are accustomed to look for in an English court of justice. Diplomatists, especially those of the Bismarckian pattern, always leave a back-door of escape open for themselves, as in the case of the famous 'Treaty' of M. Benedetti; and it is only when they begin to quarrel that they show each other up. But, though great reticence has been maintained with regard to this private agreement of the three Empires, its existence is now an open secret in diplomatic circles throughout Europe. The very date at which the plan of the war was agreed upon is known to the statesmen of more than one of the countries which had no share in the 'Triple Alliance.' That date is not, as might have been supposed, 1876 or 1877, but 1873! On the significance of this fact it is unnecessary to comment; but I would ask any one conversant with the secrets of diplomacy whether he *now* believes that the Triple Alliance was nothing more than a friendly understanding, without particular end or object, between the three most powerful military Empires of Europe. Unquestionably it was something more. It had objects, precise and real and grave, and among them it is no longer doubtful that an ulterior understanding as to Turkey was included. . . . . Though the leaders on both sides have been very shy of alluding to the existence of the scheme of the three Emperors, it has not been passed over in such absolute silence as many persons suppose. Perhaps the most significant utterance on the subject was that of Lord Derby himself on July 18th last year [1878]. It is specially significant, not merely because it shows that the country was informed of the existence of a 'secret understanding' on the part of the three Emperors, but because it throws unexpected light upon the nature of that understanding. Speaking in the House of Lords on the date mentioned, the ex-Foreign Secretary declared that the cession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria '*was part of the original engagement between the three Emperors five years ago.*' . . . Before ever the Berlin Memorandum had been formulated, this transfer of territory from Turkey to Austria had been resolved upon, and the three Emperors were merely waiting for the opportunity of effecting it. There is one other feature of that 'secret design,' that 'original engagement,' of the three Empires, which I cannot find recounted in any of the public utterances of Ministers or ex-Ministers, but the existence of which I nevertheless can affirm without hesitation. That was a clause whereby Russia was to take back Bessarabia from Roumania, and was to wrest Batoum from Turkey. Germany was to find her compensation elsewhere. Thus, strange as it may seem to the outer world, *it is nevertheless a fact that the leading features of the Berlin Treaty of* 1878 *had been decided upon several years before the Russo-Turkish War began.*"

To many political critics it was apparent from the first that the three Northern Powers had settled

their programme long before the declaration of war by Russia, although the details were of course unknown. The knowledge of this secret agreement possessed by Lord Derby when at the Foreign Office, but which he was then unable to divulge, amply justified the English Government in declining to join in the Berlin Memorandum of May 13th, 1876. The professed object of the Memorandum was to place the Christian provinces of Turkey under the control of the six Great Powers; but it was known to the Cabinet of St. James's that the real object was to further, though by a circuitous process, the plans of Russia, Germany, and Austria. They refused to sanction the plot, and it is much to be regretted that they ever identified themselves with its later phases.

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## II.

## THE BULGARIAN MASSACRES.

In Vol. I. of this History (p. 35), it is stated that Mr. (now Sir A. H.) Layard had set down the number of persons killed in the Bulgarian massacres—or, more strictly speaking, the massacres in Roumelia—at 3,900. The number should have been 3,500. The allusion occurs in a despatch from the English Ambassador at Constantinople to Lord Derby, dated May 30th, 1877. Alluding to the assertion that 60,000 Christians had been outraged and massacred, and glancing at other extravagances very widely believed at the period of the autumn agitation of 1876, Mr. Layard wrote:—"There are persons, and amongst them, I grieve to say, Englishmen, who boast that they invented these stories, with the object of 'writing down' Turkey, to which they were impelled by a well-known hand. People in England will scarcely believe that the most accurate and complete inquiries into the events of last year in Bulgaria [Roumelia] now reduce the total number of deaths to about 3,500 souls, including the Turks who were, in the first instance, slain by the Christians. No impartial man can now deny that a rising of the Christians, which was intended by its authors to lead to a general massacre of the Mohammedans, was in contemplation, and that it was directed by Russian and Pansclavist agents. The panic that it created amongst the Mohammedans was the cause of the frightful vengeance they took. The great mass of the Bulgarians did not join in the movement, but were, on the contrary, opposed to it, and took no part in it."* Mr. Layard's estimate with respect to the number of persons massacred in Roumelia was based on the report of Mr. Stoney, principal agent in the Philippopolis district for the Bulgarian Central Relief Committee—a gentleman on whom the Ambassador placed great reliance, and who, in the early part of 1877, was sent into the districts chiefly affected, in order to make inquiries. The opinion of Mr. Stoney was that the actual number killed was 3,500 or 3,600, of whom 600 were Mohammedans. Vice-Consul Calvert, in transmitting Mr. Stoney's report to the English Ambassador, on the 30th of April, 1877, remarked:—"Small as is the total number of killed by the side of the returns collected last summer by Mr. Baring, Mr. Stoney's list may, I think, be accepted as closely approaching the truth. The figures have been obtained by house-to-house visitations, patiently and carefully carried on through the winter months, when the panic, under the influence of which immensely exaggerated estimates had been made, had worn off, and when numbers of runaways, at first counted as dead, had returned, or were ascertained to be living in the towns, or in the larger villages which escaped destruction. Mr. Stoney's returns, moreover, tally nearly exactly with figures compiled by the Rev. Mr. Clarke (an American missionary, long resident in the country, and familiar with the people), who, as an agent in the distribution of relief, also visited most of the ravaged villages."† Mr. Baring, however, still maintained the accuracy of the figures which he had conjecturally set forth in his well-known report—viz., 12,000. He conducted some fresh investigations after the publication of Mr. Stoney's and Mr. Layard's views, and affirmed the correctness of his original computation. Nevertheless, it must be evident that nothing like a precise and authentic statement of numbers could be made. The accounts varied in the most preposterous manner, ranging from about 3,500 to 200,000. The favourite number, with those who wished to take an extreme view, was 60,000. All that can with any probability be affirmed is that the first accounts were very greatly exagge-

* Blue Book on Turkey, No. 26 (1877).

† Blue Book on Turkey, No. 25 (1877).

rated; yet it is a curious fact that the fanatical enemies of Turkey clung to some of these exaggerations with feverish tenacity, while at the same time affirming that the character of the Turks was pretty much the same, whether the numbers were more or less.

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## III.

## THE DEPOSITION OF SULTAN MURAD.

THE precise reasons for the deposition of Sultan Murad, on the 31st of August, 1876, after a brief reign of three months (see Vol. I., pp. 53–5), are involved in considerable doubt. It was stated at the time, in many of the English and Continental newspapers, that his intellect was impaired by excessive drinking, and that he had had two attacks of *delirium tremens* in rapid succession; but the fact appears to be questionable. It is certain that he was in a very unnerved and prostrate condition; but it has been alleged that this was from a totally different cause. A correspondent of the *Times*, writing from Constantinople on the 25th of November, 1877, gives a version of the case which places Murad in the position of a victim sacrificed to the ambition of others. The writer alludes to the shattering influence of events on the mental equilibrium of the young monarch, and remarks that he was literally taken from a dungeon to the throne, having been imprisoned, for no ascertained reason, for upwards of five weeks previous to his sudden call to power, on the 30th of May. Five days later, his uncle, the ex-Sultan Abdul-Aziz, was found dead, under circumstances which some have held to be suggestive of assassination; and in certain quarters Murad was suspected (though probably without justification) of causing the act. Then, in the course of another eleven days, came the assassination of the Ministers by the Circassian officer, Hassan; and at the same time the political state of Turkey seemed hastening to its ruin. All this while, Murad was suffering from a most painful and exhausting malady. He was afflicted with a carbuncle, and was under the medical treatment of an Italian doctor of antiquated principles, who is said to have followed the course usually adopted by the medical men of his nation, and to have bled, leeched, and starved his patient until he was in a condition of semi-imbecility. The ceremony of girding on the sword of Othman was postponed *sine die*, and the unfortunate Murad grew worse and worse with each succeeding day. It was then that he was said to be addicted to drunkenness; but the correspondent of the *Times* avers that those who knew him best declared the charge to be absolutely untrue.

While in this state of mental prostration, induced by physical illness, a keeper of lunatics went to see the Sultan at Yildiz Kiosk, where he found him "stroking his moustache with his thin white hand." His report to those who sent him was that the Sultan was meditating abdication, and that he was insane. An attempt was made to treat him upon this assumption, and the vehemence with which he resisted was taken as a further proof that the assumption was correct. He was therefore restrained, and conveyed, against his will, to Kourbadji, on the Bosphorus. About the 1st of August, the Powers were cautiously informed that his Majesty was insane, and must be deposed; but on the 3rd of that month he suddenly showed symptoms of rallying, and, after a long ride, attended the mosque, where his behaviour is said to have been that of a man perfectly in his right mind. On the 11th of August, he had interviews with several persons, transacted business, and appointed a Governor for the vilayet of Scutari, in Albania—one Mustapha Pasha, with whom he conversed for a long time quite rationally. On the same day, after a good deal of inquiry, in which he exhibited long-sustained attention, he examined the lists of Bulgarian insurgent prisoners, pardoning several hundreds, and exiling or hanging a few who appeared to be guilty. Two days further on, a great Austrian authority on diseases of the mind appeared at the court of the Sultan, to report on his mental condition. By whom these steps were taken is not precisely known; but there was a party desirous of effecting the deposition of Murad, and it was to the interest of this party to prove, if possible, that he was out of his senses. The great medical authority, however, declared that the Sultan was not insane, and a paper to this effect, in his (the doctor's) own handwriting, is said by the *Times* correspondent to be in the possession of Murad's mother. Nevertheless, the doctor came shortly afterwards to the conclusion that the Sultan's malady was chronic. Permission to visit the supposed maniac was denied



SCENE DURING THE BULGARIAN INSURRECTION.

to every doctor, of whatever nationality, resident in Constantinople; and the result was that on the 31st of August Murad was deposed, and succeeded by Abdul-Hamid. The change appears to have been received by the Turkish people generally without excitement or surprise; but after a while, owing, possibly, to the ill-fortune of the war, Abdul-Hamid became unpopular, and many persons desired to see the return of Murad. When the attempt was made to poison Mahmud Damat Pasha (Abdul-Hamid's brother-in-law), in November, 1877, it was believed that, if a revolution could have been effected, Murad would again have been placed upon the throne. "There is no doubt," says the *Times* correspondent, writing at the period, "that there has been an immense reawakening of sympathy, we may say of affection, for the unfortunate prisoner. In spite of every effort to prevent the public from ascertaining the real condition in which he now is, it leaks out from time to time that he is as sane as when he ascended the throne; and it is worthy of remark that the very precautions which are taken to prevent any attempt at a rescue or deliverance from his gaolers are instrumental in divulging the real or probable condition of his mind. These precautions, which would be utterly unreasonable were he really insane, consist in changing his guard every day or two, to prevent the personal influence of Murad—which is very great, as he is considerate, genial, and good-natured—from engendering a dangerous spirit of sympathy for him, and disloyalty to his brother. In addition to this, Murad is surrounded by spies, who exaggerate everything that he does, and purposely misinterpret every word he says. Not many weeks ago, he was rudely seized by the collar by some of these unpitying wretches, and wrenched away from an open window which looked on the Bosphorus, whither the unfortunate young man had gone for change of scene, and to get a little air. These people are all appointed by Mahmud Damat, or by the secretary of the present Sultan, Said Pasha."*

The writer here quoted was obviously influenced by a very strong feeling of sympathy with the deposed Sultan. His narrative is not in harmony with some others; but, as the facts have never yet been clearly ascertained, it is fitting that all versions should be placed before the reader for his own judgment. An account published at the time in the *Allyemeine Zeitung*, and proceeding from the Pera correspondent of that journal, asserts both that the Sultan was addicted to drink, and that he was *not* mad, though he had for a time been much agitated by apprehensions of plots against his life. This state of mind, however, had been relieved by the care of his physician, and Murad, at the date referred to—about a month before his deposition—attended the mosque, occupied himself with State affairs, read the documents submitted for his signature, perused the journals, and had recommenced playing the piano. He was still weak, but, according to the German correspondent, that was all. Of softening of the brain, there was not the slightest trace.

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## IV.

## THE MOHAMMEDAN DECREE OF TOLERATION.

DOUBT is felt by some writers as to the authenticity of the Decree of Toleration said to have been granted by Mohammed to the monks of St. Catherine, near Mount Sinai, and through them to all Christians. (See Vol. I., pp. 176–8.) Burckhardt, in his "Travels in Syria and the Holy Land" (1822), has given some account of the document, and expressed a decided opinion with regard to it. His relation is to the effect that, according to the monks of Mount Sinai, Mohammed himself, in one of his journeys, alighted under the walls of the convent, and, impressed with veneration for the mountain of Moses, presented to the house a firman, in order that he might secure for it the respect of all his followers. The decree was drawn out by Ali, the favourite disciple of the Prophet, and Mohammed himself, being unable to write, confirmed it by impressing his extended hand, blackened with ink, upon the parchment. The firman remained in the convent until the conquest of Egypt, in 1517, by Selim I. of Turkey, who, hearing of the document, sent for it, and afterwards placed it among other relics of Mohammed in the Imperial treasury at Constantinople, giving the convent in exchange a copy of the original writing, certified with his own cipher. Burckhardt says he had seen the latter, which was kept in the Sinai convent at Cairo, but did not believe it to be authentic. He adds that none of the historians of Mohammed, though they have recorded the transactions of almost every day of his existence, mention his having been at Mount Sinai, either in

* *Times*, December 5th, 1877.

his youth or in his later life; and he considers the provisions of the firman intrinsically improbable. "It is to be observed also," continues the Swiss traveller, "that this document states itself to have been written by Ali, not at the convent, but in the mosque of the Prophet at Medina, in the second year of the Hejira, and is addressed, not to the convent of Mount Sinai in particular, but to all the Christians and their priests. The names of twenty-two witnesses, followers of Mohammed, are subscribed to it; and in a note it is expressly stated that the original, written by Ali, was lost, and that the present was copied from a fourth successive copy taken from the original. Hence it appears that the relation of the priests is at variance with the document to which they refer; and I have little doubt, therefore, that the former is a fable, and the latter a forgery."



VALLEY OF THE LOM, BULGARIA.

Burckhardt visited Mount Sinai in 1816, and died the following year, at the early age of thirty-three. Although a very distinguished traveller, it may be doubted whether he was a sufficiently experienced Orientalist to pronounce a decisive judgment in the matter. That there are some inconsistencies and contradictions in the several versions of the story does not prove that the story itself is altogether false. It must be remembered that Burckhardt had no opportunity of seeing the copy of the firman (whether it be the original or a transcript) which is preserved at Constantinople. Sir Paul Rycaut, in his "History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire" (fourth edition, 1675), alleges that the original of the compact was found in the Monastery of Friars on Mount Carmel, near Lebanon, which he describes as within one day's journey of Mecca, and as the place where the Mohammedan pilgrims make their *corban*, or sacrifice, before entering the holy city. The original docu-

ment, according to Rycaut (who was five years at Constantinople, in the service of the English Embassy), was afterwards transferred to the library of the King of France. He says it was "by very good authors taken for real," and he believes it to have been granted by Mohammed when his rule was weak and in its infancy. The very multiplicity and variation of the stories are in favour of the assumption that there is some degree of truth in the statement, though some of the details are doubtless open to question. A sheer invention would have been one and indivisible.*

THE SULTAN MURAD.

## V.

## THE TREATY OF KOUTCHOUK-KAINARDJI.

A MORE precise account of this treaty than has been given in the text (Vol. I., p. 269) may here be appended, since considerable difference of opinion exists as to its bearings on the position of the Christians in Turkey, and the alleged right of Russia to interfere on their behalf. The statement that by the treaty in question (concluded in 1774) Russia obtained "the protectorship of the Greek Church within the Turkish Empire" requires some qualification. This, indeed, is what Russia has always claimed, and what is asserted on her part by English supporters; but the assumption appears to

* The opposing views of great authorities on this subject are indicated by Bayle in his "Historical and Critical Dictionary," art. Mahomet (Note AA), and by Gibbon ("Decline and Fall," chap. 50, note 148).

have resulted from an arbitrary and strained interpretation of Article XIV., which, in the original Italian of the treaty, runs thus :—"L'altissima Corte di Russia, potrà a norma delle altre Potenze, a riserva della Chiesa Domestica, edificarne una nelle parte di Galata, nella strada detta Bey-Uglù, la qual Chiesa sarà pubblica, chiamata Russo-Greca, e questa sempre si manterrà sotto la protezione del Ministro di questo Impero, e anderà illesa da ogni molestia ed oltraggio." In English :—"After the example of the other Powers, the High Court of Russia may, besides the Domestic Church, build one in the quarter of Galata, in the street called Bey-Uglù, which Church shall be public, and called Russo-Greek ; and this shall be always maintained under the protection of the Minister of that Empire, and shall be free from every hindrance and outrage." In 1775, a French version of the treaty was published at St. Petersburg, in which the word "Russo" was omitted before "Greek," and the word "Minister" was put in the plural. This version appears to be that which was published by the British Government, with an English translation, in 1854, at the time of the Crimean War. Article XXVIII. of the treaty states that the originals were one in Russian and Italian, and one in Turkish and Italian. The French translation, therefore, has clearly no authenticity, and its errors seem to have had a misleading effect on several speakers and writers. The Treaty of Kainardji simply permitted the Russian Ambassador to make representations in favour of one particular church at Constantinople—a church following the Russo-Greek rite, and evidently intended simply for the accommodation of Russians dwelling in the Turkish capital. From this, however, the Russians have deduced a right to protect the whole body of Christians in Turkey, and the claim has been too generally allowed, both in England and abroad. The French translation was made "by authority" in Russia ; which will sufficiently account for its perversions.*

## VI.

## TURKISH IRONCLADS IN THE DANUBE.

A CORRESPONDENT of the *Daily Telegraph*, writing from the Black Sea on the 25th of November, 1877, gave some particulars concerning a cruise in the Danube made by two ironclads belonging to the fleet of Rear-Admiral Hassan Pasha, who was at that time stationed at Sulina. He related that five miles north of Sulina the Russians had a cordon of troops, and that, stretching from a place called Letti to the sea on one side, and to the Danube, at the sixth mile, on the other, this force was largely composed of cavalry—an arm in which the Turks were deficient. At the sixth mile, the Russians maintained a guard-house and piquet by the water-side; and a mile further inland, on the Letti road, a large force was stationed in some cavalry barracks, with orders to harass any boats on the river, and frequently to communicate by signals with Letti. The Turks determined on the destruction of this place, and the English officer, Manthorp Bey, was requested to organize a force for the purpose. On the evening of the 12th of November, fifty-five sailors, with two officers and five armed boats' crews, assembled after dark on board the advanced ship at the chain stretching across the Sulina branch of the Danube. About three o'clock on the following morning—a morning calm, dark, and exceedingly cold—the five armed boats, with the gigs of the first and second officers in command, moved silently away, and proceeded with muffled oars up the river. At a distance of a mile and a half, the marines were landed on the low marshy shore forming the left or southern bank of the Danube. Led by Captain Sleeman, another English officer who was one of the expedition, the marines made their way through tall reeds, ten feet high, through mud and water, and across dykes, over which light bridges had been thrown. They were moving in the direction of the Russian advanced post, and at the same time the boats continued slowly advancing along the stream. A complete surprise, however, was impossible, for in a little while the marines heard the distant barking of dogs, and knew that those vigilant animals, of which several were attached to the camp, had detected the approach of strangers. Nothing was to be done but to push on with the utmost celerity ; and at a certain point, which had been previously fixed upon, the order was given to advance at the double. The marines, headed by Sleeman, rushed forward, and surrounded the guard-house ; but the piquet had retired, and nothing could be heard but the furious howling of the dogs. "The marines," continued

* The Italian and French texts may be found in the collection of treaties edited by G. F. de Martens (1817), Tome II., pp. 286-322.

the correspondent, "immediately advanced, whilst the gunboats, landing their crews as a reserve, and retaining only the gunners, anchored in line, with their cannon pointing up the road. The reserve moved on, and the whole party pushed forward with all speed, through mud and water often thigh-deep. The day was just breaking as the barracks came in view. The piquet had given warning, and the whistle of bullets showed the enemy were on the alert, but whether for retreat or defence was not known. The darkness was still too great to see anything but the outline of the station and the puffs of the smoke. At the double-quick, and firing whilst they advanced, the marines rushed on, and as they entered the enclosures the retreating horsemen were just visible galloping off, firing wildly in their retreat. What had to be done had to be done quickly, as Letti was barely three miles off, where was force enough to annihilate the little party. Everything was in confusion, and it was evident that the enemy had escaped with simply their horses and arms. Fire was soon applied to two barracks, six stables, and seven large stacks of hay, which burst forth in a roaring blaze; quantities of provisions, both for men and cattle, were in store, and had to share in the conflagration, as, being in casks, they could not be removed. Firing continued some time between some skirmishers sent in advance and the enemy: but the high reeds that flanked the road made it impossible to see the effect, and whatever wounded the Russians had in the first attack they carried off."

The Turks, whose casualties were very slight, remained half an hour on the spot, and succeeded in dismantling the guard-house, which they set on fire. The retreat was then sounded, and the men fell back towards the boats; but it was broad daylight before the Danube was reached. By that time, both officers and men were wet up to their waists, and covered with mud; but they had succeeded in their object, and had also brought away with them a large number of pumpkins, which proved a welcome addition to the scanty stock of vegetables in the little town of Sulina. The reembarkation was effected without any interruption, though the Russians had a thousand men, chiefly cavalry, not far off at Letti. Even a small number of these, sent after the retreating assailants, might have done considerable damage; but the Russians appear to have thought the attacking force much stronger than it really was. The expedition was a complete success, and seems to have been conducted throughout with great intelligence and spirit. Shortly afterwards, the Turks had another naval triumph, when, the *Osmanieh* having stood over to the Crimean coast to gain shelter from a north-easterly gale, its companion, an armed despatch-boat called the *Favourite*, observed a large brig inshore, under a three-gun battery. The shallowness of the water prevented the *Osmanieh* from getting within range; but the *Favourite* moved up towards the enemy, and cleverly managed to sink the ship with all her guns, receiving the Russian fire without any serious damage to herself.

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## VII.

## THE FALL OF KARS.

In addition to the account already given, a narrative of the taking of Kars from a Russian source may not be inappropriate.

The troops destined to make the attack were divided into five columns. The first of these, consisting of six battalions, commanded by General Komaroff, was stationed in Bozgaha, to the west of the Kars-Tchai, and had orders to attack Fort Tchim. The other columns, together with two battalions of reserves, were stationed in and around Karadjoran, a neighbouring village in front of Kars. The second column was to the left, and was composed of three battalions under Prince Melikoff, whose orders were to attack Fort Suwarri. The columns of Count Grabbe and Colonel Vazhdakin, each of which consisted of five battalions, were charged with the task of storming Fort Khanli. General Alkhazoff occupied the right with a column composed of five battalions, whose duty was to attack Fort Hafiz, and the two battalions of reserves were placed immediately behind General Alkhazoff's position. Each column was accompanied by a number of Sappers with dynamite cartridges, a rocket party for signalling, ten artillerymen with crowbars and sledge-hammers, and ten Cossacks to act as orderlies. At six o'clock in the evening, General Loris Melikoff arrived with his Staff at Karadjoran, and a demonstration against the fortifications on the Karadagh, to the north-east of the town, was made shortly afterwards. An eye-witness, who was with the

Staff, published an account of the attack in the *Moscow Gazette*, and we here read :—

"The night was calm and frosty. There was not a cloud in the sky, and the full moon shone brightly. The troops advanced noiselessly. No conversation or barking of dogs broke the stillness; only the occasional firing of the siege-batteries, which had continued all day, awoke the echoes in the valleys beyond the town. Before us lay the plain, stretching forward to the lowest of the enemy's works; but we could nowhere detect the storming columns, so silently did they advance. Suddenly, about nine o'clock, the Turks began firing. Immediately Forts Khanli and Hafiz were illuminated with innumerable little lights, and the confused rattle of musketry soon reached our ears. Evidently the attack had begun. Each of us involuntarily asked himself, What will be the result? Many, to tell the truth, had their doubts about the affair succeeding. We had been told by spies that there were forty tabors in the place, and, though we believed this statement to be exaggerated, we were convinced that there were troops enough to defend the works. Eventually it turned out that the testimony of the spies was not far from the truth, for the garrison on the day of the assault amounted to 22,000 men.

"General Loris Melikoff, with his Staff, advanced to the Sustsa Hill. Khanli sent us a few stray bullets, and occasionally a shell exploded in the immediate vicinity. His Highness the Commander-in-Chief watched the operations from a hill near Tchiflik-Kui. About ten o'clock, amid the ceaseless din of artillery and small arms, shouting and hurrahs began to be heard. These stirring sounds came from the volunteers who had forced their way into the trenches. The Turks, perceiving the small number of the assailants, began to surround them; but at that moment the storming columns arrived, and drove the Turks into Fort Khanli. The fire then became so frequent that our troops halted. At this decisive moment, the officers gave a brilliant example of self-sacrifice, and rushed forward at the head of their men. The Turks could not resist the desperate charge, and retreated to the fortified barracks. Here they opened a murderous fire from the loopholes; but our soldiers, encouraged by success, advanced over the bodies of their fallen comrades, and climbed on to the roof of the building. The defenders were called upon to yield, and told that, if they did not, the building would be blown into the air. After some hesitation, two Pashas and three hundred men surrendered. Thus Khanli was captured after many heroic exploits. Count Grabbe had fallen, pierced by two bullets, at the head of his column. Colonel Belinski, noticing some confusion in the ranks of his regiment, had rushed forward to the fortifications, and been immediately killed. Major Geritch had been the first to climb up the parapet, and had been at once bayoneted by the defenders.

"Simultaneously with the taking of Khanli, the Kutais and Vladikavkaz Regiments, under the command of General Alkhazoff, took Fort Hafiz, while the column of Prince Melikoff got possession of Suwarri almost without loss. So far, all had gone well; but now we had a check. Prince Melikoff, after taking Suwarri, quickly crossed the river, and began to storm Fort Tchim. This fort ought to have been stormed by Komaroff's column; but the Piatigorsk Regiment, having lost its way, stormed the adjoining fort, Takmash Tabia [Fort Tahmasp], by mistake. Though it was quite impossible to take that fort by storm, the Piatigorskers obstinately continued the attack, and even forced their way into the *glacis*, where they lay down behind the stones. This drew the attention of the Turks to Takmash Tabia, and facilitated the advance of our troops against the lower fortifications; but the Piatigorskers paid dearly for the service thus rendered. The companies were diminished by a half, and the brave commander, Colonel Butchkief, was killed. Meanwhile, Prince Melikoff's column continued to attack Fort Tchim, but without success. One attack after another failed, and Prince Melikoff was mortally wounded.

"About three o'clock in the morning, an orderly galloped up with the intelligence that the Nesvizhski Regiment had captured Laz Tabia, an important work to the north of the impregnable Takmash, and was advancing towards the inner fortifications. Soon afterwards, a Cossack brought the good news that the Karadagh had fallen. This happened not quite according to the programme. The Kutais Regiment, under its brave commander, Thadéef, having taken Fort Hafiz, pushed on towards the Karadagh by the Bairam Pasha faubourg. They climbed in silence the Karadagh heights, crept up to the trenches, and then, with a loud hurrah, mounted the parapet. The Turks, not expecting an attack from this direction, were so astonished by the hurrah and the appearance of the Russians that they took to flight. Thus the inaccessible Karadagh, the bulwark of Kars, fell into our hands; and when the news spread among the troops, every one felt that we had got a firmer footing in the fortress. The day began to break, and the frost increased. Our soldiers were already storming the town. When the sun rose, all the fortifications on the eastern side of the river, with the exception of Arab Tabia (a fort to the north-

west of the Karadagh), were in our possession. About nine o'clock, the firing suddenly ceased. The Turks began to evacuate the town, and to move in disorderly masses towards Fort Takmash, which still held out. Now and then our siege artillery sent a shell into Veli-Pasha—one of the inner forts on the west side of the river, facing the citadel. At that time, Lieutenant Storzhelski, a young officer of the Kutais Regiment, rode up to General Lazareff. He wore over his great-coat an old sheepskin, and bestrode a magnificent charger, which he had just captured from a Turkish officer. His object was to report to the General that, with three companies of volunteers, he had forced his way into the Arab Tabia, and after an obstinate fight had driven the garrison to Fort Mukhliss, on the western side of the river. All now believed that the Turks collected in Takmash Tabia would send out a white flag and capitulate; but they did nothing of the sort: on the contrary, more than 16,000 of them formed into thick columns, and moved over the Aravartinski hills in the direction of Olti. As the day was clear and calm, we could see with glasses parties of fugitives trying to escape to the hills, and throwing away their arms to run the faster. To intercept these, as well as the columns which were making for Olti, all the available cavalry were sent in pursuit, and had no difficulty in executing the task. About eleven o'clock the fugitives were stopped. They surrendered without firing a shot, and returned quietly to the village of Bozgaha. The Shorakh and Takmash fortifications to the north-west of the town were then occupied without difficulty, and the Russian colours were hoisted on all the forts."

We have related in the body of this work (Vol. I., chap. 41) the circumstances which throw considerable suspicion of treachery over Hassan Bey, a Colonel in the Turkish artillery, who was in a position of command at Kars when the Russians made their attack, and who appears to have left Fort Hafiz unprotected by any guns. The more that is known of this great disaster to the Turkish arms, the greater becomes the appearance of treason. It is certainly, as a correspondent of the *Times* pointed out, an extraordinary fact that, on a clear evening, with a full moon shining, five storming columns were able to traverse unobserved a broad level space, white with snow, and to arrive near the trenches before their advance was suspected. This level space is about two miles and a half in breadth; yet twenty-four battalions passed over the whole of that considerable tract without being observed from the fortress. A correspondent of the *Daily News*, writing from Kars on the 24th of November, 1877, remarked that the Turks "seem to have stuck to the queer idea that the Tchoruk Tépé fortifications would become the principal object of the enemy's attack; whether because the valiant Komaroff, the conqueror of Ardahan, stood in its vicinity with his old solid troops, or for some mysterious and yet unrevealed grounds: in short, they had massed there the bulk of their forces, some thirty battalions. The impregnable citadel, on the contrary, had no infantry garrison at all, and was merely defended by a company of artillery-men. The not less inaccessible Karadagh was likewise only manned by a few feeble battalions of demoralised and disaffected Shiah-Arabs from Mesopotamia and Irak. At all events, these foolish arrangements are, at least, worth a minute investigation, in order to ascertain why the commander and his counsellors ordered so strange a disposition of their forces, which numbered well nigh 20,000 combatants. It is obvious that such a garrison is fully equal to the task of defending a fortress like Kars, even against double that number of the best soldiers in the world." The Turks maintain that they lost Kars through the treachery of some of their own officers, and many of the facts are assuredly in favour of the contention.

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## VIII.

## THE BATTLE OF PYRGOS.

BRIEF allusion has been made, at p. 516 of Vol. I., to an action fought by a division of the Army of the Lom at a place called Pyrgos; but the details of this encounter, as related by a correspondent of the *Times*, should here be added. The Turks had driven the Russians out of the town on the 19th of November, 1877; but the latter recovered their position shortly afterwards, and renewed fighting took place on several days. Early in the morning of November 26th, Salim Pasha proceeded from Rustchuk, with eight battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry, and a number of Bashi-Bazouks. In consequence of the heavy rains which had recently fallen, and which had



TAKING OF THE VILLAGE OF PYRGOS.

converted the roads into a swamp, the Turkish commander thought it advisable not to move his artillery; but this placed him at a disadvantage with the Russians, who were provided with guns. Salim Pasha was under the impression that his enemy was much less strong than proved to be the case, and the attack ultimately failed, though it was conducted with great persistence and resolution. The Russians were sheltered behind entrenchments; but the Turks advanced to within firing distance, and for nearly four hours poured in an unceasing volley from their rifles. Towards midday, orders were given for a bayonet-charge, and it was executed with so much spirit that the Russians, who until then had not receded a foot, gave way at all points, and retreated, though in perfect order, on Metchka. The Turks again became masters of Pyrgos; but they were in a position which exposed them to a withering fire from the enemy, and for anything like a complete success it was absolutely necessary to obtain possession of the Metchka heights. No such attempt was made; the soldiers, wet to the skin, and exhausted by several hours' marching and fighting, were left on the ground they had won; and the Russians, refusing to accept their defeat,



BEFORE PLEVNA—MUD.

recommenced the struggle, after having received a reinforcement of twelve battalions. Thus strengthened, they turned the left wing of the Turks, and advanced slowly towards Pyrgos. Their appearance struck such terror into a captain of Mustahfiz (territorial militia) that he at once gave the order for retreat. A panic ran throughout the army, and the Turks fled with extreme precipitation. Salim Pasha endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. He was expecting some reinforcements under Assaf Pasha; but they did not arrive, and Salim was compelled, with great reluctance, to abandon Pyrgos once more to the enemy. The captain of Mustahfiz was afterwards punished for his cowardice; but, unfortunately, the mischief could not be repaired by any subsequent acts of severity.

About an hour after the unavoidable retreat of Salim, Assaf Pasha left his position at Kadikoi, and advanced in two strong columns, by way of Krasna and Jovan-Ciftlik, on Pyrgos and Metchka. By this force the Russians were again attacked, and, after an hour's combat, driven from their positions; but the second of the two Turkish columns was forced to retreat rapidly in the direction of Jovan-Ciftlik. In the first instance, the retreat was carried out by a single regiment on the extreme left of the second column. The example, however, soon spread, and, had the Russians pursued, the loss would doubtless have been great. Fortunately for the Turks, this was not done, and the column made good its retreat. While these events were going on, the first column, advancing through Krasna, had seized and taken the positions held by the advanced guard of the Russians; but in the evening, after a contest of two hours' duration, this column also retreated towards Kadikoi. It is said that during the series of actions the Turks lost 300 killed and 1,000 wounded; but the Russian loss appears to have been at least equal, if it did not exceed that of the Ottomans. The Turkish attack would in all likelihood have prospered, had Assaf Pasha marched with greater promptitude to the assistance of Salim. "It is difficult to believe," says the *Times* correspondent with the Turkish Army of the Lom, "that an enemy who on the 19th of November was defeated by six battalions would have been able on the 26th, even with the help of its reinforcements, to retain its position against thirty battalions." Those who were in a position to know the facts stated that Assaf Pasha could have gone much sooner to the help of Salim, had he chosen. Another charge made against him was that he allowed his left wing to remain unprotected, except by a single regiment, though he knew it was opposed to the strongest of the Russian positions. It is also said that several regiments were unprovided with reserve ammunition, and that a captain in one of the regiments was obliged, after only half an hour's fighting, to signify by sound of trumpet that they had no more ammunition left. This emboldened the Russians to renew their attack, and doubtless contributed in no small degree to the failure of the Turkish enterprise. No preparation for the transport of the wounded had been made by Assaf Pasha, and it was consequently not until the 28th that the injured men could be removed to Rustchuk. On the 29th of November, fifteen soldiers were shot for cowardice on the 26th; but the mismanagement or carelessness of Assaf Pasha had a great deal to do with the disasters of that day. In the opinion of the *Times* correspondent with Suleiman Pasha, the sentence on the men was unjust. "The Turkish soldier," he remarked, "will do anything that can be reasonably asked of him, and there is scarcely a battle on record in this war in which he has not accomplished much more than calculating generalship would have reckoned among the possibilities of the engagement. But his nerve is human nerve after all, and may be susceptible of over-tension; and anything more calculated to break a stout heart than the recent attacks on the Rustchuk side can scarcely be imagined, except, perhaps, those upon the Shipka Pass. During the first weeks I was with this army, a General in that of the United States shared my tent; and he repeatedly remarked that no army in America could be kept together for a week under the conditions in which the Turkish soldier preserved content and courage. The whole campaign is a shift to keep body and soul together, and, when the hour of conflict comes, the Osmanli soldier is sent forward to fight almost without the moral support of officers, and is expected not only to do the utmost that can be expected of a soldier, but also to supply by his courage and intelligent fighting the shortcomings of his commanders, and to surmount difficulties which informed generalship would not permit him to encounter."

## IX.

## RUSSIAN CRITICISM ON THE CAPTURE OF PLEVNA.

THE *Russki Invalid*—the official military journal of Russia—made some remarks, in the course of December, 1877, on the siege of Plevna and the fall of that stronghold, which possess an interest, as showing how Russian experts regarded one of the most important incidents of the war. It was




PLAN OF THE DEFENCE AND BLOCKADE OF PLEVNA.

admitted that the invading forces had been taken by surprise when they found the little town of Plevna occupied by the advanced guard of Osman Pasha's army, which had moved forward with remarkable rapidity from Widdin to the Vid, and appeared suddenly on the Russian right, at a distance of two days' march from the principal point of passage over the Danube. This state of things was revealed by the unsuccessful attack on Plevna made on the 19th of July, 1877, by three regiments of the Fifth Infantry Division. Twelve days later, the position was again attacked with stronger forces; but Osman Pasha had already succeeded in bringing up nearly all his troops, and had so fortified the position that the assault was repulsed. The presence of Osman's 60,000 men, in the immediate vicinity of the Russian communications, compelled the invaders to stop their advance, to recall the corps which had been sent across the Balkans, and to content themselves in the east with the active defence of the space between the Jantra and the Lom. A third attack on Plevna was made on the 11th of September by the Russian and Roumanian troops, but with no better result than on the former occasions. Up to that date, the only successes obtained by the Czar and his ally had been the capture of Loftcha, on Osman's extreme right, and the taking of the Grivica (or Gravitza) Redoubt, the possession of which, says the Russian military writer, was of no essential advantage. The object of Osman Pasha in holding Plevna as long as possible was to create a drag on all the Russian movements. He therefore kept open his principal line of retreat on Sophia by the construction of a series of fortified posts, under the protection of which he continued to receive reinforcements, provisions, and ammunition. It was essential to the success of the Russians that they

should completely invest the place; but this could not be done until the arrival of heavy reinforcements. Towards the middle of October, these reinforcements had reached the spot in considerable numbers, and Osman Pasha, in the opinion of the *Russki Invalid*, would have done wisely had he chosen the right moment for effecting his retreat on Sophia, where his troops, united to those already collected there, might have taken up a strong position. He probably relied on receiving effectual aid from Sophia, from the vicinity of the Lom, and from the line of the Balkans; but in this he was disappointed, and the result was his capitulation on the 10th of December.

"The effective blockade of the Turkish army," continued the *Russki Invalid*, "began with the arrival of the Guards, and the capture of strong works to the west of the Vid. At the same time, the Russian and Roumanian batteries on the other sides of the town were pushed forward, and a series of well-conceived operations contracted more and more the circle in which the Turks were confined. Our western corps did not, however, restrict itself to completely isolating Osman Pasha's army. A part of it was directed against Mehemet Ali's forces collected for the purpose of relieving Plevna, and soon the Turks were driven from the points which they occupied to the north of the Balkans. Meanwhile, the army of Plevna, the revictualling of which had ceased about the middle of October, saw its means of subsistence diminish day by day, and the rigour of the winter added to its privations. Worst of all, it had no hope of relief, for nearly the whole of Western Bulgaria, from the Balkans to the Danube, was in our power. In this critical situation, the energetic defender of Plevna resolved on an attempt to force his way through our lines. On the morning of the 10th of December, he crossed the Vid at the head of his troops, and threw himself with the courage of despair on the left flank of our Grenadier Corps. The whole weight of the attack had to be borne at first by the Siberian Grenadiers, who defended their positions against the masses of the enemy, fighting with the fury of men who have no possibility of retreat. The Astrakhan and Samogitian Regiments hastened to the assistance of the Siberian Grenadiers; but the struggle continued, and the Turks more than once forced their way into our trenches and batteries. At last, however, our brave regiments succeeded in repelling the assault, and capturing six guns. The whole of the Grenadier Corps then advanced, and drove the enemy across the Vid. At the same time, the Russian and Roumanian troops, who had penetrated into the fortified camp from the other side, attacked the fugitives in flank and rear. Seeing himself thus surrounded, and having done all that military honour required, the Turkish General put an end to the carnage by capitulating unconditionally. We have taken ten Pashas, more than 2,000 officers, and 37,200 men; while 77 cannon have fallen into our hands. Our losses have been relatively small, amounting to 57 officers and 1,800 men *hors de combat*."

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## X.

## THE BATTLE OF SENOVA.

TOWARDS the close of the struggle between Russia and Turkey, a battle was fought, of which, notwithstanding its great importance, no detailed contemporary account appeared in any of the papers, owing to the fact of the correspondents having been kept in ignorance of what was about to occur, and being therefore in other localities at the time. A description of the battle, which has been spoken of as the Sedan of the Russo-Turkish war, was printed in the *Daily News* of November 2nd, 1878, long after the conclusion of peace. It must now be followed with some closeness.

Immediately after the fall of Plevna, a council of war was held by the Russians, at which it was debated whether it would be better to remain in winter quarters until the arrival of spring, or to take the offensive at once. The result of the discussion was that the latter course was adopted, though several officers of high position, including General Todleben, were in favour of a postponement of active operations. At that time, the Turkish army was divided into two main bodies, one of which, under Suleiman Pasha, was stationed in and around Sophia and Trajan's Gate, while the other, under Vesoul Pasha, was gathered about Senova, a village some four miles south of Shipka, and near the southern end of the celebrated pass. The plan of campaign adopted after much consideration was that the Russian army should move straight through the Shipka Pass, strike the Turks with a sudden and concentrated blow, and then proceed by a forced march to Adrianople, whence the invaders

would be able to act with effect against Suleiman Pasha. The English officer, Colonel Baker, who was with Suleiman at the time, anticipated some such movement; but the Turkish commander disbelieved in its possibility, and the consequences were seen, not merely in his own defeat, but in the entire collapse of the Turkish system of defence.

The army under Vesoul Pasha had its base at a large entrenched redoubt at Senova, covering the road to Kezanlik, and containing upwards of 30,000 men. Several distinct bodies of troops stood behind earthworks on the heights dominating the village, and commanding the Shipka Pass as far as Fort St. Nicholas. Some 10,000 Turkish troops were distributed over the heights and in the southern half of the pass; and the commander was in possession of no fewer than a hundred and fourteen guns. The northern section of the pass was held by the Russians, who were commanded by General Radetzky; and in the early part of January these two forces stood watching one another across the ravines and rocky slopes of that mountainous region. The little village of Senova, after which the ensuing battle has been called, is situated in the middle of a wood about three miles in circumference, and the occupation of this wood by the Turks cut the road to Kezanlik. The situation of both armies was far from enviable. It was the depth of winter, and the winter of 1877–8 was in those parts more than usually cold. The snow on the mountains was in some places six feet deep: in Gourko's army, several men were frozen to death every day. So numerous were the deaths, from this cause and others, in the Twenty-fourth Division of Infantry, that the numbers had dwindled from 11,000 to 3,000 effectives. The roads were obliterated by the snow, and could only be discovered by the help of the Bulgarians, who knew the ground. It was necessary to cut out the paths by manual labour before the troops could march over them, and these operations were of course conducted in the face of the enemy himself. To attack the Turkish positions in front, appeared to the Russians too hazardous an undertaking. They therefore determined to divide their army into three portions, and to surprise the camp at Senova by taking it, if possible, in the rear. General Radetzky proposed that his forces should advance simultaneously in three columns through three parallel ravines—the western one terminating at the village of Imitli, the central at Shipka, and the eastern at Guzova. General Skobeleff was to have the command on the right—viz., the Imitli Pass; Prince Mirsky on the left; and Radetzky himself in the centre, formed by the Shipka Pass.

The army of General Skobeleff consisted of twenty-five battalions of infantry, and twenty squadrons of cavalry, counting in all nearly 20,000 men. Of artillery he had only one mountain-battery of eight three-pounders, for it was found impossible to move any other guns over so rugged a country, with roads involved in snow. The centre column, under Radetzky, consisted of the Fourteenth Division of Infantry, a regiment of the Ninth Division, and two battalions of Bulgarian Militia. Prince Mirsky took with him twenty-five battalions of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry; and he also had only eight mountain-guns. On the 5th of January, 1878, an order of the day was issued by Skobeleff, in which he told his soldiers that they had a hard task to accomplish, and one which would be worthy of the Russian renown. They were to begin the passage of the Balkans. "Without artillery, without roads," he continued, making no attempt to lighten the difficulties of the enterprise, "we shall have to push our way through the snow, and to do this in the presence of the enemy. When over the Balkans, a large and powerful Turkish army, commanded by the best generals of the enemy, will await you. This army ventures to stop your advance. Remember, soldiers, that at this moment the honour of the Fatherland is in your keeping; that at this moment the Liberator and all Russia are beseeching God for you. Russia expects you to be victorious. Do not be frightened, either at the number or the well-known bravery of the Turks, or at their hatred of you; because the cause you defend is a holy one, and God will be with you." The latter part of the order was addressed to the Bulgarians, who were exhorted to behave as bravely in the ensuing battles as they had done in the unhappy days of July. "You are fighting," said Skobeleff, "for the liberation of your country and your religion, for the inviolability of your families, for the honour of your mothers, wives, and sisters; in a word, for all that on this earth is holy and worth living for. God asks you to be heroes."

Skobeleff did not commence his movement until the day following the issue of this address; but Prince Mirsky started on the 5th, having to traverse a rather longer road than his comrade on the right. The plan was that these two commanders should cross the Imitli and Guzova Passes unobserved, and, having arrived on the plain south of the Balkans, should effect a junction, and make a combined attack upon the enemy. The march was extremely arduous. The troops forming Skobeleff's column left Toplich, at the northern end of the Imitli Pass, on the morning of the 6th of

January, and continued their forward movement throughout that day and the next. It was not until the early morning of January 8th that they reached Imitli; but by that time Prince Mirsky had brought all his forces into the plain at Guzova. It was now apparent, however, that the original scheme of taking the Turks by surprise could not be carried out, for the soldiers of the Crescent had observed the line of Skobeleff's advance, and had already opened fire. Skobeleff, therefore, stormed the village of Imitli, and carried it with the loss of two hundred men. Some of his battalions were still behind in the pass, and, having entrenched himself in the village, he awaited their arrival. The division had been compelled to march in Indian file through a trench in the snow, dug all the way across the mountain; so that when the head of the column reached the plain about Imitli, the last men had not yet started from Toplich. All were terribly fatigued, and stood imperatively in need of repose before anything further could be done. Accordingly, Skobeleff was very glad of the shelter of the village as soon as he had wrested it from the Turks. In the meanwhile, Prince Mirsky had started from Guzova for Shipka, with the intention of forming a junction with the centre column under Radetzky; but in so doing he laid himself open to an attack from the Turkish army on his left. The action began a little after sunrise, and continued until eleven at night. The Ottomans fought with great steadiness and determination, and at the end of the day Mirsky had lost nearly 4,000 men, besides having been forced into a position where he stood in great danger of being cut off from his communications with the Guzova Pass. The situation was extremely critical; so much so, indeed, that in the course of the afternoon Mirsky sent a messenger to General Radetzky, the Commander-in-Chief, informing him of his perilous position, and saying that he had heard nothing of Skobeleff. Radetzky saw that he must attack the enemy in front with all his force, if Mirsky's division was to be rescued from the hands of the Turks. The enterprise was one of a very doubtful character; but it was hardly possible to refrain from it, as Mirsky was plainly in desperate extremities. Starting, therefore, at seven o'clock on the morning of January 9th, Radetzky hurled himself against the strong positions in his front, and was repulsed with heavy loss.

The disaster would have been complete, but for the energy and military genius of Skobeleff. That quick-witted officer saw, from the heights about Imitli, on the morning of the 8th of January, that a battle was raging in the direction where Prince Mirsky and his column would probably be operating. He thought it not unlikely that the Prince was overmatched; but he could not at once go to his assistance. His soldiers were too much fatigued, and he had not yet concentrated the whole of his army. Men came straggling in throughout the day and during the next night; but they were all exhausted by their long and wearisome march. By the following morning, however, the column was reunited, and Skobeleff, who had been unmolested in the hours of darkness, determined to go at once to the help of Mirsky. Enough was known in Skobeleff's camp to make it evident that the situation was grave. Mirsky had been again attacked at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, and it was seen from Imitli that the Turks were pressing him hard, and were in a fair way to overwhelm his slender ranks. The general impression was that Suleiman Pasha had come up with reinforcements, and it was feared that the second passage of the Balkans would terminate even more disastrously than the first. All now depended on Skobeleff, and it was his promptitude and valour which changed the fortunes of the day. He determined not to march on Shipka, as he had been directed to do, but to place himself to the south of Senova. An hour after daybreak, his troops were on the road. A small body of cavalry was pushed forward in an easterly direction, so as to cut off all retreat by way of Kezanlik, and the infantry moved steadily on towards the entrenched camp of Vesoul Pasha, which was situated between the wood of Senova and the village of Shipka. The Ottoman commander had forty Krupp guns at his disposal, while Skobeleff was unable to use even the small mountain-cannon he had brought with him. The attack was therefore opened with rifles, and Skobeleff formed his battalions one behind another, so as to concentrate the whole force of his army on one point. It was ten o'clock in the morning when the action began. Under the clear, cold light of the January heavens, the Russians advanced over the snow with bands playing and colours flying. The Turks met them with a cannonade of nearly four hours' duration, to which the Muscovite infantry replied with their rifles. The order to charge was given at twelve o'clock in the middle of the day, and so well was it executed that before two o'clock all the artillery on the west and south of the Turkish camp had been captured. Trusting entirely to the bayonet, the Russians flung themselves on their opponents in the wood of Senova, and what the *Daily News* writer describes as one of the longest bayonet attacks on record was savagely fought out. At

length, however, the Turks broke, and made a rush for the Kezanlik road, only to be turned back by Skobeleff's cavalry. The greater number were driven towards the north-east, where they were met by Mirsky's men, who had advanced against

The success of the Russians was immense. Before sunset, 26,000 men and 280 officers were prisoners of war. The forty Krupp guns owned by Vesoul Pasha passed into the hands of Skobeleff, and seven flags were likewise taken. But the con-

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the Turks as soon as they felt their own position safe. Just before the action had reached this stage, Said Bey came as a *parlementaire* from Vesoul Pasha, with proposals for the surrender of the army. Skobeleff consented, on the understanding that the act should be unconditional. Shortly afterwards, Vesoul himself came up, and surrendered the whole army without stipulating for any terms.

querors paid dearly for their victory, and had to deplore the loss of two thousand men. This, however, was small in comparison with the casualties on the Turkish side, where the killed and wounded were estimated at eight thousand. Still, the Turks were in a position to offer some further resistance. There were ten thousand men in front, and on the flank of Port St. Nicholas; and by holding out

they might give a great deal of trouble. The commander at that post was Mahmud Shamsi Bey—a man who had given proof that his fighting qualities were not mean. It was impracticable to advance to Adrianople with this force in the rear; and yet, if Adrianople was to be taken at all, it must be done very speedily, before the Turks could mass large bodies of troops there. Skobeleff accordingly insisted that Vesoul Pasha should send an order to Mahmud, demanding an immediate surrender. This was done; the position, the guns, and the men, were at once given up; Radetzky was free to push through the Shipka Pass; and on the 10th of January Prince Mirsky took Kezanlik. The last hope of the Turks was gone, and negotiations for an armistice followed in a few days.

The battle of Senova is designated by the *Daily News* correspondent as "the Sedan" of the Russo-Turkish war; only there is this difference—that it was nearly the last act of the struggle, whereas Sedan, though it made the ultimate success of the French well-nigh hopeless, occurred in the early days of the campaign. Both battles, however, ended in capitulations of great magnitude, and in the "demoralisation"—to adopt a Gallicism—of the defeated troops and officers. "So long," says the writer whom we have been following, "as the Turks were behind earthworks, so long even as they were undefeated in the field, no soldiers could fight better. When Plevna fell, however, their spirit had to a great extent gone. The Turkish officers in particular were utterly demoralised. The surrender of the troops around Fort St. Nicholas after the defeat of Senova, like the neglect to make a stand at Adrianople, like the surrender of the enormously strong positions at the Bujuk Tchekmedje lines before Constantinople, was but one of the many acts showing the utter demoralisation to which the Turks had been brought. Next to the fall of Plevna, the battle of Senova did more than any other event to strike this demoralisation into the heart of the Turkish leaders and Government. When the tidings of the great loss reached the capital, all idea of maintaining the war was at an end, and the Turkish Government, panic-stricken, was ready to agree to any terms which the conquerors might dictate." Yet in many respects the Turk is a born soldier; and the Osmanlis, if better commanded, might still be among the conquering races of the world.

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## XI.

## RUSSIAN AND BULGARIAN CRUELTIES IN EUROPEAN TURKEY.

THE British Government published, on the 15th of February, 1879, a further collection of official papers on the affairs of Turkey, containing, amongst other things, some important particulars concerning the ill-treatment of Mohammedans by Russian troops and Bulgarian peasantry. In the Rhodope Mountains, in Eastern Roumelia, and in Bulgaria, atrocities were of frequent occurrence, and the English consuls repeatedly had occasion to report to their Government on these shocking and disgraceful facts. On the 17th of September, 1878, Sir A. H. Layard sent to the Foreign Office some extracts from a report by Mr. Buckle, staff-surgeon of the fleet in the Sea of Marmora, having reference to this subject. Every village between Adrianople and Philippopolis, according to Mr. Buckle, was more or less destroyed, and all the solitary farms had been ruined. In Philippopolis itself, it was difficult to recognize the course of the streets through the masses of cast-down bricks and stones. The Turkish quarter had scarcely a house standing, and thousands of poor Mussulmans were living in misery among the ruins of their former dwellings. The Bulgarians were encouraged by the Russians in their malpractices: their conduct was "insolent in the extreme," and they did the utmost to spread terror among the Turks, so as to deter them from re-occupying their lands. The Turkish women, Mr. Buckle averred, were "taken for the vilest purposes, and the men made to work for nothing, thrashed, or shot." No appeals were listened to, and the atrocities committed on the Mohammedans were described as worse than those which had startled Europe two years before—perhaps a somewhat exaggerated expression, but one which may not have been very far from the truth.

Acting-Consul Calvert, on paying his first official visit to the Russian Governor of Adrianople, towards the middle of September, 1878, drew the attention of General Lipinsky to certain outrages committed upon Mussulmans at Sary-Danishmend. When the Governor returned this visit, some days later, he acknowledged that investigations made on the spot had established the fact that outrages had been committed. "I then inquired," wrote

Mr. Calvert to Sir A. H. Layard on September 16th, "whether steps had been taken for the arrest of the guilty parties, several of whom had been identified by the victims. The tenor of his Excellency's rejoinder could only confirm—if confirmation were necessary—the impression, or rather conviction, which has been forced on me: namely, that the passive attitude of the Russian authorities towards offences committed by Bulgarians against the Mussulman population is not attributable to negligence or inefficiency, but adopted systematically and of set purpose, in obedience, no doubt, to superior orders. . . . The Christians take the law into their own hands, and visit the Turkish community at large with present and indiscriminate bloodshed, rapine, and pillage. The result is now before the world; and I hope that I, who assuredly have at no time been backward in denouncing Turkish provincial misrule, may be believed when I state that the evil state of things now prevailing is of an incomparably more widespread, harsh, and barbarous type than that to which it is manifestly intended as a set-off. I speak, of course, of the normal Turkish *régime*, to which alone a comparison can fairly apply. Where instances of robbery and assassination of individual Christians occurred under Turkish rule, whole Mussulman villages are now liable to that treatment; and whereas the Turkish authorities had at least the grace to profess a desire to afford redress, Russian rule in Turkey does not make even that concession to public opinion. Instances of outrages by Turks on Christian females were in ordinary times of far less frequent occurrence than appears to be commonly believed at home. When a single case of the sort happened, it would set a whole province in commotion. Since the Russian occupation, it is hardly too much to say that the Bulgarians in the rural districts outrage at their will Turkish women and girls by the score. The material well-being of the Bulgarian peasant under Turkish rule has become an admitted fact, and the national as well as individual spirit of hospitality of the Turk is proverbial. Now that the Bulgarians have the upper hand, their chief aim and end (and in this, I regret to say, they are joined by no small part of the Greek rural population) is utterly to ruin the Turk, and to eject him from his home in Europe. By depriving the Mussulman peasantry of their only means of independent subsistence—namely, their live stock—and by stripping them of all their money and personal property, it is evidently intended to force them to dispose of, or to abandon, their useless fields, and to reduce those Turks who may remain in the country to the condition of field-labourers—a state of life hitherto unknown to all but a small fraction of the population. Again, as regards insults in matters connected with religion, I can aver, from the experience of many years, that instances of the sort were of rare occurrence under the Turkish *régime*—at any rate, in ordinary times. The ministers of religion were treated with invariable respect. Even such a trivial mark of contempt as the firing of a shot into an empty church would be taken up by the whole community of a province, and made a State affair of. Under the present Christian rule, not one 'mesjid' (or mosque of the class answering to a Christian chapel) out of ten has escaped destruction, even in this town of Adrianople. If the demeanour of the Turk towards the native Christian personally was on occasion haughty, or otherwise objectionable (it was not habitually so), it never took the unmanly and derisive forms which the Bulgarians have adopted towards the lately dominant race, as, for instance, at Kirk-Kilissa, where they have taken to compelling the Mussulmans to carry them about the streets on their backs."

It is a noteworthy fact that the evil practices of the Bulgarians have been revealed to the world not merely by English officials and writers, who (however unjustly) might be regarded as prejudiced, but by the Special Correspondent of a Russian paper—the *Golos*. This journalist, while on his way to attend the coronation of the Prince of Bulgaria, had a conversation with the Metropolitan of Rustchuk at an inn between Varna and Tirnova. The interview took place near the end of July, 1879, and described the state of things then existing. Some account of the conversation was reproduced by the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Daily News*, from which it appeared that the Bulgarian Church dignitary was very frank in his statements. Referring to the Turks having joined in cheering the Prince on his arrival at Varna, the Metropolitan said they shouted because they were afraid that if they did not do so they would be beaten afterwards. "By whom?" asked the correspondent. "The people—the Bulgarians," was the reply. The correspondent said he had heard from many that the Bulgarians treated the Turks badly. The Metropolitan replied, "The Turks were our masters for a long time; now it is our turn to have the upper hand. We must pay off old scores." He further remarked, "The law of Moses says, 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' The Turks tyrannised over us. Now that Russia, our benefactor, has emancipated us, we will tyrannise over them." The correspondent reminded him that he was an orthodox Christian prelate, not a Jewish rabbi. He answered, "Christianity is based on the law of Moses." The

correspondent answered that Russia had fought for them as Christians. The Metropolitan replied, "We live under such exceptional circumstances that we must—" The correspondent, interrupting, said he should publish the conversation, in order that the Russian public might decide between them. The Metropolitan rejoined, "The priests and monks will take my side." The correspondent said, "I doubt it. The Czar, Emancipator, will certainly not be with you." The Metropolitan then begged him not to publish the conversation, and said he should be annoyed if it appeared. He was only joking. The correspondent replied, "Russia must know what a dangerous game you are playing. She must take care of her own people, *and not enter into another war originated by your conduct.*" What the Metropolitan had said was heard by nearly thirty persons, including some soldiers, all of whom would be very likely to act on his suggestions. The Vienna correspondent of the *Golos*—described by the *Daily News* writer as an able and evidently impartial man—was commissioned by his journal to visit and report upon the state of the East after the war; and his testimony was to the same general effect as that of Mr. Calvert, quoted above. The conduct of the Bulgarian population, he said, was extremely brutal; the Bulgarian authorities abused their powers beyond measure; and the Turks and Greeks were flying to the hills, where they formed bands, whose numbers increased with every day.*

The evidence with respect to Russian and Bulgarian cruelty was indeed overwhelming, and could be met only by a simple denial of the trustworthiness of any one who ventured to say a word against Bulgarians or Russians. Yet the facts, shocking as they were, made very little impression in England, and provoked nothing in the slightest degree approaching the fierce outburst of indignation with which the Bulgarian massacres of 1876 were received. It was not that people generally disbelieved the allegations incriminating the Czar's agents and allies: only a few fanatics systematically denied or doubted everything which told against their friends. But the question was not taken up on party grounds, nor had enthusiasts of another order anything to say on a matter which simply concerned humanity. The later wrongdoers were therefore left very much to themselves, and the expenditure of indignation was exceedingly economical. As the hideous drama began with atrocities committed by Russo-Bulgarians against Turks, so it ended; and the compensation for all this wretchedness has yet to be found.

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## XII.

## REFORMS IN ASIATIC TURKEY.

REFERENCE has already been made (Vol. II., pp. 350-498) to the despatch of the Porte to Sir A. H. Layard, dated October 24th, 1878, in which promises were made of certain reforms to be effected in the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. Some extracts from the document in question may not be uninteresting.

As regarded the organization of the *gendarmerie*, the Sublime Porte admitted—as it had done when the Conference met at Constantinople—the necessity of forming a strongly-organized corps of military police, which should guarantee order and security in the provinces. In conformity with the views of her Britannic Majesty's Government, which were also its own, the Turkish Government would place on the council of the central administration of the *gendarmerie* some foreign officers, such as should afford all possible guarantees for honesty, capacity, and integrity. The Sublime Porte would also take into its service foreign officers, similarly qualified, in the capacity of instructors; and these would be retained in the service until such time as the institution was completely elaborated and settled. The law then being drawn up on the subject would be adapted to the customs of the country and the manners of its inhabitants, and would also be in conformity with the sovereign rights of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

"In regard to judicial reform," said the despatch, "the Sublime Porte is preparing a plan for the reorganization of the tribunals, which, in accordance with the views expressed by the Cabinet of St. James's, embraces several gradations of jurisdiction, and establishes the principle of irremovability in their judicial office for all magistrates who have not failed in their duties; so that judicial appointments will be raised and surrounded with every condition requisite for their independence and impartiality. Here, again, the assistance of the experience and knowledge of European legists may

* *Daily News*, Aug. 2nd. 1879.

be largely made use of. But it would seem contrary to all the principles of a regular administration of justice to give a seat in the tribunals to foreigners who would be invested with power greater than that of their colleagues, so that no judgment could be given without their consent. It is equally difficult to conceive the admission into the tribunals of foreign members ignorant of the languages, the laws, and the customs, of the country. These serious disadvantages do not arise so long as the assistance of foreign legists is simply utilised for the superintendence of the tribunals; and, consequently, the Sublime Porte consents that foreigners possessing all the necessary special qualifications should be appointed as judicial inspectors, whom the Imperial Government propose to send into each vilayet for the purpose of controlling the administration of justice."

Coming to the consideration of fiscal reform, the despatch stated that the abolition of the tithe-system was under the consideration of the Turkish Government. But, in the first instance, the Sublime Porte proposed, as a sort of experiment, to apply the new system of taxation, and a new method of collection, to one or two provinces, afterwards extending both to other portions of the Empire, when experience had given proof of their advantages. "During this period of transition and of trial," continued the despatch, "the Imperial Government will take into its service a certain number of foreigners conversant with financial science, to take part in this important reform. . . . . The Sublime Porte agrees entirely in the views of the Government of her Britannic Majesty on the subject of the irremovability of the Valis, of the magistrates, and of the receivers of finance, named by his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and it is resolved to secure to them the privilege of maintenance in their respective offices during such time as they shall exercise their functions with honour, and with the capacity required for the proper transaction of public business. All the functionaries of these three classes who shall combine the several conditions indicated above will be confirmed in their offices for five years at least, and will not be subject to dismissal, except in the three following eventualities:—1. If they have committed a crime or misdemeanour involving dismissal. 2. If they have tendered their resignation. 3. If their dismissal is recognized as indispensable by the Imperial Government for some great public interest."

A year after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin, it was very generally admitted that reform had made little or no progress in Asiatic Turkey. However regrettable, the fact was in no way surprising. The extreme poverty and anarchy into which the provinces had been thrown by the war, the exasperated passions of different races and of various religious bodies, and the utter prostration of trade and commerce, rendered it highly difficult for any Government to reorganize society on principles imposed somewhat arbitrarily by foreign Powers. The Turkish Government was doubtless not very enthusiastic in the matter; but even supposing it to have had the most earnest desire to introduce reforms into Asia Minor and Armenia, the obstacles were enormous. Russia's continual encroachments upon Turkey, beginning with the Treaty of Kainardji, not merely reduced the Ottoman Empire to the verge of ruin, but added incalculably to the misery of the people, both Christian and Mohammedan. We ourselves cannot help thinking that an Empire situated, like Turkey, on the very edge of Western civilization, would have received by contact no trifling measure of the modern spirit, but for the mischievous system of perpetual interference and unjust harassing, which, by an unhappy but natural perversion, enlisted the very patriotism of the Turks on the side of their abuses. The Mohammedans suffered, the Christians suffered, the world in general suffered; but Russia gained, both in territory and in influence. And the other Powers were content to stand aside, either in supposed self-interest, or in actual fear.

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## XIII.

## GENERAL ROBERTS IN THE KHOST VALLEY.

EARLY in the Parliamentary session of 1879, Mr. Anderson, one of the members for Glasgow, asked the Under-Secretary of State for India if he could give any explanation with regard to certain newspaper reports, to the effect that Major-General Roberts, commanding the Kurum field force in the Afghan war, had ordered or sanctioned the plundering and burning of several villages, had refused quarter to the enemy when in flight, and had slaughtered prisoners endeavouring to make

their escape. The Government requested information on these subjects through Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, who, after hearing what the General himself had to say on the subject, gave it as his own opinion and that of his Council that the allegations had been satisfactorily answered. General Roberts, however, admitted that he had actually done some of the things charged; but he contended that he was justified by the military necessities of his position. Eleven villages had been sacked and fired by his orders, because they were the resort of tribes which were concerned in organizing night-attacks on the camp. In his reply to the Indian Government, which was issued by the Home Government towards the close of June, 1879, General Roberts states that he had given warning of his intention to exact summary and severe retribution from all who had afforded any support to the Mangals, or to other persons having hostile intentions towards us. The warning was disregarded, and unarmed camp-followers were cruelly murdered in villages within half a mile of the English army. Baggage-animals at graze were carried off, and the troops were fired on from villages which had been threatened with punishment if they behaved treacherously towards the invaders. These villages were accordingly given to the flames, after being first stripped of anything that might be useful to the army. In the judgment of General Roberts, this course was necessary for the safety of his soldiers, who were few in comparison with the hill-men swarming all round. He acknowledged that on a certain occasion he sent some cavalry, amounting to about forty sabres, to charge the enemy, who were flying from a village which was being attacked in front by infantry, and told them not to stay to make prisoners; by which he meant the cavalry to kill as many as they could. The actual number killed was between thirty and forty; but, by a mistake in the telegram, the number appeared in some places as between three and four hundred.

Nine Afghan prisoners in camp were killed while endeavouring to make their escape. Some of these men had seized the rifles of the sentries who had been placed over them. The native officer in command of the guard called out to them in their own language to keep quiet, or they would be fired into. Nevertheless, they still struggled to get free, and the order to fire was given. Besides the nine who were killed, thirteen were wounded, and the others then became quiet. It is evident that General Roberts is a stern disciplinarian; but whether to a greater extent than necessity justifies, may perhaps be an open question.

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## XIV.

## THE EASTERN POLICY OF LORD BEACONSFIELD'S GOVERNMENT.

THE whole policy of the Government with reference to the affairs of Turkey was made the subject of a trenchant attack by the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords on the 16th of May, 1879, when he moved for copies of the latest reports from her Majesty's Consuls and Ambassador at the Porte on the prospects of administrative reform in the European and Asiatic provinces of Turkey. Looking back on four years of negotiation and war, the Duke affirmed that the Government had entirely failed in the objects they had in view. Those objects were to retain as far as possible something substantial of the Turkish Empire, and to resist as far as possible any substantial gain to Russia. The Treaty of Berlin, according to the Duke of Argyll, was nothing but the Treaty of San Stefano, with a few comparatively unimportant modifications. Under the Treaty of Berlin, Russia had recovered the Bessarabian provinces on the Danube; she had recovered Kars, which was the key of Turkish Armenia; she had gained for the first time a large slice of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey; and, above all, she had obtained the harbour of Batoum, which had been the object of Russian ambition for a very long period. The Duke then cleverly turned against the Marquis of Salisbury the passage in his celebrated despatch of April 1st, 1878, in which he remarked that "the compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the shores of the Black Sea (which are principally inhabited by Mussulmans and Greeks), and the acquisition of the important harbour of Batoum, would make the will of the Russian Government dominant over all the vicinity of the Black Sea;" that the acquisition of the strongholds of Armenia would bring the population of that province under the immediate influence of Russia; and that the extensive European trade passing from Trebizond to Persia would be liable to prohibitory duties at the pleasure of the St. Petersburg Cabinet. Of all

these consequences, the Duke of Argyll asked, which had the Government averted? Every one of them, he maintained, stood exactly as Lord Salisbury had described it, except that the Russian frontier had been moved back from Bayazid, and that the caravan route from Trebizond to Persia was for the moment free. With regard to Batoum, the Duke contended that the promise or assurance of the Russian Government, that they would make that city a free port, would not prevent Russia, if she so pleased, from converting it into a fortified port, the headquarters of a Russian fleet, which would command the southern coast of the Black Sea. "This modification of the Treaty of San Stefano," said the speaker, "is a mere blind. By the Treaty of Berlin, of which you are so proud, Russia has acquired a port which you will soon hear is being fortified by General Todleben; and when the next year arises on the East, it will be a powerful station for the Russian fleet."

The Duke of Argyll maintained that under the management of the Government the losses of Turkey had been the gains of Russia. In the first place, Turkey had lost for ever her Danubian frontier, which was her first line of defence; in the second place, she had lost her powerful Quadrilateral of fortresses situated north of the Balkans. The clause about fortresses in the Treaty of Berlin was copied directly from the Treaty of San Stefano; it was a clause inserted in the interest of Russia, and the Czar would, of course, take every care that it should be fulfilled. The new Principality of Bulgaria, together with the enlarged Principality of Servia, would give a door of entrance into the very heart of Turkey. To talk of Eastern Roumelia as having been "restored to Turkey," seemed to the Duke of Argyll an absurdity. The Governor must not be a Turk; he must be a Christian. The Sultan, moreover, was not free to choose him, for his choice lay under the veto of the Powers. The whole internal government of the province was taken from the Sultan, and the people were entitled to complete autonomy in all their internal affairs. Turkey was to have no troops beyond the frontier, and the militia was to consist of natives. "Practically," observed the Duke, "I say that Eastern Roumelia is withdrawn from Turkey, and, under your management, its influence has been added to that of Russia." Nor had the rest of European Turkey been restored to the Sultan. Article XV. of the Treaty of San Stefano had stipulated that the Ottoman Empire should no longer be independent, even in its most purely internal affairs. It was to be responsible to Russia for the constitutions which were to be given to the several provinces. The English Ministers, said their critic, had adopted that provision into the Treaty of Berlin. The Government might say, "It is true we have copied the Treaty of San Stefano, because we could not help ourselves; but we have placed Turkey under the control of Europe, instead of Russia." The Duke denied that this was true. By the Treaty of Berlin, Europe was brought on the scene to coerce Turkey under the right already obtained by Russia. The Treaty of Paris required the consent of all the Powers before any one went to war with Turkey; but the Berlin Treaty gave every one the right to claim fulfilment of the promise made to Europe, and to each and all of the Powers. Under these circumstances, the speaker maintained that the Treaty of Berlin was in all essential respects a copy of the Treaty of San Stefano, with a few slight, unimportant, and sometimes mischievous, variations. As regarded Asia, the Duke objected to the guarantee of Turkish territory, because that was a guarantee which it would be impossible to execute; but he thought we might have prevented Russia from acquiring Batoum. We had a powerful fleet, and Turkey also had a fleet, whereas Russia had none. It would have been impossible for Russia to get Batoum, had we resisted; but at the same time he did not think it was worth while going to war about. The Government, however, had exercised their own freedom in the matter, while at the same time impairing and hampering the freedom of future Governments, and putting their country in the disastrous position of being obliged to declare war if Russia acquired any more Turkish territory in the East. Another Article of the Berlin Treaty left Russia in full possession of the enormous subsidy imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of San Stefano, amounting to nearly £50,000,000. The Marquis of Salisbury had recently said that reforms in Turkey depended on finance; but the agreement with reference to the subsidy enabled Russia to checkmate all reform in the Ottoman dominions. Russia had nothing to do but to intimate that she would not insist on more than half the interest for the year and she could do almost anything. "To sum up," said the Duke of Argyll, "I maintain that Turkey has gone. She has lost more than provinces; she has lost that which is essential to dominion—independence. Do not be deceived by phrases: Turkey, as an Empire, is swept away. The future of Turkey is left in complete confusion, with most dangerous liabilities to this country." A further evil result of the Ministerial policy was the identification with Russian interests of almost all the Christian populations of the East. The enthusiasm of the Bulgarians

was exclusively for the Czar and his subjects; the name of England was never mentioned. By the operation of the Treaty of Berlin, who had been elected Prince? The nephew of the Empress of Russia. That would by many be considered a significant fact. "My Lords," concluded the Duke, "I sum up the results of the Ministerial policy in Europe by saying this—that the Government have, in the main, accomplished the purposes for which it was our desire that they should work. It was our desire—at least, it was mine—that Turkey, as an Empire, should be destroyed in Europe. You have done that; and I say, as a man says who looks at some great savage beast that has received its death-blow, but is still capable of mischief, 'Hold back! Don't sacrifice another life by putting him out of his pain. Internal bleeding will do the work effectually. Leave him alone to die.'" The remainder of the Duke of Argyll's speech had reference to the Afghan war, and to the series of events out of which the contest had issued. But his remarks on this head did not raise any fresh points, and need not be considered in the present conjunction.

Lord Beaconsfield's reply to this attack was to the general effect that the Duke of Argyll had suppressed several features of the Treaty of Berlin which told against his argument, and had put entirely out of view the fact that Russia, being the victor at the close of an exhausting war, was in a position to exact great concessions from Turkey, and was certain to exact them as compensation for her own losses. "No doubt," said the Premier, "the Government could have prevented Russia from taking Batoum, as they prevented her from taking Constantinople;" but the point was, whether the country was prepared to go to war to prevent Russia from taking a port which the Duke had derisively described as one that the Emperor had made a free port. The noble Duke had forgotten to say that, by the Treaty of Berlin, Batoum was not only to be "a free port," but "a port essentially commercial"—words which, Lord Beaconsfield submitted, had some meaning, and which the signatories of the Treaty would always remember. The Premier entirely scouted the idea that Batoum would be turned into a fortified place, controlling the commerce of Persia. The same thing, he argued, had been said in 1829 with regard to the harbour of Poti, and England was warned that, in obtaining that harbour by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia had gained a commanding position, from which the Black Sea would be entirely at her mercy. The Ministerial case, however, was weak enough in this respect, for the power of Russia in the Black Sea was certainly very much increased by the Treaty of Adrianople, and it was one of the objects of the Crimean War to reduce that power within safer bounds. Lord Beaconsfield, moreover, found it convenient to forget that at the Berlin Congress Russia would not declare that Batoum should be a port "exclusively commercial," but substituted the much vaguer and more elastic expression "essentially commercial." There is certainly nothing in the Treaty of Berlin, as it stands, which, strictly and literally interpreted, would prevent Russia from fortifying Batoum, although undoubtedly such an act would be an instance of bad faith, as being contrary to the manifest desire of the Powers, and the implied undertaking of Russia herself. The Premier made a much stronger point when he observed that the Duke of Argyll had entirely suppressed the fact that under the Treaty of Berlin the finest port of the Black Sea—the port of Burgas—had been restored to the Sultan. As regarded the destruction of the Quadrilateral, it was to be remembered that Russia had vanquished Turkey, and that her claims must be considered. To suppose that under those circumstances everything was to be left exactly in the same position as before, was an assumption which could hardly be accepted as reasonable. But by the Treaty of San Stefano those forts would have become Bulgarian, and would have enabled the new Principality to menace the Turks, and to weaken their authority; consequently, it had been determined that the fortresses should be destroyed. The acknowledgment of the independence of Servia had made no practical difference in the situation of that State, because it was virtually independent before. With reference to Eastern Roumelia, Lord Beaconsfield reminded the Duke of Argyll that, although the province so called was about to receive the blessings of local government, the political and military authority of the Sultan was not only asserted, but secured. Unfortunately for this argument, it happened about that very time that the Sultan, acting under Russian pressure, renounced his right of systematically keeping garrisons on the frontiers of Eastern Roumelia, and that he was compelled to submit to the insolent conduct of Aleko Pasha, the newly-appointed Governor, in making himself almost entirely independent of the authority of Constantinople. The Duke of Argyll, observed the Premier, had forgotten that all the officers of the militia and *gendarmerie* to be created by the Roumelians must be appointed by the Sultan, and hold their commissions from the Porte. Lord Beaconsfield then traced the

history of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of war, and observed that it was her Majesty's Government who, at the close of the Servian war, came forward with the proposition that autonomy should be established in the provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Both then, and at the period of the Constantinople Conference, the Government had insisted on the principles of self-government, and of civil and religious liberty, in connection with the Christian provinces of European Turkey. No other Power in Europe had been so ready or so practical, at the Constantinople Conference, in its suggestions for the welfare of the subject races, and for a general revision of the Turkish administration. "Yet," said Lord Beaconsfield, "the noble Duke comes here, and makes an elaborate harangue, telling us of the deplorable consequences he foresees, and that we have lost for ever the confidence and affection of the subject races of Turkey, by showing a total want of sympathy with their feelings, and a total disregard of their interests." Pursuing his argument, the Premier pointed out that the Treaty of Berlin, as compared with that of San Stefano, had confined Bulgaria to the north of the Balkans; had restored Thrace, Macedonia, and the littoral of the Ægean, to the Sultan; had restricted the Sclave Principalities of Servia and Montenegro within reasonable bounds; had placed the disturbed districts of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Austria; and had created the province of Eastern Roumelia, with an organic statute which ought to insure the highest prosperity of the people. With all these and other points of difference, how could it be said that the Berlin Treaty was a copy of the San Stefano Treaty? "The noble Duke, in his attack on the Government," said Lord Beaconsfield, towards the close of his address, "has made a warlike speech. He has told Turkey that she was leaning on an ally which could not fight her battles. He has told Russia she has only to pursue a policy of aggression, and it will be accepted by the English Government; and, so far as I understand, the noble Duke does not treat with any disapprobation the policy of Russia in that respect. Now, I wish to speak in another tone, but in a sincere manner, with regard to Russia. I think I can, as an English Minister, appeal with pride to the fact that these great results, as regards the policy we recommended, were perhaps not uninfluenced by the presence of a magnificent British fleet, and by the firm tone in which her Majesty's Ministers communicated with St. Petersburg. Notwithstanding this, I know, and willingly acknowledge, that there has been on the part of Russia a spirit of wise forbearance. I believe she is sincerely anxious to bring about a state of affairs which, not only for her own sake, but for the sake of all, we should assist her in realising."

The Government policy was also expounded on the same occasion by Lord Salisbury, who made a very effective point by showing—what was indeed quite beyond dispute—that the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Gladstone, and others of the same party, had acted with gross inconsistency in supporting the independence of Turkey against Russia at the period of the Crimean War, and then clamouring for the destruction of that independence when again threatened by Russia after the events of 1876. It was evident from their speeches at the earlier period that the object in waging war against Russia was not that Turkey might have another period of twenty years or so in which to reform, but that the aggression of the Czar might be repelled, and that the Ottoman Empire might be preserved, as necessary to the peace and liberty of Europe. The same statesmen had in 1871 reviewed their former work, and had concluded a fresh treaty, deliberately confirming the greater part of that which had been sanctioned in 1856, and omitting all mention of those reforms which five years later were considered so important. Nevertheless, during the autumn agitation of 1876, Mr. Gladstone, the Duke of Argyll, and their friends, had endeavoured to persuade foreign Powers that the policy of the Crimean War was utterly abandoned, and that England would permit the destruction of Turkey. The attempt had failed; but Lord Salisbury believed that the difficulties of the case had been much increased by the course thus adopted.

The criticism of the Duke of Argyll was in some respects unanswerable, though in others its disingenuous suppressions left it an easy prey to refutation. The Government had undoubtedly agreed to a treaty which went very far towards destroying the independence, and even the existence, of European Turkey; but the objection came with the worst grace from the Duke of Argyll, or any of those who had acted with him. By their intolerant attacks on Turkey, by their encouragement of Russia, and by their opposition to the Government through the multitudinous agencies of the press, the platform, and the pulpit, they had very materially helped to bring about a state of things in which the Treaty of Berlin, bad as it was, seemed the best arrangement possible. To say that England should have joined with Russia in coercing Turkey, and have thus obtained a power of influencing the final

event, was at once idle and dishonest. England had no moral right to coerce Turkey, and, had she done so, must either have submitted to the ignominy of helping Russia to effect the major part of her designs, or have come to an open rupture with that Power, after having first of all made enemies of the Turks. The Gladstonian party deliberately upheld and strengthened the Russian cause by every means at its disposal, and then, when Russia had triumphed, turned round on the Government for not snatching from Russian hands the principal fruits of the victory which had been achieved. The war might undoubtedly have been prevented by firmer conduct on the part of the English Government; but they who had added so largely to the difficulties of such conduct should have been the very last to quarrel with the results of what they had themselves been mainly instrumental in effecting. The Duke of Argyll said it was his earnest desire that the European Empire of Turkey should be destroyed; yet he bewailed that the influence of Russia had been increased. In other words, he passionately desired a certain thing, and yet objected to the inevitable consequences. To destroy the power of Turkey in the south-eastern parts of Europe, is of necessity to increase the power of Russia; for, although a few nominally independent Principalities may be created, they will simply be the agents and puppets of St. Petersburg. It matters nothing whether they are willing or unwilling to act in this capacity; they will have no choice. We saw the effect in the case of Greece, of Servia, and of Roumania; we should, it was thought, see it again in the case of Bulgaria and of Eastern Roumelia. Such were the results of faction on the one side, and cowardice on the other; but the successful factions, at any rate, had small right to blame the cowards.

## XV.

## GREECE AND THE POWERS.

UNDER date of May 13th, 1879, the Constantinople correspondent of the *Times* reviewed the progress of negotiations on the Greek question, and the feelings entertained in Turkey with reference to making territorial concessions to the Hellenic Kingdom. Lord Salisbury, it was remarked, had evidently at one time entertained the idea of advocating Greek aspirations as a counterpoise to the inordinate extension of Sclave influence; but he refrained from pursuing that policy on finding that it might produce a Russo-Turkish alliance. He had proposed at the Berlin Congress that Bosnia and the Herzegovina should be occupied by Austria. England, moreover, had secured the occupation of Cyprus; and the British Government consequently feared to insist upon the cession of Thessaly and Epirus, lest Turkey should in this way be completely thrown into the arms of Russia, which was then endeavouring to convince the Sultan that his best policy was to place himself under the protection of the Czar. Still, it was necessary to do something for Greece; and the results of these conflicting influences were the proposal that the Porte should come to an arrangement with the Hellenic Kingdom for a rectification of frontiers, and the promise contained in Article XXIV. of the Treaty of Berlin, to the effect that the six Great Powers would offer their mediation to the two parties to facilitate negotiations, in case any special difficulties should arise. The question, as the *Times* correspondent remarked, was not solved, but simply shelved. After a time, the Porte was privately warned by one of the Ambassadors that it was about to receive a reminder in the form of identical notes from all the Powers simultaneously. Under the stress of this intimation, the Turkish Government appointed delegates for discussing the question of the Greek frontier; but, being really disinclined for action, Turkey entered on a series of delays and pretexts, which were sometimes of a frivolous nature. First, the place of meeting was changed to Prevesa, in the southern part of Albania; then it was said that the Turkish delegates had gone off to parts unknown; subsequently it was proposed that the ship with the Greek delegates on board should not enter the Gulf of Prevesa, but should go to Corfu until the apprehensions and excitement of the Mussulman population were calmed. In process of time, however, owing to the energetic interposition of one of the Powers (France), the Greek and Ottoman delegates came together, and entered on the discussion of the points at issue. Nevertheless, the matter made very little real progress. It was found that the representatives of the Porte had received no definite instructions, and, when instructions at length arrived, they differed largely from the recommendations of the Congress. Instead

of the line suggested by the Berlin Congress, a slight rectification was proposed, and, although more liberal concessions were made after a while, the sum-total of what was offered fell short of what the six Powers had believed to be advisable. The Greek delegates thereupon broke up the Conference, and returned home. Shortly afterwards, the Greek Government claimed the mediation of Europe, and M. Waddington issued a circular, with a view to such mediation being pressed upon the Ottoman Government, though not without affording the Porte a previous opportunity of re-opening at Constantinople the negotiations with Greece.

The correspondent of the *Times* admitted that the Turks were very naturally disinclined to cede a portion of their territory, especially to a nation which aspired to become the master of their capital. Even those who were not fanatics declared that they could not perceive any legal or moral foundation for the Greek claims. They argued that, in refraining from making an attack on Turkey during the war, Greece did nothing more than fulfil her elementary international obligations, any infraction of which the Sultan might have punished severely by means of his fleet. To establish on this forbearance a plea for compensation, was, they contended, to invent a new and extraordinary principle of international law, and one which they could not reasonably be expected to recognise. They furthermore maintained that if England had contracted any engagements for the purpose of securing Greek neutrality, she had acted without authority from the Porte, and that consequently the Porte was not liable. The Turks did not believe in the possibility of permanently satisfying the Greeks, or of inducing them to join heartily with the Sultan's Government in resisting the further extension of Sclave influence. They were bent on obtaining possession of Constantinople, and every concession of territory would whet their appetite for more, besides adding to their powers of aggression. One of the chief obstacles to an agreement lay in the Greek demand for Janina—a city which the Sultan was extremely disinclined to relinquish, as its loss would weaken his hold on the Adriatic, and create an immense amount of disaffection among his Mussulman subjects. Certain persons about the Palace lost no opportunity of suggesting that his Majesty's repute had already greatly suffered in consequence of the Bosnian Mohammedans (who were among the most loyal of the numerous races beneath his sceptre) having been handed over to Austria, in spite of the heroic resistance which they had opposed to the Emperor's troops. These arguments necessarily carried much weight with them; and the Ulemas, with whom the Sultan frequently conversed, were unanimous in representing to him that, according to the Koran and the most approved doctors of the law, the Caliph had no right to make any voluntary cession of territory to unbelievers. Thus it was that the negotiations hung fire, and, as the Turkish Government had reason to believe that France and England were not entirely agreed upon the subject, there was the less inclination to make concessions which, under any circumstances, could not fail to be highly mortifying to the national pride.

The reluctance of England to put anything like serious pressure on the Porte was regarded with a good deal of dissatisfaction in France. The *République Française*—a journal supposed to represent the opinions of M. Gambetta—published, on the 18th of May, an article giving expression to the sentiment of annoyance with which many French politicians regarded the conduct of England with respect to the Eastern Question. It had shortly before been stated by a London paper that a cloud hung over the relations between France and England; and the *République Française* supported this view by affirming that a feeling of distrust was gradually arising on the side of France. The French writer remarked that France, though not one of those who make large promises, had always, during the previous nine years, performed what she promised. She now only asked for reciprocal loyalty, and required that when England had an opportunity for giving some proof of good will, her statesmen should not take refuge in ambiguities. When the disinterested policy of France, which injured no legitimate interest, encountered an obstacle, she was rightly surprised at its arising from those whom she expected to manifest a friendly feeling. The writer of the article disclaimed any thought of national sympathies not based on real interests. He admitted that England might reasonably distrust Russia; but with France she had no rivalry. Glancing at the arrangements made by Lord Beaconsfield's Government with respect to Asia Minor, the French journalist remarked that the susceptibilities of his country had not been spared by those who had no motives for wounding them, and who might even have motives for treating them with respect. Yet France, with a moderation creditable to her political sagacity, accepted what had been accomplished. But, as regarded Greece, she was compelled to ask, whether it would not be better to deal with adversaries than with such friends.

France had supported England at Berlin because English policy was on the side of justice. Why, when France undertook a just cause, should England first approve, and then oppose, the efforts of the Government? England was reminded that she had not so many friends as to be able to sacrifice one of them; and, if the recent action of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet were premeditated, the thing was serious, and the attitude of France might be sensibly affected by it.

This article caused some degree of disquietude, both in France and England; but there was in truth no serious divergence, although there was undoubtedly a certain amount of disagreement, between the two Powers. The main difficulty centred about Janina. France thought that the Greek demand for that town should be conceded; England believed that there was a good deal of justice in the Turkish desire to retain it. Had the Greeks been less extreme in their requirements, the question might have been settled, at least temporarily, without much trouble. But the Hellenic Government, backed by public opinion, demanded an extreme sacrifice on the part of Turkey, and, as the English Cabinet was not persuaded that Turkey was bound to satisfy that demand, the negotiations made little progress, and France, through the organs of her semi-official papers, gave vent to a feeling of petulance, perhaps not unnatural, but certainly undignified.

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## XVI.

## MINISTERIAL CHANGES AT THE PORTE.

ANOTHER Ministerial revolution took place at Constantinople in the summer of 1879. Khaireddin Pasha, who was appointed Grand Vizier in December, 1878, and from whose liberal and enlightened views much was anticipated, resigned near the end of the following July, because he found the Sultan disinclined to carry out those reforms which, in the opinion of Khaireddin, were necessary to the renovation of the Empire. The programme which he put forward, and with respect to which he would accept no compromise, involved the introduction of a constitutional system, such as we understand it in this part of Europe. The Sultan was to refrain in the future from direct interference in the administration; the Cabinet was to be homogeneous, and protected from Palace intrigues; the Grand Vizier himself was to choose its members, and to be responsible for its decisions; and a Chamber of Deputies was to be once more summoned, for consultation on all important affairs. Abdul-Hamid could not brook so large a diminution of his powers as an absolute monarch, and, having in vain tried to induce Khaireddin Pasha to forego his plan, determined to supplant him by a Minister of more courtly views. The office of Grand Vizier was therefore again abolished, and Aarifi Pasha was made Prime Minister. This suppression of the Vizierate was thought to be necessary, in order that the Sovereign might obtain a firmer hold of the reins of government. The Sultan, it is said, believed that Khaireddin aimed at becoming dictator, and feared that he might use his power to place some other member of the Imperial family on the throne. But Khaireddin had opponents also in his own Cabinet, especially in the persons of Osman and Said Pashas. Among the rumours of the day was one which has more the character of an incident in some Arabian tale than that of actual fact, if indeed it is to be so regarded. According to this statement, the Sultan was finally influenced by the Black Astrologer at the Palace, who counselled him on no account to yield to the demands of the Western Powers. Renewed fears with regard to Murad had also much to do with the Sultan's policy; and the hopes of reform were again dashed, out of a feeling of apprehension which may possibly have had no other than an imaginary basis.

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

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